Author: Jim.Green

Chernobyl in Australia woohoo

Jim Green, 2017, ‘Radioactive Waste and Australia’s Aboriginal People’, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp.33-50.

Click here to read as a PDF (and here is a link to the journal webpage).

Abstract: The treatment of Australia’s Aboriginal people by the nuclear industry (broadly defined as private- and public-sector agencies pursuing uranium and nuclear projects) is a poorly researched topic. That is not merely a gap in the academic research on related topics (the history of the nuclear industry in Australia; the history of race relations in Australia; etc.), but it has “real world” consequences. Put simply, the paucity of information about the mistreatment of Aboriginal people makes it easier for nuclear interests to repeat past practices; and conversely, proper documentation and publication of past (and current) practices detrimental to Aboriginal people can make it more difficult for nuclear interests to repeat those practices. Over the past decade Friends of the Earth Australia (FoE) has sought to partially remedy the information deficit in the context of its work with Aboriginal communities involved in debates regarding uranium mining and proposed radioactive waste repositories (the author works for FoE). One thread of that work is the growing body of multimedia work (and a Master’s thesis) by FoE member Jessie Boylan covering the legacy of the atomic bomb tests, uranium mining and waste repository proposals (see <www.jessieboylan.com>). Another thread of the project is detailed written documentation of past and present incidents of mistreatment of Aboriginal people by nuclear interests (as well as multimedia presentations of this material – see, for example, <www.australianmap.net>). This article builds on that research and focuses on attempts to impose radioactive waste repositories on the land of unwilling Aboriginal communities in South Australia.

Perth-based uranium company Paladin Energy operated uranium mines in Malawi and Namibia. As of June 2018, both mines are in care-and-maintenance.

New report – June 2018: Morgan Somerville and Jim Green, ‘Undermining Africa: Paladin Energy’s Kayelekera Uranium Mine in Malawi’

Who cleans up the mess when an Australian uranium mining company leaves Africa? 18 June 2018, The Ecologist

Paladin Energy’s social and environmental record in Africa, July 2017

Paladin Energy goes bust, appoints administrators, July 2017

WISE Uranium, ‘Paladin Energy Ltd Hall of Infamy’

WISE Uranium, Issues at Operating Uranium Mines and Mills – Malawi

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Undermining Africa: New report calls on Australian mining company to clean up its mess in Malawi

Media Release: 19 June 2018

A new report warns that Perth-based Paladin Energy has made insufficient provision for the rehabilitation of its mothballed Kayelekera uranium mine in Malawi. The mine was put into care-and-maintenance in mid-2014 and there is little chance of a restart given the high cost of production and the small uranium resource.

Paladin ‒ once the darling of the stock-market ‒ was put into administration in July 2017. It relisted on the Australian Securities Exchange in February 2018 but just three months later the company’s only other mine ‒ the Langer Heinrich uranium mine in Namibia ‒ was also put into care-and-maintenance. Thus the company has no operating mines.

Paladin has lodged a US$10 million ‘Environmental Performance Bond’ with Malawian banks, and that money can be accessed to rehabilitate Kayelekera. But the cost of rehabilitating the mine-site will be multiples of that figure.

Paladin’s 2017 Annual Report lists a ‘rehabilitation provision’ of $86.93 million to cover both Kayelekera and Langer Heinrich. However the funds might not be available for rehabilitation if Paladin goes bankrupt, and even if the funds are available they are unlikely to be sufficient. In Australia, Energy Resources of Australia’s expects to pay almost 10 times as much to rehabilitate the Ranger uranium mine.

Dr Jim Green, national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia, said: “It stretches credulity to believe that the cost of rehabilitating both of Paladin Energy’s mines in Africa would be an order of magnitude lower than the cost of rehabilitating one single mine in Australia.”

“The Australian and Western Australian governments and Paladin Energy should liaise with the Malawian government and Malawian civil society to ensure that a proper rehabilitation of Kayelekera is undertaken.

“One option that should be considered is to move quickly to rehabilitation as an alternative to Paladin Energy’s current strategy of spending over A$13 million annually to keep Kayelekera in care-and-maintenance. The prospects for a restart of the mine are bleak and available funds would be better spent on rehabilitation.”

Help us stop the nuclear waste dump in the Flinders Ranges!

Written on November 27, 2015 at Yappala Station.

Adnyamathanha land in the Flinders Ranges has been short-listed for a national nuclear waste dump. The land was nominated by former Liberal Party Senator Grant Chapman. Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners weren’t consulted. Even Traditional Owners who live next to the proposed dump site at Yappala Station weren’t consulted.

The nomination was made public two weeks ago and even now, the government hasn’t contacted Yappala residents or Villiwarina Aboriginal Corporation. This is an insult.

The proposed dump site is adjacent to the Yappala Indigenous Protected Area.

On the land with the proposed dump site, we have been working for many years registering heritage sites and sites of significance with the SA government. Now Mr Chapman and the federal government are disrespecting our people and our wilyaru (lore).

The whole area is Adnyamathanha land. It is Arngurla Yarta (spiritual land). The proposed dump site has springs. It also has ancient mound springs. It has countless thousands of Aborigial artefects. Our ancestors are buried there.

Hookina creek that runs along the nominated site is a significant women’s site. It is a registered heritage site and must be preserved and protected. We are responsible for this area, the land and animals.

Through this area are registered cultural heritage sites and places of huge importance to our family, our history and as we plan, our future.

It is a very important archeological site for Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners. It is also a significant historical cultural site for non-Aboriginal people.

There are frequent yarta ngurra-ngurrandha (earthquakes and tremors). We see the ground move and the hills move; we feel the land move. At least half a dozen times each year.

It is flood land. The water comes from the hills and floods the plains, including the proposed dump site. Sometimes there are massive floods, the last one on 20 January 2006. The massive floods uproot huge trees − you can come out here now and see all the trees uprooted by the 2006 flood. In 1956 − 50 years earlier, to the day − a massive flood destroyed Cotabena homestead and all the houses in Hookina township. The pub was destroyed by the 1956 flood and is now a pile of rocks.

We don’t want a nuclear waste dump here on our country and worry that if the waste comes here it will harm our environment and muda (our lore, our creation, our everything).

We call on the federal government to withdraw the nomination of the site and to show more respect in future.

We call on Jay Weatherill to support us. This year one of us (Regina McKenzie) was awarded the SA Premier’s Natural Resource Management Award in the category of ‘Aboriginal Leadership − Female’ for her work to protect land that is now being threatened with a nuclear waste dump. But Premier Jay Weatherill has been silent since the announcement of the dump sites. He can either support us or he can support the federal government’s attack on us by maintaining his silence. He can’t sit on the fence.

We ask all Australians for support. We ask you for your support.

Signed by:
Regina McKenzie and Heather Stuart, Yappala residents, on behalf of Villiwarina Aboriginal Corporation.
Enice Marsh on behalf of Arnggumthanhna Camp Law Mob.

February 2013

Jim Green / Friends of the Earth Australia

August 2005 − A release by Yamarna Goldfields said that company had taken an 80% stake in a project on Pacific island country Niue that had “the potential to host uranium mineralisation of equal or greater quantity” than Olympic Dam. The company’s share price rose 22% on the day of the announcement. A director told ABC Radio Australia: “It’s very early days, but it could be up to 10 per cent of the world’s known uranium.” In September, the company was losing interest and in October it announced that “there was insufficient objective evidence to support continuing expenditure on the project.” The Australian Securities and Investments Commission filed charges but later droppedthem.

September 2005 − Far East Capital’s Warwick Grigor said: “Companies are out there scrambling to get hold of anything that’s go uranium attached to it, just because they want a seat at the table. So it’s really all happening in boardrooms and in meetings. Very little is actually happening out in the field at present. … Booms are never totally healthy, because they always have a bust afterwards. I think investors need to really have a look, and there’s a lot of rubbish out there, and they need to keep their heads about them. At the moment there’s a lot of inexperienced players in mining racing in to buy anything that’s got uranium attached to it. And it’s got all the signatures of the crazy buying that we saw in the dot-com boom.”

October 2005 − Tim Treadgold writes in the West Australian: “What’s wrong with this equation? Mum and dad speculators continue to play the uranium game by investing in penny dreadful exploration stocks, while three major shareholders in Australia’s biggest pure uranium producer sell. Fairly obvious, isn’t it? … The sellers, in this case, are Cameco of Canada, Cogema of France, and Japan Australian Uranium Resource Development Company. All three have decided to cash in the chips they hold in the Rio Tinto-controlled Energy Resources of Australia (ERA). … Meanwhile, as experienced uranium players exit the game, mum and dad investors continue to ask naïve question such as “which uranium stocks should I buy?” and “do you think they’ll continue to rise?”. The gullibility is stunning. … This comes back to the point about the smart money, which understands the uranium market heading for the exit, while less clued-up people continue to buy uranium penny dreadfuls rather than do something sensible, like bet the house (the wife and the kids) on the horse carrying the jockey wearing pink polka dots in the fourth at Ascot next Saturday.”

March 2006 − The Australian reports: “Labor has proposed a new worldwide diplomatic group to limit nuclear proliferation, relying on Australia’s influence as the world’s second-biggest uranium supplier. The new diplomatic caucus would be led by Australia and include nuclear suppliers and users to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” No such group was formed and both Labor and the Coalition have abandoned their previous policy of prohibiting uranium exports to countries that refuse to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

March 2006 − The Age reports: “Uranium’s growing status as the boom metal for investors has been confirmed in spectacular fashion with the sharemarket debut of the Oxiana and Minotaur uranium exploration spin-off, Toro Energy. Gasps and hand-clapping — plus much partying later — were the order of the day when first sales were posted for the stock, an event celebrated by a record number of punters and associated parties that rocked up to the Australian Stock Exchange’s first-floor offices in King William Street, Adelaide.”

March 2006 − The Australian reports: “It looks like a bubble, it sounds like a bubble. The ranks of listed uranium juniors have nearly doubled in the past year, and half that rise in numbers took place in just three months − and there’s more to come. Most of them don’t have a drilled resource, many of them are exploring in states where governments ban uranium mining. Even when they do have a resource, the gains look extraordinary. … The one Australian company that is developing a mine, Paladin Resources, has still to come into production in Namibia, but is now capitalised at an extraordinary $2.37 billion.”

March 2006 − According to Resource Capital Research, there are 65 uranium juniorslisted on the Australian Stock Exchange, a 96% rise over the past 12 months (similar to the 104% increase in Canada). According to The Age, by December 2006 the number of companies claiming to be involved in uranium exploration was approaching 100. The World Nuclear Association claims that more than 200 Australian companies professed an interest in uranium during 2006, compared with 34 the previous year.

April 2006 − Tim Boreham writes in The Australian: “The current valuations being ascribed to even the most rag-tag uranium hopefuls might look reasonable in a decade’s time. But it’s just as likely that we’ve solved the Middle East’s woes and sent a man to Mars by then as well. … As with all manias, investors are spoiled for choice in terms of options to do their dough.”

April 2006 − The Bulletin, ‘Atomic Boom’: “Yellowcake is the new black, as share floats by new uranium prospectors give hot returns. … The fortunate few are clearly enjoying a kind of radioactive heaven.”

May 2006 − The Sydney Morning Herald reports: “Beleaguered iron ore hopeful Cazaly Resources is to sell off its uranium assets to Southern Cross Uranium, a new company which plans to list. … The junior explorer made an application for the tenement after Rio Tinto failed to renew its lease. But Cazaly shares were gutted last month after the WA Government handed the lease back to Rio Tinto, on what it said were public interest grounds.”

July 2006 − The Age reports: “Stand by for a second bull run in local uranium exploration / development stocks − one driven by a frenzy of merger and acquisition activity. The second bull run is just starting to take shape and already it has emerged that there is likely to be three key playmakers — Canadian/Australian Mega Uranium, John Borshoff’s Paladin and Toro Energy. … It was the first bull run in uranium stocks that gave those groups their firepower. It ran out of puff in March after 15 months on the go, with the subsequent repricing of uranium equities at lower levels in April-June setting the scene for the launch of the second, and merger-and-acquisition-driven, bull run.”

August 2006 − Clive Roffey said: “What is of major concern is that for the past year a serious proportion of the rise in the spot price of uranium has been attributed to ‘investors’. This is just syntax for speculators. Hedge funds have become active players in the uranium market. This buying group is reported to have accounted for just over 25% of the total 2005 spot volume. … There are very few major miners and refiners of uranium. But there are a multitude of wannabees. Paul van Eerden sums them up as unsuccessful gold, silver, copper, nickel, platinum and palladium ambulance chasers. Almost every mining exchange has a plethora of uranium ‘exploration or development’ companies, most of them promoting a debatable set of drilling results or estimated reserves.”

November 2006 − ninemsn reports that “shares in fancied prospecting hopeful Deep Yellow Limited have trebled to 39¢ after statements it’s ready to start drilling its untested Lochness prospect near Mt Isa − once it finds a drilling rig.” Four months later, The Australian reports that Deep Yellow “has truly ridden the uranium wave to have a market capitalisation of more than $440 million”, despite taking a large hit in late 2005 after poor drilling results from the Napperby uranium deposit in the NT. Deep Yellow hoped that Toro Energy would purchase the Napperby project, but Toro Energy allowed its purchase option to expire in May 2010. As of late 2012, Deep Yellow was in the process of divestment of its Australian assets.

November 2006 − “There’s nothing to stop the rally in uranium, unless nuclear has a big accident,” said Thomas Neff from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

December 2006 − A trading frenzy, mostly from day traders, helped push Goldsearch shares more than 351% higher in the space of seven trading sessions over the final few days of 2006 and into the new year. A director sells about one-third of his Goldsearch holdings in the midst of the market hype over drilling results from its Mary Kathleen uranium prospect. The ASX suspended trading of Goldsearch on 29 December 2006. On 2 January 2007, Goldsearch was the most traded stock on the Australian Stock Exchange. Goldsearch says directors were not aware of any news that could be influencing the interest in the company’s shares. Drilling samples had been sent for assay but the results had not been received. “Some traders expressed scepticism, suspecting blatant ramping or a pump-and-dump, while others scrambled to get on board,” the Daily Diary website stated.

December 2006 − The Age reports: “Investors have joined the nuclear party by driving equity values sharply higher. ERA, at its closing price yesterday of $19.94, is sporting a 100 per cent gain for the year. Paladin’s $8.25 close gives it a 325 per cent gain. Dozens of explorers and would-be developers have done better still.”

January 2007 − Adam Schwab writes in Crikey: “Uranium King’s rocketing share price is reminiscent of the early 1970s, when nickel miners would double in price after announcing they had staked a claim near Kambalda. That ended even worse than the dot.com boom – just ask the bloke who paid $280 for Poseidon.”

March 2007 − Pepinnini Minerals says it hopes to start supplying uranium to China within three years. However, Pepinnini announced in December 2009 that preliminary modelling at Crocker Well in SA indicated that it was not currently viable, and that Pepinnini and Sinosteel were delaying completion of the bankable feasibility study “until there is a substantial increase in the price of uranium and improvement in the US dollar.”

May 2007 − Academic George Dracoulis, who contributed to the Switkowski Report, said: “We can ask the question: is uranium going to make or break Australia as an exporter?” One wonders why the question needs asking given that uranium would account for around 3% of national export revenue even if Australia supplied entire world demand. We can ask another question: what has George Dracoulis been smoking?

May 2007 − an investment banker tells the Australian Financial Review: “When this bubble pops, people will get hurt. It will happen and everyone will have blood on them − not just those small guys.”

May 2007 − The Sydney Morning Herald reports that the Gold Company’s share’s shot up nearly six-fold in one day in 2007 driven by the company’s announcement that it would buy into Greenland uranium project Kvanefjeld. It was “one of the biggest one-day gains in Australian trading history” according to a report in The Australian. However the Greenland government banned uranium mining. The company said: “It is not possible to receive a mineral licence for the exploration or exploitation of uranium in Greenland. Therefore, the licence does not include uranium.”

May 2007 − The Australian reports: “The Takeovers Panel has delivered a stunning blow to the credibility of uranium players Summit Resources and Paladin Resources, joint venture partners in one of Australia’s biggest untapped uranium deposits. The panel made a declaration of unacceptable circumstances over Paladin’s $1.3 billion bid for Summit, acting on a complaint by French nuclear giant Areva, which wants to protect lucrative marketing rights over the massive Valhalla/Skal deposit in outback Queensland. … The Takeovers Panel said it was “disappointed” with the quality and timeliness of market disclosure by both Paladin and Summit.”

June 2007 − Jamie Freed notes in the Sydney Morning Herald: “These days a uranium explorer doesn’t need any actual uranium in the ground for its float to be nearly four times oversubscribed.” Freed was referring to Fission Energy, a company whose tenements had received little if any drilling in the past, and whose parent company hadn’t found anything mineable since listing in 2001.

July 2007 − The Australian reports: “Uranium-focused shares took a tumble on the bourse, as the spot price for uranium registered its first fall since 2003 … As the demand side wanes, the market reacted savagely to uranium hopefuls, which had provided heady returns for investors speculating on yellowcake-focused stocks. Junior explorers were the hardest hit …”

July 2007 − The Age reports: “There has been a distinct cooling down in the share-price performance of the uranium explorers, due more to market saturation in the number of listings than anything else.”

June 2007 − Far East Capital’s Warwick Grigor said: “This is a bull market based on hard factual economics, not fantasies and what-ifs,” he wrote. “At these uranium prices, there are enormous cash flows that can be made.”

July 2007 − The Age reports: “Will Robinson’s Encounter Resources has not exactly been lost in space since its $4 million float as a uranium explorer in March 2006. It’s now a $44 million company ($7 million cash) and the 20¢ shares from the float closed on Friday at 63¢, down 3¢ on the day. The mainly West Australian-focused explorer could not have timed its float any better, with uranium prices rocketing from $US35 a pound to $US130 a pound since its listing.”

September 2008 − Ux Weekly reports: “One of the major changes in the spot uranium market over the past several years has been a greater involvement of hedge funds and other financial entities in the market. This makes the market more subject to the vicissitudes of the financial sector – hedge funds that are losing money in one area might have to sell uranium holdings for cash flow or to shore up their returns.”

December 2008 − The market valuation of Australian uranium companies falls by 75%in the 12 months to December 2008 according to Resource Capital Research. RCR managing director John Wilson said: “Producers continue to face significant challenges in financing and developing new projects, including cost pressures and potential delays variously relating to permitting, infrastructure development, commissioning and now credit and equity market weakness.”

March 2009 − The Australian reports: “The drastic decline in the price has really hit the local sector for six. A check on announcements shows that many local uranium explorers have more or less gone into hibernation, emerging only to file the compulsory quarterlies and financial statements.”

March 2009 − Far East Capital’s Warwick Grigor said: “There are many walking dead companies out there − zombie companies.” He said he expected about 10 serious uranium companies to survive and maybe 10 more not-so-serious companies. “Some companies will merge and some companies will be taken over, but in many cases it won’t even be worth paying the corporate advisory and legal fees to complete mergers.”

September 2009 − Barry FitzGerald and Mathew Murphy write in the Sydney Morning Herald: “A penny dreadful in the early 1990s, Paladin is now a $3.2 billion company on the strength of its African production interests and its plans to be the architect for consolidation amongst uranium groups and explorers. Borshoff has 30 years experience in the uranium sector and warns would-be uranium producers that Paladin’s success will not be repeated easily.” Fast forward to January 13 and S&A Resource Report editor Matt Badiali states in January 2013: “One company I was concerned about was Paladin Energy Ltd. … It has some great assets and a long-term supply contract with one of the French utilities, but it’s experienced some problems turning a profit. … It has a lot of debt. It’s a $712 million ($712M) market value with $830M in debt.”

October 2009 − The Age reports: “Perth-based uranium explorer Greenland Minerals and Energy has reviewed its books for the 2008 financial year − and revealed a $164 million blow-out … Few companies can rival Greenland Minerals when it comes to having bad news to bury. Fewer have done such a fine job of burying it. … A huge $171 million increase in equity-based payments made by Greenland Minerals last financial year is described in the accounts signed-off by Deloitte as ”$171,378 thousand”. A leading Melbourne taxation accountant who looked over the Greenland Minerals financial statement laughed when he examined the figures. ”I guess that’s how they do things in Perth,” he said.”

March 2010 − The Age reports: “But, spare a thought for the people of Greenland, who last year voted in a government that is opposed to uranium mining. After the election, GGG [Greenland Minerals & Energy] released a pre-feasibility study stating that Kvanefjeld was worth an estimated $2.2 billion, could produce 3895 tonnes of uranium oxide a year, making it ”a globally significant producer of uranium”, and concluding that ”construction is scheduled to commence in 2013, with first production in 2015”. [Construction has not begun as of February 2013.]

April 2010 − The Age reports: “The producers are down by 25-35 per cent from their 52-week highs and the explorers are generally showing falls of 50 per cent from their 52-week peaks. … Another way of putting it would have been to say that there is a whole bunch of junior explorers out there that do not have a hope of getting in to production while uranium prices remain in the doldrums. But in 2-5 years it could be a different story. But don’t expect punters in the sector to be hanging around that long. They will be off chasing near-term gains in others sectors.” Most active uranium explorers “are on an official go slow to preserve funds”.

June 2011 − The Australian Uranium Association claims that there are “good prospects that four or five projects in WA will begin operation in the next three to four years” and that the WA Government forecasts uranium export revenue from the state of $675m annually by 2014. As of February 2013, no uranium mines are in operation in WA despite the support of the WA and federal Governments. It is possible that one mine will be producing in 2014 (Wiluna); there is no possibility that two mines could be producing.

Disgraceful mismanagement of radioactive waste by the CSIRO at Woomera (SA), and disgraceful non-regulation by the regulator ARPANSA. As of March 2018, it seems that much work remains to be done to fix the problems.

Rusted barrels of radioactive waste cost CSIRO $30 million

13 March 2017, Steven Trask

http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/rusted-barrels-of-radioactive-waste-cost-csiro-30-million-20170307-gusb6v.html

Also posted at: http://www.theage.com.au/national/rusted-barrels-of-radioactive-waste-cost-csiro-30-million-20170307-gusb6v.html

CSIRO faces a $30 million clean up bill after barrels of radioactive waste at a major facility were found to be “deteriorating rapidly” and possibly leaking.

An inspection found “significant rusting” on many of the 9,725 drums, which are understood to contain radioactive waste and other toxic chemicals.

CSIRO flagged a $29.7 million budget provision for “remediation works” at a remote location in its latest annual report.

Fairfax Media can reveal the work will take place at a CSIRO facility located on Department of Defence land near Woomera, South Australia.

The Woomera facility is currently one of Australia’s largest storage sites for low and intermediate-level radioactive waste.

A damning report of the Woomera facility was issued by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) after an inspection in April last year.

“Evidence was sighted that indicates the drums are now beginning to deteriorate rapidly,” read the report, seen by Fairfax Media.

“Significant rust on a number of the drums, deterioration of the plastic drum-liners and crushing of some stacked drums was observed.”

Tests confirmed the presence of radioactive isotopes at one location and inspectors said there was a possibility the drums were leaking.

“Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the presence of deceased animals such as rodents and birds may indicate that some of the drums, which contain industrial chemicals, may be leaking into the environment.”

The mixture of water and concentrated radioactive material inside some of the drums also had the potential to produce explosive hydrogen gas, inspectors found.

They also noted CSIRO had little knowledge of what was inside many of the barrels, some of which are believed to date back more than 50 years.

“Without full knowledge [of] the contents of the drums, risks cannot be fully identified and risk controls cannot be appropriately implements to protect people and the environment,” inspectors noted in the report.

Many of the drums are understood to contain contaminated soil generated by government research into radioactive ores at Melbourne’s Fishermans Bend throughout the 1940s and 1950s.

The toxic soil was discovered by the Department of Defence in 1989, who sent it to Sydney’s Lucas Heights facility before it was palmed off to Woomera in 1994.

An ARPANSA spokeswoman said the $29.7 million estimate would cover the characterisation, handling, re-packaging and storage of the toxic material.

“As a result of an ARPANSA inspection in 2016, it was recognised that additional work was required to scientifically characterise some of the contents of the legacy materials more accurately,” she said.

“The work that needs to be undertaken is significant.”

A spokesman for CSIRO said the first phase of the three-year clean up would begin next month.

“CSIRO currently has a radioactive waste store located on defence land at Woomera, South Australia. The store currently has 9,725 drums of long-lived waste,” he said.

“Last year ARPANSA conducted a regulatory inspection of the Woomera facility.

“In conjunction with ARPANSA, CSIRO has developed a $29.7 million, three-year project to conduct an assessment, separation and treatment of the waste.

“The first phase of this project, which is to undertake a detailed assessment and pilot-scale separation and treatment trial of up to 600 drums of material, will begin in April this year.

“The first phase at Woomera is expected to take four to five months.”

The country’s other major radioactive waste storage facility at Lucas Heights, Sydney, is rapidly approaching full capacity.

Coupled with issues at the CSIRO site, the revelations highlighted the urgent need for a national radioactive waste storage solution, experts said.

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Deteriorating radioactive waste barrels at Woomera require $30 million clean-up by CSIRO

Peter Jean, The Advertiser, 14 March 2017

http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/deteriorating-radioactive-waste-barrels-at-woomera-require-30-million-cleanup-by-csiro/news-story/35e145b33ce748406d46d892ade39e96

AN estimated $30 million will be spent on securing radioactive waste at Woomera after inspectors discovered storage barrels were rapidly deteriorating.

The CSIRO stores almost 10,000 drums of low-level radioactive waste at Woomera.

An inspection by the radiation safety watchdog last year revealed some drums were deteriorating quickly and it was possible some industrial chemicals had leaked into the environment.

“Evidence was sighted that indicates that the drums are now beginning to deteriorate rapidly.,’’ an Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency report said.

“Significant rust on a number of the drums, deterioration of the plastic drum-liners and crushing of some stacked drums were observed.”

Some of the drums contain industrial chemicals and biological hazards.

“It was noted that chemical baiting of pests has occurred in the past at this site. A concern was the existence of deceased animals located in and around the site,’’ the ARPANSA inspection report said.

“Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the presence of deceased animals (such as rodents and birds) may also indicate that some of the drums, which contain industrial chemicals, may be leaking into the environment.’’

Most of the waste is contaminated soil from CSIRO’s former Fishermans Bend site in Melbourne.

It was transferred from Sydney’s Lucas Heights nuclear campus to Woomera in the 1990s.

A CSIRO spokesman said the agency was undertaking a three-year project to assess, separate and treat the waste.

“The first phase of this project which is to undertake a detailed assessment and pilot-scale separation and treatment trial of up to 600 drums of material will begin in April this year,’’ the spokesman said.

“The first phase at Woomera is expected to take four to five months.

“The Department of Defence provides security and controls access to the Woomera facility, and a joint CSIRO-Defence inspection of the facility is undertaken annually and reported to ARPANSA.”

The Federal Government wants to establish a single national centre for the secure storage of low-level radioactive waste. Barndioota, in the Flinders Ranges, is the preferred site for the waste dump.

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CSIRO facing $30 million bill to clean up radioactive waste in South Australia

13 March 2017

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-13/csiro-facing-$30-million-bill-to-clean-up/8350552

http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2016/s4635390.htm

The CSIRO has confirmed it faces a $30 million bill to clean up radioactive waste near Woomera in South Australia. The contaminated soil is contained in almost 10,000 drums that have been left to deteriorate over decades. The clean-up is due to begin next month, and comes as the Federal Government continues to explore options for a national nuclear storage facility.

The CSIRO has confirmed it faces a 30 million dollar bill to clean up radioactive waste near Woomera in South Australia.

The contaminated soil is contained in almost 10-thousand drums that have been left to deteriorate over decades.

Meanwhile the Federal Government is continuing to explore options for a national nuclear storage facility.

Radio segment / interviews posted at

http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2016/s4635390.htm

and at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-13/csiro-facing-$30-million-bill-to-clean-up/8350552

Featured:

Alan Parkinson, nuclear engineer who was in charge of the clean-up of the Maralinga bomb test site in South Australia

Jim Green, nuclear campaigner from Friends of the Earth

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Hot news: new home for waste

Mark Davis, 26 September 2009

http://www.smh.com.au/environment/hot-news-new-home-for-waste-20090925-g6aj.html

TWENTY years after being found at an old CSIRO site in Fishermans Bend, in Melbourne, nearly 10,000 barrels of radioactive waste are moving to another ”temporary” storage facility in outback South Australia.

The Defence Department plans to move the contaminated soil, which is now in a corrugated iron shed in the Woomera prohibited area, to an explosives storage building several kilometres away at Koolymilka.

Over the years the 1950 cubic metres of soil has been shifted from Melbourne to Lucas Heights, in Sydney, and then to the Woomera rocket-testing range as politicians squabbled over where to put a permanent radioactive waste storage facility.

A spokeswoman for the Defence Department said Koolymilka would provide secure storage for that soil and for some waste at Edinburgh, in Adelaide.

The Koolymilka facility would use a refurbished above-ground explosives storage building, she said. It would have capacity for additional waste but would not be licensed to take any.

The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency was assessing defence’s application for a licence to establish the facility, a spokesman said.

The CSIRO waste is more than half of Australia’s stockpile of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, which is expanding by about 50 cubic metres a year. It is stored at mainly temporary facilities around the country.

After the South Australian Government blocked a planned permanent national repository near Woomera in 2003, the Howard government began assessing four sites in the Northern Territory for a permanent spot for Commonwealth waste.

The Rudd Government got the scientific reports on the sites in March. It is yet to decide whether to select one of the NT sites or rethink the Howard government’s strategy of bypassing the states.

---

ARPANSA 2016 Inspection Report

https://www.arpansa.gov.au/sites/g/files/net3086/f/legacy/pubs/regulatory/inspections/2016/R16-05292.rtf

Licence Holder:  CSIRO Hangar 5 Annex

Licence Number: S0013

Location inspected: Woomera, SA

Date of inspection: 27-29 April 2016

Report No: R16/05292

An inspection was conducted under Part 7 of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (the Act). The purpose of the inspection was to assess compliance with the Act, applicable regulations, and licence conditions. The inspection was conducted as part of ARPANSA’s baseline source inspection program.

The inspection consisted of a review of records, interviews, a series of radiological measurements, and a physical inspection of radioactive material stored at Woomera. In addition, soil samples were collected in order to establish a baseline of the background environmental conditions at the site.

Background

CSIRO Business Infrastructure Services (CBIS) is licenced under section 33 of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 to store low-level radioactive material in approximately 10,000 drums at one site at Woomera.

Observations

In general the management of the drums at Woomera has not changed significantly over the previous eight (8) years. However, the inspection found concerns regarding the future integrity of the drums. Evidence was sighted that indicates that the drums are now beginning to deteriorate rapidly. Significant rust on a number of the drums, deterioration of the plastic drum-liners and crushing of some stacked drums were observed. At one location, a radiation measurement was taken that had elevated from 90nSv.hr-1 to 2μSv.hr-1 when compared to the same measurement conducted by ARPANSA eight (8) years ago. A spectrum was taken at this location confirming the presence of 226Ra. It was unclear whether the elevated dose rate was due to the in-growth of daughter products or due to material that may have leaked from the drums.

Moreover, research conducted recently by CSIRO has indicated that many of the drums contain industrial chemicals and biological hazards. There is also the potential for the buildup of hydrogen gas within the drums due to the hydrolysis of water mixed with concentrated thorium.

It was noted that chemical baiting of pests has occurred in the past at this site. A concern was the existence of deceased animals located in and around the site. Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the presence of deceased animals (such as rodents and birds) may indicate that some of the drums, which contain industrial chemicals, may be leaking into the environment.

As a result of these observations, the inspectors decided to collect environmental soil samples to be analysed for any radiological signatures that exceed the normal environmental background levels. Additional soil samples were also collected by ARPANSA for chemical analysis to be performed by Chem Centre in Western Australia. Chem Centre will be analysing the samples for heavy metals, acids and alkalines, solvents and hydrocarbons, and pesticides. The results of these environmental assessments will be provided to CSIRO.

CSIRO was unable to provide a detailed inventory of the drums. Although the inspectors recognize that this is a legacy issue where historical records of the contents of the drums are difficult to locate, the drums should be characterised as a matter of priority. Without the full knowledge the contents of the drums, risks cannot be fully identified, and risk controls cannot be appropriately implemented to protect people and the environment.

The CSIRO representatives provided a copy of the Woomera (Hangar 5) Risk Management Plan (04/04/16). Based upon the observed conditions of the drums, and new historical research which highlights evidence of the presence of combined chemical, biological and radiological hazards, the risk assessment provided failed to adequately address all of the presented hazards. On page 5 for example, Hazard 4 states “various hazards on site” but does not adequately consider the chemical hazards which are now known to exist at the site.

Being explicit about the potential risks will allow for more adequate controls to be put in place. Page 1 of the supplied Hazardous Substances Risk Control Plan (01/03/16) highlights radiological and miscellaneous substances as the Dangerous Goods Classification for the site. The newly acquired historical information on the site suggests that 2.1 Flammable Gases (hydrogen), 6.1 Toxic Substances, 8.0 Corrosive Substances should also have been highlighted. Moreover, the identified Exposure Route only considers inhalation. Ingestion, absorption and external irradiation should also be considered as pathways for the complex hazardous materials at the site.

When observing the entry and exit procedures for the storage annex, a range of contamination controls were not present. It is usual practice to have an established contamination control line, with appropriate quantities of gloves, booties, suits and respirators, a waste bin and calibrated contamination monitors. For chemical hazards, additional requirements such as a spill kits, decontamination agents and rinse stations may also be required.

These observations also demonstrate that the CSIRO staff could coordinate and communicate more effectively. Sharing new information about the history of the stored material, when discovered, would assist those charged with the responsibility to implement risk management strategies for the site.

Findings

Performance may be improved by addressing the following deficiencies:

Performance Deficiencies:

1. CSIRO was not able to provide a comprehensive inventory of the radiological material stored in the drums.
2. As a result of an inadequate inventory, CSIRO were unable to develop or implement an adequate risk assessment, risk management plan, and risk control plan for the site.
3. The procedural arrangements for protecting personnel entering or operating around the site could be enhanced. Contamination control was not established to address all types of hazardous materials located at the site.
4. Communication within across the various business units of CSIRO was not evident; the sharing of information relating to the likely contents of the drums has not occurred.

Collection of articles by The Advertiser journalist Colin James (PDF)

Web-links to the same collection of articles from The Advertiser:

• Nuclear tests no one knew about
• Mums, babies had picnics during tests
• What killed the Woomera babies
• Nuclear dust settled across 1950s Adelaide
• Just like your dad
• Spate of deaths, serious illness over three decades leads to call for a national inquiry
• Health card victory for test veterans
• Shut your eyes and dig, dig … that was the British military’s advice for surviving an A-bomb
• Found: hidden documents on A-bomb tests
• Nuclear bombs ’caused cancer’
• Maralinga tests on nerve gas, files show
• Secret atomic child files opened
• Atomic tests payouts reach $5m
• Water ‘fouled by nuclear waste’
• Atomic waste 20m from public road
• Maralinga veterans urged to have a say
• How a dying rabbit was all it took to lift the lid on what it was really like at Maralinga
• The key that unlocks the lies of Maralinga
• Cloak of secrecy thrown on veterans
• Hospital with no patient records
• Aborigines died in test site bunker
• Disabled son linked to atomic tests
• Atomic bomb fallout covered the city
• Nuclear truth revealed
• How the RAAF used ocean as a nuclear dump
• Crawling into a hotbed of radiation
• Civilians exposed to atomic bomb test radiation
• 17,000 people exposed to atomic tests
• Dark secrets
• Files on atomic tests not inspected

Update – March 2018: Rory Medcalf is no longer with the Lowy Institute – he has been Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University since January 2015. Shame on the ANU for appointing him to that position given his vigorous advocacy of selling uranium to a country that is outside the NPT, refuses to sign or ratify the CTBT, is actively expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal and delivery capabilities, and refused to accept any meaningful constraints on its nuclear weapons program as a condition of nuclear trade (inc. uranium sales).

The Lowy Institute’s dangerous nuclear propaganda

Jim Green, 28 December 2012, Online Opinion
www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=14512&page=0

The Lowy Institute portrays itself as an independent think-tank. But a close looks at the Institute’s work in relation to uranium sales to India suggests it is a dangerous, reactionary propaganda outfit.

First to briefly recap the debate over uranium sales to India (as discussed in Online Opinion earlier this year). India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are the four nuclear weapons states outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Five countries are ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states within the NPT − the USA, Russia, UK, France and China. The declared weapons states are obliged under the NPT to seriously pursue nuclear disarmament, though none of them do so and nothing is done to hold them to account.

For many years it was bipartisan policy in Australia to permit uranium sales to NPT states (including declared weapons states) but not to countries outside the NPT. The Howard government reversed that policy in 2007, the Rudd Labor government held firm on the principle of refusing uranium sales to non-NPT states, but Julia Gillard orchestrated a policy reversal at the 2011 ALP National Conference. Bilateral uranium export negotiations are slowly progressing between Australia and India.

The problems and risks of opening up uranium sales India are many. It legitimises India’s nuclear weapons program and could materially support that program (by diversion of nuclear materials or by ‘freeing up’ domestic uranium resources). It makes it difficult to maintain bans on nuclear trade with other non-NPT states. It encourages other countries to abandon previous nuclear export norms (for example China is using the India precedent to justify nuclear sales to Pakistan). It could encourage non-weapons states to pull out of the NPT, to build nuclear weapons and to do so on the assumption that civil nuclear programs will not be seriously disrupted by bans on nuclear imports or exports. It makes it more difficult to deal with problems like Iran’s suspected weapons program when double standards are clearly being applied.

To join the NPT, India would need to dismantle its nuclear weapons. For Australia, there were two defensible options. One was to maintain the ban on uranium sales to non-NPT states. The other was to make uranium sales conditional on concrete disarmament concessions such as India ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), stopping the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and stopping its missile development program. There is now bipartisan policy to pursue the third of those two options − uranium sales with no disarmament concessions from India.

It’s a complicated debate − still more complicated by the fact that in recent years some other countries have abandoned bans on nuclear exports to India. The Lowy Institute, a well-resourced think-tank with considerable foreign policy experience, ought to have played a constructive, educational role. Executive Director Michael Fullilove claims the Institute is “independent, non-partisan and evidence-driven; that we encourage the widest range of opinions but are the advocate of none.” Bollocks. The Institute − led by staff member Rory Medcalf − has run a disgraceful propaganda campaign in support of uranium sales to India.

All the rhetoric about using uranium sales to leverage disarmament concessions has been quickly forgotten. In 2007 Medcalf proposed a “political price” from Delhi in return for uranium sales. India would acknowledge Australia’s right to cease supply if India tested another nuclear bomb; affirm its moratorium on nuclear tests; state that it will support negotiation of a global treaty to ban producing fissile material for weapons; proclaim its determination to help thwart efforts by any other state to acquire nuclear weapons; commit India’s navy to interdicting illegal nuclear trade; and reiterate that India has a strictly defensive nuclear posture based on no first use, along with a moral commitment to global nuclear disarmament.

Some of those proposed conditions are useless or worse than useless − for example India’s ‘moratorium’ on weapons testing is no substitute for ratifying the CTBT. And the conditions that have any substance have been ignored by Medcalf himself, to the point that in recent years he has campaigned furiously for uranium sales to India with no concessions whatsoever.

In 2008, Medcalf said that an “invitation to India to work with Australia on arms control would test India’s highsounding rhetoric on nuclear disarmament and restraint, and could change the context for an eventual review on uranium sales.” But there has been no invitation for joint work on arms control, and the uranium agreement is progressing with no disarmament concessions.

India and Pakistan continue to produce fissile material for weapons, to expand their nuclear weapons arsenals, to expand their missile capabilities, and to thumb their nose at the CTBT. Yet Medcalf wants us to be reassured about India’s “relatively small” and “strictly defensive” nuclear weapons program. He is impressed that India’s “pacifist traditions” held it back from testing a nuclear weapon until 1974 − but by that logic we ought to reward Pyongyang for holding out until 2006.

Medcalf says that safeguards applying to uranium sales to India would be at least as strong as those applying to uranium sales to China and Russia. But International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspections in China are tokenistic and inspections in Russia are very nearly non-existent. He says that IAEA safeguards will “confirm” that uranium exports are used for civilian purposes only and that safeguards “ensure” that Australian uranium will not end up in Indian warheads. But IAEA safeguards inspections in India are at best tokenistic and are quite incapable of confirming or ensuring anything. And Australia has neither the authority nor the wherewithal to carry out independent safeguards inspections.

Medcalf dismisses proliferation-based objections to nuclear trade with India as “false” and “fallacious”. He wants us to believe that we can play a more effective role promoting nuclear disarmament in India by first permitting uranium sales. But the US, Australia and some other suppliers have conspicuously failed to use their bargaining chip − the opening up of nuclear trade − to leverage disarmament outcomes. According to Medcalf’s logic, we’re in a better bargaining position after giving our bargaining chip (for nothing) than before. It’s a nonsense argument.

In early December, Medcalf was the Australian Co-Chair of the 2012 Australia-India Roundtable, a meeting of more than 50 parliamentarians, diplomats, government officials, academics, business figures and journalists from both countries. The Roundtable was supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

The Roundtable ought to have put some positive proposals on the table. India should have been encouraged to stop attacking and murdering citizens involved in peaceful and creative protests against nuclear power plants, to take concrete steps towards nuclear weapons disarmament, to seriously address ineffective and negligent nuclear regulation, and to address inadequate nuclear security and entrenched corruption. Medcalf could have used the occasion to champion his long-lost idea of an “invitation to India to work with Australia on arms control”. The Roundtable could have called into question the scale of military spending in India (A$49 billion in 2011) and its recently-acquired status as the world’s largest weapons purchaser.

But there was none of that at the Roundtable. On the contrary, one of the main proposals was to expand military links. All the better for the Indian state to attack and murder citizens opposing the nuclear power plants that may be fuelled by Australian uranium.

Medcalf uses straw-man arguments. He writes: “Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Israel have long pursued nuclear weapons regardless of how the world treated India. It is absurd to suggest that their leaders are on the verge of nuclear disarmament if only Australia would steer clear of India’s nuclear energy program.”

No-one has ever made that absurd suggestion − Medcalf is simply making stuff up. The flip-side of his disingenuous, straw-man argument about disarmament is a disingenuous, straw-man argument about proliferation. He writes: “But the most mistaken claim is that Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s proposal to end the blanket ban on civilian uranium exports to India will somehow lead to the catastrophic spread of nuclear weapons …”

Yet nuclear trade with India clearly does encourage proliferation. If Japan or South Korea pulled out of the NPT and built nuclear weapons prior to the 2008 US-India nuclear trade agreement, they would have been excluded from international nuclear trade and that would have killed their domestic nuclear power industries and their nuclear export industries. Now, the equation is fundamentally altered − based on the Indian precedent, both countries could realistically expect to be able to build weapons with minimal impact (or manageable impact) on their nuclear power programs and their nuclear export industries.

The undermining of the nuclear non-proliferation regime coincides with a range of other worrying developments in north-east Asia. South Korea has a long history of secret nuclear weapons research. Now, Seoul wants to develop uranium enrichment technology in violation of its commitments under the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and despite the fact that it has no legitimate need for enrichment technology. Regional tensions are worsened by North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons (using plutonium from an ‘experimental power reactor’) and its recent rocket test.

Japan and China are engaged in territorial disputes. Japan’s nuclear weapons hawks have become more vocal recently and they’re not shy about pointing to Japan’s nuclear power program as a source of materials and expertise for a weapons program. Japan is pressing ahead with its reprocessing program despite already having a huge stockpile of plutonium and no legitimate need for any more.

WMD proliferation in south Asia and north-east Asia may turn out to be the defining events of this Asian century. Yet Australia turned a blind eye to secret nuclear weapons research in South Korea, one of our uranium customer countries. Australia gives Japan open-ended permission to separate and stockpile plutonium produced from Australian uranium. And there is bipartisan policy to undermine the non-proliferation regime by selling uranium to India with no disarmament concessions.

Despite its claim to champion “open debate” and to “encourage the widest range of opinions”, the Lowy Institute refused to publish a critique of Medcalf’s propaganda. Friends of the Earth will soon be writing to the Institute’s sponsors suggesting they redirect funding to organisations upholding reasonable intellectual standards and promoting peace instead of militarism and WMD proliferation. We don’t expect a positive response from at least two of those sponsors − uranium miners BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto.

Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, Australia and author of a detailed briefing paper on uranium sales to India. www.energyscience.org.au/BP18India.pdf

The think tank that didn’t

Jim Green, 16 Feb 2012, Online Opinion
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=13257&page=0

The Lowy Institute has been under fire for its role in encouraging the Labor Party to reverse its policy of banning uranium sales to India, a nuclear-armed country that has steadfastly refused to ratify either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The first person to publicly raise concerns about the Institute’s role was N.A.J. Taylor, a PhD student at Queensland University, in a number of articles published in Al Jazeera, Crikey and elsewhere. Taylor’s broad complaint is that “well-funded and resourced lobby groups successfully denied Australians of a debate, and a complacent and shameful standard of media proliferated falsehoods and empty rhetoric”.

Strong words − perhaps a little too strong. The Institute didn’t deny Australians a debate, but it did seriously debase the debate.

Sam Roggeveen, a ‘Fellow’ at the Institute and editor of its publication ‘The Interpreter’, wrote a rebuttal to Taylor, claiming that the Institute staged an open debate and provided a platform (primarily its blog) for the expression of numerous perspectives from numerous people. And so it did.

The problem was that by far the most prominent voice was that of Lowy staffer Rory Medcalf, and his contribution to the debate was, to put it politely, deeply problematic.

Medcalf is much concerned with the “hypocrisy” and “discrimination” of allowing nuclear trade with some nuclear weapons states (those that have ratified the NPT) but not others (those that haven’t, in particular India). He wrote: “India’s pacifist traditions held it back from an all-out effort to build the bomb. Delhi’s eventual decisions to test in 1974 and 1998 thus came too late to allow it a recognised nuclear-armed status under the treaty.”

But by that ‘logic’, we ought to congratulate Pyongyang and reward it with uranium sales − after all, its pacifist traditions run so deep that it didn’t test a nuclear weapon until 2006. By Medcalf’s logic, Australia (or any other country) could give expression to its pacifism by building and testing nuclear weapons.

Medcalf’s mantra about the “hypocrisy” and “discrimination” of refusing to allow uranium sales to non-NPT states misses the point that discrimination in favour of NPT states, and against non-NPT states, is precisely the purpose of the Treaty. If that’s “hypocrisy” and “discrimination”, if that’s “nuclear apartheid”, then bring it on.

Medcalf complained about Labor’s “refusal even to talk about uranium with India”. So the government is expected to negotiate uranium sales with non-NPT states even when it has a long-standing principled policy position of not negotiating uranium sales with non-NPT states? Go figure.

Let’s get to the main problem: Medcalf dimisses weapons proliferation-based objections to nuclear trade with India as “false” and “fallacious”. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The opening up of nuclear trade with India − which began with the 2008 US-India agreement − is problematic on several levels. For starters, Medcalf wants us to believe that we can play a more effective role in promoting non-proliferation and disarmament in India by first permitting uranium sales. The US, Australia and some other suppliers have conspicuously failed to use their bargaining chip (the opening up of nuclear trade) to leverage outcomes such as Indian ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. According to Medcalf’s ‘logic’, we’ll be in a better bargaining position after we’ve given up our bargaining chip (for nothing) than before.

Nuclear trade with India also alters the proliferation equation for other countries. Ron Walker, a former Australian diplomat and former Chair of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said: “Yes, India is a democracy and yes we want to be in their good books, but that is no reason to drop our principles and our interests. To make an exception for them would be crass cronyism. If you make exceptions to your rules for your mates, you weaken your ability to apply them to everyone else. How could we be harder on Japan and South Korea if they acquired nuclear weapons? Could we say Israel is less of a mate than India?”

Medcalf’s response to such arguments is that opening up nuclear trade with India won’t necessarily lead to proliferation elsewhere: “Neither the US-India deal nor Australian uranium sales will determine whether third countries opt for nuclear arms.” And this: “But the most mistaken claim is that Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s proposal to end the blanket ban on civilian uranium exports to India will somehow lead to the catastrophic spread of nuclear weapons …”

Of course no country will build nuclear weapons as a direct result of the US-India deal or the Labor government’s uranium policy reversal at its national conference last December. But those events certainly encourage proliferation and fundamentally alter the political equation for some countries.

If, for example, either Japan or South Korea pulled out of the NPT and built nuclear weapons prior to the 2008 US-India deal, they would have been excluded from international nuclear trade and that would have killed their domestic nuclear power industries and their nuclear export industries. Now, the equation is fundamentally altered − based on the Indian precedent, both countries could realistically expect to be able to build weapons with minimal impact (or manageable impact) on their nuclear power programs and their nuclear export industries.

The flip-side of Medcalf’s disingenuous, straw-man argument about proliferation is a disingenuous, straw-man argument about disarmament: “Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Israel have long pursued nuclear weapons regardless of how the world treated India. It is absurd to suggest that their leaders are on the verge of nuclear disarmament if only Australia would steer clear of India’s nuclear energy program.”

Problems are already evident in the wake of the 2008 US-India agreement, not least China’s use of the precedent to justify its plan to sell more reactors to Pakistan.

Medcalf says that safeguards applying to uranium sales to India would be at least as strong as those applying to uranium sales to China and Russia. But IAEA safeguards inspections in China are tokenistic and inspections in Russia are very nearly non-existent − one inspection of one plant in 2001, and another in 2010. Medcalf surely knows that.

And he surely knows about the controversy surrounding uranium sales to Russia. The Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office (ASNO) misled parliament’s treaties committee in 2008 by claiming that “strict” safeguards would “ensure” peaceful use of Australian uranium and by conspicuously failing to tell the committee that there had not been a single IAEA safeguards inspection in Russia since 2001. The treaties committee made the modest recommendation that some sort of a safeguards system ought to be in place before uranium exports to Russia were approved, only to have its recommendation rejected. Interestingly, the head of ASNO at the time was John Carlson, who has since left ASNO and is now a ‘Visiting Fellow’ at the Lowy Institute.

The Lowy Institute takes money from Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton, the two companies that stand to profit most from the Labor government’s policy change. I’ve never once seen that funding disclosed in relevant Lowy Institute publications. However I suspect Medcalf’s role in the India uranium debate has more to do with his extensive links with India than it has to do with funding from uranium mining companies. And there seems to be a disproportionate number of former government officials (Medcalf and Carlson among them) working for the Lowy Institute.

Whatever the explanation, it remains the case that Medcalf has seriously debased public debate on an important policy issue. The Lowy Institute should be held in contempt for so long as it continues to provide a platform for him to peddle his propaganda.

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To download a PDF of this paper click here.

Jim Green, B.Med.Sci.(Hons.) PhD

National nuclear campaigner ‒ Friends of the Earth, Australia

May 2002

jim.green@foe.org.au

Paper prepared for the Medical Association for the Prevention of War

(Australian affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War)

UPDATE ‒ 2018

Apologies for all the dead web-links in this paper. If you can’t find a particular article or paper, email jim.green@foe.org.au

A few updates to the paper below:

‒ Since 2006, North Korea has repeatedly tested nuclear weapons using plutonium produced in a small reactor (based on the UK Magnox design) variously described as an ‘experimental power reactor’ or a research reactor or a dedicated military reactor.

‒ The Arak research reactor under construction in Iran was a source of international concern and work on the reactor was stopped as one component of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

‒ The US launched military strikes on research reactor/s in Iraq in 2003.

CONTENTS

Acronyms and abbreviations

Acknowledgements

Introduction

The Links: Research Reactors & Nuclear Weapons

Plutonium Production & Separation

Highly Enriched Uranium

Case Studies: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, India, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Romania, Taiwan, Yugoslavia

Appendix: Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program

 ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

AAEC – Australian Atomic Energy Commission

ANSTO – Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

ASNO – Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office

HIFAR – High Flux Australian Reactor

HEU – Highly enriched uranium, enriched to 20% or more uranium-235.

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

LEU – Low enriched uranium, less than 20% uranium-235 but more than the 0.7% uranium-235 in natural uranium

MW(th) – Megawatts (millions of watts) of thermal power

MW(e) – Megawatts (millions of watts) of electrical power

NPT – Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

RERTR – Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor program

UK – United Kingdom

US – United States of America

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear research reactors are used for a plethora of medical, scientific and industrial purposes, and they continue to play a support role for nuclear power programs.

In addition, research reactors can be – and have been – used in support of nuclear weapons programs in several ways:

• production of plutonium
• diversion of fresh highly enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor fuel or extraction of HEU from spent fuel
• production of radionuclides (other than plutonium) for use in weapons (e.g. tritium)
• weapons related research
• development of expertise for parallel or later use in a weapons program
• justifying the acquisition of other facilities capable of being used in support of a weapons program, such as enrichment or reprocessing facilities
• establishment or strengthening of a political constituency for weapons production.

Issues raised by the dual-use civil/military capabilities of research reactors include the limitations of the international safeguards/non-proliferation regime including export controls, and actual and potential development of proliferation resistant technologies such as low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels.

The risks posed by research reactors in relation to weapons proliferation needs to be seen in the broader context of debates over the use of research reactors – and alternative technologies such as particle accelerators – for scientific, medical and industrial applications. Also relevant are public health and environmental issues associated with reactors and the spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive wastes they generate.

This paper does not address the broader debates; it is focussed on illustrating the uses of research reactors and associated technologies in nuclear weapons programs (in particular covert weapons programs):

• the following section summarises those uses
• subsequent sections address plutonium production and separation, and HEU, in more detail
• a number of case studies of the links between research reactor programs and weapons programs are then provided
• the appendix summarises the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program, which has the aim of ending the use of HEU for research reactor fuel or for targets for radioisotope production

THE LINKS: RESEARCH REACTORS & NUCLEAR WEAPONS

This section covers the following issues:

• covert and overt weapons programs
• cover from nuclear power and/or nuclear research programs
• research reactors as ‘sweeteners’
• the various uses of research reactors in weapons programs
• fissile material
• weapons related research
• training
• production of radionuclides for use in weapons
• ‘bomb lobbies’
• ‘dirty’ bombs
• theft, smuggling, and terrorism
• perceptions

Covert and overt weapons programs:

There are several reasons why a number of states have chosen to clandestinely pursue a nuclear weapons program under the guise of, and in association with, a civil nuclear program as opposed to an overt, dedicated weapons program:

– nuclear technology and materials are generally much easier to acquire from supplier states if the stated purpose is peaceful and if the recipient country is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); attempts can then be made to circumvent or break conditions imposed by the IAEA and/or the supplier state (or expertise gained through the acquisition and operation of safeguarded facilities can be used in a parallel weapons program)

– avoiding external political reaction or economic sanctions or domestic political opposition

– avoiding a pre-emptive military strike (e.g. Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s Osirak research reactor in 1981).

There are varying patterns of covert weapons programs involving research reactors (or nuclear research programs more generally). Some of the main variables are:

– pursuit of weapons within the umbrella of the NPT to a greater or lesser extent (e.g. Iraq, North Korea, Romania, Taiwan, Yugoslavia) or outside the NPT (e.g. India, Israel, Pakistan)

– attempts to acquire or produce either HEU or plutonium or (most commonly) both

– systematic, determined pursuit of weapons (e.g. Iraq, India, Israel, Pakistan) as opposed to attempting only to lower the lead time for weapons as a contingency (e.g. Australia) (proliferation is best thought of as a continuum taking into account not only possession of weapons but also other factors such as possession of nuclear materials, facilities, and expertise)

Cover from nuclear power and/or nuclear research programs:

Weapons have been pursued under the cover of nuclear power and/or nuclear research programs. The power and research routes each have their advantages and disadvantages (Fainberg, 1983; Holdren, 1983; Holdren, 1983a).

The nuclear power route has the following advantages:

– much greater plutonium production in power reactors compared to research reactors

– the development of an enrichment capability solely to service research reactors is likely to be viewed as suspicious, whereas development of enrichment technology in conjunction with nuclear power is more easily justified

– the development of a large scale reprocessing capability is more easily justified if connected to a nuclear power program (although the development of a modest capability to process irradiated targets is fairly common, e.g. to separate radioisotopes for medical applications)

– a wider range of nuclear expertise will be developed through a nuclear power program than a research reactor program, thus facilitating weapons production.

Pursuit of a covert weapons program under cover of a research reactor program has its own advantages:

– if only a small arsenal of nuclear weapons is desired, or if the intention is not to systematically pursue weapons production but merely to expedite weapons development at some indeterminate stage in the future, then a research reactor program has the advantage of being far less expensive than a nuclear power program. The Australian Science and Technology Council argued in a 1984 report: “Should a country decide to embark on a weapons program it is unlikely to use a civil power reactor to do so. This is because such a use would be inefficient both in terms of producing weapons usable material and in terms of electricity generation. It is therefore much more likely that a research reactor, or other non-power reactor, would be used for this purpose.”

– irradiated fuel elements from research reactors are more easily handled than spent fuel from power reactors. Bunn, Holdren and Weir (2002, pp.4-5) note that irradiated HEU from research reactors poses a proliferation and terrorism threat “because at many research reactors the fuel was only lightly irradiated, has been cooling for many years, and is in fuel elements of modest size, meaning that the fuel elements are not sufficiently radioactive to be self-protecting against theft …”

– smaller nuclear research facilities generally attract less interest in terms of safeguards inspections and, more generally, smaller nuclear research facilities arouse less suspicion of military intent

– detection of secret, small scale nuclear facilities is generally more difficult than detection of larger facilities associated with nuclear power programs

– nuclear power programs require a large number of trained personnel, whereas it is considerably easier to assemble personnel to run an research reactor program.

The power and research routes to nuclear weapons are not mutually exclusive. In several countries – such as South Africa, Pakistan, Argentina and Brazil – research reactor programs have been developed as a forerunner to, or in parallel with, nuclear power programs, and the power program has then become entangled in a covert weapons program. In other cases, such as Iraq and Israel, a research reactor program has been used in support of a covert weapons program without the intermediary of nuclear power (although in both countries, stated interest in nuclear power accelerated the weapons  program by facilitating technology transfers).

Research reactors as ‘sweeteners’:

Research reactors have sometimes used by suppliers as ‘sweeteners’ in the hope of securing more lucrative sales at a later date. Canada’s supply of a heavily subsidised, large research reactor to India is a notable example. Professor Gary Milhollin (1996) from the University of Wisconsin and the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, said in 1996: “And there is the problem of “sweeteners.” These are the sensitive items that are thrown in to “sweeten” big reactor deals. They are the equivalent of nuclear candy bars. The magnets that China is giving Pakistan are probably sweeteners – greasing the skids for the reactor China is building there. And Iran has been trying very hard to get sweeteners from Russia as part of its reactor deal – that is clear. Iran failed to get a centrifuge plant, but it is still trying to get a large research reactor. The reactor would operate at about 30 to 40 megawatts, exactly the size that India and Israel used to make the plutonium for their first fission bombs.”

The various uses of research reactors in weapons programs:

Research reactor programs can be used to assist in the manufacture of nuclear weapons in several ways:

– plutonium production (requiring a reactor and also some capacity to separate plutonium from irradiated materials)

– diversion of fresh HEU fuel or separation of HEU from spent fuel

– production of radionuclides (other than plutonium) for use in weapons (e.g. tritium)

– weapons related research

– development of expertise for parallel or later use in a weapons program

– justifying the acquisition of other facilities capable of being used in support of a weapons program, in particular enrichment or reprocessing/separation facilities, but also various other facilities such as fuel fabrication plants which can facilitate weapons production by minimising reliance on foreign suppliers

– establishment or strengthening of a political constituency for weapons production (a ‘bomb lobby’).

Research reactors have a chameleon quality: they can be used for peaceful purposes or, to a greater or lesser degree, they can be used in support of a weapons program. The high power Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) at Hanford in the US illustrates the point. The reactor, which first operated in 1980, was built to support the US fast breeder power program by providing fuels and materials irradiation services. From 1983 to 1992, it was used to test nuclear fuels, materials and components, to produce medical and industrial radioisotopes, and to support fusion research. After 1992, the reactor was shut down but was on standby to produce plutonium-238 for power generators in space probes or to produce tritium for nuclear weapons. A plethora of possible future uses for the reactor were proposed and debated, including medical, scientific and industrial applications, and other applications related to nuclear power and nuclear weapons. However, in December 2001, the US Department of Energy decided to permanently close the reactor.

Fissile material

For fissile material acquisition or production, the most useful research reactors are medium to high power reactors fuelled with natural uranium or very lightly enriched uranium (thus producing considerable quantities of plutonium), or medium to high power reactors which use considerable quantities of HEU fuel (which can be diverted before irradiation, or HEU can be extracted from spent fuel). Reactors in these relatively high risk categories number several dozen out of a total of approximately 287 operational research reactors in the world. (HEU and other nuclear materials stored at closed research reactor sites also pose risks.)

Bunn, Holdren, and Wier (2002, p.51) state: “While there are hundreds of small civilian sites in the world with HEU or plutonium, the number that have enough fresh HEU or separated plutonium for a bomb in one place is substantially smaller – in the range of a few dozen or less worldwide, making the problem potentially manageable. (That number increases significantly if sites with enough HEU for a bomb in forms that are irradiated, but not radioactive enough to deter a terrorist willing to incur substantial radiation doses, are also included, as research reactor spent fuel is typically far smaller and less radioactive than power reactor spent fuel.)”

While the development of enrichment and reprocessing technology is more easily justified in conjunction with power reactors rather than research reactors, there are numerous examples of such facilities being developed (or maintained or expanded) ostensibly to support a civil research reactor program while also being connected to covert weapons programs. Examples include:

– the construction of hot cells in numerous countries, used for peaceful purposes such as separating medically-useful radioisotopes from irradiated targets but in a number of cases also capable of being used to separate plutonium

– Yugoslavia’s attempt to acquire a reprocessing plant, ostensibly to treat spent fuel from research reactors

– Argentina’s pursuit of enrichment technology which, while kept secret for some years, was later justified with reference to research reactor requirements

– fuel fabrication plants in North Korea, Iraq and Yugoslavia

– the construction of a Plutonium Fuel Chemistry Laboratory in Taiwan

– South Africa’s enrichment plant at Pelindaba, used to produce HEU for weapons, which was publicly justified with reference to the 20 MW(th) Safari I research reactor (particularly when US supplies of HEU were suspended from 1975) and power reactors.

Weapons related research:

As well as the potential for research reactors to be used for nuclear weapons production via the plutonium or HEU routes, research reactors can be used for weapons related research. For example, the 19 MW(th) Purnima research reactor in India was essential for theoretical calculations relating to nuclear explosions and thus played an important role in the Indian nuclear weapons program (Reiss, 1988, ch.7).

Whereas only the larger research reactors use considerable quantities of HEU (and a declining number of reactors are HEU fuelled) or produce considerable quantities of plutonium, a greater number of reactors – including low and zero power reactors and critical assemblies – can be useful for weapons related research. For example, a critical assembly was used for an experiment in support of the weapons program in South Africa in the late 1970s (Albright, 1994).

Training:

In addition to specific experiments and projects pursued to advance a nuclear weapons program, research reactors allow for the training of staff whose expertise is likely to be of value should a decision be made to systematically pursue a weapons program. Thus, in Australia in 1962, the federal Cabinet approved an increase in the staff of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) from 950 to 1050 because, in the words of the Minister of National Development, William Spooner, “a body of nuclear scientists and engineer skilled in nuclear energy represents a positive asset which would be available at any time if the government decided to develop a nuclear defence potential.” (Reynolds, 2000, p.194.)

Production of radionuclides for use in weapons:

A number of radionuclides of use in nuclear weapons can be produced in research reactors. In some cases, the same nuclide has both peaceful and military uses. Examples include:

– polonium-210, which has industrial uses but can also be used as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons. A safeguarded research reactor was used for this purpose in Iraq (and research reactors may have been used in other countries for this purpose).

– tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen which has medical uses but is first and foremost used in nuclear weapons (to generate neutrons to initiate the fission reaction, or to enhance or “boost” the yield of a fission weapon, or in thermonuclear/fusion weapons). Tritium can be produced by neutron bombardment of lithium-6, or as a by-product of the operation of a heavy-water-moderated reactor when neutrons bombard deuterons. Countries where research reactors may have been – or might yet be – used for tritium production in support of a weapons program include India, Iraq, Israel and Pakistan.

‘Bomb lobbies’:

Civil nuclear programs often add to the political constituency for nuclear weapons. One of the clearest illustrations of this point is the situation which prevailed in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s, when the most persistent, determined and technically literate advocate of weapons production was Philip Baxter, Chair of the AAEC. Writing in the Nonproliferation Review, Jim Walsh (1997) noted that, “By the mid-1960s, the AAEC became the leading voice on nuclear affairs. The chair of the AAEC was Sir Philip Baxter, credited by friend and critic alike for his bureaucratic acumen and influence over government policy. … Baxter personally supported the concept of an Australian nuclear weapons capability and, perhaps more importantly, viewed the military’s interest in nuclear weapons as consonant with the AAEC’s need to expand its programs and budget.”

‘Dirty’ bombs:

Research reactors are potentially useful for the production of radioactive materials for a ‘dirty’ radiation bomb (in which radioactive materials are dispersed by conventional explosives).

Professor Gary Milhollin (2002), from the University of Wisconsin Law School and the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, considers a research reactor a more likely source of radioactive material for use in a radiation bomb than power reactors: “A research reactor would be a better source. Many countries use such small reactors to irradiate material samples, and it might be possible to insert some material into one of these reactors secretly, irradiate it, and then withdraw it and put it in a bomb. The difficulty would then lie in making the bomb effective. Highly radioactive materials have short half-lives; thus, any bomb would have to be used right away, and one would not be able to build up a stockpile. If enough radioactivity were packed into the bomb to injure a substantial number of victims, the too-hot-to-handle problem would arise. If the radioactive charge were diluted, the bomb would lose its effect. Saddam Hussein actually made and tested such a bomb in the 1980’s, but when UN inspectors toured the test site in the 1990’s they could find no trace of radiation from it.”

‘Dirty’ radiation bombs were produced and three test bombs were exploded in Iraq in 1987, using materials irradiated in the IRT and/or Tammuz II research reactors.

Theft, smuggling, and terrorism:

Most countries pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program have attempted to develop an indigenous capacity to produce HEU and/or plutonium, but the potential for states (or sub-national groups) to steal large quantities of fissile material, e.g. from ex-Soviet states, has become an issue of increasing concern. The future of plutonium use (and production) in fast breeder reactors and/or its use in MOX fuel for conventional reactors may also increase opportunities for theft or illicit purchase of fissile material.

Bunn and Bunn (2001) note that “Theft of insecure HEU and plutonium, in short, is not a hypothetical worry: it is an ongoing reality, not only from the former Soviet Union but from other states as well.” Examples related to research reactors include:

– two kilograms of HEU stolen from a research reactor in Georgia which has never been recovered (Trei, 2002)

– 19.9% enriched uranium stolen from a research reactor in the Congo was recovered by police in Italy and Belgium in 1998 (Bunn and Steinhausler, 2001)

– in 2001, 600 grams of 66% enriched HEU of unknown origin was recovered in Colombia (Bunn and Steinhausler, 2001).

There are numerous examples of insecure HEU stockpiles at nuclear research facilities. Bunn, Holdren, and Wier (2002, p.47) list the following examples:

– a facility near Belgrade with sufficient fresh 80% enriched HEU for a gun type bomb or several implosion type bombs with inadequate funds to provide adequate security

– an impoverished research facility in the Ukraine with 75 kgs of 90% enriched HEU

– a research facility in Belarus with more than 300 kgs of HEU but little funding to provide effective security.

Matthew Bunn (2000, pp.78-79) discussed the ex-Soviet states in an April 2000 paper: “Scattered through the former Soviet Union are nearly two dozen small, underfunded civilian nuclear research facilities possessing HEU in amounts ranging from a few kilograms to hundreds of kilograms or more. Some of these are within Russia, but there are research facilities that still have weapons-usable HEU in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Latvia, and Uzbekistan as well. Many of these facilities no longer have the money to protect the HEU appropriately, or to do the research that once required HEU. Indeed, it was at sites like these that some of the worst desperation was observed after the August 1998 financial crisis – guards leaving their posts to forage for food, electricity being cut off because bills had not been paid, and the like.”

Terrorist threats have been made against research reactors, including the following:

– on November 11, 1972, a DC-9 plane was hijacked in the US, the hijackers threatened to ditch the plane into the Oak Ridge nuclear research reactor, the plane circled the reactor plant for one hour, the reactor was shut down and the plant was evacuated (except for essential personnel)

– in 1983, nine sticks of gelignite, 25 kilograms of ammonium nitrate, three detonators and an igniter were found in an electrical sub-station inside the boundary fence of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission; two detonators failed, and one exploded but did not ignite the main charge; two people were charged over this incident.

Bunn, Holdren, and Wier (2002, p.51) urge reassessment of the costs and benefits of continued operation of many research reactors: “… only a fraction of the hundreds of research reactors still in operation around the world are genuinely needed, for research, training, and isotope production. It is absurd and unsafe for facilities that are so poor they do not have a telephone, or have dead rats floating in the spent fuel pool, to be attempting to run a research reactor. An international effort should be put in place to help countries assess the real benefits and dangers posed by their research reactors, and assist in shutting down and decommissioning those facilities where the benefits no longer outweigh the costs and risks.”

Perceptions:

In addition to the practical uses of research reactors in weapons programs, reactors (and reactor trained personnel and reactor derived expertise) may be used to create the impression of a weapons capability or movement in the direction thereof. This situation prevailed in Indonesia under Sukarno in 1964-65, when the government’s claims of major progress towards a weapons capability lacked credibility in any event but would have been still more implausible if not for the existence of a 250 kilowatt (th) TRIGA Mark-II reactor. The reactor first went critical on October 17, 1964, the day after China exploded its first nuclear weapon. (Cornejo, 2000.)

There is also the possibility that research reactors (and associated technologies and expertise) will generate the perception of intent to develop nuclear weapons even where no such intent exists. IAEA employees Elbaradei and Rames noted in the IAEA Bulletin in 1995: “The materials, knowledge, and expertise required to produce nuclear weapons are often indistinguishable from those needed to generate nuclear power and conduct nuclear research.” In light of this technological overlap, perceptions are of course important.

References:

David Albright, 1994, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August, Vol.50, No.4.

Australian Science and Technology Council, 1984, Australia’s Role in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Report to the Prime Minister, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, p.7.

George Bunn and Fritz Steinhausler, 2001, “Guarding Nuclear Reactors and Material From Terrorists and Thieves”, Arms Control Today, October, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_10/bunnoct01.asp>

Matthew Bunn, 2000, “The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material”, Washington, DC and Cambridge, MA: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Managing the Atom Project,

<ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/Nextwave> or <www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/nextwave.pdf>.

Matthew Bunn and George Bunn, 2001, “Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage”, Presented at the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Symposium, Vienna, Austria, October 30, <ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/nucleartheft>.

Matthew Bunn, John Holdren, and Anthony Wier, 2002, “Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action”, <www.nti.org/e_research/securing_nuclear_weapons_and_materials_May2002.pdf>.

Robert M. Cornejo, 2000, “When Sukarno Sought the Bomb: Indonesian Nuclear Aspirations in the Mid-1960s”, The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 7, Number 2, Summer, pp.31-43, <cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol07/72corn.pdf>.)

E.N. Elbaradei and J. Rames, 1995, “International law and nuclear energy: Overview of the legal framework”, IAEA Bulletin, Vol.3.

Anthony Fainberg, 1983, “The connection is dangerous”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May, p.60.

John Holdren, 1983, “Nuclear power and nuclear weapons: the connection is dangerous”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January, pp.40-45.

John Holdren, 1983a, “Response to Anthony Fainberg, 1983, ‘The connection is dangerous'”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May, pp.61-62.

Gary Milhollin, March 20, 1996, Address to US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, <www.wisconsinproject.org>.

Gary Milhollin, 2002, “Can Terrorists Get the Bomb?”, Commentary Magazine, February, pp.45-49, <www.wisconsinproject.org>.

Mitchell Reiss, 1988, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation, New York: Columbia University Press, ch.7.

Wayne Reynolds, 2000, Australia’s bid for the atomic bomb, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Lisa Trei, 2002, “Database exposes threat from ‘lost’ nuclear material”, Stanford Report, March 6, <www.stanford.edu/dept/news/report/news/march6/database-a.html>.

Jim Walsh, 1997, “Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions”, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall, pp.1-20.

PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION & SEPARATION

The most direct use of research reactors in weapons programs is the production of fissile plutonium via neutron irradiation of uranium-238. While plutonium is the primary concern (as far as is known, the fissile material in all nuclear weapons in existence today is plutonium and/or HEU), other possibilities should be noted:

– production of fissile uranium-233 by neutron irradiation of thorium-233. This may become an issue of greater concern if a thorium fuel cycle is developed and spreads (Friedman, 1997).

– production of fissile isotopes of neptunium or americium in uranium fuelled reactors (Rothstein, 1999).

In order to produce significant volumes of plutonium in the reactor fuel, the most useful reactors are those fuelled with natural uranium or very low enriched uranium, i.e. reactor fuels with a high proportion of uranium-238.

Alternative methods of producing plutonium are to insert uranium targets in or near the reactor core or to surround the reactor core with a “blanket” of uranium. Plutonium can be extracted from the target or blanket after irradiation. This method will be preferable if the reactor fuel is HEU and thus plutonium production in the fuel is low; the target can be made of natural uranium, depleted uranium or LEU to increase plutonium production. (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War / Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, 1992.) Another method of plutonium production is to replace reflector elements with fertile material targets (Zuccaro-Labellarte and Fagerholm, 1996).

These various methods of producing plutonium are not mutually exclusive; two or more methods might be used concurrently.

The volume of plutonium produced depends on a number of variables including the uranium enrichment level, the reactor power level, the irradiation time, reactor design, and the method of production (fuel, target, blanket, reflector). Consequently it is not possible to definitively state a power level necessary for production of volumes of fissile plutonium capable of being manufactured into a workable nuclear weapon. Generally, only the more powerful research reactors are capable of annual plutonium production in the kilograms or tens of kilograms range, and a large majority of research reactors are incapable of producing quantities of plutonium sufficient for nuclear weapons.

According to Milhollin and White (1991), the plutonium production rate for medium power research reactors is approximately one gram of plutonium per megawatt-day; they use the 10-15 MW(th) LEU fuelled research reactor in Algeria as an example, estimating an annual production capability of approximately 4.5 kilograms annually. The plutonium production rate can vary significantly depending on variables other than power rating, however. For example, spent fuel elements from the HEU fuelled 10 MW(th) High Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR) contain only about 0.5 grams of plutonium (Coleby, 1986). The total production of plutonium over the 40 year lifetime of the HIFAR reactor has been only about one kilogram.

The IAEA’s safeguards system requires that all research reactors operating at power levels above 25 MW(th) are evaluated with respect to their capability to produce at least one “Significant Quantity” of plutonium (or uranium-233) per year. (A Significant Quantity is defined by the IAEA as “the approximate quantity of nuclear material in respect of which, taking into account any conversion process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.” For safeguards purposes, one Significant Quantity is defined as eight kilograms of plutonium or uranium-233 or 25 kilograms of uranium-235. Greater or lesser amounts may be required to produce a weapon depending on factors such as the chemical form, compression and shape of the fissile material or the use of neutron reflectors in the weapon.)

As at 1996, there were about 30 thermal research reactors with power levels of 10 MW(th) or higher which were subject to IAEA safeguards. About 10 operated at power levels exceeding 25 MW(th), thus attracting additional safeguards measures with respect to clandestine production scenarios. (Zuccaro-Labellarte and Fagerholm, 1996.)

As at May 2000, the IAEA’s Research Reactor Database (which includes both safeguarded and unsafeguarded reactors) listed 28 operational research reactors with a power level of 25 MW(th) or more (<www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb>). These reactors are located in France (6), Russia (4), Japan (3), India (3), USA (2), Belgium, Canada, China, Israel, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Indonesia, Poland, South Korea and Sweden. In addition, research reactors with a power level of 25 MW(th) or more were planned or under construction in China (2), Russia and France.

According to Milhollin and White (1991), “The best way to avoid military use of a research reactor is to make it small enough so that its plutonium production is negligible.” However, low power reactors are not entirely benign. For example, the HEU fuelled IRT research reactor in Iraq, which originally operated at two MW(th) but was later upgraded to five MW(th), was involved in the Iraqi weapons program in several ways:

– a fuel element from the reactor was used for a plutonium extraction experiment

– on three other occasions, fuel elements were fabricated from undeclared uranium dioxide in an Experimental Reactor Fuel Fabrication Laboratory, they were secretly irradiated in the IRT reactor and then chemically processed in an unsafeguarded Radiochemical Laboratory containing hot cells

– the reactor was used to make polonium-210 for neutron initiator research, using bismuth targets

– the reactor was used to produce small quantities of plutonium-238, which could have been used for neutron initiator research instead of short lived polonium-210

– the reactor could potentially have produced sufficient plutonium for one weapon over a period of several years using fuel and/or a uranium blanket and/or uranium targets; this risk, albeit small, was increased by the fact that IAEA inspections of the reactor were infrequent because of the low risk status of the reactor

– HEU fuel for the IRT reactor, and the 0.5 MW(th) Tammuz-II reactor, was diverted during Iraq’s 1990-1991 ‘crash program’

– ‘dirty’ radiation bombs were produced and three test bombs were exploded in Iraq in 1987, using materials irradiated in the IRT and/or Tammuz II research reactors (the more powerful IRT reactor was the better suited of the two reactors for the purpose).

The US military clearly believed the IRT and Tammuz II reactors represented a proliferation threat and bombed them in 1991.

Low power reactors may also be useful for research or training in support of a weapons program, or for the production of radioisotopes such as polonium-210 or tritium.

Tied in with plutonium production is the question of reprocessing facilities for plutonium extraction. The longstanding view that reprocessing is a legitimate part of the nuclear fuel cycle – and perhaps a necessary step in the longer term – has condoned the establishment of reprocessing facilities in a number of countries and has assisted in a number of covert weapons programs. A number of countries – including India, Israel, Iraq, and Pakistan – have sought help from advanced supplier states to develop reprocessing/separation facilities. North Korea apparently succeeded in constructing a reprocessing facility with little or no foreign assistance. A number of other countries have expended some effort towards the establishment of reprocessing facilities, and in some cases, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Argentina and Brazil, these efforts are likely to have been motivated, at least in part, by ambitions to develop nuclear weapons.

Because of the high level of radioactivity involved, extraction of fissile material from spent fuel or other highly irradiated material (e.g. targets) is demanding, time-consuming, and potentially extremely dangerous. It requires heavily shielded facilities and generates large quantities of nuclear and chemical wastes. Nevertheless, this scenario is of particular concern at about 15 research reactors under IAEA safeguards due to large accumulated quantities of spent fuel, and it is of importance at more than 10 others. (Zuccaro-Labellarte and Fagerholm, 1996.)

The use of hot cells – shielded radiochemical laboratories with remote handling equipment for examining and processing radioactive materials – is closely related to research reactors. Hot cells can, if adequately equipped, be used to extract plutonium from spent fuel. Hot cells are “dual-use” facilities: they can be used for radioisotope processing, and other non-military purposes, as well as for plutonium separation. There are several examples of research reactors and hot cells being used in connection with covert nuclear weapons programs, e.g. Iraq, Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea (where hot cells may have been used for plutonium separation in addition to the larger Radiochemical Laboratory).

Spent research reactor fuel stockpiles have grown steadily in many countries, and efforts to address this problem in the coming decades could involve the spread of reprocessing technology. For example, the Australian government considered developing a small reprocessing plant in the mid to late 1990s to treat research reactor spent fuel.

Examples of the research reactor / plutonium connection include:

Algeria. The secret construction of a high power research reactor in Algeria, and adjacent hot cells, may have reflected military interests.

Argentina. The construction of several research reactors laid the foundation for Argentina’s nuclear power program and for its covert weapons program. One military option considered from the late 1960s to the early 1980s included a plan to build a large research reactor which could produce unsafeguarded plutonium.

Brazil. Brazil’s covert weapons program appeared to be at an end with its 1997 signing of the NPT. Yet in the same year, it was reported that plans to construct a small reactor for plutonium production had been reactivated. Once this project came to public light, the Brazilian army announced that it would be discontinued.

Canada. The NRX and NRU research reactors were used in the 1940s and 1950s to produce plutonium for the nuclear weapons programs of the US and the UK.

India. Two high power research reactors have produced most or all of the fissile material for India’s nuclear weapons.

Iraq. Military strikes on Iraqi research reactors by Israel, Iran and the US limited Iraq’s potential to produce plutonium and consequently uranium enrichment was the primary focus of the covert weapons program. Nevertheless, hot cells were used to separate small quantities of plutonium from research reactor fuel elements. In addition, diversion of HEU research reactor fuel has been a significant proliferation risk and was central to Iraq’s “crash program” in 1990-91.

Israel. The high power Dimona research reactor is central to Israel’s nuclear weapons program.

North Korea. A five MW(e) “experimental power reactor”, together with a “Radiochemical Laboratory” capable of plutonium separation, were key facilities in North Korea’s covert weapons program.

Pakistan. A 50 MW(th) research reactor has been under construction for many years at Khushab, and is reported to have begun operation. It is producing (or will produce) Pakistan’s first supply of unsafeguarded plutonium.

Romania. Little is known about the covert nuclear weapons program carried out under the Ceausescu regime, but it is known that hot cells were used for experimental plutonium extraction from irradiated research reactor fuel. Supply of HEU research reactor fuel from the US was terminated because of the risk of diversion.

Taiwan. A high power research reactor, and a small reprocessing facility, were implicated in Taiwan’s covert weapons program.

Yugoslavia. Several research reactors were constructed in support of Yugoslavia’s covert weapons program. Hot cells were used for small scale plutonium separation from research reactor spent fuel. Plans to construct an “experimental research reactor” for plutonium production formed part of the covert weapons program in the 1970s. Yugoslavia’s possession of plutonium in fresh, slightly irradiated and spent fuel remains a proliferation concern.

References:

David Albright and Mark Hibbs, 1991, “Iraq: news the front page missed”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October, Vol.47, No.8.

D. Coleby, 1986, “Forum: Shipment of Spent Nuclear Fuel from Australia”, Nuclear Spectrum (AAEC), Vol.2(1), pp.8-12.

John S. Friedman, 1997, “More power to thorium?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October, Vol.53, No.5.

IAEA, Research Reactor Database, <www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb>

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War / The Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, 1992, Plutonium: Deadly Gold of the Nuclear Age, Cambridge, Mass: International Physicians Press, pp.27-28.

Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, May 1991, “Bombs From Beijing: A Report on China’s Nuclear and Missile Exports”, <www.wisconsinproject.org>.

Linda Rothstein, 1999, “Explosive secrets”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April, Vol.55, No.2.

Jed C. Snyder, 1985, “Iraq”, in Jed C. Snyder and Samuel F. Wells Jr. (eds.), Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, pp.3-42.

Giancarlo Zuccaro-Labellarte and Robert Fagerholm, 1996, “Safeguards at research reactors: Current practices, future directions”, IAEA Bulletin, Volume 38, <www.iaea.org/worldatom/inforesource/bulletin/bull384/zuccaro.html>

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM

Weapon grade uranium contains over 90% of the isotope uranium-235. Uranium enriched to lower levels has been used in nuclear weapons, e.g. the Hiroshima bomb used 80-85% enriched uranium, and one of South Africa’s weapons used 80% enriched uranium. Uranium with a substantially lower percentage of uranium-235 could be used for weapons but with significant costs such as increased weight and decreased yield.

There are several ways in which civil nuclear programs can facilitate the acquisition or production of HEU for weapons:

– diversion of fresh HEU research reactor fuel

– extraction of HEU from spent research reactor fuel

– construction of enrichment facilities justified (partly or entirely) with reference to a research reactor program, with clandestine production of HEU for weapons.

Commonly available chemical engineering equipment is adequate for extraction of fissile material from fresh or slightly irradiated fuel. The IAEA pays particular attention to facilities where the fresh fuel contains HEU or plutonium, for which no further transmutation or enrichment would be needed for use in a nuclear weapon. As at 1996, about 20 research reactors under IAEA safeguards were using such direct use fissile material in amounts of one or more Significant Quantity. (Zuccaro-Labellarte and Fagerholm, 1996.)

Extracting HEU from spent fuel is far more complicated and hazardous than extracting it from fresh or slightly irradiated fuel. HEU from spent fuel might need further enrichment to make it suitable for weapons, and contaminants might reduce the usefulness of HEU extracted from spent fuel.

Nevertheless, spent fuel can be a source of large quantities of HEU. For example, as at 1993 the inventory of spent fuel at the Lucas Heights research reactor plant in Sydney contained over five Significant Quantities of uranium-235, with fresh fuel stocks usually maintained at less than one Significant Quantity. (Australian Safeguards Office, 1993.)

An estimated 20 tonnes of HEU exists at 345 operational and shut-down civilian research facilities in 58 countries, sometimes in sufficient quantities for weapons production (Bunn, Holdren and Wier, 2002).

Uranium enrichment techniques are complex and extremely costly. Moreover, in addition to enrichment facilities, producing enriched uranium may necessitate a uranium supply, facilities for milling and conversion, and a method to convert enriched uranium hexafluoride or enriched uranium tetrachloride into solid uranium oxide or metal.

Despite the complexity and costs, Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, South Africa, and Pakistan all selected uranium enrichment as their primary route for acquiring fissile material (Albright, 1993).

Generally, a nuclear power program provides a far more plausible rationale for the pursuit of a domestic enrichment capability than a research reactor program. Nevertheless, there are several cases where the construction, or continued operation, of enrichment facilities has been justified with reference to research reactor fuel requirements. Argentina is the most striking example. Moreover, the justifications given for enrichment technology cannot easily be separated. In Australia, for example, uranium enrichment research was pursued for numerous reasons from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s – “value adding” to uranium exports, ensuring an ongoing supply of HEU fuel for the HIFAR research reactor, the possibility of indigenous production of LEU fuel if nuclear power was introduced, and last but not least, at least some of those involved in the development of enrichment technology in the 1960s and 1970s (such as AAEC Chair Philip Baxter) supported it because of the military potential.

HEU is discussed further in Appendix 3, which deals with the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program.

References:

David Albright, 1993, “A Proliferation Primer”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June, <www.thebulletin.org/issues/1993/j93/j93Albright.html>.

Australian Safeguards Office, 1993, Submission to the Research Reactor Review.

Matthew Bunn, John Holdren, and Anthony Wier, 2002, “Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action”, <www.nti.org/e_research/securing_nuclear_weapons_and_materials_May2002.pdf>.

R.G. Muranaka, 1983, “Conversion of research reactors to low-enrichment uranium fuels”, IAEA Bulletin, Vol.25(1).

Giancarlo Zuccaro-Labellarte and Robert Fagerholm, 1996, “Safeguards at research reactors: Current practices, future directions”, IAEA Bulletin, Vol.38, <www.iaea.org/worldatom/inforesource/bulletin/bull384/zuccaro.html>

CASE STUDIES: RESEARCH REACTORS & NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS

These case studies, arranged alphabetically, cover Algeria, Argentina, Australia, India, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Romania, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia.

Other countries could also be used to illustrate various links between research reactor programs and weapons proliferation, including Brazil, Iran, Libya, Norway, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, and Syria. In addition, the declared nuclear weapons states have used research reactors in support of their weapons programs in various ways.

ALGERIA

In early 1991, US intelligence agencies discovered that Algeria was secretly building a large research reactor, known as Es Salam, about 150 kilometres south of Algiers. This raised suspicions since the reactor appeared to be unusually large in relation to Algeria’s rudimentary nuclear research program, and it was not subject to IAEA safeguards. The Algerian regime said the reactor was being supplied by China and it had a power rating of 10-15 MW(th). A reactor of that size, using LEU fuel, might produce a few kilograms of weapon grade plutonium annually. In addition, roughly 1.5 kilograms of plutonium could be produced annually by irradiating natural uranium targets in the reactor. The reactor first went critical in February 1992 and was commissioned in December 1993. In January 1992, Algeria agreed to place the Es Salam reactor under IAEA safeguards, and inspections began the same month. The Algerian regime nominated several peaceful purposes for the reactor including medical research.

A second construction phase was completed by mid 1996, with the completion of a Chinese-supplied hot cell facility and an underground tunnel connecting the reactor to the hot cells. Underground waste storage tanks, and a building containing six liquid storage tanks, were also built in the mid 1990s. A large building near the reactor appears to be unused, has no announced function, and was possibly built to house a small reprocessing plant.

In May 1997, work began on a third construction phase including a radiopharmaceutical production facility and other auxiliary facilities. It was stated that the radiopharmaceutical production facility would allow production of cobalt-60 even though cobalt-60 can be purchased cheaply from many suppliers. The hot cells, or the radiopharmaceutical production facility, might be used to extract plutonium from irradiated fuel or targets.

A one MW(th) reactor was supplied to Algeria by Argentina in the 1980s, located about 20 kilometres east of Algiers. The reactor itself was of little significance in terms of weapons proliferation (partly because of its limited capacity, partly because the reactor was subject to a site-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA) but it was a stepping stone for more dangerous facilities. All the more so because, as the Argentinian nuclear agency Invap notes on its website <www.invap.com.ar>, the project involved “genuine transfer of technology”, with over 50 Algerian professionals and technicians, and a number of Algerian firms, involved in the project.

Further discussions were held with a view to Argentina supplying Algeria with another reactor and hot cells, but these discussions did not progress. Argentina did however supply a fuel-fabrication plant, located in Draria, which could potentially be used to produce targets for plutonium production although it is subject to IAEA safeguards.

In 1995, Algeria formally acceded to the NPT. IAEA inspections discovered that about three kilograms of enriched uranium, several litres of heavy water, and several pellets of natural uranium supplied by China had not been declared to the IAEA. The IAEA does not have the authority to inspect all facilities at the nuclear site south of Algiers, and some questions remain unresolved. Many of these questions could be resolved if Algeria agrees to additional inspections under the IAEA’s Additional Model Protocol. Considerable quantities of plutonium could be produced without breaching NPT commitments.

Despite the information available about Algeria’s nuclear program, it remains unclear whether a nuclear weapons program was underway in the 1980s and 1990s, or whether there are currently plans to produce and separate plutonium for nuclear weapons.

References:

David Albright, 1993, “A Proliferation Primer”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June, <www.thebulletin.org/issues/1993/j93/j93Albright.html>.

David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, 1997, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, Oxford University Press.

David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, 2001, “Big deal in the desert?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.57, No.3, May/June, pp.45-52.

Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, 1998, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Daniel Poneman, 1985, “Argentina”, in Jed. C. Snyder and Samuel F. Wells Jr. (eds.), Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, pp.89-116.

Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, 1991, Nuclear Ambitions, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, pp.223-241.

ARGENTINA

A civil/military nuclear program was pursued by Argentina from the 1950s. After a military junta seized power in 1976, and motivated in part by Brazil’s 1975 deal with West Germany to obtain extensive nuclear fuel cycle facilities, Argentina’s nuclear program expanded and the military objective became more pronounced. Argentina rejected IAEA inspections of most of its nuclear facilities, and at the time refused to sign the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) or the NPT.

The first Argentine research reactor was manufactured and assembled in Argentina using US plans. Several more research reactors were constructed, some with little or no foreign assistance. By the late 1960s, Argentina had developed the infrastructure to support a nuclear power plant, and in 1968 it purchased a 320 MW(e) power reactor from the West German firm Siemens.

One military option considered from the late 1960s to the early 1980s included a plan to build a 70 MW(th) research reactor which could produce unsafeguarded plutonium. Another option was diversion of plutonium from safeguarded power reactors.

In the late 1960s, Argentina, possibly with assistance from an Italian firm, built a laboratory scale reprocessing facility at Ezeiza. This facility was closed in 1973 after intermittent operation and the extraction of less than one kilogram of plutonium. In 1978, the Argentine nuclear agency CNEA began construction of a second reprocessing facility at Ezeiza that had a design capacity of 10-20 kilograms of plutonium per year. The stated intention was to reprocess spent fuel from power reactors and to use plutonium in the same reactors or in breeder reactors which were (ostensibly) under consideration. Due to economic constraints, and political pressure from the US, construction on the second Ezeiza reprocessing plant was halted in 1990.

Argentina announced in 1983 that a gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plant had been under construction since 1978 – although Argentina’s nuclear power reactors did not require enriched uranium fuel – and that the plant had already produced a small amount of enriched uranium. Argentina claimed that the enrichment plant was built to service research reactors. An official involved in building the plant said that Argentina had thrown off Western intelligence agencies by encouraging them to look for a nonexistent plutonium production reactor. The enrichment plant is capable of producing up to 500 kilograms per year of 20% enriched uranium or about 10 kilograms per year of 80% enriched uranium. However it is believed that the plant produced only small amounts of LEU and no weapon grade uranium. Before building the enrichment plant, Argentina had been supplied with enriched uranium by China and the Soviet Union.

Argentina has supplied nuclear equipment to several countries suspected of pursuing covert nuclear weapons programs. A report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace stated (Jones et al., 1998): “The restoration of democratic governance in 1983 did little to change the liberal export policy of the Argentine military, especially as it pertained to North Africa. In 1985, Argentina and Algeria concluded an agreement under which Argentina exported a one MW(th) research reactor that went critical in 1989 – Algeria was not a NPT member and had no safeguards agreement at the time. Under a second agreement, discussed in 1990 but never concluded, Argentina would have sent an isotopic production reactor and hot cell facility to Algeria.”

Extensive nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Libya is believed to have taken place. Argentina was also closely involved in the development of Iran’s nuclear industry in the 1980s and 1990s. Other recipients of nuclear exports from Argentina include Brazil, Egypt, India, Peru and Romania. In the early to mid 1990s, as military influence over the nuclear industry waned, export controls were tightened.

From the late 1980s, Argentina and Brazil allowed joint inspections of each other’s nuclear facilities, and this agreement was formalised in 1991. In the mid 1990s, Argentina and Brazil joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the NPT.

References:

David Albright, 1993, “A Proliferation Primer”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June, <www.thebulletin.org/issues/1993/j93/j93Albright.html>.

Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, 1998, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <www.ceip.org/programs/npp/nppargn.htm>.

Daniel Poneman, 1985, “Argentina”, in Jed. C. Snyder and Samuel F. Wells Jr. (eds.), Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, pp.89-116.

Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, 1991, Nuclear Ambitions, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, pp.223-241.

AUSTRALIA

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Australian government made several efforts to obtain nuclear weapons from the US or the UK. Nothing eventuated from the negotiations although the UK was reasonably supportive of the idea at times.

From the mid 1960s to the early 1970s, there was greater interest in the domestic manufacture of nuclear weapons. The government never took a decision to systematically pursue a nuclear weapons program, but it repeatedly took steps to lessen the lead time for weapons production by pursuing civil nuclear projects. Consideration was also given to delivery systems – for example the 1963 contract to buy F-111s bombers from the US was partly motivated by the capacity to modify them to carry nuclear weapons.

The Australian Atomic Energy Commission’s (AAEC) major research project from the mid 1950s to mid 1960s concerned the potential use of beryllium (or beryllium compounds) as a moderator in civil reactors. The AAEC’s first reactor, the High Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR), was one of the instruments used for this research. Historian Wayne Reynolds (2000, p.27) suggests that the beryllium research may also have been connected to British interest in thermonuclear weapons.

In 1962, the federal Cabinet approved an increase in the staff of the AAEC from 950 to 1050 because, in the words of the Minister of National Development William Spooner, “a body of nuclear scientists and engineer skilled in nuclear energy represents a positive asset which would be available at any time if the government decided to develop a nuclear defence potential.” (Reynolds, 2000, p.194.)

Despite the glut in the uranium market overseas, the Minister for National Development announced in 1967 that uranium companies would henceforth have to keep half of their known reserves for Australian use, and he acknowledged in public that this decision was taken because of a desire to have a domestic uranium source in case it was needed for nuclear weapons.

The intention to leave open the nuclear weapons option was evident in the government’s approach to the NPT from 1969-71. Prime Minister John Gorton was determined not to sign the NPT, and he had some powerful allies such as Philip Baxter, Chair of the AAEC. The Minister for National Development admitted that a sticking point was a desire not to close off the weapons option. When the Government eventually signed (but did not ratify) the NPT in 1971, it was influenced by an assurance from the Department of External Affairs that it was possible for a signatory to develop nuclear technology to the brink of making nuclear weapons without contravening the NPT.

In the late 1960s, the AAEC set up a Plowshare Committee to investigate the potential uses of peaceful nuclear explosives in civil engineering projects. Plans to use peaceful nuclear explosives were never realised, partly because of the implications for the Partial Test Ban Treaty (to which Australia was a signatory), and the Plowshare Committee was disbanded in the early 1970s.

In 1969, Australia signed a secret nuclear cooperation agreement with France. The Sydney Morning Herald (June 18, 1969) reported that the agreement covered cooperation in the field of fast breeder power reactors (which produce more plutonium than they consume). The AAEC had begun preliminary research into building a plutonium separation plant by 1969, although this was never pursued.

A split table critical facility – built in 1972 at Lucas Heights but conceived in the late 1960s – was connected to the interest in fast breeder reactors and was possibly connected to the interest in weapons production. The facility was supplied by France. It proved to be difficult to secure supplies of enriched uranium or plutonium for experiments using the critical facility, which was widely regarded as a “white elephant” and was later dismantled.

In 1968, government officials and AAEC scientists studied and reported on the costs of a nuclear weapons program. They outlined two possible programs: a power reactor program capable of producing enough weapon grade plutonium for 30 fission weapons annually; and a uranium enrichment program capable of producing enough uranium-235 for the initiators of at least 10 thermonuclear weapons per year.

In 1969, federal Cabinet approved a plan to build a power reactor at Jervis Bay on the south coast of New South Wales. There is a wealth of evidence – some of it contained in Cabinet documents – revealing that the Jervis Bay project was motivated, in part, by a desire to bring Australia closer to a weapons capability. After Gorton was replaced as leader of the Liberal Party by William McMahon in 1971, the Jervis Bay project was reassessed and deferred. The Labor government, elected in 1972, did nothing to revive the Jervis Bay project, and Australia ratified the NPT in 1973.

Even before the cancellation of the Jervis Bay project, Baxter was making efforts to promote an Australian uranium enrichment plant, building on a small enrichment research program begun in secret at the AAEC in 1965. Baxter’s interest in the plant was largely military, as revealed by his written notes calculating how much HEU – and how many HEU weapons – could potentially be produced with an expanded enrichment program. Early, experimental work would of course have to be expanded to achieve Baxter’s aim, and the process modified, but these were not insurmountable obstacles. As Tony Wood (2000), former head of the AAEC’s Division of Reactors and Engineering, noted: “Although the Australian research team contained only a small number of centrifuge units, it is not a secret that one particular arrangement of a large number of centrifuge units could be capable of producing enriched uranium suitable to make a bomb of the Hiroshima type.”

Dr. Clarence Hardy (1996, p.31), a senior scientist at the AAEC (and from 1987 its successor the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation – ANSTO) from 1971-1991, has noted that the enrichment project was given the code name “The Whistle Project” and was carried out initially in the basement of Building 21. Former AAEC scientist Keith Alder (1996, p.30) noted that the enrichment project was kept secret “because of the possible uses of such technology to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium”. The project was not publicly revealed until a passing mention was made of it in the AAEC’s 1967-68 Annual Report.

A feasibility study into a joint Australian/French enrichment program was nearing completion in 1972 but collaboration with the French on nuclear matters was not supported by the incoming Labor government.

Since the early 1970s, there has been little high level support for the pursuit of a domestic nuclear weapons capability. However, there have been indications of a degree of ongoing support for the view that nuclear weapons should not be ruled out of defence policy altogether and that Australia should be able to build nuclear weapons as quickly as any neighbour that looks like doing so. For example, this current of thought was evident in a leaked 1984 defence document called The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy.

Bill Hayden, then the Foreign Minister, attempted to persuade Prime Minister Bob Hawke in 1984 that Australia should develop a “pre-nuclear weapons capability” which would involve an upgrade of Australia’s modest nuclear infrastructure. Hayden’s views found little or no support. Moreover the AAEC’s uranium enrichment research, by then the major project at Lucas Heights, and pursued in the post-Baxter period with the aim of “value adding” to Australia’s uranium exports, was terminated by government directive in the mid 1980s.

Several reasons can be given for the declining interest in nuclear weapons acquisition or production from the early 1970s onwards. Arguably, the development of the military alliance between the US and Australia is the key reason. Australia effectively became a nuclear weapons state “by proxy”, relying on the US nuclear umbrella.

A new reactor and the ‘national interest’

A new 14-20 MW(th) research reactor is planned for Australia, to replace the only operating reactor, HIFAR, at the Lucas Heights site operated by ANSTO.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and the Australian Safeguards Office (1998) state that the operation of a research reactor “first and foremost” serves “national interest requirements”. However there is probably little or no residual interest in the direct production of weapons. The proposed new reactor will be LEU fuelled and is unlikely to be capable of producing substantial quantities of plutonium.

At the most general level, the federal government argues that the expertise and experience derived from the operation of a new reactor will facilitate Australia’s contribution to international efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. In many countries it is argued that research reactors pose little or no risk in relation to weapons proliferation, but Australia appears to be treading new ground in asserting that a reactor will benefit non-proliferation initiatives. It is an argument which is difficult to reconcile with the international experience since World War II, which shows that research reactors are a recurring weapons proliferation problem.

At a more concrete level, the “national interest” issues include maintaining Australia’s place on the Board of Governors of the IAEA, and maintaining a base of nuclear expertise to monitor and assess nuclear developments overseas.

The government claims that operating a nuclear research reactor is necessary to consolidate Australia’s position on the Board of Governors of the IAEA. That claim is open for debate, and in any case the IAEA position raises numerous problems, not least the active role played by the IAEA in the promotion of dual-use nuclear technologies. Moreover, to maintain Australia’s position on the IAEA Board of Governors, Australia is expected to promote dual-use technologies (such as research reactors) and the products of dual-use technologies (such as reactor produced radioisotopes).

Another of the government’s “national interest” objectives is to consolidate the military alliance with the US. The link between a reactor, ANSTO and the US alliance has not been publicly discussed with any clarity or depth by successive governments or by government agencies such as ANSTO and the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office. In addition to vague and somewhat cryptic comments on the matter, specific issues have been raised, such as the claim that Australia needs an independent base of nuclear expertise to determine and ensure “appropriate arrangements for nuclear ship visits as part of our alliance obligations”. (Department of Foreign Affairs and the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office, 1998.)

The key issues in relation to the link between a reactor, ANSTO and the US alliance have been neatly summarised by Jean McSorley (1998): “Is it that Australia is determined to keep its regional seat on the IAEA because it is part of the ‘deal’ that Australia plays a leading role in the (Asia Pacific) region’s nuclear industry and, in lieu of having nuclear weapons, continues to be covered by the US nuclear umbrella? Taking part in ‘overseeing’ the activities of other nuclear programmes must meet an objective of the wider security alliance by playing an intelligence-gathering role – a role which the US probably finds it very useful for Australia to play. The pay-back for this is through its defence agreements with the US, that Australia gets to be a nuclear weapons state by proxy.”

Efforts to improve the NPT/IAEA safeguards system since the debacle of Iraq have focussed largely on diplomatic/political issues (e.g. expanded inspection rights), on technologies (such as environmental sampling and video surveillance) which do not require reactor experience or expertise, and on the provision of adequate funding for safeguards programs. Australia’s contribution in these fields is not dependent on the operation of a reactor.

In some respects the operation of a research reactor weakens Australia’s hand. For example, a new reactor will involve the expenditure of funds which would more profitably (in terms of non-proliferation goals) be spent on technical projects (such as video surveillance and environmental sampling) and diplomatic/political initiatives. Moreover, the Australian government would be better placed to enunciate a more sober and less compromised view on the benefits and costs (including the proliferation risks) of research reactors if not for the domestic political imperative to stress the benefits and downplay the costs.

Another opportunity cost associated with the operation of a reactor, and in particular the plan to spend several hundred million dollars on a new reactor, is the lost opportunity to take a leading role (in the region if not the world) in the development of non-reactor technologies (such as particle accelerators) for medical, scientific and industrial applications. The development and promotion of non-reactor technologies would itself represent a useful, if modest, non-proliferation initiative.

References:

Keith Alder, 1996, Australia’s Uranium Opportunities, Sydney: P.M. Alder.

Alice Cawte, 1992, Atomic Australia: 1944-1990, Sydney: New South Wales University Press.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Australian Safeguards Office, 1998, Submission to Senate Economics References Committee, Inquiry into Lucas Heights Nuclear Reactor.

Clarence Hardy, 1996, Enriching Experiences. NSW: Glen Haven.

Jacques E. C. Hymans, 2000, “Isotopes and Identity: Australia and the Nuclear Weapons Option, 1949-1999”, Nonproliferation Review, Vol.7, No.1, Spring, pp.1-23.

Jean McSorley, 1998, “The New Reactor: National Interest and Nuclear Intrigues”, Submission to Senate Economics References Committee, Inquiry into Lucas Heights Nuclear Reactor. http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/30410/20090218-0153/www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/mcsorley.html

Wayne Reynolds, 2000, Australia’s bid for the atomic bomb, Melbourne University Press.

Jim Walsh, 1997, “Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions”, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall, pp.1-20.

Tony Wood, 2000, Letter, St. George and Sutherland Shire Leader, May 2.

INDIA

India’s nuclear research and power programs laid the foundation for its 1974 nuclear test explosion. The test explosion used plutonium produced in the 40 MW(th) research reactor known as Cirus (Canada-India-Reactor-United-States), which was supplied by Canada (construction began in 1955, first criticality was achieved in 1960). The US supplied heavy water for the reactor. The conditions imposed by Canada and the US – that the reactor and heavy water be used only for peaceful purposes – were circumvented with the assertion that the test related to India’s interest in “peaceful” nuclear explosives for civil engineering projects.

The 100 MW(th) Dhruva research reactor, which became fully operational in 1988, is also believed to have been used to produce plutonium for weapons. Dhruva, like Cirus, is a heavy water moderated and natural uranium fuelled reactor. The Cirus and Dhruva reactors are estimated to be capable of producing about 25-35 kilograms of plutonium annually. India probably has enough plutonium for 60-100 nuclear weapons, most of it believed to be in separated form.

India has a number of unsafeguarded power reactors. These are thought to have supplied only a small fraction of the plutonium for India’s weapons program to date, with the majority produced by the Cirus and Dhruva research reactors. However, at least as much plutonium is contained in the spent fuel of unsafeguarded power reactors as has been produced by Cirus and Dhruva.

The Cirus and Dhruva reactors may also have been used for tritium production. (Tritium may also have been extracted from irradiated heavy water moderator in power reactors.)

Other research reactors – in particular the 19 MW(th) Purnima reactor – were used to conduct research crucial to the development of a weapons capability.

India’s stated interest in using plutonium for power production, and the development of facilities such as a fast breeder test reactor and a mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plant, have provided further civil cover for India’s military plutonium program. The ostensibly civil plutonium program has also been used to justify the development of reprocessing facilities.

India is reported to have used Cirus, Dhruva and one other reactor to produce kilogram quantities of fissile uranium-233 by irradiating thorium. Uranium-233 production will be increased significantly if India proceeds with the development of power reactors using thorium-233 fuel.

India has only a limited capacity to enrich uranium.

India has not a signatory to the NPT or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

References:

David Albright and Mark Hibbs, 1992, “India’s silent bomb”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September.

John S. Friedman, 1997, “More power to thorium?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October, Vol.53, No.5.

Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough with Evan S. Medeiros, 1995, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, Washington: Brookings Institution / Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp.89-95.

IRAQ

A civil research reactor program, plus plans to develop nuclear power, facilitated a covert weapons development program in Iraq from the early 1970s to the early 1990s which employed thousands of people spread across numerous sites.

Iraq signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1969. NPT accession was a plus for the covert weapons program because it greatly facilitated technology transfer while continued violations of legally binding NPT obligations went undetected.

Major research programs were undertaken into electromagnetic isotope separation and gas centrifuge enrichment techniques, and other enrichment methods were also investigated – chemical enrichment, gaseous diffusion, and laser isotope separation.

The enrichment projects variously relied on indigenous development of technology, deals with foreign contractors prepared to circumvent export controls, and the acquisition of freely available information and materials. If not for the 1991 Gulf War and events thereafter, Iraq may have been able to produce sufficient HEU for its first weapon in the mid 1990s.

Since so much of the enrichment work was covert, there was little or no effort or need to justify the enrichment work with reference to enriched uranium fuelled research reactors. Nevertheless, the operation of those reactors may have been used on occasions to justify requests to potential suppliers, or by suppliers to justify their actions.

In 1980, Iraq announced that IAEA inspections would be temporarily suspended because of the Iran-Iraq war, and 26 pounds (about 12 kilograms) of HEU were removed from the core of the low power Tammuz II research reactor and stored in an underground canal.

In 1981, an Israeli strike on the Al Tuwaitha site destroyed the 40-70 MW(th) French-supplied Osirak reactor (a.k.a. Tammuz-1), which was shortly to begin operation. Plutonium production is likely to have been a motive for the purchase of the reactor. This was one of several attempts to bomb nuclear facilities involving Iraq:

– in 1971, when a small research reactor was awaiting shipment from France to Iraq, its core was sabotaged in a warehouse and the person supposed to certify its quality was murdered in a Paris hotel

– Iran bombed the Al Tuwaitha nuclear complex in September 1980 but inflicted little or no damage

– Iraq bombed Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant (which included two partly-built power reactors) at least six times between March 1984 and November 1987

– the US bombed two small, safeguarded nuclear reactors (the 5 MW(th) IRT-5000 Soviet-built pool-type reactor, and a French-supplied 0.5 MW(th) critical facility called Tammuz-II), and other nuclear sites such as uranium hexafluoride conversion and centrifuge enrichment pilot facilities, in Iraq in 1991

– Iraq launched Scud missiles at the Israeli Dimona plant in 1991.

On several occasions, covert attempts to produce and separate small quantities of plutonium in IAEA safeguarded facilities took place at Tuwaitha. One exercise involved extracting plutonium from a fuel element removed from the IRT-5000 reactor. On three other occasions, fuel elements were fabricated from undeclared uranium dioxide in an Experimental Reactor Fuel Fabrication Laboratory, they were secretly irradiated in the IRT-5000 reactor and then chemically processed in an unsafeguarded Radiochemical Laboratory containing hot cells. Only tiny quantities of plutonium were separated. The plutonium separation capacity of the hot cells was probably too small to be of use in the weapons program except on an experimental basis.

In 1984, a project was established with the objective of designing and building a 40 MW(th) natural uranium fuelled, heavy water moderated and cooled reactor modelled on the Canadian NRX reactor. By that time, there was no longer any hope that France would rebuild the Tamuz-1 reactor destroyed by the Israeli air force in 1981. The reactor project appears not to have progressed beyond theoretical studies; the emphasis was on uranium enrichment. Related projects – also undeclared – concerned reprocessing and the production of plutonium metal, but only small quantities of separated plutonium and plutonium metal were produced.

Although the IRT reactor’s power level was low – five MW(th) – it could have produced sufficient plutonium for one weapon over a period of several years in the fuel and/or a uranium blanket and/or targets. This risk, albeit small, was amplified by the fact that IAEA inspections of the reactor were infrequent because of the low risk status of the reactor. The IAEA (1997, p.53) states that the IRT reactor was of “very limited usefulness as a plutonium production reactor” but made a “useful” contribution to the nuclear weapons research and development program.

The IRT-5000 reactor was used to make polonium-210 for neutron initiator research, using bismuth targets. It was also used to produce small quantities of plutonium-238, which could have been used for neutron initiator research instead of short lived polonium-210.

Iraq developed a capability to produce small quantities of lithium-6, which, when subjected to neutron irradiation, yields tritium. This suggests an interest in developing “boosted” fission weapons and/or a longer term interest in hydrogen weapons.

‘Dirty’ radiation bombs were produced and three test bombs were exploded in Iraq in 1987. The bombs used materials (such as zirconium) irradiated in the Tammuz II and/or IRT reactors. (Atomic Energy Agency (Iraq), 1987.) The results were not promising and the project was discontinued (Broad, 2001).

After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, a crash program was initiated with the aim of diverting approximately 36 kilograms of IAEA safeguarded unirradiated and irradiated HEU from the IRT-5000 and Tammuz II research reactors. The program called for chemical processing to extract HEU, construction of a 50-machine gas centrifuge cascade to further enrich some of the HEU, and conversion of the HEU chemical compounds to metal buttons suitable for a weapon. The crash program had not advanced to any great degree by January 1991, when the Gulf War began, but some progress had been made such as the installation of a chemical solvent plant in hot cells at Tuwaitha. The program may have continued after the Gulf War until such time as it became clear that research reactor fuel was to be removed from Iraq – the first shipment took place in November 1991.

While Iraq’s nuclear research program provided much cover for the weapons program, stated interest in developing nuclear power was also significant. According to Khidhir Hamza (1998), a senior nuclear scientist involved in Iraq’s weapons program: “Acquiring nuclear technology within the IAEA safeguards system was the first step in establishing the infrastructure necessary to develop nuclear weapons. In 1973, we decided to acquire a 40-megawatt research reactor, a fuel manufacturing plant, and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, all under cover of acquiring the expertise needed to eventually build and operate nuclear power plants and produce and recycle nuclear fuel. Our hidden agenda was to clandestinely develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce weapon-grade plutonium. … Under cover of safeguarded civil nuclear programs, Iraq managed to purchase the basic components of plutonium production, with full training included, despite the risk that the technology could be replicated or misused.”

Professed interest in developing fusion technology was also useful, as discussed by Hamza (1998): “Iraq took full advantage of the IAEA’s recommendation in the mid 1980s to start a plasma physics program for “peaceful” fusion research. We thought that buying a plasma focus device … would provide an excellent cover for buying and learning about fast electronics technology, which could be used to trigger atomic bombs.”

Prescient warnings were voiced in 1981 following Israel’s attack on the Osirak reactor. On June 13, 1981, US Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) called the IAEA “an international charade … riddled with loopholes” and said it was “possible for a country which is under IAEA inspections to take all the necessary steps to build a bomb and escape detection. In fact, the IAEA gave a convenient cover to the Iraqi bomb program”. (Quoted in Nucleonics Week, June 18, 1981, p.4). Sigvard Eklund, then IAEA Director General, defended the IAEA somewhat clumsily, stating that, “You can’t be accused of murder because you have acquired a gun.” (Nucleonics Week, June 25, 1981, p.3.)

IAEA safeguards inspector Roger Richter resigned in 1981, having written to the US State Department the year before stating: ‘The most disturbing implication of the Iraqi nuclear program is that the NPT agreement has had the effect of assisting Iraq in acquiring the nuclear technology and nuclear material for its program by absolving the cooperating nations of their moral responsibility by shifting it to the IAEA. These cooperating nations have thwarted concerted international criticism of their actions by pointing to Iraq’s signing of NPT, while turning away from the numerous, obvious and compelling evidence which leads to the conclusion that Iraq is embarked on a nuclear weapons program.” (Quoted in MacLachlan and Ryan (1991); see also Nucleonics Week, June 25, 1981, p.3.)

References:

Anon, 1987, “IAEA plays down Tehran talk of ‘another Chernobyl'”, The Guardian, November 20.

Anon., 1991, “Iraq Targets Israeli A-plant”, International Herald Tribune, February 18, <www.antenna.nl/wise/terrorism/iraq/02181991ih.html>.

David Albright and Mark Hibbs, 1991, “Iraq: news the front page missed”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October, Vol.47, No.8.

David Albright and Mark Hibbs, 1992, “Iraq’s bomb: Blueprints and artifacts”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February, Vol.48, No.1.

David Albright and Mark Hibbs, 1992, “Iraq’s shop-till-you-drop nuclear program”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April.

David Albright and Robert Kelley, 1995, “Has Iraq come clean at last?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December, Vol.51, No.6.

Atomic Energy Agency (Iraq), 1987, Applications of Nuclear Physics, Document No. 701001, <www.iraqwatch.org/government/Iraq/UN-iraq-bomb.htm>.

William J. Broad, April 29, 2001, “Document Reveals 1987 Bomb Test by Iraq”, New York Times, p.A8.

Albert Carnesale, 1981, “June 7 in Baghdad”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August/September, pp.11-13.

Khidhir Hamza, 1998, “Inside Saddam’s secret nuclear program”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October, Vol.54, No.5.

International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997, “Fourth consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)”, IAEA Document S/1997/779, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, October, <www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_1997_779.pdf>

Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, 1998, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Ann MacLachlan and Margaret Ryan, 1991, “Allied bombing of Iraqi reactors provokes no safeguards debate”, Nucleonics Week, January 31.

Gary Milhollin, 2002, “Can Terrorists Get the Bomb?”, Commentary Magazine, February, pp.45-49, <www.wisconsinproject.org>.

Yuval Ne’eman, 1981, “The Franco-Iraqi project”, Bulletin of the Atomic    Scientists, August/September, pp.8-10.

George H. Quester, 1985, “Israel”, in Jed. C. Snyder and Samuel F. Wells Jr. (eds.), Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, pp.43-58.

Mitchell Reiss, 1988, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation, New York: Columbia University Press, ch.5.

Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough with Evan S. Medeiros, 1995, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, Washington: Brookings Institution / Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp.125-133.

ISRAEL

The Israeli nuclear weapons program was launched in 1956, in the wake of the Suez crisis. The natural uranium fuelled IRR-2 (Dimona) research reactor, supplied by France, is central to the program. Estimates of the power of the IRR-2 reactor range from 40-150 MW(th). The reactor has been used to produce plutonium, the fissile material in most or all of Israel’s estimated 100-200 nuclear weapons. Israel is not a signatory to the NPT but signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.

The IRR-2 reactor may also have been used to produce tritium.

France also supplied information on the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons, and assisted in the construction of other facilities at the Dimona site including a reprocessing plant.

Israel has made some progress in the development of laser enrichment technology, but plutonium from the Dimona reactor is still the primary source of fissile material for the weapons program.

There are no power reactors in Israel, although the pretense of a nuclear power program may have facilitated the transfer of materials and expertise from France and other countries.

References:

Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough with Toby Dalton and Gregory Koblentz, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

George H. Quester, 1985, “Israel”, in Jed. C. Snyder and Samuel F. Wells Jr. (eds.), Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, pp.43-58.

Mitchell Reiss, 1988, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation, New York: Columbia University Press, ch.5.

Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough with Evan S. Medeiros, 1995, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, Washington: Brookings Institution / Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp.135-140.

NORTH KOREA

North Korea’s covert weapons development program proceeded under cover of a planned nuclear power program in the 1980s following the acquisition of research reactors in the 1960s and 1970s.

The majority of North Korea’s nuclear facilities are at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre, including a five MW(e) (20-30 MW(th)) “experimental power reactor”, a large-scale reprocessing plant for plutonium extraction (only partially completed but functional nonetheless), a number of hot cells that can be used for plutonium extraction, a high explosive testing facility, a fuel fabrication plant, a partially completed 50 MW(e) power reactor, a four MW(th) research reactor and a critical assembly. A 200 MW(e) power reactor was partially built at Taechon.

The three reactors were based on the gas graphite moderated, natural uranium fuelled Magnox design – suitable for co-generation of electricity and plutonium. North Korea appears to have pursued these reactor construction projects with only minimal foreign assistance. Similarly, the partially completed reprocessing plant was built with minimal foreign assistance.

North Korea became a party to the NPT in 1985 but did not allow IAEA inspections until 1992. North Korea admitted in 1992 that it had separated about 100 grams of plutonium in March 1990 and that the plutonium came from failed fuel elements from the five MW(e) reactor. The Yongbyon reprocessing plant (which North Korea calls a Radiochemical Laboratory) and possibly also hot cells were used to separate the plutonium.

Inspections and tests by the IAEA, coupled with North Korea’s refusal to comply with some requests from the IAEA, raised suspicions that larger volumes of plutonium, possibly enough for 1-2 weapons, have been separated from spent fuel which may have been unloaded from the five MW(e) experimental power reactor in 1989.

The reactor’s inventory of spent fuel was unloaded in May 1994, and that spent fuel contains between 17-33 kilograms of (unseparated) plutonium; it has been stabilised and “canned” by the US and is stored under IAEA safeguards in North Korea.

If completed, the 50 MW(e) reactor would be capable of producing much larger volumes of plutonium than the five MW(e) reactor, as would the 200 MW(e) reactor. It is believed the plan was to use the 50 MW(e) reactor primarily as a plutonium factory, and to use the 200 MW(e) reactor primarily for electricity generation and as a back-up for plutonium production.

Following a protracted international controversy, North Korea and the US signed an “Agreed Framework” in October 1994. Among other things the Agreement provided for a verified freeze of the activities at the North Korean facilities believed to have supported the weapons program, the eventual dismantling of those facilities, removal of some material including spent fuel from the five MW(e) reactor, and the construction of two power reactors of a design less suitable for producing weapon grade plutonium than the Magnox design of the three power reactors built or partially built by North Korea. Progress on implementation of the Agreed Framework has been stop-start and it remains a long way from fruition as at 2002.

North Korea has a four MW(th) IRT research reactor as well as a critical assembly and a sub-critical assembly, all supplied by the Soviet Union and all under IAEA safeguards. These research reactors do not seem to have been involved in the weapons program to any significant degree. However it is likely that a small quantity of plutonium was separated in the 1970s, before IAEA safeguards were applied, using the IRT research reactor to produce the plutonium and hot cells (also supplied by the Soviet Union) to separate it.

References:

David Albright, 1994, “How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October, Vol.50, No.5.

Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough with Toby Dalton and Gregory Koblentz, 1998, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Andrew Mack, 1997, “Potential, not Proliferation”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August, pp.48-53.

Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough with Evan S. Medeiros, 1995, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, Washington: Brookings Institution / Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp.103-110.

PAKISTAN

Pakistan launched a covert nuclear weapons program in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani war in the early 1970s. Pakistan was able to accumulate the equipment and expertise to produce weapons with the help of weak Western export controls, the cover of civil nuclear power and research programs, and Chinese support. Pakistan is not a signatory to the NPT or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

While there have been ongoing efforts to develop plutonium production and separation capabilities, the emphasis of the covert weapons program has been on uranium enrichment. In 1978 France broke off an agreement to supply an enrichment plant, but a large scale gas centrifuge enrichment plant was built at Kahuta nonetheless, using stolen European designs, some Libyan funding and some equipment bought by “dummy” companies from European and North American suppliers. The Kahuta enrichment plant is believed to be the source of all or nearly all of Pakistan’s fissile material for the weapons program. Pakistan probably has sufficient HEU for 30-52 nuclear warheads (although there is considerable uncertainty in those estimates).

In the 1970s, Pakistan planned to use power reactor/s to produce plutonium for weapons. However in 1978 France pulled out of an agreement to build a reprocessing plant because of the weapons implications. Efforts to complete the plant without further French assistance struck insurmountable obstacles.

A 50 MW(th) natural uranium fuelled, heavy water moderated research reactor has been under construction for many years at Khushab, with the potential to provide Pakistan with its first supply of unsafeguarded spent fuel. Former Prime Minister Bhutto described the Khushab reactor as “a small reactor for experimental purposes”. The reactor has been built with Chinese assistance. There have been several reports in recent years that construction of the Khushab reactor has been completed, and also reports that it has begun operation. The Khushab reactor is estimated to be capable of generating 10-15 kg of weapon grade plutonium annually, enough for 1-2 weapons. The availability of unsafeguarded plutonium would permit Pakistan to develop smaller and lighter nuclear warheads which would facilitate Pakistan’s development of warheads for ballistic missiles.

In addition, Pakistan might use the Khushab reactor to irradiate lithium-6 targets to produce tritium to use as a neutron initiator in weapons, for boosted fission weapons or, in the longer term, for hydrogen weapons.

In tandem with the construction of the Khushab reactor, Pakistan’s capacity to reprocess spent fuel has steadily expanded, with the largest reprocessing plant located at Chasma. Weapon grade plutonium from the Khushab reactor’s spent fuel could be extracted at the nearby Chasma reprocessing plant, if that facility becomes operational, or at the New Labs reprocessing facility in Rawalpindi – both unsafeguarded facilities.

Pakistan’s power reactors, which are subject to IAEA safeguards, have had little or no direct connection to the weapons program in terms of plutonium production. However one possible source of heavy water for the Khushab reactor is diversion of heavy water supplied by China for the Kanupp power reactor.

Two research reactors, both significantly less powerful than the Khushab reactor, are under IAEA safeguards. One of these reactors, PARR-I, may have been used clandestinely to produce tritium for the weapons program.

References:

Anon., 2002, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2001”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol.58, No.1, January/February, pp.70-71.

David Albright and Mark Hibbs, 1992, “Pakistan’s bomb: Out of the closet”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August.

Institute for Science and International Security, 2000, “Analysis of IKONOS Imagery of the Plutonium Production Reactor and Newly-Identified Heavy Water Plant at Khushab, Pakistan”, <www.isis-online.org>

Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough with Toby Dalton and Gregory Koblentz, 1998, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough with Evan S. Medeiros, 1995, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, Washington: Brookings Institution / Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp.97-102.

ROMANIA

Romania ratified the NPT in 1970, but a covert nuclear weapons program was pursued under the Ceausescu regime. Little information is publicly available on the weapons program, but it is known that hot cells were used for experimental plutonium extraction from irradiated research reactor fuel.

After Ceausescu’s overthrow in 1989, the weapons program was terminated. Supply of HEU for a 14 MW(th) Triga research reactor was terminated by the US in the late 1980s because of the possibility of HEU diversion; the reactor was shut down from 1989-91 and it was converted to enable the use of LEU fuel.

Reference:

Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough, with Evan S. Medeiros, 1995, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, Washington: Brookings Institution / Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp.83-86.

TAIWAN

Taiwan launched a nuclear weapons program in the 1960s in response to China’s weapons program. A plan for a dedicated weapons program – involving the purchase of a heavy water reactor, a heavy water production plant, and a plutonium separation plant – was rejected in favour of a nuclear program more easily portrayed as having peaceful intentions.

Taiwan signed the NPT in 1968. Work on the Canadian supplied 40 MW(th) natural uranium fuelled, heavy water moderated Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR) began in 1969 and the reactor began operating in 1973. The reactor had the capacity to produce more than 10 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium annually, although actual production was less. The limited scope of the research program associated with the reactor caused international consternation.

In 1969, work also began on a plant to produce natural uranium fuel, a reprocessing facility, and a plutonium chemistry laboratory.

A small reprocessing facility was built adjacent to the TRR reactor. Its declared purpose was to process spent fuel from a zero power reactor that used US supplied HEU fuel and/or the TRR reactor. Another, still smaller reprocessing laboratory was built, which could have been used to research various aspects of reprocessing irradiated material. A small number of spent fuel elements may have been reprocessed, but the amount of plutonium involved was far short of the amount required for a nuclear weapon. Taiwan also tried to purchase a large reprocessing plant but was unsuccessful.

The so-called “Plutonium Fuel Chemistry Laboratory” was used for experimental scale production of metallic plutonium using 1075 grams of separated plutonium that Taiwan had received from the US in 1974. Plutonium in metallic form is rarely if ever used in civil nuclear programs.

In the late 1970s, under pressure from the US, most of the reprocessing facilities were dismantled, and 863 grams of US supplied plutonium were returned to the US.

In 1987 Taiwan began secretly building hot cell facilities in violation of safeguards commitments. In early 1988, after a visit to the facility, US officials pressured Taiwan to dismantle it. Evidently no plutonium had been separated. The TRR reactor was also shut down in the late 1980s, again under pressure from the US. Spent fuel elements from the TRR reactor, containing about 78 kilograms of plutonium, had been shipped to the US by 1997, although some spent fuel from the TRR reactor remained in Taiwan.

References:

David Albright and Corey Gay, 1998, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February, Vol.54, No.1.

William Burr (ed.), October 13, 1999, “New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese ‘Nuclear Intentions’, 1966-1976”, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.19, <www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/>

Dr. Ta-you Wu, “A Footnote to the History of Our Country’s ‘Nuclear Energy’ Policies”, translation from Chinese article in Biographical Literature, May 1988 <www.isis-online.org/publications/taiwan/ta-youwu.html>

YUGOSLAVIA

Covert weapons programs were pursued on two occasions in Yugoslavia, under cover of nuclear research and nuclear power programs, though on neither occasion did the program reach an advanced state.

The first covert program was conceived in the late 1940s and was pursued until the mid 1960s. Yugoslavia pursued a program of nuclear research consistent with the ambition to become a nuclear weapons state. The cornerstones of the early program were three nuclear research centers established from 1948-50. The research/weapons program included the construction of a zero power critical assembly (built to acquire reactor expertise if Yugoslavia were to pursue the plutonium path) and a Soviet designed and built 6.5 MW(th) heavy water moderated “RA” research reactor capable of using uranium fuel enriched to 80% uranium-235. Heavy water and HEU for the reactors were provided by the Soviet Union. As a step towards independence from foreign suppliers, the Vinca Laboratory developed the capability to fabricate uranium oxide fuel elements for the RA research reactor.

Reprocessing technology was also pursued. Intensive negotiations between Yugoslavia and Norway took place with a view to the supply of a reprocessing plant, ostensibly to reprocess spent fuel from the RA research reactor. The engineering blueprints for the plant were delivered to Yugoslavia in 1962 but the reprocessing plant had not been built by the time Yugoslav political leaders lost interest in the weapons program in the mid 1960s.

Nevertheless, a laboratory scale reprocessing facility, equipped with four hot cells, was in operation by 1966. Small scale separation of plutonium from spent fuel from the RA reactor took place.

Although the emphasis was on developing the means to produce and separate plutonium, uranium enrichment was also studied using a small cyclotron to research electromagnetic isotope separation techniques, and a calutron. (A civil particle accelerator research program also provided useful cover for Iraq’s pursuit of electromagnetic enrichment technology.)

A second push towards a nuclear weapons capability began in 1974, partly in response to the Indian test explosion of that year. The covert weapons program was pursued despite Yugoslavia’s formal accession to the NPT in 1970. It was decided to pursue weapons under the cover of an expanded nuclear power program. (At the time, one power plant was under construction in Slovenia.)

Two parallel nuclear programs were pursued – one military, one civil. The program dedicated to weapons included projects into the nuclear explosive components for weapons including a neutron source to initiate the chain reaction, computer modelling, and exploratory studies of aspects of underground nuclear testing.

The “peaceful” program involved 11 projects. Its major activities were clearly related to the weapons program, including the design of a plutonium production reactor (referred to as an experimental research reactor), uranium metal production, development of an expanded plutonium reprocessing capability, design and construction of a zero power fast breeder reactor, and heavy water production.

The nuclear weapons program was effectively terminated in 1987 for reasons which remain unclear. The extent of the progress made between 1974-87 also remains unclear.

Yugoslavia retains highly skilled physicists, chemists, and engineers who obtained extensive experience in a broad range of nuclear activities during the first and second phases of the covert weapons program.

Although Yugoslavia continues to receive IAEA inspectors, the country’s status as a NPT signatory remains unclear. Belgrade resists formally acceding to the NPT, arguing that it should be accepted as the sole successor to the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia.

The largest of the research reactors has been shut down, and the plutonium reprocessing program appears to be inactive.

In addition to its experienced work force, Yugoslavia’s greatest weapons asset today is its 48.2 kilograms of fresh 80% enriched HEU fuel and 10 kilograms of lightly irradiated HEU. In addition, reprocessing of spent fuel could yield more than five kilograms of plutonium. All of this material is under IAEA safeguards.

References:

Andrew Koch, 1997, “Yugoslavia’s Nuclear Legacy: Should We Worry?”, Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer, pp.123-24.

William C. Potter, Djuro Miljanic and Ivo Slaus, 2000, “Tito’s nuclear legacy”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April, Vol.56, No.2, pp.63-70, <www.thebulletin.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.

APPENDIX:

REDUCED ENRICHMENT FOR RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR PROGRAM

Diverting HEU, by extracting it from fresh or spent fuel, is a proliferation issue of particular relevance to research reactors because they account for the bulk of the civil trade in HEU. The level of uranium enrichment for power reactor fuel rarely exceeds 3-5% uranium-235, which is far short of the level of enrichment necessary for weapons production. Many research reactors, by contrast, have been fuelled with HEU. HEU became readily available and was used not only for high power research reactors but also for low power reactors for which LEU would have been sufficient if not ideal (Muranaka, 1983).

The US has been the main supplier of HEU and exported over 25 tonnes to 51 countries for use in research reactors (Takats et al., 1993). A number of countries known to have covertly pursued weapons programs have been supplied with HEU research reactor fuel, including Yugoslavia, South Korea, Israel, Romania, Taiwan, Libya and South Africa. Supply of HEU research reactor fuel and/or HEU isotope production targets from the US to various countries has been suspended a number of times over the years because of concerns about the potential for diversion or theft (e.g. South Africa, Mexico, Israel, Romania).

Proliferation concerns gave rise to the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, a US initiative which emerged from the 1978 US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. (Details of the program can be found on the website of the Argonne National Lab, <www.td.anl.gov/Programs/RERTR/RERTR.html>. See also Travelli, 2000.)

The RERTR program aims to eliminate the use of HEU for research reactor fuel and also for isotope production targets. Further impetus for the program came in 1992 with the Schumer Amendment which bans US supply of HEU to countries refusing to cooperate with the RERTR program.

The primary aim of the RERTR program is the conversion of HEU fuelled reactors to enable the use of LEU fuels – immediate conversion to LEU fuel if possible, development of suitable LEU fuel types for other research reactors, and preventing new HEU fuelled reactors being built.

The US is central to the RERTR program because it has been the main supplier of HEU fuels, and actual or threatened refusal to supply HEU fuel has given the US considerable leverage. In addition to restricting the supply of HEU, the US administration has used another strategy to encourage compliance with the RERTR program – making take-back of US origin spent fuel conditional on compliance with the program. The spent fuel take-back program has has been an important incentive and will remain so. Spent fuel take-back amounting to up to 20 tonnes from a total of 41 countries is planned and some shipments have already taken place (including some from Australia). In addition to encouraging compliance with the RERTR program, US spent fuel take-back has acted as a disincentive for the horizontal proliferation of reprocessing technology. Australia is one of a number of countries involved in the US spent fuel take-back program which is not considered to be at risk of pursuing nuclear weapons programs; these countries have been primarily interested in ridding themselves of spent fuel for which no alternative arrangements exist.

An issue arising from the spent fuel take-back program is whether the US will reprocess spent fuel, use alternative treatment technologies, or use long term storage. Reprocessing would involve separation of weapons usable materials from spent fuel. For aluminum clad spent fuel assemblies containing HEU, the most likely option is the further development and use of a “melt and dilute” process which would involve melting the spent fuel in an oven, with conversion of the melted material into LEU ingots.

As at 1998, of 65 reactors with a power level of at least one MW(th) and using US supplied HEU fuel, 54 had been converted to LEU fuel, were in the process of conversion, or were not considered suitable for conversion because of plans to permanently shut down the reactor. Suitable LEU fuel types were not available for eight of the 65 reactors, and the operators of three reactors were refusing to convert their reactor. (Kuperman and Leventhal, 1998.)

The numbers of research reactor operators unable or unwilling to convert their reactors has been reduced still further since 1998. Of the above-mentioned 65 reactors, only two operators continued to reject the conversion norm outright as at late 1999 – Germany’s FRJ-2 reactor (which has sufficient HEU fuel on hand for the next few years, after which it may be shut down) and France’s Orphee reactor. In addition, a small number of research reactors still cannot use existing LEU fuel types, so further development of high density LEU fuel types remains important to the RERTR program.

Successes of the RERTR program in recent years include the following:

– operators of several reactors (e.g. Netherlands Petten reactor, Belgian BR-2 reactor, South African Safari I reactor) have announced their willingness to cooperate with the RERTR program despite earlier reluctance

– France and China have announced that their next-generation, high power research reactors will use LEU fuel

– the US government cancelled its planned Advanced Neutron Source, which was to have used HEU fuel

– several types of LEU research reactor fuels have been developed, thus facilitating conversion, and further research is ongoing to develop LEU fuels for reactors which have not yet been converted (and for new reactors)

– the US has conducted feasibility studies on converting government research reactors, to complement the ongoing conversion of US university research reactors

– US university reactors are being converted even if they are low power (less than one MW(th)) and even if they have enough HEU in their cores for their remaining lifespan. This is in recognition of the low security at university reactors.

Apart from the US, the only other significant supplier of HEU research reactor fuel (and HEU fuelled research reactors) has been the USSR/Russia, which has supplied large quantities of HEU to western and eastern European countries. This supply has been greatly reduced, and possibly stopped altogether, but containment of this source of HEU remains an issue of concern.

Russia has cooperated with the RERTR program to enable conversion of reactors located in Russia and of reactors supplied by the Soviet Union to a number of countries including Yugoslavia, North Korea, Libya, Poland and Vietnam. A related concern is the status of HEU in ex-Soviet states and HEU exported by the Soviet Union / Russia. Russian progress on meeting RERTR objectives has been considerably slower than US progress, with lack of funding being one major constraint. Unresolved issues with respect to Russia and other ex-Soviet states include: lack of data about research reactor numbers, types, operational status, etc.; the status and future handling of fresh HEU fuel stockpiles; and physical protection and the potential for theft or illicit sale of HEU. (On the RERTR program in Russia, see Arkhangelsky, 2000; on the risks associated with HEU stockpiles in ex-Soviet States, see Bunn, 2000, esp. pp.78-79.)

A threat to the RERTR programs is the FRM-II research reactor under construction in Germany with plans to use HEU fuel. The reactor was scheduled for start-up in 2001 but controversy surrounding the project has forced delays and operation before 2003 is unlikely. In October 2001, the German state of Bavaria and the federal Ministry of Environment agreed to convert the FRM-II reactor from to “medium” enriched fuel (50% uranium-235) before the end of 2010. According to the World Information Service on Energy (2001), the reactor will use up to 360 kilograms of 93% enriched fuel by the end of 2010 (less if start-up continues to be delayed). The possibility of modifications to the reactor which would allow the use of LEU (<20% uranium-235) fuel continues to be debated. With no prospect of HEU supplies from the US, a possible source of HEU for the FRM-II reactor is the European Supply Agency (an institute of Euratom, the European Commission’s agency for dealing with nuclear materials). The Technical University of Munich, owner of the reactor, has already acquired a small amount of US origin HEU within Europe and is seeking additional supplies. Russia is also considered a possible supplier of HEU by FRM-II project managers. The reactor is the first research reactor in the Western world (with power of at least one MW(th)) built to use HEU fuel since the establishment of the RERTR program. (Libya and China are the only other countries in which construction of HEU fuelled reactors has begun since the RERTR program began in 1978.)

Beyond the specific threats to the RERTR program are broader issues concerning HEU:

– stockpiles of HEU from military programs, in the US and Russia in particular, amount to hundreds of tonnes, a vastly greater quantity than has been used in research reactors. The blending down of some of this material, and the disposal of some of it as waste, is expected to take some decades and even if those plans proceed without significant disruption, significant HEU stockpiles and large numbers of HEU weapons will remain (similar points apply to plutonium stockpiles and plutonium weapons).

– HEU production for research reactors has only ever been a marginal business; the commercial enrichment industry producing LEU for power reactors has been unaffected by the RERTR program and enrichment technology could spread with further proliferation risks (the same applies to reprocessing and plutonium).

– it remains possible that countries with a covert military agenda will partly or entirely justify their pursuit of enrichment technology with reference to LEU fuelled reactors.

HEU TARGETS

In addition to conversion from HEU to LEU fuels, efforts have been made to eliminate the use of HEU targets for isotope production. Here the issue of greatest concern is the use of HEU targets to produce targets to produce fission-product radioisotopes – in particular molybdenum-99, which decays to form technetium-99m, the most commonly used isotope for diagnostic nuclear medicine.

About six countries use HEU targets for isotope production, employing a total of approximately 50 kilograms of HEU targets annually, typically enriched to 93% uranium-235. Australia is alone in using LEU targets to produce molybdenum-99 (although it should be noted that significant safety and waste management problems are associated with ANSTO’s molybdenum-99 production and processing operations). Several new molybdenum-99 producers may emerge in the coming years and there is some concern that the use of HEU targets could become more widespread. (Vandegrift et al., 1999.)

Whether existing and new producers will switch to LEU or non-uranium targets depends in part on progress with research into alternative targets, and on economic and political issues. When compared to HEU, LEU targets result in larger waste streams with higher concentration uranium solutions. Some producers are concerned about the cost implications of the increased waste streams. Cost implications may vary significantly between producers depending on the adjustments required.

According to Kuperman (1999), the major producers of molybdenum-99 – Institut National des Radioelements (IRE) in Belgium, MDS Nordion in Canada, and Mallinckrodt in the Netherlands – are responsible for up to 90% of HEU commerce associated with medical isotopes. These three producers have been reluctant to adopt LEU target technology, partly for fear of putting themselves at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis their competitors. Nevertheless, all three producers have shown some willingness to switch to LEU targets in recent years, partly because there is no certainty of ongoing availability of HEU targets from the US or other sources.

According to Kuperman (1999), Belgium’s IRE agreed to irradiate and process prototype LEU targets but without making a firm commitment to convert, while Mallinckrodt also expressed an interest in cooperating with the RERTR. In June 1999, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved the export of 130 kilograms of 93.3% enriched HEU to Canada over a five year period for isotope production. Supply is conditional on demonstrated efforts to develop suitable LEU targets for the Canadian reactors; whether this condition is being taken seriously is a matter of some controversy.

References:

Arkhangelsky, “Twenty years of RERTR in Russia: past, present and future”, Paper Presented at the 23rd International Meeting on RERTR, Las Vegas, Nevada, October 1-6, 2000, <www.td.anl.gov/Programs/RERTR/RERTR.html>.

Matthew Bunn, 2000, “The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material”, Washington, DC and Cambridge, MA: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Managing the Atom Project, <ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/Nextwave> or <www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/nextwave.pdf>.

Matthew Bunn, John Holdren, and Anthony Wier, 2002, “Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action”, <www.nti.org/e_research/securing_nuclear_weapons_and_materials_May2002.pdf>.

J. Kuperman (Nuclear Control Institute), 1999, “A level-playing field for medical isotope production – how to phase out reliance on HEU”, Paper Presented at 22nd International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), Budapest, Hungary, October 7, 1999, <www.nci.org/rertr99.htm>.

Alan J. Kuperman and Paul L. Leventhal, 1998, “HEU core conversion of Russian production reactors: a major threat to the international RERTR regime”, Paper presented at the 21st Annual International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), São Paulo, Brazil, October 19, 1998, <www.nci.org/ak101998.htm>.

Nuclear Control Institute, June 27, 2001, “NCI files petition with NRC to block export of bomb-grade uranium”, <www.nci.org>.

Takats, A. Grigoriev, and I.G. Ritchie, 1993, “Management of spent fuel from power and research reactors: International status and trends”, IAEA Bulletin, No.3, pp.18-22.

Armando Travelli, 2000, “Status and progress of the RERTR program in the year 2000”, Paper Presented at the 23rd International Meeting on RERTR, Las Vegas, Nevada, October 1-6, 2000, <www.td.anl.gov/Programs/RERTR/RERTR.html>.

G.F. Vandegrift et al., 1999, “Converting targets and processes for fission-production molybdenum-99 from high- to low-enriched uranium”, in International Atomic Energy Agency, Technical Document 1065, Production technologies for Molybdenum-99 and Technetium-99m, IAEA: Vienna, pp.25-74.

World Information Service on Energy, 2001, “Germany: FRM-2 reactor to be converted to ‘medium’ enriched uranium”, WISE News Communique, #557, November 2.