Author: Jim.Green

US Government Accountability Office pours cold water on advanced reactor concepts

Nuclear Monitor #810, 9 Sept 2015, ‘US Government Accountability Office pours cold water on advanced reactor concepts’, https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/810/us-government-accountability-office-pours-cold-water-advanced-reactor-concepts

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has released a report on the status of small modular reactors (SMRs) and other new reactor concepts in the US.

Let’s begin with the downbeat conclusion of the GAO report:

“While light water SMRs and advanced reactors may provide some benefits, their development and deployment face a number of challenges. Both SMRs and advanced reactors require additional technical and engineering work to demonstrate reactor safety and economics, although light water SMRs generally face fewer technical challenges than advanced reactors because of their similarities to the existing large LWR [light water] reactors. Depending on how they are resolved, these technical challenges may result in higher-cost reactors than anticipated, making them less competitive with large LWRs or power plants using other fuels. …

“Both light water SMRs and advanced reactors face additional challenges related to the time, cost, and uncertainty associated with developing, certifying or licensing, and deploying new reactor technology, with advanced reactor designs generally facing greater challenges than light water SMR designs. It is a multi-decade process, with costs up to $1 billion to $2 billion, to design and certify or license the reactor design, and there is an additional construction cost of several billion dollars more per power plant.

“Furthermore, the licensing process can have uncertainties associated with it, particularly for advanced reactor designs. A reactor designer would need to obtain investors or otherwise commit to this development cost years in advance of when the reactor design would be certified or available for licensing and construction, making demand (and customers) for the reactor uncertain. For example, the price of competing power production facilities may make a nuclear plant unattractive without favorable rates set by a public authority or long term prior purchase agreements, and accidents such as Fukushima as well as the ongoing need for a long-term solution for spent nuclear fuel may affect the public perception of reactor safety. These challenges will need to be addressed if the capabilities and diversification of energy sources that light water SMRs and advanced reactors can provide are to be realized.”

Many of the same reasons explain the failure of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project. Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the US Department of Energy (DoE) was to deploy a prototype ‘next generation’ reactor using advanced technology to generate electricity, produce hydrogen, or both, by the end of fiscal year 2021. However, in 2011, DoE decided not to proceed with the deployment phase of the project.

Small modular reactors

Four companies have considered developing SMRs in the US in recent years. NuScale has a cost-sharing agreement such that the DoE will pay as much as half of NuScale’s costs − up to $217 million (€194m) over five years − for SMR design certification. NuScale expects to submit a design certification application to NRC in late 2016, and may begin operating its first SMR in 2023 or 2024. (However the timeframe is unrealistic, and the project may be abandoned − as other SMR projects have.)

The other three companies are a long way behind NuScale:

• mPower, a subsidiary of Babcock & Wilcox, enjoyed a cost-sharing agreement with the DoE but in 2014 scaled back its R&D efforts because of a lack of committed customers and a lack of investors.
• Holtec says it is continuing R&D work, but does not have a detailed schedule.
• In 2014 Westinghouse suspended its efforts to certify its SMR design, because of a lack of committed customers (and the lack of a DoE cost-sharing agreement).

The GAO report states that the development of light water SMRs may proceed without serious difficulties as they are based on existing light water reactor technology. That said, standardization is a key pillar of SMR rhetoric, and members of an expert group convened by the GAO noted that component standardization has proven challenging for the construction of the larger Westinghouse AP1000 that has some modular components.

Another pillar of SMR rhetoric is mass production (to make them economic), and the development of a massive construction chain to allow for mass production is a radically different proposition to NuScale’s plan to build just one reactor over the next decade.

Not-so-advanced reactor concepts

According to the GAO report, SMRs and new reactor concepts “face some common challenges such as long time frames and high costs associated with the shift from development to deployment − that is, in the construction of the first commercial reactors of a particular type.”

The report notes the US government’s generous financial support for utilities developing SMRs and advanced reactor concepts − DoE provided US$152.5 million (€137m) in fiscal year 2015 alone. Advanced reactor concepts attracting DoE largesse are the high temperature gas cooled reactor, the sodium cooled fast reactor, and to a lesser extent the molten salt reactor (specifically, a sub-type known as the fluoride salt cooled high temperature reactor).

DoE and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officials do not expect applications for advanced reactors for at least five years. In other words, an application may (or may not) be submitted some time between five years and five centuries from now.

Advanced reactor designers told the GAO that they have been challenged to find investors due to the lengthy timeframe, costs, and uncertainty. Advanced reactor concepts face greater technical challenges than light water SMRs because of fundamental design differences. Thus designers have significantly more R&D issues to resolve, including in areas such as materials studies and fuel certification, coolant chemistry studies, and safety analysis. Some members of the expert group convened by the GAO noted a potential need for new test facilities to support this work. Furthermore, according to reactor designers, certifying or licensing an advanced reactor may be particularly time-consuming and difficult, adding to the already considerable economic uncertainty for the applicants.

The process of developing and certifying a specific reactor design can take 10 years or more for design work and nearly 3.5 years, as a best case, for NRC certification. Even that timeframe is more hope than expectation. Recent light water reactor design certifications, for the Westinghouse AP1000 and the GE Hitachi ESBWR, have taken about 15 and 11 years respectively. Both the AP1000 and ESBWR are modifications of long-established reactor types, so considerably longer timeframes can be expected for advanced concepts.

The cost to develop and certify a design can range from US$1−2 billion (€0.9−1.8b). Developers hope that costs can be reduced as they move from certification to the construction of a first-of-a-kind plant to the construction of multiple plants. But the GAO report notes that those hopes may be unfounded:

“[S]ome studies suggest that existing, large LWRs have not greatly benefitted from industry-wide standardization or learning to date for reasons including intermittent development and production. In fact, some studies have found that “reverse or negative learning” occurs when increased complexity or operation experience leads to newer safety standards. On a related point, another reactor designer said that the cost and schedule difficulties associated with building the first new design that has been certified by the NRC and started construction in the United States in three decades − the Westinghouse AP1000, a recently designed large LWR − have made it harder for light water SMRs to obtain financing because high-profile problems have made nuclear reactors in general less attractive. … The AP1000 was the first new design that has been certified by the NRC and started construction in the United States in three decades. However, construction problems, including supply chain and regulatory issues, have resulted in cost and schedule increases.”

US Government Accountability Office, July 2015, ‘Nuclear Reactors: Status and challenges in development and deployment of new commercial concepts’, GAO-15-652, www.gao.gov/assets/680/671686.pdf

(Written by Nuclear Monitor editor Jim Green.)

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French government agency sceptical about Gen IV reactors

Nuclear Monitor #803, 7 May 2015, ‘French government agency sceptical about Gen IV reactors’, https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/803/french-government-agency-sceptical-about-gen-iv-reactors

The French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) has produced an important critique of Generation IV nuclear power concepts.¹ IRSN is a government authority with 1,790 staff under the joint authority of the Ministries of Defense, the Environment, Industry, Research, and Health.

There are numerous critical analyses of Generation IV concepts by independent experts², but the IRSN critique is the first from the government of a country with an extensive nuclear industry.

The IRSN report focuses on the six Generation IV concepts prioritised by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF), which brings together 12 countries with an interest in new reactor types, plus Euratom. France is itself one of the countries involved in the GIF.

The six concepts prioritised by the GIF are:

• Sodium cooled Fast Reactors (SFR);
• Very High Temperature Reactors, with thermal neutron spectrum (VHTR);
• Gas-cooled Fast Reactors (GFR);
• Lead-cooled Fast Reactors (LFR) or Lead-Bismuth (LB) cooled Fast Reactors;
• Molten Salt Reactors (MSR), with fast or thermal neutron spectrum; and
• SuperCritical Water Reactors (SCWR), with fast or thermal neutron spectrum.

The report states: “There is still much R&D to be done to develop the Generation IV nuclear reactors, as well as for the fuel cycle and the associated waste management which depends on the system chosen.”

IRSN considers the SFR system to be the only one to have reached a degree of maturity compatible with the construction of a reactor prototype during the first half of this century − and even the development of an SFR prototype would require further preliminary studies and technological developments.

Only SFR and VHTR systems can boast operating experience. IRSN states: “No operating experience feedback from the other four systems studied can be put to direct use. The technological difficulties involved rule out any industrial deployment of these systems within the time frame considered [mid century].”

The report says that for LFR and GFR systems, small prototypes might be built by mid-century. For MSR and SCWR systems, there “is no likelihood of even an experimental or prototype MSR or SCWR being built during the first half of this century” and “it seems hard to imagine any reactor being built before the end of the century”.

IRSN notes that it is difficult to thoroughly evaluate safety and radiation protection standards of Generation IV systems as some concepts have already been partially tried and tested, while others are still in the early stages of development.

IRSN is sceptical about safety claims: “At the present stage of development, IRSN does not notice evidence that leads to conclude that the systems under review are likely to offer a significantly improved level of safety compared with Generation III reactors, except perhaps for the VHTR …” Moreover the VHTR system could bring about significant safety improvements “but only by significantly limiting unit power”.

The report notes that the safety of fast reactors can be problematic because of high operating temperatures and the toxicity and corrosive nature of most coolants considered. It says that issues arising from the Fukushima disaster require detailed examination, such as: choice of coolant; operating temperatures and power densities (which are generally higher for Generation IV concepts); and in some cases, fuel reprocessing facilities that present the risk of toxic releases.

The report is unenthusiastic about research into transmutation of minor actinides (long-lived waste products in spent fuel), saying that “this option offers only a very slight advantage in terms of inventory reduction and geological waste repository volume when set against the induced safety and radiation protection constraints for fuel cycle facilities, reactors and transport.” It notes that ASN, the French nuclear safety authority, has recently announced that minor actinide transmutation would not be a deciding factor in the choice of a future reactor system.

The reports findings on the six GIF concepts are briefly summarised here:

Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFR)

The main safety advantage is the use of low-pressure liquid coolant. The normal operating temperature of this coolant is significantly lower than its boiling point, allowing a grace period of several hours during loss-of-cooling events. The advantage gained from the high boiling point of sodium, however, must be weighed against the fact that the structural integrity of the reactor cannot be guaranteed near this temperature.

The use of sodium also comes with a number of drawbacks due to its high reactivity not only with water and air, but also with MOX fuel.

It seems possible for SFR technology to reach a safety level at least equivalent to that of Generation III pressurised water reactors, but IRSN is unable to determine whether it could significantly exceed this level, in view of design differences and the current state of knowledge and research.

Very High Temperature Reactors (VHTR)
The VHTR benefits from the operating experience feedback obtained from High Temperature Reactors (HTR).
This technology is intrinsically safe with respect to loss of cooling, which means that it could be used to design a reactor that does not require an active decay heat removal system. The VHTR system could therefore bring about significant safety improvements compared with Generation III reactors, especially regarding core melt prevention.

VHTR safety performance can only be guaranteed by significantly limiting unit power.

The feasibility of the system has yet to be determined and will chiefly depend on the development of fuels and materials capable of withstanding high temperatures; the currently considered operating temperature of around 1000°C is close to the transformation temperature of materials commonly used in the nuclear industry.

Lead-cooled Fast Reactors (LFR)

Unlike sodium, lead does not react violently with water or air.

The thermal inertia associated with the large volume of lead used and its very high density results in long grace periods in the event of loss of cooling.

In addition, the high boiling point at atmospheric pressure is a guarantee of high margins under normal operating conditions and rules out the risk of coolant boiling.

The main drawback of lead-cooled (or lead-bismuth cooled) reactors is that the coolant tends to corrode and erode stainless steel structures.

LFR safety is reliant on operating procedures, which does not seem desirable in a Generation IV reactor.

The highly toxic nature of lead and its related products, especially polonium-210, produced when lead-bismuth is used, raises the problem of potential environmental impact.
IRSN is unable to determine whether the LFR system could guarantee a significantly higher safety level than Generation III reactors.

Various technical hurdles need to be overcome before a reactor of this type could be considered.

Gas-cooled Fast Reactors (GFR)

Given the current state of GFR development, construction of an industrial prototype reactor would not be technically feasible. GFR specifications are highly ambitious and raise a number of technological problems that are still a long way from being solved.

From the safety point of view, the GFR does not display any intrinsic quality likely to lead to a significant improvement over Generation III reactors.

Molten Salt Reactors (MSR)

The MSR differs considerably from the other systems proposed by the GIF. The main differences are that the coolant and fuel are mixed in some models and that liquid fuel is used.

The MSR has several advantages, including its burning, breeding and actinide-recycling capabilities.

Its intrinsic neutron properties could be put to good use as, in theory, they should allow highly stable reactor operation. The very low thermal inertia of salt and very high operating temperatures of the system, however, call for the use of fuel salt drainage devices. System safety depends mainly on the reliability and performance of these devices.

Salt has some drawbacks − it is corrosive and has a relatively high crystallisation temperature.

The reactor must also be coupled to a salt processing unit and the system safety analysis must take into account the coupling of the two facilities.

Consideration must be given to the high toxicity of some salts and substances generated by the processes used in the salt processing unit.

The feasibility of fuel salt processing remains to be demonstrated.

SuperCritical-Water-cooled Reactors (SCWR)

The SCWR is the only system selected by GIF that uses water as a coolant. The SCWR is seen as a further development of existing water reactors and thus benefits from operating experience feedback, especially from boiling water reactors. Its chief advantage is economic.

While the use of supercritical water avoids problems relating to the phase change from liquid to vapour, it does not present any intrinsic advantage in terms of safety.

Thermal inertia is very low, for example, when the reactor is shut down.

The use of supercritical water in a nuclear reactor raises many questions, in particular its behaviour under neutron flux.

At the current stage of development, it is impossible to ascertain whether the system will eventually become significantly safer than Generation III reactors.

References:

1. IRSN, 2015, ‘Review of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems’, www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Pages/20150427_Generation-IV-nuclear-energy-systems-safety-potential-overview.aspx

Direct download: www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Documents/IRSN_Report-GenIV_04-2015.pdf

2. See for example: International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010, ‘Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status’, www.ipfmlibrary.org/rr08.pdf

Helmut Hirsch, Oda Becker, Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, April 2005, ‘Nuclear Reactor Hazards: Ongoing Dangers of Operating Nuclear Technology in the 21st Century’, www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/nuclearreactorhazards

OECD: Generation IV R&D “a growing challenge”

Nuclear Monitor #860, 10 May 2018, ‘Generation IV R&D “a growing challenge”‘, https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/860/nuclear-news-nuclear-monitor-860-10-may-2018

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency noted in its March 2018 monthly bulletin that “maintaining existing facilities operational is a growing challenge” for members of the Generation IV International Forum (GIF).¹

The Nuclear Energy Agency was reporting on a February meeting of the Forum’s new task force, established to identify R&D facilities needed for the development of Generation IV systems. Presentations were made by the representatives of the six systems that GIF member countries are exploring ‒ gas-cooled fast reactors, sodium-cooled fast reactors, lead-cooled fast reactors, molten salt reactors, supercritical water-cooled reactors, and very high temperature reactors ‒ highlighting existing R&D capabilities and also gaps.

Filling those gaps will presumably be difficult if, as the Nuclear Energy Agency states, just maintaining existing facilities operational is a growing challenge.

Industry bodies such as the Nuclear Energy Agency are typically more bullish about Generation IV prospects. However the timelines are repeatedly deferred: Generation IV reactors were 20 years away 20 years ago, they are 20 years away now, and they will likely be 20 years away 20 years from now.

The Generation IV International Forum states: “It will take at least two or three decades before the deployment of commercial Gen IV systems. In the meantime, a number of prototypes will need to be built and operated. The Gen IV concepts currently under investigation are not all on the same timeline and some might not even reach the stage of commercial exploitation.”²

The International Atomic Energy Agency states: “Experts expect that the first Generation IV fast reactor demonstration plants and prototypes will be in operation by 2030 to 2040.”³ A 2015 report by the French government’s Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) states: “There is still much R&D to be done to develop the Generation IV nuclear reactors, as well as for the fuel cycle and the associated waste management which depends on the system chosen.”⁴

The World Nuclear Association noted in 2009 that “progress is seen as slow, and several potential designs have been undergoing evaluation on paper for many years.”⁵

1. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, ‘Generation IV research and development’, NEA Monthly News Bulletin – March 2018, www.oecd-nea.org/general/mnb/2018/march.html

2. www.gen-4.org/gif/jcms/c_41890/faq-2

3. Peter Rickwood and Peter Kaiser, 1 March 2013, ‘Fast Reactors Provide Sustainable Nuclear Power for “Thousands of Years”‘, www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2013/fastreactors.html

4. Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, 2015, ‘Review of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems’, www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Pages/20150427_Generation-IV-nuclear-energy-systems-safety-potential-overview.aspx

Direct download: www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Documents/IRSN_Report-GenIV_04-2015.pdf

5. World Nuclear Association, 15 Dec 2009, ‘Fast moves? Not exactly…’, www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_France_puts_into_future_nuclear_1512091.html

Papers and submissions by David Noonan B.Sc., M.Env.St., Independent Environment Campaigner

PROPOSED NATIONAL NUCLEAR WASTE DUMP IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Safety and security questions on ANSTO nuclear waste shipments to a port in SA (Dec. 2018)

Nuclear fuel waste: Extended storage at Lucas Heights or target SA (Nov. 2017)

Proposed national nuclear waste dump in SA – safety and security issues (2-pages-David Noonan, Nov. 2018

Submission to federal government re proposed national nuclear waste dump in SA (David Noonan, Nov. 2018)

David Noonan – Jan 2017 Briefing Paper – Nuclear waste store threatens Flinders Ranges

2015-16 PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A NUCLEAR WASTE IMPORT BUSINESS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Briefing papers written by David Noonan in 2016, responding to the Royal Commission’s final report:

• 1. SA is targeted for five nuclear dumps and high-level waste processing
• 2. Nuclear Port
• 3. No Profit in Nuclear Waste
• 4. Nuclear Waste Security
• 5. Nuclear Waste ‒ storage without a disposal capacity

Chernobyl in Australia woohoo

Jim Green, 2017, ‘Radioactive Waste and Australia’s Aboriginal People’, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp.33-50.

Click here to read as a PDF (and here is a link to the journal webpage).

Abstract: The treatment of Australia’s Aboriginal people by the nuclear industry (broadly defined as private- and public-sector agencies pursuing uranium and nuclear projects) is a poorly researched topic. That is not merely a gap in the academic research on related topics (the history of the nuclear industry in Australia; the history of race relations in Australia; etc.), but it has “real world” consequences. Put simply, the paucity of information about the mistreatment of Aboriginal people makes it easier for nuclear interests to repeat past practices; and conversely, proper documentation and publication of past (and current) practices detrimental to Aboriginal people can make it more difficult for nuclear interests to repeat those practices. Over the past decade Friends of the Earth Australia (FoE) has sought to partially remedy the information deficit in the context of its work with Aboriginal communities involved in debates regarding uranium mining and proposed radioactive waste repositories (the author works for FoE). One thread of that work is the growing body of multimedia work (and a Master’s thesis) by FoE member Jessie Boylan covering the legacy of the atomic bomb tests, uranium mining and waste repository proposals (see <www.jessieboylan.com>). Another thread of the project is detailed written documentation of past and present incidents of mistreatment of Aboriginal people by nuclear interests (as well as multimedia presentations of this material – see, for example, <www.australianmap.net>). This article builds on that research and focuses on attempts to impose radioactive waste repositories on the land of unwilling Aboriginal communities in South Australia.

Perth-based uranium company Paladin Energy operated uranium mines in Malawi and Namibia. As of June 2018, both mines are in care-and-maintenance.

New report – June 2018: Morgan Somerville and Jim Green, ‘Undermining Africa: Paladin Energy’s Kayelekera Uranium Mine in Malawi’

Who cleans up the mess when an Australian uranium mining company leaves Africa? 18 June 2018, The Ecologist

Paladin Energy’s social and environmental record in Africa, July 2017

Paladin Energy goes bust, appoints administrators, July 2017

WISE Uranium, ‘Paladin Energy Ltd Hall of Infamy’

WISE Uranium, Issues at Operating Uranium Mines and Mills – Malawi

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Undermining Africa: New report calls on Australian mining company to clean up its mess in Malawi

Media Release: 19 June 2018

A new report warns that Perth-based Paladin Energy has made insufficient provision for the rehabilitation of its mothballed Kayelekera uranium mine in Malawi. The mine was put into care-and-maintenance in mid-2014 and there is little chance of a restart given the high cost of production and the small uranium resource.

Paladin ‒ once the darling of the stock-market ‒ was put into administration in July 2017. It relisted on the Australian Securities Exchange in February 2018 but just three months later the company’s only other mine ‒ the Langer Heinrich uranium mine in Namibia ‒ was also put into care-and-maintenance. Thus the company has no operating mines.

Paladin has lodged a US$10 million ‘Environmental Performance Bond’ with Malawian banks, and that money can be accessed to rehabilitate Kayelekera. But the cost of rehabilitating the mine-site will be multiples of that figure.

Paladin’s 2017 Annual Report lists a ‘rehabilitation provision’ of $86.93 million to cover both Kayelekera and Langer Heinrich. However the funds might not be available for rehabilitation if Paladin goes bankrupt, and even if the funds are available they are unlikely to be sufficient. In Australia, Energy Resources of Australia’s expects to pay almost 10 times as much to rehabilitate the Ranger uranium mine.

Dr Jim Green, national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia, said: “It stretches credulity to believe that the cost of rehabilitating both of Paladin Energy’s mines in Africa would be an order of magnitude lower than the cost of rehabilitating one single mine in Australia.”

“The Australian and Western Australian governments and Paladin Energy should liaise with the Malawian government and Malawian civil society to ensure that a proper rehabilitation of Kayelekera is undertaken.

“One option that should be considered is to move quickly to rehabilitation as an alternative to Paladin Energy’s current strategy of spending over A$13 million annually to keep Kayelekera in care-and-maintenance. The prospects for a restart of the mine are bleak and available funds would be better spent on rehabilitation.”

Help us stop the nuclear waste dump in the Flinders Ranges!

Written on November 27, 2015 at Yappala Station.

Adnyamathanha land in the Flinders Ranges has been short-listed for a national nuclear waste dump. The land was nominated by former Liberal Party Senator Grant Chapman. Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners weren’t consulted. Even Traditional Owners who live next to the proposed dump site at Yappala Station weren’t consulted.

The nomination was made public two weeks ago and even now, the government hasn’t contacted Yappala residents or Villiwarina Aboriginal Corporation. This is an insult.

The proposed dump site is adjacent to the Yappala Indigenous Protected Area.

On the land with the proposed dump site, we have been working for many years registering heritage sites and sites of significance with the SA government. Now Mr Chapman and the federal government are disrespecting our people and our wilyaru (lore).

The whole area is Adnyamathanha land. It is Arngurla Yarta (spiritual land). The proposed dump site has springs. It also has ancient mound springs. It has countless thousands of Aborigial artefects. Our ancestors are buried there.

Hookina creek that runs along the nominated site is a significant women’s site. It is a registered heritage site and must be preserved and protected. We are responsible for this area, the land and animals.

Through this area are registered cultural heritage sites and places of huge importance to our family, our history and as we plan, our future.

It is a very important archeological site for Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners. It is also a significant historical cultural site for non-Aboriginal people.

There are frequent yarta ngurra-ngurrandha (earthquakes and tremors). We see the ground move and the hills move; we feel the land move. At least half a dozen times each year.

It is flood land. The water comes from the hills and floods the plains, including the proposed dump site. Sometimes there are massive floods, the last one on 20 January 2006. The massive floods uproot huge trees − you can come out here now and see all the trees uprooted by the 2006 flood. In 1956 − 50 years earlier, to the day − a massive flood destroyed Cotabena homestead and all the houses in Hookina township. The pub was destroyed by the 1956 flood and is now a pile of rocks.

We don’t want a nuclear waste dump here on our country and worry that if the waste comes here it will harm our environment and muda (our lore, our creation, our everything).

We call on the federal government to withdraw the nomination of the site and to show more respect in future.

We call on Jay Weatherill to support us. This year one of us (Regina McKenzie) was awarded the SA Premier’s Natural Resource Management Award in the category of ‘Aboriginal Leadership − Female’ for her work to protect land that is now being threatened with a nuclear waste dump. But Premier Jay Weatherill has been silent since the announcement of the dump sites. He can either support us or he can support the federal government’s attack on us by maintaining his silence. He can’t sit on the fence.

We ask all Australians for support. We ask you for your support.

Signed by:
Regina McKenzie and Heather Stuart, Yappala residents, on behalf of Villiwarina Aboriginal Corporation.
Enice Marsh on behalf of Arnggumthanhna Camp Law Mob.

February 2013

Jim Green / Friends of the Earth Australia

August 2005 − A release by Yamarna Goldfields said that company had taken an 80% stake in a project on Pacific island country Niue that had “the potential to host uranium mineralisation of equal or greater quantity” than Olympic Dam. The company’s share price rose 22% on the day of the announcement. A director told ABC Radio Australia: “It’s very early days, but it could be up to 10 per cent of the world’s known uranium.” In September, the company was losing interest and in October it announced that “there was insufficient objective evidence to support continuing expenditure on the project.” The Australian Securities and Investments Commission filed charges but later droppedthem.

September 2005 − Far East Capital’s Warwick Grigor said: “Companies are out there scrambling to get hold of anything that’s go uranium attached to it, just because they want a seat at the table. So it’s really all happening in boardrooms and in meetings. Very little is actually happening out in the field at present. … Booms are never totally healthy, because they always have a bust afterwards. I think investors need to really have a look, and there’s a lot of rubbish out there, and they need to keep their heads about them. At the moment there’s a lot of inexperienced players in mining racing in to buy anything that’s got uranium attached to it. And it’s got all the signatures of the crazy buying that we saw in the dot-com boom.”

October 2005 − Tim Treadgold writes in the West Australian: “What’s wrong with this equation? Mum and dad speculators continue to play the uranium game by investing in penny dreadful exploration stocks, while three major shareholders in Australia’s biggest pure uranium producer sell. Fairly obvious, isn’t it? … The sellers, in this case, are Cameco of Canada, Cogema of France, and Japan Australian Uranium Resource Development Company. All three have decided to cash in the chips they hold in the Rio Tinto-controlled Energy Resources of Australia (ERA). … Meanwhile, as experienced uranium players exit the game, mum and dad investors continue to ask naïve question such as “which uranium stocks should I buy?” and “do you think they’ll continue to rise?”. The gullibility is stunning. … This comes back to the point about the smart money, which understands the uranium market heading for the exit, while less clued-up people continue to buy uranium penny dreadfuls rather than do something sensible, like bet the house (the wife and the kids) on the horse carrying the jockey wearing pink polka dots in the fourth at Ascot next Saturday.”

March 2006 − The Australian reports: “Labor has proposed a new worldwide diplomatic group to limit nuclear proliferation, relying on Australia’s influence as the world’s second-biggest uranium supplier. The new diplomatic caucus would be led by Australia and include nuclear suppliers and users to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” No such group was formed and both Labor and the Coalition have abandoned their previous policy of prohibiting uranium exports to countries that refuse to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

March 2006 − The Age reports: “Uranium’s growing status as the boom metal for investors has been confirmed in spectacular fashion with the sharemarket debut of the Oxiana and Minotaur uranium exploration spin-off, Toro Energy. Gasps and hand-clapping — plus much partying later — were the order of the day when first sales were posted for the stock, an event celebrated by a record number of punters and associated parties that rocked up to the Australian Stock Exchange’s first-floor offices in King William Street, Adelaide.”

March 2006 − The Australian reports: “It looks like a bubble, it sounds like a bubble. The ranks of listed uranium juniors have nearly doubled in the past year, and half that rise in numbers took place in just three months − and there’s more to come. Most of them don’t have a drilled resource, many of them are exploring in states where governments ban uranium mining. Even when they do have a resource, the gains look extraordinary. … The one Australian company that is developing a mine, Paladin Resources, has still to come into production in Namibia, but is now capitalised at an extraordinary $2.37 billion.”

March 2006 − According to Resource Capital Research, there are 65 uranium juniorslisted on the Australian Stock Exchange, a 96% rise over the past 12 months (similar to the 104% increase in Canada). According to The Age, by December 2006 the number of companies claiming to be involved in uranium exploration was approaching 100. The World Nuclear Association claims that more than 200 Australian companies professed an interest in uranium during 2006, compared with 34 the previous year.

April 2006 − Tim Boreham writes in The Australian: “The current valuations being ascribed to even the most rag-tag uranium hopefuls might look reasonable in a decade’s time. But it’s just as likely that we’ve solved the Middle East’s woes and sent a man to Mars by then as well. … As with all manias, investors are spoiled for choice in terms of options to do their dough.”

April 2006 − The Bulletin, ‘Atomic Boom’: “Yellowcake is the new black, as share floats by new uranium prospectors give hot returns. … The fortunate few are clearly enjoying a kind of radioactive heaven.”

May 2006 − The Sydney Morning Herald reports: “Beleaguered iron ore hopeful Cazaly Resources is to sell off its uranium assets to Southern Cross Uranium, a new company which plans to list. … The junior explorer made an application for the tenement after Rio Tinto failed to renew its lease. But Cazaly shares were gutted last month after the WA Government handed the lease back to Rio Tinto, on what it said were public interest grounds.”

July 2006 − The Age reports: “Stand by for a second bull run in local uranium exploration / development stocks − one driven by a frenzy of merger and acquisition activity. The second bull run is just starting to take shape and already it has emerged that there is likely to be three key playmakers — Canadian/Australian Mega Uranium, John Borshoff’s Paladin and Toro Energy. … It was the first bull run in uranium stocks that gave those groups their firepower. It ran out of puff in March after 15 months on the go, with the subsequent repricing of uranium equities at lower levels in April-June setting the scene for the launch of the second, and merger-and-acquisition-driven, bull run.”

August 2006 − Clive Roffey said: “What is of major concern is that for the past year a serious proportion of the rise in the spot price of uranium has been attributed to ‘investors’. This is just syntax for speculators. Hedge funds have become active players in the uranium market. This buying group is reported to have accounted for just over 25% of the total 2005 spot volume. … There are very few major miners and refiners of uranium. But there are a multitude of wannabees. Paul van Eerden sums them up as unsuccessful gold, silver, copper, nickel, platinum and palladium ambulance chasers. Almost every mining exchange has a plethora of uranium ‘exploration or development’ companies, most of them promoting a debatable set of drilling results or estimated reserves.”

November 2006 − ninemsn reports that “shares in fancied prospecting hopeful Deep Yellow Limited have trebled to 39¢ after statements it’s ready to start drilling its untested Lochness prospect near Mt Isa − once it finds a drilling rig.” Four months later, The Australian reports that Deep Yellow “has truly ridden the uranium wave to have a market capitalisation of more than $440 million”, despite taking a large hit in late 2005 after poor drilling results from the Napperby uranium deposit in the NT. Deep Yellow hoped that Toro Energy would purchase the Napperby project, but Toro Energy allowed its purchase option to expire in May 2010. As of late 2012, Deep Yellow was in the process of divestment of its Australian assets.

November 2006 − “There’s nothing to stop the rally in uranium, unless nuclear has a big accident,” said Thomas Neff from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

December 2006 − A trading frenzy, mostly from day traders, helped push Goldsearch shares more than 351% higher in the space of seven trading sessions over the final few days of 2006 and into the new year. A director sells about one-third of his Goldsearch holdings in the midst of the market hype over drilling results from its Mary Kathleen uranium prospect. The ASX suspended trading of Goldsearch on 29 December 2006. On 2 January 2007, Goldsearch was the most traded stock on the Australian Stock Exchange. Goldsearch says directors were not aware of any news that could be influencing the interest in the company’s shares. Drilling samples had been sent for assay but the results had not been received. “Some traders expressed scepticism, suspecting blatant ramping or a pump-and-dump, while others scrambled to get on board,” the Daily Diary website stated.

December 2006 − The Age reports: “Investors have joined the nuclear party by driving equity values sharply higher. ERA, at its closing price yesterday of $19.94, is sporting a 100 per cent gain for the year. Paladin’s $8.25 close gives it a 325 per cent gain. Dozens of explorers and would-be developers have done better still.”

January 2007 − Adam Schwab writes in Crikey: “Uranium King’s rocketing share price is reminiscent of the early 1970s, when nickel miners would double in price after announcing they had staked a claim near Kambalda. That ended even worse than the dot.com boom – just ask the bloke who paid $280 for Poseidon.”

March 2007 − Pepinnini Minerals says it hopes to start supplying uranium to China within three years. However, Pepinnini announced in December 2009 that preliminary modelling at Crocker Well in SA indicated that it was not currently viable, and that Pepinnini and Sinosteel were delaying completion of the bankable feasibility study “until there is a substantial increase in the price of uranium and improvement in the US dollar.”

May 2007 − Academic George Dracoulis, who contributed to the Switkowski Report, said: “We can ask the question: is uranium going to make or break Australia as an exporter?” One wonders why the question needs asking given that uranium would account for around 3% of national export revenue even if Australia supplied entire world demand. We can ask another question: what has George Dracoulis been smoking?

May 2007 − an investment banker tells the Australian Financial Review: “When this bubble pops, people will get hurt. It will happen and everyone will have blood on them − not just those small guys.”

May 2007 − The Sydney Morning Herald reports that the Gold Company’s share’s shot up nearly six-fold in one day in 2007 driven by the company’s announcement that it would buy into Greenland uranium project Kvanefjeld. It was “one of the biggest one-day gains in Australian trading history” according to a report in The Australian. However the Greenland government banned uranium mining. The company said: “It is not possible to receive a mineral licence for the exploration or exploitation of uranium in Greenland. Therefore, the licence does not include uranium.”

May 2007 − The Australian reports: “The Takeovers Panel has delivered a stunning blow to the credibility of uranium players Summit Resources and Paladin Resources, joint venture partners in one of Australia’s biggest untapped uranium deposits. The panel made a declaration of unacceptable circumstances over Paladin’s $1.3 billion bid for Summit, acting on a complaint by French nuclear giant Areva, which wants to protect lucrative marketing rights over the massive Valhalla/Skal deposit in outback Queensland. … The Takeovers Panel said it was “disappointed” with the quality and timeliness of market disclosure by both Paladin and Summit.”

June 2007 − Jamie Freed notes in the Sydney Morning Herald: “These days a uranium explorer doesn’t need any actual uranium in the ground for its float to be nearly four times oversubscribed.” Freed was referring to Fission Energy, a company whose tenements had received little if any drilling in the past, and whose parent company hadn’t found anything mineable since listing in 2001.

July 2007 − The Australian reports: “Uranium-focused shares took a tumble on the bourse, as the spot price for uranium registered its first fall since 2003 … As the demand side wanes, the market reacted savagely to uranium hopefuls, which had provided heady returns for investors speculating on yellowcake-focused stocks. Junior explorers were the hardest hit …”

July 2007 − The Age reports: “There has been a distinct cooling down in the share-price performance of the uranium explorers, due more to market saturation in the number of listings than anything else.”

June 2007 − Far East Capital’s Warwick Grigor said: “This is a bull market based on hard factual economics, not fantasies and what-ifs,” he wrote. “At these uranium prices, there are enormous cash flows that can be made.”

July 2007 − The Age reports: “Will Robinson’s Encounter Resources has not exactly been lost in space since its $4 million float as a uranium explorer in March 2006. It’s now a $44 million company ($7 million cash) and the 20¢ shares from the float closed on Friday at 63¢, down 3¢ on the day. The mainly West Australian-focused explorer could not have timed its float any better, with uranium prices rocketing from $US35 a pound to $US130 a pound since its listing.”

September 2008 − Ux Weekly reports: “One of the major changes in the spot uranium market over the past several years has been a greater involvement of hedge funds and other financial entities in the market. This makes the market more subject to the vicissitudes of the financial sector – hedge funds that are losing money in one area might have to sell uranium holdings for cash flow or to shore up their returns.”

December 2008 − The market valuation of Australian uranium companies falls by 75%in the 12 months to December 2008 according to Resource Capital Research. RCR managing director John Wilson said: “Producers continue to face significant challenges in financing and developing new projects, including cost pressures and potential delays variously relating to permitting, infrastructure development, commissioning and now credit and equity market weakness.”

March 2009 − The Australian reports: “The drastic decline in the price has really hit the local sector for six. A check on announcements shows that many local uranium explorers have more or less gone into hibernation, emerging only to file the compulsory quarterlies and financial statements.”

March 2009 − Far East Capital’s Warwick Grigor said: “There are many walking dead companies out there − zombie companies.” He said he expected about 10 serious uranium companies to survive and maybe 10 more not-so-serious companies. “Some companies will merge and some companies will be taken over, but in many cases it won’t even be worth paying the corporate advisory and legal fees to complete mergers.”

September 2009 − Barry FitzGerald and Mathew Murphy write in the Sydney Morning Herald: “A penny dreadful in the early 1990s, Paladin is now a $3.2 billion company on the strength of its African production interests and its plans to be the architect for consolidation amongst uranium groups and explorers. Borshoff has 30 years experience in the uranium sector and warns would-be uranium producers that Paladin’s success will not be repeated easily.” Fast forward to January 13 and S&A Resource Report editor Matt Badiali states in January 2013: “One company I was concerned about was Paladin Energy Ltd. … It has some great assets and a long-term supply contract with one of the French utilities, but it’s experienced some problems turning a profit. … It has a lot of debt. It’s a $712 million ($712M) market value with $830M in debt.”

October 2009 − The Age reports: “Perth-based uranium explorer Greenland Minerals and Energy has reviewed its books for the 2008 financial year − and revealed a $164 million blow-out … Few companies can rival Greenland Minerals when it comes to having bad news to bury. Fewer have done such a fine job of burying it. … A huge $171 million increase in equity-based payments made by Greenland Minerals last financial year is described in the accounts signed-off by Deloitte as ”$171,378 thousand”. A leading Melbourne taxation accountant who looked over the Greenland Minerals financial statement laughed when he examined the figures. ”I guess that’s how they do things in Perth,” he said.”

March 2010 − The Age reports: “But, spare a thought for the people of Greenland, who last year voted in a government that is opposed to uranium mining. After the election, GGG [Greenland Minerals & Energy] released a pre-feasibility study stating that Kvanefjeld was worth an estimated $2.2 billion, could produce 3895 tonnes of uranium oxide a year, making it ”a globally significant producer of uranium”, and concluding that ”construction is scheduled to commence in 2013, with first production in 2015”. [Construction has not begun as of February 2013.]

April 2010 − The Age reports: “The producers are down by 25-35 per cent from their 52-week highs and the explorers are generally showing falls of 50 per cent from their 52-week peaks. … Another way of putting it would have been to say that there is a whole bunch of junior explorers out there that do not have a hope of getting in to production while uranium prices remain in the doldrums. But in 2-5 years it could be a different story. But don’t expect punters in the sector to be hanging around that long. They will be off chasing near-term gains in others sectors.” Most active uranium explorers “are on an official go slow to preserve funds”.

June 2011 − The Australian Uranium Association claims that there are “good prospects that four or five projects in WA will begin operation in the next three to four years” and that the WA Government forecasts uranium export revenue from the state of $675m annually by 2014. As of February 2013, no uranium mines are in operation in WA despite the support of the WA and federal Governments. It is possible that one mine will be producing in 2014 (Wiluna); there is no possibility that two mines could be producing.

Disgraceful mismanagement of radioactive waste by the CSIRO at Woomera (SA), and disgraceful non-regulation by the regulator ARPANSA. As of March 2018, it seems that much work remains to be done to fix the problems.

Rusted barrels of radioactive waste cost CSIRO $30 million

13 March 2017, Steven Trask

http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/rusted-barrels-of-radioactive-waste-cost-csiro-30-million-20170307-gusb6v.html

Also posted at: http://www.theage.com.au/national/rusted-barrels-of-radioactive-waste-cost-csiro-30-million-20170307-gusb6v.html

CSIRO faces a $30 million clean up bill after barrels of radioactive waste at a major facility were found to be “deteriorating rapidly” and possibly leaking.

An inspection found “significant rusting” on many of the 9,725 drums, which are understood to contain radioactive waste and other toxic chemicals.

CSIRO flagged a $29.7 million budget provision for “remediation works” at a remote location in its latest annual report.

Fairfax Media can reveal the work will take place at a CSIRO facility located on Department of Defence land near Woomera, South Australia.

The Woomera facility is currently one of Australia’s largest storage sites for low and intermediate-level radioactive waste.

A damning report of the Woomera facility was issued by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) after an inspection in April last year.

“Evidence was sighted that indicates the drums are now beginning to deteriorate rapidly,” read the report, seen by Fairfax Media.

“Significant rust on a number of the drums, deterioration of the plastic drum-liners and crushing of some stacked drums was observed.”

Tests confirmed the presence of radioactive isotopes at one location and inspectors said there was a possibility the drums were leaking.

“Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the presence of deceased animals such as rodents and birds may indicate that some of the drums, which contain industrial chemicals, may be leaking into the environment.”

The mixture of water and concentrated radioactive material inside some of the drums also had the potential to produce explosive hydrogen gas, inspectors found.

They also noted CSIRO had little knowledge of what was inside many of the barrels, some of which are believed to date back more than 50 years.

“Without full knowledge [of] the contents of the drums, risks cannot be fully identified and risk controls cannot be appropriately implements to protect people and the environment,” inspectors noted in the report.

Many of the drums are understood to contain contaminated soil generated by government research into radioactive ores at Melbourne’s Fishermans Bend throughout the 1940s and 1950s.

The toxic soil was discovered by the Department of Defence in 1989, who sent it to Sydney’s Lucas Heights facility before it was palmed off to Woomera in 1994.

An ARPANSA spokeswoman said the $29.7 million estimate would cover the characterisation, handling, re-packaging and storage of the toxic material.

“As a result of an ARPANSA inspection in 2016, it was recognised that additional work was required to scientifically characterise some of the contents of the legacy materials more accurately,” she said.

“The work that needs to be undertaken is significant.”

A spokesman for CSIRO said the first phase of the three-year clean up would begin next month.

“CSIRO currently has a radioactive waste store located on defence land at Woomera, South Australia. The store currently has 9,725 drums of long-lived waste,” he said.

“Last year ARPANSA conducted a regulatory inspection of the Woomera facility.

“In conjunction with ARPANSA, CSIRO has developed a $29.7 million, three-year project to conduct an assessment, separation and treatment of the waste.

“The first phase of this project, which is to undertake a detailed assessment and pilot-scale separation and treatment trial of up to 600 drums of material, will begin in April this year.

“The first phase at Woomera is expected to take four to five months.”

The country’s other major radioactive waste storage facility at Lucas Heights, Sydney, is rapidly approaching full capacity.

Coupled with issues at the CSIRO site, the revelations highlighted the urgent need for a national radioactive waste storage solution, experts said.

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Deteriorating radioactive waste barrels at Woomera require $30 million clean-up by CSIRO

Peter Jean, The Advertiser, 14 March 2017

http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/deteriorating-radioactive-waste-barrels-at-woomera-require-30-million-cleanup-by-csiro/news-story/35e145b33ce748406d46d892ade39e96

AN estimated $30 million will be spent on securing radioactive waste at Woomera after inspectors discovered storage barrels were rapidly deteriorating.

The CSIRO stores almost 10,000 drums of low-level radioactive waste at Woomera.

An inspection by the radiation safety watchdog last year revealed some drums were deteriorating quickly and it was possible some industrial chemicals had leaked into the environment.

“Evidence was sighted that indicates that the drums are now beginning to deteriorate rapidly.,’’ an Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency report said.

“Significant rust on a number of the drums, deterioration of the plastic drum-liners and crushing of some stacked drums were observed.”

Some of the drums contain industrial chemicals and biological hazards.

“It was noted that chemical baiting of pests has occurred in the past at this site. A concern was the existence of deceased animals located in and around the site,’’ the ARPANSA inspection report said.

“Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the presence of deceased animals (such as rodents and birds) may also indicate that some of the drums, which contain industrial chemicals, may be leaking into the environment.’’

Most of the waste is contaminated soil from CSIRO’s former Fishermans Bend site in Melbourne.

It was transferred from Sydney’s Lucas Heights nuclear campus to Woomera in the 1990s.

A CSIRO spokesman said the agency was undertaking a three-year project to assess, separate and treat the waste.

“The first phase of this project which is to undertake a detailed assessment and pilot-scale separation and treatment trial of up to 600 drums of material will begin in April this year,’’ the spokesman said.

“The first phase at Woomera is expected to take four to five months.

“The Department of Defence provides security and controls access to the Woomera facility, and a joint CSIRO-Defence inspection of the facility is undertaken annually and reported to ARPANSA.”

The Federal Government wants to establish a single national centre for the secure storage of low-level radioactive waste. Barndioota, in the Flinders Ranges, is the preferred site for the waste dump.

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CSIRO facing $30 million bill to clean up radioactive waste in South Australia

13 March 2017

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-13/csiro-facing-$30-million-bill-to-clean-up/8350552

http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2016/s4635390.htm

The CSIRO has confirmed it faces a $30 million bill to clean up radioactive waste near Woomera in South Australia. The contaminated soil is contained in almost 10,000 drums that have been left to deteriorate over decades. The clean-up is due to begin next month, and comes as the Federal Government continues to explore options for a national nuclear storage facility.

The CSIRO has confirmed it faces a 30 million dollar bill to clean up radioactive waste near Woomera in South Australia.

The contaminated soil is contained in almost 10-thousand drums that have been left to deteriorate over decades.

Meanwhile the Federal Government is continuing to explore options for a national nuclear storage facility.

Radio segment / interviews posted at

http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2016/s4635390.htm

and at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-13/csiro-facing-$30-million-bill-to-clean-up/8350552

Featured:

Alan Parkinson, nuclear engineer who was in charge of the clean-up of the Maralinga bomb test site in South Australia

Jim Green, nuclear campaigner from Friends of the Earth

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Hot news: new home for waste

Mark Davis, 26 September 2009

http://www.smh.com.au/environment/hot-news-new-home-for-waste-20090925-g6aj.html

TWENTY years after being found at an old CSIRO site in Fishermans Bend, in Melbourne, nearly 10,000 barrels of radioactive waste are moving to another ”temporary” storage facility in outback South Australia.

The Defence Department plans to move the contaminated soil, which is now in a corrugated iron shed in the Woomera prohibited area, to an explosives storage building several kilometres away at Koolymilka.

Over the years the 1950 cubic metres of soil has been shifted from Melbourne to Lucas Heights, in Sydney, and then to the Woomera rocket-testing range as politicians squabbled over where to put a permanent radioactive waste storage facility.

A spokeswoman for the Defence Department said Koolymilka would provide secure storage for that soil and for some waste at Edinburgh, in Adelaide.

The Koolymilka facility would use a refurbished above-ground explosives storage building, she said. It would have capacity for additional waste but would not be licensed to take any.

The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency was assessing defence’s application for a licence to establish the facility, a spokesman said.

The CSIRO waste is more than half of Australia’s stockpile of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, which is expanding by about 50 cubic metres a year. It is stored at mainly temporary facilities around the country.

After the South Australian Government blocked a planned permanent national repository near Woomera in 2003, the Howard government began assessing four sites in the Northern Territory for a permanent spot for Commonwealth waste.

The Rudd Government got the scientific reports on the sites in March. It is yet to decide whether to select one of the NT sites or rethink the Howard government’s strategy of bypassing the states.

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ARPANSA 2016 Inspection Report

https://www.arpansa.gov.au/sites/g/files/net3086/f/legacy/pubs/regulatory/inspections/2016/R16-05292.rtf

Licence Holder:  CSIRO Hangar 5 Annex

Licence Number: S0013

Location inspected: Woomera, SA

Date of inspection: 27-29 April 2016

Report No: R16/05292

An inspection was conducted under Part 7 of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (the Act). The purpose of the inspection was to assess compliance with the Act, applicable regulations, and licence conditions. The inspection was conducted as part of ARPANSA’s baseline source inspection program.

The inspection consisted of a review of records, interviews, a series of radiological measurements, and a physical inspection of radioactive material stored at Woomera. In addition, soil samples were collected in order to establish a baseline of the background environmental conditions at the site.

Background

CSIRO Business Infrastructure Services (CBIS) is licenced under section 33 of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 to store low-level radioactive material in approximately 10,000 drums at one site at Woomera.

Observations

In general the management of the drums at Woomera has not changed significantly over the previous eight (8) years. However, the inspection found concerns regarding the future integrity of the drums. Evidence was sighted that indicates that the drums are now beginning to deteriorate rapidly. Significant rust on a number of the drums, deterioration of the plastic drum-liners and crushing of some stacked drums were observed. At one location, a radiation measurement was taken that had elevated from 90nSv.hr-1 to 2μSv.hr-1 when compared to the same measurement conducted by ARPANSA eight (8) years ago. A spectrum was taken at this location confirming the presence of 226Ra. It was unclear whether the elevated dose rate was due to the in-growth of daughter products or due to material that may have leaked from the drums.

Moreover, research conducted recently by CSIRO has indicated that many of the drums contain industrial chemicals and biological hazards. There is also the potential for the buildup of hydrogen gas within the drums due to the hydrolysis of water mixed with concentrated thorium.

It was noted that chemical baiting of pests has occurred in the past at this site. A concern was the existence of deceased animals located in and around the site. Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the presence of deceased animals (such as rodents and birds) may indicate that some of the drums, which contain industrial chemicals, may be leaking into the environment.

As a result of these observations, the inspectors decided to collect environmental soil samples to be analysed for any radiological signatures that exceed the normal environmental background levels. Additional soil samples were also collected by ARPANSA for chemical analysis to be performed by Chem Centre in Western Australia. Chem Centre will be analysing the samples for heavy metals, acids and alkalines, solvents and hydrocarbons, and pesticides. The results of these environmental assessments will be provided to CSIRO.

CSIRO was unable to provide a detailed inventory of the drums. Although the inspectors recognize that this is a legacy issue where historical records of the contents of the drums are difficult to locate, the drums should be characterised as a matter of priority. Without the full knowledge the contents of the drums, risks cannot be fully identified, and risk controls cannot be appropriately implemented to protect people and the environment.

The CSIRO representatives provided a copy of the Woomera (Hangar 5) Risk Management Plan (04/04/16). Based upon the observed conditions of the drums, and new historical research which highlights evidence of the presence of combined chemical, biological and radiological hazards, the risk assessment provided failed to adequately address all of the presented hazards. On page 5 for example, Hazard 4 states “various hazards on site” but does not adequately consider the chemical hazards which are now known to exist at the site.

Being explicit about the potential risks will allow for more adequate controls to be put in place. Page 1 of the supplied Hazardous Substances Risk Control Plan (01/03/16) highlights radiological and miscellaneous substances as the Dangerous Goods Classification for the site. The newly acquired historical information on the site suggests that 2.1 Flammable Gases (hydrogen), 6.1 Toxic Substances, 8.0 Corrosive Substances should also have been highlighted. Moreover, the identified Exposure Route only considers inhalation. Ingestion, absorption and external irradiation should also be considered as pathways for the complex hazardous materials at the site.

When observing the entry and exit procedures for the storage annex, a range of contamination controls were not present. It is usual practice to have an established contamination control line, with appropriate quantities of gloves, booties, suits and respirators, a waste bin and calibrated contamination monitors. For chemical hazards, additional requirements such as a spill kits, decontamination agents and rinse stations may also be required.

These observations also demonstrate that the CSIRO staff could coordinate and communicate more effectively. Sharing new information about the history of the stored material, when discovered, would assist those charged with the responsibility to implement risk management strategies for the site.

Findings

Performance may be improved by addressing the following deficiencies:

Performance Deficiencies:

1. CSIRO was not able to provide a comprehensive inventory of the radiological material stored in the drums.
2. As a result of an inadequate inventory, CSIRO were unable to develop or implement an adequate risk assessment, risk management plan, and risk control plan for the site.
3. The procedural arrangements for protecting personnel entering or operating around the site could be enhanced. Contamination control was not established to address all types of hazardous materials located at the site.
4. Communication within across the various business units of CSIRO was not evident; the sharing of information relating to the likely contents of the drums has not occurred.

Collection of articles by The Advertiser journalist Colin James (PDF)

Web-links to the same collection of articles from The Advertiser:

• Nuclear tests no one knew about
• Mums, babies had picnics during tests
• What killed the Woomera babies
• Nuclear dust settled across 1950s Adelaide
• Just like your dad
• Spate of deaths, serious illness over three decades leads to call for a national inquiry
• Health card victory for test veterans
• Shut your eyes and dig, dig … that was the British military’s advice for surviving an A-bomb
• Found: hidden documents on A-bomb tests
• Nuclear bombs ’caused cancer’
• Maralinga tests on nerve gas, files show
• Secret atomic child files opened
• Atomic tests payouts reach $5m
• Water ‘fouled by nuclear waste’
• Atomic waste 20m from public road
• Maralinga veterans urged to have a say
• How a dying rabbit was all it took to lift the lid on what it was really like at Maralinga
• The key that unlocks the lies of Maralinga
• Cloak of secrecy thrown on veterans
• Hospital with no patient records
• Aborigines died in test site bunker
• Disabled son linked to atomic tests
• Atomic bomb fallout covered the city
• Nuclear truth revealed
• How the RAAF used ocean as a nuclear dump
• Crawling into a hotbed of radiation
• Civilians exposed to atomic bomb test radiation
• 17,000 people exposed to atomic tests
• Dark secrets
• Files on atomic tests not inspected

Update – March 2018: Rory Medcalf is no longer with the Lowy Institute – he has been Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University since January 2015. Shame on the ANU for appointing him to that position given his vigorous advocacy of selling uranium to a country that is outside the NPT, refuses to sign or ratify the CTBT, is actively expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal and delivery capabilities, and refused to accept any meaningful constraints on its nuclear weapons program as a condition of nuclear trade (inc. uranium sales).

The Lowy Institute’s dangerous nuclear propaganda

Jim Green, 28 December 2012, Online Opinion
www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=14512&page=0

The Lowy Institute portrays itself as an independent think-tank. But a close looks at the Institute’s work in relation to uranium sales to India suggests it is a dangerous, reactionary propaganda outfit.

First to briefly recap the debate over uranium sales to India (as discussed in Online Opinion earlier this year). India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are the four nuclear weapons states outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Five countries are ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states within the NPT − the USA, Russia, UK, France and China. The declared weapons states are obliged under the NPT to seriously pursue nuclear disarmament, though none of them do so and nothing is done to hold them to account.

For many years it was bipartisan policy in Australia to permit uranium sales to NPT states (including declared weapons states) but not to countries outside the NPT. The Howard government reversed that policy in 2007, the Rudd Labor government held firm on the principle of refusing uranium sales to non-NPT states, but Julia Gillard orchestrated a policy reversal at the 2011 ALP National Conference. Bilateral uranium export negotiations are slowly progressing between Australia and India.

The problems and risks of opening up uranium sales India are many. It legitimises India’s nuclear weapons program and could materially support that program (by diversion of nuclear materials or by ‘freeing up’ domestic uranium resources). It makes it difficult to maintain bans on nuclear trade with other non-NPT states. It encourages other countries to abandon previous nuclear export norms (for example China is using the India precedent to justify nuclear sales to Pakistan). It could encourage non-weapons states to pull out of the NPT, to build nuclear weapons and to do so on the assumption that civil nuclear programs will not be seriously disrupted by bans on nuclear imports or exports. It makes it more difficult to deal with problems like Iran’s suspected weapons program when double standards are clearly being applied.

To join the NPT, India would need to dismantle its nuclear weapons. For Australia, there were two defensible options. One was to maintain the ban on uranium sales to non-NPT states. The other was to make uranium sales conditional on concrete disarmament concessions such as India ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), stopping the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and stopping its missile development program. There is now bipartisan policy to pursue the third of those two options − uranium sales with no disarmament concessions from India.

It’s a complicated debate − still more complicated by the fact that in recent years some other countries have abandoned bans on nuclear exports to India. The Lowy Institute, a well-resourced think-tank with considerable foreign policy experience, ought to have played a constructive, educational role. Executive Director Michael Fullilove claims the Institute is “independent, non-partisan and evidence-driven; that we encourage the widest range of opinions but are the advocate of none.” Bollocks. The Institute − led by staff member Rory Medcalf − has run a disgraceful propaganda campaign in support of uranium sales to India.

All the rhetoric about using uranium sales to leverage disarmament concessions has been quickly forgotten. In 2007 Medcalf proposed a “political price” from Delhi in return for uranium sales. India would acknowledge Australia’s right to cease supply if India tested another nuclear bomb; affirm its moratorium on nuclear tests; state that it will support negotiation of a global treaty to ban producing fissile material for weapons; proclaim its determination to help thwart efforts by any other state to acquire nuclear weapons; commit India’s navy to interdicting illegal nuclear trade; and reiterate that India has a strictly defensive nuclear posture based on no first use, along with a moral commitment to global nuclear disarmament.

Some of those proposed conditions are useless or worse than useless − for example India’s ‘moratorium’ on weapons testing is no substitute for ratifying the CTBT. And the conditions that have any substance have been ignored by Medcalf himself, to the point that in recent years he has campaigned furiously for uranium sales to India with no concessions whatsoever.

In 2008, Medcalf said that an “invitation to India to work with Australia on arms control would test India’s highsounding rhetoric on nuclear disarmament and restraint, and could change the context for an eventual review on uranium sales.” But there has been no invitation for joint work on arms control, and the uranium agreement is progressing with no disarmament concessions.

India and Pakistan continue to produce fissile material for weapons, to expand their nuclear weapons arsenals, to expand their missile capabilities, and to thumb their nose at the CTBT. Yet Medcalf wants us to be reassured about India’s “relatively small” and “strictly defensive” nuclear weapons program. He is impressed that India’s “pacifist traditions” held it back from testing a nuclear weapon until 1974 − but by that logic we ought to reward Pyongyang for holding out until 2006.

Medcalf says that safeguards applying to uranium sales to India would be at least as strong as those applying to uranium sales to China and Russia. But International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspections in China are tokenistic and inspections in Russia are very nearly non-existent. He says that IAEA safeguards will “confirm” that uranium exports are used for civilian purposes only and that safeguards “ensure” that Australian uranium will not end up in Indian warheads. But IAEA safeguards inspections in India are at best tokenistic and are quite incapable of confirming or ensuring anything. And Australia has neither the authority nor the wherewithal to carry out independent safeguards inspections.

Medcalf dismisses proliferation-based objections to nuclear trade with India as “false” and “fallacious”. He wants us to believe that we can play a more effective role promoting nuclear disarmament in India by first permitting uranium sales. But the US, Australia and some other suppliers have conspicuously failed to use their bargaining chip − the opening up of nuclear trade − to leverage disarmament outcomes. According to Medcalf’s logic, we’re in a better bargaining position after giving our bargaining chip (for nothing) than before. It’s a nonsense argument.

In early December, Medcalf was the Australian Co-Chair of the 2012 Australia-India Roundtable, a meeting of more than 50 parliamentarians, diplomats, government officials, academics, business figures and journalists from both countries. The Roundtable was supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

The Roundtable ought to have put some positive proposals on the table. India should have been encouraged to stop attacking and murdering citizens involved in peaceful and creative protests against nuclear power plants, to take concrete steps towards nuclear weapons disarmament, to seriously address ineffective and negligent nuclear regulation, and to address inadequate nuclear security and entrenched corruption. Medcalf could have used the occasion to champion his long-lost idea of an “invitation to India to work with Australia on arms control”. The Roundtable could have called into question the scale of military spending in India (A$49 billion in 2011) and its recently-acquired status as the world’s largest weapons purchaser.

But there was none of that at the Roundtable. On the contrary, one of the main proposals was to expand military links. All the better for the Indian state to attack and murder citizens opposing the nuclear power plants that may be fuelled by Australian uranium.

Medcalf uses straw-man arguments. He writes: “Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Israel have long pursued nuclear weapons regardless of how the world treated India. It is absurd to suggest that their leaders are on the verge of nuclear disarmament if only Australia would steer clear of India’s nuclear energy program.”

No-one has ever made that absurd suggestion − Medcalf is simply making stuff up. The flip-side of his disingenuous, straw-man argument about disarmament is a disingenuous, straw-man argument about proliferation. He writes: “But the most mistaken claim is that Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s proposal to end the blanket ban on civilian uranium exports to India will somehow lead to the catastrophic spread of nuclear weapons …”

Yet nuclear trade with India clearly does encourage proliferation. If Japan or South Korea pulled out of the NPT and built nuclear weapons prior to the 2008 US-India nuclear trade agreement, they would have been excluded from international nuclear trade and that would have killed their domestic nuclear power industries and their nuclear export industries. Now, the equation is fundamentally altered − based on the Indian precedent, both countries could realistically expect to be able to build weapons with minimal impact (or manageable impact) on their nuclear power programs and their nuclear export industries.

The undermining of the nuclear non-proliferation regime coincides with a range of other worrying developments in north-east Asia. South Korea has a long history of secret nuclear weapons research. Now, Seoul wants to develop uranium enrichment technology in violation of its commitments under the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and despite the fact that it has no legitimate need for enrichment technology. Regional tensions are worsened by North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons (using plutonium from an ‘experimental power reactor’) and its recent rocket test.

Japan and China are engaged in territorial disputes. Japan’s nuclear weapons hawks have become more vocal recently and they’re not shy about pointing to Japan’s nuclear power program as a source of materials and expertise for a weapons program. Japan is pressing ahead with its reprocessing program despite already having a huge stockpile of plutonium and no legitimate need for any more.

WMD proliferation in south Asia and north-east Asia may turn out to be the defining events of this Asian century. Yet Australia turned a blind eye to secret nuclear weapons research in South Korea, one of our uranium customer countries. Australia gives Japan open-ended permission to separate and stockpile plutonium produced from Australian uranium. And there is bipartisan policy to undermine the non-proliferation regime by selling uranium to India with no disarmament concessions.

Despite its claim to champion “open debate” and to “encourage the widest range of opinions”, the Lowy Institute refused to publish a critique of Medcalf’s propaganda. Friends of the Earth will soon be writing to the Institute’s sponsors suggesting they redirect funding to organisations upholding reasonable intellectual standards and promoting peace instead of militarism and WMD proliferation. We don’t expect a positive response from at least two of those sponsors − uranium miners BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto.

Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, Australia and author of a detailed briefing paper on uranium sales to India. www.energyscience.org.au/BP18India.pdf

The think tank that didn’t

Jim Green, 16 Feb 2012, Online Opinion
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=13257&page=0

The Lowy Institute has been under fire for its role in encouraging the Labor Party to reverse its policy of banning uranium sales to India, a nuclear-armed country that has steadfastly refused to ratify either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The first person to publicly raise concerns about the Institute’s role was N.A.J. Taylor, a PhD student at Queensland University, in a number of articles published in Al Jazeera, Crikey and elsewhere. Taylor’s broad complaint is that “well-funded and resourced lobby groups successfully denied Australians of a debate, and a complacent and shameful standard of media proliferated falsehoods and empty rhetoric”.

Strong words − perhaps a little too strong. The Institute didn’t deny Australians a debate, but it did seriously debase the debate.

Sam Roggeveen, a ‘Fellow’ at the Institute and editor of its publication ‘The Interpreter’, wrote a rebuttal to Taylor, claiming that the Institute staged an open debate and provided a platform (primarily its blog) for the expression of numerous perspectives from numerous people. And so it did.

The problem was that by far the most prominent voice was that of Lowy staffer Rory Medcalf, and his contribution to the debate was, to put it politely, deeply problematic.

Medcalf is much concerned with the “hypocrisy” and “discrimination” of allowing nuclear trade with some nuclear weapons states (those that have ratified the NPT) but not others (those that haven’t, in particular India). He wrote: “India’s pacifist traditions held it back from an all-out effort to build the bomb. Delhi’s eventual decisions to test in 1974 and 1998 thus came too late to allow it a recognised nuclear-armed status under the treaty.”

But by that ‘logic’, we ought to congratulate Pyongyang and reward it with uranium sales − after all, its pacifist traditions run so deep that it didn’t test a nuclear weapon until 2006. By Medcalf’s logic, Australia (or any other country) could give expression to its pacifism by building and testing nuclear weapons.

Medcalf’s mantra about the “hypocrisy” and “discrimination” of refusing to allow uranium sales to non-NPT states misses the point that discrimination in favour of NPT states, and against non-NPT states, is precisely the purpose of the Treaty. If that’s “hypocrisy” and “discrimination”, if that’s “nuclear apartheid”, then bring it on.

Medcalf complained about Labor’s “refusal even to talk about uranium with India”. So the government is expected to negotiate uranium sales with non-NPT states even when it has a long-standing principled policy position of not negotiating uranium sales with non-NPT states? Go figure.

Let’s get to the main problem: Medcalf dimisses weapons proliferation-based objections to nuclear trade with India as “false” and “fallacious”. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The opening up of nuclear trade with India − which began with the 2008 US-India agreement − is problematic on several levels. For starters, Medcalf wants us to believe that we can play a more effective role in promoting non-proliferation and disarmament in India by first permitting uranium sales. The US, Australia and some other suppliers have conspicuously failed to use their bargaining chip (the opening up of nuclear trade) to leverage outcomes such as Indian ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. According to Medcalf’s ‘logic’, we’ll be in a better bargaining position after we’ve given up our bargaining chip (for nothing) than before.

Nuclear trade with India also alters the proliferation equation for other countries. Ron Walker, a former Australian diplomat and former Chair of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said: “Yes, India is a democracy and yes we want to be in their good books, but that is no reason to drop our principles and our interests. To make an exception for them would be crass cronyism. If you make exceptions to your rules for your mates, you weaken your ability to apply them to everyone else. How could we be harder on Japan and South Korea if they acquired nuclear weapons? Could we say Israel is less of a mate than India?”

Medcalf’s response to such arguments is that opening up nuclear trade with India won’t necessarily lead to proliferation elsewhere: “Neither the US-India deal nor Australian uranium sales will determine whether third countries opt for nuclear arms.” And this: “But the most mistaken claim is that Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s proposal to end the blanket ban on civilian uranium exports to India will somehow lead to the catastrophic spread of nuclear weapons …”

Of course no country will build nuclear weapons as a direct result of the US-India deal or the Labor government’s uranium policy reversal at its national conference last December. But those events certainly encourage proliferation and fundamentally alter the political equation for some countries.

If, for example, either Japan or South Korea pulled out of the NPT and built nuclear weapons prior to the 2008 US-India deal, they would have been excluded from international nuclear trade and that would have killed their domestic nuclear power industries and their nuclear export industries. Now, the equation is fundamentally altered − based on the Indian precedent, both countries could realistically expect to be able to build weapons with minimal impact (or manageable impact) on their nuclear power programs and their nuclear export industries.

The flip-side of Medcalf’s disingenuous, straw-man argument about proliferation is a disingenuous, straw-man argument about disarmament: “Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Israel have long pursued nuclear weapons regardless of how the world treated India. It is absurd to suggest that their leaders are on the verge of nuclear disarmament if only Australia would steer clear of India’s nuclear energy program.”

Problems are already evident in the wake of the 2008 US-India agreement, not least China’s use of the precedent to justify its plan to sell more reactors to Pakistan.

Medcalf says that safeguards applying to uranium sales to India would be at least as strong as those applying to uranium sales to China and Russia. But IAEA safeguards inspections in China are tokenistic and inspections in Russia are very nearly non-existent − one inspection of one plant in 2001, and another in 2010. Medcalf surely knows that.

And he surely knows about the controversy surrounding uranium sales to Russia. The Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office (ASNO) misled parliament’s treaties committee in 2008 by claiming that “strict” safeguards would “ensure” peaceful use of Australian uranium and by conspicuously failing to tell the committee that there had not been a single IAEA safeguards inspection in Russia since 2001. The treaties committee made the modest recommendation that some sort of a safeguards system ought to be in place before uranium exports to Russia were approved, only to have its recommendation rejected. Interestingly, the head of ASNO at the time was John Carlson, who has since left ASNO and is now a ‘Visiting Fellow’ at the Lowy Institute.

The Lowy Institute takes money from Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton, the two companies that stand to profit most from the Labor government’s policy change. I’ve never once seen that funding disclosed in relevant Lowy Institute publications. However I suspect Medcalf’s role in the India uranium debate has more to do with his extensive links with India than it has to do with funding from uranium mining companies. And there seems to be a disproportionate number of former government officials (Medcalf and Carlson among them) working for the Lowy Institute.

Whatever the explanation, it remains the case that Medcalf has seriously debased public debate on an important policy issue. The Lowy Institute should be held in contempt for so long as it continues to provide a platform for him to peddle his propaganda.