Summary + articles re Olympic Dam mine expansion

Update: 2012 to 2018 – The planned open-pit mega-expansion was abandoned in mid-2012 – but other, more modest expansion plans are being progressed and explored.

2011 – The SA Greens and FoE Adelaide have been doing great work drawing attention to the many problems with the planned expansion of the Olympic Dam uranium/copper mine. Sadly, the expansion has been approved and critics (especially the SA Greens) have been subjected to a disgraceful smear campaign by the SA Labor government and the Murdoch press for raising questions about the expansion and the enabling legislation – the Roxby Downs Indenture Act. They have been accused of holding the state’s economy to ransom for raising legitimate questions and proposing amendments to the Indenture Act. The SA Liberal Party has acknowledged that every aspect of the Indenture Act favours BHP Billiton at the expense of South Australians – yet the Liberals did not propose or support amendments. Unfortunately the legislation passed through the SA Parliament in November 2011.


Dark day as state laws trashed in Roxby riches rush

http://markparnell.org.au/mr.php?mr=854

29 November 2011

The Parliamentary debate over the Roxby expansion Indenture Bill has confirmed that the State Government has delivered a bad deal for South Australia, says Greens Parliamentary Leader Mark Parnell.

“This is a dark day for our State’s democracy. The Government has locked in for the next 70 years the right of the world’s richest resource company to over-ride all relevant State laws,” said Mr Parnell.

“The hours of debate in Parliament has shown that in the rush to get this deal signed before ex-Premier Rann departed, the State Government has given too much away for too little in return.

“The environmental costs are going to be much higher, and the economic return will be much lower than the SA public rightly expect.

“Parliament has exposed the yawning gap between the Government’s hyperbolic spin over the Roxby riches and the dark reality of this terrible deal.

“Future generations are going to be disgusted with us for giving their resources away for a pittance and leaving them to deal with the enormous toxic legacy of managing the world’s largest radioactive waste dump,” he said.

The Greens put forward a package of amendments that would have positively transformed the Indenture contract.

The controversial Bill has now passed both houses of State Parliament, with only the Greens voting against it.

What the debate exposed:

• The local jobs, manufacturing and local procurement Plan will contain ‘aspirational’ targets only. Not one extra job is guaranteed.

• The ‘net’ economic return to state coffers in years 10-20 of the project could be as low as $10 million / year – and that’s even before millions are given back to BHPB through Federal subsidies like the diesel fuel rebate.

• No explanation for locking in royalty rates at a low rate for 45 years – apart from that is what BHP wanted.

• The Government did not do any comparative economic analysis with similar projects interstate and overseas to see if we were getting a good economic deal.

• There is nothing the Government can do to make BHPB expand their domestic processing up to an additional 200,000 tonnes of ore (as has been promised by the Premier and others). In fact, there is nothing to stop BHP exporting all ore from Roxby Downs to China (including the ore that is currently processed here).

• Govt has relied entirely on BHPB’s figures for the cost of processing in SA rather than exporting South Australian copper ore to China.

• BHPB can continue to extract fossil water from the Great Artesian Basin until 2082, with costs capped for the next 30 years.

• Third parties won’t have any right to access the railways, roads, ports and airports being constructed for the expansion.

• No cumulative impacts of this expansion (beyond the artificial EIS timeframe of 40 years) have been considered.

• The Government doesn’t know what impact the ODX will have on the State’s greenhouse pollution reduction targets.

• The toxic tailings waste dams have been deliberately designed to leak.

• The final operating conditions to protect the marine environment at Point Lowly will not be known for years and will be negotiated in secret.


Letter published in The Advertiser

To mention just one of the indefensible aspects of the Roxby Downs Indenture Act, the legislation retains the exemptions from the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988. Traditional Owners were not even consulted. The government’s spokesperson in Parliament said: “BHP were satisfied with the current arrangements and insisted on the continuation of these arrangements, and the government did not consult further than that.”

Recently it has been revealed that the ‘clean up’ of the Maralinga atomic test site was flawed and will most likely need to be revisited. We shouldn’t be surprised – in 2002 nuclear engineer Alan Parkinson warned that “What was done at Maralinga was a cheap and nasty solution that wouldn’t be adopted on white-fellas land.”

In 1999, SA police pepper-sprayed an 11-year old Adnyamathanha girl at the Beverley uranium mine, and an Adnyamathanha man was evicted from a public forum for suggesting that the meeting be chaired by a Traditional Owner rather than a Liberal MP.

Clearly there is a pattern. It should be enshrined on SA number plates: ‘SA: The Racist State’.


WHAT THE GREENS WANT TO KNOW

http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/greens-mark-parnell-to-fight-for-a-better-deal-on-olympic-dam/story-e6frea6u-1226189079542

November 9, 2011

SA Greens MLC Mark Parnell will put forwared 100 amendments to the Olympic Dam indenture Bill. Greens MLC Mark Parnell said his minority party was “not going to be cut short and stopped from asking the questions that need to be asked”, despite bipartisan support from Labor and the Liberals.

1. ROYALITIES

Why did the Government lock in a royalty regime for 45 years, and why is it based exclusively on old-style production-based royalties, rather than one that captures a fair share of mining profits?

2. ECONOMIC RETURN

How good an economic deal did SA receive when BHP CEO Marius Kloppers is claiming to his shareholders that the Olympic Dam Expansion will be low cost and highly profitable?

3. PROCESSING IN SA RATHER THAN CHINA

How many South Australian jobs will be lost by not requiring BHP to process our ore here in South Australia rather than exporting it to China?

4. EXEMPTION FROM SA LAWS

Why is BHP exempt from over 20 South Australian laws that every other mining company in SA has to comply with?

5. NO URANIUM OPTION

Why wasnt a No Uranium Roxby Expansion considered when we know it is not only technically feasible, it would also mean less water and energy use and more jobs as the processing would be done here in SA, rather than in China?

6. GREAT ARTESIAN BASIN

Why isn’t there a plan to wean BHP off using 42ML/day of ancient water from the Great Artesian Basin, when they plan double that volume in excess capacity (80ML/day) from their desalination plant?

7. DESALINATION PLANT & CUTTLEFISH RISK

Why is the Government prepared to risk the breeding grounds of the Giant Australian Cuttlefish by not requiring the company to build in a different location?

8. RADIOACTIVE LEAKAGE FROM TAILINGS DAM

How can the Government claim that they have met their public commitment for the expansion to meet worlds best environmental practice when only 4 per cent of the tailings dams will be lined and the dams are designed to leak up to 8 million litres of toxic radioactive waste liquid/day?

9. RESPONSIBILITY POST MINE CLOSURE

Who will ultimately be responsible to manage the open pit, tailings dams and rock waste pile for the 10,000 years after the operations cease that the radioactive risk remains: the company or SA taxpayers, and how much will that management cost?

10. GREENHOUSE POLLUTION & RENEWABLE ENERGY

Why isn’t the company committing to any investment in cleaner energy to meet their whopping 650 MW electricity demand beyond the 57MW commitment for powering the desal plant (less than 10 per cent of total demand) to reduce their enormous increase in the states greenhouse pollution of 12-15 per cent?


A case of Olympian incompetence by South Australia

By Paul Cleary, The Australian, October 21, 2011

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/a-case-of-olympian-incompetence-by-south-australia/story-e6frg9if-1226172260137?mid=523

THE royalty agreement negotiated by South Australia for BHP Billiton’s Olympic Dam expansion has robbed the state’s citizens and all Australians of the opportunity to share in the profits of what will become the world’s biggest mine.

This deal is a monumental example of state government incompetence when it comes to acting as custodian of the nation’s mineral wealth.

South Australia has agreed to a regime based solely on percentages and even cents per tonne of the mine’s production. Mike Rann, who stands down today as Premier, has done South Australians a disservice that will cost them dearly for almost half a century.

Rann and his administration should know full well that these royalties fail to capture a fair share of mining profits. This has been in the economic literature since the 1970s and was made more prominent by the Henry review. Yet the deal does not contain a single element of profits-based taxation.

The case for such measures is all the more compelling given that the mineral resources rent tax will not tax the millions of tonnes of copper, uranium, silver and gold the mine will be produce under the 45-year agreement, because the MRRT only applies to coal and iron ore.

Given that this is an agreement negotiated in the 21st century, it beggars belief the state could have agreed to a regime based exclusively on production-based royalties that hark back to medieval times.

But none of these ideas penetrated the thinking of the South Australian government when it negotiated its 45-year agreement for BHP’s $30 billion expansion.

The three-tier regime involves 3.5 per cent for refined mineral products, meaning copper and gold, and 5 per cent for uranium oxide and uranium-bearing copper concentrates.

There’s also 35c per tonne on extractive minerals sold to a third party, but this is not even indexed for inflation, so its value will diminish over the life of the agreement.

When asked to explain how the government could have agreed to a non-indexed royalty, a spokesman said it was a trade-off in negotiations because BHP had asked for the expansion to gain concessional royalty rates for new mines. Well, that issue should not have even been on the table, because Olympic Dam is an existing mine.

The spokesman declined to say why a profits-based regime had not been considered.

This agreement will unfortunately stand as a sad and enduring indictment of the weakness of our state governments when it comes to negotiating with powerful mining multinationals.

The power of BHP was abundantly evident when it signed the agreement with the South Australian government on its home turf in Melbourne, rather than in Adelaide, and then declared that its board had already pre-committed $1.2bn in investment ahead of approval by the state and federal parliaments.

Given the environmental legacy of this mine, including above-ground storage of radioactive tailings and risks to water resources, a profits-based royalty could have been paid directly into a sovereign wealth fund. This fund could be used to compensate future generations who will most certainly have to live with greatly depleted mineral resources, and the environmental consequences of this mammoth venture.

These risks were glossed over by Environment Minister Tony Burke when he approved it under federal law. Burke’s description of the project is even more euphemistic than what is found in BHP’s environmental impact statement.

At no point in his media statement did Burke use the word radioactive. At least BHP’s EIS admits that its tailings heap will be.

Even glossier was Burke’s acceptance of the claim that seepage from the radioactive tailings storage facility would be “neutralised” 4m below the surface by limestone that is 60m deep. None of Burke’s three media advisers responded to questions last week.

BHP is less certain than Burke. Its draft EIS says the mine’s impact on groundwater would “depend” on various unknown factors, such as the “interaction of seepage with the sediments beneath the respective facilities”.

The EIS says that up to 8.2 million litres would seep from the TCF into groundwater each day in the first 10 years of operations, before falling to about 3.2 million litres a day.

Gavin Mudd, a senior lecturer in Monash University’s school of engineering, says BHP “got the lowest cost option on every front”, especially for above-ground storage of radioactive tailings. This is contrary to the practice employed with the Ranger uranium mine.

Mudd says the uncertainty flagged by BHP relates to the way water seeps into limestone creates caves; an imperfect mixing of water into the sediment could cause channels to open up, allowing massive volumes of water to flow into Lake Torrens, less than 100km from the mine.

“You will get these channels opening up — it is the nature of limestone. They have always underestimated seepage. Despite their claims, they still don’t understand as well as they need to to justify their claims,” he says.

The BHP spokeswoman, however, says that the company has been operating tailings storage since 1989, giving it “a long and deep understanding of how they work”.

Mudd, however, points to a 1991 incident in which the mine lost 3 million litres of water in three hours.

BHP argues that its field investigations and modelling have been “peer reviewed and assessed by state and federal government experts”.

Mudd says the process is flawed because the government is “very reliant on data that comes from the company”.

For a project of this nature and magnitude, with inherent risks for future generations, taking out insurance in the form of a future fund is clearly warranted.

But this won’t happen with the royalties agreed to by the myopic state government.


Olympic Dam – summary of the problems with the mine

Updated May 2009 following the release of the Draft EIS for the proposed mine expansion.

2012 update: the planned mega-expansion, discussed below, was cancelled in 2012

THE MINE EXPANSION

On May 1, 2009, BHP Billiton released a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) promoting its plans to turn the Olympic Dam (Roxby Downs) mine in South Australia into the largest uranium mine in the world.

The Olympic Dam uranium deposit is by far the largest on earth. Although the uranium is low-grade, the volume is staggering, amounting to about 2.4 million tonnes (and counting) − 30% of the world’s known conventional uranium reserves. That’s enough uranium to fuel the world’s fleet of 430 power reactors for 40 years.

The mine has been operating since the late 1980s using underground mining. BHP Billiton plans to supplement underground mining with open-cut mining − it plans to make Olympic Dam the largest open-cut mine in the world by digging a pit of about 14.4 cubic kms (4.1×3.5×1 kms). Export of uranium is expected to increase from an average of 4,500 tonnes per year to 19,000 tonnes per year. Copper production is expected to increase from 180,000 tonnes per year to 750,000 tonnes per year, and production of gold and silver is also expected to increase.

The plan would lock Australia in as the world’s uranium quarry and fuel unresolved nuclear waste management problems and unacceptable WMD proliferation risks.

BHP Billiton expects government approval in mid-2010 and will then make final decisions on the scope and timing of the expansion project. A company representative said on the day the EIS was released: “We still have a lot of work to do before we can tell you when this project may start and how much it may cost.”

At the mine site (most information from the Draft EIS):

* The quantity of ore to be processed would increase from 12 million tonnes annually to 72 million tonnes.

* The existing smelter would be expanded and new concentrator and hydrometallurgical plants would be built to process the additional ore, and generate additional concentrate for transport.

* It would take about five years of mining to remove the layer of overburden and expose the first section of the ore body. During this time, about 410 million tonnes per annum of material would be removed from the open pit. Over 40 years, the footprint of the pit would grow to be 14.4 sq kms. The overburden would be used for a ‘Rock Storage Facility’.

* On-site production of refined copper would increase to 350,000 tonnes annually (about twice the current output).

* About 1.6 million tonnes of concentrate would be exported to China annually for further processing, yielding about 400,000 tonnes of refined copper along with several thousand tonnes of uranium and some gold and silver.

New or upgraded infrastructure to support the mine would include (most information from the Draft EIS):

* A 280 megalitre per day (ML/d) coastal desalination plant at Point Lowly on the Upper Spencer Gulf (to supply 200 ML/d of additional water via a 320 km pipeline connection to Olympic Dam and with the potential to supply 80 ML/d elsewhere).

* Either a new 270 km electricity transmission line from Port Augusta to Olympic Dam, and/or a gas pipeline from Moomba and a new gas-fired power station at Olympic Dam.

* A 105 km rail line to connect Olympic Dam to the national rail network near Pimba.

* A new airport to replace the existing airport at Olympic Dam.

* A landing facility on the Upper Spencer Gulf to unload equipment from barges, and an access corridor to a pre-assembly yard on the north-western outskirts of Port Augusta.

* Additional port facilities in SA at Outer Harbor and in the Northern Territory at the Port of Darwin to import supplies and export product

* A new accommodation village for workers.

* Expansion of the Roxby Downs township.

Waste and Weapons

Uranium production at Olympic Dam is expected to increase to 19,000 tonnes per year, sufficient to fuel 95 power reactors which will produce 2,850 tonnes of high-level nuclear waste per year (in the form of spent nuclear fuel). That amount of spent fuel contains 28.5 tonnes of plutonium − enough for 2,850 nuclear weapons each year. Over the lifespan of the mine, it could be responsible for the production of enough plutonium for over 340,000 nuclear weapons. If 99.9% of that plutonium is adequately safeguarded, the remaining 0.1% would suffice to build 340 plutonium bombs similar to the one that destroyed Nagasaki in 1945.

This is all the more troubling given the flaws and limitations of the international nuclear ‘safeguards’ system. A BHP Billiton EIS ‘infosheet’ states that safeguards arrangements “ensure that Australian uranium is used exclusively for peaceful purposes” and is “accounted for in full”. In fact, safeguards fall far short of “ensuring” peaceful use of uranium exports and Australia’s uranium exports are not fully accounted for – there are routine accounting discrepancies (known as Material Unaccounted For). International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei has acknowledged that the IAEA’s rights of inspection are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system is subject to “vulnerabilities” and “clearly needs reinforcement”, that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted” and it operates on a “shoestring budget … comparable to a local police department.” (More information on safeguards <www.nuclear.foe.org.au/safeguards>.)

BHP Billiton sells uranium to nuclear weapons states, states refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, states blocking progress on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, states with a history of secret nuclear weapons research, and states stockpiling ‘civil’ plutonium.

A new low was set in 2006 when the federal government, with BHP Billiton’s support, negotiated a uranium export agreement with the secretive, repressive, militaristic, undemocratic regime in China. The Olympic Dam expansion is heavily dependent on the export of concentrate to China, leaving over one million tonnes of long-lived radioactive wastes each year for China to manage into the future. BHP Billiton intends to transport this radioactive concentrate by train through central Australia and out through the Port of Darwin. Communities and environments will be placed at risk by these hazardous bulk cargoes from Alice Springs to Darwin and across China − and none of these communities will be given a right to refuse these risks.

Dean Dalla Valle, head of BHP Billiton’s uranium division, said on May 1: “Exporting uranium to new customers like China will be an integral part of creating value from the Olympic Dam ore body. We can do this with confidence because China is subject to the same strict safeguards arrangements as all of our other customers.”

However, China is not subject to the same safeguards arrangements as all other customers. As one of the ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states, China’s safeguards are voluntary. Assoc. Prof. Tilman Ruff noted in a 2007 paper that of the 44 proliferation-sensitive nuclear facilities in China, only 10 facilities were eligible for IAEA safeguards, only three had actually been inspected, and only one had a full suite of IAEA safeguards arrangements in place (Briefing Paper #19 at <www.energyscience.org.au>).

Australia should not sell uranium to any nuclear weapon state and must not turn a blind eye to their failure to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or to Russia’s illegal threat to use nuclear weapons against Poland in 2008 over US missile defence plans, or to China’s continuing practice of cultural genocide in Tibet and other human rights violations. An October 2008 Newspoll found that two-thirds of Australians oppose uranium exports to countries with nuclear weapons (73% of women and 51% of men).

The Draft EIS predicts global uranium mine production to double to about 92,000 tonnes of uranium oxide annually by 2030. The estimate is very optimistic. For a more realistic appraisal of the trajectory of nuclear power, see Schneider’s analysis in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:

Radioactive Tailings

Under the mine expansion plan, the production of radioactive tailings, stored above ground, will increase six-fold to 58 million tonnes annually. The current tailings stockpile amounts to 100 million tonnes. BHP Billiton plans up to nine tailings dams in addition to the four that currently receive approximately 10 million tonnes of tailings annually, with their height increasing from the current 30m to 65m. The existing operation consists of 400 ha of tailings dams and 133 ha of evaporation ponds.

The tailings contain a toxic, acidic soup of radionuclides and heavy metals. There have been numerous spills and leaks – most significantly in 1994, when it was revealed that about three billion litres had seeped from the tailings dams over two years.

Mining consultants Advanced Geomechanics noted in a 2004 report that radioactive slurry was deposited “partially off” a lined area of a storage pond at Olympic Dam, contributing to greater seepage and rising ground water levels; that there is no agreed, accurate formula to determine the rate of evaporation of tailings and how much leaks into the ground; and that cells within a tailings pond covered an area more than three times greater than recommended, requiring “urgent remedial measures”.

The problems have not been resolved. Photos taken by an Olympic Dam mine worker in December 2008 show radioactive tailings liquid leaking from the rock ‘armoury’ of the tailings ‘retention’ system. The leaks were ongoing for at least eight months and probably amounted to several million litres, but were not publicly reported by BHP Billiton or the SA government. BHP Billiton said that mine workers taking and releasing photos of the mine would be subject to “disciplinary action”.

Managing the current tailings stockpile is challenging enough and there is every reason to be concerned about BHP Billiton’s capacity to manage a six-fold increase.

Large numbers of bird deaths have been recorded in the vicinity of the evaporation ponds − over 100 deaths in one four-day period in 2004. BHP Billiton says “several measures used to deter fauna from visiting the Tailings Storage Facility over the past decade have met with varying degrees of success, but none have resolved the issue.”

BHP Billiton likes euphemisms. ‘Tailings retention facilities’ retain some but not all tailings. The tailings dams have a ‘rock armoury’ – which leaks. Tailings dams are ‘storage facilities’ – as if to suggest that BHP Billiton has some plan for the waste other than leaving it where it is in perpetuity. BHP Billiton’s plans for Olympic Dam compare unfavourably with the Ranger uranium mine in the NT, where tailings are required to be returned to the pit at the end of the mine’s life and steps taken to ensure the tailings do not have a detrimental impact on the environment for at least 10,000 years.

(BHP to ‘dump mine tailings on ground’, Gavin Lower, May 01, 2009, The Australian, <www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25411908-5013404,00.html>)

Nuclear power advocates like to compare the relatively small volume of waste produced by nuclear plants to the huge volume of waste produced by coal plants. However, to produce enough uranium to operate just one power reactor for just one year, Olympic Dam will produce 611,000 tonnes of radioactive tailings waste (58MT/95).

The Draft EIS states: “An estimated 12 cubic metres of low-level radioactive waste is produced at Olympic Dam annually in the form of personal protective equipment, laboratory equipment, and geological and processing sample wastes generated following analysis for radionuclides, but is not returned to the processing circuit. This would increase to 48 cubic metres annually on completion of the expanded project. After a review of disposal options and government approval in 2006, low-level radioactive waste has been packaged and disposed of within the TSF [Tailings Storage Facility]. Inventories of the waste and its disposal locations are recorded so that it can be managed in the event of future disturbance if the tailings were to be reprocessed. This disposal practice would continue for the expanded project.”

Water Consumption

BHP Billiton proposes an increase in water consumption from 37 million litres daily (from the Great Artesian Basin) to over 250 million litres daily (up to 42 million litres from the Great Artesian Basin, plus 200 million litres or more from a proposed desalination plant).

That total of 250 million litres equates to over 170,000 litres per minute … every minute of every day in the driest state in the driest inhabited continent.

The water take from the Great Artesian Basin has had adverse impacts on precious Mound Springs − unique habitats which support rare and delicate micro flora and fauna, some species of which are unique to a particular Spring. While there is no current plan to increase the rate of water usage from the Great Artesian Basin, nor is there any intention to reduce it.

BHP Billiton’s Draft EIS says the company assessed and rejected the option of a third wellfield in the Great Artesian Basin: “The two existing wellfields supplying the current operation could not sustain the additional demand. It would have been necessary to establish a third wellfield much further into the GAB to ensure the GAB springs were protected. The resulting production of much warmer water would have been technically difficult and very expensive to cool to the required temperature and pipe to Olympic Dam.”

BHP Billiton pays nothing for its massive water take for the Olympic Dam mine despite recording a $17.7 billion profit in 2007-08. That arrangement is enshrined in the Roxby Downs Indenture Act 1982 − as anachronistic a piece of legislation as you’re ever likely to see. (BHP Billiton also has its hand out for more corporate welfare with an ask for around $120 million of public subsidies in the form of diesel fuel rebates over the four year open-pit construction period.)

In February 2007, then Prime Minister John Howard wrote to state Premiers seeking their agreement “to establish proper entitlements, metering, pricing and reporting arrangements for water extracted from the Great Artesian Basin.” Asked whether his proposed new arrangements would apply to Olympic Dam, Mr Howard said: “Everybody’s got to make a contribution to solving this problem.” But within days, he voiced support for BHP Billiton’s “right” to free water from the Artesian Basin. In other words, everyone except BHP Billiton has to make a contribution to solving this problem.

As The Advertiser noted in a November 2005 Editorial, it is “essential … to safeguard the artesian basin water supplies”. To that end, most users are subject to the Great Artesian Basin Management Plan. But BHP Billiton is a law unto itself − its Olympic Dam mine is not subject to the Management Plan and also enjoys exemptions from the SA Natural Resources Act 2004 and the Environment Protection Act 1993.

BHP Billiton has a bore-capping program which, the company claims, saves more water than the mine currently uses. But water extraction for the mine is localised and the adverse impacts are all too apparent to people who have monitored the Mound Springs over the past 20 years. Likewise, the company’s bore capping program is small comfort to pastoralists who suffer reduced water flow from the localised effects of water extraction for the mine.

The proposed desalination plant has raised concerns over its impacts on marine species and fishing industries – in particular from the discharge of brine. The Upper Spencer Gulf is a low flushing fragile marine environment unsuited to siting a desalination plant and BHP Billiton’s preferred site at Point Lowly is the breeding ground of the Charismatic Giant Australian Cuttle Fish.

David Noonan from the Australian Conservation Foundation said: “This is the worst possible place to build an internationally-sized desalination plant. The Gulf is shallow, low-flushing. It’s the breeding ground of the giant cuttlefish which is extremely sensitive to changes in salinity. The plant should be built on the ocean, not the gulf. We could build a reverse osmosis plant at Elliston on Eyre Peninsula’s west coast. Elliston has the ocean flushing that Pt Lowly lacks and enormous potential for year-round wind energy. Taxpayers are paying 20 per cent of the desalination plant’s capital cost and we should also have a big say on where it goes. It’s not good enough to leave it up to BHP.”

Adelaide University marine biologist Assoc. Prof. Bronwyn Gilanders says the sea around Whyalla is actually the world’s largest cuttlefish breeding zone, and that the plant could wipe them out: “Squids and Cuttlefish are generally short-lived. So they live a year; they breed only once. So if you damage the eggs or affect their reproductive ability then potentially that will have devastating consequences on the population.”

Electricity Demand

BHP Billiton expects the mine’s electricity consumption to increase over six-fold from 125 MW to 775 MW, to be sourced from some combination of supply from:

* the SA electricity grid (and the national electricity market) with a new electricity transmission line from Port Augusta.

* a proposed gas-fired on-site 600 MW plant with a pipe from Moomba.

* a proposed co-generation plant using industrial waste heat generated from the burning of sulphur to produce the sulphuric acid required for the new hydrometallurgical plant. This waste heat could be used to generate up to 250 MW.

The Draft EIS says a study is ongoing into the feasibility of a 150 MW concentrated solar thermal plant. Geothermal power is described as an “opportunity for the future”.

The proposed desalination plant would require 35 MW of electricity, which would be supplied by a new 25 km transmission line from the Cultana substation. The Draft EIS says the electricity would be supplied by renewable energy sourced from the National Electricity Market.

Mark Parnell from the SA Greens is advocating a 500 MW solar thermal plant for the mine:

“Large scale solar thermal is the ideal power solution for the expansion project. Solar thermal electricity is a different technology to solar photovoltaics (PVs). A PV system converts sunshine into electricity, whereas solar thermal converts sunshine to heat. This heat is then transferred to a fluid, which drives a turbine to generate electricity. A big advantage of solar thermal electricity is that the heat energy can be stored, potentially allowing electricity to be generated when the sun goes down.

“Solar thermal technology is available now, with 500MW plants currently planned for California and Nevada, where the technology has been road-tested for 20 years. Australia’s biggest engineering firm, WorleyParsons said last year it wants to build 34 large-scale solar thermal power stations in Australia by 2020. The Roxby expansion is the ideal project to kick-start this plan – the Olympic Dam mine needs huge amounts of power, in a spot that’s well away from the grid and bakes in the sun all year round.

“Investing in cutting edge renewable technology will provide a huge smart job boost for South Australia, placing our state at the centre of a new growth industry. The Rann Government must insist BHP Billiton’s enormous appetite for electricity is sated from the sun, not dirty fossil fuels. Otherwise, we’ll be left struggling with old technology and old thinking as the Roxby expansion sends our State’s greenhouse pollution levels sky high.”

Greenhouse Emissions

Greenhouse emissions from the mine (and associated infrastructure) are projected to increase from 900,000 tonnes annually to 4.7 million tonnes, making it all but impossible for South Australia to reach its legislated target of 13 million tonnes. A technical assessment by Monash University engineering lecturer Dr Gavin Mudd estimates emissions would reach 4.5 to 6.6 million tonnes annually — one-third to one-half of the target of 13 million tonnes. (The technical assessment is posted at https://nuclear.foe.org.au/olympic-dam-uranium-copper-mine)

BHP Billiton likes to promote uranium as a fuel for low-carbon nuclear power – but that argument only holds if the comparison is with fossil fuels. According to the 2006 Switkowski report, nuclear power is three times more greenhouse intensive than wind power. Moreover, BHP Billiton wants to take credit for the alleged greenhouse benefits of its uranium exports but not for the WMD proliferation risks or the high-level nuclear waste legacy. Nor does BHP Billiton take any responsibility for the greenhouse emissions arising from the use of its extensive fossil fuel exports.

Dr Mudd said: “South Australia has a legislated greenhouse target to reduce emissions by 60%, limiting total emissions to about 12 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually by 2050. Yet Olympic Dam alone will produce 4.5-6.6 million tonnes annually, making it virtually impossible for South Australia to meet its legislated target. BHP Billiton likes to take credit for its export of uranium to fuel low-carbon nuclear reactors, but that argument is flawed on two counts. Firstly, the end uses of energy exports are not counted in Australia’s greenhouse emissions, and if they were, BHP Billiton would also need to account for its extensive fossil fuel exports. Secondly, the argument rests on the arbitrary and implausible assumption that the only alternative to Olympic Dam uranium exports is to build coal fired power plants.”

Radioactive Racism

Racism in the uranium mining industry in Australia typically involves ignoring the concerns of Traditional Owners insofar as the legal and political circumstances permit; divide-and-rule tactics; bribery; humbugging Traditional Owners – exerting persistent, unwanted pressure until the mining company gets what it wants; providing Traditional Owners with false or misleading information; and threats, most commonly legal threats.

BHP Billiton claims that it consults with Traditional Owners such as the Kokatha and Arabunna. But consultation is hardly the word since the company is under no obligation to take the slightest bit of notice of their views. The mine operates under the Roxby Downs Indenture Act, which provides overrides and exemptions from the SA Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988. The latter is the key law aimed at protecting Indigenous heritage in South Australia. However, under the Indenture Act, BHP Billiton is in a legal position to determine what consultation occurs with Traditional Owners, who is consulted, and nature of any consultation. The company decides the level of protection that Aboriginal heritage sites receive and which sites are recognised. The company claims that it fully complies with Aboriginal heritage legislation even though it is not required to do so – if so, why is the company unwilling to relinquish the legal exemptions it enjoys?

It is ironic that BHP Billiton supports Reconciliation Australia’s ‘good governance’ program and has provided over $2 million to Reconciliation Australia, yet will not relinquish its exemptions from the Aboriginal Heritage Act. The company’s attitude appears to be ‘do as I say, not as I do’.

One particularly notorious incident in the history of the Olympic Dam mine concerned the laying of a water pipeline on the land of Arabunna Traditional Owners in the mid-1990s, when WMC Resources owned the mine. The dispute over the pipeline led to violence, terrorism, imprisonment, and the death of one person. Jan Whyte and Ila Marks summarised the controversy in the July 1996 edition of the Friends of the Earth magazine, Chain Reaction: “It appears that WMC has embarked on a course of side-stepping consultation with the Arabunna as the traditional custodians. It has also taken similar actions in regard to the Kokatha, the traditional custodians for the actual mine site. One method used by mining companies to side-step proper consultation processes is documented in North America and Canada as well as Australia. Mining companies incorporate small Aboriginal groups in areas under dispute and give them financial support. These groups are then regarded as the official representatives for that area and mining companies proceed to consult with them. Thus, it seems as if the companies are going through the correct legal processes whereas, in fact, they are ignoring parties who have legitimate interests.” (See the full article and also the ABC ‘Background Briefing’ transcript at <https://nuclear.foe.org.au/watered-down-negotiations-wmc-picks-both-sides/>.)

Of course, BHP Billiton cannot be held responsible for the actions of WMC Resources over a decade ago. But it seems that little has changed, including BHP Billiton’s refusal to relinquish the overrides and exemptions it enjoys from the Aboriginal Heritage Act.

The Roxby Downs Indenture Act

The proposed expansion of the mine ought to be subject to legislative and regulatory controls and standards at least as rigorous as those that apply to smaller projects. To apply considerably weaker standards is indefensible. Yet the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 provides BHP Billiton the legal authority to override important state legislation including the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988; Environmental Protection Act 1993; Freedom of Information Act 1991; Natural Resources Act 2004 (incorporating water management issues); Development Act 1993; and the Mining Act 1971.

An indication of the sweeping nature of the legal privileges is the statement in the Indenture Act that:

“(1) The law of the State is so far modified as is necessary to give full effect to the Indenture and the provisions of any law of the State shall accordingly be construed subject to the modifications that take effect under this Act.

(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), in the case of any inconsistency between the provisions of any Act or law and of the Indenture, the provisions of the Indenture shall prevail …”

The Indenture Act is currently the subject of secret negotiations between the SA government and BHP Billiton and is expected to be modified in the first half of 2010 to accommodate the mine expansion plans. The SA Labor government has refused to commit to repeal the legal privileges although they are clearly inconsistent with the government’s policy of applying the “strictest environmental standards” to uranium mining.

SA Premier Mike Rann said on the day of the release of the Draft EIS: “It [the mine expansion] has got massive benefits for South Australia but I will insist that world’s best practice in terms of environment is complied with.”

If Mr Rann was serious, he would immediately announce that the indefensible clauses in the Indenture Act will be promptly repealed.

Nor has there been any indication from BHP Billiton that it will relinquish the privileges although they are inconsistent with the company’s policy of meeting “internationally recognised standards”. Olympic Dam does not have to comply with South Australian standards let alone international standards. BHP Billiton Chairman Don Argus said in November 2006 that “we will apply the highest standards … we are acting within the law.” However, Olympic Dam does not operate within the law that applies everywhere else in SA.

Under confidentiality clause 35 of the Indenture Act, BHP Billiton has veto power over public release of information relating to activities undertaken within the 1.5 million hectares covered by the Indenture Act, and related matters such as government/company negotiations. Monash University environmental engineer Dr Gavin Mudd notes that: “until the Indenture Act is revoked entirely there can be no truly independent, external environmental assessment of the impacts of Olympic Dam.”

The Draft EIS (ch.6) says that the Indenture Act “ensures the continuation … of a safe and environmentally acceptable operation”. It does nothing of the sort.

More information

Friends of the Earth https://nuclear.foe.org.au/olympic-dam-uranium-copper-mine/

Dr Gavin Mudd’s articles on Mound Springs, Great Artesian Basin etc http://users.monash.edu.au/~gmudd

SA Greens MLC Mark Parnell http://sagreens.markparnell.org.au/


Waste fears at uranium mine

Michelle Wiese Bockmann, The Australian, 10 March 2006

THE Olympic Dam uranium mine needs urgent improvements in radioactive waste management and monitoring, according to audit reviews. As owner BHP Billiton seeks state and federal government approval for a four-fold, $5 billion expansion at Olympic Dam, concerns about the mine’s tailings storage facilities have been raised in the last two audit reviews provided to the Rann Government.
The reviews, obtained by The Australian under Freedom of Information laws, call on government regulators to “encourage” changes to the deposit of tailings, a radioactive slurry that is a by-product of uranium mining production. More than 10 million tonnes of tailings a year are placed in ponds near the mine.
The review noted radioactive slurry was deposited “partially off” a lined area of a storage pond, which it believed contributed to greater seepage and rising ground water levels.
The review also criticises the lack of an agreed, accurate formula to determine the rate of evaporation of tailings and how much leaks into the ground.
Consultants Advanced Geomechanics conducted the reviews of the tailings storage facilities in 2002 and 2003 when the mine was owned by WMC Resources. In a September 2004 letter to state Department of Primary Industries and Resources, Advanced Geomechanics consultant Richard Jewell urged “strong representation to the operators on these issues to make the changes”.
In April last year, Mr Jewell noted cells within a tailings pond covered 70ha, more than three times greater than a key performance indicator recommended.
“This is an issue of real concern and requires the implementation of urgent remedial measures,” Mr Jewell warns in the letter. He agrees with the auditors’ general conclusion that the tailings facility was “well managed”.
The tailings dams were the subject of a 1996 parliamentary inquiry after previous owners Western Mining Corporation reported in 1994 that five million cubic litres had leaked from them over two years.
“They (the mine owners) have a continuing problem with managing radioactive tailings and a continuing problem with seepage of tailings,” said Australian Conservation Foundation official David Noonan.
Mr Noonan said the audit reviews showed the mine “had failed even the most basic monitoring practices”.
Mr Jewell yesterday confirmed the 2004 auditors had again raised the tailings problems. “But in general from my experience the management at Olympic Dam is as good as I’ve seen anywhere in the world,” he said.

Olympic Dam uranium / copper mine

Please note: Friends of the Earth previously understood that Kokatha people were the uncontested traditional owners of the Roxby Downs region and that view is reflected in some papers on this website. However we now understand traditional ownership is contested.

Note: the most up-to-date information on the Olympic Dam is the material written by David Noonan — please see this separate webpage: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/olympic-dam/

Vale Uncle Kevin Buzzacott, fierce advocate for his people and a nuclear free Australia

Information about proposed expansion of the Olympic Dam uranium/copper mine (first announced in 2019)

Proposed expansion abandoned in 2012: Information about the mine expansion approval process and the amended Roxby Downs Indenture Act

More information on the Roxby Downs Indenture Act

Lizards Revenge protest at Olympic Dam, July 2012

Dr Gavin Mudd’s report on the option of exporting copper, gold and silver but not uranium from Olympic Dam

Alternative Annuals Reports (PDF): 2009201020112012

Greenhouse emissions – Olympic Dam mine expansion (PDF) – technical paper by Dr Gavin Mudd, Monash University

Radiation leak plan 15 years out of date

WMC’s racism in the 1990s – Jan Whyte and Ila Marks look at how WMC’s activities divide Aboriginal people. Also: 1995 ABC Radio National Background Briefing story about the outbreak of violence in Marree and its connection to the Roxby Downs mine.

Detailed report on Mound Springs and the Roxby mine’s impacts on them (PDF) By Daniel Keane, 1997

Another report on Mound Springs and the Roxby mine’s impacts on them (PDF) By Gavin Mudd

Massive energy consumption and greenhouse emissions.

Bird deaths from the tailings dam

Accidents and incidents 2003-08 (PDF).

Roxby timeline + accidents 1987-2001

WISE Uranium: Issues at Operating Uranium Mines and Mills – Olympic Dam, Australia

SA Parliamentary Inquiry Into The Tailings System Leakage – In 1994, WMC reported that up to 5 million cubic metres of liquid had leaked from it’s Tailings Retention System at Olympic Dam. According to WMC the leak had been happening for at least 2 years but only became fully understood in January 1994.

Environmental Impacts Statement – submission by Friends of the Earth, Adelaide. August 2009 (PDF)

BHP’s operations overseas – undermining the future

BHP’s OLYMPIC DAM – SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCERNS

Olympic Dam is a state within a state; it operates under a unique set of laws enshrined in the amended Roxby Downs Indenture Act. That would be unobjectionable except that the Indenture Act allows Olympic Dam wide-ranging exemptions from environmental laws, water management laws, Aboriginal Heritage laws, and it curtails the application of the Freedom of Information Act.

Then SA Liberal Party industry spokesperson Martin Hamilton-Smith said “every word of the [Indenture] agreement favours BHP, not South Australians.” It beggars belief that the SA Labor government would agree to such one-sided terms; and it beggars belief that Mr Hamilton-Smith and his Liberal colleagues waved it through Parliament with no amendments.

The only politician to insist on some scrutiny of the amended Indenture Act was SA Greens MLC Mark Parnell. He was accused of holding the state’s economy to ransom. Yet the transcripts of his late-night Parliamentary questioning of the Labor government ought to be required reading (see here and here). Time and time again the government spokesperson said that BHP wanted such-and-such a provision in the Indenture Act, and the government simply agreed without further consideration or consultation.

For example, Parnell asked why the Indenture Act retains exemptions from the SA Aboriginal Heritage Act. The government spokesperson said: “BHP were satisfied with the current arrangements and insisted on the continuation of these arrangements, and the government did not consult further than that.”

In a scathing assessment of the Olympic Dam royalties regime enshrined in the Indenture Act, journalist Paul Clearly wrote in The Australian on 21 October 2011 that the regime “has robbed the state’s citizens and all Australians of the opportunity to share in the profits of what will become the world’s biggest mine.” He added that the agreement “will unfortunately stand as a sad and enduring indictment of the weakness of our state governments when it comes to negotiating with powerful mining multinationals.”

Olympic Dam is a state within a state − and it has shades of a Stalinist state. When a mine worker provided the media with photos of multiple leaks in the tailings dams in 2009, BHP’s response was to threaten “disciplinary action” against any workers caught taking photos. The SA government was conspicuously silent. Have the leaks of toxic tailings liquid been fixed? Who knows. It would be naive to believe anything BHP or the state government has to say on the subject.

In 2010, another worker was sufficiently concerned about occupational health issues at Olympic Dam that he leaked information to the media. The leaked documents show that BHP uses manipulated averages and distorted sampling to ensure its official figures of worker radiation exposure slip under the maximum exposure levels set by government. Are those claims true? Who knows. It would be naive to believe anything BHP or the state government has to say on the subject.

The risks will escalate with plans for a massive expansion of the mine. The BHP whistleblower said. “Assertions of safety of workers made by BHP are not credible because they rely on assumptions rather than, for example, blood sampling and, crucially, an assumption that all workers wear a respirator when exposed to highly radioactive polonium dust in the smelter.” [Update – the planned mega-expansion was cancelled in 2012 but expansion plans are still being pursued.]

So there we have a couple of examples of serious concerns being raised by mine workers, with inadequate responses (or no response at all) by BHP and the SA government, and no way for any of us to get to the truth of the matter. Suffice it to mention one more. Mining consultants Advanced Geomechanics noted in a 2004 report that radioactive slurry was deposited “partially off” a lined area of a storage pond at Olympic Dam, contributing to greater seepage and rising ground water levels; that there is no agreed, accurate formula to determine the rate of evaporation of tailings and how much leaks into the ground; and that cells within a tailings pond covered an area more than three times greater than recommended, requiring “urgent remedial measures” (Michelle Wiese Bockmann, 10 March 2006, ‘Waste fears at uranium mine’, The Australian).

Have any of those problems been addressed? I doubt it. But we do know that the management of radioactive tailings has been an ongoing headache for decades and that the rate of production is set to go through the roof − from 10 million tonnes annually to 68 million tonnes. And we do know that BHP has responded to worker concerns about tailings mismanagement with intimidation instead of information.

The domestic problems with Australia’s uranium industry are compounded by serious international problems. Australia has uranium export agreements with nuclear weapons states with no intention of meeting their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty disarmament obligations; countries with a history of secret nuclear weapons research; countries that refuse to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; countries blocking progress on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; undemocratic, and secretive states with appalling human rights records.

Both major parties now support the abandonment of previous policy of refusing uranium exports to countries that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And the federal government is planning to allow uranium sales to a Middle Eastern dictatorship − the United Arab Emirates. The last time Australia planned uranium sales to a Middle Eastern dictatorship was in late 1978 when the Fraser government was negotiating with the Shah of Iran − a few short months before his overthrow during the Iranian Revolution. You’d think we’d learn.

All of these uranium export agreements are accompanied by safeguards inspection regimes that are at best modest, sometimes tokenistic (e.g. China) and sometimes all but non-existent (e.g. Russia).

Australians are evenly divided on the topic of uranium mining; typically, polls find that a majority of Australians want existing uranium mines to be allowed to run their course but a majority want a ban on new uranium mines. A 2006 Newspoll found that a majority of Coalition voters − yes, Coalition voters − wanted a ban on new uranium mines, as did more than three-quarters of Labor voters. Recent polls indicate that two-thirds of Australians oppose uranium sales to nuclear weapons states and two-thirds oppose the plan to sell uranium to India − a country which has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is engaged in a nuclear arms race with Pakistan and China.

ISL uranium mining – environmental impacts

In-Situ Leach (ISL) Uranium Mining Method Far From ‘Benign’

By Dr. Gavin Mudd
Hydrogeologist / Environmental Engineer, Monash University
2007

The mining technique of in situ leaching (ISL), often referred to as solution mining, is becoming an increasingly favoured method for the extraction of uranium across the world. This is primarily due to its low capital and operating costs compared to conventional mining. Little is known about the environmental impact of this method, and mining companies have been able to exploit this to promote the method as “environmentally benign”.

The ISL process involves drilling groundwater bores or wells into a uranium deposit, injecting corrosive chemicals to dissolve the uranium within the ore zone, then pumping back the uranium-laden solution.

The method should only be applied to uranium deposits located within a groundwater system or confined aquifer, commonly in palaeochannel deposits (old buried river beds).

Although ISL is presented in simplified diagrams by the nuclear industry, the reality is that geological systems are inherently complex and not easily predictable.

There are a range of options for the chemistry of the mining solutions. Either acidic or alkaline chemical agents can be used in conjunction with an oxidising agent to dissolve the uranium.

Typical oxidising agents include oxygen or hydrogen peroxide, while alkaline agents include ammonia or sodium-bicarbonate or carbon dioxide. The most common acidic chemical used is sulphuric acid, although nitric acid has been tried at select sites and in laboratory tests.

The chemicals can have serious environmental impacts and cause long-term and potentially irreversible changes to groundwater quality.

The use of acidic solutions mobilises high levels of heavy metals, such as cadmium, strontium, lead and chromium. Alkaline solutions tend to mobilise only a few heavy metals such as selenium and molybdenum. The ability to restore the groundwater to its pre-mining quality is, arguably, easier at sites that have used alkaline solution chemistry.

A review of the available literature on ISL mines across the world can easily counter the myths promulgated about ISL uranium mining. Whether one examines the USA, Germany, Russia and former annexed states, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Australia or new ISL projects across Asia, the truth remains the same – the ISL technique merely treats groundwater as a sacrifice zone and the problem remains “out of sight, out of mind”.

ISL uranium mining is not controllable, is inherently unsafe and is unlikely to meet “strict environmental controls”. It is not an environmentally benign method of uranium mining.

The use of sulphuric acid solutions at ISL mines across Eastern Europe, as well as a callous disregard for sensible environmental management, has led to many seriously contaminated sites.

Perhaps the most severe example is Straz pod Ralskem in the Czech Republic, where up to 200 billion litres of groundwater is contaminated. Restoration of the site is expected to take several decades or even centuries. For the USA, solution escapes outside of the ‘controlled mining zone’ and difficult restorations have been documented at ISL sites in Texas and Wyoming – including both acid and alkaline leach sites. Australia has encountered these same difficulties, especially at the controversial Honeymoon deposit in South Australia during pilot studies in the early 1980s and at Manyingee in Western Australia until 1985.

The Honeymoon pilot project used sulphuric acid in conjunction with ferric sulphate as the oxidising agent. The wells and aquifer experienced significant blockages due to the minerals jarosite and gypsum precipitating, lowering the efficiency of the leaching process and leading to increased excursions. The aquifers in the vicinity of Honeymoon are known to be connected to aquifers used by local pastoralists to water stock.

For Australia, water of any quality is precious – and particularly so when the only secure supply of water in a region is from groundwater. With the rise of water treatment technologies such as desalination, water of any quality is a valuable resource – environmentally as well as for possible community and industry use. An acid leach-type ISL project, especially as approved for Beverley and Honeymoon without remediation of polluted groundwater, therefore imposes a major environmental risk and pollution burden on future users of groundwater in these regions. ISL mining is therefore far from sustainable.

Journal articles, conferences papers etc. by Dr. Mudd on his Monash webpage (last updated 2012) and his RMIT webpage (last updated 2023).


ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION – ROUTINE CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER

This summary is drawn from the Friends of the Earth, Australia submission to the Beverley Four Mile uranium mine application, March 2009.

In-situ leach (ISL) uranium mining involves pumping an acid solution (or an alkaline solution in some cases) into an aquifer. This dissolves the uranium ore and other heavy metals and the solution is then pumped back to the surface. The small amount of uranium is separated at the surface. The liquid radioactive waste – containing radioactive particles, heavy metals and acid – is simply dumped in groundwater.

The 2004 CSIRO report states: “As stated in the Beverley Assessment Report, the bleed solutions, waste solutions from uranium recovery, plant washdown waters and bleed streams from the reverse osmosis plants are collected prior to disposal into the Namba aquifer via disposal wells. These liquid wastes are combined and concentrated in holding/evaporation ponds, with excess injected into selected locations within the mined aquifer. The injected liquid is acidic (pH 1.8 to 2.8) and contains heavy metals and radionuclides originating from the orebody.”

(Taylor, G.; Farrington, V.; Woods, P.; Ring, R.; Molloy, R. (2004): Review of Environmental Impacts of the Acid In-Situ Leach Uranium Mining Process.- CSIRO Land and Water Client Report.)

From being inert and immobile in the ore body, the radionuclides and heavy metals are now bioavailable and mobile in the aquifer.

The volume of liquid waste is discussed in the 7/1/09 Beverley Four Mile Project Public Environment – Report and Mining Lease Proposal document:

“With the inclusion of maximised recycling of water, approximately 2.5 L/s (averaged over a year) of liquid waste will be generated once the Beverley extraction circuits are decommissioned. This will be disposed of at Beverley ML 6321 in the hydraulically isolated formerly mined Beverley Sands aquifers in the North, Central and South wellfields.

“It is noted that initially the Beverley Four Mile resin elution circuit and Beverley ML 6321 capture and elution circuits will operate in parallel. During this time the combined volume of liquid waste will remain within an annualised average rate of 5 L/s.

“At the indicated rate there is enough disposal volume in those three wellfields to accommodate up to 16 years of liquid waste. Additional volume exists in Beverley North East, East and Deep South wellfields. Any extension of liquid waste disposal in these areas would be subject to a successful application to the regulatory authorities using the Beverley Mine Procedure for Management of Liquid Waste Disposal (Appendix C of the MARP, Heathgate 2008c) or its approved successor.”

The Beverley Four Mile proponents have no plans to remediate the polluted aquifer as they say the pollution will ‘attenuate’ – that the aquifer will return to its pre-mining state over time. This claim has been queried by the scientific community as being highly speculative with no firm science behind it.

The 2004 CSIRO report endorsed the dumping of liquid waste in ground-water yet the information and arguments it used in support of that conclusion were tenuous. In short, the CSIRO report exaggerates the problems of pursuing waste management methods other than dumping it in groundwater, and the report trivialises the impacts of dumping liquid waste in groundwater.

The CSIRO report notes that attenuation is “not yet proven” and the timeframe of “several years to decades” could hardly be more vague. The 2004 CSIRO report states in its Executive Summary:

“The use of acid rather than alkaline leaching and disposal of liquid wastes by re-injection into the aquifer is contentious. Available data indicate that both the leach solution and liquid waste have greater concentrations of soluble ions than does the pre-mining groundwater. However as this groundwater has no apparent beneficial use other than by the mining industry, this method of disposal is preferable to surface disposal. Although not yet proven, it is widely believed and accepted that natural attenuation will result in the contaminated water chemistry returning to pre-mining conditions within a timeframe of over several years to decades.”

Elsewhere the 2004 CSIRO report notes uncertainties associated with attenuation:

“The EIA for Beverley and Honeymoon suggest that natural attenuation will occur, however, exact timeframes are not given. The issue of predicting attenuation is made more complex by not fully understanding the microbiological or the mineralogy of the surrounding ore bodies, before and after mining, and how these natural conditions will react with the altered water quality introduced by the injection of leachate, and re-injection of wastewaters. Following general practice, geochemical modelling was undertaken with a series of assumptions where data were not available. Although these assumptions are considered reasonable by the review team, some technical experts have a differing opinion. In any case the results must be considered approximate.

“The monitoring results from Beverley are limited by the short duration of mining and operation, and there are currently no completely mined-out areas for which the water chemistry can be followed after mining to verify the extent of the expected natural attenuation. However, pH results for an area that was trial-mined in 1998 and then left until full-scale mining of the same area was due are shown in Figure 13.

“Note that whilst other data are available for these wells there are not consistent trends in other analytes. There has been little recovery of groundwater chemistry towards background in the test-production wells other than a favourable change for pH. There are presently no equivalent monitoring data for the northern area, which is presently being mined.”

Even if full attenuation does occur over time, it is unlikely to occur in the timeframe of post-mine-closure monitoring proposed by the mining proponent. The 7/1/09 Beverley Four Mile Project Public Environment – Report and Mining Lease Proposal document states:

“Heathgate proposes an initial period of five years from the conclusion of commercial operations to complete the decommissioning of facilities. A monitoring and maintenance program is proposed to run for a further two years, for a total of seven years from the final conclusion of mining activities. The total monitoring period will be reviewed with the regulatory authorities and may be extended.

“Facilities will therefore be fully decommissioned within seven years from the conclusion of the commercial operation. This period includes a post-completion monitoring period for vegetation maintenance, groundwater sampling, drainage repairs and other activities to ensure the long-term permanent rehabilitation of the site.”

The 2004 CSIRO report states: “Natural attenuation is preferred to adjusting the chemistry of the wastewater prior to re-injection as the latter would result in the need for additional chemicals on-site, generation of contaminated neutralisation sludges which would have to be disposed of, risk of potential clogging of pore spaces in the aquifer and associated higher costs.

Those are not insurmountable problems. Moreover there are alternatives to adjusting the chemistry of waste-water then reinjecting it into the aquifer, such as evaporation followed by management of solid wastes. As the CSIRO report notes:

“10.6 Alternatives to Liquid Waste Re-Injection

“Suggestions made during the community consultation process included not re-injecting the liquid wastes into the aquifer, and neutralisation of waste before re-injection.

“Not re-injecting the waste into the aquifer would require either sophisticated water treatment and/or the installation of much larger evaporation ponds. Both would generate solid wastes to be disposed of in a solid waste repository. When the wastes dried out they would become a possible dust source, which could increase the potential radiation exposure of workers, in particular in relation to dust inhalation, but also from radon inhalation and gamma exposure. Environmental radiation levels at the surface would also increase. These are presently negligible issues associated with the existing ISL practices.

“Neutralisation of the waste liquid prior to re-injection would precipitate out some metal salts, which would need to be filtered before re-injection, and be disposed of in a solid waste repository.

“Also following re-injection it is likely that the re-injection bores would rapidly clog owing to precipitation around the bores, as the injected water and existing acidic water in the aquifer interact. Clogging of re-injection wellfields and associated problems with pipelines and pumps may increase the risk of spills due to operational problems with equipment and increased maintenance.”

None of the issues raised by the CSIRO amount to compelling reasons to support dumping liquid waste in groundwater. Some of the reasons cited are absurd and cast serious doubt over the credibility of the CSIRO review – for example dust suppression is simple and inexpensive.

The SA government should:
* conduct or commission a thorough comparative assessment of the options for managing liquid waste.
* insist that the proponents rehabilite the aquifer to pre-mining conditions and insist on monitoring/remediation until pre-mining conditions are achieved.

The 2004 CSIRO report states:

“For the Beverley operation, groundwater monitoring is required to be conducted for seven years after mining to demonstrate that their expectations in regard to natural attenuation are being borne out.

“Research into the use of and ability of chemical amendments to assist with or speed up the processes of natural attenuation processes may be beneficial, especially where the latter may be slow and/or incomplete. This approach may also be of benefit in the case of plant or equipment failure with resultant contamination of soil or shallow aquifers.”

Has any follow-up work been done to investigate the potential to assist or hasten attenuation?

The 2003 Senate References and Legislation Committee report into the regulation of uranium mining in Australia reported “a pattern of under-performance and non-compliance”, it identified “many gaps in knowledge and found an absence of reliable data on which to measure the extent of contamination or its impact on the environment”, and it concluded that changes were necessary “in order to protect the environment and its inhabitants from serious or irreversible damage”. On ISL mining, the 2003 Senate report stated:
            “The Committee is concerned that the ISL process, which is still in its experimental state and introduced in the face of considerable public opposition, was permitted prior to conclusive evidence being available on its safety and environmental impacts.”
“The Committee recommends that, owing to the experimental nature and the level of public opposition, the ISL mining technique should not be permitted until more conclusive evidence can be presented on its safety and environmental impacts.”
“Failing that, the Committee recommends that at the very least, mines utilising the ISL technique should be subject to strict regulation, including prohibition of discharge of radioactive liquid mine waste to groundwater, and ongoing, regular independent monitoring to ensure environmental impacts are minimised.”

In relation to the Beverley mine, Dr. Gavin Mudd, a hydrogeologist based at Monash University, notes: “The critical data which could answer scientific questions concerning contaminant mobility in groundwater has never been released by General Atomics. This is especially important since GA no longer maintain the mine is ‘isolated’ from surrounding groundwater, with desires to expand the mine raising legitimate concerns over the groundwater contamination legacy left at Beverley.”

The 2004 CSIRO report states in its Executive Summary:

“While ISL technology has environmental and safety advantages when projects are well planned and operated (Underhill 1998), there are several acid ISL operations that have been developed and operated with little or no consideration for the environment. The conditions at these sites are a direct consequence of the Soviet-era operation of uranium mines without effective management of environmental aspects of production, without restoration of contaminated areas, much less planning and design for reclamation and long-term containment of wastes. Similar operating conditions without effective pollution control and closure concepts were apparent at uranium sites in other centrally planned economies such as East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary prior to 1990.”

“… The environmental consequences from acid ISL operations under the Soviet-era are significant and a component of the many environmental problems from this era, the majority of which were from mine water/groundwater/tailings/waste rock arising from underground and open cut mines. It is noted that as many of the environmental problems were related to the governance and institutional arrangements of the era, direct comparison with practices in Australia cannot be made.”

However a number of the criticisms made of Soviet-era management apply to uranium mining in SA:
* Captured bureaucracies (e..g PIRSA)
* Slack regulation.
* Political interference (e.g. Rann pre-empting assessment by describing Beverley Four Mile as a “world class” project).
* Orwellian doublespeak (e.g. Peter Garrett describing ISL as “world’s best practice”).

In-situ leach uranium mining

In-situ leach uranium mining in Australia – Beverley, Beverley-Four Mile, Honeymoon etc.

Controversies involving Heathgate and General Atomics and its CEO Neal Blue

In-Situ Leach (ISL) Uranium Mining Method Far From ‘Benign’

Jillian K. Marsh, 2011, “A Critical Analysis of Decision-making Protocols used in Approving a Commercial Mining License for the Beverley Uranium Mine in Adnyamathanha Country: Toward Effective Indigenous Participation in Caring for Cultural Resources.” PhD Environmental Studies Thesis, Department of Geographical and Environmental Studies, The University of Adelaide.

Beverley Four Mile – Friends of the Earth (Australia) submission. 2009

Beverley Four Mile – Friends of the Earth (Adelaide) submission – information regarding ISL mining (PDF)

2002-03 Senate Inquiry – chapter regarding Beverley and Honeymoon ISL mining

Uranium Miners Turning Water Into Liquid Waste

Uranium sales to China

See also the ‘Illusion of Protection‘ document.


Uranium policy a hypocrisy

David Noonan, October 5, 2009

http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/uranium-policy-a-hypocrisy-20091004-ght0.html

As China celebrates the 60th anniversary of communist rule with a slickly orchestrated march down the Avenue of Eternal Peace to Tiananmen Square that featured new nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles, it is a fitting moment to question Australia’s role as uranium supplier to the crouching tiger of our region.

After the United Nations Security Council, with a push from US President Barack Obama, agreed to a historic resolution last month to rid the world of nuclear weapons, Australia needs to consider whether we see our future as supplying China’s uranium market. We also need to assess the broader effects of Australia’s uranium exports on nuclear non-proliferation, regional security and China’s human rights record.

One of Kevin Rudd’s early initiatives as prime minister was to establish the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, co-chaired by former foreign minister Gareth Evans, saying this would be “our gift to the world”.

Unfortunately, Australia can never credibly lead on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament while spreading nuclear risks as one of the world’s largest uranium suppliers. The mismatch between Australia’s rhetoric and the illusion of protection provided by nuclear safeguards is stark in the case of China.

As a uranium exporter, Australia has a responsibility to strengthen nuclear safeguards and to act decisively to disqualify any state that does not fully observe its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. China is modernising – rather than eliminating – its nuclear arsenal and has so far failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China is one country that does not meet its non-proliferation treaty obligations.

BHP Billiton’s plan to expand the Roxby Downs (Olympic Dam) copper and uranium mine is being considered by the federal and South Australian governments. BHP proposes the world’s largest open pit mine as a uranium quarry to fuel the global nuclear industry, with much of its efforts directed towards China. BHP’s plan would see Australia selling uranium-infused bulk copper concentrate for processing in China, transferring more than a million tonnes a year of radioactive waste and thousands of tonnes of uranium.

Australian uranium will effectively disappear off the safeguards radar on arrival in China, a country whose military is inextricably linked to the civilian nuclear sector and where nuclear whistleblowers and critics are brutally suppressed and jailed. This alone is reason to disqualify China from acquiring Australian uranium.

In July, a well-known environmental activist and recipient in 2006 of the prestigious Nuclear-Free Future Award, Sun Xiaodi, and his daughter Sun Dunbai were jailed and sent to a “re-education through labour” camp for their efforts to expose corruption and contamination in China’s nuclear industry.

Sun Xiaodi is a former worker at No. 792 Uranium Mine in Gansu province in north-west China. Since 1988, the whistleblower has travelled repeatedly to Beijing to petition the Government to end corruption in China’s nuclear industry and to speak out for the rights of uranium mine workers.

According to Chinese court documents, the crimes Sun Xiaodi and Sun Dunbai are guilty of include inciting the public with libellous slogans including “nuclear pollution” and “human rights violation”. In reality, Sun Xiaodi and Sun Dunbai are paying a very high price for speaking out.

Australians should recognise that it is not appropriate for us to export uranium to a government that does not tolerate criticism of its nuclear industry and fails to meet minimum international human rights standards. We should also be mindful that our commitments to non-proliferation are in conflict with our “dual use” uranium sales.

Australian uranium produces plutonium – a potent bomb-making material – in nuclear reactors overseas. Australia consents to the separation and stockpiling of this plutonium through the “reprocessing” of spent nuclear fuel waste in a number of countries, including China. While our Government says that the plutonium is only to be used for peaceful purposes, we are in effect being asked to trust this and every future Beijing regime.

Nuclear waste management remains unresolved around the world. With the future of high-level nuclear waste accumulating at reactor sites across the US still unresolved after 50 years of the nuclear industry, how can BHP provide any credible assurances on nuclear waste management in China?

Australia is strutting the international stage claiming credentials as a regional democratic voice, nodding our head in agreement with the US President’s call for the abolition of nuclear weapons, while propping up the nuclear sector in a China that is suppressing human rights, modernising its nuclear weapons arsenal and engaging in building nuclear reactors in Pakistan that will increase plutonium production capacity.

Australia’s reputation and nuclear-safeguard responsibilities should not be further compromised to suit BHP Billiton’s commercial interests. The first shipment of Australian uranium that BHP has now sent to China should be the last.

The only potentially credible future for BHP’s Roxby Down mine and the proposed expansion is to trade only in copper and to leave the uranium and other radioactive wastes at the mine site.

David Noonan is the Australian Conservation Foundation’s nuclear-free campaigner.


China will do what it likes with the uranium we sell it

Mike Steketee, The Australian, April 6, 2006

www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,18721734%255E7583,00.html

JOHN Howard is sparing in his use of superlatives but this week he was moved to describe as “remarkable” the transformation in the relationship between Australia and China.

Indeed. It was only two Liberal governments ago that Australia refused to recognise Red China, as it was commonly referred to. Howard entered parliament in 1974, 18 months after the Whitlam government extended diplomatic recognition and three years after conservatives saw political capital in Gough Whitlam’s visit to China as Opposition leader for talks with premier Zhou Enlai.

“Australia has gained a Chinese candidate, if not a Manchurian candidate, for the prime ministership,” fulminated the National Civic Council’s Bob Santamaria. “In no time at all Mr Zhou had Mr Whitlam on a hook and he played him as a fisherman plays a trout,” said Liberal prime minister William McMahon.

Thirty-five years later, a conservative Government has agreed to sell uranium to China, a country with nuclear weapons which remains a communist dictatorship, albeit a changed one. And Howard, the self-styled most conservative leader the Liberals have had, concedes that, although the safeguards negotiated with China are “very rigorous”, in selling uranium to any country “we have to assume a certain degree of good faith”.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer claimed the safeguards agreements signed by China this week would ensure that Australian uranium would be used “exclusively for peaceful purposes”. The agreements themselves give the lie to that.

As explained in the annual reports of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, uranium is routinely mixed from many sources when it is converted into nuclear fuel, making Australian atoms indistinguishable from the rest. The safeguards agreements do not cover the conversion plants: instead, they require that an equivalent quantity of converted uranium is allocated to a facility, such as an enrichment plant, which is covered by the safeguards. So the argument goes that if Australian uranium were used to make materials for a bomb, it would have no practical effect because an equivalent amount would have been removed.

This is the same agreement we have struck with other countries, including the US, to which we now sell almost 40 per cent of our uranium and which remains the only country to have used nuclear weapons. The safeguards may be strict on paper but enforcement is another matter.

China has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, bringing it under international safeguards, as well as the bilateral ones agreed with Australia.

In fact, it has gone further than the US in bringing into force, as well as signing, the additional protocol that requires increased access to nuclear facilities and more information about nuclear activities.

But China’s history is hardly that of a model nuclear citizen. It has transferred nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and Libya. To adapt Howard’s words, we have to assume a degree of faith that it behaves better in future. As a nuclear weapons state, China chooses which of its facilities are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection.

The international non-proliferation regime is far from watertight, as the IAEA’s Mohamed El Baradei readily acknowledges. He said in a speech last month that IAEA verification operated on an annual budget of about E100 million ($170 million), “a budget comparable to that of a local police department. With these resources, we oversee approximately 900 nuclear facilities in 71 countries. When you consider our growing responsibilities – as well as the need to stay ahead of the game – we are clearly operating on a shoestring budget.”

This is just one of the many challenges El Baradei identified in policing nuclear safeguards. Terrorists had expressed a clear desire to acquire nuclear weapons, he said. In the past decade, the IAEA had recorded more than 650 cases of attempted smuggling of nuclear material. Of 189 signatories to the NPT, 118 still had not brought into force the additional protocol meant to beef up the safeguards. Though disarmament was supposed to be a key goal of the NPT, El Baradei estimated that there were still 27,000 nuclear warheads around the world.

As with other safeguard agreements Australia has negotiated, China cannot enrich uranium greater than 20per cent or reprocess nuclear material – both steps towards making weapons-grade material – without Australian permission. But Australia has never refused a request for reprocessing.

How willing would we be to blow the whistle on China if we suspected it was breaching the safeguards? Not very, judging by how far we are prepared to go to cater to Chinese sensitivities. Police this week went to extraordinary lengths to prevent Falun Gong protesters from polluting the line of sight of visiting Premier Wen Jiabao, even wheeling out the Canberra booze bus to park in front of their banners. If that seems like a small matter, it betrays a larger government attitude.

Of course, Australia already is up to its armpits in the world uranium trade. Refusing to sell to China would not close down its nuclear weapons program, any more than would withholding supplies from the US. Even if we stopped all uranium exports, the world would not quickly become a safer place, given the amount of nuclear material sloshing around. In fact, cutting back access to Australian uranium might have the perverse effect of encouraging more reprocessing and increase the stock of weapons-grade material.

But we should not pretend that we have any control over China’s behaviour. We would be better off putting our efforts into supporting El Baradei’s proposals to take enrichment and reprocessing out of the hands of individual nations and provide them through international facilities.


Uranium exports to China would be a bad risk

Any promises made by China regarding Australian uranium are not to be trusted, says JIM GREEN

Canberra Times, 17/1/06.

A POLL of 1200 Australians last September found that 53 percent were opposed to uranium exports to China, with just 31 percent in favour. Nevertheless, the federal Government is meeting a Chinese delegation in Canberra this week to negotiate a bilateral uranium export agreement.

Some difficult questions arise. What would happen to a whistleblower publicly raising concerns about diversion of materials from China’s nuclear power program to its WMD program? Most likely the same fate as befell Sun Xiaodi, who was concerned about environmental contamination at a uranium mine in north-western China. The non-government organisation Human Rights in China reports that Sun Xiaodi was sacked and harassed, and in April 2005, immediately after speaking to a foreign journalist, he was abducted by state authorities and has not been heard from since.

Beijing’s record of media censorship is equally deplorable. According to Reporters Without Borders, at least 27 journalists were being held in prison at the start of last year, making China the world’s largest prison for journalists. Of the 167 countries surveyed by Reporters Without Borders, China ranked 159th for press freedom.

Uranium sales to China would set a poor precedent. Will we now sell uranium to all repressive, secretive, military states, or just some, or just China?

Clearly we can’t rely on whistleblowers or the Chinese media to inform us of any diversion of Australian uranium for nuclear weapons production. We would be completely reliant on the inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the provisions of the bilateral safeguards agreement being negotiated in Canberra this week.

As a nuclear weapons state, China is not subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. Facilities using Australian uranium would be subject to inspections, but this is no simple matter since ‘our’ uranium is indistinguishable from, and mixed with, uranium sourced elsewhere. Further, the IAEA’s inspection program is chronically under-resourced, so it is unlikely that inspections would be sufficiently numerous and rigorous to provide confidence – let alone certainty – that Australian uranium was not being diverted.

As for the bilateral agreement being negotiated this week, it will probably contain provisions such as a requirement for Australian consent before uranium is enriched beyond 20 percent uranium-235 (highly enriched uranium can be used in nuclear weapons) and a requirement for consent to reprocess spent fuel produced using Australian uranium.

While these provisions are commendable, they have never once been invoked. No customer country has ever sought permission to enrich beyond 20 percent. More importantly, numerous requests to reprocess spent fuel produced from Australian uranium have been received, but they have never once been rejected, even when this leads to the stockpiling of plutonium.

Given that bilateral agreement provisions have been repeatedly watered down, and some key remaining provisions have never once been invoked, it cannot truthfully be claimed that Australia’s uranium export safeguards are better than any in the world. That claim will, however, be made repeatedly this week.

As for the argument that China will simply source uranium from elsewhere if we do not supply it, the argument is morally bankrupt. By the same logic, we might just as well be exporting illegal drugs, or profiting from the detention of political prisoners in China.

Freedom of Information documents released last year reveal that Beijing wants to weaken provisions contained in bilateral agreements, though the detail remains unclear.

Does China want a free hand to enrich uranium or to separate plutonium from spent fuel without seeking Australian consent? Currently, China claims that it is not producing fissile material for its weapons program, but there is no independent verification of the claim.

Perhaps Beijing wants the freedom to transfer Australian uranium, and by-products such as spent fuel and plutonium, to other countries without first seeking Australian consent? That also is an alarming scenario. Beijing joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, and that hopefully represents a lasting change of attitude. But as recently as 2001, the CIA reported that China had provided missile-related items to North Korea and Libya as well as “extensive support” to Pakistan’s nuclear program. In 2003, the US government imposed trade bans on five Chinese firms for selling weapons technology to Iran.

It is not difficult to envisage a scenario whereby the IAEA inspection regime and the bilateral agreement would count for nothing – the most obvious being escalating tension over Taiwan. Beijing promises military action in the event that Taipei declares independence, and Washington promises a military reaction in which Australia could become embroiled. The bilateral agreement would not be worth the paper it’s written on.

Former diplomat Professor Richard Broinowski has voiced his concern that by exporting uranium to China, we could free up China’s limited domestic reserves for military use. Comments made in December by China’s ambassador to Australia, Madame Fu Ying, strengthen this concern. The ambassador reportedly told a Melbourne Mining Club luncheon that China has sufficient uranium for its military program but not enough to accommodate both its military and civil requirements.

Dr. Jim Green is a campaigner with the newly-formed Beyond Nuclear Initiative, a collaboration between the Poola Foundation (Tom Kantor Fund), Friends of the Earth and the Australian Conservation Foundation.


Mate, I nuked myself in the foot

Editorial – Taipei Times – Taiwan
Jan 21, 2006

The Australian newspaper on Wednesday reported that an Australian government source has privately admitted that Canberra cannot prevent Beijing from using uranium bought from Australia in its nuclear arsenal, should the two countries strike a trade deal.

But this minor hitch is not likely to stop sales of uranium to China, because Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) seems to believe, in all seriousness, that China would honor an agreement in which the “use of [Australian uranium] for nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices, military nuclear propulsion [or] depleted uranium munitions will be proscribed,” as a DFAT spokesperson put it.

Whether or not Aussie uranium goes directly into Chinese warheads — or whether it is used in power stations in lieu of uranium that goes into Chinese warheads — makes little difference. Canberra is about to do a deal with a regime with a record of flouting international conventions, notwithstanding the increased oversight that comes with participation in global bodies.

One can almost hear the Australian government’s saliva collecting in its mouth at the prospect of selling billions of dollars of uranium from its huge reserves to an eager customer for decades to come.

Never mind that the customer is an unstable Third World despot with a big chip on its shoulder — and the owner of nuclear warheads and other munitions pointing in potentially inconvenient directions for Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Russia, India and Taiwan, not to mention US bases in the region.

The question that follows is whether Australia can be trusted to do not only the lucrative thing for itself, but also the smart thing for the region when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation. The answer appears to be “no.”

We can expect to hear a lot of highfalutin language from Australia in the weeks to come about the need to modernize China and the role “clean” nuclear energy can play in a country desperate for fuel.

Such “global citizen” shtick won’t wash. All of this is happening as evidence emerges of tawdry connections between DFAT and the Australian Wheat Board, which is under investigation for feeding massive bribes to Iraqi officials while former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was still in power.

What confidence is there to be had in Canberra now that we know Prime Minister John Howard misled the public about the dangers of non-existent Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and lectured on the moral certitude of an invasion, at the same time as people with close government connections — with possible government knowledge — were spreading bags of filthy lucre across Baghdad and beyond?

In China’s case, Canberra has been setting itself up for a sublime strategic fall for some time, with Washington increasingly concerned that Australia might act in a manner that would compromise regional stability, and US strategy in particular.

Were it not so preoccupied with “homeland security” and the grim situation in Iraq, perhaps Washington could better recognize the folly of its deputy sheriff in Asia profiting handsomely from the potential acceleration of China’s nuclear militarization.

“She’ll be right, mate,” is the cry from an Australian who would seek to soothe the tempers of people around him and shut down an embarrassing conversation.

To which Taiwanese can only reply, “It’s not right, and you’re not my mate.”


China’s money blinds many to danger

February 10, 2006, Sydney Morning Herald

www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/chinas-money-blinds-many-to-danger/2006/02/09/1139465796018.html

It is wrong to trust the regime when it says it will not use Australian uranium for weapons, writes Yu Jie.

FOR the past few years, Western countries have gradually lost their vigilance toward the Chinese Communist Party regime. Western countries investing in China have become the greatest help to the maintenance of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic growth.
This is particularly the case with the lopsided development of Shanghai, whose economic bubble is for the most part driven by Western investment.
Western government and business circles are like the ostrich, pretending they cannot see the reality of China’s political system, pretending they don’t know the appalling human rights catastrophe now happening in China, such as the ruthless persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and the Christians worshipping in household churches – more than 100 million citizens pursuing freedom of belief.
This kind of persecution didn’t just happen in the Middle Ages; it’s happening in China today.
The Western policy of appeasement is driven by economic interest. In order to sell China Airbuses and high-speed trains, the French President, Jacques Chirac, when he visited China, shamelessly said the Tiananmen incident belongs to the past century and we should let bygones be bygones.
In the greatest rebuke to him, not long after Chirac returned to France, the Chinese communist authorities opened fire on villagers in Dongzhou in Guangdong province. The Tiananmen incident remains China’s bloody reality.
The French and German governments have for a time energetically campaigned for the European Union to lift the embargo on selling weapons to China, but the regime is one that maintains its political rule by killing people.
I can be regarded only as a nominal citizen. I am 32 this year, but I have never participated in an election – not an election of the head of state nor an election of the mayor. Not even once.
The legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party rule does not come from elections; it comes from military might. The founder of the party, Mao Zedong, once openly declared: “Political power comes from the barrel of a gun.” There has not been any change in this principle today.
One aspect of the party authorities’ foreign policy is to politely propagandise the foreign policy of China’s peaceful rise to the people of the West.
Another aspect is to deliberately let Zhu Chenghu, the head of the National Defence University’s Defence Academy and a People’s Liberation Army major-general, issue an aggressive threat to the whole world, in asserting that China can launch a nuclear war on the West, particularly the United States.
Zhu Chenghu is a crown prince of pure lineage, the grandson of the founder of the Chinese Red Army, Zhu De. According to the Chinese Communist Party ruling principle that “the party commands the gun”, it is not possible for a mere major-general to issue this kind of individual opinion on his own.
Even in a Western country with freedom of expression, a high-ranking military general cannot indiscreetly make his personal views about a nation’s nuclear policy known in a public forum.
Zhu’s views must therefore have received silent approval from the highest authorities – even from the nation’s President, Hu Jintao. It’s just like a master unleashing a fierce and vengeful dog to threaten the neighbours.
But Australian authorities blithely plan to export uranium ore to this highly dangerous regime, one side willingly believing a series of agreements, which China signed, that this uranium ore will not be used for military purposes.
But when have the Communist Party authorities genuinely respected international agreements?
The European Union should not lift the weapons embargo against China, and Australia should not export uranium ore to China.
This shortsighted behaviour can in the short term bring a definite economic benefit. But in the long term it will inevitably endanger world peace.
Yu Jie, the co-founder and vice-president of Independent Chinese PEN Centre, is a writer and intellectual based in Beijing. Translation by Chip Rolley.


Uranium to China could go in nukes

Dan Box, The Australian, January 18, 2006

GOVERNMENT officials negotiating the sale of Australian uranium to China admit there is no guarantee it will never be used in nuclear weapons.
Australian diplomats, due to meet their Chinese counterparts today in Canberra, are expected to push for China to agree to safeguards similar to those signed by other nuclear weapons states that buy Australian uranium, such as the US, Britain and France.
The agreements are designed to prevent the use of Australian uranium in nuclear weapons. However, they allow countries with both nuclear power and nuclear weapons programs to mix Australian uranium with uranium from different sources.
The safeguards state only that an equivalent amount of uranium bought from Australia – designated Australian obligated nuclear material (AONM) – is not used in nuclear weapons.
This means Australian uranium can be mixed with uranium from other sources provided a portion of the total, matching the size of the Australian export, is used only for nuclear energy.
Australian officials admit the system means it is possible for Australian uranium to end up being used in the production of nuclear weapons.
“On an atom-for-atom basis it is theoretically possible,” a government source said.
A spokesman for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said yesterday Australian negotiators would insist that safeguards preventing the use of AONM in weapons production would be a condition of any trade in uranium to China.
“Use of AONM for nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices, military nuclear propulsion (or) depleted uranium munitions will be proscribed,” he said.
Responsibility for monitoring the use of AONM is held by the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, whose director-general, John Carlson, is leading the talks in Canberra.
The office already accepts there is public concern the AONM principle means Australian uranium may end up being used in nuclear weapons. “This overlooks the realities of the situation, that uranium atoms are indistinguishable from one another and there is no practical way of attaching flags to atoms,” it says in a 2000 report.
Critics of the current negotiations also argue that any export deal will allow China to use Australian uranium for its energy, diverting more of its existing uranium supplies to its weapons program.
In December, Chinese ambassador to Australia Fu Ying told an audience at the Melbourne Mining Club that China had enough uranium resources to support its weapons program but would need to import more to meet its power demands.
China is planning a significant expansion of its nuclear energy program.
The Uranium Information Centre says China gets about half its uranium needs from its own mines – about 750 tonnes – with the balance imported from Kazakhstan, Russia and Namibia in Africa.
Today’s talks are the result of years of informal negotiations between government and industry on both sides.
WMC Resources, the former owner of the Olympic Dam uranium mine in South Australia, lobbied Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in 2004 to open up discussions on an export safety agreement.
While Australia sits on about 40 per cent of the world’s known uranium reserves, the industry’s attempts to profit from this have suffered under longstanding Labor policy restricting mine development.
A number of senior party figures, including federal Opposition resources spokesman Martin Ferguson, support a change in the policy, widely expected to be debated at the ALP conference next year. This would be a significant step towards overturning restrictions on uranium development in place in individual Labor-held states.
“It’s hard to accept that under the current policy we can, by 2011 or so, have the largest uranium mine in the world (at Olympic Dam) and be potentially the largest exporter of uranium in the world but, at the same time, say that some other little uranium mine which is a pip on the horizon can’t be developed,” Mr Ferguson said.


New China syndrome

The Bulletin, 02/01/2006,
bulletin.ninemsn.com.au/bulletin/site/articleIDs/8B9E747B1188D978CA257103000722FD (dead link)

If Australia wins a contract to supply uranium to China, it may very well wind up supplying material for nuclear weapons. Paul Daley reports.

So you thought Doctor Strangelove died in the rubble of the Berlin Wall? And the N-bomb menace? About as relevant, you say, as Sting bleating on about the Russians loving their children, too? Prepare for a frightening truth. The New Terrorism that ushered in the 21st century with such terrible effect courtesy of suicide bombers and hijacked passenger planes is fast being superseded by a renewed global nuclear threat.
And it’s not just terrorist groups like al-Qaeda who want to acquire or are threatening to use nuclear weapons. It seems the most onerous sabre-rattling today comes from the original nuclear powers – including China, France and the United States – and newcomers like Israel, Iran, Pakistan and India, which are developing, or already have, their own nukes.
Australia, which owns 40% of the world’s established uranium stocks, is central to the future of global nuclear power and, therefore, to weapons proliferation. China, an emerging superpower and repressive military regime with arguably little distinction between its nuclear energy and weapons programs, is energetically engaged in multi-billion-dollar negotiations with Canberra to buy Australian uranium to fuel its nuclear reactors. It plans to spend up to $40bn on a new program to ensure nuclear fuel provides up to 4% of its voracious domestic energy needs by 2010.
While the deal is worth potentially $450m a year to Australia’s uranium producers, it will be incumbent upon our political leaders to convince us of the virtually impossible – that any atomic material derived from Australian yellowcake sent to China is used solely for peaceful purposes. At the outset of diplomatic negotiations between Beijing and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on January 17 over the proposed Australia-China Nuclear Co-operation Treaty, Australian officials and politicians talked tough: Australia would insist on stringent “safeguards”, they said, to ensure China couldn’t use our uranium for weapons. But that’s impossible to guarantee. Impossible, because any Australian safeguards will be predicated on the fundamentally flawed safety regime of the UN’s Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, which makes inspections of nuclear facilities optional for the five original nuclear weapons states, namely the US, Britain, Russia, France – and China.
In the past few months everything old, at least in the world of weapons of mass destruction, has become new again, as threats and counter-threats of nuclear strikes have issued forth across the globe.
This month, apropos of little, soon-to-be-former French President Jacques Chirac announced Paris reserved the right to use its nuclear arsenal, its force de frappe, against state-sponsored terrorists. This coincided with Israel’s thinly veiled warning that it might launch a nuclear strike against new global bad boy, Iran, if Tehran continued to defiantly pursue its quest to enrich uranium, a critical process in the production of nuclear power – and N-bombs. An overreaction? Just late last year the new Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, did, after all, declare that Israel should be “wiped off the map”. Could this have been anything but a nuclear threat?
All the while China, fast becoming enough of a military and trade colossus to spook the US, last year warned Washington that its intervention in any military conflict over Taiwan would be met with a nuclear response.
“If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition onto the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons,” said Zhu Chenghu, a general in the People’s Liberation Army.
“We, Chinese, will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all the cities east of Xian.Of course, the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese.”
This reverberated in Washington and Taipei, where there is growing alarm over Australia’s negotiations with China.
The Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council, Professor Parris Chang, told The Bulletin that Australia could become an unwitting “accomplice” in China’s nuclear weapons program and should not trust Beijing’s assurances that its nuclear energy and weapons programs are distinct. He also stridently criticised Australia for having “east-tilted” towards China and for putting trade with Beijing ahead of regional security.
“China’s assurance is not that valuable because we know China’s record of proliferation … and, yes, we know of China’s [nuclear technology] assistance to Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Pakistan. And so we look [at] what China is doing instead of just what China is saying,” Chang says.
“Certainly, Australia doesn’t want to be seen as an accomplice in China’s manufacturing of nuclear weapons because the sale of uranium to China, even though the Chinese say this is for nuclear power use, well … the so-called peaceful use of the uranium could be transferred to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
“Australia also ought to place a great emphasis on the peace and security of the South-East Asian area. In recent years we have noticed that Australia has almost east-tilted towards China because of trade considerations … even for the purpose of business, for the interests of Australia, [Taiwan thinks] that really, peace and security in East Asia would be very important.”
Concerns such as Chang’s which, diplomatic sources maintain, are also held (albeit more discreetly) in the Pentagon, will, ironically, only make the prospect of a uranium deal with Australia all the sweeter for China.
One insider to the negotiations told- The Bulletin that while Beijing’s priority was to secure a deal, “it will happily drive a wedge between Washington and Canberra on China policy and security policy relating to Taiwan.
“There is much more riding on this for China than just a uranium deal.”
China is, indeed, playing a deft game with Canberra. It has been underscored almost from the outset by an implied threat that if it gets too difficult, Beijing will take its fantastically lucrative business elsewhere. Beijing also made it clear well before formal negotiations began that it would play hard-ball on safeguards and would not subject itself to further – or perhaps any – IAEA inspections in relation to Australian uranium.
Last September, China’s leading arms control official, Zhang Yan, refused to say if Beijing would allow IAEA inspections as part of the safeguards governing the import of Australian uranium.
“I can’t give you an affirmative guarantee to that,” he told The Australian.
Last December, meanwhile, China’s ambassador to Australia, Madam Fu Ying, reportedly told almost 600 of Australia’s leading mining executives that Australia needed to prove it was a “reliable” uranium supplier if it wanted the business.
“China really needs to be careful in where it chooses its source of supply,” Fu said, adding that the “political environment” of supplier countries was a key factor.
“We don’t want this trade to be interrupted by other factors,” she said.
While the Chinese embassy did not respond to The Bulletin’s repeated requests to interview Fu, insiders say she was effectively warning Australia not to complicate the deal with political bickering over safeguards or, indeed, the merits and safety of nuclear power.
It’s an argument likely to appeal to the pro-mining, pro-nuclear energy Foreign Minister Alexander Downer who, with the imprimatur of John Howard, strongly favours exporting Australian uranium to responsible buyers. The Chinese have gone out of their way to fete Downer over this deal.
“Australia holds the world’s largest uranium reserves, which enables us to make a major contribution to global energy production,” he said in a major speech late last year. “It also means we have the responsibility and the opportunity to have a strong input on international efforts to counter proliferation of nuclear materials.”
Downer and Howard will also be acutely mindful that any public debate on Australian uranium exports will draw attention to deep divisions in the Labor Party over its unworkable 1995 No New Mines Policy, which limits uranium production to the three existing mines – the giant Olympic Dam (which has a third of the world’s uranium reserves) and Beverley mines in South Australia, and the Northern Territory’s Ranger mine. Labor’s state leaders have been seriously at odds over uranium policy. Some opponents, including Western Australia’s recently retired premier Geoff Gallop, argued uranium mining opened the possibility of fissile material falling into the hands of terrorists. Others, like former NSW premier Bob Carr, have been more equivocal while Gallop’s replacement, Alan Carpenter, foreshadowed a change to WA Labor’s stance on uranium mining when he took over. Uranium stocks spiked.
Washington has made it clear it expects Australian military support in the event of any conflict with China over Taiwan. But could, as critics maintain, fissile material derived from Australian uranium find its way into Chinese nuclear warheads fired at American – or indeed, Australian – interests in such circumstances?
The answer, it seems, is yes.
Sources maintain that Australian officials, led by the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office – the section of our foreign service charged with ensuring Australian Obligated Nuclear Material is used solely for peaceful means – expect China will ultimately comply with what are in reality relatively relaxed safeguards imposed on other established nuclear weapons states, like Britain and the US, that have purchased our uranium. While the regulations allow export to countries, such as China, with both nuclear weapons and energy programs, such countries are only required to prove that the equivalent amount of yellowcake – as opposed to the specific uranium in the shipment – is used solely for power generation.
Any Australian uranium imported by China can, therefore, be mixed with uranium from elsewhere and used to make weapons – so long as a portion of the total, equal to the size of the Australian take, is demonstrably used solely for energy production.
As ASNO noted in a 2000 report: “Uranium atoms are indistinguishable from one another and there is no practical way of attaching flags to atoms.”
Since the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which made possession of nuclear weapons the sole prerogative of China and the other nuclear weapons states – the Club of Five – other states must subject themselves to IAEA inspections if they wish to acquire nuclear technology.
Numerous countries – including North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, India and now Iran – have covertly developed nuclear weapons while enriching uranium for energy.
The inherent bias of the IAEA safeguards towards the Club of Five underpins the safety guidelines for Australian uranium exports, because only states outside the club are subject to additional international protocols of random inspection and verification.
Despite much conjecture, it remains unclear what safeguards China will ultimately accept. China has indicated it would prefer Australian officials – rather than IAEA inspectors – to enforce any requisite safeguards attached to the Australian deal.
A DFAT spokeswoman confirmed to The Bulletin that the safeguards being sought by Australia in relation to the proposed uranium deal were based on those of the IAEA.
She said Australia was confident that, in the event of a deal, no Australian uranium would make its way into China’s weapons program. “Consistent with other similar agreements China will be required to give a binding treaty-level commitment to use Australian uranium solely for peaceful purposes. Military purposes will be proscribed. It should be noted that Australian uranium would not be supplied to China for unspecified purposes, but would be sold to Chinese power utilities for electricity generation.”
In the event of a deal, the spokeswoman said, Australians would not carry out inspections. “Under arrangements anticipated, the IAEA would conduct inspections – ASNO would monitor the flow of Australian nuclear material in China through nuclear accountancy, analysis of reporting provided by counterparts, and other relevant information.”
The Australian Conservation Foundation, which opposes nuclear power and uranium exports, is stepping up its campaign against the Australia-China Nuclear Co-operation Treaty. It says all states should be subject to the additional safeguards.
“Our understanding is that a deal is being put forward whereby China will be expected to sign up to the existing safeguard regime, that is a non-binding agreement that will allow China to exclude certain facilities from inspection or opt out, citing national security, altogether,” says the ACF’s David Noonan.
“The ACF is also concerned that China – which, according to a US Congressional report has exported weapons technology to Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, Libya and Syria – does not make a real distinction between its nuclear weapons and energy programs and is opposed to any transparency in the process.”
Despite the ambiguity surrounding China’s nuclear programs, others argue that supplying uranium to China for energy simply frees up other uranium for weapons.
“Yes, sure, of course, unavoidably so – unless China were swimming in such a glut of uranium that it would never consider importing any. But if it is considering importing, then it presumably would not easily have enough for all its needs – civilian and military – without those imports,” says Norman Rubin, director of Nuclear Research at Energy Probe, an anti-nuclear think-tank in Canada, another country negotiating uranium exports to China.
“In those circumstances, even if every atom of Australian uranium can be proved to have ended up in civilian use, Australia would still be helping China to meet its needs for military explosive uranium. One might as well argue that Australians should send money to al-Qaeda for flight training lessons, but not for knives or guns. In fact, sending money to al-Qaeda for textbooks and medicines and food and childcare is probably illegal in Australia, as it should be, because it will inevitably increase their ability to buy explosives and box-cutters.”
“The bottom line,” says the figure involved in the Beijing–Canberra negotiations, “is that China has enough uranium supplies for power or weapons, but not both, to last until 2020.”
The talks between Australia and China will continue in the weeks ahead, but our insider describes the deal as a fait accompli.
All of which might give Sting something new (or should that be old?) to sing about.

Australia’s uranium customer countries

Australia has uranium export agreements with:

* All of the ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states (USA, UK, China, France, Russia), none of which is serious about fulfilling its disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

* India ‒ which has not signed or ratified the NPT, has not signed or ratified the CTBT, continues to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons and to expand its weapons arsenal and to expand its missile capabilities.

* countries with a history of weapons-related research based on their civil nuclear programs (such as South Korea and Taiwan)

* countries that have not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (China, USA)

* countries blocking progress on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (e.g. USA).

* undemocratic, secretive states with appalling human rights records (e.g. China, Russia, United Arab Emirates).

Australian governments, and uranium companies operating in Australia, are disinterested in lax nuclear safety standards in uranium customer countries. The most dramatic illustration of this was the fact that Australian uranium was in the Fukushima reactors during the explosions, meltdowns and fires in March 2011. They knew about the grossly inadequate nuclear safety standards in Japan, and the grossly inadequate regulation of Japan’s nuclear industry, but they did nothing about it and continued to sell uranium to TEPCO and other Japanese companies.

Ukraine – India – Russia – China – United Arab Emirates – South Korea – Japan

Australia’s uranium sales fuel insecurity (2-page briefing note by David Noonan, Feb. 2021).

Uranium sales to Ukraine

Uranium sales to India


Uranium sales to Russia

Uranium sales to China

Uranium sales to United Arab Emirates


Uranium sales to South Korea

Nuclear corruption and the partial reform of South Korea’s nuclear mafia

South Korea: Nuclear scandal widens


Uranium sales to Japan

Australian uranium fuelled Fukushima (March 2021 article in The Ecologist)

Australia’s role in the Fukushima disaster (older articles)

Radioactive by-products of Australian uranium spew out from Fukushima (2011)


Australian uranium fuelled Fukushima

Jim Green and David Noonan, The Ecologist, 9 March 2021

https://theecologist.org/2021/mar/09/australian-uranium-fuelled-fukushima

The Fukushima nuclear disaster was fuelled by Australian uranium but lessons have not been learned and the uranium industry ‒ aided and abetted by the national government ‒ continues to fuel global insecurity with irresponsible uranium export policies.

Fukushima was an avoidable disaster, fuelled by Australian uranium and the hubris and profiteering of Japan’s nuclear industry in collusion with compromised regulators and captured bureaucracies.

The Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission ‒ established by the Japanese Parliament ‒ concluded in its 2012 report that the accident was “a profoundly man-made disaster that could and should have been foreseen and prevented” if not for “a multitude of errors and wilful negligence that left the Fukushima plant unprepared for the events of March 11”.

The accident was the result of “collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO”, the Commission found.

Overseas suppliers

But overseas suppliers who turned a blind eye to unacceptable nuclear risks in Japan have largely escaped scrutiny or blame. Australia’s uranium industry is a case in point.

Yuki Tanaka from the Hiroshima Peace Institute noted: “Japan is not the sole nation responsible for the current nuclear disaster. From the manufacture of the reactors by GE to provision of uranium by Canada, Australia and others, many nations are implicated.”

There is no dispute that Australian uranium was used in the Fukushima reactors. The mining companies won’t acknowledge that fact — instead they hide behind claims of “commercial confidentiality” and “security”.

But the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office acknowledged in October 2011 that: “We can confirm that Australian obligated nuclear material was at the Fukushima Daiichi site and in each of the reactors — maybe five out of six, or it could have been all of them”.

BHP and Rio Tinto, two of the world’s largest mining companies, supplied Australian uranium to TEPCO and that uranium was used to fuel Fukushima.

The mining companies have failed to take any responsibility for the catastrophic impacts on Japanese society that resulted from the use of their uranium in a poorly managed, poorly regulated industry.

They can’t claim ignorance

Moreover, the mining companies can’t claim ignorance. The warning signs were clear. Australia’s uranium industry did nothing as TEPCO and other Japanese nuclear companies lurched from scandal to scandal and accident to accident.

The uranium industry did nothing in 2002 when it was revealed that TEPCO had systematically and routinely falsified safety data and breached safety regulations for 25 years or more.

The uranium industry did nothing in 2007 when over 300 incidents of ‘malpractice’ at Japan’s nuclear plants were revealed (104 of them at nuclear power plants).

It did nothing even as the ability of Japan’s nuclear plants to withstand earthquakes and tsunamis came under growing criticism from industry insiders and independent experts.

And the uranium industry did nothing about the multiple conflicts of interest plaguing Japanese nuclear regulators.

“Deeply saddened”

Mirarr senior Traditional Owner Yvonne Margarula ‒ on whose land in the Northern Territory Rio Tinto’s Ranger uranium mine operated ‒ said she was “deeply saddened” that uranium from Ranger was exported to Japanese nuclear power companies including TEPCO.

No such humility from the uranium companies. They get tetchy at any suggestion of culpability, with the Australian Uranium Association describing it as “opportunism in the midst of human tragedy” and “utter nonsense”.

Yet, Australia could have played a role in breaking the vicious cycle of mismanagement in Japan’s nuclear industry by making uranium exports conditional on improved management of nuclear plants and tighter regulation.

Even a strong public statement of concern would have been heard by the Japanese utilities (unless it was understood to be rhetoric for public consumption) and it would have registered in the Japanese media.

But the industry stuck its head in the sand

But the uranium industry denied culpability and instead stuck its head in the sand. Since the industry is in denial about its role in fuelling the Fukushima disaster, there is no reason to believe that it will behave more responsibly in future.

Successive Australian governments did nothing about the unacceptable standards in Japan’s nuclear industry. Julia Gillard ‒ Australia’s Prime Minister at the time of the Fukushima disaster ‒ said the disaster “doesn’t have any impact on my thinking about uranium exports”.

‘Nuclear village’

Signification elements of Japan’s corrupt ‘nuclear village’ ‒ comprising industry, regulators, politicians and government agencies ‒ were back in control just a few years after the Fukushima disaster. Regulation remains problematic.

Add to that ageing reactors, and companies facing serious economic stress and intense competition, and there’s every reason for ongoing concern about nuclear safety in Japan.

Professor Yoshioka Hitoshi, a Kyushu University academic who served on the government’s 2011-12 Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, said in October 2015:

“Unfortunately, the new regulatory regime is … inadequate to ensure the safety of Japan’s nuclear power facilities. The first problem is that the new safety standards on which the screening and inspection of facilities are to be based are simply too lax.

“While it is true that the new rules are based on international standards, the international standards themselves are predicated on the status quo.

“They have been set so as to be attainable by most of the reactors already in operation. In essence, the NRA made sure that all Japan’s existing reactors would be able to meet the new standards with the help of affordable piecemeal modifications ‒ back-fitting, in other words.”

Fuelling global insecurity

In the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon called for an independent cost-benefit inquiry into uranium trade. The Australian government failed to act.

Inadequate regulation was a root cause of the Fukushima disaster yet Australia has uranium supply agreements with numerous countries with demonstrably inadequate nuclear regulation, including China, India, Russia, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Ukraine.

Likewise, Australian uranium companies and the government turn a blind eye to nuclear corruption scandals in countries with uranium supply agreements: South Korea, India, Russia and Ukraine among others.

Uranium sales to India, UAE, Ukraine

Indeed, Australia has signed up to expand its uranium trade to sell into insecure regions.

In 2011 ‒ the same year as the Fukushima disaster ‒ the Australian government agreed to to allow uranium exports to India.

This despite inadequate nuclear regulation in India, and despite India’s ongoing expansion of its nuclear weaponry and delivery capabilities.

A uranium supply agreement with the United Arab Emirates was concluded in 2013 despite the obvious risks of selling uranium into a politically and militarily volatile region where nuclear facilities have repeatedly been targeted by adversaries intent on stopping covert nuclear weapons programs. Australia was planning uranium sales to the Shah of Iran months before his overthrow in 1979.

A uranium supply agreement with Ukraine was concluded in 2016 despite a host of safety and security concerns, and the inability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out safeguards inspections in regions annexed by Russia. (In 2014, Australia banned uranium sales to Russia, with then Prime Minister Tony Abbott stating: “Australia has no intention of selling uranium to a country which is so obviously in breach of international law as Russia currently is.”)

China

Australia’s uranium supply agreement with China, concluded in 2006, has not been reviewed despite abundant evidence of inadequate nuclear safety standards, inadequate regulation, lack of transparency, repression of whistleblowers, world’s worst insurance and liability arrangements, security risks, and widespread corruption.

Civil society and NGO’s are campaigning to wind back Australia’s atomic exposures in the uranium trade with emphasis on uranium sales to China.

China’s human rights abuses and a range of strategic insecurity issues warrant a cessation of uranium sales. China’s ongoing human rights abuses in Tibet and mass detention and forced labour against Uyghurs in Xinjiang are severe breaches of international humanitarian law and UN Treaties.

China proliferated nuclear weapons know-how to Pakistan, targets Australia in cyber-attacks, and is causing regional insecurity on the India border, in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and in the Pacific.

BHP’s Olympic Dam is the only company still selling Australian uranium into China. There is a case for the ‘Big Australian’ to forego uranium sales overall and an onus to end sales to China.

A federal Parliamentary Inquiry in Australia is investigating forced labour in China and the options for Australia to respond. A case is before this Inquiry to disqualify China from supply of Australian uranium sales (see submission 02 on human rights abuses and submission 02.1 on security risks).

Weapons proliferation risks

Australia supplies uranium with scant regard for nuclear safety risks. Likewise, proliferation risks are given short shrift.

Australia has uranium export agreements with all of the ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states – the U.S., U.K., China, France, Russia – although not one of them takes seriously its obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue disarmament in good faith.

Australia claims to be working to discourage countries from producing fissile (explosive) material for nuclear bombs, but nonetheless exports uranium to countries blocking progress on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

And Australia gives Japan open-ended permission to separate and stockpile plutonium although that stockpiling fans regional proliferation risks and tensions in North-East Asia.

An industry in decline

Despite liberal export policies, Australian uranium sales are in long-term decline and now represent only 8.9 percent of world uranium usage.

With the Ranger mine shut down and no longer processing ore for uranium exports, there are only two operating uranium mines in Australia: BHP’s Olympic Dam copper-uranium mine and the smaller General Atomics’ Beverley Four Mile operation ‒ both in South Australia.

Uranium accounts for less than 0.3 percent of Australia’s export revenue and less than 0.1 percent of all jobs in Australia.

One wonders why an industry that delivers so little is given carte blanche by the government to do as it pleases.

Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia. David Noonan is an independent environment campaigner. 


How low can Australia go with uranium export policy?

Jim Green, 9 December 2011, Online Opinion

http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=12991&page=0

How low can Australia go with uranium export policy? We now have uranium export agreements with all of the ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states – the U.S., U.K., China, France, Russia – although not one of them takes seriously its obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue disarmament in good faith. That weakness, among others, is now being used to justify disregarding the NPT altogether with sales to India. Selling uranium to countries in breach of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms violates Australian government policy and binding Labor platform policy. That’s pretty low.

We claim to have championed the adoption of ‘Additional Protocols’, agreements that provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with somewhat greater powers to uncover covert weapons programs. But we waited until all of our customer countries had an Additional Protocol in place before making it a condition of uranium sales; that’s not leveraging improvements in the safeguards regime, it’s low-brow PR.

We claim to be working to discourage countries from producing fissile (explosive) material for nuclear bombs, yet we export uranium to countries blocking progress on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. And we give Japan permission to separate and stockpile plutonium although that stockpiling has fanned regional proliferation risks and tensions in North-East Asia for many years.

In 1993, cables from the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo posed these questions: “Can Japan expect that if it embarks on a massive plutonium recycling program that Korea and other nations would not press ahead with reprocessing programs? Would not the perception of Japan’s being awash in plutonium and possessing leading edge rocket technology create anxiety in the region?”

Australia’s response? We have weakened the previous policy of requiring case-by-case permission to separate and stockpile plutonium, and we now give Japan open-ended permission. That’s pretty low. In theory, Australia has a relatively ‘strict’ policy of requiring Australian consent to separate and stockpile plutonium produced from Australian uranium. In practice we have failed when put to the test and permission to separate plutonium has never once been refused.

We sell uranium to countries with a recent history of weapons-related research. In 2004, South Korea disclosed information about a range of weapons-related R&D over the preceding 20 years. Australia has supplied South Korea with uranium since 1986. We don’t know whether Australian uranium or its by-products were used in any of the illicit research in South Korea. The attitude from the Howard government and its safeguards office was ‘see no evil, hear no evil’.

The 2006 approval to sell uranium to China set another new low: uranium sales to an undemocratic, secretive state with an appalling human rights record (such as jailing nuclear whistle-blowers). That precedent was reinforced with the subsequent approval of uranium sales to Russia (another undemocratic nuclear weapons state, though Russia prefers to deal with dissidents by poisoning them with radioactive polonium).

The Russian agreement set a new low: uranium sales to a country that is very rarely visited by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspectors – just two inspections over the past decade. Federal parliament’s treaties committee recommended against uranium sales to Russia until some sort of safeguards system was put in place, only to have its recommendation ignored.

Another new low with the Russian agreement: we granted permission to Russia to process Australian uranium at a nuclear plant that is entirely beyond the scope of IAEA inspections. The IAEA has no authority to inspect the plant even if it had the resources and the inclination to do so.

The decision to sell to India sets a new low: uranium sales to a country which is outside the NPT altogether and is not subject to the requirement of the ‘declared’ weapons states to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. As former Defence Department Secretary Paul Barratt recently said: “The discrimination is in India’s favour, not against it.”

And another low: India would be the only one of Australia’s uranium customers that is definitely continuing to produce fissile material for weapons (China may also be doing so).

And another low: we take pride in Australia’s ‘leadership’ role in the development of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty yet we sell uranium to countries that have signed but not ratified the CTBT (the U.S and China) and the government now plans to sell uranium to India, which has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT. The CTBT remains in limbo because those three countries, and a few others, refuse to ratify it.

And another low: if uranium sales to India proceed, it will be the first time since the Cold War that we have sold uranium to a country which is engaged in a nuclear arms race. India and Pakistan have increased the size of their nuclear weapons arsenals by 25-35 per cent over the past year alone. Both continue to develop nuclear-capable missiles. Both are expanding their capacity to produce fissile material. Both refuse to sign or ratify the CTBT.

The India decision marks a low-point in Australia’s international diplomacy. To permit uranium sales with no meaningful commitment by India to curb its weapons program, and to de-escalate the South Asian nuclear arms race, is spineless, irresponsible, dangerous sycophancy.

How low can we go? Plans are in train to sell uranium to the United Arab Emirates, probably followed by other undemocratic states in the Middle East. We were planning uranium sales to the Shah of Iran months before his overthrow in 1979. The Middle East has been (and remains) a nuclear hot-spot with numerous covert nuclear weapons programs – successful, aborted, destroyed or ongoing. The Middle East has also seen numerous conventional military strikes and attempted strikes on nuclear plants, in Iraq (several times), Iran, Israel, and most recently Israel’s strike on a suspected reactor site in Syria.

Short of selling uranium deliberately and specifically for weapons production – as we did after World War II – I don’t think its possible for Australian uranium export policy to sink any lower. I suppose we can take some comfort from that. Sort of. Not really.

Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth and author of a detailed briefing paper on uranium sales to India.


A Year Of Nuclear Bungles

Jim Green, 19 Dec 2012, New Matilda

http://newmatilda.com/2012/12/19/year-nuclear-bungles

The nuclear industry inflicts far more damage on itself than its opponents could ever hope to. The mere mention of the easily-preventable Fukushima disaster probably suffices to establish that point, but there are many more examples. To make the task manageable, this snapshot of recent nuclear shenanigans, jiggery-pokery, goings-on and own-goals is restricted to countries that Australia sells uranium to (or plans to sell uranium to).

Tests carried out at the European Union’s 143 nuclear power reactors have exposed hundreds of problems requiring up to €25 billion (AU$31 billion) to remedy, according to a report by the EU energy commissioner. The report concludes that “practically all” plants need safety improvements.

Gee-whiz “next generation” power reactors in Finland and France continue to embarrass the industry. When the contract was signed in 2003 for a new “European Pressurized Reactor” (EPR) in Finland, completion was anticipated in 2009. Now, commercial operation is not anticipated until 2015 — six years behind schedule. The estimated cost ballooned from €3 billion to €6.4 billion, and up again to €8 billion (AU$10 billion). Peter Atherton, utilities analyst at Citigroup, said: “There are few companies in the world that can take a loss of that size and remain solvent.”

EDF’s Flamanville 3 EPR reactor in northern France is also behind schedule — it was originally meant to enter service in 2012 but that date has been pushed back to 2016. Its estimated cost has grown from €3.3 billion to €8 billion, and up again to €8.5 billion. Italian utility Enel recently pulled out of the project, prompting UBS analyst Per Lekander to say: “In a way, the last 24 hours have killed French nuclear finally because the cost makes it totally impossible to export and now you have one of the few partners actively withdrawing; it looks really bad.”

In November, a report by the UK National Audit Office said that nuclear waste stored in run-down buildings at the Sellafield nuclear complex poses an “intolerable risk“, and that costs of plant decommissioning have spiralled out of control. In the same month, UK government agencies filed nine charges against the owners of Sellafield for illegal dumping of radioactive waste.

The National Audit Office estimates the total future costs for decommissioning Sellafield, over a century or so, will be £67 billion (AU$103 billion) — well up from the 2009 estimate of £47 billion (AU$72 billion). Estimates of the clean up costs for a range of UK nuclear sites including Sellafield have jumped from a 2005 estimate of £56 billion (AU$86 billion) to over £100 billion.

In South Korea, five engineers were charged with covering up a potentially dangerous power failure at the Kori-I reactor in May. The accident occurred because of a failure to follow safety procedures. The manager of the reactor decided to conceal the incident and to delete records, despite a legal obligation to notify the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission.

In early November, the South Korean government shut down two reactors at Yeonggwang to replace thousands of parts that had been supplied with forged quality and safety warranties. Plant owner Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) has acknowledged possible bribery and collusion by KHNP officials as well as corruption by firms supplying reactor parts. In late November there were further revelations and the current total stands at 8601 reactor parts, 10 firms and six reactors. Inadequate and compromised regulation has been a key contributor to the problems in South Korea’s nuclear industry — just as it was a key factor behind the Fukushima disaster in Japan.

South Korea wants to develop uranium enrichment technology (a direct route to nuclear weapons material) in violation of its commitments under the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In Sweden, problems with back-up generators have forced two reactors off-line. One of the reactors had only just restarted after over a year out of service following problems with the turbine system and damage to the reactor vessel. The Swedish Nuclear Safety Authority has uncovered a deficit of at least €3.4 billion in the Swedish Nuclear Waste Fund.

The Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) — established by  the Japanese Parliament — has lifted the lid on the widespread corruption that led to the Fukushima disaster. The report states that the accident was “a profoundly man-made disaster that could and should have been foreseen and prevented” if not for “a multitude of errors and wilful negligence that left the Fukushima plant unprepared for the events of March 11”. The accident was the result of “collusion between the government, the regulators and [plant operator] TEPCO”.

The NAIIC report is equally scathing about the response to the disaster: “Insufficient evacuation planning led to many residents receiving unnecessary radiation exposure. Others were forced to move multiple times, resulting in increased stress and health risks — including deaths among seriously ill patients.” The report notes that most of the 150,000 evacuees from the nuclear disaster are still dislocated and they “continue to face grave concerns, including the health effects of radiation exposure, displacement, the dissolution of families, disruption of their lives and lifestyles and the contamination of vast areas of the environment.”

Australia fuels proliferation tensions in North Asia by allowing Japan open ended permission to separate and stockpile weapons-useable plutonium produced from Australian uranium. The issue has resurfaced in recent months thanks to Japan’s nuclear hawks. Former defence minister Shigeru Ishiba put it bluntly: “Having nuclear plants shows to other nations that Japan can make nuclear weapons.”

Last year, US President Obama told a nuclear security summit: “We simply can’t go on accumulating huge amounts of the very material, like separated plutonium, that we are trying to keep away from terrorists.” Yet Australia gives open ended permission to Japan to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel and to stockpile it.

India’s comptroller and auditor-general, Vinod Rai, has found that the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is ineffective and negligent. He found that 60 per cent of regulatory inspections for operating nuclear power reactors were either delayed or not undertaken at all. Smaller radiation facilities operate with no oversight at all. Existing legislation gives the board almost no punitive power.

Meanwhile, the Indian government continues to attack and murder citizens opposing nuclear power plants; to expand its nuclear weapons arsenal and its missile capabilities; and to thumb its nose at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Nuclear security remains very poor and corruption is widespread.

Diplomatic cables from the US embassy in Beijing raise serious concerns about safety in China’s nuclear industry. Cables say that cheap, old technology is “vastly increasing” risks. Professor He Zuoxiu, who helped to develop China’s nuclear weapons program, warns about the pace of China’s nuclear power program: “Are we really ready for this kind of giddy speed? I think not — we’re seriously underprepared, especially on the safety front.” Experts from the Chinese Academy of Sciences warn that China lacks a fully independent safety and regulatory agency and that risks are further increased by shortages of qualified staff.

The first consignment of uranium from Australia has arrived in Russia following the 2010 ratification of a uranium supply agreement. Unfortunately, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspections of Australian uranium (and its by-products) will be rare if indeed any inspections take place at all. In 2008, Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties concluded that: “It is essential that actual physical inspection by the IAEA occurs at any Russian sites that may handle [Australian Obligated Nuclear Materials]. Further, the supply of uranium to Russia should be contingent upon such inspections being carried out.” The Gillard Government ignored the recommendation and ratified the agreement.

In the United States, the New York Times reports that security guards at a nuclear weapons plant who failed to stop an 82-year-old nun from reaching a bomb fuel storage building were also cheating on a “security knowledge test”. At least 99 nuclear accidents — resulting in the loss of human life and/or more than US$50,000 (AU$47,000) of property damage — occurred worldwide between 1952 and 2009. Most of them — 56 out of 99 — occurred in the US.

In August, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announced the suspension of all reactor licensing decisions until political and legal disputes regarding high level nuclear waste management are resolved. Former NRC commissioner Peter Bradford said that “the reactors awaiting construction licenses weren’t going to be built anytime soon … Falling demand, cheaper alternatives and runaway nuclear costs had doomed their near-term prospects”. Over AU$10 billion and over 20 years effort was wasted on plans for a nuclear waste dump at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, before the scandal-plagued project was cancelled by the Obama Administration in 2009.

All these shenanigans would be a great laugh if they took place in, say, a Bureau de Change. But the nuclear industry brings with it immense risks: catastrophic accidents and WMD proliferation (and nuclear warfare has the potential to cause catastrophic climate change as well as killing millions directly).

Selling WMD feedstock (in the form of uranium) to dictatorships, crooks, murderers and proliferators is a mug’s game. Just ask BHP Billiton — the world’s largest mining company has disbanded its Uranium Division, cancelled the Olympic Dam mine expansion (citing the depressed uranium price), and sold the Yeelirrie uranium deposit in WA for less than 7 per cent of the nominal value of the uranium resource.

Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, Australia.


Nuclear ambitions must put safety first

Dave Sweeney, 30 October 2015, Fairfax

http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/comment/nuclear-ambitions-must-put-safety-first-20151030-gkmqtm.html

It’s now three years since then-Premier Campbell Newman back-flipped on a ‘crystal clear’ commitment and opened the door for the uranium industry in Queensland. The decision, made without consultation, evidence or any independent analysis was explained on the basis of a potential uranium sales deal with India.

Since this time – and to their considerable credit – the re-elected Labor government has reinstated the state’s long-standing and popular ban on uranium mining.

As the uranium lobbyists and former LNP mines minister Andrew Cripps continue to beat the radioactive drum it is useful to look at the risks and roadblocks that mean there will be no smooth passage to India for any Australian uranium.

In September the federal Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties completed a detailed examination of the proposed sales deal and its implications. Despite strong personal support for the sales plan by then PM Tony Abbot the government controlled committee took a far more considered and cautious approach.

The committee’s report identified a range of serious and unresolved nuclear safety, security and regulatory concerns with the proposed sales deal – as well as questioning its uncertain legal basis.

The cross party committee further recommended no uranium sales take place at this time or under the current terms of the Australia-India Nuclear Co-operation Agreement and outlined a series of pre-conditions that need to resolved before any future sales to India.

These include the full separation of military and civil nuclear facilities, the establishment of an independent nuclear regulatory authority, a review of the adequacy and independence of the regulatory framework, IAEA verification that inspections of nuclear facilities are of best practice standard, improved decommissioning planning and more.

So far, all well and good: a contested sales plan with significant national and regional risks has been reviewed by Parliament and been found wanting with a prescription of much more work required.

The question now is whether Malcolm Turnbull will respect and reflect JSCOT’s recommendations. And there is added concern because right now Trade Minister Andrew Robb is touring India.

In Abu Dhabi in April last year Australia inked a uranium supply deal with the United Arab Emirates, even though a series of recommendations from a separate JSCOT inquiry had not been realised at the time of signing. It was Trade Minister Robb’s hand that signed the paper for the fast-tracked deal.

It took a further seven months before the government’s rationale for this unseemly haste was disclosed to the federal Parliament. In a clear case of prioritising nuclear interests ahead of national interest the primary driver for the deal was to provide “certainty to Australian uranium producers who operate in a competitive international market”.

This short-circuiting of due process and accountability cannot be repeated in relation to the proposed Indian uranium deal. The stakes are simply too high.

The agreement with India weakens many of Australia’s nuclear safeguards and standards and opens the door for Australian uranium to find its way into Indian weapons. If the uranium sales agreement is advanced there will also be sustained pressure for Australia to apply equally inadequate standards to other uranium customer countries.

It would create a dangerous and irresponsible precedent for Australia’s already risky uranium exports and could lead to increased pressure on Queensland and other reluctant states over uranium mining.

In 2012 a review of the Indian nuclear sector by the Indian Auditor General found profound failures in safety, governance and regulation and warned of “a Fukushima or Chernobyl-like disaster if the nuclear safety issue is not addressed”. In the shadow of the continuing – and Australian uranium-fuelled – Fukushima nuclear crisis there are compelling reasons not to supply uranium to India.

As it currently stands the proposed Indian agreement puts no constraints on India’s nuclear weapons program, fails to advance non-proliferation outcomes and doesn’t even provide effective scrutiny of Australian uranium.

Australia, including Queensland, clearly has a key role to play in supporting India’s legitimate energy aspirations. But this cannot and must not be advanced by a retreat from responsibility on nuclear safeguards and security. Malcolm Turnbull should pay heed to the findings of the JSCOT report and not be rushed by those with poor track records and overt atomic agendas.

Dave Sweeney is a nuclear-free campaigner for the Australian Conservation Foundation.

Critique of ASNO

Jim Green
National nuclear campaigner – Friends of the Earth, Australia.
<jim.green@foe.org.au>

March 2007

(See also EnergyScience Briefing Paper #19, August 2007, <www.energyscience.org.au> – a detailed critique of the  Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office written by Prof. Richard Broinowski, Assoc. Prof. Tilman Ruff, Dr. Alan Roberts and Jim Green.)

Acronyms

* AONM – Australian-obligated nuclear materials – e.g. Australian-origin uranium and its by-products such as depleted uranium and plutonium.
* ASNO – so-called Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office
* HEU – highly-enriched uranium
* IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
* MUF – Material Unaccounted For.

Safeguards are not and could never be 100% effective

The Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office (ASNO) routinely misleads the Australian public and our political representatives when it asserts that international and bilateral safeguards agreements and processes “ensure” or “provide assurances” that Australian uranium and its by-products such as depleted uranium and plutonium, known collectively as Australian-obligated nuclear materials (AONM), will not contribute to weapons proliferation.

Those agreements and processes certainly attempt to prevent diversion of nuclear materials to weapons programs but they are not and could never be 100% effective.

ASNO and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade routinely offer these false “assurances”. The ASNO website illustrates the point:
1. The risk of diversion of AONM is not acknowledged in a document linked from the front page of ASNO’s website, “Australia’s Uranium Export Policy”, <www.dfat.gov.au/security/aus_uran_exp_policy.html>. That document asserts that “Australia’s uranium export policy … provides assurances that exported uranium and its derivatives cannot benefit the development of nuclear weapons or be used in other military programs.” Why no acknowledgement of the risk of diversion of AONM for nuclear weapons research and/or production?
2. That document links to another, “Australia’s Network of Nuclear Safeguards Agreements”, <www.dfat.gov.au/security/nuclear_safeguards.html>, which asserts that: “All of Australia’s uranium is exported for exclusively peaceful purposes, and only to countries and parties with which Australia has a bilateral safeguards Agreement. These Agreements ensure that Australia’s nuclear exports remain in exclusively peaceful use …” Why no acknowledgement of the risk of diversion of AONM?
3. That document links to an excerpt from the Australian Safeguards Office Annual Report 1998-99, <www.asno.dfat.gov.au/annual_report_9899/25_years.html>, which asserts that bilateral safeguards agreements “were established to ensure that nuclear items exported from Australia remain in exclusively peaceful use, and in no way enhance or contribute to any military purpose.” Why no acknowledgement of the risk of diversion of AONM?

The ASNO website links to the so-called Uranium Information Centre, which also fails to acknowledge the risk of diversion of AONM. We can easily understand why the industry-funded Uranium Information Centre peddles misinformation – it has a commercial interest in doing so. But what is ASNO’s excuse? While ASNO is an independent statutory authority, as it should be, it exhibits the tendencies of a captured bureaucracy.

Occasionally, ASNO will concede the indisputable point that there is a risk of diversion of AONM – for example, ASNO Director-General John Carlson (2005) states that “… of course it is possible diversion might occur in the future …”. However, it is far more common for ASNO to provide false “assurances” which strongly imply that there is no risk of diversion.

ASNO should clearly acknowledge on its website that there is a risk of diversion of AONM, and it should remove or modify statements which imply otherwise.

AONM is not fully accounted for

Carlson (2002) says: “All Australian-obligated nuclear material [AONM], including plutonium, is fully accounted for.” That is false. There are routine accounting discrepancies – called ‘Material Unaccounted For’. MUF refers to discrepancies between the ‘book stock’ (the expected measured amount) and the ‘physical stock’ (the actual measured amount) of nuclear materials at a location under safeguards. Such discrepancies are frequent due to the difficulty of precisely measuring amounts of nuclear material.

What Carlson means when he says that all AONM is “fully accounted for” is that ASNO has accepted all the various reasons given for MUF over the years, however fanciful those explanations may or may not be. (ASNO refuses to provide specific data on MUF discrepancies or even aggregate information. Nor has ASNO adequately justified this secrecy.)

Carlson (2005) states: “MUF certainly does not imply that AONM is missing. When ASNO concludes that all AONM is accounted for, this means, inter alia, that we are satisfied about the explanation for any MUF.”

In other words, when ASNO says all AONM is fully accounted for, it means all AONM is not fully accounted for.

It is agreed that MUF does not necessarily mean that diversion has occurred – the problem is that we cannot be certain that diversion of MUF has not occurred on each and every occasion when there is a difference between recorded and measured quantities. The inevitability of accounting discrepancies provides an obvious loophole for would-be proliferators. The problem is most acute with facilities processing large volumes of nuclear material, and in particular those processing large volumes of fissile material such as reprocessing plants.

South Korea

ASNO (letter, available on request) insists that South Korea did not use AONM in its long-standing secret nuclear weapons research program from 1979-2000. How can ASNO be sure? According to the letter, one reason is that the South Koreans say so!

We still do not know – and will probably never know – whether AONM was used in the South Korean secret nuclear weapons research program:
* We have the assurance of South Korean authorities – but the value of such an assurance is highly questionable in the circumstances.
* There could not possibly have been diversion before 1986 since there was no transfer of AONM to South Korea until 1986.
* Carlson (2005) states in relation to post-1986 unauthorised activities that: “… the IAEA’s investigations showed that the nuclear material used was produced from indigenous sources, Accordingly, ASNO is satisfied that no AONM was involved.” But the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) appears to base its conclusions in part on “information provided by the ROK”, so the argument becomes circular. Moreover, the claim that only indigenous material was used is contested (Kang et al., 2005).

Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

Carlson (2000) states that “… in some of the countries having nuclear weapons, nuclear power remains insignificant or non-existent.” Carlson’s attempt to absolve civil nuclear programs from the proliferation problem ignores the well-documented use of civil nuclear facilities and materials in weapons programs as well as the important political ‘cover’ civil programs provide for military programs. It also ignores the more specific links between nuclear power and weapons proliferation.

Of the ten states known to have produced nuclear weapons:
* eight have nuclear power reactors.
* North Korea has no operating power reactors but an ‘Experimental Power Reactor’ is believed to have been the source of the fissile material (plutonium) used in the November 2006 nuclear bomb test, and North Korea has power reactors partly constructed under the Joint Framework Agreement.
* Israel has no power reactors, though the pretence of an interest in the development of nuclear power helped to justify nuclear transfers to Israel.

Power reactors are certainly used in support of India’s nuclear weapons program – this is no longer in dispute since India is refusing to subject numerous power reactors to safeguards under the US/India nuclear agreement.

The US itself is using a power reactor to produce tritium for use in nuclear weapons.

Pakistan may be using power reactor/s in support of its nuclear weapons program.

North Korea’s October 2006 weapon test is believed to have used plutonium from an ‘Experimental Power Reactor’.

Then Australian Prime Minister John Gorton certainly had military ambitions for the power reactor he pushed to have constructed at Jervis bay in NSW in the late 1960s – he later admitted that the agenda was to produce both plutonium and electricity.

Moreover, nuclear power reactors per sé need not be directly involved in weapons research/production in order for a nuclear power program to provide cover and support for a weapons program. For example, the nuclear weapons programs in South Africa and Pakistan were clearly outgrowths of their power programs although enrichment plants, not power reactors, produced the fissile material for use in weapons. Likewise, nuclear power programs typically involve the construction of research/training reactors which can be and have been used in weapons programs (e.g. India, Israel).

Iraq is another illustration of the potential for nuclear power programs to facilitate nuclear weapons programs even if power reactors are not used to produce fissile material for weapons, or even if power reactors are not built. While Iraq’s nuclear research program provided much cover for the weapons program, stated interest in developing nuclear power was also significant. According to Khidhir Hamza (1998), a senior nuclear scientist involved in Iraq’s weapons program: “Acquiring nuclear technology within the IAEA safeguards system was the first step in establishing the infrastructure necessary to develop nuclear weapons. In 1973, we decided to acquire a 40-megawatt research reactor, a fuel manufacturing plant, and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, all under cover of acquiring the expertise needed to eventually build and operate nuclear power plants and produce and recycle nuclear fuel. Our hidden agenda was to clandestinely develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce weapon-grade plutonium.”

Carlson’s view also sits uncomfortably with the concentration of nuclear power in weapons states – almost 60% of global nuclear power output is in the nuclear weapons states and those power programs involve large numbers of nuclear scientists, technicians, engineers etc., with frequent transfer to and from nuclear weapons programs.

In short, the attempt to distance nuclear power programs from weapons proliferation is disingenuous. While currently-serving politicians and bureaucrats are prone to obfuscation on this point, several retired politicians have recently noted the link between power and weapons:
* Former US Vice President Al Gore said in 2006: “For eight years in the White House, every weapons-proliferation problem we dealt with was connected to a civilian reactor program. And if we ever got to the point where we wanted to use nuclear reactors to back out a lot of coal … then we’d have to put them in so many places we’d run that proliferation risk right off the reasonability scale.”
* Former US President Bill Clinton said in 2006: “The push to bring back nuclear power as an antidote to global warming is a big problem. If you build more nuclear power plants we have toxic waste at least, bomb-making at worse.”
* Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating said in 2006: “Any country with a nuclear power program “ipso facto ends up with a nuclear weapons capability”.

Carlson (2000) says: “If we look to the history of nuclear weapons development, we can see that those countries with nuclear weapons developed them before they developed nuclear power programs.” However, ostensibly civil nuclear programs clearly preceded and facilitated the successful development of nuclear weapons in India, Pakistan, and in the former nuclear weapons state South Africa.

Carlson (2006) states: “I have pointed out on numerous occasions that nuclear power as such is not a proliferation problem – rather the problem is with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies …” The claim is false, no matter how many times Carlson makes it:
* Power reactors have been used directly in weapons programs.
* Power programs have facilitated and provided cover for weapons programs even without direct use of power reactor/s in the weapons program.
* And, as will now be discussed, power reactors produce large volumes of weapons-useable plutonium and can be operated on a short irradiation cycle to produce large volumes of weapon-grade plutonium.

Plutonium grades

Statements by Carlson/ASNO about the weapons useability of below-weapon-grade plutonium grossly distort the available scientific evidence and can only be seen as an attempt to promote uranium exports and to absolve governments and uranium mining companies of their culpability in increasing the global stockpile of weapons-useable plutonium. (For a detailed discussion and references to the scientific literature, see https://nuclear.foe.org.au/plutonium-grades-and-nuclear-weapons-2/.)

In addition to the actual and potential use of below-weapon-grade plutonium in nuclear weapons, power reactors can be operated on a shorter-than-usual irradiation cycle to maximise the proportion of plutonium relative to other, unwanted plutonium isotopes. Thus, power reactors can produce large volumes (hundreds of kilograms per year) of weapon-grade plutonium, and as little as 3-4 kgs of this weapon-grade plutonium is required to build one nuclear weapon.

Carlson (2002) states that Australian-obligated plutonium is not weapon-grade but he fails to note that below-weapon-grade plutonium can be – and has been – used in nuclear weapons. Further, weapon-grade plutonium is produced using Australian uranium – in the normal course of events this weapon-grade plutonium is produced in power reactors and in the normal course of events it is converted to fuel-grade then reactor-grade plutonium in the reactor. It is misleading for Carlson to state that Australian-obligated plutonium is not weapon-grade without noting that below-weapon-grade plutonium can be and has been used in nuclear weapons.

Carlson (2002) says “weapons-grade plutonium is not produced in the normal operation of power reactors” though he knows it is and he knows that below-weapon-grade plutonium has been used in weapons.

Research reactors can be used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Israel and India are the most notorious examples of ‘research’ reactors being used for this purpose – most of the fissile material for their nuclear arsenals comes from research reactors.

IAEA safeguards

Carlson (2002) defends the IAEA’s safeguards system and says it provides the “foundation” for preventing misuse of Australian-obligated nuclear materials. The safeguards system was exposed as a farce by the Iraqi regime in the 1980s and early ’90s – see the voluminous material on this scandal published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (<www.thebulletin.org>) and by the IAEA (<www.iaea.org>). Since the Iraq debacle, efforts have been made to improve the system, but it still inadequate.

Apart from the nuclear industry and its apologists, including ASNO, there is universal acknowledgement of serious flaws with the safeguards system. Indeed Dr Mohamed El Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA, has stated that the IAEA’s basic inspection rights are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system suffers from “vulnerabilities”, that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted”, and that the safeguards system operates on a “shoestring budget”. (See statements at <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/index.html>.)

Compare those acknowledgements from the IAEA Director General with ASNO’s false “assurances” that safeguards prevent diversion of AONM.

The IAEA has two roles – promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and preventing weapons proliferation. Since the materials and facilities required for peaceful nuclear research and power programs can be and have been used for nuclear weapons R&D and in some cases full-scale weapons production, the IAEA’s two roles can be described as: trying to prevent weapons proliferation while actively promoting the expanded use of materials and facilities which can in many cases be used for nuclear weapons research and/or production. The contradiction is obvious notwithstanding Carlson’s (2005) comments about the two roles being “complementary” rather than “inconsistent”. By Carlson’s logic, drug-running operations would neatly complement efforts to stem the trade in illicit drugs.

Membership of the Board of Governors of the IAEA is weighted in favour of countries with significant nuclear programs. Carlson (2005) fails to see the problem arising from that weighting. The problem is that countries with significant nuclear programs may have reasons, e.g. commercial reasons, to downplay the proliferation risks associated with civil nuclear programs. South Australian Premier Mike Rann’s observation in a 1982 paper is pertinent: “Again and again, it has been demonstrated here and overseas that when problems over safeguards prove difficult, commercial considerations will come first.”

(Numerous articles on the flawed nuclear safeguards system are posted at: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/safeguards/)

Uranium customer countries

Carlson (1998) makes the absurd claim that: “One of the features of Australian policy … is very careful selection of our treaty partners. We have concluded bilateral arrangements only with countries whose credentials are impeccable in this area.”

Carlson’s claim is demonstrably false. Australia has uranium export agreements with nuclear weapons states (most or all of which are failing to fulfil their NPT disarmament obligations), states with a history of covert nuclear weapons research based on their ‘civil’ nuclear programs, states blocking progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and states blocking progress on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

To give some examples:

1. The US is breaching its NPT disarmament commitments in many ways: refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; making a mockery of the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty by blocking any inspection or verification measures; engaging in research on new generations of nuclear weapons; indicating that it might begin nuclear weapons testing again; resuming the production of tritium for use in nuclear weapons and using a ‘civil’ power reactor to produce the tritium; acknowledging in its 2002 Nuclear Posture Review that it intends to maintain its nuclear arsenal “forever”; embarking on nuclear co-operation with India (a non-NPT state); threatening first-use nuclear strikes; and developing a nuclear hit-list of seven states, all of them NPT member states except North Korea, and five of them non-nuclear weapons states.

The disgraceful role of the US, and its manifold breaches of its NPT obligations, have been ignored by the Australian government. Successive Australian governments have claimed that the US is in compliance with its NPT obligations because of the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. But even that solitary achievement is largely a function of creative accounting “worthy of Enron” according to the US Natural Resources Defense Council. Moreover, the numbers argument can be misleading. Due to technical enhancement, the smaller stockpile of US nuclear weapons actually has an increased destructive power.

2. France and the UK are also customers of Australian uranium and, like the US, neither country has the slightest intention of fulfilling its NPT disarmament obligations. The UK government is strongly advocating replacement of its Trident nuclear system. In January 2006, French President Jacques Chirac declared that French nuclear weapons would be used in fighting terrorism, increasing rather than decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.

3. The federal government has negotiated a bilateral treaty with China to permit uranium sales. China is a nuclear weapons state with no intention of fulfilling its NPT disarmament obligations, and it refuses to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Further, the Chinese state is undemocratic and repressive. It is difficult to imagine a nuclear industry worker in China publicly raising safety, security or proliferation concerns without reprisal. It is a closed, secretive state – which makes safeguarding AONM all the more difficult. China is included in the US’s Nuclear Posture Review hit-list because of the “ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces” and its “still developing strategic objectives”.

4. Japan, a major customer of Australian uranium, has developed a nuclear ‘threshold’ or ‘breakout’ capability – it could produce nuclear weapons within months of a decision to do so, relying heavily on facilities, materials and expertise from its civil nuclear program. An obvious source of fissile material for a weapons program in Japan would be its stockpile of plutonium – including Australian-obligated plutonium. In April 2002, the then leader of Japan’s Liberal Party, Ichiro Ozawa, said Japan should consider building nuclear weapons to counter China and suggested a source of fissile material: “It would be so easy for us to produce nuclear warheads; we have plutonium at nuclear power plants in Japan, enough to make several thousand such warheads.”

Japan’s plutonium policy is anything but impeccable. It is irresponsible. Diplomatic cables in 1993 and 1994 from US Ambassadors in Tokyo describe Japan’s accumulation of plutonium as “massive” and questioned the rationale for the stockpiling of so much plutonium since it appeared to be economically unjustified. A March 1993 diplomatic cable from US Ambassador Armacost in Tokyo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, obtained under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, posed these questions: “Can Japan expect that if it embarks on a massive plutonium recycling program that Korea and other nations would not press ahead with reprocessing programs? Would not the perception of Japan’s being awash in plutonium and possessing leading edge rocket technology create anxiety in the region?” (Greenpeace, 1999.)

Yet successive Australian governments have allowed Japan to stockpile Australian-obligated plutonium. Not once has a reprocessing request from Japan been refused.

5. South Korea is another major customer of Australian uranium with less than impeccable credentials. In 2004, South Korea disclosed information about a range of activities which violated its NPT commitments – uranium enrichment from 1979-81, the separation of small quantities of plutonium in 1982, uranium enrichment experiments in 2000, and the production of depleted uranium munitions from 1983-1987.

Nuclear weapons states   

Carlson (2005) states that it is it is “not plausible” that a non nuclear weapons state would seek nuclear weapons because the nuclear weapons states are not meeting their NPT commitments. Why not? According to IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei (2005): “[W]e must show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm. As long as some countries place strategic reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, other countries will emulate them. We cannot delude ourselves into thinking otherwise.”

Likewise, El Baradei (2004) noted that: ”There are some who have continued to dangle a cigarette from their mouth and tell everybody else not to smoke.”

So by the logic of no less an authority than Dr. Mohamed El Baradei – Nobel Peace Prize winner and IAEA Director General – Carlson is deluding himself.

Carlson’s illogical and incomprehensible statement is out of step not only with the IAEA Director General but also with the expert Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nobel Laureats, Cold War warriors such as Henry Kissinger and countless experts in non-proliferation.

Declared and undeclared facilities

Carlson (2006) stresses the use of undeclared facilities in Iraq’s nuclear weapons program from the 1970s to 1991:

“It is well known that discovery of the undeclared Iraq program after the first Gulf War showed inadequacies in “traditional” IAEA safeguards, especially as regards possible undeclared nuclear activities. This is what prompted the program to strengthen safeguards, of which the Additional Protocol is a part.

“It is also well known that the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities requires substantial further development, this is the most serious challenge to safeguards – also discussed at length in my annual reports. Australian uranium is exported for declared nuclear programs under IAEA safeguards – the problem of detecting undeclared activities does not show that safeguards on declared activities are inadequate.” (emphasis in original)

However there is abundant evidence of safeguarded facilities being used in the nuclear weapons program in Iraq (Green, 2002).

For example, the safeguarded, highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuelled IRT research reactor was frequently used in the Iraqi weapons program:

1. A fuel element from the IRT reactor was used for a plutonium extraction experiment.

2. On three other occasions, fuel elements were fabricated from undeclared uranium dioxide in an Experimental Reactor Fuel Fabrication Laboratory, they were secretly irradiated in the IRT reactor and then chemically processed in an unsafeguarded Radiochemical Laboratory containing hot cells.

3. The reactor was used to make polonium-210 for neutron initiator research, using bismuth targets.

4. The reactor was used to produce small quantities of plutonium-238, which could have been used for neutron initiator research instead of short lived polonium-210.

5. The reactor could potentially have produced sufficient plutonium for one weapon over a period of several years using fuel and/or a uranium blanket and/or uranium targets; this risk, albeit small, was increased by the fact that IAEA inspections of the reactor were infrequent because of the low risk status of the reactor.

6. HEU fuel for the IRT reactor, and the 0.5 MW(th) Tammuz-II reactor, was diverted during Iraq’s 1990-1991 ‘crash program’.

7. ‘Dirty’ radiation bombs were produced and three test bombs were exploded in Iraq in 1987, using materials irradiated in the IRT and/or Tammuz II research reactors (the more powerful IRT reactor was the better suited of the two reactors for the purpose).

Not once did the IAEA detect these proscribed uses of the ‘safeguarded’ IRT reactor.

The US military clearly believed the IRT and Tammuz II reactors represented a proliferation threat and bombed them in 1991.

The IAEA (1997, p.53) states that the IRT reactor was of “very limited usefulness as a plutonium production reactor” but made a “useful” contribution to the nuclear weapons research and development program.

Iraq’s accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a net positive for its nuclear weapons program. Safeguards did little to thwart the program, and NPT accession facilitated technology transfer. IAEA safeguards inspector Roger Richter resigned in 1981, having written to the US State Department the year before stating: ‘The most disturbing implication of the Iraqi nuclear program is that the NPT agreement has had the effect of assisting Iraq in acquiring the nuclear technology and nuclear material for its program by absolving the cooperating nations of their moral responsibility by shifting it to the IAEA. These cooperating nations have thwarted concerted international criticism of their actions by pointing to Iraq’s signing of NPT, while turning away from the numerous, obvious and compelling evidence which leads to the conclusion that Iraq is embarked on a nuclear weapons program.” (Quoted in MacLachlan and Ryan (1991); see also Nucleonics Week, June 25, 1981, p.3.)

Conclusion

ASNO has a track record of making false and misleading statements. Numerous other examples could be provided in addition to those included in this paper. Since ASNO has proven itself unwilling to redress this problem, the Commonwealth government should hold ASNO to account.

References

Anon., November 12, 1990, “Blix Says IAEA Does Not Dispute Utility of Reactor-Grade Pu for Weapons,” Nuclear Fuel, p.8.

Blix, H., November 1, 1990, Letter to the Nuclear Control Institute, Washington DC.

Carlson, John, December 21, 1998, Evidence before Joint Committee on Treaties, <www.aph.gov.au/hansard/joint/commttee/j2022.pdf>.

Carlson, John, 2000, “Nuclear Energy and Non-proliferation – Issues and Challenges: An Australian Perspective”, Paper prepared for JAIF Symposium on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Tokyo, 9-10 March 2000.

Carlson, John, November 15, 2002, Australian Financial Review, Letter to the Editor. <www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/uraniumbombs.html>

Carlson, John, 2005, supplementary submission 33.1 to
House Standing Committee on Industry and Resources, Inquiry into developing Australia’s non-fossil fuel energy industry, <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/isr/uranium/subs.htm>
or direct download: <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/isr/uranium/subs/sub33_1.pdf>.

Carlson, John, November 27, 2006, supplementary submission 30.2 to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Inquiry into Uranium Sales To China, <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/ jsct/8august2006/subs2/sub30_2.pdf>.

El Baradei, Mohamed, 2004, Quoted in James Traub, “The Netherworld of Nonproliferation”, New York Times, June 13.

El Baradei, Mohamed, 2005, <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n006.html>.

Green, Jim, 2002, Myth of the Peaceful Atom: Research Reactors and Nuclear Weapons, https://nuclear.foe.org.au/research-reactors-nuclear-weapons/

Greenpeace, September 1, 1999, “Confidential diplomatic documents reveal U.S. proliferation concerns over Japan’s plutonium program”, media release.

Hamza, Khidhir, 1998, “Inside Saddam’s secret nuclear program”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October, Vol.54, No.5.

International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997, “Fourth consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)”, IAEA Document S/1997/779, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, October, <www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_1997_779.pdf>

Kang, Jungmin, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter, 2005, “South Korea’s nuclear surprise”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February, Vol.61, No.01, pp.40-49, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=jf05kang>.

Koutsoukis, Jason, November 9, 2002, “Has anybody seen Australia’s uranium?”, Australian Financial Review, pg. 21.

MacLachlan, Ann and Margaret Ryan, 1991, “Allied bombing of Iraqi reactors provokes no safeguards debate”, Nucleonics Week, January 31.

Nuclear Safeguards

General information

The unprofessional, dishonest Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office (ASNO)

More information about safeguards

Australian literature (dealing with Australian and international issues)

International literature:

Summary – the limitations of safeguards

Short excerpt from August 2015 submission to the SA Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission, by Friends of the Earth, Australia; the Australian Conservation Foundation; and the Conservation Council of SA.

The limitations of safeguards − summary

There are many problems and limitations with the international safeguards system.[1] In articles and speeches during his tenure as IAEA Director General from 1997− 2009, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei said that the Agency’s basic rights of inspection are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system suffers from “vulnerabilities” and “clearly needs reinforcement”, that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted”, and that the safeguards system operates on a “shoestring budget … comparable to that of a local police department”.

Problems with safeguards include:

  1. Chronic under-resourcing.[2] El Baradei told the IAEA Board of Governors in 2009: “I would be misleading world public opinion to create an impression that we are doing what we are supposed to do, when we know that we don’t have the money to do it.”[3] Little has changed since 2009. Meanwhile, the scale of the safeguards challenge is ever-increasing as new facilities are built and materials stockpiles grow.
  2. Issues relating to national sovereignty and commercial confidentiality adversely impact on safeguards.
  3. The inevitability of accounting discrepancies. Nuclear accounting discrepancies are commonplace and inevitable due to the difficulty of precisely measuring nuclear materials. The accounting discrepancies are known as Material Unaccounted For (MUF). There have been incidents of large-scale MUF in Australia’s uranium customer countries such as the UK and Japan.[4]
  4. Incorrect/outdated assumptions about the amount of fissile material required to build a weapon.
  5. The fact that the IAEA has no mandate to prevent the misuse of civil nuclear facilities and materials − at best it can detect misuse/diversion and refer the problem to the UN Security Council. As the IAEA states: “It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion or the setting up of an undeclared or clandestine nuclear programme.”[5] Numerous examples illustrate how difficult and protracted the resolution (or attempted resolution) of such issues can be, e.g. North Korea, Iran, Iraq in the 1970s and again in the early 1990s. Countries that have breached their safeguards obligations can simply withdraw from the NPT and pursue a weapons program, as North Korea has done.
  6. Safeguards are shrouded in secrecy − to give one example, the IAEA used to publish aggregate data on the number of inspections in India, Israel and Pakistan, but even that nearly worthless information is no longer publicly available.
  7. There are precedents for the complete breakdown of nuclear safeguards in the context of political and military conflict − examples include Iraq, Yugoslavia and several African countries.
  8. Currently, IAEA safeguards only begin at the stage of uranium enrichment. Application of IAEA safeguards should be extended to fully apply to mined uranium ores, to refined uranium oxides, to uranium hexafluoride gas, and to uranium conversion facilities, as well as enrichment and subsequent stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Joint Standing Committe on Treaties (JSCT) recommended in 2008 that “the Australian Government lobbies the IAEA and the five declared nuclear weapons states under the NPT to make the safeguarding of all conversion facilities mandatory.”[6] However the Australian Government rejected the recommendation in its 2009 response to the JSCT report.[7]
  9. There is no resolution in sight to some of the most fundamental problems with safeguards such as countries invoking their right to pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and developing a weapons capability as North Korea has done. More generally, responses to suspected non-compliance with safeguards agreements have been highly variable, ranging from inaction to economic sanctions to UN Security Council-mandated decommissioning programmes. Some states prefer to take matters into their own hands: Israel bombed and destroyed a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, the US bombed and destroyed a reactor in Iraq in 1991 and Israel bombed and destroyed a suspected reactor site in Syria in 2007.

In 1982, Mike Rann identified the core problem: “Again and again, it has been demonstrated here and overseas that when problems over safeguards prove difficult, commercial considerations will come first.”[8]

References:

[1] For information on safeguards see the papers listed at https://nuclear.foe.org.au/links/#safeguards

[2] See section 6 in: ‘The Nuclear Safeguards System: An Illusion of Protection‘, 2010.

[3] Mohamed El Baradei, 16 June 2009, ‘Director General’s Intervention on Budget at IAEA Board of Governors’, www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/director-generals-intervention-budget-iaea-board-governors

[4] See section 4 in: ‘The Nuclear Safeguards System: An Illusion of Protection‘, 2010.

[5] IAEA, 1993, Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Safeguards in the 1990s.

[6] Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 2008, ‘Report 94: Review into Treaties tabled on 14 May 2008’, www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jsct/14may2008/report1/fullreport.pdf

[7] Australian Government, 2009, ‘Government Response to Report 94 of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties: Australia-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement’

[8] Mike Rann, March 1982, ‘Uranium: Play It Safe’.

Articles about radtours

3CR radio show about the history of the radioactive exposure tours – click here or to download directly click here.

2008 radtour

Click here to download Jessie Boylan’s article + pics about the 2008 Radioactive Exposure Tour (PDF file)

2014 radtour:

2013 radtour:

Photos from the 2013 radtour:

Photos from the 2011 radtour:

Photos from the 2010 radtour:

Photos from the 2006 radtour:

 

Radioactive Exposure Tours

A summary of the tours from 1990 – 2004, taken from the book ’30 years of creative resistance’, a history of Friends of the Earth Australia.

The first Nuclear Exposure Tour was organised in 1990, six years after the Roxby Blockades of 1983 and 1984 where hundreds of people blockaded and hindered the establishment of Olympic Dam Operations (the copper/uranium mine at Roxby Downs in northern South Australia). During these blockades people had the powerful experience of seeing a uranium mine and listening to Aboriginal people who opposed the mine. Blockaders also had the opportunity to show their opposition to uranium mining in creative, colourful and sometimes dramatic ways.It was in this tradition that the idea of Nuclear Exposure Tours evolved. The Anti-Uranium Collective at Friends of the Earth organised the tours with the aim of letting people witness and experience the nuclear industry first hand. People would be able to see and walk on the country affected, to hear what Aboriginal people had to say, learn about the anti-nuclear movement and strengthen opposition to the nuclear industry. We wanted to give people the opportunity to support traditional land owners in their opposition to the nuclear industry, so that the tour participants could return to their colleges, work places or communities with the story of their experience and to encourage them to play a role in the anti-nuclear movement.

The first tour to Roxby Downs was carefully planned, with members of the Friends of the Earth anti-uranium collective doing what we call, a “dry-run”. Such a trip was not new; members of the collective had been visiting the Mound Springs area in northern South Australia and working with the Marree/Arabunna community there since 1987. The Mounds Springs are 120 Kilometres north of the Olympic Dam copper/uranium mine at Roxby Downs. Water for the mine, metallurgy plant and town was, and still is, being taken from the Great Artesian Basin and unique springs have dried completely and others have had a drastic reduction of flow. A trip to the Springs area led us to do a round trip to the town at Roxby Downs, the mine there and the tailings dam. Members of the anti-uranium collective were becoming familiar with the Springs and Roxby; this was another motivation for the tour, to share this experience with other people in an organised and constructive way.

The “dry-run” was important as permission from traditional land owners was needed to camp in their country and to obtain information on culturally appropriate behaviour. The anti-uranium collective also needed to meet with communities whose land they would be passing though to organise joint actions against nuclear activities in their areas. These included CRA’s proposed mineral sands development near Horsham in Victoria and the Rare Earth Tailings dump at Port Pirie. Future tours took in the Beverley Uranium Mine and the Honeymoon Project, and at the invitation of the Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta, camping at Ten Mile Creek just out of Coober Pedy. Recent tours have become focused on the proposal for a low to intermediate level nuclear waste dump in the Woomera area.In organising the tours we at FoE always endeavour to make them more than just an out-back adventure! At Roxby Downs we organised public meetings on radiation exposure levels at the community centre, we leafleted the entire town on workers’ and community health issues, we organised awareness stalls with local environmentalists and produced a performance at the Woomera Primary School that involved all of the students as well as the people on the tour.

Following a tour in 1996 the participants formed a collective and organised the ‘Roxstop Action and Music Festival’ in 1997, where over 300 people gathered at Roxby to protest against the expansion of the mine. Here they hosted a public meeting attended by over 120 people with the United States epidemiologist Dr David Richarson as the key note speaker talking about his work and the effects of low level radiation exposure on nuclear workers. Roxstop also included an exhibition of paintings by the Melbourne Artist Lyn Hovey in the Roxby Library. After three days at Roxby the protestors moved to Alberrie Creek on Finnis Springs Station where a music festival was held over three nights to celebrate the Mound Springs, while during the day there were cultural workshops and tours given by members of the Arrabunna community including Reg Dodd and Kevin Buzzacott.

In August 1998 the collective that had organised Roxstop received a fax from the Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta. It said: “We’re trying hard about this rubbish – the radio-active waste dump. We don’t want that… We want your help! We want you to come up here to Coober Pedy and have a meeting with Aboriginal people (and any whitefellas from here who want to come)”. In September of that year a group of over a dozen people travelled from Melbourne to Coober Pedy and held a public meeting with the Aboriginal people to discuss the dump.

Things have not always run smoothly for the anti-uranium collective. One year we were stranded for a night on the Borefield Road between the Oodnadatta Track and Roxby Downs with forty people and three buses when the road became impassable due to rain! Another time at Mambury Creek in the southern Flinders Rangers, emus raided our camp and scattered our provisions including cereal, bread and fruit all over the campsite while the campers were protesting in Port Pirie! But, there have been great highlights.

The first time we were invited to the Ten Mile Creek (just outside of Cooper Pedy) by the Kungka Tjuta, we saw the beautiful sight of moon rising over Lake Eyre South. At Ten Mile Creek we saw the effects of the leaflet on workers’ health and exposure to low levels of radiation, we protested outside the Woomera Detention Centre, we saw the representatives of the Honeymoon Uranium Project squirm as tour participants asked difficult questions about the chemical structure of the waste solution to be pumped back into the aquifer. And we will never forget the warm greeting from members of the Adnyamathanha community at Nepabunna, even though we were four hours late!

There have been many great and rewarding outcomes from the Nuclear Exposures Tours. What stands out for us and what must be acknowledged here is the strengthening of the close working relationships we at Friends of the Earth have with the Aboriginal communities and the many individuals who have taken part in our tours. Every person who has gone on a tour has had an amazing, never-to-be-forgotten experience and many of the participants from various tours have made a considerable contribution to the anti-nuclear movement.

— Ila Marks


Radioactive Exposure Tour 2014

Tour exposes radioactive racism

April 26, 2014, Rachel Evans & Yuya Mori, https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/56316

Radical Exposure Tourists at Roxby Downs, home of Australia’s largest uranium mine, Olympic Dam.

Forty people travelled over 6000 kilometres as part of an anti-nuclear educational trip from Melbourne to Tennant Creek in the Northern Territory and back from April 12 to 27.

The annual “Rad Tour” weaved its way through Victoria, South Australia and the Northern Territory to educate people about the dangers of the nuclear industry.

The Rad Tourers came from across Australia and several international guests took part. The tour visited Roxby Downs in South Australia, had a tour of the Olympic Dam mine and finished by visiting the community opposing a national radioactive waste dump on their land at Muckaty, 100 km north of Tennant Creek in the NT.

Tour organiser Gemma Romuld told Green Left Weekly: “The tour was a great success. We had 40 people participating from Australia, India, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, England, New Zealand and France. It assisted the campaign to stop the waste dump at Muckaty, by helping people understand the Muckaty story, and [giving them] the confidence to take the message back home and share the experience with Indigenous elders whose country they are from.

“I thought the highlights were drawing the connections between uranium mining, atomic energy, racism and radioactive waste. It was great hearing from the most important defenders of the country on their own land. Really, we can’t talk about uranium mining and dumping radioactive waste without talking about the NT Intervention, racism, colonisation and corporate capitalism.”

The first Radioactive Exposure Tour was organised in 1990, six years after the Roxby Blockades of 1983 and 1984 in which hundreds of people blockaded and hindered the establishment of Olympic Dam. During these blockades people had the powerful experience of seeing a uranium mine and listening to Aboriginal people who opposed the mine. Blockaders also had the opportunity to show their opposition to uranium mining in creative, colourful and sometimes dramatic ways.

It was in this tradition that the idea of Radioactive Exposure Tours evolved. The Anti-Uranium Collective at Friends of the Earth organised the tours with the aim of letting people witness and experience the nuclear industry first-hand. People would be able to see and walk on the country affected, to hear what Aboriginal people had to say, learn about the anti-nuclear movement and strengthen opposition to the nuclear industry.

Adam Sharah, an activist in Australian Nuclear Free Alliance spoke to GLW as he was helping construct a humpy.

“This tour is poignant as it allows people to experience the Aboriginal story behind apartheid policy in the NT,” he said.

“It is an education against the global nuclear movement and imperialist militarism and how the government willfully attacks land rights.

“It also highlighted to me the ineffectiveness of Native Title. In terms of the Muckaty waste dump, the Radioactive Waste Management Act, introduced by ALP minister Martin Ferguson, overrides Native Title. Like the BHP Billiton mega mine up in Lake Eyre on Arabunna land — Aboriginal rights are overridden.

“Elders that travelled from Muckaty to Melbourne to talk to Ferguson about the legislation were refused a meeting — he literally shut the door on them.” …

Noor Alifa Ardiamimgrum is an Indonesian environment postgraduate student in environment studies at Melbourne University who was on the tour. She said: “Indonesia has a nuclear plan – but the geology is not stable, we have areas that have been hit by earthquakes – and the plans for nuclear expansion on an energy front have been rejected by the community.

“There was a survey of people in the area about a nuclear plant and 70% were pro-nuclear — that was in 2004 or 2005 — they felt we needed the energy. But they have never surveyed people living in the areas.

“Then in East Java we had a big earthquake and they stopped the plan. In Indonesia there is no uranium mining — they are not consciously extracting uranium, but they are probably taking uranium out when they mine copper. Australian mining companies are very active in Indonesia — especially gold mining in the east Indonesia region. The largest gold mine in Indonesia is in East Java and the Australian company mining it is taxed really low.

“There is no strong law, no strong environmental risk management assessment and law enforcement is weak. There is a terrible power imbalance between the company and the local community. It’s very hard. If the local community does not give permission, then the companies just come in anyway.

“This tour has helped me get the context with the environment struggle — in Indonesia, the indigenous people have also been fighting the companies. The alliances we need to build are with Indigenous people. West Papua is also an area of exploitation — not so much of mining companies but of agribusiness — it’s a land grab off indigenous tribes and it is hard to help as West Papua is very closed. The tour inspired me to recognise the importance of the indigenous and environmentalist connection.”

Kumar Sundaram, who is the international campaigner for the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, in India was also on the tour. He told GLW: “The CNDP is an umbrella coalition of anti-nuclear organisations across India. There are 10 to 12 places that are protesting nuclear reactors across India.

“Elections in India take place on May 12 and we are organising a nation wide conference of anti-nuclear campaigners in Delhi, so we can come out of the election period with a clear statement. CNDP organises protests, conferences and works on a college student program. The city-centres are quite pro-nuclear — in the urban centres people have swallowed a pro-consumption, pro-development argument and they think that involves nuclear energy.

“In 1998 the coalition against the nuclear cycle was strengthened because India conducted nuclear tests in 1998. The movement is still strong. We are able to organise big rallies with several hundred people in attendance.

“The Indian and Australian governments have a nuclear agreement, which seeks to open ways to supply uranium to India. We oppose this, because the supply of uranium would fuel newly proposed reactors — pushed by a government which brutally overrides community opposition, environmental concerns and safety issues while the international community moves away from nuclear energy since the Fukushima accident in Japan.

“Secondly, we oppose the agreement because of the brutal oppression meted out against fisherfolk, agricultural workers, tribes and petty traders. This is not a small amount of people in India. Lots of people have been forced to give away their land and there have been large grassroots protests.

“The southernmost tip of India is Koodankulam — at this place 30,000 people protested against a proposed reactor. Two people were killed and several hundred people were kept in jail for three months. Ten thousand people face charges from police, fictitious charges of murder and sedition. This is a human rights crisis. If you oppose the nuclear industry then you are a traitor. Farmers and local community land is owned by half a dozen people — the government uses the carrot and the stick and then re-takes the land.”

“A major concern is that an Australian uranium expansion will fuel the expansion in contempt of a worldwide turn away from nuclear energy post Fukushima. The expansion taking place in India is being pushed through in a brutal fashion. Also, Australian uranium will fuel the arms race in south-east Asia. As part of the tour I met with the officials of the uranium mine in Roxby Downs.

“This tour has been about learning about the context of the nuclear industry expansion and seeing the parallels. India’s anti-nuclear movement is not just about a choice of technology, about what we do and don’t want. It’s about control of land. There are parallels between Aboriginal Australia and Indian indigenous struggles. These issues are class and social justice issues.

“We saw this most acutely on the tour when we met Yami Lester, an Aboriginal man now completely blind due to being exposed to atomic weapon tests at Maralinga. In India and Australia, whether it’s the fight against dangerous nuclear energy or the fight by tribal people over losing land, the fight against radiation poisoning or being deprived of basic immunities — it is all because the local elites decided their priorities are profits. We must resist. This tour was a wonderful exchange of information.”

Tour participants will provide ongoing solidarity with the Muckaty battle. Tour spokeswoman Emma Kefford said: “We are travelling all the way from Melbourne to Tennant Creek to show our support to the Muckaty Traditional Owners saying no to a radioactive waste dump on their land. They are taking their case to the federal court in June and we hope they get the justice they deserve after seven years of struggle.”

——————->


Radioactive Exposure Tour 2005

Pioneered by Ila Marks and Eric Miller, the Radioactive Exposure Tours have been providing amazing opportunities for people to learn about the impacts of uranium mining first-hand by travelling to South Australia visiting existing uranium mines and talking with locals and indigenous communities about their experiences with the nuclear industry. Tour participants get to experience affinity groups, consensus decision making, desert camping and delicious organic, vegetarian, communal cooking whilst travelling to some of the most beautiful and ecologically significant environments in Australia.

The 2005 tour was held in April. The following is feedback from some of the participants.

“The tour encompassed many areas involved in the local nuclear fuel cycle, from mining to dumping to nuclear testing, and those activists devoting their lives to preventing this chain of death. More importantly, it also encompassed so much that will be lost if mining companies and the government continue to have their way; ­ the remaining cohesion of indigenous groups and culture; the incredible Mound Springs that are drying up as a result of overdrawing the Great Artesian Basin, the existence of other ecological life that the GAB supports, and human good health.”- Sophie Green

“You could never have imagined what you would learn, what you would see and how much of an impact this would have on you. Never. Your thoughts now are; how are you going to use your images, your knowledge, your ideas to tell other people, to explain the importance of understanding what is happening to this land and the indigenous people of this land. What they think, what they are experiencing is nothing we could ever go through, we are so privileged and so well looked after that we can actually choose to care about things or not. They don’t get that choice. Uranium mining in South Australia and everywhere else is damaging so much indigenous land, and so many indigenous and non-indigenous people. “ – Jessie Boylan

”During the trip, participants were given first-hand accounts of the history of the anti-nuclear movement in South Australia by activists that had been involved in past protests against the mining companies and had the opportunity to participate in a new campaign to inform residents of Roxby Downs about the Olympic Dam operation. Some of the issues discussed … include the environmental damage caused by mining, the Government’s apparent failure to take problems with mining operations seriously, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the Aboriginal consultation process. Examples of current and past anti-nuclear activism are also given.” – Joel Williams


Radioactive Exposure Tour 2008

Hideko Nakamura’s feedback from the 2008 radtour:

The tour was one of the most memorable events in my life. I had some knowledge on the British nuclear tests conducted during the 50s and 60s in SA because I am very much interested in nuclear issues, notably the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki of 1945. I, however, had not been aware of the unimaginable effects of the tests on people and environments until I listened to Avon Hudson’s talk. I can relate the tragedy of the bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Avon’s story. I was inspired by his long-term courageous campaign in trying to tell the truth. When I stood on the outback, I could not help but imagine how indigenous people loved and looked after the land with care for so many years. At the same time I noticed how much core members of Friends of the Earth made efforts to cultivate and strengthen bonds with these beautiful indigenous people we have met. Now I miss each participant of the tour. Thank you for sharing ideas and aspirations with me.


Radioactive Exposure Tour 2011

A participant’s account by Cherie Spaulding

Controlled power flight first occurred at the hands of an improbable pair. The Wright Brothers had no money nor were they university educated. What they did have was a purpose. Everyone who worked beside them believed in what they were doing. Passion was their fuel and it drove them toward their goal with solid conviction. Against the odds, their airplane took flight in 1903.

Activism, like that daring airplane flight, is never an easy endeavor. The odds are stacked against you, the road periled, pot-holed and poorly funded. Activism requires individuals to stand against the status quo: to stand on principal for the collective good. The 2011 Radioactive Exposure Tour combined activists, tribal elders, nuclear veterans and concerned citizens seeking to understand the social, cultural and environmental impacts of uranium mining. Through firsthand accounts of aboriginal elders, a nuclear veteran of the British missile tests, concerned citizens, community activists and mine representatives, participants were exposed to the concerns of uranium mining and nuclear endeavors. Together, the group sought to understand more in depth the climate surrounding the extraction and use of nuclear materials.

This years RAD Tour included five children. Immediately apparent were FIVE REASONS why we should pause to consider the use of radioactive materials to feed nuclear reactors or fuel atomic weapons. Our children’s futures will be shaped by the actions of their parents, aunties and uncles, and elders. Along with thirty adults., the group traversed the South Australian outback for ten days, camping in some of the states most scenic locations. Along the way they made new friends, sampled local cuisine, imbibed fine music and explored the natural environment. The following excerpt journals our trip.

Day one: early morning in Melbourne. Trip leaders, Jessie and Kasey, arrived at FOE with the vans and trailers and began loading our gear. Before long, both trailers and buses were packed. The journey to Adelaide began as the bus marched through city streets that turned to suburbs that grew into sprawling green pastures of flocked sheep, and then sprung into wheat fields that stretched into dry desert, where cattle grazed in the distance. The drive consumed most of the day. Arriving at Single Step after dark, friend’s from Adelaide awaited with dinner. Promptly, we unrolled our swags on the soft lawn beneath the stars.

On the second day, we discovered that repacking the trailer required strategy and skill. Gangis and Jared organized the system while strong backs and helping hands piled the gear on the trailer’s tailgate. With a farewell to our gracious hosts, we were back on the bus heading toward stops at Port Wakefield and then Point Pirie for lunch.

At Point Pirie we met Adnymathanha elder, Enice Marsh. Gathering in the shade, we listened as she shared stories and experiences of growing up on native land and her early awareness of the water “poisoned” by radioactivity. She described some of the challenges to the Native Title agreement and the exclusion of some aboriginal peoples in the decision-making concerning land use and mine expansions. Though a small women and soft spoken, her voice was clear and confident, deepening our awareness with her story.

By nightfall we were making camp away from the traditional amenities of urban life. Kasey, the co-leader and instrument of complete kitchen construction, possibly magician, pulled a kitchen out of a trailer—voilà! Suddenly, on the edge of a sea inlet, between freshly unrolled swags, we had the makings of a dinner! Busy hands set about chopping and lighting, sautéing and simmering, until at last, a meal appeared. Heavy in veggies, the dinner call sounded; torch-lit heads began sashaying to the table for the good night’s tucker. With bellies full, we listened to Dr. Andrew Melville Smith describe the Roxby Downs plan to build a desalination plant at Point Lowly, potentially jeopardizing the breeding ground of the giant cuttlefish. Plans to dump the access salt in the bay, he said, would disrupt the ecological balance that maintained a suitable habitat for this exotic cephalopod. The true threat is that a slight variation in the water pH can disrupt the breeding habits of the cuttlefish. A simple equation, really. No breeding, no cuttlefish. The almost electric bodies of the meter long fish could disappear from Point Lowly—forever. The group was called to action. In the morning, we would travel to the Point and stand in defense of the cuttlefish.

After breakfast, the activist campers tucked loose ends in the trailer and loaded the buses. Because I had not properly introduced myself to our resident whistle-blower, I thought I would become better acquainted if I road along in his car. We had first met up with Avon Hudson the previous afternoon, at Point Wakefield, only to discover that his self-serviced Toyota was having some engine trouble. Maybe the fan or the thermostat, he speculated. The engine wasn’t cooling properly. Such a scenario might incline one to reconsider a caravan across South Australian in an old jalopy. Not Avon. Equipped with replacement parts, he motored on. When the tour schedule afforded him a spare moment, he popped the hood and began repairing the trouble. Beneath the hood he revealed an immaculate engine, deceptively so, considering the age and condition of the car. You could have sautéed tofu on the engine block, and it would have been petrol-flavor free: each part was cleaned and dated with the time of service. Having contemplated my own safety as a potential passenger, I now felt reassured by the apparent competency of the onboard mechanic. This was day two. Saying good luck to the cuttlefish at Point Lowly, we loaded up. The adventure of the RAD Tour was full on.

The days driving covered miles and miles of South Australian landscape. The soil turned from dusty grayish-ochre to burnt umber and red. The earth rolled under us, past roving steer, mile after mile. The wheels on the bus, as the children sang, rolled round and round. Old friends were reconnecting and new friends were becoming acquainted. Trailing in the Toyota, Avon recollected history with one eye on the rising needle; he recited experiences with the accuracy of a scientist, but with a poet’s passion and potency. Propelled by stories and prayers, we rolled on toward the next town.

At Maralinga, statue-like missile bodies sprung from the dry ground: once aimed toward destruction, now hollow and empty. Outside a small school painted with aboriginal faces, Avon offered a detailed account of the missile testing. The fallout after a nuclear explosion can be radioactive for decades, contaminating the dust that intermingles with breathable air. Avon described how the men working at Maralinga were uninformed (by their British officers) about the harmful effects of the nuclear radiation. Men were sent out in severely contaminated fields wearing only shorts and t-shirts, while higher officials wore white suits and silk gloves for full body protection. Time and history would reveal the deception to those involved in the nuclear testing. The unseen sacrifice to the men and their families was to their cells and genes; from the fallout of the nuclear missiles, the environment remained contaminated by radiation…and so did the men.

After lunch, our caravan forged along miles of dusty gravel roads, heading deeper and deeper into the country toward Lake Eyre. To understand what we were about to experience, you would have to know that Lake Eyre has not been a “lake” in 35 years. Twelve meters below sea level, the salty lakebed sat empty, crusted with white flaky salt crystals. Because of the heavy rain in northern Australia, water began to fill the bed—and fill it did! As the group prepared camp, children tromped in the mucky soft soil that had been cracked and dry for over three decades. Some dredged to the salty waters’ edge for a wade. Here we were joined by the Adelaide mob that brought along Uncle Kevin Buzzacott, an Arabunna elder. Uncle Kevin planned to share stories with us, but urged us to watch the sunset over Lake Eyre first; knowing the land, he also knew the experience was rare, one we would want to see and remember.

Much of the activity of the next few days occurred around Lake Eyre. The first, an easy morning: breakfast and a chance to relax. The mornings generally revolved around coffee, children and campfire. Cups clanging and fire stoking, morning meetings organised the camp duties and the plans for our day. We also compared notes from the night: Any mice in your swag? Did you stay warm? Dry? In the afternoon a bus loaded with twenty campers, including the five children, left to check out the local culture of Andamooka, an opal-mining town nearby. By nightfall, we were back around the fire, preparing for the Olympic Dam Tour at Roxby Downs.

The next morning the group left for Roxby Downs and the mine tour. As we drove onto the premises of the mining operation, the tour leader began describing the history and resources of the mine. Uranium is one of the four resources extracted from Olympic Dam, along with copper, gold and silver. With approximately 1,000 employees on site at any given hour, the mine is a tremendous operation. The above ground infrastructure was reminiscent of a city newly under construction, consisting of few walls and deeply trenched pits. Iron and steel beams shot at right angles, cutting horizontal and vertical planes of steel into the blue sky.

Because of a growing concern for the Olympic Dam expansion, and the potential environmental threats to Spencer Gulf (at Point Lowly) the group inquired: Would the mine oppose relocation of the desalination plant? What if the excess salt turned Spencer Gulf into a “dead sea?” Was there proper consideration of the cuttlefish? Other questions concerned the working operations and safety of mine employees handling uranium and other waste products. Unfortunately, our guide could not offer solid answers to our critical inquiries, referring us instead to a newly published mining document. Leaving the mine, the tour bus drove over a small bridge and the tires were sprayed to remove potential contaminates. Post-mine tour, we ate lunch at a nearby park and posed for a photo op with a local newspaper; standing in the foreground was Uncle Kevin, arms crossing his chest, saying “NO DEAL” to the mine expansion.

Day six took us to fragile Mound Springs. Uncle Kevin captivated the children with his story about the two snakes that became the mounds, one the source of the life giving spring. Lunch at Coward Springs afforded some coveted reprieve from showerlessness. While falafel sizzled on the burner, children danced to Madeline’s ukulele renditions of favorite songs. Others showered or sat in the bubbly warm spring that looked like a wooden Jacuzzi, powered by nature. Driving back to Lake Eyre, our bus turned onto a mucky path and the wheels sunk in deep. Within minutes, everyone was off the bus, giving a big heave-ho shove. By now our group was united. Working together, we were becoming an excellent team: a solid force of collective awareness.

Day seven broke camp at Lake Eyre and said goodbye to the strange and wonderful region, the source of many Arubunna dreamings. Jessie, co-leader extraordinaire, had us salivating at the mention of quandong and roo pies at Copley. As an appetizer we stopped off in Marree to see the aboriginal cultural center and found ourselves pulled by near gravitational force toward another kind of culture: the general store. Suddenly, we found ourselves ordering chips and coffees—captivated by the strange array of items from camping equipment to cough drops to authentic bush attire, all available in one convenient location. The cultural center, by contrast was filled with art, artifacts and relics from the desert; a brief talk offered another dimension to the aboriginal struggle to ward off further mining on native land. For the last leg with Uncle Kevin, we stopped off at the Ochre Pits, a deep hand-dug canyon, millennia in the making. Used for the purpose of ceremonial painting, medicine and trading, the clay walls of the canyon echoed the colors of region: mustard, beige, ivory, pumpkin, and rust. Before saying goodbye, Uncle Kevin appealed to the group one last time. He wanted our experience to incite change. We said farewell and then drove for pies. By torchlight we made camp at Nepoire Creek.

The next morning a bus left camp and drove to the Beverly Mine. In contrast to the very public location of the Olympic Dam, the Beverly Mine is tucked below the Gammon Ranges, far from observing eyes. With a gated periphery, the bus awaited chaperone. Escorted into the conference room, we were welcomed with a tray of yellow frosted yellow cake, warm cups of tea, coffee and a slideshow. Prepped for the potential spear flinging Rad Toursits, the presenters were forthright on some occasions, however, they deflected many tough questions, leaving palpable dissatisfaction. We were hungry for concrete answers. The company reassured us that stored tailings sealed underground aquifer was a secure solution for the long haul. Their convictions validated by current scientific standards. The skeptics among the group were well acquainted with the occasional misgivings of scientific validation. Unfortunately, the gap between the present and future sometimes presents a void too great to predict potential calamities.

Our next stop was lunch and showers at Balcanoona Station. The warm camp showers were a sweet reprieve from the dust and grit of camp life. By mid-afternoon we would be settled in the Gammon Ranges. Marsupial mice were rumored to be lurking about and the site was lively with the adventures of hiking explorations. Camped near a creek bed on the rolling slope of hillside, we made shelter for the evening. By accidentally digging the pit toilet in the creek bed, I witnessed firsthand the salt of my fellow camper, Kate, pregnant as could be, who helped me dig a second hole across the road. Though digging silently, I felt a sense of comfort in knowing that my traveling companions followed their conviction with solid action.

Day nine brought us to Arkaroola. Our fearless explorers examined the mountains and the gift shop with equal fervor. We met with Marg Sprigg, whose family once journeyed across Australia and settled in the Arkaroola wilderness area. Widely known as caretakers of the region, Marg spoke of opposing Marathon mining company if their explorations of the sanctuary proved fruitful. After lunch, we boarded the bus. With plenty of daylight and miles to cover, we pressed on toward the Flinders Ranges, through mountain valleys, once thirsty, now fed by brimming streams, past hopping kangaroos and camels, rolling hillsides and plains.

The final days were heavy with driving. Near nightfall, we said goodbye to Avon and pressed on toward Adelaide, leaving others there, until only the Melbourne mob remained. To lessen the miles, we drove late and made camp around midnight. The small group cozied around a warm fire, on soft, grassy terrain. In high spirits the fire brimmed with laughter; the worn and weary were raised by the hand of friendship—swag and all—to higher ground and restful sleep.

By the time we arrived in Melbourne, everyone was tired, but giddy. Hugs and laughter peppered Smith Street as we unloaded swags and gear from the bus. The trip had gathered an incredible group of people, uniting them toward a common cause. If we struggled at all, the lesser force was the wind. Though the tour had equipped us with a better understanding of the challenges the greater resistance lie ahead, in a future we would need to create.

The 2011 Radioactive Exposure Tour began almost three decades ago as a simple idea that manifest into action. This year the RAD Tour brought together a melting pot of citizens: students, activists, professionals and tradesman. People concerned about the well being of both Australia and the earth. Participants gained an over-whelming awareness of the potential impact of the human use of radioactive materials. They were learning by doing…and only by action can our ideas take flight.


Radiaoctive Exposure Tour – 2009

Write-up of the radtour by Ania Anderst

As a student living in Perth, I found myself remarkably lucky to have made it out to the South Australian desert for ten days in May on the Friends of the Earth Radioactive Exposure Tour. The ‘radtour’ is a unique experience allowing people interested in learning about the nuclear industry to go out on country to see uranium mines and to meet people directly affected by the nuclear industry past and present.

Tackling the nuclear industry can be an overwhelming experience, mostly because there is no end to the amount of information on the issue; from uranium mining, nuclear reactors, waste issues, to nuclear proliferation, it’s easy to get lost in the information. And there’s also the added factor of the multi-million dollar mining companies we’re fighting, not to mention the governments siding with them.

The big picture can be rather scary, but actually stepping out onto uranium mines, onto country, and making connections with people who have for years been directly affected by these mining operations makes it easier to understand. It’s no longer some abstract mine in some landscape you can’t imagine, affecting some people you’ve never met before; these are real people with the real deal on their doorstep.

That abstract image of a mine in the back of your head becomes the physical site of the ugly and protruding Olympic Dam uranium/copper mine, or the hundreds of white pipes sticking out of the ground at Beverley uranium mine where they practice in-situ leach uranium mining. Those people become real when you hear the stories of Arabunna Elder Uncle Kevin Buzzacott, Maralinga veteran Avon Hudson and Adnyamathanha custodian Jillian Marsh. Their personal stories, dating decades back, make the issues more human, more accessible.

There’s no better way than to see it yourself – and not only tour the mines and ask the workers questions, but then to juxtapose that intense, sometimes hostile experience with the peaceful time shared around the campfire with people who share your passions and willingness to fight the machine.

When BHP Billiton took us on a tour of Olympic Dam – which takes 35 million litres of water daily from the Great Artesian Basin for free – it was hard to believe some of the things they had to say. According to the BHP employee giving the tour, the mine had less of an environmental impact than pastoralism would have, and the nuclear industry was alleviating people from poverty by providing poor countries with power. It was difficult not to get hostile and emotional hearing that somewhat bent rationale for the existence of such an unsound industry. There was an answer to every one of our questions and the tour bus was filled with suffocating negative energy, lie after lie.

For me, Heathgate Resources’ Beverley mine was even harder to stomach because of the propaganda which included giant placards covering an entire wall concerning their ongoing relationship with Aboriginal communities in the area and showing pictures of Aboriginal kids smiling. When in fact, in May 2000, local Aboriginal communities were at the gates of Beverley protesting and were subsequently put in a shipment container and capsicum sprayed by the SA police. An 11-year-old local Adnyamathanha girl was capsicum sprayed.

BHP Billiton really seemed to believe what they were saying, they were proud of what they were doing. In comparison, the PR chump at Heathgate Resources was a blundering boy behind a company t-shirt. He didn’t answer questions properly, referring mostly to reports he hadn’t seemed to have read, and it felt like he had something to hide. When asked about the shipping container episode, he refused to comment.

Both companies claimed to have excellent relations with Aboriginal communities, but after listening to Jillian and Uncle Kevin talk, it seemed more like mining companies were deliberately creating an ongoing war of attrition amongst Aboriginal communities who are not consulted properly, and are instead split over whether to take a mining company’s money. If resources are needed in a remote community, people living there shouldn’t have to have a uranium mine (or a waste dump for that matter) in order to have health care and infrastructure. These are basic human rights and Aboriginal communities shouldn’t have to settle on corporate sponsorship and give up land rights for health and housing.

Coming face to face with these issues on country was confronting but the land itself allowed some peace of mind. Being out there, seeing the landscape and setting foot on red earth or on Lake Eyre, I had the strong sense that this country was alive. It surprised me how alive it was, with it’s gentle and soft sands, yet rough, hard, contrasts in colour.

Every night we camped somewhere different, and by the end it felt like we’d been all over the state of South Australia – Woomera, Roxby Downs, Lake Eyre, Copley for coffee and quandong pie (more than once thanks to a trailer tyre which caught on fire), Marree, a bit of a crazed dip into the hot springs at Coward Springs, the Blanche Cup and Bubbler Mound Springs with Uncle Kevin, the Beverley uranium mine, Arkaroola Wilderness Sanctuary, the ochre cliffs near Lyndhurst, Brachina Gorge, the surrounding Gammon Ranges, Port Pirie …

Aside from the heavy nature of what we were doing, life on tour was a lot of fun. As a group of 40 people with a range of ages, levels of experience, and approaches to the issue, it was what some called a social experiment. It was particularly lovely having a few children on the tour to emphasise the importance of the issues. Each night a different group helped set up dinner and campfires, and slowly the swags would surround the fires and the stars would come out at full capacity. Music was around all the time, singing tunes on the bus, off the bus, while the bus was bogged, while tyres were flat, while the bus wouldn’t start, while faffing …

And while we were out in the desert it was interesting to see the newspapers filling with related stories; with BHP announcing its proposal to the federal government for a uranium mine at Yeelirrie in WA, followed by the nuclear bomb test in North Korea. While North Korea gets a slap on the wrists from the UN, BHP in WA gets a tidal wave of anti-nuclear groups on it’s ass. This spells out to me that it’s better to stop them before the mines get going, because the safeguards against nuclear proliferation aren’t safe, and while they’re not we shouldn’t be touching uranium (amongst other reasons to leave it in the ground).

Seeing such amazing country, meeting so many beautiful people and seeing the mines for what they are was an inspiring experience, and thanks to this opportunity I feel a lot more equipped to do whatever I can to make sure uranium stays where it belongs – in the ground.

Articles about Lucas Heights and its nuclear reactors

The case for a Royal Commission into the proposal for a new nuclear reactor in Sydney’s southern suburbs

Produced by the Nuclear Reactor Taskforce
Sutherland Shire Council
PO Box 17, Sutherland, NSW, 1499.
1999

Summary

The Commonwealth Government and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) plan to build a new nuclear reactor in the Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights. This is Australia’s largest ever scientific investment, with profound implications for foreign policy and the direction of future Australian science, as well as significant health and property risks for the population of Australia’s largest city. Yet the design and approval process for the reactor has been shrouded in extraordinary secrecy and unaccountability, with the effect of blocking public debate and Parliamentary oversight.

Vital documents and studies have not been made public or do not exist:
* No detailed costings or economic analysis have been released
* No reactor design has been prepared
* No credible accident scenarios appear to exist
* No alternatives have been seriously considered
* No independent analyses apparently exist
* The waste processing contract with France is “Cabinet in confidence” and cannot be viewed, even by Parliament.
* The alternative sites study is “Cabinet in confidence”.

Further, scientists’ concerns over the public health and environmental risks associated with the planned new reactor and associated facilities have been trivialised or ignored; opponents of the reactor plan have been threatened with defamation suits; emergency planning procedures are far from adequate; a plethora of economic issues remain unanswered and unresolved; the Executive Director of ANSTO sat on a selection panel to interview applicants for the position of CEO of the regulatory agency which, in theory, regulates ANSTO’s activities.

Many more issues could be added to this list of concerns. Above all, two recurring themes have prompted this demand for a Royal Commission:
* secrecy, so pervasive that even the President of the Australian Nuclear Association has recently complained about the “culture of secrecy” at ANSTO; and
* dishonesty, which prompted a former ANSTO engineer with over 25 years experience to write last year, “It is an unfortunate state of affairs that dear old ANSTO, which lives off taxpayer’s money, is feeding us all this propaganda and very little objective information. I thought governmental agencies are there to serve the public – not just to perpetuate themselves.”

The effect of these failings, plus the gaps contained a weak and partisan Environmental Impact Statement, mean that neither the public nor Parliament have the possibility of rationally assessing or debating this proposal. In order to create the conditions for public confidence and trust, and make possible Parliamentary oversight of the proposed project, it is vital that a independent and rigorous inquiry is made into the siting, costs, alternatives, waste management and safety aspects.

We therefore call upon the federal government to establish a Royal Commission into the nuclear reactor proposal and the licensing process which has accompanied it.

A saga of deception

The Government ignored the 1993 Research Reactor Review’s recommendation for a Public Inquiry to investigate any future proposal for a new reactor. More recently the Government ignored the recommendation of the Senate Economics References Committee for a public inquiry into the proposal. The Senate committee said the decision to build a new reactor was “premature and open to ongoing controversy” because of the failure to carry out a public inquiry into the proposal, to properly investigate alternative sites, to take into account community views, and to resolve radioactive waste management issues.

Instead of a public inquiry, ANSTO prepared its own Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which was duly approved by the federal government. The government refused a request from the Sutherland Shire Council to appoint an independent auditor to oversee the Environment Impact Assessment. The EIS was neatly, though generously, summarised by a former head of Engineering and Reactors at ANSTO: “If it is normal for the proponent (of an EIS) to tell the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth, then ANSTO’s presentation is normal. Sometimes the difference between the truth and the whole truth is quite remarkable.”

A senior government bureaucrat said on ABC Radio National on March 29, 1998, that: “The government decided to starve the opponents of oxygen, so that it could dictate the manner of the debate that would follow the announcement. Because the government couldn’t win it on rational grounds … they decided, right, we’ll play the game and in the lead up to the announcement catch them totally unawares, catch them completely off-guard and starve them of oxygen until then. No leaks, don’t write letters arguing the point, just keep them in the dark completely.”

Such comments on the public record, yet the Prime Minister stated last year that the government has been “open and honest” in its handling of the reactor controversy.

Both ANSTO and the government have sought to cloak rational discussion about the costs and benefits of a reactor under a dishonest claim that the reactor is vital for nuclear medicine. In fact medical isotopes can be easily obtained from a global market which already supplies many Australian hospitals.

Peter McGauran, then science minister, began his press release announcing the decision to build a new reactor with the words, “The construction of a replacement research reactor at Lucas Heights will build on Australia’s life-saving nuclear medicine capabilities.” McGauran said on ABC radio on March 29, 1998, that “There’s no doubt that health issues concluded the matter beyond any doubt whatsoever.”

It has indeed been a dishonest argument according to a senior government bureaucrat who was quoted on the same ABC radio program saying: “The government decided to push the whole health line, and that included appealing to the emotion of people. … So it was reduced to one point, and an emotional one at that. They never tried to argue the science of it, the rationality of it”.

When Dr. Geoff Bower, head of the Australian and New Zealand Association of Physicians in Nuclear Medicine, was asked if it would be a “life threatening” situation if Australia did not produce medical isotopes locally, he said, “Probably not life threatening. I think that’s over-dramatising it and that’s what people have done to win an argument. I resist that.”

The medical isotope rhetoric has become so implausible that the government is itself backing away from it. The parliamentary Public Works Committee produced a bipartisan report in August 1999 which said: “A number of organisations and individuals challenged the need for a research reactor based on a requirement to produce medical radiopharmaceuticals. … The Committee recognises that this issue has not been resolved satisfactorily.”

Over two years have passed since the government’s decision to build a new reactor, $300 million has been committed to the project, a sham Environmental Impact Assessment has been completed, the tendering process is underway. Yet we now observe the government acknowledging that the debate over medical isotope supply – the issue which “concluded the matter beyond any doubt whatsoever” according to the former Science Minister – has not been resolved satisfactorily.

Nor was the Department of the Environment and Heritage prepared to accept this rhetoric when required to examine the EIS produced by ANSTO. It said that “a combination of alternatives, such as funding for ‘suitcase science’, importation of radioisotopes, and possible development of spallation and other technologies, could substitute in part for not constructing a new reactor.” A further reflection of the Department’s unwillingness to parrot the rhetoric was its statement that, “The Department’s assessment concludes that the need and justification for the proposal is ultimately a matter for Government, particularly in defining how best to meet national interest objectives.”

A blank cheque

The proposal requires spending over $500 million of Commonwealth funds in the short term, with well over a billion dollars committed for on-going expenditure during the 40-50 year life of the reactor.

The absence of financial honesty in the proposal is astonishing – neither the public nor Parliament have been provided with detailed costings or a credible cost-benefit analyses. At a time of acute financial accountability and restraint in Commonwealth expenditures, ANSTO is apparently being handed a blank cheque.

ANSTO’s claim that the reactor will cost taxpayers $286 million. This is a 1993 figure which does not take cost escalations into account. It is a deceptive figure which fails to take into account obvious foreseeable costs. Here is a more honest accouting:

Cost of reactor – up to $400 million (1)
Instrumentation – up to $150 million (1)
Decommissioning old reactor – $70 million (1)
Spent fuel reprocessing – $120 million (3)
Isotope processing – $13 million p.a. (2)
Reactor operating costs – $20 million p.a. (1)

Total likely costs = over $500 million

Plus ± $20 million Commonwealth subsidy per year for 40-50 years.

(1) McKinnon Research Reactor Review 1993
(2) ANSTO Annual Report 1998-99
(3) ANSTO EIS 1998

To these costs must be added the unknown cost of a waste repository for long-lived intermediate level wastes (ie. spent fuel when returned to Australia from reprocessing overseas).

The costs of such a waste repository are likely to be immense. The US government plans to spend US$30 billion on a high level waste repository in Nevada. The cancelled Nirex intermediate waste facility in the UK was to cost £2 billion. Pangea Ltd’s high level waste proposal in Australia was supposed to cost US$6 billion.

Does the federal government intent to hand ANSTO a blank cheque? It certainly seems so.

A key task for the Royal Commission would be to obtain credible independent assessments of the likely costs of the reactor proposal, so that an informed debate can occur.

A failure of science policy

As with the rhetoric about medical isotopes, claims that a new reactor is required for “world-class” scientific research are also questionable. The reactor, if built, would be the single largest investment in a science facility in Australia’s history yet the government failed to consult its science advisers – the Office of the Chief Scientist, the Australian Science, Technology and Engineering Council (ASTEC) and the CSIRO – before making the decision. The CSIRO said in 1993 that “more productive research could be funded for the cost of a reactor.”

There is little scientific or medical support for a new reactor beyond those individuals and organisations with financial and/or career interests in reactor technology. Needless to say alternative technologies – such as cyclotrons – have not received such enthusiastic and uncritical support; indeed the development of alternative technologies has been impeded because of the push for reactor technology.

Distorting Australia’s foreign policy

So why does the government want a new reactor? The Public Works Committee said that the “national interest criterion forms the cornerstone of the need for a replacement research reactor”. ANSTO said in its Draft EIS that national interest issues were addressed “comprehensively” by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards Office in their submission to the Senate Nuclear Reactor Inquiry – but that submission was just seven pages long and it was unreferenced.

It appears that a seven-page, unreferenced document on “national interest” issues forms the principle justification for the new reactor.

In fact, a nuclear reactor is likely to commit Australia decisively to the “nuclear club” by ensuring a seat on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA regulates the world’s nuclear industry and is also the world’s biggest promoter of nuclear energy.

It is unclear how our national interest is served by participating in the global spread of nuclear energy with its associated risks and waste problems. Professor McKinnon, who carried out the government’s 1993 Reactor Review, agreed, stating: “There may be national advantages in not being so closely associated with IAEA stances.”

The serious accident in September 1999 at Tokaimura, Japan, suggests a far more sensible ‘national interest’ for Australia might be to encourage regional countries to adopt safer non-reactor technologies.

(Note that on page 38 of the 1998-99 Annual Report, ANSTO boasts a 14 year collaboration with Tokaimura on the management of waste!)

These ought to be vital matters for Parliamentary, and public, discussion.

A culture of secrecy

ANSTO’s operations are shrouded in secrecy. Some of the issues of concern include the following:
* the Federal Government claims to have evaluated alternative sites but refuses to release the site selection study report, claiminig it is “Cabinet in confidence”.
* ANSTO has refused to release copies of the spent fuel reprocessing contracts between ANSTO and the French nuclear agency Cogema to the Senate Economic References Committee, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, and the Sutherland Shire Council.
* progress on a Community Right to Know Charter has been stalled. In 1998, ANSTO rejected a Charter put forward by the local community group involved in these negotiations. More recently, the Environment Minister, Senator Robert Hill, has refused to facilitate the introduction of a Charter despite his agreement that the establishment of a Charter should be a “high priority” before the reactor is built.
* several accidents took place at ANSTO’s Lucas Heights plant in February 1999 with one worker taking contamination home. Local residents and schools were not informed, nor was the NSW Health Department, nor was the Sutherland Shire Council. The information only came to light when released by a concerned ANSTO employee. One accident involved a spent fuel rod falling from its container, where it remained for a period of months. Four ANSTO staff members were exposed to radiation. On two other occasions, radiation releases above routine levels required closure of ANSTO’s radioisotope processing plant. Discussing one of these accidents, an ANSTO employee said, “ANSTO have covered this incident up and have not even told the staff that this incident occurred. Many staff believe that a site emergency should have been declared.” ANSTO management claims that the radiation releases posed no environmental or health risk. Who is to be believed? The February accidents require detailed investigation. A Royal Commission will also have the power to determine if there have been other accidents and other cover-ups.

Radioactive waste – where is the promised solution?

A major increase in radioactive waste production is projected by ANSTO if a new reactor is built. In the words of a senior bureaucrat quoted on ABC radio, waste management is “an issue for another generation”, “someone else can worry about it”.

Of particular concern is the government’s failure to develop a strategy to manage spent fuel from the Lucas Heights reactors.

ANSTO plans to send most of its spent fuel for reprocessing in Europe by the French nuclear agency Cogema. But where will the long-lived intermediate-level wastes arising from reprocessing spent fuel be stored when returned to Australia?

In 1997, the Commonwealth/State Consultative Committee on the Management of Radioactive Waste decided that “co-location” of an interim, above-ground store for long-lived intermediate-level wastes with the planned underground dump for low-level waste “should be considered as a first siting option.” The Government plans to establish a low-level dump in South Australia. ANSTO said in the Draft EIS in 1998 that it is “expected” that long-lived intermediate-level wastes will be stored adjacent to the proposed nuclear dump in South Australia.

However, South Australian Premier John Olsen said in state parliament on November 19 that while the SA Government supports a low-level dump: “the storage of long-lived intermediate-level waste, such as reprocessed fuel rods from Lucas Heights, is an entirely separate issue. … I wish to make it very clear that I am opposed to medium- to high-level radioactive waste being dumped in South Australia.”

Will the Government attempt to co-locate a store with the dump in the face of opposition from the South Australian Government? Will any other State or Territory Government accept spent fuel wastes originating at the Lucas Heights reactor plant? Or is ANSTO’s Lucas Heights site destined to remain a de factor nuclear dump?

No progress whatsoever has been made towards establishing a deep underground dump for long-lived intermediate-level wastes. The Government and ANSTO claim that the volume of existing long-lived intermediate-level wastes is insufficient to warrant construction of a deep underground dump. What volume would justify a deep geological dump? The Department of Industry, Science and Resources says that no decision has been made on what “magical volume” would trigger moves to establish a deep underground dump. Will the deep geological dump be sited in South Australia? What are the environmental and public health implications?

With so many waste management issues unresolved, it is irresponsible for the government and ANSTO to proceed with a plan for a new reactor which will generate another 1500-2000 spent fuel rods and which will also result in a 12-fold increase in the production of intermediate-level liquid wastes and a four-fold increase in other wastes according to ANSTO documents.

These ad hoc, politically-expedient waste management plans fly in the face of the 1993 Research Reactor Review’s statement: “A crucial issue is final disposal of high-level wastes, which depends upon identification of a site and investigation of its characteristics. A solution to this problem is essential and necessary well prior to any future decision about a new reactor. … It would be utterly wrong to decide on a new reactor before progress is made on identification of a high level waste repository site.”

Nuclear waste is just one issue that needs to be tested by public debate – a debate which cannot occur in the present atmosphere of secrecy and deception.

For the above reasons we call upon the federal government to establish a Royal Commission to independently investigate the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor proposal with the aim of returning public confidence and trust, encouraging informed public debate, and making possible Parliamentary oversight of the proposed project.

 


Proposed new reactor at Lucas Heights: decision-making processes

Jim Green
October 2000 (updated May 2002)

“[C]atch them totally unawares, catch them completely off-guard and starve them of oxygen” — Senior Canberra bureaucrat involved in the reactor push. ABC Radio National, March 29, 1998

1992 ASTEC REPORT

ANSTO’s reactor Draft EIS (1998, p.3-14) refers to the 1992 Australian Science Technology and Engineering Council (ASTEC) report on major national research facilities in support of the new reactor proposal. DISR and Hughes MP Danna Vale have done likewise. However the 1992 ASTEC Review was a preliminary sifting of almost a hundred proposals for science funding; it was anything but a searching analysis of the cases for and against a new reactor. This can easily be confirmed by consulting the flimsy ASTEC report.

The ASTEC report itself says (p.xiii), in bold type: “It must be emphasised that, while the present study has identified a number of timely proposals for major national research facilities, ASTEC has not employed peer review, on-site visits or other steps necessary for a full evaluation of proposals. It will be essential for this to be carried out rigorously before final decisions are taken about which facilities should be given the highest priority for funding.”

Prof. Anne Henderson-Sellers, an ASTEC member (and now an ANSTO division manager), expressed serious doubts about the medical, scientific and commercial reasons for a reactor in the 1993 Research Reactor Review (RRR) report. Henderson-Sellers was one of three members of the RRR panel,

During the 1993 RRR, ASTEC said a decision on a new reactor “…. must not be based solely on the needs of scientific research and industrial production. It must also take account of a number of social, political and cost factors. …. The detailed, rigorous evaluation advocated by ASTEC has yet to be made – ASTEC sees this as the responsibility of the Research Reactor Review.”

If built the reactor will be the single biggest investment in a science facility in Australia’s history, yet the Government did not consult its science advisory bodies – the Office of the Chief Scientist, ASTEC, or the CSIRO – before the 1997 decision to build a new reactor. The CSIRO said in its 1993 submission to the Research Reactor Review that “more productive research could be funded for the cost of a new reactor”.

ASTEC, 1992, Major National Research Facilities: A National Program, Canberra: AGPS.

 

1993 RESEARCH REACTOR REVIEW

ANSTO/DIST (submission to Senate Economics References Committee, May 1998, pp.497-498) state that the 1993 Research Reactor Review (RRR) “identified the necessity for a replacement research reactor.” That is a lie.

In 12 August, 1996 letter, then science minister Peter McGauran said: “Although the Research Reactor Review recommended that a decision on a new reactor be made ‘in about five years time’, it did not recommend that a new inquiry be undertaken.” That is false. The 1993 Research Reactor Review (p.4) specifically said that “if, at some later stage, a new reactor is envisaged, it should be assessed by a new panel possibly operating within the Environmental Protection Act 1974”. The RRR clearly had in mind a public inquiry, conducted by a panel such as that which conducted the RRR, not a sham Environmental Impact Assessment which was conducted not by “a new panel” but by ANSTO itself.

The RRR said (p.xv):

“If, at the end of a further period of about five years,
– a high level waste repository site has been firmly identified and work started on proving its suitability
– there is no evidence that spallation technology can economically offer as much or more than a new reactor
– there has been no practical initiation of a cyclotron anywhere worldwide to produce technetium-99m
– there is good evidence of strong and diverse applications of neutron scattering capability in Australian science, including many young scientists, and a complex of industrial uses
– the national interest remains a high priority
it would be appropriate to make a positive decision on a new reactor. The most suitable site would need to be identified.
If any one of these onerous requirements is not met, either a negative decision, or a decision to delay further, would be indicated.”

1994 BAIN-BATELLE REPORT

ANSTO’s reactor Draft EIS (1998, p.3-16) attempts to justify the reactor proposal with reference to the 1994 Bain-Batelle report. The Draft EIS fails to note that this report was commissioned by ANSTO and thus its independence is open to debate. Moreover the report’s treatment of substantive issues such as waste management is cursory; this can easily be proved by consulting the report.

Bain International Inc., Batelle Memorial Institute, and Pacific Northwest Laboratories, 1994, Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation: Strategy Review Recommendations: Final Report, Lucas Heights: ANSTO.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

“If it is normal for the proponent to tell the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth, then ANSTO’s presentation is normal. Sometimes the difference between the truth and the whole truth is quite remarkable.” –Tony Wood, Former Head, Engineering and Reactors, ANSTO, 1998, EIS submission.

A substantive critique of the Final EIS was prepared by the Sutherland Shire Council. I can also supply a substantive critique of the Draft EIS and Final EIS on request. The following comments address process issues only.

The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was an expensive bureaucratic whitewash. The fact that ANSTO prepared the EIS is completely unacceptable given its vested interest in a new reactor and ANSTO’s demonstrated track record of secrecy and dishonesty. That this was within the parameters of the EPIP legislation does not make it any less farcical.

The Sutherland Shire Council (submission to 1997-99 Senate Economics References Committee) called on the Federal Government to put in place an environmental auditor to oversee the reactor EIS process. That call went unanswered.

ANSTO had millions of dollars of tax-payers’ money to prepare the EIS whereas local residents and other opponents of the reactor plan had no funding whatsoever.

ANSTO hired PPK Environment and Infrastructure to help prepare the EIS. PPK was heavily criticised by an independent auditor during the Holsworthy airport EIS. The PPK project team has no expertise in nuclear sciences. PPK’s “information stalls” were high farce: PPK distributed information on the EIA/EIS process but hardly any information on the reactor proposal per se.

PPK refused to organise a public meeting at which both proponents and opponents would speak.

PPK refused to publicly release research documents being produced by ANSTO and NNC (the sub-contractor) during the preparation of the Draft EIS.

Any number of other specific examples could be provided to illustrate problems experienced by the public during the EIS process. To give one of many examples, Dr. Furzer’s (Sydney University) submission on the Draft EIS notes that he twice asked ANSTO to supply four papers listed in the Draft EIS. The papers were not supplied and Dr. Furzer said his submission was “limited in scope” because of ANSTO’s failure to supply information.

The fact that there was no opportunity for public comments to be made on the Final EIS was unacceptable.
THE REALPOLITIK OF THE SEPTEMBER 1997 DECISION TO BUILD A NEW REACTOR

The government’s Public Relations strategy in relation to the proposed new reactor was explained by a senior government bureaucrat, based in Canberra, on Radio National’s “Background Briefing” program (March 29, 1998, www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/bbing/bb980329.htm): “The government decided to starve the opponents of oxygen, so that they could dictate the manner of the debate that would follow the announcement. Because they couldn’t win it on rational grounds … they decided, right, we’ll play the game and in the lead up to the announcement catch them totally unawares, catch them completely off-guard and starve them of oxygen until then.”

A Department of Industry, Science and Tourism (DIST) briefing paper, dated April 1998, obtained by Sutherland Shire Council under Freedom of Information legislation, says: “There is “no point in consulting with potential/hypothetical recipients of a new reactor. It was discovered through the course of inquiry into the new airport that such a course of action serves only to inflame the communities for no good reason.”

1997-99 SENATE ECONOMICS REFERENCES COMMITTEE INQUIRY

The government has ignored the recommendation of the Senate Economics References Committee (1999) for a public inquiry into the reactor proposal.

The Committee’s majority report said the decision to build a new reactor was “premature and open to ongoing controversy” because of the failure to carry out a public inquiry into the proposal, to properly investigate alternative sites, to take into account community views, and to resolve radioactive waste management issues.

The majority report also said that the decision “relied largely on the vested interests of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and those involved in, and dependent on, the nuclear industry.”

The majority report argued that no reactor should be constructed “until a permanent site for disposal of the Lucas Heights nuclear waste is determined.”

The majority report recommended the establishment of a public inquiry “similar to the 1993 Research Reactor Review”.

Report by the Senate Economics References Committee on a New Reactor at Lucas Heights, September 1999:
www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/economics_ctte/lucas/index.htm.

NO COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

The federal Department of the Environment and Heritage (1999, p.42), in its assessment of ANSTO’s EIS, said, “The Department accepts that a formal cost-benefit analysis for the proposal is not appropriate, in view of the comprehensive analysis by the Research Reactor Review (RRR).”

The Department (1999, p.34) also said that the “The RRR undertook a comprehensive examination of costs and benefits of a new reactor.”

However, the RRR (1993) said that “a complete cost-benefit analysis of the case for a new reactor could not be done because of the inescapable arbitrariness of the financial values put on the national interest and benefits from science aspects.”
1999 PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE

Senator Minchin describes the Public Works Committee as an “independent public inquiry”. In fact, the Public Works Committee process was a rubber stamp and a complete waste of time. This can easily be confirmed by consulting the Committee’s report, which merely parrots ANSTO information/misinformation ad nauseum.

Public Works Committee (Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works), 1999, Report relating to the proposed Replacement Nuclear Research Reactor, Lucas Heights, NSW, Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia.
www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pwc/ansto/ncpindex.htm

Transcripts of hearings:
www.aph.gov.au/hansard/joint/commttee/j-pub-wk.htm
1999-2001 SENATE INQUIRY

A federal senate committee slammed the proposal in a report released on May 23, 2001. The majority report of thecommittee is a joint production of the Labor Party and the Democrats. The Democrats also wrote a minority report, taking a more critical line on the reactor project than the Labor Party, and a minority report from Liberal and National Party senators restates the government’s support for a new reactor.

On the alleged need for a research reactor in Australia, the committee concluded that “… no conclusive or compelling case has been established to support the proposed new reactor and … the proposed new reactor should not proceed.”

The committee found that “the decision to build a new reactor was taken without a detailed investigation of Australia’s present and future scientific and medical needs”. It was not convinced that logistical difficulties constitute a serious obstacle to the importation of radioisotopes, and also noted the expanding medical and scientific applications of alternative technologies such as cyclotrons.

On the foreign policy agenda driving the Coalition government’s plan for a new reactor, the committee found that “… the justification for the new research reactor solely on national interest grounds is not strong where national interest is defined on purely ‘security’ and non-proliferation grounds.” The committee said the government’s argument that a new reactor is required to facilitate nuclear disarmament and the implementation of nuclear safeguards is “tenuous”.

The committee went on to say, “The argument for the new research reactor on national interest grounds is more convincing when all areas of nuclear technology are considered, including its role in the region as an educational, research and training centre. The Committee believes, however, that this reason alone is not sufficient to justify the new research reactor. If the reactor is to go ahead, then the main considerations in establishing the need for a reactor must be its place as a research tool providing a neutron source for Australian researchers and products for industry, the health care system and the potential impacts on the environment.”

The committee recommended that before the government proceeds any further with the project it should establish an independent public inquiry into the alleged need for a new nuclear reactor and related issues such as funding for both medical and scientific research in Australia. The government rejected that recommendation on the same day the senate report was released.

The senate committee was particularly critical of the Coalition government and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) for their secrecy. It said, “The Committee is highly critical of ANSTO’s attitude which seeks to make a parliamentary committee subordinate to the whims of a government agency and prevents that committee from exercising its responsibility to scrutinise the executive. The Committee therefore appreciates the frustration experienced by the Sutherland Shire Council and members of the public who have experienced a similar attitude.”

The report also states, “The Committee is highly critical of ANSTO’s approach to providing documents. Its attitude seems to stem from a culture of secrecy so embedded that it has lost sight of its responsibility to be accountable to the Parliament.”

Even Liberal and National Party senators conceded that point, accepting “… that ANSTO could have been more helpful in providing certain less commercially sensitive information to the Committee and could have been more willing to seek a compromise when sensitive material was involved.”

The committee recommended that Senator Nick Minchin, the minister for industry, science and resources, should be censured for his refusal to comply with an order of the senate to table various documents relating to project including the reactor contract between ANSTO and the Argentinean company Invap, and the spent fuel reprocessing contract between ANSTO and the French company Cogema.

The committee recommended that the Australian National Audit Office “consider examining the tender and contract documents for the new reactor” with a view to determining whether documents sought by the committee and the senate should be made public; whether the cost estimate for the reactor is accurate; and whether, during the tendering process, ANSTO ensured that there was adequate and appropriate independent verification and validation of the tenderers’ claims.

The committee also expressed numerous concerns about the failure of ANSTO and the federal government to put in place plans to manage radioactive wastes arising from the existing HIFAR reactor or the planned new reactor.

2001 Senate Select Committee for an Inquiry into the Contract for a New Reactor at Lucas Heights, final report: www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/lucasheights_ctte
Transcripts of public hearings: www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/s-lh.htm

REGULATOR APPROVES REACTOR CONSTRUCTION – APRIL 2002

The head of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA), John Loy, approved construction of a new 20-megawatt nuclear reactor in the Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights on April 5, 2002.

The approval came as no surprise – so much so that the Associated Press and The Australian reported it before it had even taken place. ARPANSA describes itself as the ‘independent regulator’ and the ‘nuclear watchdog’, but it’s a puppet regulator, more poodle than watchdog. The head of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) sat on the panel which recommended Loy’s appointment to the health minister. Moreover, ARPANSA and ANSTO are linked by a revolving door – six ex-ANSTO employees now work for ARPANSA.

The announcement was accompanied with the usual propaganda about the ‘need’ for a reactor to produce medical isotopes. “The government had a clear choice”, said science minister Peter McGauran, “do we save lives or pander to extremists?” No mention of the fact that few if any doctors noticed the three-month closure of the existing reactor from February to May 2000.

ARPANSA has back-tracked from previous ‘commitments’ that a licence to construct a reactor would not be issued unless ANSTO demonstrated progress on radioactive waste management. For example, Loy said in June 2000 that before issuing a licence, “there would need to be progress on the strategy to establish a store for intermediate level waste, including for the waste arising from the reprocessing of spent fuel”.

All the ‘progress’ on storage of intermediate level waste has been in the wrong direction. The federal government has given up on its previous plan to store the waste in South Australia because of overwhelming public opposition and state legislation prohibiting such a store. With no other options available, the federal government has gone back to the drawing board with the establishment of an ‘advisory panel’ to suggest siting options later this year.

In a statement which purports to justify the issuing of a reactor construction licence, Loy notes his previous ‘commitment’ not to issue a licence unless progress had been made on intermediate level waste storage, he notes the abandonment of plans to store the waste in SA, and then he moves on to the next topic as if there was no contradiction to be explained. (ANSTO discusses storage of intermediate level waste in such a way as to imply that a store actually exists, while McGauran asserted on April 5 that plans for a store are “well advanced”.)

Loy says in his latest statement that a licence to operate the reactor (in or about 2005) will not be issued unless ‘significant progress’ is made on waste management plans, but this may prove to be as hollow as his previous commitments.

Plans for a national low level waste dump in SA also face fierce opposition, with 86-93% of South Australians opposed to the planned dump and the incoming state Labor government also opposed. The federal government will release an environmental impact statement justifying the planned dump in the near future.

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty now facing the reactor project concerns the Argentinian company Invap, which won the contract to build the new reactor. Invap is in a perilous financial situation and recently had to apply for a $10.5 million loan from the Argentinian government. Invap is also facing legal action over the constitutionality of the reactor contract, which contains a provision for conditioning of spent fuel from the Lucas Heights reactor in Argentina as a fall-back option if reprocessing contracts with the French agency Cogema fall through. This provision appears to breach Argentina’s constitution, which explicitly prohibits importation of radioactive waste. ANSTO and Invap make the unlikely claim that spent reactor fuel is not radioactive waste and thus the constitutional prohibition does not apply.


ANSTO staff speak

ANSTO “Staff Representing Truth in Science” wrote to a Sutherland Shire Councillor on April 3, 2000. Their comments are transcribed below:

“The reactor HIFAR will be shut down from 7 February to 1 May, 2000. ANSTO’s radioisotope production has suffered no dislocation as a result of the shutdown, since bulk supplies of radioisotopes are purchased from the big international players in Canada and South Africa. Indeed it is understood that we can purchase bulk supplies of radioactive molybdenum (ANSTO’s major seller in the form of a ‘generator’) from one supplier more cheaply than ANSTO can produce it. If HIFAR was so essential to the supply of radioisotopes why has there been no effective production dislocation during the shutdown.”

“It has been heavily rumoured that ANSTO is financially in the red to the tune of $6 million. The radioisotope production group is in the red by $2.2 million. If ANSTO cannot manage simple finances, although it has a large number of staff devoted to the task, how can it possibly hope to manage a complex reactor.”

“Further, it is known that the reactor replacement costs are projected to blow out considerably more than the amounts told to the Federal Government, but once the project is started it will have to be completed irrespective of costs. A number of staff believe there should be an independent external review of financial management at ANSTO and the real costs of a new reactor.”

“Because of inept executive management there is no succession planning within the organisation. Although it will be strongly denied by ANSTO, it is well known by those in the field that the new reactor project is having difficulty finding sufficient nuclear literate staff to address the tender process. It is understood that the current full-time staff on the program had their origins in the AAEC and are up for retirement. Inept management, no succession planning? Who is going to safely operate a new reactor in Sutherland Shire.”

“The last 4 years have seen unprecedented industrial actions resulting in lost-time for ANSTO. The staff morale is exceptionally low … because of unprecedented ineptitude at senior management level.”

“The ANSTO Board has a very limited idea of what is really transpiring at Lucas Heights. For instance, the radiation contamination scare last year was only brought to the staff’s attention because of a local newspaper. The incident was of such gravity, that the executive should have made an announcement over the site-emergency monitor about the incident to inform the staff. Instead the management practiced a culture of secrecy and cover-up, even to the extent of actively and rudely dissuading staff from asking too many questions about the event. The unions were outraged at the executive management concerning this incident but passively towed the management line because they wanted job security with a new reactor.”

“The ANSTO management appears to be endeavoring to muzzle staff comments external to the organisation (through the use of) Acknowledgment Undertaking (forms).”

“We understand that ANSTO has been obtaining supplies of samarium from South Africa since the HIFAR shutdown in February with no dislocation, this isotope is usually manufactured by ANSTO. It is further understood that ANSTO has stopped its importation of samarium from South Africa to “prove” the need for a new reactor. If this is the case it would appear that ANSTO is orchestrating its own circumstances to ensure a new reactor.” (Note: ANSTO and the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa have been asked to supply details of shipments of samarium-153 (and other radioisotopes) – but both organisations will not even say whether or not samarium-153 has been shipped to Australia let alone providing further details.)

 


Quotable quotes on the plan for a new reactor at Lucas Heights

Posted at:

http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/30410/20090218-0153/www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/quotes.html

 


Lucas Heights: Over Reaction?

Australian Broadcasting Corporation – Background Briefing
March 29, 1998.

Transcript of some of the most interesting comments below. Full transcript posted at

http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/30410/20090218-0153/www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/bbriefing.html

Senior government source: “The Government decided to starve the opponents of oxygen, so that they could dictate the manner of the debate that would follow the announcement. Because they couldn’t win it on rational grounds, though they would happily engage anybody on that basis, but seeing as they couldn’t they decided, ‘Right, we’ll play the game and in the lead-up to the announcement, get them totally unawares, catch them completely off guard and starve them of oxygen until then. No leaks, don’t write letters arguing the point, just keep them in the dark completely.”

Bronwyn Adcock (journalist): The benefits of the new reactor’s role in nuclear medicine were “deliberately overstated”.

Senior government source: “The government decided to push the whole health line, and that included appealing to the emotion of people – the loss of life, the loss of children’s lives, and all that data was available to the government from the nuclear medical profession. So it was reduced to one point, and an emotional one at that. They never tried to argue the science of it, the rationality of it.”

Adcock: The announcement on a new reactor was delayed for a month to minimise the political fallout. Senior government source: “When Cabinet finally made the official decision in August, it was decided that tactically, it would be a good idea to wait for the Minister for Transport, John Sharp’s, announcement on Holsworthy, so that on the one day the people of Hughes would see a good and a bad decision. The strategy was to appeal to the people of Hughes on the day of the announcement especially, so you have the relief of their fears about Holsworthy, and supposedly confirmation of their fears about a reactor.”

Senior government source: “I understand that Cabinet considered reprocessing, but decided it was an issue for another generation. They knew that they could dispose of the current spent fuel rods in the US and the UK and then not have a storage problem until the year 2015. You see the new reactor comes on stream 2005, the spent fuel rods have to cool down for seven years and then be stored for another five, so 2015 they’ve got to worry about their spent fuel rods. Someone else can worry about it. And reprocessing is a possibility then. The technology might be better, the costs lower, but that’s 20 years away. So the government thought, we’re not going to make decisions about reprocessing 20 years before we have to. But there was a strong lobby within the science community and even industry that said ‘Its a legitimate technology. Its safe and relatively inexpensive. Do it.’ In fact the reprocessing option was roughly the same cost as the repatriation of the spent fuel rods.”

Senior government source: “The big ticket item was the new reactor and it was felt that politically you just couldn’t win the reprocessing argument and the new reactor.”

Jean McSorley: if Australia builds a new reactor, that encourages other countries to build reactors; reactors are part of the proliferation problem.

Prof. Ken McKinnon (Chair of the 1993 Research Reactor Review): “There is no way that a research reactor, a new one, built in Australia, would ever make a return on the investment for scientific, commercial and medical uses, which would even get towards a fraction of what it would cost for a cost-benefit analysis on the normal industry basis.”

Prof. Barry Allen (former Chief Research Scientist at ANSTO): “We’ve now moved on and its a question of whether we move into the 21st century or whether we’re committing ourselves to 20th century science and the reactor and all the things we can do on the reactor are quite clearly 20th century science.”

Prof. Barry Allen: “One couldn’t escape the conclusion that because you can’t generate alpha-emitting radioisotopes on a reactor, then it wasn’t core …. business of ANSTO. The question is really what the tax-payer of Australia’ wants. Do they want new therapies or do they want the reactor to be the centre of all research.”

Prof. Barry Allen: “Its reported that if we don’t have the reactor people will die because they won’t be getting their nuclear medicine radioisotopes. I think that’s rather unlikely. Most of the isotopes can be imported into Australia. Some are being generated on the cyclotron. But on the other hand alot of people are dying of cancer and we’re trying to develop new cancer therapies which use radioisotopes which emit alpha particles which you cannot get from reactors. And if it comes down to cost-benefit, I think alot more people will be saved if we can proceed with targeted alpha cancer therapy than being stuck with the reactor when we could in fact have imported those isotopes.”

Prof. Barry Allen: “What worries me is that it might have an impact on the scientific development of new directions for the 21st century because at ANSTO for instance it will certainly require a lot of focussing of research to utilise the new reactor. That’s absolutely inevitable. Nobody builds a $300 million new reactor and then lets people do non-reactor-based research. So there’s really two aspects of it. There’s the dollar cost and then there’s the redirection of research interests into areas where the potential is already known I would say. There’s no blue sky there on that reactor whereas with other approaches, they may or may not fail, but the other approaches have some blue sky and if you can’t see blue sky, then you’re not going to get alot out of it. The blue sky is the future. And I think the reactor is, you’re just looking at a rain-cloud from the past, you can’t see too far.”

Prof. Barry Allen: “I don’t see why these things have to be closed door. I mean this is science and technology. If there are better facilities which would demonstrably serve us better in the 21st century we should be looking at them and comparing them to a new reactor. And if it turns out the new reactor stands head and shoulders above everything else, OK ….. But I really don’t think that would be the case so that’s the real problem. There’s nothing intrinsically wrong with the new reactor; its just that its too late and its not taking us in the new directions we should be going.”

Chief Scientist John Stocker didn’t want to comment. He learnt about the plan to build a new reactor in the press and wasn’t asked to advise the government before the decision to build a new nuclear reactor.

The government did not consult with the current head of the CSIRO about the plan to build a new reactor.

Full transcript posted at

http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/30410/20090218-0153/www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/bbriefing.html

 


Senate investigates Sydney’s Collins-class reactor

Jim Green

November 2000

A federal Senate inquiry into the plan for a new nuclear research reactor in Sydney has heard evidence about a string of problems surrounding the project in the past fortnight.

Numerous government departments made submissions in support of the proposed reactor, including the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), the department of industry, science and resources, the so-called radiation protection agency, the department of foreign affairs and the so-called Australian safeguards and non-proliferation office. The inquiry also heard evidence from numerous critics of the plan for a new reactor, including Greenpeace, the Australian Conservation Foundation, the Medical Association for the Prevention of War, and the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre Council.

The Liberal Party senators on the Senate inquiry – Ross Lightfoot and Grant Chapman – were a constant source of amusement. I am told that Chapman appeared to be asleep during hearings on October 25. Lightfoot – notorious for describing Aborigines as the lowest end of the colour spectrum when he was first appointed as a senator representing Western Australia – wavered between aggressive questioning of opponents of the reactor plan about their qualifications and sources of income, to complete disinterest. Lightfoot’s tactic of grilling opponents of the reactor plan on their qualifications backfired with Garry Smith, Sutherland Shire Council’s senior environmental scientist:

Senator Lightfoot: Dr Smith, could you tell us what your qualifications are.

Dr Smith: “I have a Bachelor of Science from the University of Sydney, a PhD in Biochemistry from the University of Western Australia and a Master of Planning from the University of Technology Sydney. I am currently the honorary chair of environmental science at the University of Wollongong and I am on the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) committees. … As Director of the New South Wales Cancer Council Carcinogenesis Research Unit at the University of New South Wales for 10 years, I used radionuclides very frequently – imported and local. For the last nine years I have been attending the ANSTO site four times a year and, based on my scientific, biochemical and toxicity academic qualifications, I have been participating on that Committee. I was appointed by the Commonwealth government to the Probabilistic Safety Assessment Committee and the Seismic Hazard Committee on the basis of my expertise rather than my affiliation with the council.”

Smith told the Senate hearing:

“Frankly, based on the evidence I have seen over many years and on the evidence presented in the EIS process, this [reactor] proposal is an ill-judged proposal. The benefits are highly inflated for this proposal. I have a serious concern that it is a Commonwealth bureaucracy attempting to promote a development under loose Commonwealth laws and very poor accountability criteria. It is not even producing a design at the EIS stage for a major hazardous facility. The economics are questionable as two totally independent and highly eminent economists have advised us – highly questionable.”

“In a scenario where a Commonwealth government does not ask the right questions, does not allow testing of information at a public inquiry – as would occur overseas – and where two unsuccessful tenderers raise the same types of questions about the proposal that we have been raising for over eight years, I think to move ahead with this proposal is ill judged and highly risky commercially, on safety grounds and on nuclear waste management grounds. That is my professional opinion on this proposal.”

Dozens of medical organisations and doctors submitted form letters arguing the specious case that a new reactor is required for isotope production. The president of the Association of Physicians in Nuclear Medicine, Barry Elison, was asked to comment on reports that he did not know that the Lucas Heights HIFAR reactor was shut down from February to May for maintenance. “I’m not sure if I said that”, was his curious response.

The submissions from doctors and medical organisations were notable for their numerous factual errors, stemming from the fact that doctors have no direct involvement in radioisotope production and most have little or no knowledge of the subject. The medical submissions also made numerous misleading assertions, a reflection of the vested interest of sections of the medical profession in an ongoing supply of subsidised isotopes from ANSTO. As Garry Smith told the inquiry, the assertions made to justify a new reactor for isotope supply “seem very much unaccompanied by evidence”.

Just to give a few examples of the errors in the medical submissions from Volume 1 of written submissions:

* Dr. McCarthy says ALL therapeutic isotopes are reactor produced. Wrong. Therapeutics such as iodine-125 and palladium-103 are produced in cyclotrons.

* a medical physicist by the name of Martin Carolan says that molybdenum-99 (which decays to form technetium-99m, used in about 75% of all nuclear medicine procedures) “could” be imported; apparently he doesn’t know that molybdenum-99 already is imported, by Nycomed Amersham from Europe on a weekly basis, by ANSTO from South Africa on a regular / semi-regular basis, and by ANSTO from South Africa and Canada during HIFAR reactor shut-downs.

* Dr. Daunt is concerned that without a new reactor the isotope strontium-87 for the secondary bone cancer therapy will not be available. In fact, it’s strontium-89 not strontium-87 (more precisely, strontium-89 chloride, marketed as Metastron), and it has never been produced by ANSTO because it is patented by Nycomed Amersham and is imported into Australia. Also, it’s not for therapy but for palliation (pain relief), although to be fair, some define therapy to include palliation.

* Dr. Chatterton says without a new reactor in Australia we would be dependent on one overseas reactor (in Canada) for molybdenum-99. Nonsense, there are numerous overseas reactors irradiating targets to produce fission-product molybdenum-99. As the International Atomic Energy Agency said in IAEA Technical Document 1065, April 1999: “The present installed processing capacity [for molybdenum-99] is substantially larger than the demand (of about 6000 Ci per week (6-day precalibrated)), and the capacity for irradiation of targets is even higher. The large demand for Mo-99 has given it an ‘industrial scale production’ status.” Chatterton has been one of the most vocal medical supporters of a new reactor – and he hasn’t got his basic facts right. This issue of molybdenum-99 production is not a minor or tangential issue: on the contrary, about two-thirds of ALL nuclear medicine procedures around the world use technetium-99m drawn from imported molybdenum-99.

* Dr. Bibbo and Dr. Cain said in their Senate submission, “At present, there are no alternative modalities to nuclear medicine and it is envisaged there will not be in the future.” Rubbish. Compare that comment with this from Dr. A.F. Jacobson, “Nuclear medicine and other radiologic imaging techniques: competitors or collaborators?”, European Journal of Nuclear Medicine, Vol.21(12), pp.1369-1372: “The future holds the potential for many unpleasant battles between competing imaging specialists as the need to obtain the maximum information in the minimum time and at the lowest cost intensifies. The applications of the radionuclide technique are not as broad as those of ultrasound, CT, or MRI, and this places great demands on the practitioners of our specialty to remain vigilant in the competition to retain a role in diagnostic imaging evaluations.”

Some of the most interesting submissions to the Senate inquiry came from nuclear engineers including ex-ANSTO stock. Alan Parkinson, a nuclear engineer with over 40 years experience, including experience at ANSTO’s predecessor the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) said in his Senate submission that he is “pro-nuclear and has no concerns about the construction of a new reactor at Lucas Heights”. However he provides detailed, first-hand evidence to substantiate damning claims about the competence, honesty and openness of the Department of Industry Science and Resources (DISR): “[DISR’s] record in project management and their lack of understanding of radiation and other technical subjects, as demonstrated publicly in recent months, leaves very much to be desired.”

Parkinson also provided ample evidence in support of his criticisms of the “independent regulator”: “The newly formed Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) also has not performed particularly well in its first major assignment – the Maralinga project. Unless their performance as regulators improves, then the new reactor project will be a trail of compromises as is the case on the Maralinga project.”

Collins-class reactor

The choice of the Argentinean company Invap to build the proposed new Lucas Heights reactor was “risky” according to ex-ANSTO engineer Tony Wood, who likened Invap to “the new boy on the block”.

Wood told the Senate inquiry, “… the literature does not support the minister’s [Nick Minchin] claim that INVAP has a ‘solid track record’. It is not that it has a poor track record. It has no track record on the reactor of significance – that is, a 20-megawatt reactor. My fairly long exposure to the engineers of Technicatome, Siemens and Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd leads me to the view that the INVAP choice, though possibly a good choice, was a risky one. When considered against the backdrop of the Collins submarine project, where we again chose to forsake experienced vendors in favour of the new boy on the block, I might even suggest that the decision was courageous.”

Another pro-nuclear Trojan horse to make a submission to the Senate inquiry was Dr Robert Turtle, a fellow of the Institution of Engineers Australia and a member of the Australian Nuclear Association. Turtle said he “strongly supports” the construction of a new reactor but he objects to the selection of Invap for the following reasons:

– “The Australian Contract is believed to be the largest contract undertaken by Invap. This violates financial and management criteria of prudential and sustainable development.”

– “It is not considered sound financial or management practice for an Organisation to undertake work greater than say 25-30% of its normal annual turnover. It is additionally imprudent to advance the scale and scope of work by large increments. Invap appears to be violating both these areas. … Such companies are poorly placed to meet contingencies which arise, largely because of their lack of experience.”

– it has proved difficult or impossible to obtain Invap’s financial reports and accounts even though it is a government-owned agency.

Siemens, the German company which competed for the reactor project but lost, said in its Senate submission that Invap was the least experienced of the four short-listed tenderers. Siemens said the Australian government had allocated too little funding and that only a “highly subsidised” offer could comply with all performance and safety specifications and still come in on-budget.

Technicatome, the losing French tenderer for the reactor project, said in its written Senate submission:

– that ANSTO’s assessment of tenders was “mainly based on scientific calculations, and not on proven experience as asked by the tender documentation”;

– that ANSTO’s approach of having separate assessors working on different aspects of the assessment may have led to insufficient consideration of “the overall consistency of the concept proposed for the reactor, where the overall optimum is not the sum of each local optimum”;

– that ANSTO’s separate assessment of fuel and reactor issues was surprising “considering the strong dependence of both matters when designing a high performance reactor”; and

– that the reliance on theoretical assessment of performance parameters overlooks the “many technological reasons to decrease the neutron flux transmission at the point of use compared to the theoretical levels”.

Technicatome said, “We were surprised that the tender process … led to the selection of the competitor which is generally considered to be the least experienced. For example, as far as we know none of the reactors built so far by the winning competitor have … cold or hot sources or neutron guide hall installed, silicide fuel or containment.”

At a Senate inquiry hearing in Canberra on October 9, ANSTO admitted that it had not even visited Invap’s head office in Argentina. The May 16 Bulletin summarised a leaked report from a bureaucrat in Minchin’s department which describes a working tour of overseas research reactors. The report discusses taxi rides in Indonesia, wine making in Korea, the pyramids and a museum in Egypt, and the usual tourist haunts in France and Canada. As for the research reactors, “I’m obviously at the foot of a very steep learning curve”, the bureaucrat said.

Numerous concerns about the operations of Invap were raised by Dr. Raúl Montenegro, Professor of Evolutionary Biology at the National University of Cordoba, in his written submissions to the inquiry and in his phone link-up with the senators. Montenegro’s concerns span Invap’s experience, safety and performance records, and Invap’s ability to fulfill agreements it made during the reactor contracting process in relation to spent reactor fuel.

So why was Invap chosen? On paper, it probably had the best bid – but there’s a huge question as to whether it can meet performance and safety specifications. Perhaps Invap’s bid is subsidised or underwritten by the Argentinean government, an advantage which other tenderers may not have enjoyed.

Waste

Part of the reasoning for Invap’s selection is likely to relate to promises made about spent fuel. It may be necessary to use silicide fuel in the proposed new reactor until an alternative fuel type is available. Siemens said in its Senate submission, “It has been suggested to [Siemens] at the formal debriefing meeting that the successful tenderer has mitigated the risk to ANSTO should more than approximately two cores be required.”

One of the possibilities for spent fuel from the proposed new reactor is that it would be sent to Argentina for conditioning and then returned to Australia as long-lived intermediate-level waste for indefinite storage. However, Argentina’s constitution precludes the importation of radioactive waste. Invap may (or may not) be able to circumvent the constitution by defining spent fuel as something other than radioactive waste. Montenegro believes the reactor contract between Invap and ANSTO is null and void because of the constitutional breach. Another difficulty is that Argentina may not have the facilities to treat spent fuel.

Secrecy

Montenegro has received four letters from Invap threatening legal action and urging him to stop disseminating comments “injurious” to Invap. Montenegro has drawn this matter to the attention of the Australian Senate inquiry, in the hope that public scrutiny of Invap’s tactics will allow for an open, public debate.

The situation is no better in Australia. Several opponents of the new reactor plan have been threatened with defamation suits. A senior government bureaucrat has publicly gloated about the government’s decision “to starve the opponents of oxygen … just keep them in the dark completely.” Similarly, a Department of Industry, Science and Resources briefing document said there is “no point in consulting with potential/hypothetical recipients of a new reactor.”

ANSTO staff are also feeling the heat. ANSTO “Staff Representing Truth in Science” said in their March 3 letter that “ANSTO management appears to be endeavoring to muzzle staff comments external to the organisation”. Even the president of the Australian Nuclear Association has recently complained about the “culture of secrecy” at ANSTO.

In October, the Sydney Morning Herald was told by ANSTO that it would cost $7099.78 to obtain two pages of information about the tender decision-making process following a freedom of information application. Greenpeace was told by ANSTO that it would have to pay $6,809.25 for 22 pages of information and that almost 1300 pages of relevant information would not be made available at any price.

The federal government claims to have conducted a study on potential siting options around Australia but refuses to release the study. The reactor contract is secret. Spent fuel reprocessing contracts are secret. Calls for an independent public inquiry into the reactor issue – from the Sutherland Shire Council, the 1993 Research Reactor Review, the Senate Economics References Committee, and many other organisations and individuals – have been ignored. The establishment of a “Community Right to Know Charter” has been stone-walled by ANSTO for several years.

Tony Wood told the Senate inquiry, “If I had to sum up my concerns in one sentence, it would be that for the first time in my long association with the AAEC and ANSTO I do not feel comfortable with what the organisation is telling the public and its own staff.” An ANSTO engineer with 25 years experience said in 1997, “(It is an) unfortunate state of affairs that dear old ANSTO, which lives off taxpayer’s money, is feeding us all this propaganda and very little objective information.” On DISR’s handling of the Maralinga “clean-up”, Alan Parkinson says, “A very disturbing feature of the Maralinga project is the lack of openness about what was done. Even those who might be the future custodians of the land have not been kept truthfully informed on the project.”

 


Senate report slams reactor plan

Jim Green

June 2001

A federal senate committee which inquired into the plan for a new nuclear research reactor in the southern Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights has slammed the proposal in a report released on May 23.

The majority report of the committee is a joint production of the Labor Party and the Democrats. The Democrats also wrote a minority report, taking a more critical line on the reactor project than the Labor Party, and a minority report from Liberal and National Party senators restates the government’s support for a new reactor.

On the alleged need for a research reactor in Australia, the committee concluded that “… no conclusive or compelling case has been established to support the proposed new reactor and … the proposed new reactor should not proceed.”

The committee found that “the decision to build a new reactor was taken without a detailed investigation of Australia’s present and future scientific and medical needs”. It was not convinced that logistical difficulties constitute a serious obstacle to the importation of radioisotopes, and also noted the expanding medical and scientific applications of alternative technologies such as cyclotrons.

On the foreign policy agenda driving the Coalition government’s plan for a new reactor, the committee found that “… the justification for the new research reactor solely on national interest grounds is not strong where national interest is defined on purely ‘security’ and non-proliferation grounds.” The committee said the government’s argument that a new reactor is required to facilitate nuclear disarmament and the implementation of nuclear safeguards is “tenuous”.

The committee went on to say, “The argument for the new research reactor on national interest grounds is more convincing when all areas of nuclear technology are considered, including its role in the region as an educational, research and training centre. The Committee believes, however, that this reason alone is not sufficient to justify the new research reactor. If the reactor is to go ahead, then the main considerations in establishing the need for a reactor must be its place as a research tool providing a neutron source for Australian researchers and products for industry, the health care system and the potential impacts on the environment.”

The committee recommended that before the government proceeds any further with the project it should establish an independent public inquiry into the alleged need for a new nuclear reactor and related issues such as funding for both medical and scientific research in Australia. The government rejected that recommendation on the same day the senate report was released.

Secrecy

The senate committee was particularly critical of the Coalition government and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) for their secrecy. It said, “The Committee is highly critical of ANSTO’s attitude which seeks to make a parliamentary committee subordinate to the whims of a government agency and prevents that committee from exercising its responsibility to scrutinise the executive. The Committee therefore appreciates the frustration experienced by the Sutherland Shire Council and members of the public who have experienced a similar attitude.”

The report also states, “The Committee is highly critical of ANSTO’s approach to providing documents. Its attitude seems to stem from a culture of secrecy so embedded that it has lost sight of its responsibility to be accountable to the Parliament.”

Even Liberal and National Party senators conceded that point, accepting “… that ANSTO could have been more helpful in providing certain less commercially sensitive information to the Committee and could have been more willing to seek a compromise when sensitive material was involved.”

The committee recommended that Senator Nick Minchin, the minister for industry, science and resources, should be censured for his refusal to comply with an order of the senate to table various documents relating to project including the reactor contract between ANSTO and the Argentinean company Invap, and the spent fuel reprocessing contract between ANSTO and the French company Cogema.

The committee recommended that the Australian National Audit Office “consider examining the tender and contract documents for the new reactor” with a view to determining whether documents sought by the committee and the senate should be made public; whether the cost estimate for the reactor is accurate; and whether, during the tendering process, ANSTO ensured that there was adequate and appropriate independent verification and validation of the tenderers’ claims.

Waste

The committee expressed numerous concerns about the failure of ANSTO and the federal government to put in place plans to manage radioactive wastes arising from the existing HIFAR reactor or the planned new reactor.

Arrangements for spent fuel are particularly tenuous. ANSTO has a contract with the French company Cogema to reprocess spent fuel from the HIFAR reactor, and the contract also has provisions covering spent fuel from a new reactor. However, Cogema’s medium- to long-term future cannot be assured giving mounting political pressure to end reprocessing in Europe.

In March, a French court prohibited the unloading of a shipment of ANSTO’s spent fuel at a French port. While the decision was overturned on appeal, and the spent fuel was transferred to Cogema’s plant at La Hague, further court action is underway. Greenpeace France is awaiting the judgement of a French court as to whether Cogema’s storage of spent fuel from ANSTO is legal under the provisions of the 1991 Waste Management Act which seeks to prevent La Hague being used as a DE FACTO waste storage site. ANSTO and the federal government hope that reprocessing wastes will not be returned to Australia for at least 10-15 years. Regardless of the outcome of the current court case, Cogema does not yet have the licenses required to reprocess spent fuel from ANSTO.

For the new reactor, ANSTO plans to use a uranium-molybdenum fuel type, but this fuel type is still under development. If the reactor project proceeds and the uranium-molybdenum fuel type is not yet available, ANSTO plans to use a uranium-silicide fuel as an interim measure. It is far from certain that Cogema could or would reprocess silicide spent fuel. The ANSTO/Cogema contract specifically precludes reprocessing of silicide spent fuel, although ANSTO claims to have subsequently obtained an in-principle agreement from Cogema to reprocess silicide spent fuel.

A back-up plan for silicide spent fuel – sending it to Argentina for ‘processing’ – is still more tenuous. This would generate a political controversy and, most likely, legal challenges, in Argentina. One basis for a legal challenge would be Argentina’s constitution, which prohibits the importation of radioactive waste – unsurprisingly, ANSTO’s claim that spent fuel is not radioactive waste is not universally accepted.

Moreover, Invap has admitted that there are no facilities to process spent fuel in Argentina despite ANSTO’s statement in October 2000 that “Invap has satisfied ANSTO that they already have the basic facilities and technology that would be required should processing by Invap be needed.” In fact, Invap has no processing facilities, while the Argentinean nuclear agency CNEA only has partly-constructed, partly-operational experimental processing facilities at the Ezeiza Atomic Center.

Because of the uncertainties surrounding spent fuel, the senate committee recommended that ANSTO prepare and fully cost a contingency plan for spent fuel conditioning and disposal within Australia, fully describing the technologies which would be used.

Even if ANSTO is able to send spent fuel overseas for reprocessing (or similar processes called processing or conditioning), the resulting wastes will be returned to Australia and there is no store to receive this material. The government is stalling on this issue, and does not plan to announce a site for a store for long-lived intermediate-level wastes (LLILW), including reprocessing wastes, until late 2002 at the earliest.

In 1998 and 1999, the federal government was attempting to fast-track plans for an underground dump for low-level nuclear waste in South Australia. However, planning for an underground dump for low-level waste has also been stalled, with the government deciding to hand-ball this problem to the next government.

In 1998, the government said it planned to begin construction of the dump in the year 2000. The current timetable is for a draft environmental impact statement to be released in 2002, with construction probably not beginning until the following year. With several polls indicating that 86-93% of South Australians are opposed to the dump, it remains doubtful whether the dump will ever be built.

Labor Party obfuscation

Although the Labor Party endorsed the majority report of the senate committee, it has not committed to stopping the reactor project if it wins the federal election later this year. Nor does the senate report commit the Labor Party to establishing an independent public inquiry into the project if it wins government.

Labor’s public statements on the reactor have been contradictory. Environment spokesperson Nick Bolkus said in a March 16, 2001 media release, “Labor today stepped up its calls on the Government to abandon plans for a new nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights”. In January 2001, Bolkus sent a letter to the People Against a Nuclear Reactor Campaign group in which he says, “A Labor Government will subject the contract to the closest scrutiny with a view to attempting to stop the construction of a new nuclear reactor.” Industry spokesperson Carmen Lawrence said in a January 22, 2001 media release that the “the Federal Opposition repeats its calls on the Government to scrap plans for the construction of a $326 million new reactor at Lucas Heights” and recommended investing instead in “innovative technologies for a cleaner, greener future”.

On the other hand, Labor was embarrassed by a report in the March 28 Sydney Morning Herald which said that Labor’s science spokesperson Martyn Evans had admitted telling the Argentinean ambassador that Labor had “never been in the business of simply cancelling contracts”. In 1999, federal Labor MPs endorsed a report of the federal parliament’s Public Works Committee which concluded that “that a need existed to replace HIFAR with a modern reactor”. In 1998, a letter from then Labor deputy leader Gareth Evans to ANSTO was released in which Evans said that Labor’s stated policy of opposing the construction of a reactor at Lucas Heights (but not necessarily elsewhere) was due to “the realities of politics in an election year, and in particular our need to win [the federal seat of] Hughes”.

Bolkus said in the March 17, 2001 Sydney Morning Herald, “We [a Labor government] will closely scrutinise the contract and the legal commitments and make an economic assessment … but obviously we’ll be looking … to see how to get the Australian people out of it. … If we found we have to pay $200 million in damages [to Invap] or something, it’s a pretty hard decision.” Cancelling the reactor contract would require payment to Invap and its sub-contractors for work already carried out plus penalties for breaking the contract – the total would probably be between $50-70 million if the contract was cancelled early- to mid-2002.

If elected, Labor will also assess the political costs of pursuing or cancelling the reactor project. The next government will also have to deal with the growing stockpile of spent fuel and other radioactive wastes – a problem which will be far more difficult to resolve if a new reactor is built.

The senate report can be downloaded at

http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/lucasheights_ctte