Thorium

See also the Friends of the Earth web-page on thorium and WMD proliferation risks.

Summary

The use of thorium-232 as a reactor fuel is sometimes suggested as a long-term energy source, partly because of its relative abundance compared to uranium.

Some experience has been gained with the use of thorium in power and research reactors – but far less experience than has been gained with conventional uranium reactors. The Uranium Information Centre (2004) states that: “Much development work is still required before the thorium fuel cycle can be commercialised, and the effort required seems unlikely while (or where) abundant uranium is available.”

According to the World Nuclear Association (2006): “Problems include the high cost of fuel fabrication due partly to the high radioactivity of U-233 which is always contaminated with traces of U-232; the similar problems in recycling thorium due to highly radioactive Th-228, some weapons proliferation risk of U-233; and the technical problems (not yet satisfactorily solved) in reprocessing. Much development work is still required before the thorium fuel cycle can be commercialised, and the effort required seems unlikely while (or where) abundant uranium is available.”

Thorium fuel cycles are promoted on the grounds that they pose less of a proliferation risk compared to conventional reactors. However, whether there is any significant non-proliferation advantage depends on the design of the various thorium-based systems. No thorium system would negate proliferation risks altogether (Friedman, 1997; Feiveson, 2001).

Neutron bombardment of thorium (indirectly) produces uranium-233, a fissile material which can be used in nuclear weapons (1 Significant Quantity of U-233 = 8kg).

The USA has successfully tested weapons using uranium-233 cores, and India may have investigated the military use of thorium/uranium-233 in addition to its civil applications.

The proliferation risk is exacerbated with existing and proposed configurations involving uranium-233 separation from irradiated fuel. As the World Nuclear Association (2006) notes: “Given a start with some other fissile material (U-235 or Pu-239), a breeding cycle similar to but more efficient than that with U-238 and plutonium (in slow-neutron reactors) can be set up. The Th-232 absorbs a neutron to become Th-233 which normally decays to protactinium-233 and then U-233. The irradiated fuel can then be unloaded from the reactor, the U-233 separated from the thorium, and fed back into another reactor as part of a closed fuel cycle.”

(A research reactor in India operates on U-233 fuel extracted from thorium which has been irradiated and bred in another reactor.)

The possible use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium to initiate a thorium-232/uranium-233 reaction, or proposed systems using thorium in conjunction with HEU or plutonium as fuel present the risk of diversion of HEU or plutonium for weapons production.

Kang and von Hippel (2001) conclude that “the proliferation resistance of thorium fuel cycles depends very much upon how they are implemented”. For example, the co-production of uranium-232 complicates weapons production but, as Kang and von Hippel note, “just as it is possible to produce weapon-grade plutonium in low-burnup fuel, it is also practical to use heavy-water reactors to produce U-233 containing only a few ppm of U-232 if the thorium is segregated in “target” channels and discharged a few times more frequently than the natural-uranium “driver” fuel.”

One proposed system is an Accelerator Driven Systems (ADS) in which an accelerator produces a proton beam which is targeted at target nuclei (e.g. lead, bismuth) to produce neutrons. The neutrons can be directed to a subcritical reactor containing thorium. ADS systems could reduce but not negate the proliferation risks.

References:

Feiveson, Harold, 2001, “The Search for Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power”, The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, September/October 2001, Volume 54, Number 5, www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n5/nuclear.htm

Friedman, John S., 1997, “More power to thorium?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No.5, September/October

Kang, Jungmin, and Frank N. von Hippel, 2001, “U-232 and the Proliferation-Resistance of U-233 in Spent Fuel”, Science & Global Security, Volume 9, pp 1-32, www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/pdf/9_1kang.pdf

Uranium Information Centre, 2004, “Thorium”, Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper # 67.

World Nuclear Association, 2006, “Thorium”, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/thorium.aspx

Thorium ‒ a better fuel for nuclear technology?

Dr. Rainer Moormann, ‘Thorium ‒ a better fuel for nuclear technology?’, Nuclear Monitor #858, 1 March 2018.

Dr. Moormann’s article is online at the Nuclear Monitor website.

Thor-bores and uro-sceptics: thorium’s friendly fire

Jim Green, 9 April 2015, ‘Thor-bores and uro-sceptics: thorium’s friendly fire’, Nuclear Monitor #801, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/801/thor-bores-and-uro-sceptics-thoriums-friendly-fire

Many Nuclear Monitor readers will be familiar with the tiresome rhetoric of thorium enthusiasts − let’s call them thor-bores. Their arguments have little merit but they refuse to go away.

Here’s a thor-bore in full flight − a science journalist who should know better:

“Thorium is a superior nuclear fuel to uranium in almost every conceivable way … If there is such a thing as green nuclear power, thorium is it. … For one, a thorium-powered nuclear reactor can never undergo a meltdown. It just can’t. … Thorium is also thoroughly useless for making nuclear weapons. … But wait, there’s more. Thorium doesn’t only produce less waste, it can be used to consume existing waste.”1

Thankfully, there is a healthy degree of scepticism about thorium, even among nuclear industry insiders, experts and enthusiasts (other than the thor-bores themselves, of course). Some of that ‘friendly fire’ is noted here.

Readiness

The World Nuclear Association (WNA) notes that the commercialization of thorium fuels faces some “significant hurdles in terms of building an economic case to undertake the necessary development work.” The WNA states:

“A great deal of testing, analysis and licensing and qualification work is required before any thorium fuel can enter into service. This is expensive and will not eventuate without a clear business case and government support. Also, uranium is abundant and cheap and forms only a small part of the cost of nuclear electricity generation, so there are no real incentives for investment in a new fuel type that may save uranium resources.

“Other impediments to the development of thorium fuel cycle are the higher cost of fuel fabrication and the cost of reprocessing to provide the fissile plutonium driver material. The high cost of fuel fabrication (for solid fuel) is due partly to the high level of radioactivity that builds up in U-233 chemically separated from the irradiated thorium fuel. Separated U-233 is always contaminated with traces of U-232 which decays (with a 69-year half-life) to daughter nuclides such as thallium-208 that are high-energy gamma emitters. Although this confers proliferation resistance to the fuel cycle by making U-233 hard to handle and easy to detect, it results in increased costs. There are similar problems in recycling thorium itself due to highly radioactive Th-228 (an alpha emitter with two-year half life) present.”2

A 2012 report by the UK National Nuclear Laboratory states:

“NNL has assessed the Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) of the thorium fuel cycle. For all of the system options more work is needed at the fundamental level to establish the basic knowledge and understanding. Thorium reprocessing and waste management are poorly understood. The thorium fuel cycle cannot be considered to be mature in any area.”3

Fiona Rayment from the UK National Nuclear Laboratory states:

“It is conceivable that thorium could be introduced in current generation reactors within about 15 years, if there was a clear economic benefit to utilities. This would be a once-through fuel cycle that would partly realise the strategic benefits of thorium.

“To obtain the full strategic benefit of the thorium fuel cycle would require recycle, for which the technological development timescale is longer, probably 25 to 30 years.

“To develop radical new reactor designs, specifically designed around thorium, would take at least 30 years. It will therefore be some time before the thorium fuel cycle can realistically be expected to make a significant contribution to emissions reductions targets.”4

Thorium is no ‘silver bullet’

Do thorium reactors potentially offer significant advantages compared to conventional uranium reactors?

Nuclear physicist Prof. George Dracoulis states: “Some of the rhetoric associated with thorium gives the impression that thorium is, somehow, magical. In reality it isn’t.”5

The UK National Nuclear Laboratory report argues that thorium has “theoretical advantages regarding sustainability, reducing radiotoxicity and reducing proliferation risk” but that “while there is some justification for these benefits, they are often over stated.” The report further states that the purported benefits “have yet to be demonstrated or substantiated, particularly in a commercial or regulatory environment.”3

The UK National Nuclear Laboratory report is sceptical about safety claims:

“Thorium fuelled reactors have already been advocated as being inherently safer than LWRs [light water reactors], but the basis of these claims is not sufficiently substantiated and will not be for many years, if at all.”3

False distinction

Thor-bores posit a sharp distinction between thorium and uranium. But there is little to distinguish the two. A much more important distinction is between conventional reactor technology and some ‘Generation IV’ concepts − in particular, those based on repeated (or continuous) fuel recycling and the ‘breeding’ of fissile isotopes from fertile isotopes (Th-232>U-233 or U-238>Pu-239).

A report by the Idaho National Laboratory states:

“For fuel type, either uranium-based or thorium-based, it is only in the case of continuous recycle where these two fuel types exhibit different characteristics, and it is important to emphasize that this difference only exists for a fissile breeder strategy. The comparison between the thorium/U-233 and uranium/Pu-239 option shows that the thorium option would have lower, but probably not significantly lower, TRU [transuranic waste] inventory and disposal requirements, both having essentially equivalent proliferation risks.

“For these reasons, the choice between uranium-based fuel and thorium-based fuels is seen basically as one of preference, with no fundamental difference in addressing the nuclear power issues.

“Since no infrastructure currently exists in the U.S. for thorium-based fuels, and processing of thorium-based fuels is at a lower level of technical maturity when compared to processing of uranium-based fuels, costs and RD&D requirements for using thorium are anticipated to be higher.”7

George Dracoulis takes issue with the “particularly silly claim” by a science journalist (and many others) that almost all the thorium is usable as fuel compared to just 0.7% of uranium (i.e. uranium-235), and that thorium can therefore power civilization for millennia. Dracoulis states:

“In fact, in that sense, none of the thorium is usable since it is not fissile. The comparison should be with the analogous fertile isotope uranium-238, which makes up nearly 100% of natural uranium. If you wanted to go that way (breeding that is), there is already enough uranium-238 to ‘power civilization for millennia’.”5

Some Generation IV concepts promise major advantages, such as the potential to use long-lived nuclear waste and weapons-usable material (esp. plutonium) as reactor fuel. On the other hand, Generation IV concepts are generally those that face the greatest technical challenges and are the furthest away from commercial deployment; and they will gobble up a great deal of R&D funding before they gobble up any waste or weapons material.

Moreover, uranium/plutonium fast reactor technology might more accurately be described as failed Generation I technology. The first reactor to produce electricity − the EBR-I fast reactor in the US, a.k.a. Zinn’s Infernal Pile − suffered a partial fuel meltdown in 1955. The subsequent history of fast reactors has largely been one of extremely expensive, underperforming and accident-prone reactors which have contributed far more to WMD proliferation problems than to the resolution of those problems.

Most importantly, whether Generation IV concepts deliver on their potential depends on a myriad of factors − not just the resolution of technical challenges. India’s fast reactor / thorium program illustrates how badly things can go wrong, and it illustrates problems that can’t be solved with technical innovation. John Carlson, a nuclear advocate and former Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, writes:

“India has a plan to produce [weapons-grade] plutonium in fast breeder reactors for use as driver fuel in thorium reactors. This is problematic on non-proliferation and nuclear security grounds. Pakistan believes the real purpose of the fast breeder program is to produce plutonium for weapons (so this plan raises tensions between the two countries); and transport and use of weapons-grade plutonium in civil reactors presents a serious terrorism risk (weapons-grade material would be a priority target for seizure by terrorists).”8

Generation IV thorium concepts such as molten salt reactors (MSR) have a lengthy, uncertain R&D road ahead of them − notwithstanding the fact that there is some previous R&D to build upon.4,9

Kirk Sorensen, founder of a US firm which aims to build a demonstration ‘liquid fluoride thorium reactor’ (a type of MSR), notes that “several technical hurdles” confront thorium-fuelled MSRs, including materials corrosion, reactor control and in-line processing of the fuel.4

George Dracoulis writes:

“MSRs are not currently available at an industrial scale, but test reactors with different configurations have operated for extended periods in the past. But there are a number of technical challenges that have been encountered along the way. One such challenge is that the hot beryllium and lithium “salts” – in which the fuel and heavy wastes are dissolved – are highly reactive and corrosive. Building a large-scale system that can operate reliably for decades is non-trivial. That said, many of the components have been the subject of extensive research programs.”10

Weapons proliferation

Claims that thorium reactors would be proliferation-resistant or proliferation-proof do not stand up to scrutiny.11 Irradiation of thorium-232 produces uranium-233, which can be and has been used in nuclear weapons.

The World Nuclear Association states:

“The USA produced about 2 tonnes of U-233 from thorium during the ‘Cold War’, at various levels of chemical and isotopic purity, in plutonium production reactors. It is possible to use U-233 in a nuclear weapon, and in 1955 the USA detonated a device with a plutonium-U-233 composite pit, in Operation Teapot. The explosive yield was less than anticipated, at 22 kilotons. In 1998 India detonated a very small device based on U-233 called Shakti V.”2

According to Assoc. Prof. Nigel Marks, both the US and the USSR tested uranium-233 bombs in 1955.6

Uranium-233 is contaminated with uranium-232 but there are ways around that problem. Kang and von Hippel note:

“[J]ust as it is possible to produce weapon-grade plutonium in low-burnup fuel, it is also practical to use heavy-water reactors to produce U-233 containing only a few ppm of U-232 if the thorium is segregated in “target” channels and discharged a few times more frequently than the natural-uranium “driver” fuel.”12

John Carlson discusses the proliferation risks associated with thorium:

“The thorium fuel cycle has similarities to the fast neutron fuel cycle – it depends on breeding fissile material (U-233) in the reactor, and reprocessing to recover this fissile material for recycle. …

“Proponents argue that the thorium fuel cycle is proliferation resistant because it does not produce plutonium. Proponents claim that it is not practicable to use U-233 for nuclear weapons.

“There is no doubt that use of U-233 for nuclear weapons would present significant technical difficulties, due to the high gamma radiation and heat output arising from decay of U-232 which is unavoidably produced with U-233. Heat levels would become excessive within a few weeks, degrading the high explosive and electronic components of a weapon and making use of U‑233 impracticable for stockpiled weapons. However, it would be possible to develop strategies to deal with these drawbacks, e.g. designing weapons where the fissile “pit” (the core of the nuclear weapon) is not inserted until required, and where ongoing production and treatment of U-233 allows for pits to be continually replaced. This might not be practical for a large arsenal, but could certainly be done on a small scale.

“In addition, there are other considerations. A thorium reactor requires initial core fuel – LEU or plutonium – until it reaches the point where it is producing sufficient U-233 for self-sustainability, so the cycle is not entirely free of issues applying to the uranium fuel cycle (i.e. requirement for enrichment or reprocessing). Further, while the thorium cycle can be self-sustaining on produced U‑233, it is much more efficient if the U-233 is supplemented by additional “driver” fuel, such as LEU or plutonium. For example, India, which has spent some decades developing a comprehensive thorium fuel cycle concept, is proposing production of weapons grade plutonium in fast breeder reactors specifically for use as driver fuel for thorium reactors. This approach has obvious problems in terms of proliferation and terrorism risks.

“A concept for a liquid fuel thorium reactor is under consideration (in which the thorium/uranium fuel would be dissolved in molten fluoride salts), which would avoid the need for reprocessing to separate U-233. If it proceeds, this concept would have non-proliferation advantages.

“Finally, it cannot be excluded that a thorium reactor – as in the case of other reactors – could be used for plutonium production through irradiation of uranium targets.

“Arguments that the thorium fuel cycle is inherently proliferation resistant are overstated. In some circumstances the thorium cycle could involve significant proliferation risks.”13

Sometimes thor-bores posit conspiracy theories. Former International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Hans Blix said “it is almost impossible to make a bomb out of thorium” and thorium is being held back by the “vested interests” of the uranium-based nuclear industry.14

But Julian Kelly from Thor Energy, a Norwegian company developing and testing thorium-plutonium fuels for use in commercial light water reactors, states:

“Conspiracy theories about funding denials for thorium work are for the entertainment sector. A greater risk is that there will be a classic R&D bubble [that] divides R&D effort and investment into fragmented camps and feifdoms.”4

Thor-bores and uro-sceptics

Might the considered opinions of nuclear insiders, experts and enthusiasts help to shut the thor-bores up? Perhaps not − critics are dismissed with claims that they have ideological or financial connections to the vested interests of the uranium-based nuclear industry, or they are dismissed with claims that they are ideologically opposed to all things nuclear. But we live in hope.

Thor-bores do serve one useful purpose − they sometimes serve up pointed criticisms of the uranium fuel cycle. In other words, some thor-bores are uro-sceptics. For example, thorium enthusiast and former Shell executive John Hofmeister states:

“The days of nuclear power based upon uranium-based fission are coming to a close because the fear of nuclear proliferation, the reality of nuclear waste and the difficulty of managing it have proven too difficult over time.”15

References:

1. Tim Dean, 16 March 2011, ‘The greener nuclear alternative’, www.abc.net.au/unleashed/45178.html

2. www.world-nuclear.org/info/Current-and-Future-Generation/Thorium/

3. UK National Nuclear Laboratory Ltd., 5 March 2012, ‘Comparison of thorium and uranium fuel cycles’, www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/meeting-energy-demand/nuclear/6300-comparison-fuel-cycles.pdf

4. Stephen Harris, 9 Jan 2014, ‘Your questions answered: thorium-powered nuclear’, www.theengineer.co.uk/energy-and-environment/in-depth/your-questions-answered-thorium-powered-nuclear/1017776.article

5. George Dracoulis, 5 Aug 2011, ‘Thorium is no silver bullet when it comes to nuclear energy, but it could play a role’, http://theconversation.com/thorium-is-no-silver-bullet-when-it-comes-to-nuclear-energy-but-it-could-play-a-role-1842

6. Nigel Marks, 2 March 2015, ‘Should Australia consider thorium nuclear power?’, http://theconversation.com/should-australia-consider-thorium-nuclear-power-37850

7. Idaho National Laboratory, Sept 2009, ‘AFCI Options Study’, INL/EXT-10-17639, www.inl.gov/technicalpublications/Documents/4480296.pdf

8. John Carlson, 2014, submission to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=79a1a29e-5691-4299-8923-06e633780d4b&subId=301365

9. Oliver Tickell, August/September 2012, ‘Thorium: Not ‘green’, not ‘viable’, and not likely’, www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/nuclearnews/NuClearNewsNo43.pdf

10. George Dracoulis, 19 Dec 2011, ‘Thoughts from a thorium ‘symposium”, http://theconversation.com/thoughts-from-a-thorium-symposium-4545

11. www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/nfc/power-weapons/thorium

12. Jungmin Kang and Frank N. von Hippel, 2001, “U-232 and the Proliferation-Resistance of U-233 in Spent Fuel”, Science & Global Security, Volume 9, pp.1-32, www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/sgs/pdf/9_1kang.pdf

13. John Carlson, 2009, ‘Introduction to the Concept of Proliferation Resistance’, www.foe.org.au/sites/default/files/Carlson%20ASNO%20ICNND%20Prolif%20Resistance.doc

14. Herman Trabish, 10 Dec 2013, ‘Thorium Reactors: Nuclear Redemption or Nuclear Hazard?’, http://theenergycollective.com/hermantrabish/314771/thorium-reactors-nuclear-redemption-or-nuclear-hazard

15. Pia Akerman, 7 Oct 2013, ‘Ex-Shell boss issues nuclear call’, The Australian, www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/ex-shell-boss-issues-nuclear-call/story-e6frg6xf-1226733858032

A thought for thorium

Nuclear Engineering International, 03 November 2009

www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?sectionCode=76&storyCode=2054564

The question of thorium fuel comes up every so often, says [Albert Machiels, senior technical executive at the USA’s Electric Power Research Institute]. “I really cannot claim that there is a great interest in thorium fuel – it is more a matter of curiosity. …

Experts disagree about whether thorium fuel is more proliferation-resistant than uranium. …

Many in the industry remain sceptical with regard to thorium. Now that uranium infrastructure is in place, developing a thorium fuel cycle is a  ‘big risk,’ ‘unnecessary’ and a ‘distraction,’ according to some in the industry.

I put the question to Thorium Power; if thorium fuel is so good why aren’t we using it? Their response:

“Essentially the answer is because the nuclear industry started using UO2 on a large scale first and they’ve had 50 years to improve it and become comfortable with it. Due to a highly conservative nature of nuclear utilities (‘why change something that works just fine’), there has been little incentive for a commercial utility to switch from UO2 fuels even though ThO2-based fuels have many advantages.”

For this reason, if thorium fuel is going to take off it will need to be introduced in light water reactors first, notwithstanding the interesting reactor concepts currently being developed that use thorium. In accelerator-driven systems, or ADS, a particle accelerator knocks neutrons off a heavy element such as mercury, and those neutrons cause thorium to breed fissile uranium- 233. In molten salt reactors, thorium dissolved in a 650°C fluoride salt coolant breeds uranium-233, which undergoes fission.

“ADS and breeder reactors, such as molten-salt reactors, are so far in the future that if thorium has to wait for one of those developments it’s not going to happen. The point of entry must be the existing infrastructure, at least for the United States,” Machiels says.

Comparison of thorium and uranium fuel cycles

UK National Nuclear Laboratory Ltd.

A report prepared for and on behalf of Department of Energy and Climate Change

Issue 5, 5 Mar 2012

http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/meeting-energy-demand/nuclear/6300-comparison-fuel-cycles.pdf

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The UK National Nuclear Laboratory has been contracted by the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to review and assess the relevance to the UK of the advanced reactor systems currently being developed internationally. Part of the task specification relates to comparison of the thorium and uranium fuel cycles. Worldwide, there has for a long time been a sustained interest in the thorium fuel cycle and presently there are several major research initiatives which are either focused specifically on the thorium fuel cycle or on systems which use thorium as the fertile seed instead of U-238. Currently in the UK, the thorium fuel cycle is not an option that is being pursued commercially and it is important for DECC to understand why this is the case and whether there is a valid argument for adopting a different position in the future.

NNL has recently published a position paper on thorium [1] which attempts to take a balanced view of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the thorium fuel cycle. Thorium has theoretical advantages regarding sustainability, reducing radiotoxicity and reducing proliferation risk. NNL’s position paper finds that while there is some justification for these benefits, they are often over stated.

The value of using thorium fuel for plutonium disposition would need to be assessed against high level issues concerning the importance of maintaining high standards of safety, security and protection against proliferation, as well as meeting other essential strategic goals related to maintaining flexibility in the fuel cycle, optimising waste arisings and economic competitiveness. It is important that the UK should be very clear as to what the overall objectives should be and the timescales for achieving these objectives.

Overall, the conclusion is reached that the thorium fuel cycle at best has only limited relevance to the UK as a possible alternative plutonium disposition strategy and as a possible strategic option in the very long term for any follow-up reactor construction programme after LWR new build. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that world-wide there remains interest in thorium fuel cycles and as this is not likely to diminish in the near future. It may therefore be judicious for the UK to maintain a low level of engagement in thorium fuel cycle R&D by involvement in international collaborative research activities. This will enable the UK to keep up with developments, comment from a position of knowledge and to some extent influence the direction of research. Participation will also ensure that the UK is more ready to respond if changes in technology or market forces bring the thorium fuel cycle more to the fore.

Important French and US government reports pouring cold water on Gen 4 propaganda

US Government Accountability Office pours cold water on advanced reactor concepts

Nuclear Monitor #810, 9 Sept 2015, ‘US Government Accountability Office pours cold water on advanced reactor concepts’, https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/810/us-government-accountability-office-pours-cold-water-advanced-reactor-concepts

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has released a report on the status of small modular reactors (SMRs) and other new reactor concepts in the US.

Let’s begin with the downbeat conclusion of the GAO report:

“While light water SMRs and advanced reactors may provide some benefits, their development and deployment face a number of challenges. Both SMRs and advanced reactors require additional technical and engineering work to demonstrate reactor safety and economics, although light water SMRs generally face fewer technical challenges than advanced reactors because of their similarities to the existing large LWR [light water] reactors. Depending on how they are resolved, these technical challenges may result in higher-cost reactors than anticipated, making them less competitive with large LWRs or power plants using other fuels. …

“Both light water SMRs and advanced reactors face additional challenges related to the time, cost, and uncertainty associated with developing, certifying or licensing, and deploying new reactor technology, with advanced reactor designs generally facing greater challenges than light water SMR designs. It is a multi-decade process, with costs up to $1 billion to $2 billion, to design and certify or license the reactor design, and there is an additional construction cost of several billion dollars more per power plant.

“Furthermore, the licensing process can have uncertainties associated with it, particularly for advanced reactor designs. A reactor designer would need to obtain investors or otherwise commit to this development cost years in advance of when the reactor design would be certified or available for licensing and construction, making demand (and customers) for the reactor uncertain. For example, the price of competing power production facilities may make a nuclear plant unattractive without favorable rates set by a public authority or long term prior purchase agreements, and accidents such as Fukushima as well as the ongoing need for a long-term solution for spent nuclear fuel may affect the public perception of reactor safety. These challenges will need to be addressed if the capabilities and diversification of energy sources that light water SMRs and advanced reactors can provide are to be realized.”

Many of the same reasons explain the failure of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project. Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the US Department of Energy (DoE) was to deploy a prototype ‘next generation’ reactor using advanced technology to generate electricity, produce hydrogen, or both, by the end of fiscal year 2021. However, in 2011, DoE decided not to proceed with the deployment phase of the project.

Small modular reactors

Four companies have considered developing SMRs in the US in recent years. NuScale has a cost-sharing agreement such that the DoE will pay as much as half of NuScale’s costs − up to $217 million (€194m) over five years − for SMR design certification. NuScale expects to submit a design certification application to NRC in late 2016, and may begin operating its first SMR in 2023 or 2024. (However the timeframe is unrealistic, and the project may be abandoned − as other SMR projects have.)

The other three companies are a long way behind NuScale:

  • mPower, a subsidiary of Babcock & Wilcox, enjoyed a cost-sharing agreement with the DoE but in 2014 scaled back its R&D efforts because of a lack of committed customers and a lack of investors.
  • Holtec says it is continuing R&D work, but does not have a detailed schedule.
  • In 2014 Westinghouse suspended its efforts to certify its SMR design, because of a lack of committed customers (and the lack of a DoE cost-sharing agreement).

The GAO report states that the development of light water SMRs may proceed without serious difficulties as they are based on existing light water reactor technology. That said, standardization is a key pillar of SMR rhetoric, and members of an expert group convened by the GAO noted that component standardization has proven challenging for the construction of the larger Westinghouse AP1000 that has some modular components.

Another pillar of SMR rhetoric is mass production (to make them economic), and the development of a massive construction chain to allow for mass production is a radically different proposition to NuScale’s plan to build just one reactor over the next decade.

Not-so-advanced reactor concepts

According to the GAO report, SMRs and new reactor concepts “face some common challenges such as long time frames and high costs associated with the shift from development to deployment − that is, in the construction of the first commercial reactors of a particular type.”

The report notes the US government’s generous financial support for utilities developing SMRs and advanced reactor concepts − DoE provided US$152.5 million (€137m) in fiscal year 2015 alone. Advanced reactor concepts attracting DoE largesse are the high temperature gas cooled reactor, the sodium cooled fast reactor, and to a lesser extent the molten salt reactor (specifically, a sub-type known as the fluoride salt cooled high temperature reactor).

DoE and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officials do not expect applications for advanced reactors for at least five years. In other words, an application may (or may not) be submitted some time between five years and five centuries from now.

Advanced reactor designers told the GAO that they have been challenged to find investors due to the lengthy timeframe, costs, and uncertainty. Advanced reactor concepts face greater technical challenges than light water SMRs because of fundamental design differences. Thus designers have significantly more R&D issues to resolve, including in areas such as materials studies and fuel certification, coolant chemistry studies, and safety analysis. Some members of the expert group convened by the GAO noted a potential need for new test facilities to support this work. Furthermore, according to reactor designers, certifying or licensing an advanced reactor may be particularly time-consuming and difficult, adding to the already considerable economic uncertainty for the applicants.

The process of developing and certifying a specific reactor design can take 10 years or more for design work and nearly 3.5 years, as a best case, for NRC certification. Even that timeframe is more hope than expectation. Recent light water reactor design certifications, for the Westinghouse AP1000 and the GE Hitachi ESBWR, have taken about 15 and 11 years respectively. Both the AP1000 and ESBWR are modifications of long-established reactor types, so considerably longer timeframes can be expected for advanced concepts.

The cost to develop and certify a design can range from US$1−2 billion (€0.9−1.8b). Developers hope that costs can be reduced as they move from certification to the construction of a first-of-a-kind plant to the construction of multiple plants. But the GAO report notes that those hopes may be unfounded:

“[S]ome studies suggest that existing, large LWRs have not greatly benefitted from industry-wide standardization or learning to date for reasons including intermittent development and production. In fact, some studies have found that “reverse or negative learning” occurs when increased complexity or operation experience leads to newer safety standards. On a related point, another reactor designer said that the cost and schedule difficulties associated with building the first new design that has been certified by the NRC and started construction in the United States in three decades − the Westinghouse AP1000, a recently designed large LWR − have made it harder for light water SMRs to obtain financing because high-profile problems have made nuclear reactors in general less attractive. … The AP1000 was the first new design that has been certified by the NRC and started construction in the United States in three decades. However, construction problems, including supply chain and regulatory issues, have resulted in cost and schedule increases.”

US Government Accountability Office, July 2015, ‘Nuclear Reactors: Status and challenges in development and deployment of new commercial concepts’, GAO-15-652, www.gao.gov/assets/680/671686.pdf

(Written by Nuclear Monitor editor Jim Green.)


French government agency sceptical about Gen IV reactors

Nuclear Monitor #803, 7 May 2015, ‘French government agency sceptical about Gen IV reactors’, https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/803/french-government-agency-sceptical-about-gen-iv-reactors

The French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) has produced an important critique of Generation IV nuclear power concepts.1 IRSN is a government authority with 1,790 staff under the joint authority of the Ministries of Defense, the Environment, Industry, Research, and Health.

There are numerous critical analyses of Generation IV concepts by independent experts2, but the IRSN critique is the first from the government of a country with an extensive nuclear industry.

The IRSN report focuses on the six Generation IV concepts prioritised by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF), which brings together 12 countries with an interest in new reactor types, plus Euratom. France is itself one of the countries involved in the GIF.

The six concepts prioritised by the GIF are:

  • Sodium cooled Fast Reactors (SFR);
  • Very High Temperature Reactors, with thermal neutron spectrum (VHTR);
  • Gas-cooled Fast Reactors (GFR);
  • Lead-cooled Fast Reactors (LFR) or Lead-Bismuth (LB) cooled Fast Reactors;
  • Molten Salt Reactors (MSR), with fast or thermal neutron spectrum; and
  • SuperCritical Water Reactors (SCWR), with fast or thermal neutron spectrum.

The report states: “There is still much R&D to be done to develop the Generation IV nuclear reactors, as well as for the fuel cycle and the associated waste management which depends on the system chosen.”

IRSN considers the SFR system to be the only one to have reached a degree of maturity compatible with the construction of a reactor prototype during the first half of this century − and even the development of an SFR prototype would require further preliminary studies and technological developments.

Only SFR and VHTR systems can boast operating experience. IRSN states: “No operating experience feedback from the other four systems studied can be put to direct use. The technological difficulties involved rule out any industrial deployment of these systems within the time frame considered [mid century].”

The report says that for LFR and GFR systems, small prototypes might be built by mid-century. For MSR and SCWR systems, there “is no likelihood of even an experimental or prototype MSR or SCWR being built during the first half of this century” and “it seems hard to imagine any reactor being built before the end of the century”.

IRSN notes that it is difficult to thoroughly evaluate safety and radiation protection standards of Generation IV systems as some concepts have already been partially tried and tested, while others are still in the early stages of development.

IRSN is sceptical about safety claims: “At the present stage of development, IRSN does not notice evidence that leads to conclude that the systems under review are likely to offer a significantly improved level of safety compared with Generation III reactors, except perhaps for the VHTR …” Moreover the VHTR system could bring about significant safety improvements “but only by significantly limiting unit power”.

The report notes that the safety of fast reactors can be problematic because of high operating temperatures and the toxicity and corrosive nature of most coolants considered. It says that issues arising from the Fukushima disaster require detailed examination, such as: choice of coolant; operating temperatures and power densities (which are generally higher for Generation IV concepts); and in some cases, fuel reprocessing facilities that present the risk of toxic releases.

The report is unenthusiastic about research into transmutation of minor actinides (long-lived waste products in spent fuel), saying that “this option offers only a very slight advantage in terms of inventory reduction and geological waste repository volume when set against the induced safety and radiation protection constraints for fuel cycle facilities, reactors and transport.” It notes that ASN, the French nuclear safety authority, has recently announced that minor actinide transmutation would not be a deciding factor in the choice of a future reactor system.

The reports findings on the six GIF concepts are briefly summarised here:

Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFR)

The main safety advantage is the use of low-pressure liquid coolant. The normal operating temperature of this coolant is significantly lower than its boiling point, allowing a grace period of several hours during loss-of-cooling events. The advantage gained from the high boiling point of sodium, however, must be weighed against the fact that the structural integrity of the reactor cannot be guaranteed near this temperature.

The use of sodium also comes with a number of drawbacks due to its high reactivity not only with water and air, but also with MOX fuel.

It seems possible for SFR technology to reach a safety level at least equivalent to that of Generation III pressurised water reactors, but IRSN is unable to determine whether it could significantly exceed this level, in view of design differences and the current state of knowledge and research.

Very High Temperature Reactors (VHTR)
The VHTR benefits from the operating experience feedback obtained from High Temperature Reactors (HTR).
This technology is intrinsically safe with respect to loss of cooling, which means that it could be used to design a reactor that does not require an active decay heat removal system. The VHTR system could therefore bring about significant safety improvements compared with Generation III reactors, especially regarding core melt prevention.

VHTR safety performance can only be guaranteed by significantly limiting unit power.

The feasibility of the system has yet to be determined and will chiefly depend on the development of fuels and materials capable of withstanding high temperatures; the currently considered operating temperature of around 1000°C is close to the transformation temperature of materials commonly used in the nuclear industry.

Lead-cooled Fast Reactors (LFR)

Unlike sodium, lead does not react violently with water or air.

The thermal inertia associated with the large volume of lead used and its very high density results in long grace periods in the event of loss of cooling.

In addition, the high boiling point at atmospheric pressure is a guarantee of high margins under normal operating conditions and rules out the risk of coolant boiling.

The main drawback of lead-cooled (or lead-bismuth cooled) reactors is that the coolant tends to corrode and erode stainless steel structures.

LFR safety is reliant on operating procedures, which does not seem desirable in a Generation IV reactor.

The highly toxic nature of lead and its related products, especially polonium-210, produced when lead-bismuth is used, raises the problem of potential environmental impact.
IRSN is unable to determine whether the LFR system could guarantee a significantly higher safety level than Generation III reactors.

Various technical hurdles need to be overcome before a reactor of this type could be considered.

Gas-cooled Fast Reactors (GFR)

Given the current state of GFR development, construction of an industrial prototype reactor would not be technically feasible. GFR specifications are highly ambitious and raise a number of technological problems that are still a long way from being solved.

From the safety point of view, the GFR does not display any intrinsic quality likely to lead to a significant improvement over Generation III reactors.

Molten Salt Reactors (MSR)

The MSR differs considerably from the other systems proposed by the GIF. The main differences are that the coolant and fuel are mixed in some models and that liquid fuel is used.

The MSR has several advantages, including its burning, breeding and actinide-recycling capabilities.

Its intrinsic neutron properties could be put to good use as, in theory, they should allow highly stable reactor operation. The very low thermal inertia of salt and very high operating temperatures of the system, however, call for the use of fuel salt drainage devices. System safety depends mainly on the reliability and performance of these devices.

Salt has some drawbacks − it is corrosive and has a relatively high crystallisation temperature.

The reactor must also be coupled to a salt processing unit and the system safety analysis must take into account the coupling of the two facilities.

Consideration must be given to the high toxicity of some salts and substances generated by the processes used in the salt processing unit.

The feasibility of fuel salt processing remains to be demonstrated.

SuperCritical-Water-cooled Reactors (SCWR)

The SCWR is the only system selected by GIF that uses water as a coolant. The SCWR is seen as a further development of existing water reactors and thus benefits from operating experience feedback, especially from boiling water reactors. Its chief advantage is economic.

While the use of supercritical water avoids problems relating to the phase change from liquid to vapour, it does not present any intrinsic advantage in terms of safety.

Thermal inertia is very low, for example, when the reactor is shut down.

The use of supercritical water in a nuclear reactor raises many questions, in particular its behaviour under neutron flux.

At the current stage of development, it is impossible to ascertain whether the system will eventually become significantly safer than Generation III reactors.

References:

1. IRSN, 2015, ‘Review of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems’, www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Pages/20150427_Generation-IV-nuclear-energy-systems-safety-potential-overview.aspx

Direct download: www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Documents/IRSN_Report-GenIV_04-2015.pdf

2. See for example: International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010, ‘Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status’, www.ipfmlibrary.org/rr08.pdf

Helmut Hirsch, Oda Becker, Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, April 2005, ‘Nuclear Reactor Hazards: Ongoing Dangers of Operating Nuclear Technology in the 21st Century’, www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/nuclearreactorhazards

OECD: Generation IV R&D “a growing challenge”

Nuclear Monitor #860, 10 May 2018, ‘Generation IV R&D “a growing challenge”‘, https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/860/nuclear-news-nuclear-monitor-860-10-may-2018

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency noted in its March 2018 monthly bulletin that “maintaining existing facilities operational is a growing challenge” for members of the Generation IV International Forum (GIF).1

The Nuclear Energy Agency was reporting on a February meeting of the Forum’s new task force, established to identify R&D facilities needed for the development of Generation IV systems. Presentations were made by the representatives of the six systems that GIF member countries are exploring ‒ gas-cooled fast reactors, sodium-cooled fast reactors, lead-cooled fast reactors, molten salt reactors, supercritical water-cooled reactors, and very high temperature reactors ‒ highlighting existing R&D capabilities and also gaps.

Filling those gaps will presumably be difficult if, as the Nuclear Energy Agency states, just maintaining existing facilities operational is a growing challenge.

Industry bodies such as the Nuclear Energy Agency are typically more bullish about Generation IV prospects. However the timelines are repeatedly deferred: Generation IV reactors were 20 years away 20 years ago, they are 20 years away now, and they will likely be 20 years away 20 years from now.

The Generation IV International Forum states: “It will take at least two or three decades before the deployment of commercial Gen IV systems. In the meantime, a number of prototypes will need to be built and operated. The Gen IV concepts currently under investigation are not all on the same timeline and some might not even reach the stage of commercial exploitation.”2

The International Atomic Energy Agency states: “Experts expect that the first Generation IV fast reactor demonstration plants and prototypes will be in operation by 2030 to 2040.”3 A 2015 report by the French government’s Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) states: “There is still much R&D to be done to develop the Generation IV nuclear reactors, as well as for the fuel cycle and the associated waste management which depends on the system chosen.”4

The World Nuclear Association noted in 2009 that “progress is seen as slow, and several potential designs have been undergoing evaluation on paper for many years.”5

1. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, ‘Generation IV research and development’, NEA Monthly News Bulletin – March 2018, www.oecd-nea.org/general/mnb/2018/march.html

2. www.gen-4.org/gif/jcms/c_41890/faq-2

3. Peter Rickwood and Peter Kaiser, 1 March 2013, ‘Fast Reactors Provide Sustainable Nuclear Power for “Thousands of Years”‘, www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2013/fastreactors.html

4. Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, 2015, ‘Review of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems’, www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Pages/20150427_Generation-IV-nuclear-energy-systems-safety-potential-overview.aspx

Direct download: www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Documents/IRSN_Report-GenIV_04-2015.pdf

5. World Nuclear Association, 15 Dec 2009, ‘Fast moves? Not exactly…’, www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_France_puts_into_future_nuclear_1512091.html

Nuclear waste information by David Noonan

Papers and submissions by David Noonan B.Sc., M.Env.St., Independent Environment Campaigner

PROPOSED NATIONAL NUCLEAR WASTE DUMP IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Safety and security questions on ANSTO nuclear waste shipments to a port in SA (Dec. 2018)

Nuclear fuel waste: Extended storage at Lucas Heights or target SA (Nov. 2017)

Proposed national nuclear waste dump in SA – safety and security issues (2-pages-David Noonan, Nov. 2018

Submission to federal government re proposed national nuclear waste dump in SA (David Noonan, Nov. 2018)

David Noonan – Jan 2017 Briefing Paper – Nuclear waste store threatens Flinders Ranges

2015-16 PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A NUCLEAR WASTE IMPORT BUSINESS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Briefing papers written by David Noonan in 2016, responding to the Royal Commission’s final report:

Radioactive Waste and Australia’s Aboriginal People

Jim Green, 2017, ‘Radioactive Waste and Australia’s Aboriginal People’, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp.33-50.

Click here to read as a PDF (and here is a link to the journal webpage).

Abstract: The treatment of Australia’s Aboriginal people by the nuclear industry (broadly defined as private- and public-sector agencies pursuing uranium and nuclear projects) is a poorly researched topic. That is not merely a gap in the academic research on related topics (the history of the nuclear industry in Australia; the history of race relations in Australia; etc.), but it has “real world” consequences. Put simply, the paucity of information about the mistreatment of Aboriginal people makes it easier for nuclear interests to repeat past practices; and conversely, proper documentation and publication of past (and current) practices detrimental to Aboriginal people can make it more difficult for nuclear interests to repeat those practices. Over the past decade Friends of the Earth Australia (FoE) has sought to partially remedy the information deficit in the context of its work with Aboriginal communities involved in debates regarding uranium mining and proposed radioactive waste repositories (the author works for FoE). One thread of that work is the growing body of multimedia work (and a Master’s thesis) by FoE member Jessie Boylan covering the legacy of the atomic bomb tests, uranium mining and waste repository proposals (see <www.jessieboylan.com>). Another thread of the project is detailed written documentation of past and present incidents of mistreatment of Aboriginal people by nuclear interests (as well as multimedia presentations of this material – see, for example, <www.australianmap.net>). This article builds on that research and focuses on attempts to impose radioactive waste repositories on the land of unwilling Aboriginal communities in South Australia.

Paladin Energy’s uranium mines in Africa

Perth-based uranium company Paladin Energy operated uranium mines in Malawi and Namibia. As of June 2018, both mines are in care-and-maintenance.

New report – June 2018: Morgan Somerville and Jim Green, ‘Undermining Africa: Paladin Energy’s Kayelekera Uranium Mine in Malawi’

Who cleans up the mess when an Australian uranium mining company leaves Africa? 18 June 2018, The Ecologist

Paladin Energy’s social and environmental record in Africa, July 2017

Paladin Energy goes bust, appoints administrators, July 2017

WISE Uranium, ‘Paladin Energy Ltd Hall of Infamy’

WISE Uranium, Issues at Operating Uranium Mines and Mills – Malawi


Undermining Africa: New report calls on Australian mining company to clean up its mess in Malawi

Media Release: 19 June 2018

A new report warns that Perth-based Paladin Energy has made insufficient provision for the rehabilitation of its mothballed Kayelekera uranium mine in Malawi. The mine was put into care-and-maintenance in mid-2014 and there is little chance of a restart given the high cost of production and the small uranium resource.

Paladin ‒ once the darling of the stock-market ‒ was put into administration in July 2017. It relisted on the Australian Securities Exchange in February 2018 but just three months later the company’s only other mine ‒ the Langer Heinrich uranium mine in Namibia ‒ was also put into care-and-maintenance. Thus the company has no operating mines.

Paladin has lodged a US$10 million ‘Environmental Performance Bond’ with Malawian banks, and that money can be accessed to rehabilitate Kayelekera. But the cost of rehabilitating the mine-site will be multiples of that figure.

Paladin’s 2017 Annual Report lists a ‘rehabilitation provision’ of $86.93 million to cover both Kayelekera and Langer Heinrich. However the funds might not be available for rehabilitation if Paladin goes bankrupt, and even if the funds are available they are unlikely to be sufficient. In Australia, Energy Resources of Australia’s expects to pay almost 10 times as much to rehabilitate the Ranger uranium mine.

Dr Jim Green, national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia, said: “It stretches credulity to believe that the cost of rehabilitating both of Paladin Energy’s mines in Africa would be an order of magnitude lower than the cost of rehabilitating one single mine in Australia.”

“The Australian and Western Australian governments and Paladin Energy should liaise with the Malawian government and Malawian civil society to ensure that a proper rehabilitation of Kayelekera is undertaken.

“One option that should be considered is to move quickly to rehabilitation as an alternative to Paladin Energy’s current strategy of spending over A$13 million annually to keep Kayelekera in care-and-maintenance. The prospects for a restart of the mine are bleak and available funds would be better spent on rehabilitation.”

2015 Statement from Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners

Help us stop the nuclear waste dump in the Flinders Ranges!

Written on November 27, 2015 at Yappala Station.

Adnyamathanha land in the Flinders Ranges has been short-listed for a national nuclear waste dump. The land was nominated by former Liberal Party Senator Grant Chapman. Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners weren’t consulted. Even Traditional Owners who live next to the proposed dump site at Yappala Station weren’t consulted.

The nomination was made public two weeks ago and even now, the government hasn’t contacted Yappala residents or Villiwarina Aboriginal Corporation. This is an insult.

The proposed dump site is adjacent to the Yappala Indigenous Protected Area.

On the land with the proposed dump site, we have been working for many years registering heritage sites and sites of significance with the SA government. Now Mr Chapman and the federal government are disrespecting our people and our wilyaru (lore).

The whole area is Adnyamathanha land. It is Arngurla Yarta (spiritual land). The proposed dump site has springs. It also has ancient mound springs. It has countless thousands of Aborigial artefects. Our ancestors are buried there.

Hookina creek that runs along the nominated site is a significant women’s site. It is a registered heritage site and must be preserved and protected. We are responsible for this area, the land and animals.

Through this area are registered cultural heritage sites and places of huge importance to our family, our history and as we plan, our future.

It is a very important archeological site for Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners. It is also a significant historical cultural site for non-Aboriginal people.

There are frequent yarta ngurra-ngurrandha (earthquakes and tremors). We see the ground move and the hills move; we feel the land move. At least half a dozen times each year.

It is flood land. The water comes from the hills and floods the plains, including the proposed dump site. Sometimes there are massive floods, the last one on 20 January 2006. The massive floods uproot huge trees − you can come out here now and see all the trees uprooted by the 2006 flood. In 1956 − 50 years earlier, to the day − a massive flood destroyed Cotabena homestead and all the houses in Hookina township. The pub was destroyed by the 1956 flood and is now a pile of rocks.

We don’t want a nuclear waste dump here on our country and worry that if the waste comes here it will harm our environment and muda (our lore, our creation, our everything).

We call on the federal government to withdraw the nomination of the site and to show more respect in future.

We call on Jay Weatherill to support us. This year one of us (Regina McKenzie) was awarded the SA Premier’s Natural Resource Management Award in the category of ‘Aboriginal Leadership − Female’ for her work to protect land that is now being threatened with a nuclear waste dump. But Premier Jay Weatherill has been silent since the announcement of the dump sites. He can either support us or he can support the federal government’s attack on us by maintaining his silence. He can’t sit on the fence.

We ask all Australians for support. We ask you for your support.

Signed by:
Regina McKenzie and Heather Stuart, Yappala residents, on behalf of Villiwarina Aboriginal Corporation.
Enice Marsh on behalf of Arnggumthanhna Camp Law Mob.

Timeline of the 2005-07 Uranium Price Bubble and its Aftermath

February 2013

Jim Green / Friends of the Earth Australia

August 2005 − A release by Yamarna Goldfields said that company had taken an 80% stake in a project on Pacific island country Niue that had “the potential to host uranium mineralisation of equal or greater quantity” than Olympic Dam. The company’s share price rose 22% on the day of the announcement. A director told ABC Radio Australia: “It’s very early days, but it could be up to 10 per cent of the world’s known uranium.” In September, the company was losing interest and in October it announced that “there was insufficient objective evidence to support continuing expenditure on the project.” The Australian Securities and Investments Commission filed charges but later droppedthem.

September 2005 − Far East Capital’s Warwick Grigor said: “Companies are out there scrambling to get hold of anything that’s go uranium attached to it, just because they want a seat at the table. So it’s really all happening in boardrooms and in meetings. Very little is actually happening out in the field at present. … Booms are never totally healthy, because they always have a bust afterwards. I think investors need to really have a look, and there’s a lot of rubbish out there, and they need to keep their heads about them. At the moment there’s a lot of inexperienced players in mining racing in to buy anything that’s got uranium attached to it. And it’s got all the signatures of the crazy buying that we saw in the dot-com boom.”

October 2005 − Tim Treadgold writes in the West Australian: “What’s wrong with this equation? Mum and dad speculators continue to play the uranium game by investing in penny dreadful exploration stocks, while three major shareholders in Australia’s biggest pure uranium producer sell. Fairly obvious, isn’t it? … The sellers, in this case, are Cameco of Canada, Cogema of France, and Japan Australian Uranium Resource Development Company. All three have decided to cash in the chips they hold in the Rio Tinto-controlled Energy Resources of Australia (ERA). … Meanwhile, as experienced uranium players exit the game, mum and dad investors continue to ask naïve question such as “which uranium stocks should I buy?” and “do you think they’ll continue to rise?”. The gullibility is stunning. … This comes back to the point about the smart money, which understands the uranium market heading for the exit, while less clued-up people continue to buy uranium penny dreadfuls rather than do something sensible, like bet the house (the wife and the kids) on the horse carrying the jockey wearing pink polka dots in the fourth at Ascot next Saturday.”

March 2006 − The Australian reports: “Labor has proposed a new worldwide diplomatic group to limit nuclear proliferation, relying on Australia’s influence as the world’s second-biggest uranium supplier. The new diplomatic caucus would be led by Australia and include nuclear suppliers and users to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” No such group was formed and both Labor and the Coalition have abandoned their previous policy of prohibiting uranium exports to countries that refuse to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

March 2006 − The Age reports: “Uranium’s growing status as the boom metal for investors has been confirmed in spectacular fashion with the sharemarket debut of the Oxiana and Minotaur uranium exploration spin-off, Toro Energy. Gasps and hand-clapping — plus much partying later — were the order of the day when first sales were posted for the stock, an event celebrated by a record number of punters and associated parties that rocked up to the Australian Stock Exchange’s first-floor offices in King William Street, Adelaide.”

March 2006 − The Australian reports: “It looks like a bubble, it sounds like a bubble. The ranks of listed uranium juniors have nearly doubled in the past year, and half that rise in numbers took place in just three months − and there’s more to come. Most of them don’t have a drilled resource, many of them are exploring in states where governments ban uranium mining. Even when they do have a resource, the gains look extraordinary. … The one Australian company that is developing a mine, Paladin Resources, has still to come into production in Namibia, but is now capitalised at an extraordinary $2.37 billion.”

March 2006 − According to Resource Capital Research, there are 65 uranium juniorslisted on the Australian Stock Exchange, a 96% rise over the past 12 months (similar to the 104% increase in Canada). According to The Age, by December 2006 the number of companies claiming to be involved in uranium exploration was approaching 100. The World Nuclear Association claims that more than 200 Australian companies professed an interest in uranium during 2006, compared with 34 the previous year.

April 2006 − Tim Boreham writes in The Australian: “The current valuations being ascribed to even the most rag-tag uranium hopefuls might look reasonable in a decade’s time. But it’s just as likely that we’ve solved the Middle East’s woes and sent a man to Mars by then as well. … As with all manias, investors are spoiled for choice in terms of options to do their dough.”

April 2006 − The Bulletin, ‘Atomic Boom’: “Yellowcake is the new black, as share floats by new uranium prospectors give hot returns. … The fortunate few are clearly enjoying a kind of radioactive heaven.”

May 2006 − The Sydney Morning Herald reports: “Beleaguered iron ore hopeful Cazaly Resources is to sell off its uranium assets to Southern Cross Uranium, a new company which plans to list. … The junior explorer made an application for the tenement after Rio Tinto failed to renew its lease. But Cazaly shares were gutted last month after the WA Government handed the lease back to Rio Tinto, on what it said were public interest grounds.”

July 2006 − The Age reports: “Stand by for a second bull run in local uranium exploration / development stocks − one driven by a frenzy of merger and acquisition activity. The second bull run is just starting to take shape and already it has emerged that there is likely to be three key playmakers — Canadian/Australian Mega Uranium, John Borshoff’s Paladin and Toro Energy. … It was the first bull run in uranium stocks that gave those groups their firepower. It ran out of puff in March after 15 months on the go, with the subsequent repricing of uranium equities at lower levels in April-June setting the scene for the launch of the second, and merger-and-acquisition-driven, bull run.”

August 2006 − Clive Roffey said: “What is of major concern is that for the past year a serious proportion of the rise in the spot price of uranium has been attributed to ‘investors’. This is just syntax for speculators. Hedge funds have become active players in the uranium market. This buying group is reported to have accounted for just over 25% of the total 2005 spot volume. … There are very few major miners and refiners of uranium. But there are a multitude of wannabees. Paul van Eerden sums them up as unsuccessful gold, silver, copper, nickel, platinum and palladium ambulance chasers. Almost every mining exchange has a plethora of uranium ‘exploration or development’ companies, most of them promoting a debatable set of drilling results or estimated reserves.”

November 2006 − ninemsn reports that “shares in fancied prospecting hopeful Deep Yellow Limited have trebled to 39¢ after statements it’s ready to start drilling its untested Lochness prospect near Mt Isa − once it finds a drilling rig.” Four months later, The Australian reports that Deep Yellow “has truly ridden the uranium wave to have a market capitalisation of more than $440 million”, despite taking a large hit in late 2005 after poor drilling results from the Napperby uranium deposit in the NT. Deep Yellow hoped that Toro Energy would purchase the Napperby project, but Toro Energy allowed its purchase option to expire in May 2010. As of late 2012, Deep Yellow was in the process of divestment of its Australian assets.

November 2006 − “There’s nothing to stop the rally in uranium, unless nuclear has a big accident,” said Thomas Neff from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

December 2006 − A trading frenzy, mostly from day traders, helped push Goldsearch shares more than 351% higher in the space of seven trading sessions over the final few days of 2006 and into the new year. A director sells about one-third of his Goldsearch holdings in the midst of the market hype over drilling results from its Mary Kathleen uranium prospect. The ASX suspended trading of Goldsearch on 29 December 2006. On 2 January 2007, Goldsearch was the most traded stock on the Australian Stock Exchange. Goldsearch says directors were not aware of any news that could be influencing the interest in the company’s shares. Drilling samples had been sent for assay but the results had not been received. “Some traders expressed scepticism, suspecting blatant ramping or a pump-and-dump, while others scrambled to get on board,” the Daily Diary website stated.

December 2006 − The Age reports: “Investors have joined the nuclear party by driving equity values sharply higher. ERA, at its closing price yesterday of $19.94, is sporting a 100 per cent gain for the year. Paladin’s $8.25 close gives it a 325 per cent gain. Dozens of explorers and would-be developers have done better still.”

January 2007 − Adam Schwab writes in Crikey: “Uranium King’s rocketing share price is reminiscent of the early 1970s, when nickel miners would double in price after announcing they had staked a claim near Kambalda. That ended even worse than the dot.com boom – just ask the bloke who paid $280 for Poseidon.”

March 2007 − Pepinnini Minerals says it hopes to start supplying uranium to China within three years. However, Pepinnini announced in December 2009 that preliminary modelling at Crocker Well in SA indicated that it was not currently viable, and that Pepinnini and Sinosteel were delaying completion of the bankable feasibility study “until there is a substantial increase in the price of uranium and improvement in the US dollar.”

May 2007 − Academic George Dracoulis, who contributed to the Switkowski Report, said: “We can ask the question: is uranium going to make or break Australia as an exporter?” One wonders why the question needs asking given that uranium would account for around 3% of national export revenue even if Australia supplied entire world demand. We can ask another question: what has George Dracoulis been smoking?

May 2007 − an investment banker tells the Australian Financial Review: “When this bubble pops, people will get hurt. It will happen and everyone will have blood on them − not just those small guys.”

May 2007 − The Sydney Morning Herald reports that the Gold Company’s share’s shot up nearly six-fold in one day in 2007 driven by the company’s announcement that it would buy into Greenland uranium project Kvanefjeld. It was “one of the biggest one-day gains in Australian trading history” according to a report in The Australian. However the Greenland government banned uranium mining. The company said: “It is not possible to receive a mineral licence for the exploration or exploitation of uranium in Greenland. Therefore, the licence does not include uranium.”

May 2007 − The Australian reports: “The Takeovers Panel has delivered a stunning blow to the credibility of uranium players Summit Resources and Paladin Resources, joint venture partners in one of Australia’s biggest untapped uranium deposits. The panel made a declaration of unacceptable circumstances over Paladin’s $1.3 billion bid for Summit, acting on a complaint by French nuclear giant Areva, which wants to protect lucrative marketing rights over the massive Valhalla/Skal deposit in outback Queensland. … The Takeovers Panel said it was “disappointed” with the quality and timeliness of market disclosure by both Paladin and Summit.”

June 2007 − Jamie Freed notes in the Sydney Morning Herald: “These days a uranium explorer doesn’t need any actual uranium in the ground for its float to be nearly four times oversubscribed.” Freed was referring to Fission Energy, a company whose tenements had received little if any drilling in the past, and whose parent company hadn’t found anything mineable since listing in 2001.

July 2007 − The Australian reports: “Uranium-focused shares took a tumble on the bourse, as the spot price for uranium registered its first fall since 2003 … As the demand side wanes, the market reacted savagely to uranium hopefuls, which had provided heady returns for investors speculating on yellowcake-focused stocks. Junior explorers were the hardest hit …”

July 2007 − The Age reports: “There has been a distinct cooling down in the share-price performance of the uranium explorers, due more to market saturation in the number of listings than anything else.”

June 2007 − Far East Capital’s Warwick Grigor said: “This is a bull market based on hard factual economics, not fantasies and what-ifs,” he wrote. “At these uranium prices, there are enormous cash flows that can be made.”

July 2007 − The Age reports: “Will Robinson’s Encounter Resources has not exactly been lost in space since its $4 million float as a uranium explorer in March 2006. It’s now a $44 million company ($7 million cash) and the 20¢ shares from the float closed on Friday at 63¢, down 3¢ on the day. The mainly West Australian-focused explorer could not have timed its float any better, with uranium prices rocketing from $US35 a pound to $US130 a pound since its listing.”

September 2008 − Ux Weekly reports: “One of the major changes in the spot uranium market over the past several years has been a greater involvement of hedge funds and other financial entities in the market. This makes the market more subject to the vicissitudes of the financial sector – hedge funds that are losing money in one area might have to sell uranium holdings for cash flow or to shore up their returns.”

December 2008 − The market valuation of Australian uranium companies falls by 75%in the 12 months to December 2008 according to Resource Capital Research. RCR managing director John Wilson said: “Producers continue to face significant challenges in financing and developing new projects, including cost pressures and potential delays variously relating to permitting, infrastructure development, commissioning and now credit and equity market weakness.”

March 2009 − The Australian reports: “The drastic decline in the price has really hit the local sector for six. A check on announcements shows that many local uranium explorers have more or less gone into hibernation, emerging only to file the compulsory quarterlies and financial statements.”

March 2009 − Far East Capital’s Warwick Grigor said: “There are many walking dead companies out there − zombie companies.” He said he expected about 10 serious uranium companies to survive and maybe 10 more not-so-serious companies. “Some companies will merge and some companies will be taken over, but in many cases it won’t even be worth paying the corporate advisory and legal fees to complete mergers.”

September 2009 − Barry FitzGerald and Mathew Murphy write in the Sydney Morning Herald: “A penny dreadful in the early 1990s, Paladin is now a $3.2 billion company on the strength of its African production interests and its plans to be the architect for consolidation amongst uranium groups and explorers. Borshoff has 30 years experience in the uranium sector and warns would-be uranium producers that Paladin’s success will not be repeated easily.” Fast forward to January 13 and S&A Resource Report editor Matt Badiali states in January 2013: “One company I was concerned about was Paladin Energy Ltd. … It has some great assets and a long-term supply contract with one of the French utilities, but it’s experienced some problems turning a profit. … It has a lot of debt. It’s a $712 million ($712M) market value with $830M in debt.”

October 2009 − The Age reports: “Perth-based uranium explorer Greenland Minerals and Energy has reviewed its books for the 2008 financial year − and revealed a $164 million blow-out … Few companies can rival Greenland Minerals when it comes to having bad news to bury. Fewer have done such a fine job of burying it. … A huge $171 million increase in equity-based payments made by Greenland Minerals last financial year is described in the accounts signed-off by Deloitte as ”$171,378 thousand”. A leading Melbourne taxation accountant who looked over the Greenland Minerals financial statement laughed when he examined the figures. ”I guess that’s how they do things in Perth,” he said.”

March 2010 − The Age reports: “But, spare a thought for the people of Greenland, who last year voted in a government that is opposed to uranium mining. After the election, GGG [Greenland Minerals & Energy] released a pre-feasibility study stating that Kvanefjeld was worth an estimated $2.2 billion, could produce 3895 tonnes of uranium oxide a year, making it ”a globally significant producer of uranium”, and concluding that ”construction is scheduled to commence in 2013, with first production in 2015”. [Construction has not begun as of February 2013.]

April 2010 − The Age reports: “The producers are down by 25-35 per cent from their 52-week highs and the explorers are generally showing falls of 50 per cent from their 52-week peaks. … Another way of putting it would have been to say that there is a whole bunch of junior explorers out there that do not have a hope of getting in to production while uranium prices remain in the doldrums. But in 2-5 years it could be a different story. But don’t expect punters in the sector to be hanging around that long. They will be off chasing near-term gains in others sectors.” Most active uranium explorers “are on an official go slow to preserve funds”.

June 2011 − The Australian Uranium Association claims that there are “good prospects that four or five projects in WA will begin operation in the next three to four years” and that the WA Government forecasts uranium export revenue from the state of $675m annually by 2014. As of February 2013, no uranium mines are in operation in WA despite the support of the WA and federal Governments. It is possible that one mine will be producing in 2014 (Wiluna); there is no possibility that two mines could be producing.

Woomera waste – rust, leaks, compaction, potentially explosive

Disgraceful mismanagement of radioactive waste by the CSIRO at Woomera (SA), and disgraceful non-regulation by the regulator ARPANSA. As of March 2018, it seems that much work remains to be done to fix the problems.

Rusted barrels of radioactive waste cost CSIRO $30 million

13 March 2017, Steven Trask

http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/rusted-barrels-of-radioactive-waste-cost-csiro-30-million-20170307-gusb6v.html

Also posted at: http://www.theage.com.au/national/rusted-barrels-of-radioactive-waste-cost-csiro-30-million-20170307-gusb6v.html

CSIRO faces a $30 million clean up bill after barrels of radioactive waste at a major facility were found to be “deteriorating rapidly” and possibly leaking.

An inspection found “significant rusting” on many of the 9,725 drums, which are understood to contain radioactive waste and other toxic chemicals.

CSIRO flagged a $29.7 million budget provision for “remediation works” at a remote location in its latest annual report.

Fairfax Media can reveal the work will take place at a CSIRO facility located on Department of Defence land near Woomera, South Australia.

The Woomera facility is currently one of Australia’s largest storage sites for low and intermediate-level radioactive waste.

A damning report of the Woomera facility was issued by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) after an inspection in April last year.

“Evidence was sighted that indicates the drums are now beginning to deteriorate rapidly,” read the report, seen by Fairfax Media.

“Significant rust on a number of the drums, deterioration of the plastic drum-liners and crushing of some stacked drums was observed.”

Tests confirmed the presence of radioactive isotopes at one location and inspectors said there was a possibility the drums were leaking.

“Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the presence of deceased animals such as rodents and birds may indicate that some of the drums, which contain industrial chemicals, may be leaking into the environment.”

The mixture of water and concentrated radioactive material inside some of the drums also had the potential to produce explosive hydrogen gas, inspectors found.

They also noted CSIRO had little knowledge of what was inside many of the barrels, some of which are believed to date back more than 50 years.

“Without full knowledge [of] the contents of the drums, risks cannot be fully identified and risk controls cannot be appropriately implements to protect people and the environment,” inspectors noted in the report.

Many of the drums are understood to contain contaminated soil generated by government research into radioactive ores at Melbourne’s Fishermans Bend throughout the 1940s and 1950s.

The toxic soil was discovered by the Department of Defence in 1989, who sent it to Sydney’s Lucas Heights facility before it was palmed off to Woomera in 1994.

An ARPANSA spokeswoman said the $29.7 million estimate would cover the characterisation, handling, re-packaging and storage of the toxic material.

“As a result of an ARPANSA inspection in 2016, it was recognised that additional work was required to scientifically characterise some of the contents of the legacy materials more accurately,” she said.

“The work that needs to be undertaken is significant.”

A spokesman for CSIRO said the first phase of the three-year clean up would begin next month.

“CSIRO currently has a radioactive waste store located on defence land at Woomera, South Australia. The store currently has 9,725 drums of long-lived waste,” he said.

“Last year ARPANSA conducted a regulatory inspection of the Woomera facility.

“In conjunction with ARPANSA, CSIRO has developed a $29.7 million, three-year project to conduct an assessment, separation and treatment of the waste.

“The first phase of this project, which is to undertake a detailed assessment and pilot-scale separation and treatment trial of up to 600 drums of material, will begin in April this year.

“The first phase at Woomera is expected to take four to five months.”

The country’s other major radioactive waste storage facility at Lucas Heights, Sydney, is rapidly approaching full capacity.

Coupled with issues at the CSIRO site, the revelations highlighted the urgent need for a national radioactive waste storage solution, experts said.


Deteriorating radioactive waste barrels at Woomera require $30 million clean-up by CSIRO

Peter Jean, The Advertiser, 14 March 2017

http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/deteriorating-radioactive-waste-barrels-at-woomera-require-30-million-cleanup-by-csiro/news-story/35e145b33ce748406d46d892ade39e96

AN estimated $30 million will be spent on securing radioactive waste at Woomera after inspectors discovered storage barrels were rapidly deteriorating.

The CSIRO stores almost 10,000 drums of low-level radioactive waste at Woomera.

An inspection by the radiation safety watchdog last year revealed some drums were deteriorating quickly and it was possible some industrial chemicals had leaked into the environment.

“Evidence was sighted that indicates that the drums are now beginning to deteriorate rapidly.,’’ an Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency report said.

“Significant rust on a number of the drums, deterioration of the plastic drum-liners and crushing of some stacked drums were observed.”

Some of the drums contain industrial chemicals and biological hazards.

“It was noted that chemical baiting of pests has occurred in the past at this site. A concern was the existence of deceased animals located in and around the site,’’ the ARPANSA inspection report said.

“Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the presence of deceased animals (such as rodents and birds) may also indicate that some of the drums, which contain industrial chemicals, may be leaking into the environment.’’

Most of the waste is contaminated soil from CSIRO’s former Fishermans Bend site in Melbourne.

It was transferred from Sydney’s Lucas Heights nuclear campus to Woomera in the 1990s.

A CSIRO spokesman said the agency was undertaking a three-year project to assess, separate and treat the waste.

“The first phase of this project which is to undertake a detailed assessment and pilot-scale separation and treatment trial of up to 600 drums of material will begin in April this year,’’ the spokesman said.

“The first phase at Woomera is expected to take four to five months.

“The Department of Defence provides security and controls access to the Woomera facility, and a joint CSIRO-Defence inspection of the facility is undertaken annually and reported to ARPANSA.”

The Federal Government wants to establish a single national centre for the secure storage of low-level radioactive waste. Barndioota, in the Flinders Ranges, is the preferred site for the waste dump.


CSIRO facing $30 million bill to clean up radioactive waste in South Australia

13 March 2017

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-13/csiro-facing-$30-million-bill-to-clean-up/8350552

http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2016/s4635390.htm

The CSIRO has confirmed it faces a $30 million bill to clean up radioactive waste near Woomera in South Australia. The contaminated soil is contained in almost 10,000 drums that have been left to deteriorate over decades. The clean-up is due to begin next month, and comes as the Federal Government continues to explore options for a national nuclear storage facility.

The CSIRO has confirmed it faces a 30 million dollar bill to clean up radioactive waste near Woomera in South Australia.

The contaminated soil is contained in almost 10-thousand drums that have been left to deteriorate over decades.

Meanwhile the Federal Government is continuing to explore options for a national nuclear storage facility.

Radio segment / interviews posted at

http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2016/s4635390.htm

and at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-13/csiro-facing-$30-million-bill-to-clean-up/8350552

Featured:

Alan Parkinson, nuclear engineer who was in charge of the clean-up of the Maralinga bomb test site in South Australia

Jim Green, nuclear campaigner from Friends of the Earth


Hot news: new home for waste

Mark Davis, 26 September 2009

http://www.smh.com.au/environment/hot-news-new-home-for-waste-20090925-g6aj.html

TWENTY years after being found at an old CSIRO site in Fishermans Bend, in Melbourne, nearly 10,000 barrels of radioactive waste are moving to another ”temporary” storage facility in outback South Australia.

The Defence Department plans to move the contaminated soil, which is now in a corrugated iron shed in the Woomera prohibited area, to an explosives storage building several kilometres away at Koolymilka.

Over the years the 1950 cubic metres of soil has been shifted from Melbourne to Lucas Heights, in Sydney, and then to the Woomera rocket-testing range as politicians squabbled over where to put a permanent radioactive waste storage facility.

A spokeswoman for the Defence Department said Koolymilka would provide secure storage for that soil and for some waste at Edinburgh, in Adelaide.

The Koolymilka facility would use a refurbished above-ground explosives storage building, she said. It would have capacity for additional waste but would not be licensed to take any.

The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency was assessing defence’s application for a licence to establish the facility, a spokesman said.

The CSIRO waste is more than half of Australia’s stockpile of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, which is expanding by about 50 cubic metres a year. It is stored at mainly temporary facilities around the country.

After the South Australian Government blocked a planned permanent national repository near Woomera in 2003, the Howard government began assessing four sites in the Northern Territory for a permanent spot for Commonwealth waste.

The Rudd Government got the scientific reports on the sites in March. It is yet to decide whether to select one of the NT sites or rethink the Howard government’s strategy of bypassing the states.


ARPANSA 2016 Inspection Report

https://www.arpansa.gov.au/sites/g/files/net3086/f/legacy/pubs/regulatory/inspections/2016/R16-05292.rtf

Licence Holder:  CSIRO Hangar 5 Annex

Licence Number: S0013

Location inspected: Woomera, SA

Date of inspection: 27-29 April 2016

Report No: R16/05292

An inspection was conducted under Part 7 of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (the Act). The purpose of the inspection was to assess compliance with the Act, applicable regulations, and licence conditions. The inspection was conducted as part of ARPANSA’s baseline source inspection program.

The inspection consisted of a review of records, interviews, a series of radiological measurements, and a physical inspection of radioactive material stored at Woomera. In addition, soil samples were collected in order to establish a baseline of the background environmental conditions at the site.

Background

CSIRO Business Infrastructure Services (CBIS) is licenced under section 33 of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 to store low-level radioactive material in approximately 10,000 drums at one site at Woomera.

Observations

In general the management of the drums at Woomera has not changed significantly over the previous eight (8) years. However, the inspection found concerns regarding the future integrity of the drums. Evidence was sighted that indicates that the drums are now beginning to deteriorate rapidly. Significant rust on a number of the drums, deterioration of the plastic drum-liners and crushing of some stacked drums were observed. At one location, a radiation measurement was taken that had elevated from 90nSv.hr-1 to 2μSv.hr-1 when compared to the same measurement conducted by ARPANSA eight (8) years ago. A spectrum was taken at this location confirming the presence of 226Ra. It was unclear whether the elevated dose rate was due to the in-growth of daughter products or due to material that may have leaked from the drums.

Moreover, research conducted recently by CSIRO has indicated that many of the drums contain industrial chemicals and biological hazards. There is also the potential for the buildup of hydrogen gas within the drums due to the hydrolysis of water mixed with concentrated thorium.

It was noted that chemical baiting of pests has occurred in the past at this site. A concern was the existence of deceased animals located in and around the site. Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the presence of deceased animals (such as rodents and birds) may indicate that some of the drums, which contain industrial chemicals, may be leaking into the environment.

As a result of these observations, the inspectors decided to collect environmental soil samples to be analysed for any radiological signatures that exceed the normal environmental background levels. Additional soil samples were also collected by ARPANSA for chemical analysis to be performed by Chem Centre in Western Australia. Chem Centre will be analysing the samples for heavy metals, acids and alkalines, solvents and hydrocarbons, and pesticides. The results of these environmental assessments will be provided to CSIRO.

CSIRO was unable to provide a detailed inventory of the drums. Although the inspectors recognize that this is a legacy issue where historical records of the contents of the drums are difficult to locate, the drums should be characterised as a matter of priority. Without the full knowledge the contents of the drums, risks cannot be fully identified, and risk controls cannot be appropriately implemented to protect people and the environment.

The CSIRO representatives provided a copy of the Woomera (Hangar 5) Risk Management Plan (04/04/16). Based upon the observed conditions of the drums, and new historical research which highlights evidence of the presence of combined chemical, biological and radiological hazards, the risk assessment provided failed to adequately address all of the presented hazards. On page 5 for example, Hazard 4 states “various hazards on site” but does not adequately consider the chemical hazards which are now known to exist at the site.

Being explicit about the potential risks will allow for more adequate controls to be put in place. Page 1 of the supplied Hazardous Substances Risk Control Plan (01/03/16) highlights radiological and miscellaneous substances as the Dangerous Goods Classification for the site. The newly acquired historical information on the site suggests that 2.1 Flammable Gases (hydrogen), 6.1 Toxic Substances, 8.0 Corrosive Substances should also have been highlighted. Moreover, the identified Exposure Route only considers inhalation. Ingestion, absorption and external irradiation should also be considered as pathways for the complex hazardous materials at the site.

When observing the entry and exit procedures for the storage annex, a range of contamination controls were not present. It is usual practice to have an established contamination control line, with appropriate quantities of gloves, booties, suits and respirators, a waste bin and calibrated contamination monitors. For chemical hazards, additional requirements such as a spill kits, decontamination agents and rinse stations may also be required.

These observations also demonstrate that the CSIRO staff could coordinate and communicate more effectively. Sharing new information about the history of the stored material, when discovered, would assist those charged with the responsibility to implement risk management strategies for the site.

Findings

Performance may be improved by addressing the following deficiencies:

Performance Deficiencies:

  1. CSIRO was not able to provide a comprehensive inventory of the radiological material stored in the drums.
  2. As a result of an inadequate inventory, CSIRO were unable to develop or implement an adequate risk assessment, risk management plan, and risk control plan for the site.
  3. The procedural arrangements for protecting personnel entering or operating around the site could be enhanced. Contamination control was not established to address all types of hazardous materials located at the site.
  4. Communication within across the various business units of CSIRO was not evident; the sharing of information relating to the likely contents of the drums has not occurred.

Maralinga – Advertiser articles

Collection of articles by The Advertiser journalist Colin James (PDF)

Web-links to the same collection of articles from The Advertiser: