Howard’s nuclear dump backdown
On July 14, 2004, the federal government announced that it had abandoned plans to build a national radioactive waste dump in South Australia. The backdown was a major victory for the environmental and Aboriginal organisations which fought the dump plan for over six years.
The government announced its intention to build the dump near Woomera, 500 kms north of Adelaide, in February 1998 – just a few months after it announced its intention to build a new nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights in southern Sydney. The two plans were closely linked. Up to 90% of the waste to be dumped in SA is stored at Lucas Heights. And the political agenda was simply to get radioactive waste out of Lucas Heights in order to reduce public opposition to the new reactor.
A campaign to oppose the dump took shape. The Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta – a senior Aboriginal women’s council from northern SA – took up the fight, as did the Kokatha traditional owners. The Kungkas – victims of the British nuclear testing program at Maralinga and Emu Field in the 1950s – have been supported by the GANG (Girls Against Nuclear Genocide) who have moved to Coober Pedy to help fight the proposed nuclear dump.
The Kungka Tjuta recounted time and again their experiences of the Maralinga nuclear test program in South Australia in the 1950s. They knew first hand about the problems of the nuclear industry and pleaded with the politicians to ‘get their ears out of their pockets’.
The Maralinga experience also influenced the dump campaign in another way. The federal government completed a ‘clean-up’ of Maralinga in the late 1990s, but it was grossly inadequate. Even after the ‘clean-up’, kilograms of plutonium remain buried in shallow, unlined trenches in totally unsuitable geology. The botched ‘clean-up’ was hardly reassuring.
The federal government planned to build two facilities at Woomera – an underground dump for lower-level waste, and an above-ground store for ‘interim’ storage of higher-level wastes including those arising from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods from the Lucas Heights reactor. As public and media opposition to the dump plans grew, the Olsen Liberal government in SA sniffed the political wind and announced in 1999 that it would accept the underground dump but would legislate in an attempt to ban the higher-level waste store. The Labor Party – state and federal – trumped them by announcing opposition to both the dump and the store.
Several environment groups have fought the dump plan since it was first announced, including Friends of the Earth and the Australian Conservation Foundation. Opposition to the dump grew along the transport corridor linking Lucas Heights to Woomera, in no small part because of Friends of the Earth’s Nuclear Freeways project. On numerous occasions FoE activists took a mock nuclear waste castor along the transport corridor, building relations with communities all the time. This project was highly successful. Of the 18 councils along the transport corridor, 16 took a position of opposing the dump and the trucking of radioactive waste through their communities. FoE also organised numerous ‘radioactive exposure’ tours, taking hundreds of students to nuclear sites in SA – the proposed dump site and the uranium mines at Honeymoon, Beverley and Roxby Downs.
The Nuclear Freeways project was also significant in linking the dump proposal to the root of the problem – the planned new reactor at Lucas Heights. While the federal government mounted scare campaigns about waste stored in urban areas, it became increasingly well known that the dump plan had nothing to do with the small volumes of waste stored around the country and the everything to do with Lucas Heights. The NSW government was persuaded to hold a parliamentary inquiry into radioactive waste management in 2003-04, and that inquiry concluded that the dump proposal could not be justified and should be abandoned.
The Labor Party won the 2002 election in SA, and in the following year it legislated in an attempt to ban any form of national radioactive waste facility being built in SA.
The SA Labor government also tried a legal manoeuvre to stop the dump in 2003 – announcing its intention to declare the dump site a public park, which would make it immune from compulsory acquisition by the federal government. That led the federal government to use an urgency provision in the land acquisition act to seize control of the dump site with the stroke of a pen in mid-2003. The SA Labor government challenged the land seizure in the federal court, but lost. The SA government appealed the judgement to the full bench of the Federal Court, and that appeal was upheld in June 2004 – reversing the land seizure.
By July 2004, the Howard government was in trouble. It had the option of appealing the Federal Court decision to the High Court, but that appeal would have been deeply unpopular and it probably would not have succeeded in any case. And already, the dump was shaping up as a key issue in marginal seats in SA. For example, in the marginal seat of Adelaide, polling showed that the dump was second only to Medicare as a vote-swinging issue.
The Howard government decided to cut its losses and abandon the dump plan. The government said it would instead attempt to find a site to co-locate both lower and higher level wastes.
The victory of the dump campaign is something to savour – a fantastic result reflecting an enormous amount of hard work by a broad, effective alliance.
The Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta’s ‘Irati Wanti’ website is archived at
http://web.archive.org/web/20080718193150/www.iratiwanti.org/home.php3
and the Kungka’s victory message is posted below and at
http://web.archive.org/web/20050614071014/http://www.iratiwanti.org/iratiwanti.php3?page=news&id=244
================================================
‘We are winners because of what’s in our hearts, not what’s on paper.’
Open Letter from the Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta – senior Aboriginal women’s council from northern SA – after the Federal Government abandoned its plan to build a national radioactive waste dump in South Australia.
http://web.archive.org/web/20050614071014/http://www.iratiwanti.org/iratiwanti.php3?page=news&id=244
August 2004
People said that you can’t win against the Government. Just a few women. We just kept talking and telling them to get their ears out of their pockets and listen. We never said we were going to give up. Government has big money to buy their way out but we never gave up. We told Howard you should look after us, not try and kill us. Straight out. We always talk straight out. In the end he didn’t have the power, we did. He only had money, but money doesn’t win.
Happy now – Kungka winners. We are winners because of what’s in our hearts, not what’s on paper. About the country, bush tucker, bush medicine and Inma (traditional songs and dances). Big happiness that we won against the Government. Victorious. And the family and all the grandchildren are so happy because we fought the whole way. And we were going away all the time. Kids growing up, babies have been born since we started. And still we have family coming. All learning about our fight.
We started talking strong against the dump a long time ago, in 1998 with Sister Michelle. We thought we would get the Greenies to help us. Greenies care for the same thing. Fight for the same thing. Against the poison.
Since then we been everywhere talking about the poison. Canberra, Sydney, Lucas Heights, Melbourne, Adelaide, Silverton, Port Augusta, Roxby Downs, Lake Eyre. We did it the hard way. Always camping out in the cold. Travelling all over with no money. Just enough for cool drink along the way. We went through it. Survivors. Even had an accident where we hit a bullock one night on the way to Roxby Downs. We even went to Lucas Heights Reactor. It’s a dangerous place, but we went in boldly to see where they were making the poison – the radiation. Seven women, seven sisters, we went in.
We lost our friends. Never mind we lost our loved ones. We never give up. Been through too much. Too much hard business and still keep going. Sorry business all the time. Fought through every hard thing along the way. People trying to scare us from fighting, it was hard work, but we never stopped. When we were going to Sydney people say “You Kungkas cranky they might bomb you”, but we kept going. People were telling us that the Whitefellas were pushing us, but no everything was coming from the heart, from us.
We showed that Greenies and Anangu can work together. Greenies could come and live here in Coober Pedy and work together to stop the dump. Kungkas showed the Greenies about the country and the culture. Our Greenie girls are the best in Australia. We give them all the love from our hearts. Family you know. Working together – that’s family. Big thank you to them especially. We can’t write. They help us with the letters, the writing, the computers, helped tell the world.
Thank you very much for helping us over the years, for everything. Thank you to the Lord, all our family and friends, the Coober Pedy community, Umoona Aged Care, the South Australian Government and all our friends around Australia and overseas. You helped us and you helped the kids. We are happy. We can have a break now. We want to have a rest and go on with other things now. Sit around the campfire and have a yarn. We don’t have to talk about the dump anymore, and get up and go all the time. Now we can go out together and camp out and pick bush medicine and bush tucker. And take the grandchildren out.
We were crying for the little ones and the ones still coming. With all the help – we won. Thank you all very much.
No Radioactive Waste Dump in our Ngura – In our Country!
Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta
Ivy Makinti Stewart
Eileen Kampakuta Brown
Eileen Unkari Crombie
Emily Munyungka Austin
Angelina Wonga
Tjunmutja Myra Watson
Coober Pedy, South Australia
Michels
Warren PRopaganda
Introduction
June
2004 marks the fifth anniversary of PR company Michel Warren’s involvement in
the federal government’s plan to establish a national nuclear waste dump in
South Australia. A great deal of information is now available about the role of
Michels Warren in this controversy thanks to documents released under Freedom
of Information (FoI) legislation.
Parts
of the FoI material were discussed in a media release from the SA environment
minister John Hill on May 5, 2004 (included below), but a closer reading of the
FoI documents reveals much else of interest – including proof that federal
science minister Peter McGauran has misled the Parliament.
Misleading
statements by the federal government
While
this paper focusses on the role of Michels Warren, it should be noted that the
FoI material reveals evidence of the federal government misleading the Parliament
and the public.
The
FoI material reveals that the dump could be 25 times larger than the government
has ever publicly acknowledged. A February 10, 2000 email from a senior
government official, Rosemary Marcon, says that the “actual disposal area is a
500mx500m” (250,000 square metres) and she repeats that statement in a March
22, 2000 email. Yet public statements from the government refer to a 100mx100m
disposal area – 10,000 square metres (e.g. Environmental Impact Statement,
p.11.) Had the reference to a much larger dump been made once, and/or had it
been made by a junior official, it might be passed over as an error. But the
statement is made twice, and it is made by a senior government official.
In
response to a Question on Notice, federal science minister Peter McGauran
asserted unequivocally that departmental officers had not developed a list of
‘experts’ to make public comments in support of the proposed nuclear waste
dump. (Senate Hansard, October 27, 2003, p.16471, Question No. 2134, full text
copied below.) However, the FoI material makes it clear that such a list was
indeed developed. A July 6, 2000 email from Caroline Perkins, a senior
government official, lists four “technical experts … who have agreed to
assisting us in general”, though their names are blanked out. McGauran’s
unequivocal assertion that departmental officers had not developed a list of
‘experts’ to comment on the dump was clearly false – and he was clearly
misleading the Parliament and the public.
A
2002 government document released under FoI legislation (and previously
leaked), titled “Communication Strategy for the National Radioactive Waste
Repository Project”, states that: “An Adelaide based communications consultant,
Michels Warren, has been subcontracted … to assist with the development,
implementation and refinement of this strategy which has entailed the
following: … enlistment of a scientific liaison officer and other willing
experts”.
A
2003 document written by Michels Warren discusses plans to organise eminent
Australians and members of South Australian medical and science community to
participate in the ‘communications’ program. Michels Warren states: “This would
involve a concerted program of letters to the editor of The Advertiser and
responding and participating on talk radio programs.”
The
government and Michels Warren seem to have struggled to find “willing experts”.
For example, Mike Duggan from Michels Warren said in a July 6, 2000 email that
it would be a “great idea” to gather experts for a media conference, “if
possible at one of the universities or hospitals where waste is held”, in
support of the dump – but no such media conference eventuated.
Those
‘experts’ that have been enlisted have been error-prone. For example, the FoI
material contains a summary of a May 2000 radio interview with Dr Leon Mitchell
of Flinders University, who falsely claimed the dump would be lined with an
impermeable layer to isolate it from the underlying earth (the dump trenches
will be unlined). Mitchells also said the dump was for things such as watch
dials not nuclear power plants and reactors. In fact, dismantled nuclear
reactor components will be sent to the dump (if it proceeds), and that reactor
waste will amount to up to 5,000 cubic metres, which is greater than the entire
existing stockpile of 3,700 cubic metres of waste destined for the dump.
Michels Warren was involved in organising radio interviews with Mitchell, the
FoI material reveals. Other enlisted ‘experts’ have falsely claimed that the
dump is only for low-level waste, and one ‘expert’ even claimed that the waste
would not be buried!
McGauran
misled Parliament on another point. He asserted unequivocally in a response to
a Question on Notice that no ‘experts’ were provided with media training by
consultants to the department. The FoI material reveals that McGauran’s claim
was false. On July 12, 2000, Michels Warren charged the government $240 to
provide a written briefing to one of the enlisted ‘experts’, Dr. Gerald
Laurence, in preparation for media interviews. On July 7, 2000, Michels Warren
briefed another enlisted ‘expert’, Dr. John Patterson, for a radio interview.
Then on July 12-13, 2000, Michels Warren billed the federal government $800 for
media training with the government’s scientific liaison officer on the dump
project, Dr. Keith Lokan.
Why
Michels Warren would be conducting briefings about the dump is anyone’s guess.
The FoI material is replete with factual errors. For example, a draft letter to
a newspaper, states: “Unequivocally, it [the dump] will only ever contain
low-level waste.” Yet the dump will take both low- and intermediate-level
waste, including (according to the EIS, pp.45-46) long-lived intermediate-level
waste. The draft letter also states that “Australia produces no high-level waste
…” Yet the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, operator
of the reactor at Lucas Heights in Sydney, acknowledges that its spent nuclear
fuel meets the heat and radiological criteria for classification as high-level
waste, and the New South Wales Environment Protection Agency has also
acknowledged that the Lucas Heights reactor generates high-level waste.
The
context for the “willing experts” strategy is made clear in the FoI documents.
Market research by the McGregor Tan company revealed: “A knee-jerk negative
reaction to sighting the Commonwealth crest – it is interpreted as the symbol
accompanying government propaganda.” The market research also revealed:
“Cynical responses to government promises and attempts at reassurance.” And McGregor
Tan found that: “Ministers’ statements are rarely believed, regardless of the
individual Minister’s honourable intentions.”
Michels
Warren’s nuclear dump PRopaganda
Michels
Warren has been involved in the following campaigns (among others): a controversy
over cadmium at West Lakes, Bridgestone tyres, bacteria in fast food, SA Water
contamination, ETSA Utilities, the SA Freemasons, Telstra, WMC Ltd., and
campaigns on behalf of the corporate owners of the Beverley and Honeymoon
uranium mines in South Australia.
Michels
Warren has been involved in the nuclear dump campaign since June 1999. Its
involvement has consisted of several discrete contracts rather than an ongoing
involvement. A July 8, 1999 letter from Stephen Middleton from Michels Warren
states that the company is “delighted to be part of the project” and has “hit
the ground running” since it started on the project in the previous month.
Michels Warren has maintained its enthusiasm. A 2003 document – a tender
seeking involvement in the federal government’s covert plan to seize control of
land for the dump site – states that: “We are available 24-hours-a-day,
seven-days-a-week to provide our support to the Minister and this project.”
A
September 27, 2000 email written by Stephen Middleton from Michels Warren talks
about the need to “soften up the community” and “sell” the repository: “We will
lose ground once again unless we can soften up the community on the need for
the repository and the reasons why SA has been identified as the best location.
The prospect of the Minister announcing the preferred site before we can get to
the community with something that explains what it all means makes my head
spin. The wider research into issues such as Lucas Heights, uranium mining, the
nuclear fuel cycle etc etc can be tackled as a separate issue. It should not
hold up anything we are doing in terms of selling the repository to South
Australians. The rest of the country probably doesn’t care less about the
repository, but it is a big issue in SA. Further delays could be potentially
disastrous.”
Why
on earth is a South Australian company willingly involving itself in the
federal government’s nuclear dump plans? After all, Michels Warren itself
acknowledges that the dump is an unwanted imposition on SA. A 2003 Michels
Warren document released under FoI legislation states:
“The
National Repository could never be sold as “good news” to South Australians.
There are few, if any, tangible benefits such as jobs, investment or improved
infrastructure. Its merits to South Australians, at the most, are intangible
and the range and complexity of issues make them difficult to communicate.”
So
why is Michels Warren dumping on its home state? Money, of course. The federal
government has acknowledged making the following payments to Michels Warren (in
response to a Question on Notice from Senator Bob Brown – copied in full
below):
*
$359,000 in financial years 2000-01, 2001-02, 2002-03 (Senate Hansard, October
27, 2003, p.16471 – copied in full below).
*
in 2003, Michels Warren and the federal government signed a $107,000 contract
for work connected to the government’s compulsory seizure of land for the dump.
At least $26,000 of that amount was paid (and quite possibly the entire
$107,000).
*
undisclosed payments to Michels Warren in 1999-2000.
The
1999-2000 payments amount to at least $102,000 up to May 31, 2000, according to
a document included in the FoI material (Progress Payment Certificate, Number
12, August 24, 2000).
So
in total, Michels Warren has been paid at least $487,000 to dump on SA … and
possibly much more.
Michels
Warren staff have been paid at rates up to $192.50 per hour (GST inclusive) for
their work on the nuclear dump campaign.
The
detailed breakdowns of payments to Michels Warren raise further concerns about
whether tax-payers are getting value for money. For example:
*
$160 to draft a letter to editor of Mt Barker Times
*
$894 for Michels Warren employees to attend a public meeting organised by the
Australian Conservation Foundation and for preparatory and debriefing work
surrounding the meeting (a full house at the Adelaide Town Hall, with
approximately 1000 people attending).
*
$225 to draft a letter to a constituent.
*
$240 to schedule talk-back radio interviews.
Michels
Warren is not the only company in receipt of government funding for PR and
research in relation to the nuclear waste dump, e.g.
*
$61,369 paid to Worthington Di Marzio in 2003 for market research. (Senate
Hansard, October 29, 2003, pp.16681-2, Question No. 2139.)
*
$72,000 paid to Hill & Knowlton in 2002-03. (Senate Hansard, October 27,
2003, p.16471, Question No. 2136.) Hill & Knowlton is well known for its
involvement in the imaginative ‘babies in the incubator’ fiasco in Iraq in
1990-91, and for its work with tobacco companies, Enron, etc.
Monitoring
protesters
An
August 16, 2000 “high priority” email reveals that Caroline Perkins, a senior
official in the Department of Industry, Science and Resources – at that time
under the direction of Senator Nick Minchin – was asked to compile information
on protesters. "[T[he minister wants a short biography of our main
opponents in the Ivy campaign by about 11am our time (pre-rally)”, the email
said. The rest of the email is blacked out under FoI provisions. The email refers
to a Michels Warren employee – no doubt Michels Warren helped compile the
biographies.
In
1999 Michels Warren was working hard “obviating the impact of campaigns by
opponents and the ‘I’m With Ivy Campaign’ run by Ch 7.”
The
Michels Warren worksheet for February 2000 includes the following: “Liaise
investigator re green planning. Liaise R Yeeles [from WMC Ltd.] re updated
intelligence.” Was Michels Warren employing a private investigator as that
comment suggests?
And
on March 28, 2000, $150 for activities concerned with a “Protest at South
Australian Parliament”, and $160 four days earlier to “Liaise WMC, Police and
media re weekend protests.”
And
in April 2000: “check re new protest activities”, “liaise SA Police re same”,
“internet search re protests”, and “update intelligence re OHMS Not Boms
protest group”.
In
March 2000, Rosemary Marcon, a government official, asked Michels Warren for
the details of an “activist website
which we should monitor”. She was advised by Michels Warren that the site is
<www.lockon.org>. Evidently that piece of ‘intelligence’ was off-beam –
the website advertises streaming live shows from nude male dancers in Montreal!
The
FoI documentation is frequently contemptuous of opponents of the planned
nuclear waste dump (about 80% of the South Australian population). The option
of displaying the Environmental Impact Statement in the Conservation Centre of
South Australia is treated as a joke. Opponents of the dump are described as
“anti-nuclear anarchists”. Michels Warren co-founder Daryl Warren refers in a
July 14, 2003 email to protests and “demons”. On July 10, 2003, Warren stated
that: “It has become apparent during the week that people seem to have lost the
plot on the repository as it becomes embroiled in a political fight.”
In
response to an invitation to the federal science minister to attend a
conference at Adelaide University in March 2000, Michel’s Warren employee
Stephen Middleton recommends against attending the conference. Middleton wrote:
“The better option is to:
(i)
dismiss the gathering as nothing more than a stunt
(ii)
attempt to discredit it with counter media measures before, during and after.”
Doctoring
photos
The
FoI material suggests that photographs have been doctored to suit the
government’s ends. A February 14, 2000 email from a senior government official
to Michels Warren’s graphic designer refers to a photo “with the sandhills
removed.” The rationale was explained in a December 13, 1999 email by the same
government official: “Dunes are a sensitive area with respect to Aboriginal
Heritage.”
The
February, 2000 email also asked: “Can the horizon be straightened up as well.”
Scare
campaign
A
recurring theme in the exchanges between the federal government and Michels
Warren is the attempt to justify the dump by mounting a scare-campaign in
relation to existing storage facilities. Yet they get their lines muddled up.
One document released under FoI includes that statement that “none” of the
waste “is stored satisfactorily” in existing stores. That is in direct
contradiction to a June 2000 document document under Senator Nick Minchin’s
name (“Radioactive waste: the eight biggest myths”), which states: “The safety
of the storage of radioactive waste is proven by the fact that there are fifty
stores around Australia housing radioactive waste and there has never been an
accident exposing a person to unsafe levels of radiation.”
And
in a May 17, 2000 media release, Minchin said: "South Australians have
nothing to fear from radioactive waste. The fact is that waste is already
stored in downtown Adelaide in complete safety." Anyone claiming otherwise
was merely trying to "whip up anti-radioactive waste hysteria",
Minchin claimed. So by his logic, Michels Warren and the federal government
itself are guilty of trying to whip up hysteria.
WMC was not financially penalised for it’s failure to prevent escape of the contaminated water.
Due to the immense public outrage that such a breach of public
trust could happen, a major parliamentary inquiry was setup to
investigate the cause of the problem, possible solutions, and comment
on ‘the
desirability of the Department of Mines and Energy having prime
responsibility for environmental matters in relation to mining
operations’.
Overall Conclusions
credit for calling attention to the leak was due to Dr Phil Crouch of the SA Health Commission.
WMC and the Dept. of Mines & Energy and the Dept. of
Environment were reluctant to acknowledge that there was a leak.
Acknowledgement eventually occurred in May 1993.
By August 1993 an initial estimate had been made of the magnitude of the leak.
Government departments and WMC discussed the drafting of a press release in November 1993.
In view of the above, the Minister for Mines &
Energy, Mr Blevins, should have known about the seriousness of the
problem at Olympic Dam before the State elections in December 1993. The
fact that a public announcement was not made until February 1994 is a
damning indictment of the Labour and Liberal governments and of the
Dept. of Mines & Energy.
The inquiry into the leak at Olympic Dam clearly shows that even
experienced mining companies like WMC still cannot properly manage
their dangerous wastes.
The leak at Olympic Dam was not an isolated event. According to
WMC’s Annual Environmental Progress Reports (1994-95 and 1996) there
were at least two other cases of leaks at WMC operations in Western
Australia, and negligent mismanagement of their Yeelirrie trial uranium
mine :
Groundwater monitoring at the Baldivis nickel residue storage
facility indicated that ammonium sulphate has leaked into the
groundwater adjacent to Lake Cooloongup.
At the St. Ives gold mine at Kambalda, water from a TSF is seeping into the local aquifer causing a rise in the groundwater.
The Yeelirrie trial mine, abandoned in 1983 when the ALP Three
Mines Policy was introduced, had been left without adequate fencing and
signs for more than 10 years. Drums of uranium were left exposed, used
for road building and the open pit dam, with high levels of radiation
and salts, open to the public for swimming (see the Yeelirrie page for more info).
There was no substantive, quantifiable, accountable response of the SA
Government to the failure of the Tailings Retention System (TRS) at
Olympic Dam.
In the "bad old days" many embarrassing pollutants were
disposed of by tanks and dams that "leaked". The cases of Roxby,
Baldivis and St Ives suggest that we have progressed from leakage to
seepage, but the result is much the same.
More regulatory power may be given to the EPA and the Health
Commission but the recommendations from the leakage inquiry call for too little too late.
Principal Findings and Recommendations of Note
Below are excerpts from the Nineteenth report of the Environment, Resources and Development Committee of the Parliament of South Australia, released April 24, 1996, titled "Roxby Downs Water Leakage".
page 49 :
The Committee finds that the final design of the Olympic Dam
tailings retention system was deficient in that there was only one
storage area and no decant of tailings liquor was provided.
The Committee also finds that the decision remove the coarse
fraction from the tailings exacerbated these design deficiencies and
made management of the system more difficult.
page 49 :
The Committee agrees that the concept of unlined evaporation ponds
was a deficiency in the final design of the Olympic Dam tailings
retention system.
Comment :
This, the first major finding of the committee, sets an unfortunate precedent – it got it’s terminology wrong, and thereby set the stage for confusion, a result which can be attributed to WMC.
The above statement was actually referring to Tailings Storage Facility
(TSF), which is only one element of the Tailings Retention System
(TRS), the other elements include the Mine Water Evaporation Pond
(MWEP) and Wash Water Evaporation Ponds (EP). The confusion can be
traced to the WMC submissions and WMC literature which defines the TSF
as being "Holding areas for tailings, sometimes referred to as a
Tailings Retention System".
What the finding refers to is that by not dividing the TSF into
a number of cells so that the tailings could be rotated from one to
another, and by not having a mechanism for drawing off excess liquid
into a sealed evaporation pond, the tailings could not dry out
sufficiently to provide a seal to the otherwise unsealed TSF.
The above finding amounts to a condemnation not only of WMC and
the SA Department of Mines & Energy, which approved of the changes,
but of the environmental impact assessment process. After going through
the motions of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), receiving
submissions, and modifying it’s proposal, the operators were allowed to
radically modify the design of the TSF, without public consultation,
subject to the approval of the Department of Mines & Energy in
consultation with the Health Commission and the Department of
Environment & Planning.
page 54 :
While being satisfied that the approvals process
was handled conscientiously and competently by the agencies
involved…….the Committee is concerned that potentially valuable
public comment or comment by disinterested experts was not available to
the then joint venturers.
Such comment may conceivably have alerted agencies or the joint
venturers to the deficiencies in design…….and may also have helped
to reduce some of the problems experienced with operation of the
system.
Comment :
Thus the committee acknowledges this deficiency in the approvals process. It then goes on to recommend the following :
page 132 :
Recommendation 13
The Committee
recommends that the Minister for Mines and Energy reviews any statutory
and practical impediments to the free flow of information about the
environmental impact of Olympic Dam operations with a view to ensuring
that all relevant information is freely available to interested members
of the public.
Comment :
Indeed Recommendation 14 (below) states the need for more public scrutiny, but even here it is only for "information exchange" and not measures designed to improve assessment of environmental performance at Olympic Dam.
As long as the Dept. of Mines & Energy (now Mines & Energy South Australia, "MESA") maintains the environmental regulator of the mine it has a clear and unequivocal conflict of interest. It is both the promoter and regulator of mining – two very opposing roles.
This is contrary to the widely accepted practice of keeping industry and regulators at arms length as far as possible.
Not only was the TSF radically modified but the modifications were such
that they were clearly contrary to the design concept which formed the
basis of the original proposal and it should have been apparent to the
most junior mining engineer that the redesigned TSF would leak
profusely. Both the joint venturers and the Dept. of Mines & Energy
were clearly at fault in permitting such a TSF to be built.
The fact that it was not the Dept. of Mines & Energy which
raised the alarm, but Dr Crouch of the Health Commission, and the
absence of any attempt until then, to carry out a mass balance is an
indictment of the Dept. of Mines & Energy.
Despite clear evidence that the Dept. of Mines & Energy is
not the appropriate department to monitor environmental issues the
committee made the following two recommendations :
page 55 :
Recommendation 4
The Committee
recommends that requests for approval for future developments at
Olympic Dam beyond those considered in the course of the recent public
Environmental Review should be made in a similarly public manner.
Recommendation 5
The Committee
recommends that, as with the recent Olympic Dam Environmental Review,
future reviews should be carried out in accordance with guidelines
issued by the Minister for Mines and Energy which should be developed
by the Minister following consultation with relevant agencies.
Comment :
Environmental Reviews and regulations should be set by the Environment
Protection Authority in consultation with community, environmental and
interested groups, not by an agency with a mission to promote mining.
As pointed out above, this is a clear conflict of interest.
The Dept. of Environment and Planning was presumably considered to be
either incompetent or too radical to be trusted with environmental
management. The Committee, however, seems to recognise the potential
conflict of interest with Recommendation 15 :
page 136 :
Recommendation 15
The Committee
recommends that the Minister for Mines and Energy and the Minister of
Environment and Natural Resources consult with the Olympic Dam
operators and relevant government agencies with a view to establishing
a system of periodic, independent, external, environmental audit
arrangements in relation to Olympic Dam operations.
Comment :
The Roxby Indenture Act prevents such a process and until the Act is
revoked entirely there can be no truly independent, external
environmental assessment of the impacts of Olympic Dam.
page 63 :
The Committee finds that there were deficiencies in the monitoring and reporting systems in place at Olympic Dam….
Comment :
This finding is an understatement. The inadequacy of the
monitoring and it’s regulation were pitiful. Despite constant problems
with surface water entering boreholes, as late as November 1992, the
operators had still not secured all bore holes against contamination by
surface waters.
page 73 :
The Committee finds that the Olympic Dam tailings retention system
did not receive the degree of informed supervision of its various
components it required to operate efficiently as designed and that this
inadequate supervision by the operators of the tailings retention
system, particularly the system as extended in 1991, contributed to the
massive leakage from it.
Comment :
This understatement stops short of accusing the operators of negligence.
page 87 :
The Committee finds that, although admitting difficulties of
interpretation, the operators were reluctant to accept that a leakage
from the tailings retention system was occurring, despite mounting
evidence to that effect.
Comment :
One disturbing aspect of this denial was the claim by WMC that a
localized leak was not a breach of the restricted release zone (RRZ)
because the zone extends underground indefinitely! WMC argued that as
no lower boundary had been defined, and the leakage went straight down,
there was no breach of the zone, and in any event the leakage would be
returned to the mine.
WMC also tried to deny the deficiencies in the design and operation of the TSF :
page 87 :
The Committee finds that, confident of the benign impact of any
seepage, the operators were reluctant to admit deficiencies in the
design and difficulties with the operation of the tailings retention
system which were contributing to the leakage from it and that this
reluctance coloured their reporting of operations at Olympic Dam and
delayed measures necessary to understand the leakage and reduce its
impact.
Comment :
This recommendation refers to the fact that the operators relied on
laboratory studies to support their contention that any leakage would
be blocked by the underlying limestone. This ignores defects in the
limestone structure and advice from mining consultants.
page 87 :
The Committee finds that it was only when the leakage was too big to
ignore or to explain away and only in response to hard prompting from
regulatory agencies that ad hoc operational changes were converted into
radical remedial action to alter the original defective design concept.
Comment :
When this "radical remedial action" was finally taken, the agency which
did the prompting was not, as one might have expected, the Dept. of
Environment or the Dept. of Mines & Energy, but the Health
Commission, especially Dr Phil Crouch. The Dept. of Mines & Energy
was as reluctant as the operators to accept the obvious. Basic measures
like doing a mass balance, ie., comparing the liquid put into the TRS
with the amount lost by evaporation, were not even attempted until
mid-1993.
The report then goes on to make a few more findings and proceeds to a gigantic leap of faith concerning the harmful effects :
page 87 :
The Committee finds that the monitoring systems designed in part to
detect leakage from the Olympic Dam tailings retention system were
defective….
page 95 :
The Committee finds that the leakage is not attributable to any
single cause and that, although it does not come from any single
source, the minewater evaporation pond has made a significant
contribution to the amount of leaked liquid.
page 108 :
The Committee finds that, on the basis of current evidence, there
have been no harmful effects to employees, the local community or the
environment arising out of the leakage from the tailings retention
system at Olympic Dam and that it is highly unlikely that any such
harmful effects will emerge in the future.
Comment :
Despite recognising a "lack of knowledge about what has happened to the
leaked liquor under Olympic Dam" and that "more scientific studies are
obviously necessary", the report confidently asserts that there has
been no harmful effects to date and any such effects are "highly
unlikely" to emerge in the future.
Such polarized findings can hardly be an oversight. Bearing in mind
that the mine is expected to have a life of more than 100 years and
that many of the radioactive contaminants in the ground under the TRS
will remain radioactive for tens of thousands of years, it is very hard
to see where the Committee finds it’s confidence.
page 123 :
As in its Sellicks Hill Quarry Cave report,
having looked at some of the mistakes of the past, the Committee is
anxious to look positively to the future and to make recommendations
which will prevent their reoccurence and increase public confidence in
the operations.
Comment :
Thus it becomes clear that the Committee is not
intending to seriously question Olympic Dam’s competence in properly
managing it’s own operations, the Inquiry is merely an exercise in
public relations.
page 126 :
Recommendation 11
The Committee recommends that the operators be encouraged to continue
their commitment to improving their environmental management of Olympic
Dam operations and that government agencies commit themselves to
establishing environmental goals and overseeing their attainment while
leaving the prime responsibility for day to day environmental
management to the operators.
Comment :
In one sentence the Committee is openly critical of the recalcitrant
behaviour which Olympic Dam displayed in their concern over the
seepage, that the tailings retention system did not get the degree of
professional supervision such a system unequivocally demands, and yet
they are still allowed responsibility for their own environmental
management despite proven gross incompetence ? This is clearly
unacceptable.
page 131 :
However, with the company, the Committee sees considerable benefits in
the Olympic Dam operations being more ‘open to public scrutiny’.
Comment :
The Roxby Indenture Act provides a secure channel
between the company and the government in order to fast-track approvals
and permits and thereby avoid rigorous public scrutiny. If "being more
open to public scrutiny" is going to achieve anything, it would have to
involve the removal of the Roxby Indenture Act. So far this is not
being considered at all.
page 132 :
Recommendation 14
The Committee recommends that the Minister for Mines and Energy consult
with the Olympic Dam operators, other relevant state and Commonwealth
agencies and other interested bodies with a view to providing a forum
for information exchange and policy consultation among groups on the
effect of operations at Olympic Dam on the environment.
Comment :
The Federal Environment Minister, Senator Robert Hill, has released a
press statement saying that such a forum is currently being planned. As
noted above, the recommendation is for "information exchange" and not a
two way dialogue as it is being marketed as. It remains to be seen that
even if such a form were established whether it would be anything more
than a sleek public relations campaign.
page 136 :
The Committee finds that although there is a separate, fully
professional environment group within the Department of Mines and
Energy committed to a high standard of environmental management, this
does not overcome the public’s perceived lack of objectivity of the
regulatory process currently in place in relation to the Olympic Dam
operations.
Comment :
Until the Roxby Indenture Act is revoked there is no "perceived" lack
of objectivity on behalf of the public at all – environmental
regulation of a large mining operation by a body with a mission to
promote mining is a clear and unequivocal conflict of interest.