Author: NuclearAdmin

A case study of a PR company spinning for the nuclear industry (1999-2004).

Michels Warren PRopaganda

Introduction

June 2004 marks the fifth anniversary of PR company Michel Warren’s involvement in the federal government’s plan to establish a national nuclear waste dump in South Australia. A great deal of information is now available about the role of Michels Warren in this controversy thanks to documents released under Freedom of Information (FoI) legislation.

Parts of the FoI material were discussed in a media release from the SA environment minister John Hill on May 5, 2004 (included below), but a closer reading of the FoI documents reveals much else of interest – including proof that federal science minister Peter McGauran has misled the Parliament.

Misleading statements by the federal government

While this paper focusses on the role of Michels Warren, it should be noted that the FoI material reveals evidence of the federal government misleading the Parliament and the public.

The FoI material reveals that the dump could be 25 times larger than the government has ever publicly acknowledged. A February 10, 2000 email from a senior government official, Rosemary Marcon, says that the “actual disposal area is a 500mx500m” (250,000 square metres) and she repeats that statement in a March 22, 2000 email. Yet public statements from the government refer to a 100mx100m disposal area – 10,000 square metres (e.g. Environmental Impact Statement, p.11.) Had the reference to a much larger dump been made once, and/or had it been made by a junior official, it might be passed over as an error. But the statement is made twice, and it is made by a senior government official.

In response to a Question on Notice, federal science minister Peter McGauran asserted unequivocally that departmental officers had not developed a list of ‘experts’ to make public comments in support of the proposed nuclear waste dump. (Senate Hansard, October 27, 2003, p.16471, Question No. 2134, full text copied below.) However, the FoI material makes it clear that such a list was indeed developed. A July 6, 2000 email from Caroline Perkins, a senior government official, lists four “technical experts … who have agreed to assisting us in general”, though their names are blanked out. McGauran’s unequivocal assertion that departmental officers had not developed a list of ‘experts’ to comment on the dump was clearly false – and he was clearly misleading the Parliament and the public.

A 2002 government document released under FoI legislation (and previously leaked), titled “Communication Strategy for the National Radioactive Waste Repository Project”, states that: “An Adelaide based communications consultant, Michels Warren, has been subcontracted … to assist with the development, implementation and refinement of this strategy which has entailed the following: … enlistment of a scientific liaison officer and other willing experts”.

A 2003 document written by Michels Warren discusses plans to organise eminent Australians and members of South Australian medical and science community to participate in the ‘communications’ program. Michels Warren states: “This would involve a concerted program of letters to the editor of The Advertiser and responding and participating on talk radio programs.”

The government and Michels Warren seem to have struggled to find “willing experts”. For example, Mike Duggan from Michels Warren said in a July 6, 2000 email that it would be a “great idea” to gather experts for a media conference, “if possible at one of the universities or hospitals where waste is held”, in support of the dump – but no such media conference eventuated.

Those ‘experts’ that have been enlisted have been error-prone. For example, the FoI material contains a summary of a May 2000 radio interview with Dr Leon Mitchell of Flinders University, who falsely claimed the dump would be lined with an impermeable layer to isolate it from the underlying earth (the dump trenches will be unlined). Mitchells also said the dump was for things such as watch dials not nuclear power plants and reactors. In fact, dismantled nuclear reactor components will be sent to the dump (if it proceeds), and that reactor waste will amount to up to 5,000 cubic metres, which is greater than the entire existing stockpile of 3,700 cubic metres of waste destined for the dump. Michels Warren was involved in organising radio interviews with Mitchell, the FoI material reveals. Other enlisted ‘experts’ have falsely claimed that the dump is only for low-level waste, and one ‘expert’ even claimed that the waste would not be buried!

McGauran misled Parliament on another point. He asserted unequivocally in a response to a Question on Notice that no ‘experts’ were provided with media training by consultants to the department. The FoI material reveals that McGauran’s claim was false. On July 12, 2000, Michels Warren charged the government $240 to provide a written briefing to one of the enlisted ‘experts’, Dr. Gerald Laurence, in preparation for media interviews. On July 7, 2000, Michels Warren briefed another enlisted ‘expert’, Dr. John Patterson, for a radio interview. Then on July 12-13, 2000, Michels Warren billed the federal government $800 for media training with the government’s scientific liaison officer on the dump project, Dr. Keith Lokan.

Why Michels Warren would be conducting briefings about the dump is anyone’s guess. The FoI material is replete with factual errors. For example, a draft letter to a newspaper, states: “Unequivocally, it [the dump] will only ever contain low-level waste.” Yet the dump will take both low- and intermediate-level waste, including (according to the EIS, pp.45-46) long-lived intermediate-level waste. The draft letter also states that “Australia produces no high-level waste …” Yet the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, operator of the reactor at Lucas Heights in Sydney, acknowledges that its spent nuclear fuel meets the heat and radiological criteria for classification as high-level waste, and the New South Wales Environment Protection Agency has also acknowledged that the Lucas Heights reactor generates high-level waste.

The context for the “willing experts” strategy is made clear in the FoI documents. Market research by the McGregor Tan company revealed: “A knee-jerk negative reaction to sighting the Commonwealth crest – it is interpreted as the symbol accompanying government propaganda.” The market research also revealed: “Cynical responses to government promises and attempts at reassurance.” And McGregor Tan found that: “Ministers’ statements are rarely believed, regardless of the individual Minister’s honourable intentions.”

Michels Warren’s nuclear dump PRopaganda

Michels Warren has been involved in the following campaigns (among others): a controversy over cadmium at West Lakes, Bridgestone tyres, bacteria in fast food, SA Water contamination, ETSA Utilities, the SA Freemasons, Telstra, WMC Ltd., and campaigns on behalf of the corporate owners of the Beverley and Honeymoon uranium mines in South Australia.

Michels Warren has been involved in the nuclear dump campaign since June 1999. Its involvement has consisted of several discrete contracts rather than an ongoing involvement. A July 8, 1999 letter from Stephen Middleton from Michels Warren states that the company is “delighted to be part of the project” and has “hit the ground running” since it started on the project in the previous month. Michels Warren has maintained its enthusiasm. A 2003 document – a tender seeking involvement in the federal government’s covert plan to seize control of land for the dump site – states that: “We are available 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week to provide our support to the Minister and this project.”

A September 27, 2000 email written by Stephen Middleton from Michels Warren talks about the need to “soften up the community” and “sell” the repository: “We will lose ground once again unless we can soften up the community on the need for the repository and the reasons why SA has been identified as the best location. The prospect of the Minister announcing the preferred site before we can get to the community with something that explains what it all means makes my head spin. The wider research into issues such as Lucas Heights, uranium mining, the nuclear fuel cycle etc etc can be tackled as a separate issue. It should not hold up anything we are doing in terms of selling the repository to South Australians. The rest of the country probably doesn’t care less about the repository, but it is a big issue in SA. Further delays could be potentially disastrous.”

Why on earth is a South Australian company willingly involving itself in the federal government’s nuclear dump plans? After all, Michels Warren itself acknowledges that the dump is an unwanted imposition on SA. A 2003 Michels Warren document released under FoI legislation states:

“The National Repository could never be sold as “good news” to South Australians. There are few, if any, tangible benefits such as jobs, investment or improved infrastructure. Its merits to South Australians, at the most, are intangible and the range and complexity of issues make them difficult to communicate.”

So why is Michels Warren dumping on its home state? Money, of course. The federal government has acknowledged making the following payments to Michels Warren (in response to a Question on Notice from Senator Bob Brown – copied in full below):

* $359,000 in financial years 2000-01, 2001-02, 2002-03 (Senate Hansard, October 27, 2003, p.16471 – copied in full below).

* in 2003, Michels Warren and the federal government signed a $107,000 contract for work connected to the government’s compulsory seizure of land for the dump. At least $26,000 of that amount was paid (and quite possibly the entire $107,000).

* undisclosed payments to Michels Warren in 1999-2000.

The 1999-2000 payments amount to at least $102,000 up to May 31, 2000, according to a document included in the FoI material (Progress Payment Certificate, Number 12, August 24, 2000).

So in total, Michels Warren has been paid at least $487,000 to dump on SA … and possibly much more.

Michels Warren staff have been paid at rates up to $192.50 per hour (GST inclusive) for their work on the nuclear dump campaign.

The detailed breakdowns of payments to Michels Warren raise further concerns about whether tax-payers are getting value for money. For example:

* $160 to draft a letter to editor of Mt Barker Times

* $894 for Michels Warren employees to attend a public meeting organised by the Australian Conservation Foundation and for preparatory and debriefing work surrounding the meeting (a full house at the Adelaide Town Hall, with approximately 1000 people attending).

* $225 to draft a letter to a constituent.

* $240 to schedule talk-back radio interviews.

Michels Warren is not the only company in receipt of government funding for PR and research in relation to the nuclear waste dump, e.g.

* $61,369 paid to Worthington Di Marzio in 2003 for market research. (Senate Hansard, October 29, 2003, pp.16681-2, Question No. 2139.)

* $72,000 paid to Hill & Knowlton in 2002-03. (Senate Hansard, October 27, 2003, p.16471, Question No. 2136.) Hill & Knowlton is well known for its involvement in the imaginative ‘babies in the incubator’ fiasco in Iraq in 1990-91, and for its work with tobacco companies, Enron, etc.

Monitoring protesters

An August 16, 2000 “high priority” email reveals that Caroline Perkins, a senior official in the Department of Industry, Science and Resources – at that time under the direction of Senator Nick Minchin – was asked to compile information on protesters. “[T[he minister wants a short biography of our main opponents in the Ivy campaign by about 11am our time (pre-rally)”, the email said. The rest of the email is blacked out under FoI provisions. The email refers to a Michels Warren employee – no doubt Michels Warren helped compile the biographies.

In 1999 Michels Warren was working hard “obviating the impact of campaigns by opponents and the ‘I’m With Ivy Campaign’ run by Ch 7.”

The Michels Warren worksheet for February 2000 includes the following: “Liaise investigator re green planning. Liaise R Yeeles [from WMC Ltd.] re updated intelligence.” Was Michels Warren employing a private investigator as that comment suggests?

And on March 28, 2000, $150 for activities concerned with a “Protest at South Australian Parliament”, and $160 four days earlier to “Liaise WMC, Police and media re weekend protests.”

And in April 2000: “check re new protest activities”, “liaise SA Police re same”, “internet search re protests”, and “update intelligence re OHMS Not Boms protest group”.

In March 2000, Rosemary Marcon, a government official, asked Michels Warren for the details of  an “activist website which we should monitor”. She was advised by Michels Warren that the site is <www.lockon.org>. Evidently that piece of ‘intelligence’ was off-beam – the website advertises streaming live shows from nude male dancers in Montreal!

The FoI documentation is frequently contemptuous of opponents of the planned nuclear waste dump (about 80% of the South Australian population). The option of displaying the Environmental Impact Statement in the Conservation Centre of South Australia is treated as a joke. Opponents of the dump are described as “anti-nuclear anarchists”. Michels Warren co-founder Daryl Warren refers in a July 14, 2003 email to protests and “demons”. On July 10, 2003, Warren stated that: “It has become apparent during the week that people seem to have lost the plot on the repository as it becomes embroiled in a political fight.”

In response to an invitation to the federal science minister to attend a conference at Adelaide University in March 2000, Michel’s Warren employee Stephen Middleton recommends against attending the conference. Middleton wrote: “The better option is to:

(i) dismiss the gathering as nothing more than a stunt

(ii) attempt to discredit it with counter media measures before, during and after.”

Doctoring photos

The FoI material suggests that photographs have been doctored to suit the government’s ends. A February 14, 2000 email from a senior government official to Michels Warren’s graphic designer refers to a photo “with the sandhills removed.” The rationale was explained in a December 13, 1999 email by the same government official: “Dunes are a sensitive area with respect to Aboriginal Heritage.”

The February, 2000 email also asked: “Can the horizon be straightened up as well.”

Scare campaign

A recurring theme in the exchanges between the federal government and Michels Warren is the attempt to justify the dump by mounting a scare-campaign in relation to existing storage facilities. Yet they get their lines muddled up. One document released under FoI includes that statement that “none” of the waste “is stored satisfactorily” in existing stores. That is in direct contradiction to a June 2000 document document under Senator Nick Minchin’s name (“Radioactive waste: the eight biggest myths”), which states: “The safety of the storage of radioactive waste is proven by the fact that there are fifty stores around Australia housing radioactive waste and there has never been an accident exposing a person to unsafe levels of radiation.”

And in a May 17, 2000 media release, Minchin said: “South Australians have nothing to fear from radioactive waste. The fact is that waste is already stored in downtown Adelaide in complete safety.” Anyone claiming otherwise was merely trying to “whip up anti-radioactive waste hysteria”, Minchin claimed. So by his logic, Michels Warren and the federal government itself are guilty of trying to whip up hysteria.

June 2008

Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
PO Box 6022,
House of Representatives, Parliament House, Canberra ACT 2600
Tel: (02) 6277 7700      Fax: (02) 6273 4100

June 11, 2008

Re: Radioactive Waste Management Election Commitments

To Prime Minister Kevin Rudd

Cc: Minister Martin Ferguson, Minister Jenny Macklin, Minister Warren Snowdon, Senator Trish Crossin
   
Dear Prime Minister,

Before the federal election there was a clear commitment that a Labor government would repeal the Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act (CRWMA 2005/06). Almost 200 days since the election, this promise has not been publicly reiterated and there is grave concern from the undersigned organisations that your government is considering rescinding this promise.

Labor voted against the 2005 legislation and the 2006 amendments, with Labor MPs describing the legislation as ‘extreme’, ‘arrogant’, ‘heavy-handed’, ‘draconian’, ‘sorry’, ‘sordid’, ‘extraordinary’ and ‘profoundly shameful’. A number of Labor MPs unequivocally committed a Labor government to repeal of the legislation.

Given this clear commitment, why has the government not yet announced repeal of the Act?

Many affected people, Members of the Northern Territory Government, Territory organisations and national environment groups have made numerous requests to you and Minister Ferguson to clarify when the commitment to repeal this draconian and undemocratic law will be acted upon.

Minister Ferguson has not been forthcoming or transparent in his response to these requests and is out of step with promises of a process which is “scientific, transparent, accountable, fair and allows access to appeal mechanisms” and to “ensure full community consultation in radioactive waste decision-making processes” (ALP Platform, Chapter 5).

The undersigned groups call for you to immediately announce a repeal date for the CRWMA and notify all affected Traditional Owners, communities and stakeholder organisations.

National ALP Platform states the Federal Labor Government will “not proceed with the development of any of the current sites identified by the Howard Government in the Northern Territory, if no contracts have been entered into for those sites.” (ALP Platform, Chapter 5).

Given that no contracts have been entered into beyond the assessment phase, we ask you to confirm that processes related to the four sites currently being studied will cease when the assessment report is finalised. This includes the three nominated Department of Defence sites (Mt Everard, Harts Range and Fishers Ridge) and Muckaty, which was nominated by the Northern Land Council using extraordinary provisions of the CRWMA 2006.

We ask you to implement the resolution passed at the April 2008 NT Labor Conference: “Conference understands the nomination of Muckaty as a potential radioactive dump site, made under the CRWMA legislation, was not made with the full and informed consent of all Traditional Owners and affected people and as such does not comply with the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (ALRA). Conference calls for the Muckaty nomination to also be repealed when the CRWMA legislation is overturned.”

In respect of Northern Territory law and in recognition of strong and sustained opposition from the Northern Territory Government and communities throughout the NT, we ask you not to pursue any sites in the Territory to host a federal radioactive waste dump.

We further ask that the federal budget allocation of $3.8 million over the next two years for radioactive waste management be used for a national study of waste management options, a study which is in line with Labor’s platform commitments to handle this contentious issue in a manner which is scientific, transparent, accountable, and fair.

Prime Minister, there is no more time to waste.

Sincerely:

1. Beyond Nuclear Initiative – Natalie Wasley, uranium project coordinator
2. Friends of the Earth Australia – Dr Jim Green, national nuclear campaigner
3. The Wilderness Society – Alec Marr, Executive Director
4. Greenpeace Australia Pacific – Steve Campbell, campaign director
5. Top End Aboriginal Conservation Alliance – Donna Jackson, convenor
6. Medical Association for the Prevention of War – Dr Sue Wareham, OAM, President, MAPW (Australia); Dr Hilary Tyler (NT Branch)
7. Australian Student Environment Network
8. Environment Centre of the Northern Territory – Charles Roche, coordinator
9. Anti Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia – Jo Vallentine, convenor
10. Arid Lands Environment Centre – Jimmy Cocking, coordinator
11. Public Health Association – Michael Moore, Chief Executive Officer

Community reps in London to challenge world’s biggest mining multinational

October 28, 2009
Representatives of communities facing displacement by the massive Cerrejon mine are attending the Annual General Meeting of BHP Billiton plc in London on Thursday 29 October.
http://londonminingnetwork.org/2009/10/community-representatives-in-london-to-challenge-world%E2%80%99s-biggest-mining-multinational/

BHP Billiton is the biggest mining company in the world. Its headquarters are in Australia but it is also listed on the London Stock Exchange. BHP Billiton owns one-third of the Cerrejon Coal Company, which operates the biggest opencast coal export mine in the world. The mine is in the Colombian department (province) of La Guajira.

In 2007, in response to continuing international criticism, Cerrejon Coal set up an Independent Panel of Investigation into the impacts of its operations. The Panel made a number of recommendations in early 2008. As a result, in December 2008, Cerrejon Coal reached an agreement with former residents of Tabaco, a community evicted and forcibly displaced for mine expansion in 2001 – see http://www.colombiasolidarity.org.uk/content/view/446/31/. The company also began negotiations aiming at community relocation (as opposed to individual family compensation) for other villages affected by the mine. The villages involved are Chancleta, Patilla, Roche and Tamaquitos.

The Presidents of the Community Action Committees of Chancleta and Roche, Wilman Palmesano and Yoe Arregoces, are in London to make their concerns known to shareholders in BHP Billiton. They complain that Cerrejon Coal is not negotiating with them in good faith. They are also concerned about threats being made against them because of their community organising and criticisms of the company. Today they are presenting to BHP Billiton and its shareholders the following Demands and Communique.

For further background, see below the Communique.

Demands of the communities of Roche and Chancleta

in the Department of La Guajira, Colombia, concerning the current process of community relocation by the Cerrejon Coal Company (33.33% owned by BHP Billiton)

In all aspects of the relocation, there should be mutual agreement and consultation. The company must abstain from dividing and manipulating the communities.

Expert advice: an independent advice team must be established, paid for by the company but not dependent upon it.

Cerrejon Coal has not followed the recommendations of the Independent Panel of Investigation and the World Bank guidelines on involuntary resettlement, even though these are the minimum standards which should be followed. We do not accept that these guidelines are sufficient and just for our communities, and so we insist that whatever process is carried out should be by prior mutual agreement.

There must be consultation and agreement on all the stages and elements of the relocation. Above all, the timetables and relocation plans must be discussed and agreed with the communities and their advisers. The communities’ own proposals must be taken into account. The communities must have a say and a vote in the selection of contractors.

There is a preference for collective relocation to a rural area, with sufficient land, a guarantee of economic sustainability after the relocation, good services (electricity, drinking water etc) and above all, good education.

There should be respect for the rights of all the traditional inhabitants of the area without discrimination or exclusion on the basis of censuses which do not reflect in a transparent manner the number of inhabitants of the communities. Members of the community who have sold the properties to the mine or have otherwise been displaced must be taken into account.

A solution must be found to health problems, addressing both the contamination and the treatment and prevention of illnesses; including, for example, access to specialists.

An overall agreement must be reached about the reconstruction of Roche, the area and the distribution of the rooms and houses, and their design. This must include elements of self-build as a way of generating employment and investment. Construction must not continue before reaching agreement on this. The same must apply to the other communities.

The property valuations must be handed over, and there must be negotiation about them. There must be clarity over the levels of compensation and indemnity.

There must be an end to the pressure and persecution which occur every time a proposal is made. Yoe and Wilman are worried about their security on their return to La Guajira.

There must be investment, productive economic projects and/or employment from now on during the process of relocation.

29 October 2009

Communique to the Cerrejon Coal company and its shareholders, the Colombian authorities
and national and international public opinion from representatives of the communities of Roche and Chancleta
in the Department of La Guajira, Colombia, affected by the Cerrejon coal mine (33.33% owned by BHP Billiton)

We, Yoe Arregoces and Wilman Palmesano, have been in Switzerland, Germany and the United Kingdom, explaining the situation which our communities are experiencing as a result of mining. We are seeking to be heard and we are seeking solutions to the most pressing problems that our people are facing. To this end, we have met with NGOs, government representatives, politicians, purchasers of coal, and the companies which own the Cerrejon mine.

Being in Europe, we have been worried about our security and physical and mental wellbeing when we return to our communities. We know from former visits by community and union leaders that they have frequently been subjected to accusations and all manner of pressures by the Cerrejon Coal company because of the statements they have made outside Colombia. Being here in Europe, we have learnt of a strong rumour about a possible incursion by paramilitary groups into the area where our communities are, and this increases our concern and creates anxiety in our communities and for us as well.

We call on the local, departmental and national authorities in Colombia and on the Cerrejon Coal company and its shareholders to take the measures necessary to guarantee the security of the communities and their leaders.

London, 29 October 2009

Background: community removals round the Cerrejon Coal mine

BHP Billiton was part of a consortium of three multinational companies which in late 2000 bought the Colombian Government’s 50% share of the massive opencast Cerrejon coal mine in the Department (province) of La Guajira in northern Colombia, reputedly the largest opencast coal mine in the world. The mine, operated by Exxon subsidiary Intercor (which owned the other 50% share) had a history of forced relocations of Indigenous and Afrocolombian communities, with inadequate or non-existent compensation, to make way for mine expansion.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Indigenous Wayuu communities were moved to make way for a coal export port at Puerto Bolivar, and for a railway built to carry coal from the mine to the port. Burial sites were desecrated and tensions caused between family groups as displaced families moved into the traditional territory of other families.

In August 2001, the small farming village of Tabaco, inhabited mainly by Colombians of African descent, was bulldozed by the mining company in a brutal operation accompanied by hundreds of armed soldiers and security personnel. In February 2002, the consortium of which BHP Billiton was a part bought the remaining 50% of the Cerrejon mine from Intercor. BHP Billiton now owns 33.33% of Cerrejon Coal, the mine’s operator.

A sustained campaign of community opposition followed, supported by dissident shareholders in BHP Billiton and others around the world. Some of the former residents of Tabaco organized themselves through the Tabaco Relocation Committee, which was demanding not only compensation for the destruction of homes and livelihoods but also community relocation to farmland of equivalent agricultural value – as the World Bank’s Guidelines on Involuntary Resettlement urge. The best that Cerrejon Coal was willing to offer was family by family financial payouts based on property valuations which many in the community disputed. In 2007 a complaint against BHP Billiton was made to the Australian National Contact Point of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

In response to the criticism, in 2007 BHP Billiton and the other two multinational companies involved in Cerrejon Coal (Anglo American and Xstrata) commissioned an Independent Panel of Investigation to look into Cerrejon Coal’s social programmes and its general impacts on local communities. The Panel found substance in much of the criticism that had been levelled at the company. It made a number of recommendations, particularly concerning a just settlement for the people of Tabaco. The Panel recommended, among other things, that Cerrejon Coal work with the Tabaco Relocation Committee as well as with other former residents of the village to ensure just compensation, buy collective land for agriculture and help construct a church and community centre for common use by former residents. The Panel also recommended that in future open, transparent negotiations take place with communities badly affected by the proximity of the mine, leading to collective relocation with community consent.

Cerrejon Coal and its three multinational shareholders, including BHP Billiton, broadly accepted the Panel’s recommendations. Negotiations with the Tabaco Relocation Committee led to an agreement in December 2008 which, according to the Relocation Committee’s lawyer, contained most of what the Committee had been struggling for, including the purchase of a piece of land to which families from the former settlement could be moved, in order to continue their life together as farmers. Negotiations began with other small farming communities facing relocation as the mine expands – Roche, Chancleta, Patilla and Tamaquitos.

But conflict continues. There has been strong criticism of the levels of financial compensation in the Tabaco agreement. Provision of infrastructure to the new community – roads, drainage, electricity – is the responsibility of the local authority, and therefore relies on good will from the local mayor. The land being bought by the company is sufficient for housing but insufficient for farming on the scale practiced at Tabaco. It is unclear how people will make a living.

Difficulties also remain for the communities currently facing displacement. There are disagreements over the number of people subject to relocation. The company refuses to acknowledge the need for productive land in the relocated settlements, even though it is essential for the communities to continue their agricultural activities. In recent years, people have found it almost impossible to support themselves as mining expansion has encroached on agricultural land, and while the relocation process is under way – a process which may take two years – people will have no means at all of supporting themselves. Community members accuse Cerrejon Coal of undermining their community leadership, taking decisions without consultation, publishing relocation timetables on the company’s website without informing the communities, calling meetings at short notice and causing confusion and divisions by cancelling meetings already agreed at the last minute, informing only some of the participants and not others. The company has not succeeded in creating a relationship of trust with the communities and community leaders. Community members remain in the dark about what they will eventually receive – what kind of houses, land, work and financial compensation.

Meanwhile, people are living in extremely difficult conditions, with blasting from the mine causing damage to homes, coal dust in the air causing skin and respiratory problems, land on which people used to work being swallowed up by mining activities or fenced off in readiness for mine expansion. People feel that their communities are being ‘strangled’. The Independent Panel of Investigation recommended that the company do more to ensure that people could make a living – including provision of services and financing of small-scale economic projects – but it has not done so to date.

At the same time, Cerrejon mine workers who are members of the SINTRACARBON trade union are concerned about the inferior working conditions of non-unionised contract workers at the mine. SINTRACARBON is also worried about exposure to coal dust. The union says that coal dust is a hazardous substance under Colombian law and that because of this the company is legally bound to pay higher social security contributions than it is currently paying, in order to facilitate earlier retirement for mine workers.

Public meeting on BHP Billiton in Colombia

http://londonminingnetwork.org/2009/10/public-meeting-on-bhp-billiton-in-colombia/
October 2009

Amnesty International UK’s Human Rights Action Centre

Karmen Ramirez works with Wayuu Indigenous women’s groups Cabildo Wayuu Nouna de Campamento and Sutsuin Jiyeyu Wayuu – Fuerza de Mujeres Wayuu (SJW-FMW). The Wayuu People live between the mine and the coal export port of Puerto Bolivar. They are affected by the transportation of coal from the mine and the militarisation of the area to protect the company’s interests.

Yoe Arregoces and Wilman Palmesano represent the Afrocolombian communities of Roche and Chancleta, which face relocation as the Cerrejon coal mine expands and which, despite company protestations of goodwill, are being deprived of means of making a living while negotiations on relocation continue.

Karmen, Yoe and Wilman are in London for the Annual General Meeting of the world’s biggest mining company, BHP Billiton, which owns one-third of the Cerrejon mine along with two other massive multinational mining companies listed on the London Stock Exchange – Anglo American and Xstrata. The AGM takes place at 11am on Thursday 29 October. Yoe, Wilman and Karmen will make clear to shareholders the failures of BHP Billiton to ensure that the Cerrejon mine treats affected communities justly. They will also speak at the launch of an ‘alternative report’ on the company’s activities which will take place at Amnesty UK’s Human Rights Action Centre at 2pm on Tuesday 27 October.

Organised by LMN member group Colombia Solidarity Campaign.

On February 14, 1994, WMC reported that up to 5 million cubic metres of liquid had leaked from it’s Tailings Retention System (TRS) at Olympic Dam. According to WMC the leak had been happening for at least 2 years but only became fully understood in January 1994. It has since become apparent that the leak occurred over several years and there are no plans to clean up the toxic radioactive material which leaked from the tailings retention system.

This material is copied from <http://www.sea-us.org.au/roxby/sa-inquiry.html> including the SEA-US webmaster’s comments …

WMC was not financially penalised for it’s failure to prevent escape of the contaminated water.

Due to the immense public outrage that such a breach of public trust could happen, a major parliamentary inquiry was setup to investigate the cause of the problem, possible solutions, and comment on ‘the desirability of the Department of Mines and Energy having prime responsibility for environmental matters in relation to mining operations’.

Overall Conclusions

• credit for calling attention to the leak was due to Dr Phil Crouch of the SA Health Commission.
• WMC and the Dept. of Mines & Energy and the Dept. of Environment were reluctant to acknowledge that there was a leak. Acknowledgement eventually occurred in May 1993.
• By August 1993 an initial estimate had been made of the magnitude of the leak.
• Government departments and WMC discussed the drafting of a press release in November 1993.

In view of the above, the Minister for Mines & Energy, Mr Blevins, should have known about the seriousness of the problem at Olympic Dam before the State elections in December 1993. The fact that a public announcement was not made until February 1994 is a damning indictment of the Labour and Liberal governments and of the Dept. of Mines & Energy.

The inquiry into the leak at Olympic Dam clearly shows that even experienced mining companies like WMC still cannot properly manage their dangerous wastes.

The leak at Olympic Dam was not an isolated event. According to WMC’s Annual Environmental Progress Reports (1994-95 and 1996) there were at least two other cases of leaks at WMC operations in Western Australia, and negligent mismanagement of their Yeelirrie trial uranium mine :

• Groundwater monitoring at the Baldivis nickel residue storage facility indicated that ammonium sulphate has leaked into the groundwater adjacent to Lake Cooloongup.
• At the St. Ives gold mine at Kambalda, water from a TSF is seeping into the local aquifer causing a rise in the groundwater.
• The Yeelirrie trial mine, abandoned in 1983 when the ALP Three Mines Policy was introduced, had been left without adequate fencing and signs for more than 10 years. Drums of uranium were left exposed, used for road building and the open pit dam, with high levels of radiation and salts, open to the public for swimming (see the Yeelirrie page for more info).

There was no substantive, quantifiable, accountable response of the SA Government to the failure of the Tailings Retention System (TRS) at Olympic Dam.

In the “bad old days” many embarrassing pollutants were disposed of by tanks and dams that “leaked”. The cases of Roxby, Baldivis and St Ives suggest that we have progressed from leakage to seepage, but the result is much the same.

More regulatory power may be given to the EPA and the Health Commission but the recommendations from the leakage inquiry call for too little too late.

Principal Findings and Recommendations of Note

Below are excerpts from the Nineteenth report of the Environment, Resources and Development Committee of the Parliament of South Australia, released April 24, 1996, titled “Roxby Downs Water Leakage”.

page 49 :
The Committee finds that the final design of the Olympic Dam tailings retention system was deficient in that there was only one storage area and no decant of tailings liquor was provided.

The Committee also finds that the decision remove the coarse fraction from the tailings exacerbated these design deficiencies and made management of the system more difficult.

page 49 :
The Committee agrees that the concept of unlined evaporation ponds was a deficiency in the final design of the Olympic Dam tailings retention system.

Comment :
This, the first major finding of the committee, sets an unfortunate precedent – it got it’s terminology wrong, and thereby set the stage for confusion, a result which can be attributed to WMC.

The above statement was actually referring to Tailings Storage Facility (TSF), which is only one element of the Tailings Retention System (TRS), the other elements include the Mine Water Evaporation Pond (MWEP) and Wash Water Evaporation Ponds (EP). The confusion can be traced to the WMC submissions and WMC literature which defines the TSF as being “Holding areas for tailings, sometimes referred to as a Tailings Retention System”.

What the finding refers to is that by not dividing the TSF into a number of cells so that the tailings could be rotated from one to another, and by not having a mechanism for drawing off excess liquid into a sealed evaporation pond, the tailings could not dry out sufficiently to provide a seal to the otherwise unsealed TSF.

The above finding amounts to a condemnation not only of WMC and the SA Department of Mines & Energy, which approved of the changes, but of the environmental impact assessment process. After going through the motions of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), receiving submissions, and modifying it’s proposal, the operators were allowed to radically modify the design of the TSF, without public consultation, subject to the approval of the Department of Mines & Energy in consultation with the Health Commission and the Department of Environment & Planning.

page 54 :
While being satisfied that the approvals process was handled conscientiously and competently by the agencies involved…….the Committee is concerned that potentially valuable public comment or comment by disinterested experts was not available to the then joint venturers.

Such comment may conceivably have alerted agencies or the joint venturers to the deficiencies in design…….and may also have helped to reduce some of the problems experienced with operation of the system.

Comment :
Thus the committee acknowledges this deficiency in the approvals process. It then goes on to recommend the following :

page 132 :
Recommendation 13
The Committee recommends that the Minister for Mines and Energy reviews any statutory and practical impediments to the free flow of information about the environmental impact of Olympic Dam operations with a view to ensuring that all relevant information is freely available to interested members of the public.

Comment :
Indeed Recommendation 14 (below) states the need for more public scrutiny, but even here it is only for “information exchange” and not measures designed to improve assessment of environmental performance at Olympic Dam.

As long as the Dept. of Mines & Energy (now Mines & Energy South Australia, “MESA”) maintains the environmental regulator of the mine it has a clear and unequivocal conflict of interest. It is both the promoter and regulator of mining – two very opposing roles.

This is contrary to the widely accepted practice of keeping industry and regulators at arms length as far as possible.

Not only was the TSF radically modified but the modifications were such that they were clearly contrary to the design concept which formed the basis of the original proposal and it should have been apparent to the most junior mining engineer that the redesigned TSF would leak profusely. Both the joint venturers and the Dept. of Mines & Energy were clearly at fault in permitting such a TSF to be built.

The fact that it was not the Dept. of Mines & Energy which raised the alarm, but Dr Crouch of the Health Commission, and the absence of any attempt until then, to carry out a mass balance is an indictment of the Dept. of Mines & Energy.

Despite clear evidence that the Dept. of Mines & Energy is not the appropriate department to monitor environmental issues the committee made the following two recommendations :

page 55 :
Recommendation 4
The Committee recommends that requests for approval for future developments at Olympic Dam beyond those considered in the course of the recent public Environmental Review should be made in a similarly public manner.

Recommendation 5
The Committee recommends that, as with the recent Olympic Dam Environmental Review, future reviews should be carried out in accordance with guidelines issued by the Minister for Mines and Energy which should be developed by the Minister following consultation with relevant agencies.

Comment :
Environmental Reviews and regulations should be set by the Environment Protection Authority in consultation with community, environmental and interested groups, not by an agency with a mission to promote mining. As pointed out above, this is a clear conflict of interest.

The Dept. of Environment and Planning was presumably considered to be either incompetent or too radical to be trusted with environmental management. The Committee, however, seems to recognise the potential conflict of interest with Recommendation 15 :

page 136 :
Recommendation 15
The Committee recommends that the Minister for Mines and Energy and the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources consult with the Olympic Dam operators and relevant government agencies with a view to establishing a system of periodic, independent, external, environmental audit arrangements in relation to Olympic Dam operations.

Comment :
The Roxby Indenture Act prevents such a process and until the Act is revoked entirely there can be no truly independent, external environmental assessment of the impacts of Olympic Dam.

page 63 :
The Committee finds that there were deficiencies in the monitoring and reporting systems in place at Olympic Dam….

Comment :
This finding is an understatement. The inadequacy of the monitoring and it’s regulation were pitiful. Despite constant problems with surface water entering boreholes, as late as November 1992, the operators had still not secured all bore holes against contamination by surface waters.

page 73 :
The Committee finds that the Olympic Dam tailings retention system did not receive the degree of informed supervision of its various components it required to operate efficiently as designed and that this inadequate supervision by the operators of the tailings retention system, particularly the system as extended in 1991, contributed to the massive leakage from it.

Comment :
This understatement stops short of accusing the operators of negligence.

page 87 :
The Committee finds that, although admitting difficulties of interpretation, the operators were reluctant to accept that a leakage from the tailings retention system was occurring, despite mounting evidence to that effect.

Comment :
One disturbing aspect of this denial was the claim by WMC that a localized leak was not a breach of the restricted release zone (RRZ) because the zone extends underground indefinitely! WMC argued that as no lower boundary had been defined, and the leakage went straight down, there was no breach of the zone, and in any event the leakage would be returned to the mine.

WMC also tried to deny the deficiencies in the design and operation of the TSF :

page 87 :
The Committee finds that, confident of the benign impact of any seepage, the operators were reluctant to admit deficiencies in the design and difficulties with the operation of the tailings retention system which were contributing to the leakage from it and that this reluctance coloured their reporting of operations at Olympic Dam and delayed measures necessary to understand the leakage and reduce its impact.

Comment :
This recommendation refers to the fact that the operators relied on laboratory studies to support their contention that any leakage would be blocked by the underlying limestone. This ignores defects in the limestone structure and advice from mining consultants.

page 87 :
The Committee finds that it was only when the leakage was too big to ignore or to explain away and only in response to hard prompting from regulatory agencies that ad hoc operational changes were converted into radical remedial action to alter the original defective design concept.

Comment :
When this “radical remedial action” was finally taken, the agency which did the prompting was not, as one might have expected, the Dept. of Environment or the Dept. of Mines & Energy, but the Health Commission, especially Dr Phil Crouch. The Dept. of Mines & Energy was as reluctant as the operators to accept the obvious. Basic measures like doing a mass balance, ie., comparing the liquid put into the TRS with the amount lost by evaporation, were not even attempted until mid-1993.

The report then goes on to make a few more findings and proceeds to a gigantic leap of faith concerning the harmful effects :

page 87 :
The Committee finds that the monitoring systems designed in part to detect leakage from the Olympic Dam tailings retention system were defective….

page 95 :
The Committee finds that the leakage is not attributable to any single cause and that, although it does not come from any single source, the minewater evaporation pond has made a significant contribution to the amount of leaked liquid.

page 108 :
The Committee finds that, on the basis of current evidence, there have been no harmful effects to employees, the local community or the environment arising out of the leakage from the tailings retention system at Olympic Dam and that it is highly unlikely that any such harmful effects will emerge in the future.

Comment :
Despite recognising a “lack of knowledge about what has happened to the leaked liquor under Olympic Dam” and that “more scientific studies are obviously necessary”, the report confidently asserts that there has been no harmful effects to date and any such effects are “highly unlikely” to emerge in the future.

Such polarized findings can hardly be an oversight. Bearing in mind that the mine is expected to have a life of more than 100 years and that many of the radioactive contaminants in the ground under the TRS will remain radioactive for tens of thousands of years, it is very hard to see where the Committee finds it’s confidence.

page 123 :
As in its Sellicks Hill Quarry Cave report, having looked at some of the mistakes of the past, the Committee is anxious to look positively to the future and to make recommendations which will prevent their reoccurence and increase public confidence in the operations.

Comment :
Thus it becomes clear that the Committee is not intending to seriously question Olympic Dam’s competence in properly managing it’s own operations, the Inquiry is merely an exercise in public relations.

page 126 :
Recommendation 11
The Committee recommends that the operators be encouraged to continue their commitment to improving their environmental management of Olympic Dam operations and that government agencies commit themselves to establishing environmental goals and overseeing their attainment while leaving the prime responsibility for day to day environmental management to the operators.

Comment :
In one sentence the Committee is openly critical of the recalcitrant behaviour which Olympic Dam displayed in their concern over the seepage, that the tailings retention system did not get the degree of professional supervision such a system unequivocally demands, and yet they are still allowed responsibility for their own environmental management despite proven gross incompetence ? This is clearly unacceptable.

page 131 :
However, with the company, the Committee sees considerable benefits in the Olympic Dam operations being more ‘open to public scrutiny’.

Comment :
The Roxby Indenture Act provides a secure channel between the company and the government in order to fast-track approvals and permits and thereby avoid rigorous public scrutiny. If “being more open to public scrutiny” is going to achieve anything, it would have to involve the removal of the Roxby Indenture Act. So far this is not being considered at all.

page 132 :
Recommendation 14
The Committee recommends that the Minister for Mines and Energy consult with the Olympic Dam operators, other relevant state and Commonwealth agencies and other interested bodies with a view to providing a forum for information exchange and policy consultation among groups on the effect of operations at Olympic Dam on the environment.

Comment :
The Federal Environment Minister, Senator Robert Hill, has released a press statement saying that such a forum is currently being planned. As noted above, the recommendation is for “information exchange” and not a two way dialogue as it is being marketed as. It remains to be seen that even if such a form were established whether it would be anything more than a sleek public relations campaign.

page 136 :
The Committee finds that although there is a separate, fully professional environment group within the Department of Mines and Energy committed to a high standard of environmental management, this does not overcome the public’s perceived lack of objectivity of the regulatory process currently in place in relation to the Olympic Dam operations.

Comment :
Until the Roxby Indenture Act is revoked there is no “perceived” lack of objectivity on behalf of the public at all – environmental regulation of a large mining operation by a body with a mission to promote mining is a clear and unequivocal conflict of interest.

Information from the “Environment, Resources and Development Committee – Roxby Downs Water Leakage”, Parliament of South Australia (April, 1996) and the “The Tailings Leak at Roxby Downs” Briefing Paper – Nuclear Information Centre, Adelaide.

WMC acknowledges tailings dangerous for birds
January 11, 2005.
<www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1279971.htm>

WMC Resources says it will do all it can to try and reduce the number of birds being killed at its Olympic Dam mine in South Australia’s north.

The South Australian Government has ordered a report after 100 birds were killed over a recent four day period.

Environmental agencies will visit the mine today to talk with the company.

WMC Resources spokesman Richard Yeeles agrees that the issue needs to be investigated.

“This is a very dry area and birds do see what appears to be a large body of water and will tend to land on these areas,” he said.

“We have had a deterent system in place which over the years has helped us to reduce contact between birds and tailings facilities, but it appears for some reason that this is not working as it has done in the past.”