Articles about Lucas Heights – accidents, emergency planning, insurance etc

Secret advice: avoid reactor health study

By ANDREW CLENNELL in Canberra
28/6/2000

http://www.smh.com.au/news/0006/28/national/national14.html

The Federal Government was at pains to avoid a detailed health study of residents living near the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor before a
replacement reactor was built, according to a document released under Freedom of Information laws.

“Be careful in terms of health impacts – don’t really want a detailed study done of the health of Sutherland residents,” the document warns.

Obtained by Sutherland Shire Council, it was prepared by the Department of Industry, Science and Resources to offer advice to officers on how they
might answer questions at a Senate inquiry into the proposed reactor. It includes suggested questions on public health.

Question: “Is it better to locate a replacement reactor in a remote location or in a suburban location?”

Answer: “There is no difference where it is located in terms of public health.”

Question: “Was it not the case that persons living next to lead smelters were perfectly happy with those establishments, but were not truly aware of the risk they were facing?”

Answer: “The replacement is going to be a safe facility wherever it is located, because it will be safe by design.”

It says there is “no point in consulting with potential/hypothetical recipients of a new reactor. It was discovered through the course of inquiry into the new airport that such a course of action serves only to inflame the communities for no good reason.”

A spokesman for the Industry, Science and Resources Minister, Senator Minchin, said the only reason the department would not have wanted a detailed health study was because it “wasn’t required”.

“There was already extensive evidence there was no impact on the health of people in the Sutherland Shire,” he said. “There is absolutely no evidence of cancer clusters, as claimed by Sutherland Shire Council.”

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation said the maximum dose of radiation from the reactor was “one-hundredth the annual rate approved by the National Health and Medical Research Council”.

It also emerged yesterday that the Government is about to sign the contract for the new reactor without knowing if the proposed fuel will be ready in time.

Revealed: A Nuclear Nightmare in Sydney’s Backyard

Anthony Hoy, The Bulletin, November 12, 2003

The deportation of accused al Qaeda bomber Willie Brigitte, suspected of plotting an attack on Sydney’s Lucas Heights nuclear reactor or other military sites, coincides with warnings of a major public health catastrophe resulting from a terrorist attack. Why residents have not been told and how emergency services may be hamstrung by all the secrecy are just two of the serious questions raised by a former ANSTO employee turned whistleblower. Anthony Hoy reports.

Australia is about to confront the reality of the war on terrorism. The head of the nuclear watchdog, the Australian Radiation Protection and Safety Agency (ARPANSA), has warned of the danger of an aerial terrorist attack on the Lucas Heights nuclear research reactor, 40km to the south-west of the Sydney CBD.

Reports that suspected al Qaeda bomber Willie Brigitte, who was deported to France last month, may have been plotting attacks against Lucas Heights or other military sites followed a briefing to local government by the NSW government last week on plans to evacuate people within 3km of the nuclear reactor in the event of such an attack.

ASIO reportedly reaffirmed suspicions that Brigitte was a skilled bomb-maker sent to Australia to commit a serious terrorist act.

The NSW Health Department has told both council and emergency services that other households – possibly within an 80km radius of the reactor – would be advised to stock up on iodine tablets at their own expense as a protective measure against radioactive contamination.

But fire brigade, ambulance and some other emergency services personnel, concerned about a lack of preparedness for a possible strike and the state government’s refusal to distribute iodine tablets, have indicated their personnel might refuse to respond to any attack on Lucas Heights on the grounds of personal safety.

Speculation is growing that a secret “radiation consequences analysis” commissioned by ARPANSA confirms that an estimated 4 million residents living within 80km of the reactor – virtually Sydney’s entire population – risk radioactive contamination in the event of a successful strike on the reactor.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States show that the most wildly imaginative incident is possible, ARPANSA CEo Dr John Loy told a Senate inquiry. “And of course it is incumbent on me, as a safety regulator, to think about that [and] to think about the implications of it. We certainly looked at what might be the consequences of crashing an aircraft into the facility.”

Loy argued that if a terrorist attack penetrated the reactor’s shielding, exposing its nuclear core, “there would be a buoyancy because of the fire and the radiation distribution would go higher into the atmosphere than in an accident, and that you might expect some radioactive contamination at a distance further from the reactor than in the case of an accident”.

Loy detailed government sensitivity about the threat, plus the possible misuse by terrorists of any official radiation data, to a Senate community affairs estimates hearing in June. ARPANSA, ASIO and bureaucrats involved in the “children overboard affair” have joined forces to prevent the public release of the radiation consequences analysis.

“At one end, you can characterise a report like that as a description of how to go about the sabotage of an installation and a suggestion on how to produce maximum consequences,” Loy said. “If you go to the extreme of assuming everything away – nothing works and the whole inventory is released and you get an absolute extreme case – the value of advising the public of that seems to me to be pretty limited.”

Bureaucrat Jane Halton, who had a key role in the children overboard affair, told the Senate inquiry: “I do not think that [the radiation consequences analysis] has a value in public discussion … My view is that, in the present security environment, releasing that information would not be of assistance to the public.”

The local government custodian in and around Lucas Heights, Sutherland Shire Council, has confirmed that the principal player in the children overboard affair, then-cabinet secretary Max Moore-Wilton, has also played a key role in frustrating the community’s “right to know” charter concerning the reactor’s operations.

“Our extensive freedom of information applications concerning Lucas Heights were blocked by Moore-Wilton with what are kn ˇown as conclusive certificates, generally on the grounds that the material we sought was ultimately contained in cabinet documents,” said Dr Gary Smith, the council’s principal science officer and a member of the federal government’s Nuclear Safety Committee.

Loy has confirmed that, in a revised security plan developed by federal security agencies in conjunction with ARPANSA and the operator of the reactor, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, about $18m is being spent over four years on increased security at the Lucas Heights site.

But in the face of a terrorist threat, ANSTO continues to operate with what was described in a Senate report as “a culture of secrecy so embedded that it has lost sight of its responsibility to be accountable to parliament”.

Loy confirms that it is whistleblower John Mulcair, a former ANSTO employee, who has been alerting ARPANSA and the federal government over the operator’s continuing secretive modus operandi, continuing accidents involving Lucas Heights staff, and serious shortcomings in the construction of a replacement nuclear reactor on the site.

THE WHISTLEBLOWER

John Mulcair was ANSTO’s communications manager for 51D′ years. From 1994 to 1999, he trudged daily through ANSTO’s security gates and along avenues named after prominent research scientists. One was named for Marie Curie, who discovered radium and provided the key to a basic understanding of matter and energy, thus ushering in a new era in medical research and treatment to which the Lucas Heights reactor is dedicated.

During his time there, Mulcair doggedly but unsuccessfully championed the rights of the broader Sutherland Shire community to know more about Lucas Heights’ operations. In particular, he was a strong advocate of the community’s right to information on the likely local impact of any serious major nuclear accident or incident.

The existing research reactor, which first achieved fission power in 1958 ⁄ and began routine operation in 1960, was to be shut down and decommissioned by 2005. In June 2000, the government announced the Argentine company INVAP S.E. was the successful tenderer for the construction of a replacement research reactor.

Mulcair oversaw the community processes associated with the environmental impact statement for the new reactor. “It was a case of ‘do I really need this shit anymore?’,” he said. “Basically, I got to the end of my time for doing the job. It is part of the make-up in being a journalist. So I paid off my mortgage and resigned. It was one step removed from winning the lottery and pouring the inkwell over the boss’ head. I contacted Fairfax Community Newspapers and while I left ANSTO on very good terms I took a job Fairfax created for me on the St George Leader.” His role as a reporter on the Lucas Heights hometown newspaper has effectively lifted the veil of secrecy that had surrounded the research facility.

It was to Mulcair that many ˜ ANSTO staff living with their families in the immediate environs – in suburbs such as Engadine, Heathcote, Lucas Heights (now called Baden Ridge) and Menai – turned when they felt the need to discreetly raise their concerns about aspects of ANSTO’s operations.

Mulcair alerted the Sutherland Shire community, John Loy and ARPANSA to serious problems with standards and communications between the parties building the replacement reactor. Mulcair also disclosed that ANSTO had intentionally withheld some of that information from ARPANSA for more than three months. “Indeed, and he [Mulcair] appears to have some good sources,” Loy told the Senate inquiry.

Says Mulcair: “All the motivations of my sources have been of the very best order. These people have only one interest, and that is to get the job done properly. I have a great deal of faith in the people I worked with at ANSTO to make good decisions. They are driven by principle. They don’t want something dodgy to affectthem and their families. From a public relations perspective, the replacement reactor should have been built somewhere else.”

A BOTCHED JOB

The worst fears of the community – and Mulcair – about the construction of the replacement reactor were quickly confirmed: the inquiring senators calling it “a comedy of errors”.

ANSTO was meant to seek ARPANSA approval for the construction of individual structures and components. Through the press, Mulcair progressively advised ARPANSA, the government and the community of repeated licence breaches by ANSTO and the contractor. As far as Loy was concerned, these mistakes raised the question of whether other mistakes had been made, and whether the system that allowed for the mistakes to be made needed further examination. Fresh licensing conditions were progressively imposed.

But Mulcair eventually blew the whistle on a communications gap between ARPANSA, ANSTO and INVAP, and the Argentine company’s Australian construction partners, John Holland, Evans Deakin and their subcontractors. He confirmed that ANSTO had, in effect, defied ARPANSA’s licence conditions preventing penetrations for the heavy water system in the bottom of the reactor’s pool tank. Mulcair’s alert, Loy says, resulted in “a significant investigation as to how that happened”. Such a communications gap was “a concern, yes”.

From then on, Loy required that INVAP’s procedures be amended to ensure ARPANSA’s directions were “explicitly included in all … written chains of command”.

ANSTO’s subsequent three-month delay in informing ARPANSA of the discovery of faulty welds in the pipework was, according to Loy, “a matter of concern” requiring “further investigation”. A full-time ARPANSA officer was to begin “intelligence gathering” and conduct full-time inspections at the new reactor site and manufacturing points.

Loy told the Senate inquiry: “There will be complexi kties of instrumentation and control and there will be issues connected with the fuel, the fuel type and the core complex systems … I would expect issues to arise in many of those, just from a priori experience.”

Loy has also confirmed that before he even considers issuing an operating licence for the replacement reactor, he will need to be satisfied there will be storage for Lucas Heights’ spent fuel waste when it is brought back from conditioning overseas. “ANSTO has talked about 2005 for the operation of the reactor, but whether that comes to pass or not, I do not know.”

HELL ON EARTH

Sydney residents will be relieved to know that in the event of a worst-case scenario, there is an evacuation contingency plan for those living within 3km of Lucas Heights.

But officers of the Ambulance Service of NSW have refused to join any post-incident distribution of iod ?ine “due to the lack of appropriate Personal Protective Equipment”. Similar arguments exist for the NSW Police Force, the Rural Fire Service, the State Emergency Service and crews under the umbrella of the Volunteer Rescue Association. The NSW Fire Brigade Employees Union is also among those highly critical of the contingency plans.

Only this month, the NSW government reluctantly agreed to accept the World Health Organisation’s safe level of radioactive exposure of 10milligray (mGy) – a third of the level advocated by ANSTO and ARPANSA, according to FBEU president Darryl Snow. “ANSTO and ARPANSA are concerned that their advocacy of the WHO contamination threshold would amount to their tacit admission that a nuclear incident is a possibility,” he says. “A comprehensive and effective emergency response to the affected ar Lea is beyond the scope of agencies tasked with dealing with such an incident. Our critical concern is whether an evacuation might take place smoothly, effectively and in a timely manner.”

The NSW Fire Brigade is the designated combat agency for radioactive incidents. “There is no guarantee that contaminated water will be contained and that local water supply and catchment areas will not be affected,” Snow says, warning that crews may cease to respond “to unsafe levels of radioactivity”.

There were also concerns that “any actions taken by firefighters may be ultimately ineffective in containing the incident. Consideration must also be given to the possibility that a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility will be but one part of a co-ordinated attack.” In short, Snow says, procedures in place in the event of a terrorist attack “are -breathtakingly inept in their inability to comprehend how an incident might be fought effectively”.

Sydney’s nuclear target

Jim Green
October 2001

Introduction

The terrorist attack in the United States on September 11 has led to renewed calls for the Australian government to cancel its plan to build a 20-megawatt nuclear research reactor in the southern Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights.

The Coalition government insists that the reactor plan will proceed. Labor is being pressed to state unequivocally that a Labor government would cancel the contract with Argentinean reactor constructor INVAP; to date, Labor has only committed to reviewing the contract. A firm commitment from Labor may be necessary to secure preferences from the Australian Greens in the November 10 election.

If built, the new reactor will replace the 10-megawatt HIFAR reactor operated by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) at Lucas Heights.

In the 1970s, an assessment of the danger of a terrorist attack on the HIFAR reactor found that the reactor could be vulnerable and an explosive in the ‘right’ place could have severe consequences.

In 1983, nine sticks of gelignite, 25 kilograms of ammonium nitrate, three detonators and an igniter were found in an electrical sub-station inside ANSTO’s boundary fence. Two detonators failed, and one exploded but did not ignite the main charge. Two people were charged over this incident.

In 1984, a threat was made to fly an aircraft packed with explosives into the HIFAR reactor; a person was charged and found guilty on two counts of causing public mischief. In 1985, after vandalism of a pipe, radioactive liquid drained into Woronora river, and this incident was not reported for 10 days. In 1986 an act of vandalism resulted in damage to the sampling pit on the effluent pipeline.

On October 9, 2001, NSW and federal police were alerted to a bomb threat directed at ANSTO. Australian Protective Services and NSW police conducted a full search of ANSTO after a threat was made, Sergeant Jim McGrath of Sutherland police said. Channel Ten received the anonymous call at about 10pm. “There was a veiled threat the reactor was going to go up,” McGrath said. The grounds of ANSTO were searched but no device was found. (news.ninemsn.com.au/national/story_19935.asp)

Increased terrorist risk?

A number of recent reports on possible terrorist activities in Australia are summarised below. It should be noted that:
* in most cases it is impossible to judge the accuracy of these reports;
* some of the statements/activities reported below may be politically motivated and/or may constitute racist scapegoating (just as the New Zealand saga evoked ignorant, racist commentary). Again, it’s difficult to comment on the basis of the limited information on the public record.

Prime Minister John Howard said on September 21 that terrorist cells linked to Osama bin Laden could be operating in Australia. “It’s possible”, he told Melbourne radio 3AW. “I said earlier you can’t assume that Australia is immune from the threat of terrorism. We are not as high on the scale of vulnerability as other countries but we are on it and you can’t rule it out.” (Sydney Morning Herald Online, September 21, 2001.)

Howard said on October 3, “We should also understand that this country is more vulnerable as a result of what happened on September 11. … We should not be alarmed, nor should we be complacent, nor should we lazily assume that it can’t happen here.” Asked about suggestions terrorist organisations were present in Australia, Howard said, “It’s always hard in an area like this as to what one can say to keep the public informed and equally what one can’t say so as not to compromise traditional approaches to intelligence and security”. (“Howard warns Australia more vulnerable to terrorism”, Sydney Morning Herald Online, October 3, 2001.)

Howard said on October 8 that Australia will be involved in a long military campaign with the US against the Taliban that will result in casualties and a greater risk of retaliation from terrorists. He said, “I don’t want to overdramatise, but equally I don’t want to underestimate or understate the obvious, and that is that all of those who stand with our American friends are potential targets.” (“We are potential targets, warns PM”, The Age, October 9, 2001.)

The (Melbourne) Age reported on September 22 that a number of Australian-based supporters of bin Laden, based primarily in New South Wales, came to the attention of Australian authorities in the late 1990s as ASIO and the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence made security preparations for the Olympics. The CIA and the FBI discovered the link during investigations into the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre. The investigations found that those eventually convicted had telephoned Australia in the months before and after the bombing. Australian DIO operatives have expressed alarm at the growth of bin Laden “cells” throughout South-East Asia. (Paul Daley, Bin Laden’s Australian links, The Age, September 22, 2001.)

The Sun Herald reported on September 30 that ASIO agents investigating “sympathy links” to the US terrorist attacks have conducted a series of home raids in Sydney’s south-west. Backed by 70 federal and NSW police, operatives from ASIO executed warrants on at least five houses in Sydney, seizing passports, financial records and other documents. According to the Sun Herald report, one address targeted is believed to be that of a Middle Eastern Australian employed as a baggage handler at Sydney airport. (“ASIO swoop in hunt for bin Laden link”, John Kidman, The Sun Herald, 30 September, 2001; also Sydney Morning Herald Online www.smh.com.au)

The Australian reported on October 12 that “About 100 members of four international terrorist groups linked to Osama bin Laden have been identified living in Sydney and Victoria raising funds for the holy war against the United States.” (“Bin Ladin groups in our suburbs”, The Australian, October 12, 2001.)

The Australian reported on September 29 that “Australian intelligence sources have confirmed that associates of terrorist Osama bin Laden are active in Australia. … Senior intelligence sources told The Weekend Australian yesterday that information about activities of bin Laden’s associates in Australia was uncovered during intensive investigations shortly before the 2000 Sydney Olympics. … The official confirmed that ASIO was investigating a number of individuals in Australia suspected of having links with bin Laden or his terrorist groups.” (Cameron Stewart, “Bin Laden’s men are here”, The Australian, September 29, 2001.)

Dr Rohan Gunaratna of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews in Scotland says there is evidence of terrorist operations in Australia. He said terrorist groups were increasingly looking for money and support within countries such as Australia and New Zealand because of tighter anti-terrorist measures in Europe and America. (Mark Metherell, “Terrorist groups already here, academic warns”, Sydney Morning Herald, September 27, 2001.)

Howard said on September 16 that the risk of terrorist activity against Australia was greater than in the past. “I don’t share the complacency of some that this can’t happen in Australia. I think it can”, he said. Howard said that Australia may be at a greater risk because of Federal Cabinet’s decision to invoke the ANZUS treaty. (Chelsey Martin and Steve Lewis, “Threat of terrorist attack in Australia is rising: PM”, Australian Financial Review, September 17, 2001.)

ANSTO and its reactor are connected to the ANZUS alliance – and therefore potentially more attractive terrorist targets. The Department of Foreign Affairs and the Australian Safeguards Office stated in 1998 that the operation of a research reactor “first and foremost” serves “national interest requirements”. One of the “national interest requirements” said to justify the operation of a reactor, and the construction of a new reactor, is the ANZUS alliance. The Coalition and the Labor Party not only support the US nuclear weapons program, but also consider the US nuclear umbrella to be a centerpiece of Australian defence policy.

New reactor challenge

During the debate over the planned new reactor, ANSTO has dismissed the possibility of a sabotage event leading to a ‘loss of coolant’ accident which would expose the reactor core. This has been challenged by nuclear engineer Tony Wood, former head of ANSTO’s Division of Reactors and Engineering. Wood told a Senate inquiry on October 25 last year that a sabotage event “has the potential to have much worse consequences [than ANSTO’s selected ‘reference’ accident] and the environmental impact statement admits there is no way of assessing its likelihood.”

Industry minister Nick Minchin said in an August 26, 2000 media release that “The ANSTO facility is a research reactor and as such its fundamental design greatly limits the risk to public safety from an accident.” In fact, research reactors are designed for ease of access in order to facilitate the range of purposes for which they are used – isotope production, scientific research and commercial applications such as silicon irradiation. This ease of access bring with it obvious risks. Wood told the Senate inquiry last year, “Pool reactors have a free water surface and this very feature, which is desirable for flexible access to the core, also makes it vulnerable. The EIS claims credit for the massive reinforced concrete block of the pool but this is the very thing which would direct the force of an explosion into the reactor core and expel fuel and water.”

Wood asked for an assessment to be carried out and the results published “of a true upper-bound event based on major sabotage” with involvement from the SAS or other military experts: “When it comes to the confidential assumptions about types and quantities of explosives which could realistically be used I would like to see input from SAS or other military experts because I believe, in the light of what has been said on this topic in the EIS, a degree of realism is missing at ANSTO.”

Wood does not believe that such an assessment would conclude that the risks are unacceptable, but merely asks that an assessment be carried out. ANSTO prefers to stick its head in the sand and to continue to deny the possibility of a loss of coolant accident.

US-based nuclear expert Daniel Hirsch, in a 1998 report commissioned by Sutherland Shire Council, makes the important point that the trivialisation of safety risks actually increases risks: “… a blind belief that no serious harm can occur, no matter what goes wrong with the reactor, no matter how serious the operator error, produces a markedly increased risk, as any review of past nuclear accidents will demonstrate.”

Wood says he has “confidence that the security arrangements will match the perceived threat”. Perhaps so, but one aspect of the security system is vetting access to ANSTO’s reactor plant, and I’ve entered on numerous occasions without showing my visitor’s pass or having my bag inspected – and I’m sure the same applies to others. Yet ANSTO says on its website, “Employees and long term visitors always have to show passes – this is nothing new and car boots are often checked. Indeed ANSTO security is constantly under review to ensure that the highest standards are maintained.” Bollocks.

Another risk is the possibility of sabotage carried out by an ANSTO staff member. Anonymous ANSTO staff members, self-described as ANSTO “Staff Representing Truth in Science”, said in a March 3, 2000 letter to a Sutherland Shire councillor: “The last 4 years have seen unprecedented industrial actions resulting in lost-time for ANSTO. The staff morale is exceptionally low … because of unprecedented ineptitude at senior management level.” In October 2000, an ANSTO scientist described management/staff relations as being on a “permanent war footing”.

If an act of sabotage or terrorism, or a serious accident, does occur, the consequences could be serious. Wood told the Senate inquiry that the proposed new reactor “when operating at full power will contain sufficient fission products to cause great damage off site if a large fraction were to escape.”

Sutherland Shire Council has obtained documents from the (now defunct) Nuclear Safety Bureau saying that a loss of coolant accident would be 1000 times worse than the maximum hypothetical accident being planned for by ANSTO and the Argentinean contractor INVAP. Daniel Hirsch said in a written submission to the Senate inquiry: “We [Hirsch and ANSTO] all appear now to agree that if the replacement reactor were to suffer a loss of coolant, or a power excursion accident that tosses out the coolant, and if the confinement fails or is bypassed, radioactivity releases thousands of times higher than that assumed in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) could result. Indeed, we are in fairly close agreement how large those releases would be, and presumably, how many cancers would result.”

Puppet regulator

Last year, the CEO of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, John Loy, issued a licence to ANSTO to prepare a site for a new reactor at Lucas Heights. That licence was granted despite the absence of a detailed reactor design. Loy issued a statement saying: “I accept that the critical point in the evaluation of the reference accident is the exclusion of a fast loss of coolant. But I believe that the ARPANSA review and the international peer reviews commissioned in the EIS process demonstrate that this is a valid scenario. Of course, it is possible to posit all sorts of simultaneous disasters and suggest superhuman powers to saboteurs or enemies; but that does not help the careful evaluation of a real life proposal.”

ARPANSA will not commit to insisting on changes to design specifications for the proposed new reactor in the wake of September 11 terrorist attack and subsequent events. ARPANSA’s regulatory branch is inhabited by no less than six former ANSTO staff members, and the executive director of ANSTO sat on the panel which interviewed applicants for the position of CEO of the ‘independent’ regulator, ARPANSA.

ANSTO’s website says that if an aircraft hit HIFAR, “even in the unlikely event that an aircraft was able to hit the relatively small target presented by HIFAR, the radiation doses to persons beyond the buffer zone would be relatively low (comparable to natural background radiation in some parts of the world).” ARPANSA says that “even if the HIFAR was struck by a large aircraft, radiation doses to persons beyond the 1.6 km buffer zone would be relatively low (comparable to natural background radiation in some parts of the world).” The near-identical wording may say something about the lack of independence of ARPANSA.

Decoded, these statements from ANSTO/ARPANSA mean that in the event of an aircraft hitting the reactor, the radiation doses within ANSTO’s nuclear plant could be significant, and beyond the 1.6 km buffer zone, thousands of people might be subjected to smaller radiation doses, but would still be at slightly greater risk of fatal cancers and other pathologies. In addition to direct exposure to radiation, the contamination of land and property could have major social and economic consequences.

ANSTO says the planned new reactor will be designed to withstand the impact from a Cessna 500 Citation aircraft. Sutherland Shire Council is concerned about the adequacy of this standard given the close proximity of both the Sydney and Bankstown airports, which cater for aircraft much larger than a Cessna 500.

Target-rich environment

The existing reactor, and the proposed new reactor, are not the only risks at Lucas Heights; it is a target-rich environment, to use the military jargon.

The isotope processing plant, in which irradiated targets, including enriched uranium targets, are processed, is vulnerable. The targets and the liquid waste stream contain uranium fission products and transuranics including long-lived plutonium isotopes. As at mid 1996, 6000 litres of this waste was stored at Lucas Heights. The waste is slowly being solidified by ANSTO. It was identified as having potential for off-site consequences in the event of an accident (such as an earthquake or a major fire) by the government’s Safety Review Committee, which complained on several occasions in the 1990s about the delays in the solidification of this waste. There are no plans for long-term storage or disposal of the solidified waste.

Another obvious target at Lucas Heights is the irradiated (spent) fuel from the reactor. On April 2, 1996, maritime workers refused to load a shipment of spent fuel from ANSTO because they had not been forewarned of the shipment. The spent fuel was driven aimlessly around Sydney while the dispute was resolved, because of a law preventing the convoy being stationary for more than two hours (presumably for security reasons). (Sydney Morning Herald, September 5, 1998.)

A previous spent fuel shipment was no less farcical: a spent fuel convoy from Lucas Heights was followed onto a ship by a truck driven by Greenpeace campaigners.

Insurance

In the event of a serious reactor accident at Lucas Heights, Sydney residents would find it extremely difficult or impossible to pursue compensation claims. (For more information click here.)

With respect to government indemnity, Tony Wood said in his written submission to the Senate inquiry that both ANSTO and the government have “misled” the public and that ANSTO’s EIS was “genuinely confused, or … had set out deliberately to confuse.”

Wood notes that, unlike many countries in Europe, North America, and elsewhere, Sydney residents are not protected by absolute liability, which frees the claimant from having to prove anything other than damage as a result of a reactor accident. Instead, Sydney residents effected by a nuclear accident would only have recourse to common law, which requires that the aggrieved party prove both damage and negligence.

Wood says it is a “mystery” to him why the Government has not accepted absolute liability: “It looks as if the Commonwealth lacks confidence in the low level of public risk claimed for the new reactor in the EIS. If it is so low what is to be lost by offering the guarantee.”

Nuclear weapons

A perception that ANSTO might be involved in weapons production might make it more attractive as a terrorist target. From the 1940s to the early 1970s, successive Australian governments pursued nuclear projects which, by design or accident, brought Australia closer to a nuclear weapons capability. Consequently, as former ANSTO scientist Murray Scott noted in a submission during the reactor EIS process, there has been an accumulation of programs and facilities at Lucas Heights which could be seen internationally to have ambiguous potential for weapons development. These facilities, which have been publicly declared and in most cases shut down, include a fluorine plant, a uranium hexafluouride synthesis plant, a laser enrichment project, a centrifuge cascade development (uranium enrichment), a split table experimental facility, fuel irradiation facilities in HIFAR, and hot cells in current use for chemical extraction of components from irradiated uranium targets.

There is no interest in pursuing a nuclear weapons program in Australia, although anyone (e.g. state or sub-state terrorists) could be forgiven for believing otherwise given that the stated objectives of the plan for a new reactor – isotope production and scientific research – are barely credible. The real agenda behind the reactor – which the government describes as the “national interest” agenda – includes supporting the nuclear alliance with the US, continuing to play a nuclear watch-dog role in the Asia Pacific (which also ties into the US alliance), maintaining Australia’s place on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and other such activities.

Radioactive materials at Lucas Heights might be fashioned by terrorists or saboteurs into a ‘radiation bomb’ in combination with explosive materials – not nearly so lethal as a nuclear bomb but nonetheless capable of spreading radiation far and wide.

Fresh fuel and spent fuel at Lucas Heights contain highly enriched uranium which might provide the fissile material for a nuclear weapon, although it would require extensive facilities and expertise; far simpler for a terrorist to blow up the reactor, spent fuel, or the isotope processing plant or associated liquid waste stockpile.

Sydney’s new nuclear reactor: safe as houses?

Jim Green
November 2000
Despite ANSTO’s attempts to trivialise the safety risks of the proposed new reactor at Lucas Heights in southern Sydney, there’s no doubt that it would contain sufficient radioactivity to cause major off-site contamination in the event of a major accident and the failure of containment systems. Nuclear engineer Tony Wood, former head of ANSTO’s Division of Engineering and Reactors, told the 2000-2001 Senate inquiry into the reactor plan that the proposed new reactor “when operating at full power will contain sufficient fission products to cause great damage off site if a large fraction were to escape.”

Likewise, a 1995 report from MHB Technical Associates, commissioned by the Sutherland Shire Council, said that HIFAR, or any similar or larger reactor, “is potentially subject to severe accidents involving fuel melting which have the potential to release sizable quantities of radioactive material into the environment.”

The safety debates involve issues such as what type of accident would constitute a worst-case accident (or “reference accident”), the likelihood of such an accident, what proportion of the reactor’s radioactivity might escape to the environment, and what consequences a serious accident would have.

The Senate inquiry heard from Daniel Hirsch, the former director of a nuclear policy research program at the University of California and currently co-chair of the Santa Susana Field Laboratory Advisory Panel, an independent oversight body for the US Department of Energy. Hirsch is visiting Australia at the invitation of the Sutherland Shire Council.

Hirsch disputes ANSTO’s dismissal of an accident in which coolant (or water) would be lost thus exposing fuel rods. Hirsch says that at least half a dozen loss-of-coolant accidents have occurred around the world.

ANSTO’s assertion that a loss-of-coolant accident can be dismissed as being too unlikely to contemplate is premature, since a detailed design for the proposed reactor has yet to be produced. ANSTO uses the conditional clause, as in the Final EIS: “The pool structure and beam tube penetrations would be designed to be so robust that a large loss of coolant accident is not considered credible.”

Hirsch said he was astonished to find that the environmental impact statement for the proposed new reactor took place in the absence of a reactor design.

An October 31 media release from ANSTO says, “three independent peer reviews of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the replacement research reactor … confirmed that the “reference accident” assumptions and outcomes, were appropriate.” This assertion is partly misleading, partly false:
* the review by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said “full justification for the selected Reference Accident is not included in the EIS”.
* the Review by Parkman Safety Management said, “As no specific design has yet been chosen, it is not possible for a full and detailed safety assessment to be undertaken at this stage.”
* and the Review by CH2M Hill said “The probability of occurrence and potential consequences of a given accident sequence are highly dependent on the specific design and operational features of a reactor facility. Because these details have not yet been finalised for the proposal, it is not possible to develop a detailed quantitative assessment of accident hazards and risks at this stage.”

Sabotage

The Sutherland Shire Council is concerned that ANSTO all but ignores sabotage as a risk, particularly in light of previous attempts at sabotage such as the 1983 discovery of significant quantities of gelignite and ammonium nitrate, and three detonators, inside ANSTO’s boundary fence.

Tony Wood says a sabotage event “has the potential to have much worse consequences [than ANSTO’s selected reference accident] and the EIS admits there is no way of assessing its likelihood.”

At the October 25 hearing of the Senate inquiry, Wood expressed concern about the pool-type reactor proposed by ANSTO: “Pool reactors have a free water surface and this very feature, which is desirable for flexible access to the core, also makes it vulnerable. The EIS claims credit for the massive reinforced concrete block of the pool but this is the very thing which would direct the force of an explosion into the reactor core and expel fuel and water.”

Wood urged the Senate committee to urge the federal government and ANSTO to conduct an assessment of the potential consequences of sabotage: “When it comes to the confidential assumptions about types and quantities of explosives which could realistically be used I would like to see input from SAS or other military experts because I believe, in the light of what has been said on this topic in the EIS, a degree of realism is missing at ANSTO.”

A related issue is the poor status of staff/management relations at ANSTO. ANSTO staff members, self-described as ANSTO “Staff Representing Truth in Science” said in a March 3 letter to a Sutherland Shire Councillor that, “The last 4 years have seen unprecedented industrial actions resulting in lost-time for ANSTO. The staff morale is exceptionally low … because of unprecendented ineptitude at senior management level.” This raises the spectre of sabotage, and it could lead to an exacerbation of an already critical problem: the lack of nuclear and engineering expertise at ANSTO.

Earthquake

ANSTO’s dismissal of earthquakes as a potential initiator of a serious accident has also been called into question. The federal government commissioned the New Zealand Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences and other experts to assess the likelihood and potential impacts of an earthquake on the Lucas Heights nuclear plant.

The chair of the technical review committee concluded that: “The TRC considers the assessment provided by IGNS Ltd. does represent the most comprehensive review of potential earthquake motion in the Lucas Heights region that has been undertaken to date, and the general methodology employed conforms to recognised international standards.”

The IGNS report found that the impact of an earthquake could be almost twice that previously predicted. Subsequently, the government refused to release the report for some months, and the IGNS report is currently being “reviewed” by government agencies behind closed doors.

Dr. Garry Smith, from the Sutherland Shire Council, told the October 25 Senate hearing, “The report of that independent consultant was to the effect that the estimation for earthquake came up with an earthquake size, a peak ground acceleration, approximately twice the size of that previously assessed by ANSTO and others. Our concern is that that measure of twice the earthquake has not entered into the specification process for the design of the reactor. From what we have seen – we are addressing this with ANSTO and ARPANSA – it was to some degree the earlier earthquake specifications that were initially used for the tendering process and so on. And we do not know what the current earthquake specification for the design is: whether that New Zealand study, which is agreed to be the most comprehensive study to date, has been taken on board, or whether there is some earthquake number in between, or whether it is the low number. … What is of particular concern is that the process of assessing this issue is occurring post-EIS, it is occurring in a non-public process between ANSTO and ARPANSA, and the public has no access to how that government information is being used. It is a real concern to us.”

Smith said, “If there is any uncertainty with respect to the size of an earthquake which can potentially affect radioactivity release, surely the public can expect that the government will err on the side of caution and safety. You do not ignore a report just because you are not sure or the estimates have some level of uncertainty. You build in an inherent level of safety to overcome the uncertainty. I am not confident, having been part of those committee processes and now part of ARPANSA, that under the current process those levels of uncertainty are being adequately addressed. … I have real concerns about the level of safety that will be achieved by the reactor with respect to things like earthquake specification. It costs money to build in safety features.”

Consequences

ANSTO claims the most “credible serious accident” would release one millionth of the radioactivity of the core of the reactor. Based on previous reactor accidents, Daniel Hirsch says that a more appropriate figure would be several-hundredths of the core radioactivity. ANSTO arrived at its optimistic conclusion in part by ignoring many of the radionuclides that would be released in the event of a serious reactor accident.

A serious reactor accident at Lucas Heights would have health effects (e.g. fatal cancers, non-fatal cancers, genetic effects) and many other effects: decontamination costs, evacuation costs, restrictions on food consumption, litigation costs, and overall impacts on economic output. As MHB Technical Associates notes, “Even relatively small radiological accident releases have resulted overseas in large societal costs within the ‘evacuation shadow’.”

Dr. Greg Storr, an ANSTO scientist giving evidence to the Senate inquiry on October 25, described a fatal research reactor accident at the SL-1 reactor in the USA in 1961: “Three operators died. It was a research sized reactor. It was caused by what was called a reactivity excursion. It was caused by one of the operators deliberately withdrawing one of the control rods – that is one of the pieces of material which controls the neutron reaction – and that action sent the reactor to what they call superprompt critical. When it went superprompt critical, there was a large increase in the temperature in the reactor core, the water boiled and it caused a water hammer effect which accelerated the slug of water above the core up in to the pressure vessel. The pressure vessel broke and it accelerated up and hit the roof, pinning one of the operators to the roof. The two other operators died later from radiation exposure. That is the SL-1 accident.”

Several other fatal research reactor accidents have been recorded, most recently in the USA in 1998 during maintenance operations at a research reactor.

Health effects of radiation

Another safety-related debate concerns the health effects of low-level radiation. Despite being Australia’s largest nuclear agency, ANSTO cannot make up its mind on this topic. On October 30 (as reported in the October 31 Sydney Morning Herald), ANSTO said that in the “improbable event of an accident, community impacts would be negligible”. The following day, ANSTO announced that a reactor accident would have “no health impacts on the community” (emphasis added).

This confusion was also evident in an internal Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR) 1998 briefing document, obtained by the Sutherland Shire Council under freedom of information legislation. The document ponders the best euphemism to describe the health risks from radioactive emissions from the planned new reactor. “Don’t say no extra risk – acceptable risk?? … There are risks associated with everything.”

“Be careful in terms of health impacts – don’t really want a detailed study done of the health of Sutherland residents”, the DISR document said. (Alan Parkinson noted in his Senate submission that a senior DISR bureaucrat did not one of the most basic facts in the field of radiation studies – the difference between alpha and gamma radiation. An adviser to Senator Minchin is revealed by Parkinson not to know the difference between an acid and a base.)

Further safety concerns derive from the lack of nuclear expertise at Lucas Heights. Tony Wood said in his submission, “It is a fact … that ANSTO now only has a small team of dedicated reactor professionals most of whom are operating HIFAR and they are fully extended. … I suggest that the [Senate] Committee seek assurance from the Government that experienced reactor engineers be hired by ANSTO to pursue the proposal from now on. So far they have been conspicuous by their absence in the team.”

ANSTO staff members – self-described as “Staff Representing Truth in Science” – wrote to a Sutherland Councillor on March 3, saying, “Because of inept executive management there is no succession planning within the organisation. Although it will be strongly denied by ANSTO, it is well known by those in the field that the new reactor project is having difficulty finding sufficient nuclear literate staff to address the tender process. It is understood that the current full-time staff on the program had their origins in the AAEC and are up for retirement. Inept management, no succession planning? Who is going to safely operate a new reactor in Sutherland Shire.”

Another issue which impinges on safety is the significant likelihood of a cost blow-out associated with the new reactor project, which could lead to cost-cutting in areas affecting safety (e.g. design parameters for the proposed new reactor, e.g. staff retrenchments). Jim Fredsall, former president of the Australian Nuclear Association and a former ANSTO nuclear engineer, said in his submission to the Senate Inquiry that the new reactor would be a constant drain on the taxpayers of this country for the next half century.

ANSTO “Staff Representing Truth in Science” wrote in their March 3 letter, “it is known that the reactor replacement costs are projected to blow out considerably more than the amounts told to the Federal Government, but once the project is started it will have to be completed irrespective of costs. A number of staff believe there should be an independent external review of financial management at ANSTO and the real costs of a new reactor.”

ANSTO claims that even for the “hypothetical maximum credible accident”, no countermeasures beyond the 1.6km buffer zone would be required. Emergency planning is inadequate and will remain so because of the head-in-the-sand approach taken by ANSTO and by federal and state governments.

Daniel Hirsch makes the important point that the trivialisation of the safety risks associated with the Lucas Heights nuclear plant actually increases the risks: “… a blind belief that no serious harm can occur, no matter what goes wrong with the reactor, no matter how serious the operator error; produces a markedly increased risk, as any review of past nuclear accidents will demonstrate.”

Insurance

In the event of a serious reactor accident at Lucas Heights, Sydney residents would find it extremely difficult or impossible to pursue compensation claims.

According to Michael Priceman from the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre, “The [ANSTO EIS] report on the suitability of Lucas Heights as the site for a new reactor … found that it was perfect, based on what ANSTO described as its pessimistic assumptions that the frequency of a worst case accident was one in a million per year and therefore the maximum risk to an individual developing a fatal cancer was one in 6 billion per year. Armed with those sporting odds the Insurance Council of Australia still refuses to insure the public.”

The government knows that it has misled the public, Wood says, “yet not only has it chosen to do nothing about it, but it has misinformed the community that a Deed of Indemnity it has produced for a different purpose does provide equivalent financial security, when clearly it does not.”

Wood says the Deed of Indemnity was designed to attract bidders for the reactor project: “In the absence of absolute liability of the operator in Australia the Government faced a dilemma because no overseas reactor vendor would consider bidding because if he (sic) were successful he (sic) could be held liable in the event of an accident. Although the Government has chosen not to indemnify its own citizens, it must indemnify the reactor vendor if it wants a new reactor. Hence the Deed of Indemnity was produced last year, which does in fact indemnify the vendor.”

Wood quoted the US Presidential Commission on Catastrophic Accidents, which said in 1988 that applying common law principles to nuclear accidents would result in an outright denial of recovery or a difficult and protracted process.

Reactor engineer says safety inadequate

Sydney Morning Herald
December 17, 2001

A former engineering director at Australia’s only nuclear reactor said today that safety measures at the existing facility were inadequate and did not cover public safety.

Speaking at the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) public forum on the building of a new reactor at Sydney’s Lucas Heights, Tony Woods said the facility “didn’t have adequate protection for anything”.
“Our (safety) procedures are so cumbersome, and they’d take so long to implement, they’d be ineffective,” he said.

Mr Woods, who retired in 1991 after 30 years service at Lucas Heights, said the “safety culture” at the facility had to be greatly improved.

He said the current Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) safety plan only considered plant employees and did not include any measures for the public.

Mr Woods said the Sutherland Shire Council’s contingency plan anticipated many emergencies, including earthquakes, but did not consider a nuclear accident.

“If you look at the plan regarding the public, there’s no mention of the reactor. It’s like it isn’t there,” he said.
He cited the example of a reactor employee who was refused admission to Sutherland Hospital, one of the nearest medical facilities to Lucas Heights, because of a wound that was contaminated.

Mr Woods urged planning for a worst-case scenario of complete core meltdown plus major containment failure, including evacuation procedures and prior distribution of medicines.

He also said a smaller research reactor like the one planned would be more vulnerable to an act of sabotage or terrorism because it isn’t as well fortified.

“The main reason a terrorist would attack this (facility) is not to kill a lot of people but to terrify them,” he said.
“If we’ve got a good plan we can protect people … that’s more effective than fortifying the reactor.”

But there was one very significant positive in Mr Woods’ presentation – nuclear accidents were not as catastrophic as people imagined.

He said research showed that many of the illnesses anticipated after the accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, including leukaemia, did not manifest themselves among the population as expected.

Thyroid cancer was the only illness that boomed after Chernobyl, which Mr Woods said could be nipped at the bud by using iodine tablets.

He said the biggest health hazard in the event of a reactor accident was the psychological effect of the incident, and better communication was needed.

“People don’t have the correct perspective as far as radiation is concerned,” he said.

“You’d go in an get an X-ray and you wouldn’t ask what the dosage is.

“I think ANSTO has a problem in so much as it likes to sugar-coat its information.

“They feel the public can’t take information that could cause them concern.

“I think (consulting and informing external bodies) is better for the project and better for everyone.”

–AAP

Insurance and the Lucas Heights nuclear plant

In the event of a serious reactor accident at Lucas Heights, Sydney residents would find it extremely difficult or impossible to pursue compensation claims.

With respect to government indemnity, nuclear engineer Tony Wood, former head of ANSTO’s Division of Engineering and Reactors, said in his written submission to the Senate inquiry that both ANSTO and the government have “misled” the public and that ANSTO’s EIS was “genuinely confused, or … had set out deliberately to confuse.”

Wood says the Deed of Indemnity was designed to attract bidders for the reactor project: “In the absence of absolute liability of the operator in Australia the Government faced a dilemma because no overseas reactor vendor would consider bidding because if he were successful he could be held liable in the event of an accident. Although the Government has chosen not to indemnify its own citizens, it must indemnify the reactor vendor if it wants a new reactor. Hence the Deed of Indemnity was produced last year, which does in fact indemnify the vendor.”

Wood told the Senate inquiry on October 25, 2000, “If I had to sum up my concerns in one sentence, it would be that for the first time in my long association with … ANSTO, I do not feel comfortable with what the organisation is telling the public and its own staff.”

Senate inquiry into the contract for a new reactor at Lucas Heights
October 25, 2000
Tony Wood (former head of ANSTO’s Division of Engineering and Reactors)
Transcript of comments on insurance from: www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/comsen.htm

“I would like to concentrate now mainly on the two questions of ‘nuclear liability’ and ‘the worst accident’, because these two items are still both open to the committee to influence change, should it choose to do so. First, on nuclear liability, in our society, if we feel exposed to some risk of financial loss from the activities of some third party, we have two options: we can take out insurance, or we can accept the risk, knowing that if we are damaged later we may exercise our common law right to seek damages through the law courts. However, it would be prudent to check first on the financial status of the party we intend to sue—it could be a man of straw and not worth suing.

It is little different with respect to possible damage from nuclear installations, as Mr Priceman mentioned earlier, because we all know that we are not insured against this risk. He mentioned in Australia; I say around the world, because nobody around the world these days is insured against nuclear risk. For the last 20 years or so, all of our insurance policies have had nuclear exclusion clauses. This does not worry most of us because we are not exposed to the risk.

But let us consider the people living near the reactor, who are exposed to the risk. Let us think the unthinkable: say there was a reactor accident at Lucas Heights and the affected people wanted to sue ANSTO for damages. There are no worries about ANSTO’s ability to pay—the Commonwealth owns ANSTO. However, you may be aware that it is a common law requirement that, for a damages claim to be successful, the claimant must be able to establish not only that he has been damaged, but also that the damage arose from the defendant’s negligence. This last part is the tricky part, because the classical defence is to show there has been no negligence. It would be claimed that either all reasonable steps had been taken or that someone else was to blame. There is no doubt that this would happen. If it did not, the crown lawyers would be in breach of their ethical duty to their client.

In the USA, this is what the Presidential Commission on Catastrophic Accidents had to say in 1988 on the effectiveness of common law in nuclear accidents, and I am quoting from the OECD report, Liability and compensation for nuclear damage: “The Commission expressed the belief that applying the common law principles of actions for damages would result in an outright denial of recovery or a difficult and protracted process.” That is quite unambiguous. Other nations have recognised this too and responded, through conventions or other means, by waiving the requirement to prove negligence. They did this through legislation based on certain conventions in which the plant operator was declared absolutely liable. This removed fault from the basis of liability, just leaving causation. The citizens of Britain, USA, Canada, Japan, Germany, France and the Netherlands all enjoy this concession.

Given that the Australian government is looking for public support for the project, and given that the EIS tells us that the worst accident would have trivial consequences and hence a close to zero pay-out, one would think there would be a rush to offer this concession to Australian citizens. But, no, the government has refused to offer absolute liability. As a consequence, Australians seeking compensation would have to prove negligence. Recall that the American commission said that this may amount to outright denial of recovery. You might ask: why would the government take such an extraordinarily negative position on this matter? I tried to pursue this in Canberra, with conflicting responses from two ministries. Finally I think I have a clue. It comes from a letter I received from Senator Minchin’s head of science and technology policy, Dr Tucker, which says:

“You have raised the issue of absolute liability. I understand this means the liability irrespective of intention or negligence. It is apparent that the issue of absolute liability has financial implications well beyond the risks associated with research reactor operations at Lucas Heights. I am informed that the Commonwealth, as a matter of financial policy, does not accept such liability.”

What does this mean? I think that the lawyers and advisers in Canberra are not familiar with the concept of absolute liability and are worried and suspicious that if this is offered to the nuclear industry others will want it too. My response to this is that the lawyers in North America, Japan, Britain and other places have managed to negotiate this hurdle. Their world has not fallen in.

Perhaps our people need a little shove from this committee.

Now I come to the worst part of the liability story and that is the deception part. A not so well known aspect of the nuclear liability problem is that no reactor vendor around the world would build a reactor here or anywhere else without receiving indemnity. The government’s response was to produce the so-called deed of indemnity, which we heard about earlier, which indemnifies ANSTO and its officers and agents against loss. There is nothing wrong with this and the vendor was satisfied but then someone had the idea of misrepresenting the deed of indemnity as being something that it is not. ANSTO said in its submission to the parliamentary works committee: “The deed therefore ensures residents are adequately protected in terms of nuclear compensation claims.”

And Senator Minchin said in a letter dated 18 February 1999, which justifies the absence of absolute indemnity, that the same ends will be achieved by alternative means. He then went on to describe these means as being the deed of indemnity. This invites us to believe that offering the assurance that ANSTO will pay its bills provides adequate compensation protection to residents and somehow this is equivalent to waiving the legal obligation to prove negligence in a court of law.

I do not know whether you would believe this but I cannot. I seek the committee’s support in influencing the government to offer absolute liability then the deed of indemnity can go back to being what it truly is and that is just a means of indemnifying INVAP. The residents could then enjoy the degree of protection offered to their overseas counterparts and this at no cost to the government.”

Whistleblower exposes Lucas Heights nuclear accidents

Jim Green
March/April 1999 (plus updates)

An employee of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) has revealed information about a series of accidents at the nuclear reactor plant in the southern Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights.

The ANSTO whistle blower provided a statement to a journalist from the St George and Sutherland Shire Leader and to Sutherland Shire councillor Genevieve Rankin.

The statement began, “Some very serious accidents have happened at ANSTO over the last few weeks. The first accident was, while retrieving a spent fuel rod from its mortuary hole in the waste management section, the operators didn’t realise that the rod was in a very poor condition. The rod fell off the retaining mechanism while being transported in its flask. As the operators opened the flask door the spent fuel rod fell out of its shielded flask and onto the floor in front of them. These rods, although they have been stored for many years, are in very poor condition and are highly radioactive. The operators quickly lowered the transport flask onto the rod so that they were shielded from massive doses of radiation. I believe this happened a few weeks ago and they still do not know how they will ever retrieve the rod from the floor under the flask.”

ANSTO released a statement acknowledging that the accident occurred on February 1. According to ANSTO, four staff members were exposed to radiation doses between 50 to 500 microsieverts; the upper figure is half the ANNUAL limit for members of the public.

On March 16, ANSTO confirmed that the spent fuel rod remains where it fell. ANSTO says it intends to design and build a device to grasp the fuel rod and place it inside its flask.

Last year, it was revealed that a number of “airtight” tubes containing spent fuel rods had been breached by water and a number of fuel rods had corroded as a result. Increased humidity levels suggested other tubes also contained water, and it was during investigation of these tubes that the February 1 accident occurred. When the revelations were made last year, ANSTO’s executive director, Helen Garnett, said the fuel rods posed “no safety or environmental hazard” regardless of the infiltration of water.

Former ANSTO scientist Murray Scott says “the corrosion of old spent fuel HIFAR rods is a real concern. A few rods are already deemed unacceptable for reprocessing in the US.”

Radioisotope processing emissions

The ANSTO whistle blower described another accident which occurred in February 1999 and involved the processing of radioisotopes: “A large amount of radioactive gas was emitted from building 54 two weeks ago. I am told the filters were bypassed at the time, a mistake was made and radioactive gas was emitted into the atmosphere. The escape was that large that the monitors in the HIFAR nuclear reactor were set off. This distance would be about 500 metres. I am also led to believe that staff members working outside were contaminated. ANSTO have covered this incident up and have not even told the staff that this incident occurred. Many staff believe that a site emergency should have been declared.”

Yet another accident was described as follows by the ANSTO employee: “A large amount of radioactive iodine was released into the atmosphere from ARI (ANSTO’s radioisotope processing plant). Again ANSTO has covered up the incident. I received this information from a very reputable source and we think these incidents have been covered by ANSTO as they are desperate to get the new reactor approved. These incidents I’m sure would not go down well with the environmental impact statement being considered at the moment.”

Responding to these claims, ANSTO acknowledged that during a period of three weeks in February 1999, there were two occasions when radiation releases above routine levels required its isotope processing plant to be shut down. One involved the release of xenon and krypton, and the other, iodine. According to ANSTO, “On neither occasions did the release exceed the permitted level of emissions. There were no significant personnel exposures and no offsite health impacts.” ANSTO did not confirm or deny the claim that alarm systems in the HIFAR reactor were triggered by the release of radiation some distance away.

At odds with ANSTO management’s version of the accidents were the ANSTO staff members who wrote in a March 3, 2000, letter to Genevieve Rankin: “The ANSTO Board has a very limited idea of what is really transpiring at Lucas Heights. For instance, the radiation contamination scare last year was only brought to the staff’s attention because of a local newspaper. The incident was of such gravity, that the executive should have made an announcement over the site emergency monitor about the incident to inform the staff. Instead the management practiced a culture of secrecy and cover up, even to the extent of actively and rudely dissuading staff from asking too many questions about the event. The unions were outraged at the executive management concerning this incident but passively towed the management line because they wanted job security with a new reactor.”

Who is to be believed? ANSTO management, despite its documented record of secrecy and its documented record of being fast and loose with the truth? Or anonymous ANSTO staff members?

Cover up

In a clumsy attempt to diffuse concern and anger about the accidents, ANSTO asserted that “None of the events was associated with the HIFAR research reactor.” However the fuel rods were originally used to fuel the reactor, and most or all of the radioisotopes were produced in the reactor.

The accidents, and the cover up, occurred at a crucial juncture in the debate over the plan to replace the HIFAR nuclear reactor. The ANSTO whistle blower said “these incidents have been covered up by ANSTO as they are desperate to get the new reactor approved. These incidents I’m sure would not go down well with the environmental impact statement being considered at the moment.”

Genevieve Rankin said:

“Neither the Health Department, the Sutherland Council or local schools were notified about the February accidents although Council has an agreement with ANSTO that it would be notified of such accidents.”

“It is a disgrace that ANSTO management continues to be allowed to expose the community to high levels of radioactive gases and doesn’t even bother to inform the community when this happens. We only find out by way of information supplied by public spirited staff who believe the community should be informed.”

“Local residents can’t help wondering how many other accidents have been covered up over the years. ANSTO has clearly tried to suppress the information on the latest accidents during the assessment period for the new reactor. The environment minister Senator Hill decided to delay the announcement of the approval for the new reactor until the Monday after the NSW state election in order to minimise public comment on the issues during an election period.”

ARPANSA

ANSTO denies covering up the accidents, saying the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) was notified. However, ARPANSA was nonexistent at the time of the accidents involving fuel rods, the most noteable of which took place on 1 February 1999 when a fuel rod fell from its flask. ARPANSA came into existence on 5 February 1999.

ARPANSA itself said, “These incidents occurred at facilities that are not yet regulated by ARPANSA.” (First Quarterly Report of the Chief Executive Officer for the period 5 February to 31 March 1999.)

If the acting CEO of ARPANSA was notified about the accidents, he did not release the information publicly.

ARPANSA said: “Four incidents at the Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre run by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), have recently been reported in the media and discussed at the Senate Inquiry hearings at Sutherland, NSW on 14 April 1999. One incident did not involve radiation (the release of water into the Woronora River), while the others were not serious incidents in the sense of causing significant exposures of workers or the public to radiation. These incidents occurred at facilities that are not yet regulated by ARPANSA. Under the ARPANS Act ANSTO has until 5 August 1999 to apply for facility licences. However, the three incidents are being fully investigated by both ANSTO and ARPANSA to determine their root causes and to establish improvements which will help to ensure that such incidents do not recur.” (ARPANSA, First Quarterly Report of the Chief Executive Officer for the period 5 February to 31 March 1999.)

ANSTO says the government appointed Safety Review Committee was notified of the recent accidents. But the Safety Review Committee was abolished during the restructuring of regulatory bodies. What power did the Committee have at the time of the accidents? Perhaps the Safety Review Committee was advised of the accidents, but the Sutherland Council’s representative on the Committee was not.

Evidently the Nuclear Safety Bureau was also notified, but it too was abolished as part of the restructuring. (And approximately half of the NSB staff were former ANSTO employees.)

ALP skeletons

NSW premier Bob Carr attempted to minimise the electoral fall out from the ANSTO accidents and cover up. Carr said the ANSTO nuclear plant is on commonwealth land and that state powers to regulate ANSTO were removed in 1992. He did not note that it was a Labor federal government who passed the 1992 law making ANSTO immune from state environmental and public health regulations.

More info on accidents at Lucas Heights:

http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/30410/20090218-0153/www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/accidents.html

Safety first: Lucas Heights told to face plane truth

By Andrew Stevenson
Sydney Morning Herald
April 22, 2002

The operator of the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor has been ordered to significantly upgrade its emergency response plans for its planned new reactor to include the consequences of a successful terrorist attack.

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation’s application for the replacement reactor had argued off-site emergency arrangements would not be necessary because the facility would be so safe.

But John Loy, the head of the Federal Government’s nuclear watchdog, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Authority, has confirmed that an independent review of emergency responses must be undertaken before the reactor can begin operation.

The new reactor, near the aging Hifar reactor, is expected to be operational in 2005.

While he does not believe the terrorist threat to be credible, Dr Loy wants the scenario, plus the impact of a commercial aircraft crash, to be considered in emergency response plans.

The strictures – contained in the safety authority’s approval documents – come as the existing emergency plans have been strongly criticised by the chair of the Sutherland Emergency Management Committee, Genevieve Rankin, and Tony Wood, a former ANSTO controller of reactors.

Both say there are no logical plans in place to give residents around Lucas Heights access to iodine tablets if there is a significant radiation leak.

Mr Wood says existing emergency plans are a shambles. He says ANSTO must review its plans for the existing reactor at Lucas Heights in light of a possible terrorist attack.

“There is no recognition this could be a problem; this is the problem,” he said. “The emergency planning is inadequate because they have made assumptions which understate the potential consequences about the worst-case accident.”

Mr Wood said saturating the thyroid gland with potassium iodide tablets would dramatically lower the risk, especially among children, of contracting thyroid cancer.

“It’s like a magic pill, but you’ve got to take it within hours, and I’m not at all confident the people who are going to make the decisions realise how important the time element is.”

Councillor Rankin says the emergency framework is a “disaster plan based on the idea you’ll never have a disaster”.
“It’s very much beset by internal contradictions and these should be sorted out and they should have been sorted out before ARPANSA signed a licence for ANSTO,” Cr Rankin said.

“Fundamentally, the plan calls for shelter and for people to seal off any air source coming into the house. But to get the iodine tablets they’ll have to leave.”

The tablets, stored at Sutherland district ambulance stations, would be made available at potential evacuation points, such as Waratah Park, a fact which is not advertised because the plan is based on taking shelter.

“The emergency management committee, which includes the local chiefs of the fire brigades, ambulance, police and a representative of NSW Health, was unanimous in saying [to ANSTO] that the plans ought to be reassessed,” Cr Rankin said.
ANSTO has rejected a meeting with Cr Rankin and the Sutherland Police Superintendent, Henry Karpic, to discuss the issue, preferring to work through an ANSTO-chaired local liaison group.

Dr Loy said he saw no fundamental problem with the plans. “Maybe we need to work out in a bit more detail about who does what to whom on the day, but I don’t have any sense of concern from the NSW agencies that, provided they have the right information, they can do what they need to do.”