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Thorium and WMD proliferation risks

Thorium power has a protactinium problem

By Eva C. Uribe

August 6, 2018

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Eva C. Uribe is an affiliate and former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

Thorium power has a protactinium problem

In 1980, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) observed that protactinium, a chemical element generated in thorium reactors, could be separated and allowed to decay to isotopically pure uranium 233—suitable material for making nuclear weapons. The IAEA report, titled “Advanced Fuel Cycle and Reactor Concepts,” concluded that the proliferation resistance of thorium fuel cycles “would be equivalent to” the uranium/plutonium fuel cycles of conventional civilian nuclear reactors, assuming both included spent fuel reprocessing to isolate fissile material.

Decades later, the story changed. “Th[orium]-based fuels and fuel cycles have intrinsic proliferation resistance,” according to the IAEA in 2005. Mainstream media have repeated this view ever since, often without caveat. Several scholars have recognized the inherent proliferation risk of protactinium separations in the thorium fuel cycle, but the perception that thorium reactors cannot be used to make weapons persists. While technology has advanced, the fundamental radiochemistry that governs nuclear fuel reprocessing remains unchanged. Thus, this shift in perspective is puzzling and reflects a failure to recognize the importance of protactinium radiochemistry in thorium fuel cycles.

…

Protactinium separations provide a pathway for obtaining highly attractive weapons-grade uranium 233 from thorium fuel cycles. The difficulties of safeguarding commercial spent fuel reprocessing are significant for any type of fuel cycle, and thorium is no exception. Reprocessing creates unique safeguard challenges, particularly in India, which is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

There is little to be gained by calling thorium fuel cycles intrinsically proliferation-resistant. The best way to realize nuclear power from thorium fuel cycles is to acknowledge their unique proliferation vulnerabilities, and to adequately safeguard them against theft and misuse.

Read the full article at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists website.

Thorium ‒ a better fuel for nuclear technology

Excerpt from: Dr. Rainer Moormann, ‘Thorium ‒ a better fuel for nuclear technology?’, Nuclear Monitor #858, 1 March 2018.

Claim 3: Thorium use has hardly any proliferation risk

The proliferation problem of Th / U-233 needs a differentiated analysis ‒ general answers are easily misleading. First of all, one has to assess the weapon capability of U-233. Criteria for good suitability are a low critical mass and a low rate of spontaneous fission. The critical mass of U-233 is only 40% of that of U-235, the critical mass of plutonium-239 is around 15% smaller than for U-233. A relatively easy to construct nuclear explosive needs around 20 to 25 kg U-233. The spontaneous fission rate is important, because the neutrons from spontaneous fission act as a starter of the chain reaction; for an efficient nuclear explosion, the fissile material needs to have a super-criticality of at least 2.5 (criticality is the amount of new fissions produced by the neutrons of each fission.)

When, because of spontaneous fissions, a noticeable chain reaction already starts during the initial conventional explosion trigger mechanism in the criticality phase between 1 and 2.5, undesired weak nuclear explosions would end the super-criticality before a significant part of the fissile material has reacted. This largely depends on how fast the criticality phase of 1 to 2.5 is passed. Weapon plutonium (largely Pu-239) and moreover reactor plutonium have – different from the mentioned uranium fission materials U-235 and U-233 – a high spontaneous fission rate, which excludes their use in easy to build bombs.

More specifically, plutonium cannot be caused to explode in a so-called gun-type fission weapon, but both uranium isotopes can. Plutonium needs the far more complex implosion bomb design, which we will not go into further here. A gun-type fission weapon was used in Hiroshima – a cannon barrel set-up, in which a fission projectile is shot into a fission block of a suitable form so that they together form a highly super-critical arrangement (see the picture in sheet 7 in reference #1). Here, the criticality phase from 1 to 2.5 is in the order of magnitude of milliseconds – a relatively long time, in which a plutonium explosive would destroy itself with weak nuclear explosions caused by spontaneous fission. One cannot find such uranium gun-type fission weapons in modern weapon arsenals any longer (South Africa’s apartheid regime built 7 gun-type fission weapons using uranium-235): their efficiency (at most a few percent) is rather low, they are bulky (the Hiroshima bomb: 3.6 metric tons, 3.2 meters long), inflexible, and not really suitable for carriers like intercontinental rockets.

On the other hand, gun-type designs are highly reliable and relatively easy to build. Also, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reckons that larger terror groups would be capable of constructing a nuclear explosive on the basis of the gun-type fission design provided they got hold of a sufficient amount of suitable fissile material.1 Bombs with a force of at most 2 to 2.5 times that of the Hiroshima bomb (13 kt TNT) are conceivable. For that reason, the USA and Russia have tried intensively for decades to repatriate their world-wide delivered highly enriched uranium (HEU).

A draw-back of U-233 in weapon technology is that – when it is produced only for energy generation purposes – it is contaminated with maximally 250 parts per million (ppm) U-232 (half-life 70 years).2 That does not impair the nuclear explosion capability, but the uranium-232 turns in the thorium decay chain, which means ‒ as mentioned above ‒ emission of the highly penetrating radiation of Tl-208. A strongly radiating bomb is undesirable in a military environment – from the point of view of handling, and because the radiation intervenes with the bomb’s electronics. In the USA, there exists a limit of 50 ppm U-232 above which U-233 is no longer considered suitable for weapons.

Nevertheless, U-232 does not really diminish all proliferation problems around U-233. First of all, simple gun-type designs do not need any electronics; furthermore, radiation safety arguments during bomb construction will hardly play a role for terrorist organisations that use suicide bombers. Besides that, Tl-208 only appears in the end of the decay chain of U-232: freshly produced or purified U-233/U-232 will radiate little for weeks and is easier to handle.2 It is also possible to suppress the build-up of uranium-232 to a large extent, when during the breeding process of U-233 fast neutrons with energies larger than 0.5 MeV are filtered out (for instance by arranging the thorium in the reactor behind a moderating layer) and thorium is used from ore that contains as little uranium as possible.

A very elegant way to harvest highly pure U-233 is offered by the proposed molten salt reactors with integrated reprocessing (MSR): During the breeding of U-233 from thorium, the intermediate protactinium-233 (Pa-233) is produced, which has a half-life of around one month. When this intermediate is isolated – as is intended in some molten salt reactors – and let decay outside the reactor, pure U-233 is obtained that is optimally suited for nuclear weapons.

An advantage of U-233 in comparison with Pu-239 in military use is that under neutron irradiation during the production in the reactor, it tends to turn a lot less into nuclides that negatively influence the explosion capability. U-233 can (like U-235) be made unsuitable for use in weapons by adding U-238: When depleted uranium is already mixed with thorium during the feed-in into the reactor, the resulting mix of nuclides is virtually unusable for weapons. However, for MSRs with integrated reprocessing this is not a sufficient remedy. One would have to prevent separation of protactinium-233.9

The conclusion has to be that the use of thorium contains severe proliferation risks. These are less in the risk that highly developed states would find it easier to lay their hands on high-tech weapons, than that the bar for the construction of simple but highly effective nuclear explosives for terror organisations or unstable states will be a lot lower.

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In my opinion, the proliferation aspect is a vital issue. Here we would see a severe deterioration of the current situation, because the barriers to the construction of feasible nuclear explosives by, for instance, terror groups would be seriously lowered. This aspect deserves more attention. We can hope that the IAEA, the USA and Russia would oppose uncontrolled propagation of thorium technology, when they would see its introduction thwarting their decades-long efforts to reduce the proliferation risk by repatriation of HEU.

On the other hand, the current thorium hype, partially carried by a fanaticism based on limited knowledge, could lead in a populist environment to incalculable developments. For that reason, I think it important that the environment and peace movements should insist that thorium technology without sufficient proliferation control should be outlawed in the same way as currently is the case with efforts to phase out the use of HEU. As a minimum requirement, thorium technology without U-233 denaturation with U-238 should be banned, and online reprocessing in molten salt reactors should be banned.

Thor-bores and uro-sceptics: thorium’s friendly fire

Excerpt from: Jim Green, 9 April 2015, Nuclear Monitor #801, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/801/thor-bores-and-uro-sceptics-thoriums-friendly-fire

Many Nuclear Monitor readers will be familiar with the tiresome rhetoric of thorium enthusiasts − let’s call them thor-bores. Their arguments have little merit but they refuse to go away. Here’s a thor-bore in full flight − a science journalist who should know better:

“Thorium is a superior nuclear fuel to uranium in almost every conceivable way … If there is such a thing as green nuclear power, thorium is it. … For one, a thorium-powered nuclear reactor can never undergo a meltdown. It just can’t. … Thorium is also thoroughly useless for making nuclear weapons. … But wait, there’s more. Thorium doesn’t only produce less waste, it can be used to consume existing waste.”¹

…

Weapons proliferation

Claims that thorium reactors would be proliferation-resistant or proliferation-proof do not stand up to scrutiny.¹¹ Irradiation of thorium-232 produces uranium-233, which can be and has been used in nuclear weapons.

The World Nuclear Association states:

“The USA produced about 2 tonnes of U-233 from thorium during the ‘Cold War’, at various levels of chemical and isotopic purity, in plutonium production reactors. It is possible to use U-233 in a nuclear weapon, and in 1955 the USA detonated a device with a plutonium-U-233 composite pit, in Operation Teapot. The explosive yield was less than anticipated, at 22 kilotons. In 1998 India detonated a very small device based on U-233 called Shakti V.”²

According to Assoc. Prof. Nigel Marks, both the US and the USSR tested uranium-233 bombs in 1955.⁶

Uranium-233 is contaminated with uranium-232 but there are ways around that problem. Kang and von Hippel note:

“[J]ust as it is possible to produce weapon-grade plutonium in low-burnup fuel, it is also practical to use heavy-water reactors to produce U-233 containing only a few ppm of U-232 if the thorium is segregated in “target” channels and discharged a few times more frequently than the natural-uranium “driver” fuel.”¹²

John Carlson discusses the proliferation risks associated with thorium:

“The thorium fuel cycle has similarities to the fast neutron fuel cycle – it depends on breeding fissile material (U-233) in the reactor, and reprocessing to recover this fissile material for recycle. …

“Proponents argue that the thorium fuel cycle is proliferation resistant because it does not produce plutonium. Proponents claim that it is not practicable to use U-233 for nuclear weapons.

“There is no doubt that use of U-233 for nuclear weapons would present significant technical difficulties, due to the high gamma radiation and heat output arising from decay of U-232 which is unavoidably produced with U-233. Heat levels would become excessive within a few weeks, degrading the high explosive and electronic components of a weapon and making use of U‑233 impracticable for stockpiled weapons. However, it would be possible to develop strategies to deal with these drawbacks, e.g. designing weapons where the fissile “pit” (the core of the nuclear weapon) is not inserted until required, and where ongoing production and treatment of U-233 allows for pits to be continually replaced. This might not be practical for a large arsenal, but could certainly be done on a small scale.

“In addition, there are other considerations. A thorium reactor requires initial core fuel – LEU or plutonium – until it reaches the point where it is producing sufficient U-233 for self-sustainability, so the cycle is not entirely free of issues applying to the uranium fuel cycle (i.e. requirement for enrichment or reprocessing). Further, while the thorium cycle can be self-sustaining on produced U‑233, it is much more efficient if the U-233 is supplemented by additional “driver” fuel, such as LEU or plutonium. For example, India, which has spent some decades developing a comprehensive thorium fuel cycle concept, is proposing production of weapons grade plutonium in fast breeder reactors specifically for use as driver fuel for thorium reactors. This approach has obvious problems in terms of proliferation and terrorism risks.

“A concept for a liquid fuel thorium reactor is under consideration (in which the thorium/uranium fuel would be dissolved in molten fluoride salts), which would avoid the need for reprocessing to separate U-233. If it proceeds, this concept would have non-proliferation advantages.

“Finally, it cannot be excluded that a thorium reactor – as in the case of other reactors – could be used for plutonium production through irradiation of uranium targets.

“Arguments that the thorium fuel cycle is inherently proliferation resistant are overstated. In some circumstances the thorium cycle could involve significant proliferation risks.”¹³

Sometimes thor-bores posit conspiracy theories. Former International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Hans Blix said “it is almost impossible to make a bomb out of thorium” and thorium is being held back by the “vested interests” of the uranium-based nuclear industry.¹⁴

But Julian Kelly from Thor Energy, a Norwegian company developing and testing thorium-plutonium fuels for use in commercial light water reactors, states:

“Conspiracy theories about funding denials for thorium work are for the entertainment sector. A greater risk is that there will be a classic R&D bubble [that] divides R&D effort and investment into fragmented camps and feifdoms.”⁴

References:

1. Tim Dean, 16 March 2011, ‘The greener nuclear alternative’, www.abc.net.au/unleashed/45178.html

2. www.world-nuclear.org/info/Current-and-Future-Generation/Thorium/

3. UK National Nuclear Laboratory Ltd., 5 March 2012, ‘Comparison of thorium and uranium fuel cycles’, www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/meeting-energy-demand/nuclear/6300-comparison-fuel-cycles.pdf

4. Stephen Harris, 9 Jan 2014, ‘Your questions answered: thorium-powered nuclear’, www.theengineer.co.uk/energy-and-environment/in-depth/your-questions-answered-thorium-powered-nuclear/1017776.article

5. George Dracoulis, 5 Aug 2011, ‘Thorium is no silver bullet when it comes to nuclear energy, but it could play a role’, http://theconversation.com/thorium-is-no-silver-bullet-when-it-comes-to-nuclear-energy-but-it-could-play-a-role-1842

6. Nigel Marks, 2 March 2015, ‘Should Australia consider thorium nuclear power?’, http://theconversation.com/should-australia-consider-thorium-nuclear-power-37850

7. Idaho National Laboratory, Sept 2009, ‘AFCI Options Study’, INL/EXT-10-17639, www.inl.gov/technicalpublications/Documents/4480296.pdf

8. John Carlson, 2014, submission to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=79a1a29e-5691-4299-8923-06e633780d4b&subId=301365

9. Oliver Tickell, August/September 2012, ‘Thorium: Not ‘green’, not ‘viable’, and not likely’, www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/nuclearnews/NuClearNewsNo43.pdf

10. George Dracoulis, 19 Dec 2011, ‘Thoughts from a thorium ‘symposium”, http://theconversation.com/thoughts-from-a-thorium-symposium-4545

11. https://nuclear.foe.org.au/thorium-and-wmd-proliferation-risks-2/

12. Jungmin Kang and Frank N. von Hippel, 2001, “U-232 and the Proliferation-Resistance of U-233 in Spent Fuel”, Science & Global Security, Volume 9, pp.1-32, www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/sgs/pdf/9_1kang.pdf

13. John Carlson, 2009, ‘Introduction to the Concept of Proliferation Resistance’, http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/foe/legacy_url/863/Carlson_20ASNO_20ICNND_20Prolif_20Resistance.doc

14. Herman Trabish, 10 Dec 2013, ‘Thorium Reactors: Nuclear Redemption or Nuclear Hazard?’, http://theenergycollective.com/hermantrabish/314771/thorium-reactors-nuclear-redemption-or-nuclear-hazard

15. Pia Akerman, 7 Oct 2013, ‘Ex-Shell boss issues nuclear call’, The Australian, www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/ex-shell-boss-issues-nuclear-call/story-e6frg6xf-1226733858032

Thorium and nuclear weapons

Jim Green

Thorium fuel cycles are promoted on the grounds that they pose less of a proliferation risk compared to conventional reactors. However, whether there is any significant non-proliferation advantage depends on the design of the various thorium-based systems. No thorium system would negate proliferation risks altogether.

Neutron bombardment of thorium (indirectly) produces uranium-233, a fissile material which can be used in nuclear weapons (1 Significant Quantity of U-233 = 8kg).

The USA has successfully tested weapon/s using uranium-233 cores. India may be interested in the military potential of thorium/uranium-233 in addition to civil applications. India is refusing to allow safeguards to apply to its entire ‘advanced’ thorium/plutonium fuel cycle, stongly suggesting a military dimension.

The possible use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium to initiate a thorium-232/uranium-233 reaction, or proposed systems using thorium in conjunction with HEU or plutonium as fuel, present risks of diversion of HEU or plutonium for weapons production as well as providing a rationale for the ongoing operation of dual-use enrichment and reprocessing plants.

Thorium fuelled reactors could also be used to irradiate uranium to produce weapon grade plutonium.

Kang and von Hippel conclude that “the proliferation resistance of thorium fuel cycles depends very much upon how they are implemented”. For example, the co-production of uranium-232 complicates weapons production but, as Kang and von Hippel note, “just as it is possible to produce weapon-grade plutonium in low-burnup fuel, it is also practical to use heavy-water reactors to produce U-233 containing only a few ppm of U-232 if the thorium is segregated in “target” channels and discharged a few times more frequently than the natural-uranium “driver” fuel.” (Kang, Jungmin, and Frank N. von Hippel, 2001, “U-232 and the Proliferation-Resistance of U-233 in Spent Fuel”, Science & Global Security, Volume 9, pp 1-32, <www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/pdf/9_1kang.pdf>.)

One proposed system is an Accelerator Driven Systems (ADS) in which an accelerator produces a proton beam which is targeted at target nuclei (e.g. lead, bismuth) to produce neutrons. The neutrons can be directed to a subcritical reactor containing thorium. ADS systems could reduce but not negate the proliferation risks.

Excerpt from: Thorium Fuel: No Panacea for Nuclear Power

By Michele Boyd and Arjun Makhijani

http://www.ieer.org/fctsheet/thorium2009factsheet.pdf

A Fact Sheet Produced by Physicians for Social Responsibility and the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research

Thorium is not actually a “fuel” because it is not fissile and therefore cannot be used to start or sustain a nuclear chain reaction. A fissile material, such as uranium-235 (U-235) or plutonium-239 (which is made in reactors from uranium-238), is required to kick-start the reaction. The enriched uranium fuel or plutonium fuel also maintains the chain reaction until enough of the thorium target material has been converted into fissile uranium-233 (U-233) to take over much or most of the job.

The use of enriched uranium or plutonium in thorium fuel has proliferation implications. Although U-235 is found in nature, it is only 0.7% of natural uranium, so the proportion of U-235 must be industrially increased to make “enriched uranium” for use in reactors. Highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are nuclear weapons materials.

In addition, U-233 is as effective as plutonium-239 for making nuclear bombs. In most proposed thorium fuel cycles, reprocessing is required to separate out the U-233 for use in fresh fuel. This means that, like uranium fuel with reprocessing, bomb-making material is separated out, making it vulnerable to theft or diversion. Some proposed thorium fuel cycles even require 20% enriched uranium in order to get the chain reaction started in existing reactors using thorium fuel. It takes

90% enrichment to make weapons-usable uranium, but very little work is needed to move from 20% enrichment to 90% enrichment.

It has been claimed that thorium fuel cycles with reprocessing would be much less of a proliferation risk because the thorium can be mixed with uranium-238. In this case, fissile uranium-233 is also mixed with non-fissile uranium-238. The claim is that if the U-238 content is high enough, the mixture cannot be used to make bombs without a complex uranium enrichment plant. This is misleading. More uranium-238 does dilute the uranium-233, but it also results in the production of more plutonium-239 as the reactor operates. So the proliferation problem remains – either bomb-usable uranium-233 or bomb-usable plutonium is created and can be separated out. Even if the mixture of U-238 and U-233 contains so much U-238 that it cannot be used for making weapons, the U-233 proportion can be increased by enrichment – the same process used to enrich natural uranium in U-235. The enrichment of U-233 is easier than the enrichment of U-235 because U-233 is much lighter than U-235 relative to U-238 (five atomic weight units lighter compared to three).

There is just no way to avoid proliferation problems associated with thorium fuel cycles that involve reprocessing. Thorium fuel cycles without reprocessing would offer the same temptation to reprocess as today’s once-through uranium fuel cycles.

Excerpt from: ICNND Research Paper No. 8, Revised

John Carlson, Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, 3 June 2009, ‘Introduction to the Concept of Proliferation Resistance’, www.icnnd.org/

For reasons unknown the paper appears to have been removed from the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament website but here is a link to the paper (Word file)

In principle, another route for avoiding the need for enrichment is the thorium fuel cycle, but as will be discussed in section 5.C, a thorium reactor requires enriched uranium or plutonium for the initial operating cycles, and current thorium reactor types also require reprocessing. Although reprocessing is for recovery of uranium-233 rather than plutonium, U-233 can also be used in nuclear weapons. A liquid fuel reactor concept is being considered which would avoid the need for U-233 separation.

5.C Thorium fuel cycle

The thorium fuel cycle has similarities to the fast neutron fuel cycle – it depends on breeding fissile material (U-233) in the reactor, and reprocessing to recover this fissile material for recycle.

Thorium is not a fissile material, so cannot be used as reactor fuel. The basis of the thorium fuel cycle is irradiation of the fertile thorium isotope, Th-232, to produce the fissile material U-233 through neutron capture (rather like production of plutonium from U‑238). The thorium fuel cycle requires separation – i.e. reprocessing – of U-233 produced in the fuel, and the recycle of U‑233 as fresh fuel.

Proponents argue that the thorium fuel cycle is proliferation resistant because it does not produce plutonium. Proponents claim that it is not practicable to use U-233 for nuclear weapons.

There is no doubt that use of U-233 for nuclear weapons would present significant technical difficulties, due to the high gamma radiation and heat output arising from decay of U-232 which is unavoidably produced with U-233. Heat levels would become excessive within a few weeks, degrading the high explosive and electronic components of a weapon and making use of U‑233 impracticable for stockpiled weapons. However, it would be possible to develop strategies to deal with these drawbacks, e.g. designing weapons where the fissile “pit” (the core of the nuclear nuclear weapon) is not inserted until required, and where ongoing production and treatment of U-233 allows for pits to be continually replaced. This might not be practical for a large arsenal, but could certainly be done on a small scale.

In addition, there are other considerations. A thorium reactor requires initial core fuel – LEU or plutonium – until it reaches the point where it is producing sufficient U-233 for self-sustainability, so the cycle is not entirely free of issues applying to the uranium fuel cycle (i.e. requirement for enrichment or reprocessing). Further, while the thorium cycle can be self-sustaining on produced U‑233, it is much more efficient if the U-233 is supplemented by additional “driver” fuel, such as LEU or plutonium. For example, India, which has spent some decades developing a comprehensive thorium fuel cycle concept, is proposing production of weapons grade plutonium in fast breeder reactors specifically for use as driver fuel for thorium reactors. This approach has obvious problems in terms of proliferation and terrorism risks.

A concept for a liquid fuel thorium reactor is under consideration (in which the thorium/uranium fuel would be dissolved in molten fluoride salts), which would avoid the need for reprocessing to separate U-233. If it proceeds, this concept would have non-proliferation advantages.

Finally, it cannot be excluded that a thorium reactor – as in the case of other reactors – could be used for plutonium production through irradiation of uranium targets.

Summary Arguments that the thorium fuel cycle is inherently proliferation resistant are overstated. In some circumstances the thorium cycle could involve significant proliferation risks.

Comparison of thorium and uranium fuel cycles

UK National Nuclear Laboratory Ltd.

A report prepared for and on behalf of Department of Energy and Climate Change

Issue 5, 5 March 2012

http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/meeting-energy-demand/nuclear/6300-comparison-fuel-cycles.pdf

Here is the Exec Summary and an extract about proliferation risks.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The UK National Nuclear Laboratory has been contracted by the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to review and assess the relevance to the UK of the advanced reactor systems currently being developed internationally. Part of the task specification relates to comparison of the thorium and uranium fuel cycles. Worldwide, there has for a long time been a sustained interest in the thorium fuel cycle and presently there are several major research initiatives which are either focused specifically on the thorium fuel cycle or on systems which use thorium as the fertile seed instead of U-238. Currently in the UK, the thorium fuel cycle is not an option that is being pursued commercially and it is important for DECC to understand why this is the case and whether there is a valid argument for adopting a different position in the future.

NNL has recently published a position paper on thorium [1] which attempts to take a balanced view of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the thorium fuel cycle. Thorium has theoretical advantages regarding sustainability, reducing radiotoxicity and reducing proliferation risk. NNL’s position paper finds that while there is some justification for these benefits, they are often over stated.

The value of using thorium fuel for plutonium disposition would need to be assessed against high level issues concerning the importance of maintaining high standards of safety, security and protection against proliferation, as well as meeting other essential strategic goals related to maintaining flexibility in the fuel cycle, optimising waste arisings and economic competitiveness. It is important that the UK should be very clear as to what the overall objectives should be and the timescales for achieving these objectives.

Overall, the conclusion is reached that the thorium fuel cycle at best has only limited relevance to the UK as a possible alternative plutonium disposition strategy and as a possible strategic option in the very long term for any follow-up reactor construction programme after LWR new build. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that world-wide there remains interest in thorium fuel cycles and as this is not likely to diminish in the near future. It may therefore be judicious for the UK to maintain a low level of engagement in thorium fuel cycle R&D by involvement in international collaborative research activities. This will enable the UK to keep up with developments, comment from a position of knowledge and to some extent influence the direction of research. Participation will also ensure that the UK is more ready to respond if changes in technology or market forces bring the thorium fuel cycle more to the fore.

It should be noted that this paper is not intended to provide an exhaustive review and assessment of potential advanced reactor technologies in order for DECC or other UK interested parties to immediately down select reactor options. The study and the approach developed was deliberately limited in its assessment of reactor options primarily due to time and in particular budget constraints. As such, only a limited cross section of reactor technologies were assessed and no design variants were assessed either e.g. prismatic or pebble VHTR options.

The UK NNL would like to also recognise and thank all of the external reviewers for their time taken to review the study and for their comments on the paper. As with any such review process, not all of the comments were able to be included in the final version of the report either due to opposing views not simply between the authors and the reviewers, but also between the reviewers themselves. Nevertheless, every comment was considered and included where appropriate.

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Section 3.5

Measures to increase the inherent proliferation resistance of the reprocessing fuel, such as avoiding the separation of pure plutonium oxide are considered desirable in designing new reactors and associated fuel cycle facilities. However, reducing proliferation risk is not a factor in strategic decision making for utilities and is unlikely to become so in the foreseeable future. Therefore, there currently is no incentive for utilities to seek alternatives to U-Pu fuel.

Section 4.5. Proliferation risk

The absence of plutonium is in the thorium fuel cycle is claimed to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, though Reference [1] questions whether is this is completely valid, given that there were a number of U-233 nuclear tests (the “Teapot tests”) in the US in the 1950s. U-233 is in many respects very well suited for weapons use, because it has a low critical mass, a low spontaneous neutron source and low heat output. It has been stated [eg Wikipedia entry on U-233] that because U-233 has a higher spontaneous neutron source than Pu-239, then this makes it more of a technical challenge. However, this is erroneous, because even in weapons grade plutonium the main neutron source is from Pu-240. A further consideration is that the U-233 produced in thorium fuel is isotopically very pure, with only trace quantities of U-232 and U-234 produced. Although the U-232 presents problems with radiological protection during fuel fabrication, the fissile quality does not degrade with irradiation. Therefore, if it is accepted that U-233 is weapons useable, this remains the case at all burnups and there is no degradation in weapons attractiveness with burnup, unlike the U-Pu cycle.

The presence of trace amounts of U-232 is beneficial in that it provides a significant gamma dose field that would complicate weapons fabrication and this has been claimed to make U-233 proliferation resistant. However, there are mitigating strategies can be conceived and the U-232 dose rate cannot be regarded as a completely effective barrier to proliferation. As such, U-233 should be considered weapons usable in the same way as HEU and plutonium. This is also the position taken by the IAEA, which under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials [16] categorises U-233 in the same way as plutonium. Under the IAEA classification, 2 kg or more of U-233 or plutonium are designated as Category I Nuclear Material and as such are subject to appropriate controls. By way of comparison, the mass of U-235 for Category I material is 5 kg. Attempts to lower the fissile content of uranium by adding U-238 are considered to offer only weak protection, as the U-233 could be separated relatively easily in a centrifuge cascade in the same way that U-235 is separated from U-238 in the standard uranium fuel cycle.

The overall conclusion is that while there may be some justification for the thorium fuel cycle posing a reduced proliferation risk, the justification is not very strong and, as noted in Section 3.5, this is not a major factor for utilities. Regardless of the details, those safeguards and security measures in place for the U-Pu cycle will have to remain in place for the thorium fuel cycle and there is no overall benefit.

Nuclear Weapons and ‘Generation 4’ Reactors

Thorium

On the proliferation risks associated with thorium please use this link:

https://nuclear.foe.org.au/thorium-and-wmd-proliferation-risks-2/

Nuclear Weapons and ‘Generation 4’ Reactors

Jim Green – Friends of the Earth Australia.

A version of this article was published in FoE Australia’s magazine Chain Reaction, August 2009.

‘Integral fast reactors’ and other ‘fourth generation’ nuclear power concepts have been gaining attention, in part because of comments by US climate scientist James Hansen. While not a card-carrying convert, Hansen argues for more research: “We need hard-headed evaluation of how to get rid of long-lived nuclear waste and minimize dangers of proliferation and nuclear accidents. Fourth generation nuclear power seems to have the potential to solve the waste problem and minimize the others.”

Others are less circumspect, with one advocate of integral fast reactors promoting them as the “holy grail” in the fight against global warming. There are two main problems with these arguments. Firstly, nuclear power could at most make a modest contribution to climate change abatement, mainly because it is used almost exclusively for electricity generation which accounts for about one-quarter of global greenhouse emissions. Doubling global nuclear power output (at the expense of coal) would reduce greenhouse emissions by about 5%. Building six nuclear power reactors in Australia (at the expense of coal) would reduce Australia’s emissions by just 4%.

The second major problem with the nuclear ‘solution’ to climate change is that all nuclear power concepts (including ‘fourth generation’ concepts) fail to address the single greatest problem with nuclear power − its repeatedly-demonstrated connection to the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Not just any old WMDs but nuclear weapons − the most destructive, indiscriminate and immoral of all weapons.

Integral fast reactors

Integral fast reactors (IFRs) are reactors proposed to be fuelled with a metallic alloy of uranium and plutonium, with liquid sodium as the coolant. ‘Fast’ because they would use unmoderated neutrons as with other plutonium-fuelled fast neutron reactors (e.g. breeders). ‘Integral’ because they would operate in conjunction with on-site ‘pyroprocessing’ to separate plutonium and other long-lived radioisotopes and to re-irradiate (both as an additional energy source and to convert long-lived waste products into shorter-lived, less problematic wastes).

IFRs would breed their own fuel (plutonium-239) from uranium-238 contained in abundant stockpiles of depleted uranium. Thus there would be less global demand for uranium mining with its attendant problems, and less demand for uranium enrichment plants which can be used to produce low-enriched uranium for power reactors or highly enriched uranium for weapons. Drawing down depleted uranium stockpiles would be welcome because of the public health and environmental problems they pose and because one of the few alternative uses for depleted uranium − hardening munitions − is objectionable.

Pyroprocessing technology would be used − it would not separate pure plutonium suitable for direct use in nuclear weapons, but would keep the plutonium mixed with other long-lived radioisotopes such that it would be very difficult or impossible to use directly in nuclear weapons. Recycling plutonium generates energy and gets rid of the plutonium with its attendant proliferation risks. These advantages could potentially be achieved with conventional reprocessing and plutonium use in MOX (uranium/plutonium oxide) reactors or fast neutron reactors. IFR offers one further potential advantage − transmutation of long-lived waste radioisotopes to convert them into shorter-lived waste products.

In short, IFRs could produce lots of greenhouse-friendly energy and while they’re at it they can ‘eat’ nuclear waste and convert fissile materials, which might otherwise find their way into nuclear weapons, into useful energy. Too good to be true? Sadly, yes. Nuclear engineer Dave Lochbaum from the Union of Concerned Scientists writes: “The IFR looks good on paper. So good, in fact, that we should leave it on paper. For it only gets ugly in moving from blueprint to backyard.”

Complete IFR systems don’t exist. Fast neutron reactors exist but experience is limited and they have had a troubled history. The pyroprocessing and waste transmutation technologies intended to operate as part of IFR systems are some distance from being mature. But even if the technologies were fully developed and successfully integrated, IFRs would still fail a crucial test − they can too easily be used to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

IFRs and nuclear weapons

George Stanford, who worked on an IFR R&D program in the US, notes that proliferators “could do [with IFRs] what they could do with any other reactor − operate it on a special cycle to produce good quality weapons material.”

As with conventional reactors, IFRs can be used to produce weapon grade plutonium in the fuel (using a shorter-than-usual irradiation time) or by irradiating a uranium or depleted uranium ‘blanket’ or targets. Conventional PUREX reprocessing can be used to separate the plutonium. Another option is to separate reactor grade plutonium from IFR fuel and to use that in weapons instead of weapon grade plutonium.

The debate isn’t helped by the muddle-headed inaccuracies of some IFR advocates, including some who should know better. For example, Prof. Barry Brook from Adelaide University says: “IFRs cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium. The integral fast reactor is a systems design with a sodium-cooled reactor with metal fuels and pyroprocessing on-site. To produce weapons-grade plutonium you would have to build an IFR+HSHVHSORF (highly specialised, highly visible, heavily shielded off-site reprocessing facility). You would also need to run your IFR on a short cycle.” Or to paraphrase: IFRs can’t produce weapon grade plutonium, IFRs can produce weapon grade plutonium. Go figure.

Presumably Brook’s point is that IFR-produced plutonium cannot be separated on-site from irradiated materials (fuel/blanket/targets); it would need to be separated from irradiated materials at a separate reprocessing plant. If so, it is a banal point which also applies to conventional reactors, and it remains the case that IFRs can certainly produce weapon grade plutonium.

Brooks’ HSHVHSORFs are conventional PUREX plants − technology which is well within the reach of most or all nation states. Existing reprocessing plants would suffice for low-burn-up IFR-irradiated materials while more elaborate shielding might be required to safely process materials irradiated for a longer period. IFR advocate Tom Blees notes that: “IFRs are certainly not the panacea that removes all threat of proliferation, and extracting plutonium from it would require the same sort of techniques as extracting it from spent fuel from light water reactors.”

IFR advocates propose using them to draw down global stockpiles of fissile material, whether derived from nuclear research, power or WMD programs. However, IFRs have no need for outside sources of fissile material beyond their initial fuel load. Whether they are used to irradiate outside sources of fissile material to any significant extent would depend on a confluence of commercial, political and military interests. History shows that non-proliferation objectives receive low priority. Conventional reprocessing with the use of separated plutonium as fuel (in breeders or MOX reactors) has the same potential to drawn down fissile material stockpiles, but has increased rather than decreased proliferation risks. Very little plutonium has been used as reactor fuel in breeders or MOX reactors. But the separation of plutonium from spent fuel continues and stockpiles of separated ‘civil’ plutonium − which can be used directly in weapons − are increasing by about five tonnes annually and amount to over 270 tonnes, enough for 27,000 nuclear weapons.

IFR advocates demonstrate little or no understanding of the realpolitik imposed by the commercial, political and military interests responsible for, amongst other things, unnecessarily creating this problem of 270+ tonnes of separated civil plutonium and failing to take the simplest steps to address the problem − namely, suspending reprocessing or reducing the rate of reprocessing such that plutonium stockpiles are drawn down rather than continually increasing.

The proposed use of IFRs to irradiate fissile materials produced elsewhere faces the familiar problem that countries with the greatest interest in WMD production will be the least likely to forfeit fissile material stockpiles and vice versa. Whatever benefits arise from the potential consumption of outside sources of fissile material must be weighed against the problem that IFRs could themselves be used to produce fissile material for weapons. WMD proliferators won’t use IFRs to draw down stockpiles of their own fissile material let alone anyone else’s − they are more likely to use them to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.

Some IFR proponents propose initially deploying IFR technology in nuclear weapons states and weapons-capable states, but every other proposal for selective deployment of dual-use nuclear technology has been rejected by countries that would be excluded.

Safeguards

Some IFR advocates downplay the proliferation risks by arguing that fissile material is more easily produced in research reactors. But producing fissile material for weapons in IFRs would not be difficult. Extracting irradiated material from an IFR may be challenging though not from those IFRs which have been designed to produce the initial fuel load for other IFRs (and are thus designed to facilitate the insertion and extraction of uranium targets).

The main challenge would be to circumvent safeguards. Proponents of IFR acknowledge the need for a rigorous safeguards system to detect and deter the use of IFRs to produce fissile material for weapons. And they generally accept that the existing safeguards system is inadequate − so much so that the former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, has noted that the IAEA’s basic rights of inspection are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system suffers from “vulnerabilities” and “clearly needs reinforcement”, that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted”, and that the safeguards system operates on a “shoestring budget … comparable to that of a local police department”.

Blees argues for a radically strengthened safeguards system including the establishment of an international strike force on full standby to attend promptly to any detected attempts to misuse IFRs or to divert nuclear materials. But there’s no evidence of IFR advocates getting off their backsides to engage in the laborious work of trying to bring about improvements in safeguards. Evidently they do not accept the argument that proponents of dual-use technology have a responsibility to engage in that laborious work. Nor do they see strengthened safeguards as a prerequisite for the widespread deployment of IFRs. Yet, when pressed, IFR advocates point to safeguards which exist only in their imaginations: we needn’t worry about IFRs and WMD proliferation, for example, because Blees’ international strike force will take care of that. Such arguments are circular and disingenuous.

IFR advocates imagine that a strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation will shape the development and deployment of IFR technology, but in practice it could easily fall prey to the interests responsible for turning attractive theories into the fiasco of ever-growing stockpiles of separated civil plutonium. Under the Bush administration, proposals for advanced, ‘proliferation-resistant’ reprocessing under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership gave way to a plan to expand conventional reprocessing while working on R&D into advanced reprocessing. A similar fate could easily befall proposals to run fast neutron reactors in conjunction with ‘proliferation-resistant’ reprocessing.

IFR proponents want to avoid the risks associated with widespread transportation of nuclear and fissile materials by co-locating a pyroprocessing facility with every IFR reactor plant − but nuclear utilities might prefer the cost savings associated with centralised processing.

As another example of the potential for attractive theories to turn into problematic outcomes, the fissile material required for the initial IFR fuel loading would ideally come from civil and military stockpiles or from other IFRs − but that fissile material requirement could be used to justify the ongoing operation of enrichment and PUREX reprocessing plants and to justify the construction of new ones.

In his book ‘Prescription for the Planet’, Blees argues that: “Privatized nuclear power should be outlawed worldwide, with complete international control of not only the entire fuel cycle but also the engineering, construction, and operation of all nuclear power plants. Only in this way will safety and proliferation issues be satisfactorily dealt with. Anything short of that opens up a Pandora’s box of inevitable problems.” He goes further, arguing for a “nonprofit global energy consortium” to control nuclear power: “The shadowy threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism virtually requires us to either internationalize or ban nuclear power.”

But there’s little or no discussion among IFR advocates about how to bring about these fundamental changes, nor any sense that proponents of IFRs and other dual-use technology ought to be part of that struggle, and these fundamental changes are not seen as a prerequisite for the deployment of IFRs.

It would be silly to oppose nuclear power reactors in a hypothetical world where rigorous safeguards ensured that they would not be used to produce fissile material for weapons, where no expense was spared to minimise the short- and long-term environmental and public health hazards, where genuinely independent regulators provided strict oversight, and where the corrupting effects of the profit motive and nationalism had been eliminated. In other words, it would be silly to oppose nuclear power if all the rational reasons for that opposition were satisfactorily addressed. But that tells us nothing about the real world.

Other ‘fourth generation’ reactor types

IFRs and other plutonium-based nuclear power concepts fail the WMD proliferation test, i.e. they can too easily be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Conventional reactors also fail the test because they produce plutonium and because they legitimise the operation of enrichment plants and reprocessing plants.

The use of thorium as a nuclear fuel doesn’t solve the WMD proliferation problem. Irradiation of thorium (indirectly) produces uranium-233, a fissile material which can be used in nuclear weapons. The US has successfully tested weapons using uranium-233 (and France may have too). India’s thorium program must have a WMD component − as evidenced by India’s refusal to allow IAEA safeguards to apply to its thorium program. Thorium fuelled reactors could also be used to irradiate uranium to produce weapon grade plutonium. The possible use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium to initiate a thorium-232/uranium-233 reaction, or proposed systems using thorium in conjunction with HEU or plutonium as fuel, present further risks of diversion of HEU or plutonium for weapons production as well as providing a rationale for the ongoing operation of dual-use enrichment and reprocessing plants.

Some proponents of nuclear fusion power falsely claim that it would pose no risk of contributing to weapons proliferation. In fact, there are several risks, the most important of which is the use of fusion reactors to irradiate uranium to produce plutonium or to irradiate thorium-232 to produce uranium-233.

Fusion power has yet to generate a single Watt of useful electricity but it has already contributed to proliferation problems. According to Khidhir Hamza, a senior nuclear scientist involved in Iraq’s weapons program in the 1980s: “Iraq took full advantage of the IAEA’s recommendation in the mid 1980s to start a plasma physics program for “peaceful” fusion research. We thought that buying a plasma focus device … would provide an excellent cover for buying and learning about fast electronics technology, which could be used to trigger atomic bombs.”

All existing and proposed nuclear power concepts pose WMD proliferation risks. History gives us some indication of the scale of the problem. Over 20 countries have used their ‘peaceful’ nuclear facilities for some level of weapons research and five countries developed nuclear weapons under cover of a civil program.

Former US Vice President Al Gore has summed up the problem of heavy reliance on nuclear power for climate change abatement: “For eight years in the White House, every weapons-proliferation problem we dealt with was connected to a civilian reactor program. And if we ever got to the point where we wanted to use nuclear reactors to back out a lot of coal … then we’d have to put them in so many places we’d run that proliferation risk right off the reasonability scale.”

Make-believe nuclear reactors

In addition to dishonest or ill-informed claims that ‘fourth generation’ nuclear power will satisfactorily address WMD proliferation concerns, its proponents also claim that it will be safe, cheap, simple, flexible etc.

Amory Lovins from the Rocky Mountain Institute has summarised the differences between real and make-believe nuclear reactors:

“An academic reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following basic characteristics: (1) It is simple. (2) It is small. (3) It is cheap. (4) It is light. (5) It can be built very quickly. (6) It is very flexible in purpose. (7) Very little development will be required. It will use off the shelf components. (8) The reactor is in the study phase. It is not being built now.

“On the other hand a practical reactor can be distinguished by the following characteristics: (1) It is being built now. (2) It is behind schedule. (3) It requires an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. (4) It is very expensive. (5) It takes a long time to build because of its engineering development problems. (6) It is large. (7) It is heavy. (8) It is complicated.

“Every new type of reactor in history has been costlier, slower, and harder than projected. …

“In short, the notion that different or smaller reactors plus wholly new fuel cycles (and, usually, new competitive conditions and political systems) could overcome nuclear energy’s inherent problems is not just decades too late, but fundamentally a fantasy. Fantasies are all right, but people should pay for their own. Investors in and advocates of small-reactor innovations will be disappointed. But in due course, the aging advocates of the half-century-old reactor concepts that never made it to market will retire and die, their credulous young devotees will relearn painful lessons lately forgotten, and the whole nuclear business will complete its slow death of an incurable attack of market forces.”

More information on IFRs is posted at https://nuclear.foe.org.au/power/

See also relevant papers posted at: www.energyscience.org.au

A debate on IFRs is posted at

http://skirsch.com/politics/globalwarming/ifrUCSresponse.pdf

Amory Lovins’ article, ‘New nuclear reactors, same old story’, is posted at www.rmi.org/sitepages/pid601.php

More information on second, third and fourth generation reactors:

Hirsch, Helmut, Oda Becker, Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, April 2005, “Nuclear Reactor Hazards: Ongoing Dangers of Operating Nuclear Technology in the 21st Century”, Report prepared for Greenpeace International, www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/nuclearreactorhazards

James Hansen’s Generation IV nuclear fallacies and fantasies

Jim Green, Nuclear Monitor #849, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/849/james-hansens-generation-iv-nuclear-fallacies-and-fantasies

The two young co-founders of nuclear engineering start-up Transatomic Power were embarrassed earlier this year when their claims about their molten salt reactor design were debunked, forcing some major retractions.¹

The claims of MIT nuclear engineering graduate students – Leslie Dewan and Mark Massie – were trumpeted in MIT’s Technology Review under the headline, ‘What if we could build a nuclear reactor that costs half as much, consumes nuclear waste, and will never melt down?’²

The Technology Review puff-piece said Dewan “introduced new materials and a new shape that allowed her to increase power output by 30 times. As a result, the reactor is now so compact that a version large enough for a power plant can be built in a factory and shipped by rail to a plant site, which is potentially cheaper than the current practice of building nuclear reactors on site. The reactor also makes more efficient use of the energy in nuclear fuel. It can consume about one ton of nuclear waste a year, leaving just four kilograms behind. Dewan’s name for the technology: the Waste-Annihilating Molten-Salt Reactor.”²

A February 2017 article in MIT’s Technology Review ‒ this one far more critical ‒ said: “Those lofty claims helped it raise millions in venture capital, secure a series of glowing media profiles (including in this publication), and draw a rock-star lineup of technical advisors.”¹

MIT physics professor Kord Smith debunked a number of Transatomic’s key claims. Smith says he asked Transatomic to run a test which, he says, confirmed that “their claims were completely untrue.”¹

Transatomic’s claim that the ‘Waste-Annihilating Molten-Salt Reactor’ could “generate up to 75 times more electricity per ton of mined uranium than a light-water reactor” was severely downgraded to “more than twice.”¹ And the company abandoned its waste-to-fuel claims and now says that a reactor based on the current design would not use waste as fuel and thus would “not reduce existing stockpiles of spent nuclear fuel”.¹

Hansen’s Generation IV propaganda

Kennedy Maize wrote about Transatomic’s troubles in Power Magazine: “[T]his was another case of technology hubris, an all-to-common malady in energy, where hyperbolic claims are frequent and technology journalists all too credulous.”³ Pro-nuclear commentator Dan Yurman said that “other start-ups with audacious claims are likely to receive similar levels of scrutiny” and that it “may have the effect of putting other nuclear energy entrepreneurs on notice that they too may get the same enhanced levels of analysis of their claims.”⁴

Well, yes, others making false claims about Generation IV reactor concepts might receive similar levels of scrutiny … or they might not. Arguably the greatest sin of the Transatomic founders was not that they inadvertently spread misinformation, but that they are young, and in Dewan’s case, female. Aging men seem to have a free pass to peddle as much misinformation as they like without the public shaming that the Transatomic founders have been subjected to. A case in point is climate scientist James Hansen. We’ve repeatedly drawn attention to Hansen’s nuclear misinformation in Nuclear Monitor^5-9 ‒ but you’d struggle to find any critical commentary outside the environmental and anti-nuclear literature.

Hansen states that a total requirement of 115 new reactor start-ups per year to 2050 would be required to replace fossil fuel electricity generation ‒ a total of about 4,000 reactors.¹⁰ Let’s assume that Generation IV reactors do the heavy lifting, and let’s generously assume that mass production of Generation IV reactors begins in 2030. That would necessitate about 200 reactor start-ups per year from 2030 to 2050 ‒ or four every week. Good luck with that.

Moreover, the assumption that mass production of Generation IV reactors might begin in or around 2030 is unrealistic. A report by the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety − a government authority under the Ministries of Defense, the Environment, Industry, Research, and Health − states: “There is still much R&D to be done to develop the Generation IV nuclear reactors, as well as for the fuel cycle and the associated waste management which depends on the system chosen.”¹¹

Likewise, a US Government Accountability Office report on the status of small modular reactors (SMRs) and other ‘advanced’ reactor concepts in the US concluded: “Both light water SMRs and advanced reactors face additional challenges related to the time, cost, and uncertainty associated with developing, certifying or licensing, and deploying new reactor technology, with advanced reactor designs generally facing greater challenges than light water SMR designs. It is a multi-decade process, with costs up to $1 billion to $2 billion, to design and certify or license the reactor design, and there is an additional construction cost of several billion dollars more per power plant.”¹²

An analysis recently published in the peer-reviewed literature found that the US government has wasted billions of dollars on Generation IV R&D with little to show for it.¹³ Lead researcher Dr Ahmed Abdulla, from the University of California, said that “despite repeated commitments to non-light water reactors, and substantial investments … (more than $2 billion of public money), no such design is remotely ready for deployment today.”¹⁴

Weapons

In a nutshell, Hansen and other propagandists claim that some Generation IV reactors are a triple threat: they can convert weapons-usable (fissile) material and long-lived nuclear waste into low-carbon electricity. Let’s take the weapons and waste issues in turn.

Hansen says Generation IV reactors can be made “more resistant to weapons proliferation than today’s reactors”¹⁵ and “modern nuclear technology can reduce proliferation risks”.¹⁶ But are new reactors being made more resistant to weapons proliferation and are they reducing proliferation risks? In a word: No. Fast neutron reactors have been used for weapons production in the past (e.g. by France¹⁷) and will likely be used for weapons production in future (e.g. by India).

India plans to produce weapons-grade plutonium in fast breeder reactors for use as driver fuel in thorium reactors.¹⁸ Compared to conventional uranium reactors, India’s plan is far worse on both proliferation and security grounds. To make matters worse, India refuses to place its fast breeder / thorium program under IAEA safeguards.¹⁹

Hansen claims that thorium-based fuel cycles are “inherently proliferation-resistant”.²⁰ That’s garbage ‒ thorium has been used to produce fissile material (uranium-233) for nuclear weapons tests.²¹ Again, India’s plans provide a striking real-world refutation of Hansen’s dangerous misinformation.

Hansen states that if “designed properly”, fast neutron reactors would generate “nothing suitable for weapons”.²⁰ What does that even mean? Are we meant to ignore actual and potential links between Generation IV nuclear technology and WMD proliferation on the grounds that the reactors weren’t built “properly”? And if we take Hansen’s statement literally, no reactors produce material suitable for weapons ‒ the fissile material must always be separated from irradiated materials ‒ in which case all reactors can be said to be “designed properly”. Hooray.

Hansen claims that integral fast reactors (IFR) ‒ a non-existent variant of fast neutron reactors ‒ “could be inherently free from the risk of proliferation”.²² That’s another dangerous falsehood.²³ Dr George Stanford, who worked on an IFR R&D program in the US, notes that proliferators “could do [with IFRs] what they could do with any other reactor − operate it on a special cycle to produce good quality weapons material.”²⁴

Hansen acknowledges that “nuclear does pose unique safety and proliferation concerns that must be addressed with strong and binding international standards and safeguards.”¹⁰ There’s no doubting that the safeguards systems needs strengthening.²⁵ In articles and speeches during his tenure as the Director General of the IAEA from 1997‒2009, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei said that the Agency’s basic rights of inspection are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system suffers from “vulnerabilities” and “clearly needs reinforcement”, that efforts to improve the system were “half-hearted”, and that the safeguards system operated on a “shoestring budget … comparable to that of a local police department”.

Hansen says he was converted to the cause of Generation IV nuclear technology by Tom Blees, whose 2008 book ‘Prescription for the Planet’ argues the case for IFRs.²⁶ But Hansen evidently missed those sections of the book where Blees argues for radically strengthened safeguards including the creation of an international strike-force on full standby to attend promptly to any detected attempts to misuse or to divert nuclear materials. Blees also argues that “privatized nuclear power should be outlawed worldwide” and that nuclear power must either be internationalized or banned to deal with the “shadowy threat of nuclear proliferation”.²⁶

So what is James Hansen doing about the WMD proliferation problem and the demonstrably inadequate nuclear safeguards system? This is one of the great ironies of Hansen’s nuclear advocacy ‒ he does absolutely nothing other than making demonstrably false claims about the potential of Generation IV concepts to solve the problems, and repeatedly slagging off at organizations with a strong track record of campaigning for improvements to the safeguards system.²⁷

Waste

Hansen claims that “modern nuclear technology can … solve the waste disposal problem by burning current waste and using fuel more efficiently.”¹⁶ He elaborates: “Nuclear “waste”: it is not waste, it is fuel for 4th generation reactors! Current (‘slow’) nuclear reactors are lightwater reactors that ‘burn’ less than 1% of the energy in the original uranium ore, leaving a waste pile that is radioactive for more than 10,000 years. The 4th generation reactors can ‘burn’ this waste, as well as excess nuclear weapons material, leaving a much smaller waste pile with radioactive half-life measured in decades rather than millennia, thus minimizing the nuclear waste problem. The economic value of current nuclear waste, if used as a fuel for 4th generation reactors, is trillions of dollars.”²⁸

But even if IFRs ‒ Hansen’s favored Generation IV concept ‒ worked as hoped, they would still leave residual actinides, and long-lived fission products, and long-lived intermediate-level waste in the form of reactor and reprocessing components … all of it requiring deep geological disposal. UC Berkeley nuclear engineer Prof. Per Peterson notes in an article published by the pro-nuclear Breakthrough Institute: “Even integral fast reactors (IFRs), which recycle most of their waste, leave behind materials that have been contaminated by transuranic elements and so cannot avoid the need to develop deep geologic disposal.”²⁹

So if IFRs don’t obviate the need for deep geological repositories, what problem do they solve? They don’t solve the WMD proliferation problem associated with nuclear power. They would make more efficient use of finite uranium … but uranium is plentiful.

In theory, IFRs would gobble up nuclear waste and convert it into low-carbon electricity. In practice, the IFR R&D program in Idaho has left a legacy of troublesome waste. This saga is detailed in a recent article³¹ and a longer report³² by the Union of Concerned Scientists’ senior scientist Ed Lyman (see the following article in this issue of Nuclear Monitor). Lyman states that attempts to treat IFR spent fuel with pyroprocessing have not made management and disposal of the spent fuel simpler and safer, they have “created an even bigger mess”.³¹

Japan is about to get first-hand experience of the waste legacy associated with Generation IV reactors in light of the decision to decommission the Monju fast spectrum reactor. Decommissioning Monju has a hefty price-tag ‒ far more than for conventional light-water reactors. According to a 2012 estimate by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, decommissioning Monju will cost an estimated ¥300 billion (US$2.74bn; €2.33bn).³⁰ That estimate includes ¥20 billion to remove spent fuel from the reactor ‒ but no allowance is made for the cost of disposing of the spent fuel, and in any case Japan has no deep geological repository to dispose of the waste.

Generation IV economics

Hansen claimed in 2012 that IFRs could generate electricity “at a cost per kW less than coal.”^33,34 He was closer to the mark in 2008 when he said of IFRs: “I do not have the expertise or insight to evaluate the cost and technology readiness estimates” of IFR advocate Tom Blees and the “overwhelming impression that I get … is that Blees is a great optimist.”³⁵

The US Government Accountability Office’s 2015 report noted that technical challenges facing SMRs and advanced reactors may result in higher-cost reactors than anticipated, making them less competitive with large light-water reactors or power plants using other fuels.³⁶

A 2015 pro-nuclear puff-piece by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) arrived at the disingenuous conclusion that nuclear power is “an attractive low-carbon technology in the absence of cost overruns and with low financing costs”.³⁷ But the IEA/NEA report made no effort to spin the economics of Generation IV nuclear concepts, stating that “generation IV technologies aim to be at least as competitive as generation III technologies … though the additional complexity of these designs, the need to develop a specific supply chain for these reactors and the development of the associated fuel cycles will make this a challenging task.”³⁷

The late Michael Mariotte commented on the IEA/NEA report: “So, at best the Generation IV reactors are aiming to be as competitive as the current − and economically failing − Generation III reactors. And even realizing that inadequate goal will be “challenging.” The report might as well have recommended to Generation IV developers not to bother.”³⁸

Of course, Hansen isn’t the only person peddling misinformation about Generation IV economics. A recent report states that the “cost estimates from some advanced reactor companies ‒ if accurate ‒ suggest that these technologies could revolutionize the way we think about the cost, availability, and environmental consequences of energy generation.”³⁹ To estimate the costs of Generation IV nuclear concepts, the researchers simply asked companies involved in R&D projects to supply the information!

The researchers did at least have the decency to qualify their findings: “There is inherent and significant uncertainty in projecting NOAK [nth-of-a-kind] costs from a group of companies that have not yet built a single commercial-scale demonstration reactor, let alone a first commercial plant. Without a commercial-scale plant as a reference, it is difficult to reliably estimate the costs of building out the manufacturing capacity needed to achieve the NOAK costs being reported; many questions still remain unanswered ‒ what scale of investments will be needed to launch the supply chain; what type of capacity building will be needed for the supply chain, and so forth.”³⁹

Hansen has doubled down on his nuclear advocacy, undeterred by the Fukushima disaster; undeterred by the economic disasters of nuclear power in the US, the UK, France, Finland and elsewhere; and undeterred by the spectacular growth of renewables and the spectacular cost reductions. He needs to take his own advice. Peter Bradford, adjunct professor at Vermont Law School and a former US Nuclear Regulatory Commission member, said in response to a 2015 letter¹⁰ co-authored by Hansen:⁴⁰

“The Hansen letter contains these remarkably unself-aware sentences:

‘To solve the climate problem, policy must be based on facts and not on prejudice.’

‘The climate issue is too important for us to delude ourselves with wishful thinking.’

‘The future of our planet and our descendants depends on basing decisions on facts, and letting go of long held biases when it comes to nuclear power.’

Amen, brother.”

References:

1. James Temple, 24 Feb 2017, ‘Nuclear Energy Startup Transatomic Backtracks on Key Promises’, www.technologyreview.com/s/603731/nuclear-energy-startup-transatomic-backtracks-on-key-promises/
2. Kevin Bullis, 2013, ‘What if we could build a nuclear reactor that costs half as much, consumes nuclear waste, and will never melt down?’, www.technologyreview.com/lists/innovators-under-35/2013/pioneer/leslie-dewan/
3. Kennedy Maize, 8 March 2017, ‘Molten Salt Reactor Claims Melt Down Under Scrutiny’, www.powermag.com/blog/molten-salt-reactor-claims-melt-down-under-scrutiny/
4. Dan Yurman, 26 Feb 2017, ‘An Up & Down Week for Developers of Advanced Reactors’, https://neutronbytes.com/2017/02/26/an-up-down-week-for-developers-of-advanced-reactors/
5. Nuclear Monitor #814, 18 Nov 2015, ‘James Hansen’s nuclear fantasies’, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/814/james-hansens-nuclear-fantasies
6. Nuclear Monitor #776, 24 Jan 2014, ‘Environmentalists urge Hansen to rethink nuclear’, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/776/nuclear-news
7. Michael Mariotte, 21 April 2016, ‘How low can they go? Hansen, Shellenberger shilling for Exelon’, Nuclear Monitor #822, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/822/how-low-can-they-go-hansen-shellenberger-shilling-exelon
8. M.V. Ramana, 3 Dec 2015, ‘Betting on the wrong horse: Fast reactors and climate change’, Nuclear Monitor #815, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/815/betting-wrong-horse-fast-reactors-and-climate-change
9. Michael Mariotte, 9 Jan 2014, ‘The grassroots response to Dr. James Hansen’s call for more nukes’, http://safeenergy.org/2014/01/09/the-grassroots-response-to-Dr.-James-Hansens-call-for-more-nukes/
10. James Hansen, Kerry Emanuel, Ken Caldeira and Tom Wigley, 4 Dec 2015, ‘Nuclear power paves the only viable path forward on climate change’, www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/03/nuclear-power-paves-the-only-viable-path-forward-on-climate-change
11. IRSN, 2015, ‘Review of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems’, www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Pages/20150427_Generation-IV-nuclear-energy-systems-safety-potential-overview.aspx Direct download: www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Documents/IRSN_Report-GenIV_04-2015.pdf
12. U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 2015, ‘Nuclear Reactors: Status and challenges in development and deployment of new commercial concepts’, GAO-15-652, www.gao.gov/assets/680/671686.pdf
13. A. Abdulla et al., 10 Aug 2017, ‘A retrospective analysis of funding and focus in US advanced fission innovation’, http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7f10/meta;jsessionid=71D13DABD51435540783FCC24BCE831B.c2.iopscience.cld.iop.org
14. 9 Aug 2017, ‘Analysis highlights failings in US’s advanced nuclear program’, https://phys.org/news/2017-08-analysis-highlights-advanced-nuclear.html
15. James Hansen, 7 June 2014, ‘Scientists can help in planet’s carbon cut’, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-06/07/content_17570035.htm
16. K. Caldeira, K. Emanuel, J. Hansen, and T. Wigley, 3 Nov 2013, ‘Top climate change scientists’ letter to policy influencers’, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/03/world/nuclear-energy-climate-change-scientists-letter/index.html
17. See pp.44-45 in Mycle Schneider, 2009, ‘Fast Breeder Reactors in France’, Science and Global Security, 17:36–53, www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/sgs/archive/17-1-Schneider-FBR-France.pdf
18. John Carlson, 2014, submission to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=79a1a29e-5691-4299-8923-06e633780d4b&subId=301365
19. John Carlson, 2015, first supplementary submission to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=cd70cb45-f71e-4d95-a2f5-dab0f986c0a3&subId=301365
20. P. Kharecha et al., 2010, ‘Options for near-term phaseout of CO2 emissions from coal use in the United States’, Environmental Science & Technology, 44, 4050-4062, http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es903884a
21. Nuclear Monitor #801, 9 April 2015, ‘Thor-bores and uro-sceptics: thorium’s friendly fire’, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/801/thor-bores-and-uro-sceptics-thoriums-friendly-fire
22. Pushker Kharecha and James Hansen, March 2013, ‘Prevented Mortality and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Historical and Projected Nuclear Power’, Environment, Science and Technology, http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es3051197
23. https://nuclear.foe.org.au/nuclear-weapons-and-generation-4-reactors/
24. George Stanford, 18 Sept 2010, ‘IFR FaD 7 – Q&A on Integral Fast Reactors’, http://bravenewclimate.com/2010/09/18/ifr-fad-7/
25. See section 2.12, pp.100ff, in Friends of the Earth et al., 2015, ‘Submission to the SA Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission’, https://nuclear.foe.org.au/wp-content/uploads/NFCRC-submission-FoEA-ACF-CCSA-FINAL-AUGUST-2015.pdf
26. Tom Blees, 2008, ‘Prescription for the Planet’, www.thesciencecouncil.com/pdfs/P4TP4U.pdf
27. https://nuclear.foe.org.au/safeguards/
28. James Hansen, 2011, ‘Baby Lauren and the Kool-Aid’, www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2011/20110729_BabyLauren.pdf
29. Breakthrough Institute, 5 May 2014, ‘Cheap Nuclear’, http://theenergycollective.com/breakthroughinstitut/376966/cheap-nuclear
30. Reiji Yoshida, 21 Sept 2016, ‘Japan to scrap troubled ¥1 trillion Monju fast-breeder reactor’, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/21/national/japans-cabinet-hold-meeting-decide-fate-monju-reactor/
31. Ed Lyman / Union of Concerned Scientists, 12 Aug 2017, ‘The Pyroprocessing Files’, http://allthingsnuclear.org/elyman/the-pyroprocessing-files
32. Edwin Lyman, 2017, ‘External Assessment of the U.S. Sodium-Bonded Spent Fuel Treatment Program’, https://s3.amazonaws.com/ucs-documents/nuclear-power/Pyroprocessing/IAEA-CN-245-492%2Blyman%2Bfinal.pdf
33. Mark Halper, 20 July 2012, ‘Richard Branson urges Obama to back next-generation nuclear technology’, www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jul/20/richard-branson-obama-nuclear-technology
34. 27 Dec 2012, ‘Have you heard the one about the Entrepreneur, the Climate Scientist and the Nuclear Engineer?’, http://prismsuk.blogspot.com.au/2012/
35. James Hansen, 2008, ‘Trip Report – Nuclear Power’, http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/20080804_TripReport.pdf
36. U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 2015, ‘Nuclear Reactors: Status and challenges in development and deployment of new commercial concepts’, GAO-15-652, www.gao.gov/assets/680/671686.pdf
37. International Energy Agency (IEA) and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), 2015, ‘Projected Costs of Generating Electricity’, www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ElecCost2015.pdf
38. Michael Mariotte, ‘Nuclear advocates fight back with wishful thinking’, Nuclear Monitor #810, 9 Sept 2015, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/810/nuclear-advocates-fight-back-wishful-thinking
39. Energy Innovation Reform Project Report Prepared by the Energy Options Network, 2017, ‘What Will Advanced Nuclear Power Plants Cost? A Standardized Cost Analysis of Advanced Nuclear Technologies in Commercial Development’, http://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Advanced-Nuclear-Reactors-Cost-Study.pdf
40. Peter A. Bradford, 17 Dec 2015, ‘The experts on nuclear power and climate change’, http://thebulletin.org/experts-nuclear-power-and-climate-change8996

Fusion scientist debunks fusion power

26 April 2017, Nuclear Monitor #842, 26/04/2017, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/842/fusion-scientist-debunks-fusion-power

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has published a detailed critique of fusion power written by Dr Daniel Jassby, a former principal research physicist at the Princeton Plasma Physics Lab with 25 years experience working in areas of plasma physics and neutron production related to fusion energy.1

Here is a summary of his main arguments.

Jassby writes:

“[U]nlike what happens in solar fusion ‒ which uses ordinary hydrogen ‒ Earth-bound fusion reactors that burn neutron-rich isotopes have byproducts that are anything but harmless: Energetic neutron streams comprise 80 percent of the fusion energy output of deuterium-tritium reactions and 35 percent of deuterium-deuterium reactions.

“Now, an energy source consisting of 80 percent energetic neutron streams may be the perfect neutron source, but it’s truly bizarre that it would ever be hailed as the ideal electrical energy source. In fact, these neutron streams lead directly to four regrettable problems with nuclear energy: radiation damage to structures; radioactive waste; the need for biological shielding; and the potential for the production of weapons-grade plutonium 239 ‒ thus adding to the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, not lessening it, as fusion proponents would have it.

“In addition, if fusion reactors are indeed feasible ‒ as assumed here ‒ they would share some of the other serious problems that plague fission reactors, including tritium release, daunting coolant demands, and high operating costs. There will also be additional drawbacks that are unique to fusion devices: the use of fuel (tritium) that is not found in nature and must be replenished by the reactor itself; and unavoidable on-site power drains that drastically reduce the electric power available for sale.”

All of these problems are endemic to any type of magnetic confinement fusion or inertial confinement fusion reactor that is fueled with deuterium-tritium or deuterium alone. The deuterium-tritium reaction is favored by fusion developers. Jassby notes that tritium consumed in fusion can theoretically be fully regenerated in order to sustain the nuclear reactions, by using a lithium blanket, but full regeneration is not possible in practice for reasons explained in his article.

Jassby writes: “To make up for the inevitable shortfalls in recovering unburned tritium for use as fuel in a fusion reactor, fission reactors must continue to be used to produce sufficient supplies of tritium ‒ a situation which implies a perpetual dependence on fission reactors, with all their safety and nuclear proliferation problems. Because external tritium production is enormously expensive, it is likely instead that only fusion reactors fueled solely with deuterium can ever be practical from the viewpoint of fuel supply. This circumstance aggravates the problem of nuclear proliferation …”

Weapons proliferation

Fusion reactors could be used to produce plutonium-239 for weapons “simply by placing natural or depleted uranium oxide at any location where neutrons of any energy are flying about” in the reactor interior or appendages to the reaction vessel.

Tritium breeding is not required in systems based on deuterium-deuterium reactions, so all the fusion neutrons are available for any use including the production of plutonium-239 for weapons ‒ hence Jassby’s comment about deuterium-deuterium systems posing greater proliferation risks than deuterium-tritium systems. He writes: “In effect, the reactor transforms electrical input power into “free-agent” neutrons and tritium, so that a fusion reactor fueled with deuterium-only can be a singularly dangerous tool for nuclear proliferation.”

Further, tritium itself is a proliferation risk ‒ it is used to enhance the efficiency and yield of fission bombs and the fission stages of hydrogen bombs in a process known as “boosting”, and tritium is also used in the external neutron initiators for such weapons. “A reactor fueled with deuterium-tritium or deuterium-only will have an inventory of many kilograms of tritium, providing opportunities for diversion for use in nuclear weapons,” Jassby writes.

It isn’t mentioned in Jassby’s article, but fusion has already contributed to proliferation problems even though it has yet to generate a single Watt of useful electricity. According to Khidhir Hamza, a senior nuclear scientist involved in Iraq’s weapons program in the 1980s: “Iraq took full advantage of the IAEA’s recommendation in the mid 1980s to start a plasma physics program for “peaceful” fusion research. We thought that buying a plasma focus device … would provide an excellent cover for buying and learning about fast electronics technology, which could be used to trigger atomic bombs.”2

Other problems

Another problem is the “huge” parasitic power consumption of fusion systems ‒ “they consume a good chunk of the very power that they produce … on a scale unknown to any other source of electrical power.” There are two classes of parasitic power drain ‒ a host of essential auxiliary systems that must be maintained continuously even when the fusion plasma is dormant (of the order of 75‒100 MW), and power needed to control the fusion plasma in magnetic confinement fusion systems or to ignite fuel capsules in pulsed inertial confinement fusion systems (at least 6% of the fusion power generated). Thus a 300 MWt / 120 MWe system barely supplies on-site needs and thus fusion reactors would need to be much larger to overcome this problem of parasitic power consumption.

The neutron radiation damage in the solid vessel wall of a fusion reactor is expected to be worse than in fission reactors because of the higher neutron energies, potentially putting the integrity of the reaction vessel in peril.

Fusion fuel assemblies will be transformed into tons of radioactive waste to be removed annually from each reactor. Structural components would need to be replaced periodically thus generating “huge masses of highly radioactive material that must eventually be transported offsite for burial”, and non-structural components inside the reaction vessel and in the blanket will also become highly radioactive by neutron activation.

Molten lithium presents a fire and explosion hazard, introducing a drawback common to liquid-metal cooled fission reactors.

Tritium leakage is another problem. Jassby writes: “Corrosion in the heat exchange system, or a breach in the reactor vacuum ducts could result in the release of radioactive tritium into the atmosphere or local water resources. Tritium exchanges with hydrogen to produce tritiated water, which is biologically hazardous. Most fission reactors contain trivial amounts of tritium (less than 1 gram) compared with the kilograms in putative fusion reactors. But the release of even tiny amounts of radioactive tritium from fission reactors into groundwater causes public consternation. Thwarting tritium permeation through certain classes of solids remains an unsolved problem.”

Water consumption is another problem. Jassby writes: “In addition, there are the problems of coolant demands and poor water efficiency. A fusion reactor is a thermal power plant that would place immense demands on water resources for the secondary cooling loop that generates steam as well as for removing heat from other reactor subsystems such as cryogenic refrigerators and pumps. … In fact, a fusion reactor would have the lowest water efficiency of any type of thermal power plant, whether fossil or nuclear. With drought conditions intensifying in sundry regions of the world, many countries could not physically sustain large fusion reactors.”

Due to all of the aforementioned problems, and others, “any fusion reactor will face outsized operating costs.” Whereas fission reactors typically require around 500 employees, fusion reactors would require closer to 1,000 employees. Jassby states that it “is inconceivable that the total operating costs of a fusion reactor will be less than that of a fission reactor”.

Jassby concludes:

“To sum up, fusion reactors face some unique problems: a lack of natural fuel supply (tritium), and large and irreducible electrical energy drains to offset. Because 80 percent of the energy in any reactor fueled by deuterium and tritium appears in the form of neutron streams, it is inescapable that such reactors share many of the drawbacks of fission reactors ‒ including the production of large masses of radioactive waste and serious radiation damage to reactor components. …

“If reactors can be made to operate using only deuterium fuel, then the tritium replenishment issue vanishes and neutron radiation damage is alleviated. But the other drawbacks remain—and reactors requiring only deuterium fueling will have greatly enhanced nuclear weapons proliferation potential.”

“These impediments ‒ together with colossal capital outlay and several additional disadvantages shared with fission reactors ‒ will make fusion reactors more demanding to construct and operate, or reach economic practicality, than any other type of electrical energy generator.

“The harsh realities of fusion belie the claims of its proponents of “unlimited, clean, safe and cheap energy.” Terrestrial fusion energy is not the ideal energy source extolled by its boosters, but to the contrary: It’s something to be shunned.”

References:
1. Daniel Jassby, 19 April 2017, ‘Fusion reactors: Not what they’re cracked up to be’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/fusion-reactors-not-what-they%E2%80%99re-cracked-be10699
2. Khidhir Hamza, Sep/Oct 1998, ‘Inside Saddam’s Secret Nuclear Program’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, No. 5, www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/bas-hamza-iraqnuke-10-98.htm

Nuclear power and weapons – explaining the connections

This paper was written c.2002, apologies for dead web-links.

Overview
Enrichment
Nuclear power and weapons
Indirect links between power and weapons
Plutonium grades
Alternative reactor types and alternative fuel cycles
Safeguards
More information
References

OVERVIEW

This webpage discusses the numerous methods by which civil nuclear programs can – and do – contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, with emphasis on the links between nuclear power and weapons.

According to Ian Hore-Lacy from the Uranium Information Centre (2000): “Happily, proliferation is only a fraction of what had been feared when the NPT was set up, and none of the problem arises from the civil nuclear cycle.” Sadly, Hore-Lacy’s statement could hardly be further from the truth.

Ostensibly civil nuclear materials and facilities can be used in support of nuclear weapons programs in many ways:
* Production of plutonium in reactors followed by separation of plutonium from irradiated material in reprocessing facilities (or smaller facilities, sometimes called hot cells).
* Production of radionuclides other than plutonium for use in weapons, e.g. tritium, used to initiate or boost nuclear weapons.
* Diversion of fresh highly enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor fuel or extraction of HEU from spent fuel.
* Nuclear weapons-related research.
* Development of expertise for parallel or later use in a weapons program.
* Justifying the acquisition of other facilities capable of being used in support of a nuclear weapons program, such as enrichment or reprocessing facilities.
* Establishment or strengthening of a political constituency for nuclear weapons production (a ‘bomb lobby’).

These are not just hypothetical risks. On the contrary, the use of civil facilities and materials in nuclear weapons research or systematic weapons programs has been commonplace (Nuclear Weapon Archive, n.d.; Institute for Science and International Security, n.d.). It has occurred in the following countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Syria, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia. A few other countries could arguably be added to the list e.g. Burma’s suspected nuclear program, or Canada (because of its use of research reactors to produce plutonium for US and British nuclear weapons).

Overall, civil nuclear facilities and materials have been used for weapons R&D in about one third of all the countries with a nuclear industry of any significance, i.e. with power and/or research reactors. The Institute for Science and International Security (n.d.) collates information on nuclear programs and concludes that about 30 countries have sought nuclear weapons and ten succeeded – a similar strike rate of about one in three.

In a number of the countries in which civil materials and facilities have been used in support of military objectives, the weapons-related work was short-lived and fell short of the determined pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, civil programs provided the basis for the full-scale production of nuclear weapons in Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea. In other cases – with Iraq from the 1970s until 1991 being the most striking example – substantial progress had been made towards a weapons capability under cover of a civil program before the weapons program was terminated.

Civil and military nuclear programs also overlap to a greater or lesser degree in the five ‘declared’ weapons states – the US, the UK, Russia, China and France.

ENRICHMENT

There are three methods of using the cover of a civil nuclear program for the acquisition of HEU for weapons production:
* Diversion of imported HEU. An example was the (abandoned) ‘crash program’ in Iraq in 1991 to build a nuclear weapon using imported HEU. The US alone has exported over 25 tonnes of HEU.
* Extraction of HEU from spent research reactor fuel. HEU has been used in many research reactors but power reactors use low enriched uranium or in some cases natural uranium.
* A nuclear power program or a uranium mining and export industry can be used to justify the development of enrichment facilities.

The acquisition of enrichment technology and expertise – ostensibly for civil programs – enabled South Africa and Pakistan to produce HEU which has been used for their HEU weapons arsenals.

The nuclear black market centred around the ‘father’ of the Pakistani bomb Abdul Qadeer Khan involved the transfer of enrichment know-how and/or facilities to North Korea, Iran and Libya.

An expansion of nuclear power would most likely result in the spread (horizontal proliferation) of enrichment technologies, justified by requirements and markets for low-enriched uranium for power reactors but also capable of being used to produce HEU for weapons.

Technical developments in the field of enrichment technology – such as the development of laser enrichment technology by the Silex company at Lucas Heights in Australia – could worsen the situation. Silex will potentially provide proliferators with an ideal enrichment capability as it is expected to have relatively low capital cost and low power consumption, and it is based on relatively simple and practical separation modules. (Greenpeace, 2004; Boureston and Ferguson, 2005.)

An Australian Strategic Policy Institute report released in August 2006 notes that an enrichment industry would give Australia “a potential ‘break-out’ capability whether that was our intention or not” and that this point is “unlikely to be missed by other countries, especially those in Australia’s region.” (Davies, 2006.)

Former Australian Prime Minister John Howard drew a parallel between exporting unprocessed uranium and unprocessed wool and argued for value-adding processing in both cases. But there is a differerence between uranium and wool. The Lucas Heights nuclear agency once embarked on a secret uranium enrichment program; there was never a secret knitting program.

NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

John Carlson (2000) from the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office states that “… in some of the countries having nuclear weapons, nuclear power remains insignificant or non-existent.” Carlson’s attempt to absolve civil nuclear programs from the proliferation problem ignores the well-documented use of civil nuclear facilities and materials in weapons programs as well as the important political ‘cover’ civil programs provide for military programs. It also ignores the more specific links between nuclear power and weapons proliferation.

Of the ten states known to have produced nuclear weapons:
* eight have nuclear power reactors.
* North Korea has no operating power reactors but an ‘Experimental Power Reactor’ is believed to have been the source of the fissile material (plutonium) used in the October 2006 nuclear bomb test, and North Korea has power reactors partly constructed under the Joint Framework Agreement.
* Israel has no power reactors, though the pretence of an interest in the development of nuclear power helped to justify nuclear transfers to Israel.

Power reactors are certainly used in support of India’s nuclear weapons program. This has long been suspected (Albright and Hibbs, 1992) and is no longer in doubt since India is refusing to subject numerous power reactors to safeguards under the US/India nuclear agreement.

The US has used a power reactor to produce tritium for use in nuclear weapons (in the 1990s)

The 1962 test of sub-weapon-grade plutonium by the US may have used plutonium from a power reactor.

Pakistan may be using power reactor/s in support of its nuclear weapons program.

North Korea’s October 2006 weapon test used plutonium from an ‘Experimental Power Reactor’.

Former Australian Prime Minister John Gorton certainly had military ambitions for the power reactor he pushed to have constructed at Jervis bay in NSW in the late 1960s – he later admitted that the agenda was to produce both electricity as well as plutonium for potential use in weapons.

According to Matthew Bunn, in France, “material for the weapons program [was] sometimes produced in power reactors”.

So there are a handful of cases of nuclear power reactors being used directly in support of weapons production. But the indirect links between nuclear power and weapons – discussed below – are by far the larger part of the problem.

The nuclear industry and its supporters claim that reprocessing is a ‘sensitive’ nuclear technology but power reactors are not. But of course they are part of the same problem. The existence of a reprocessing plant poses no proliferation risk in the absence of reactor-irradiated nuclear materials. Reactors pose no proliferation risk in the absence a reprocessing facility to separate fissile material from irradiated materials. Put reactors and reprocessing together and you have the capacity to produce and separate plutonium.

In short, the attempt to distance nuclear power programs from weapons proliferation is disingenuous. While currently-serving politicians and bureaucrats (and others) are prone to obfuscation on this point, several retired politicians have noted the link between power and weapons:
* Former US Vice President Al Gore said in 2006: “For eight years in the White House, every weapons-proliferation problem we dealt with was connected to a civilian reactor program. And if we ever got to the point where we wanted to use nuclear reactors to back out a lot of coal … then we’d have to put them in so many places we’d run that proliferation risk right off the reasonability scale.” (<www.grist.org/news/maindish/2006/05/09/roberts>)
* Former US President Bill Clinton said in 2006: “The push to bring back nuclear power as an antidote to global warming is a big problem. If you build more nuclear power plants we have toxic waste at least, bomb-making at worse.” (Clinton Global Initiative, September 2006.)
* Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating said in 2006: “Any country with a nuclear power program “ipso facto ends up with a nuclear weapons capability”. (AAP, October 16, 2006.)

INDIRECT LINKS BETWEEN POWER AND WEAPONS

Nuclear power reactors per sé need not be directly involved in weapons research/production in order for a nuclear power program to provide cover and support for a weapons program.

The claim that power reactors have not become entangled in weapons programs ignores the pool of expertise required to run a nuclear power program and the actual and potential use of that expertise in military programs. For example, it is no coincidence that the five declared nuclear weapons states – the USA, Russia, China, France and the UK – all have nuclear power reactors and they account for 57% of global nuclear power output (203/370 gigawatts as at September 2006). Specific examples of power-weapons links – such as the use of a power reactor to produce tritium for weapons in the US – are of less importance than the broad pattern of civil programs providing a large pool of nuclear expertise from which military programs can draw.

The nuclear weapons programs in South Africa and Pakistan were clearly outgrowths of their power programs although enrichment plants, not power reactors, produced the fissile material for use in weapons.

Claims made about power reactors also ignore the fact that research and training reactors, ostensibly acquired in support of a power program or for other civil purposes, have been the plutonium source in India and Israel. Small volumes of plutonium have been produced in ‘civil’ research reactors then separated from irradiated materials in a number of countries suspected of or known to be interested in the development of a nuclear weapons capability – including Iraq, Iran, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, and possibly Romania. Pakistan announced in 1998 that a powerful ‘research’ reactor had begun operation at Khusab; if so, the reactor can produce unsafeguarded plutonium. (The links between research reactor programs and nuclear weapons are addressed in detail in Green, 2002.)

So nuclear power programs can facilitate weapons programs and weapons production even if power reactors per se are not used to produce fissile material for weapons.

Furthermore, nuclear power programs can facilitate weapons programs and weapons production even if power reactors are not actually built. Iraq provides a clear illustration of this point. While Iraq’s nuclear research program provided much cover for the weapons program, stated interest in developing nuclear power was also significant. According to Khidhir Hamza (1998), a senior nuclear scientist involved in Iraq’s weapons program: “Acquiring nuclear technology within the IAEA safeguards system was the first step in establishing the infrastructure necessary to develop nuclear weapons. In 1973, we decided to acquire a 40-megawatt research reactor, a fuel manufacturing plant, and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, all under cover of acquiring the expertise needed to eventually build and operate nuclear power plants and produce and recycle nuclear fuel. Our hidden agenda was to clandestinely develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce weapon-grade plutonium.”

Carlson (2000) says: “If we look to the history of nuclear weapons development, we can see that those countries with nuclear weapons developed them before they developed nuclear power programs.” However, ostensibly civil nuclear programs clearly preceded and facilitated the successful development of nuclear weapons in India, Pakistan, and in the former nuclear weapons state South Africa.

Carlson (2006) states: “I have pointed out on numerous occasions that nuclear power as such is not a proliferation problem – rather the problem is with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies …” The claim is false, no matter how many times Carlson makes it:
* Power reactors have been used directly in weapons programs.
* Power programs have facilitated and provided cover for weapons programs even without direct use of power reactor/s in the weapons program.
* And power reactors produce large volumes of weapons-useable plutonium and can be operated on a short irradiation cycle to produce large volumes of weapon-grade plutonium.

PLUTONIUM GRADES

No-one disputes that ‘reactor-grade’ plutonium can be used in nuclear weapons but there is debate about the difficulty of so doing, and the likely cost in terms of reliability and yield.

Moreover, there is no dispute that power reactors can produce weapon-grade plutonium. This could hardly be simpler – all that needs to be done is to shorten the irradiation time, thereby maximising the production of plutonium-239 relative to other, unwanted plutonium isotopes. Indeed low burn-up, weapon-grade plutonium is produced in the normal course of operation of a power reactor, although in the normal course of operation it becomes fuel-grade then reactor-grade plutonium.

(The issue of plutonium grades is discussed in detail in the paper posted at: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/plutonium-grades-and-nuclear-weapons-2/.)

Power reactors have been responsible for the production of a vast quantity of weapons-useable plutonium. Adding to the proliferation risk is the growing stockpile of separated plutonium, as reprocessing outstrips the use of plutonium in MOX (mixed oxide fuel containing plutonium and uranium).

A typical power reactor (1000 MWe) produces about 300 kilograms of plutonium each year. Total global production of plutonium in power reactors is about 70 tonnes per year. As at the end of 2003, power reactors had produced an estimated 1,600 tonnes of plutonium (Institute for Science and International Security, 2004).

Using the above figures, and assuming that 10 kilograms of (reactor-grade) plutonium is required to produce a weapon with a destructive power comparable to that of the plutonium weapon dropped on Nagasaki in 1945:
* The plutonium produced in a single reactor each year is sufficient for 30 weapons.
* Total global plutonium production in power reactors each year is sufficient to produce 7,000 weapons.
* Total accumulated ‘civil’ plutonium is sufficient for 160,000 weapons.

The production of vast amounts of plutonium in power reactors is problem enough, but the problem is greatly exacerbated by the separation of plutonium in reprocessing plants. Whereas separation of plutonium from spent fuel requires a reprocessing capability and is potentially hazardous because of the radioactivity of spent fuel, the use of separated plutonium for weapons production is far less complicated.

The problem is further exacerbated by ongoing plutonium separation in excess of its limited re-use in MOX. According to the Uranium Information Centre (2002), only about one third of separated plutonium has been used in MOX over the last 30 years. Thus the stockpile of separated plutonium continues to grow – about 15-20 tonnes of plutonium are separated from spent fuel each year but only 10-15 tonnes are fabricated into MOX fuel. (Albright and Kramer, 2004.)

Hence there is a growing stockpile of plutonium in unirradiated forms (separated or in MOX), currently amounting to about 240 tonnes.

What would it take to address this problem of growing stockpiles of unirradiated / separated plutonium? All that would need to be done is to slow or suspend reprocessing until the stockpile was drawn down. That the nuclear industry refuses to do this shows how little it cares about the WMD proliferation risks it creates.

ALTERNATIVE REACTOR TYPES AND ALTERNATIVE FUEL CYCLES

Proliferation-resistant technologies are the subject of much discussion and some research (a number of examples are discussed in Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, n.d.)

However, there is little reason to believe that minimising proliferation risks will be a priority in the evolution of nuclear power technology. The growing stockpiles of unirradiated plutonium provide compelling evidence of the low priority given to non-proliferation initiatives compared to commercial and political (and sometime military) imperatives. Further, a number of the ‘advanced’ reactor concepts being studied involve the large-scale use of plutonium and the operation of fast breeder reactors (Burnie, 2005).

Plutonium breeder reactors rely on plutonium as the primary fuel. There are various possible configurations of breeder systems. Most rely on irradiation of a natural or depleted uranium blanket which produces plutonium which can be separated and used as fuel. Breeder reactors can potentially produce more plutonium than they consume, and the use of uranium is only a tiny fraction of that consumed in conventional reactors. (Hirsch et al., 2005, pp.33-35; von Hippel and Jones, 1997.) Breeder technology is highly problematic in relation to proliferation because it involves the large-scale production and separation of plutonium (although separation is not required in some proposed configurations). (Feiveson, 2001.) The proliferation of reprocessing capabilities is a likely outcome.

Fast neutron or fast spectrum reactors can be ‘breeders’ (producing more fissile material than they consume) or burners or they can produce as much fissile material as they consume. Burner reactor concepts (e.g. integral fast reactors) have some obvious attractions from a non-proliferation standpoint but the claims made about the proliferation resistance of these reactor concepts has been grossly overblown. Those issues are discussed in more detail at: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/nuclear-weapons-and-generation-4-reactors/

Like conventional reactors, proposed ‘Pebble Bed’ reactors are based on uranium fission. The nature of the fuel pebbles may make it somewhat more difficult to separate plutonium from irradiated fuel. However, uranium (or depleted uranium) targets could be inserted to produce weapon-grade plutonium for weapons. The enriched uranium fuel could be further enriched for HEU weapons – particularly since the proposed enrichment level of 9.6% uranium-235 is about twice the level of conventional reactor fuel. The reliance on enriched uranium will encourage the use and perhaps proliferation of enrichment plants, which can be used to produce HEU for weapons. (Harding, 2004.)

Fusion power systems remain a distant dream, and fusion also poses a number of weapons proliferation risks including the following:
* The production or supply of tritium which can be diverted for use in boosted nuclear weapons. (As mentioned above, the USA used a power reactor to produce tritium for weapons in the 1990s.)
* Using neutron radiation to bombard a uranium blanket (leading to the production of fissile plutonium) or a thorium blanket (leading to the production of fissile uranium-233).
* Research in support of a (thermonuclear) weapon program. (Gsponer and Hurni, 2004; WISE/NIRS, 2004; Hirsch et al., 2005.)

The use of thorium-232 as a reactor fuel is sometimes suggested as a long-term energy source, partly because of its relative abundance compared to uranium. No thorium-based power system would negate proliferation risks altogether (Friedman, 1997; Feiveson, 2001). Neutron bombardment of thorium (indirectly) produces uranium-233, a fissile material which is subject to the same safeguards requirements as uranium-235. The possible use of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to initiate a thorium-232/uranium-233 reaction is a further proliferation concern. Most proposed thorium fuel cycles require reprocessing with the attendant proliferation risks. More information on the proliferation risks associated with thorium is posted at: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/thorium-and-wmd-proliferation-risks-2/

SAFEGUARDS

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards system is seriously flawed and under-resourced. IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei has described the IAEA’s basic inspection rights as “fairly limited”, complained about “half-hearted” efforts to improve the system, and expressed concern that the safeguards system operates on a “shoestring budget … comparable to a local police department”. (El Baradei, n.d.)

There is serious concern that the NPT/IAEA safeguards system could collapse. For example, the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) noted: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”

MORE INFORMATION

Connections between civil and military nuclear programs – general information and country case studies: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/power-weapons/

REFERENCES

Albright, David, and Mark Hibbs, September 1992, “India’s silent bomb”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.48, No.07, pp.27-31, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=sep92albright>.

Albright, David, and Kimberly Kramer, November/December 2004, “Fissile material: Stockpiles still growing”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.60, No.6, pp.14-16, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04albright_016>.

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, n.d., “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: An overview of Institutional & Technical Issues”, <www.asno.dfat.gov.au/nuclear_safeguards.html>.

Boureston, Jack, and Charles D. Ferguson, March/April 2005, “Laser enrichment: Separation anxiety”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.61, No.2, pp.14-18, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ma05boureston>.

Burnie, Shaun, April 2005, “Proliferation Report: sensitive nuclear technology and plutonium technologies in the Republic of Korea and Japan”, Greenpeace report, <www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/Proliferation-Korea-Japan>.

Carlson, John, 2000, “Nuclear Energy and Non-proliferation – Issues and Challenges: An Australian Perspective”, Paper prepared for JAIF Symposium on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Tokyo, 9-10 March 2000.

Carlson, John, November 27, 2006, supplementary submission 30.2 to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Inquiry into Uranium Sales To China, <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/ jsct/8august2006/subs2/sub30_2.pdf>.

Davies, Andrew, 2006, Australian uranium exports and security: Preventing proliferation. Australian Strategic Policy Institute . <www.aspi.org.au/publications.cfm?pubID=98>.

El Baradei, Mohamed, n.d., various speeches and papers available at <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/index.html>.

Friedman, John S., 1997, “More power to thorium?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No.5, September/October .

Green, Jim, 2002, “Research Reactors and Nuclear Weapons”, paper prepared for the Medical Association for the Prevention of War, https://nuclear.foe.org.au/power-weapons/

Greenpeace, 2004, “Secrets, Lies and Uranium Enrichment: The Classified Silex Project at Lucas Heights”, www.greenpeace.org.au/frontpage/pdf/silex_report.pdf

Gsponer, A., and J-P. Hurni, 2004 “ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Implications of Thermonuclear-Fusion Energy Systems”, Independent Scientific Research Institute report number ISRI-04-01, http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0401110

Harding, Jim, 2004, “Pebble Bed Modular Reactors—Status and Prospects”,
www.rmi.org/sitepages/pid171php#E05-10

Hore-Lacy, Ian, 2000, “The Future of Nuclear Energy”, www.uic.com.au/opinion6.html

ISIS – Institute for Science and International Security, n.d., “Nuclear Weapons Programs Worldwide: An Historical Overview”, www.isis-online.org/mapproject/introduction.html

ISIS – Institute for Science and International Security, 2004, “Civil Plutonium Produced in Power Reactors”, <www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/civil_pu.html>.

Nuclear Weapon Archive, n.d., “Nuclear Weapon Nations and Arsenals”, <nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq7.html>.

UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, November 2004, <www.un.org/secureworld>.

Uranium Information Centre, 2002, “Plutonium”, Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper 18, <www.uic.com.au/nip18.htm>.

von Hippel, Frank, and Suzanne Jones, 1997, “The slow death of the fast breeder”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.53, No.5, September/October.

WISE/NIRS, February 13, 2004, “The Proliferation Risks of ITER”, WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor, #603, https://wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/603/proliferation-risks-iter

Summary: Nuclear Power & Climate Change

There are three main problems with the nuclear “solution” to climate change — it is a blunt instrument, a dangerous one, and it is unnecessary.

First, nuclear power could at most make a modest contribution to climate change abatement. The main limitation is that it is used almost exclusively for electricity generation, which accounts for about 25% of global greenhouse emissions (estimates vary from 16-40%).

The 2006 Switkowski report found that even a major nuclear power program in Australia – 25 reactors by mid-century – would reduce emissions by a modest 17% compared to business-as-usual (assuming nuclear displaces black coal). A more modest (and realistic) program of six power reactors would reduce Australia’s overall emissions by just 4% if they displaced coal or 2% if they displaced gas.

Compared to most renewable energy sources, nuclear power produces more greenhouse emissions per unit of power generated. For example, the 2006 Switkowski report states that nuclear power is three times more greenhouse intensive than wind power. Nuclear power is far more greenhouse intensive than many energy efficiency measures.

Therefore displacing renewables and energy conservation with nuclear power will worsen climate change, as explained by US physicist Amory Lovins: “If climate is a problem, we need the most solution per dollar and the most solution per year. We can get two to 10 times more coal displaced per dollar buying stuff other than nuclear. Every time I spend a dollar on an expensive solution I forgo a lot more that I could have bought of a cheaper solution.”

Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

The second big problem with the nuclear “solution” to climate change is that all nuclear power concepts (including “next generation” concepts) fail to resolve the greatest problem with nuclear power — its repeatedly demonstrated connection to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Not just any old WMDs, but nuclear weapons — the most destructive, indiscriminate and immoral of all weapons.

These risks are not hypothetical – there is already an alarming history of ‘peaceful’ nuclear programs providing the expertise, facilities and materials for nuclear weapons programs. Supposedly ‘peaceful’ nuclear programs have facilitated many nuclear weapons research and production programs. Of the 10 nations to have produced nuclear weapons, five did so under cover of a supposedly peaceful nuclear program – India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa and North Korea. Over 20 countries have used their ‘peaceful’ nuclear facilities for nuclear weapons research.

The greenhouse benefits of a global doubling nuclear power output would be small but the same cannot be said of the proliferation risks. Doubling nuclear output by the middle of the century would require the construction of 800-900 reactors to replace most of the existing cohort of reactors and to build as many again. These reactors would produce over one million tonnes of nuclear waste (in the form of spent fuel) containing enough plutonium to build over one million nuclear weapons.

Nuclear power plants have already produced enough plutonium to build over 160,000 nuclear weapons. Safeguarding this material is the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Yet the outgoing Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, has noted that the IAEA’s basic rights of inspection are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system suffers from “vulnerabilities” and it “clearly needs reinforcement”, that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted”, and that the safeguards system operates on a “shoestring budget … comparable to that of a local police department “.

UNSW academic Dr Mark Diesendorf argues: “On top of the perennial challenges of global poverty and injustice, the two biggest threats facing human civilisation in the 21st century are climate change and nuclear war. It would be absurd to respond to one by increasing the risks of the other. Yet that is what nuclear power does.”

Likewise, former US Vice President Al Gore has summarised the problem: “For eight years in the White House, every weapons-proliferation problem we dealt with was connected to a civilian reactor program. And if we ever got to the point where we wanted to use nuclear reactors to back out a lot of coal … then we’d have to put them in so many places we’d run that proliferation risk right off the reasonability scale.”

Running the proliferation risk off the reasonability scale brings us back to climate change — a connection explained by Alan Robock in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: “As recent work … has shown, we now understand that the atmospheric effects of a nuclear war would last for at least a decade — more than proving the nuclear winter theory of the 1980s correct. By our calculations, a regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan using less than 0.3% of the current global arsenal would produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history and global ozone depletion equal in size to the current hole in the ozone, only spread out globally.”

Nuclear power and climate change

Energy expert Mycle Schneider notes that countries and regions with a high reliance on nuclear power also tend to have high greenhouse emissions:

“The largest generators of nuclear power also have energy sectors with the highest CO2 emissions. Western Europe and the United States produce about two-thirds of the nuclear electricity in the world [yet] their energy sectors also produce 39% of the world’s energy-related CO2 emissions.

“The same analysis applies to overall CO2 emissions per country or region. There is an interesting correlation between nuclear generation and CO2 emissions. The United States alone, [with] less than 5% of the world’s population, accounts for 25% of the world’s total CO2 emissions and generates 29.4% of the world’s nuclear electricity. Western Europe, with only 6.5% of the world’s population accounts for about 15% of global CO2 emissions and 34% of the nuclear power production.

“China is the counter example. With 21.5% of the world’s population, the country emits 13.5% of global CO2 and generates 0.6% of the world’s nuclear power. The example of China illustrates well the potential role of energy efficiency in greenhouse gas abatement. Analysis of developments between 1980 and 1997 shows that while the country reduced its CO2 emissions through penetration of “carbon-free fuel” by hardly more than 10 million tonnes of carbon, the reduction due to energy efficiency measures delivered savings of more than 430 million tonnes of carbon over the same period.”

Mycle Schneider, April 2000, “Climate Change and Nuclear Power”, <www.panda.org/downloads/climate_ change/fullnuclearreprotwwf.pdf>.

Similar points can be made in relation to India. Leonard Weiss, a former staff director of the US Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation, noted in the May/June 2006 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that a concerted program of improved energy efficiency could substitute for all the future power output from nuclear reactors currently being planned in India between 2006 and 2020.

Clean energy solutions

A significant and growing body of scientific literature demonstrates how the systematic deployment of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency policies and technologies can generate major reductions in greenhouse emissions without recourse to nuclear power.

For Australia, a starting point is the study by the Clean Energy Future Group (CEFG). The CEFG proposes an electricity supply scenario which would reduce greenhouse emissions from the electricity sector by 78% by 2040, comprising solar (5%); hydro (7%); coal/petroleum (10%); wind (20%); bioenergy − mostly from crop residues so it is not competing with other land uses (28%); and gas (30%).

The CEFG study is conservative in that it makes no allowance for technological advancement in important areas like solar-with-storage or geothermal power, even over a timeframe of several decades. Recently, Mark Diesendorf, who contributed to the CEFG study, has proposed a more ambitious scenario: “By 2030 it will be technically possible to replace all conventional coal power with the following mixes: wind, bioelectricity and solar thermal each 20 to 30%; solar photovoltaic 10-20%; geothermal 10-20%; and marine (wave, ocean current) 10%. Natural gas too, provided it hasn’t all been sold to China, could be fuelling cogeneration of electricity and heat, trigeneration (electricity, heating and cooling), combined-cycle power stations and back-up for solar hot water, solar thermal electricity and wind power. There is an embarrassment of riches in the non-nuclear alternatives to coal.”

It is a myth that all renewable energy sources are incapable of providing reliable base-load electricity (see briefing paper #16 on the issue of baseload power posted at www.energyscience.org.au/factsheets.html):

* Geothermal ‘hot rocks’ can provide baseload power.

* Bioenergy can provide base-load power.

* Depending on the water source, hydro can provide base-load, intermediate-load or peak-load power.

* Dispersed wind farms with a small amount of back-up (e.g. from gas) can provide base-load power.

* Solar with storage can provide baseload – this is an expensive option at the moment, but an Australian government-funded Cooperative Research Centre reported in 2006 that solar thermal technology “is poised to play a significant role in baseload generation for Australia” and will be cost-competitive with coal within seven years. Solar water heating can reduce demand for baseload supply.

* Energy efficiency and conservation measures can reduce demand for base-, intermediate- and peak-load power.

As Dr Diesendorf notes: “The producers and consumers of fossil fuels, and their supporters among public officials, the Federal Government and CSIRO, are well aware that we already have the technologies to commence a rapid transition to an energy future based on renewable energy and efficient energy, with gas playing the role as an important transitional fuel. The barriers to this transition are not primarily technological or economic, but rather are the immense political power of vested interests.”

More information on the nuclear/greenhouse debate:

See the links page. https://nuclear.foe.org.au/links/
WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor, 25 June 2016, ‘Nuclear power: No solution to climate change’:

https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/806/nuclear-power-no-solution-climate-change

https://wiseinternational.org/sites/default/files/NM806-climate-nuclear.pdf

New Reactor Types – pebble bed, thorium, plutonium, fusion

Jim Green

National nuclear campaigner – Friends of the Earth, Australia

January 2013

Introduction
Generations I-II
Generation III
Generation IV
Pebble Bed Modular Reactor
Plutonium Breeder Reactors
Fusion
Thorium
Further Reading & References

INTRODUCTION

New nuclear reactor types are being promoted with claims that they will produce less nuclear waste than conventional reactors, reduce weapons proliferation risks, and reduce the risk of serious accidents. While there is certainly scope for considerable improvement on all three fronts, the claims should be treated with some scepticism.

It is uncertain whether new reactor types will be developed, with the very large R&D costs being one of the major obstacles. Reactor types with the greatest likelihood of deployment are those which are relatively minor modifications of existing reactor types; as such, any advantages over existing reactors will be marginal.

If new reactor types are developed, they are unlikely to be commercially deployed for some decades (other than those which are minor modifications of existing reactor types).

While new reactor types are being promoted as advantageous in relation to waste, weapons and safety, closer inspection of R&D programs suggests that the primary aim is to lower the cost of nuclear power.

Indicative of this emphasis on improving economic competitiveness is the list of objectives of ‘advanced’ reactor types provided by Hore-Lacy (2003) from the Uranium Information Centre and  the World Nuclear Association:

a standardised design for each type to expedite licensing, reduce capital cost and reduce construction time,
simpler and more rugged design, easier to operate and less vulnerable to operational upsets,
higher availability and longer operating life,
economically competitive in a range of sizes,
further reduce the possibility of core melt accidents, and
higher burn-up to reduce fuel use and the amount of waste.

To the extent that the nuclear power industry is able to improve its cost competitiveness by means other than technological innovation, this will reduce the incentive to develop new reactor types. Methods of improving cost competitiveness in the absence of technological development are:

reducing regulatory requirements and the attendant costs;
the imposition of carbon taxes or other disincentives to the use of fossil fuels; and
further subsidisation of nuclear power e.g. with R&D funding and favourable insurance arrangements such as the US Price Anderson Act.

Improving the economics of nuclear power may come into conflict with the other stated objectives in relation to weapons, waste and safety. Most importantly, there is little reason to believe that minimising proliferation risks will be a priority in the development of new reactor types. A number of the ‘advanced’ reactor concepts being studied involve a ‘closed’ fuel cycle which involves reprocessing and thus the actual or potential separation of weapons-useable plutonium (or weapons-useable uranium-233) from irradiated fuel or targets.

Passive or ‘inherent’ safety systems can improve overall plant safety, such as the use of gravity rather than (failure-prone) pumps to feed coolant into the plant as required. However, overblown and unsubstantiated claims about future reactor designs with (some) passive safety systems has attracted scepticism and cynicism even from within the nuclear industry, with one industry representative quipping that “the paper-moderated, ink-cooled reactor is the safest of all” and noting that “all kinds of unexpected problems may occur after a project has been launched”. (Quoted in Hirsch et al., 2005.)

Importantly, safety depends on social as well as technological factors. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Interdisciplinary Study states: “We do not believe there is a nuclear plant design that is totally risk free. In part, this is due to technical possibilities; in part due to workforce issues. Safe operation requires effective regulation, a management committed to safety, and a skilled work force.” (Ansolabehere et al., 2003, p.9.)

Serious, unresolved problems remain on all three fronts – regulation, management, and workforce skills. The safety culture varies considerably within and between nations operating nuclear power plants. As the MIT study notes: “It is still an open question whether the average performers in the industry have yet incorporated an effective safety culture into their conduct of business.” (Ansolabehere et al., 2003)

The World Nuclear Association (2009) offers this sober view of the development of ‘next generation’ reactors: “There are two worldwide programs to develop next-generation reactors, which both enjoy wide international membership and support. However, progress is seen as slow, and several potential designs have been undergoing evaluation on paper for many years. One initiative is the Generation IV International Forum, consisting of a group of governments; the other is Inpro, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

GENERATIONS I-II

Among commercial nuclear power plant types, four generations of reactors are commonly distinguished.

Generation I were prototype commercial reactors developed in the 1950s and 1960s. They mostly used natural uranium fuel and used graphite as moderator. Most, but not all of them have already been decommissioned although some Magnox reactors are still operating.

The vast majority of the 441 power reactors in commercial operation worldwide today belong to Generation II. They include the following (with parentheses indicating the number in operation, fuel, coolant and moderator)

Pressurized Water Reactors (268 in operation – enriched uranium dioxide fuel – water coolant – water moderator)
Boiling Water Reactors (94 – enriched uranium dioxide – water – water)
Gas-cooled reactors (Magnox and AGR) (23 – natural or enriched uranium – carbon dioxide coolant – graphite moderator)
Graphite Moderated Boiling Water Reactors (12 – enriched uranium dioxide – water – graphite)
Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (40 – natural uranium dioxide – heavy water – heavy water)
Fast Neutron Reactors (4 – plutonium and uranium dioxide – liquid sodium – no moderator).

(For a description of Generation II reactors see World Nuclear Association, 2005. For description and critical analysis, see Hirsch et al., 2005.)

GENERATION III

Throughout the world there are around 20 different concepts for the next generation of reactor design, known as Generation III. Most of them are “evolutionary” designs that have been developed from Generation II reactor types with some modifications. A smaller number of proposed Generation III reactor types are more innovative.

Only in Japan are there any commercial scale reactors of Generation III in operation – the Advanced Boiling Water Reactors, which are modifications of existing reactor types.

The next most advanced design is the European Pressurised Water Reactor, which is being built in Finland and may be also sited in France. According to Hirsch et al. (2005), this design is a slightly modified version of current reactor designs operating in France and Germany, with some improvements, but also with reduction of safety margins and fewer redundancies for some safety systems.

Other examples of Generation III reactor types are: various pressurised water reactor types, the pebble bed modular reactor, boiling water reactors, heavy water reactors, gas cooled reactors, and fast breeder reactors.

Hirsch et al. (2005) conclude that: “All in all, “Generation III” appears as a heterogeneous collection of different reactor concepts. Some are barely evolved from the current Generation II, with modifications aiming primarily at better economics, yet bearing the label of being safer than current reactors in the hope of improving public acceptance. Others are mostly theoretical concepts so far, with a mixture of innovative and conventional features, which are being used to underpin the promise of a safe and bright nuclear future – while also not forgetting about simplification and cost-cutting.”

GENERATION IV

Under the leadership of the US, the “Generation IV International Forum” (GIF) was established in 2000. The GIF also includes Argentina, Brazil, China, Canada, France, Japan, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, the UK, and EURATOM.

A parallel initiative is the IAEA-led International Projects on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), established in 2000. (www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NENP/NPTDS/Projects/INPRO)

Generation IV reactor types generally represent considerable departures from conventional reactor technology. Development to the point of commercial deployment will necessarily involve major financial investments over a period of some decades.

While electricity generation is the primary focus, there is also some interest in the development of reactor types suitable for hydrogen production and nuclear waste treatment.

Currently, there are six reactor designs being considered, including:

Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor System
Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor System
Molten Salt Reactor System
Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactor System
Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor System
Very-High-Temperature Reactor System

Hirsch et al. (2005, p.55) summarise the gap between rhetoric and reality in relation to Generation IV designs: “A closer look at the technical concepts shows that many safety problems are still completely unresolved. Safety improvements in one respect sometimes create new safety problems. And even the Generation IV strategists themselves do not expect significant improvements regarding proliferation resistance. But even real technical improvements that might be feasible in principle are only implemented if their costs are not too high. There is an enormous discrepancy between the catch-words used to describe Generation IV for the media, politicians and the public, and the actual basic driving force behind the initiative, which is economic competitiveness.”

It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe and analyse all of the Generation III and IV reactor types but some of the best-known types are discussed below – the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, plutonium breeder reactors, fusion power, and thorium-powered systems.

PEBBLE BED MODULAR REACTORS (PBMR)

Of the more innovative Generation III reactor types, the best known is the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). (Thomas, 1999; Harding, 2004; Hirsch et al., 2005.)

PBMRs are helium cooled and graphite moderated and intended to be built in small modules. Pressurised helium heated in the reactor core drives turbines that attach to an electrical generator.

While the PBMR is in some respects innovative, it also shares features with high temperature gas cooled reactors (HGTR). The HTGR line has been pursued until the late 80s in several countries; however, only prototype plants were ever operated (in the USA, UK and Germany), all of which were decommissioned after about 12 years of operation at most.

A South African nuclear utility has been at the forefront of developing pebble bed reactors but the project has been postponed indefinitely as a result of economic factors as well as technical factors, some with safety consequences. Unless the South African project is revived, that leaves only China developing pebble bed concepts (with one small prototype operating and one 200 MW ‘demonstration reactor’ planned or in the early stages of construction).

These articles discuss the demise of PBMR technology in South Africa:

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-PBMR_postponed-1109092.html

http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-demise-of-the-pebble-bed-modular-reactor

http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?sectionCode=76&storyCode=2052590

http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?sectioncode=76&storyCode=2052589

PBMR proponents claim major safety advantages resulting from the heat-resistant quality and integrity of the small fuel pebbles, many thousands of which are continuously fed from a silo. Each spherical fuel element has a graphite core embedded with thousands of small fuel particles of enriched uranium (up to 10% uranium-235), encapsulated in layers of carbon.

The safety advantages of PBMR technology include a greater ability to retain fissile products in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. While this configuration is potentially advantageous compared to conventional reactors, it does not altogether avoid the risk of serious accidents; in other words, claims that the system is ‘walk-away safe’ are overblown. The safety advantages can be undermined by familiar commercial pressures; for example there are plans to develop PBMR reactors with no containment building.

In relation to weapons proliferation (Harding, 2004):

The nature of the fuel pebbles may make it somewhat more difficult to separate plutonium from irradiated fuel, but plutonium separation is certainly not impossible.
Uranium (or depleted uranium) targets could be inserted to produce weapon-grade plutonium for weapons, or thorium targets could be inserted to produce uranium-233.
The enriched uranium fuel could be further enriched for weapons – particularly since the proposed enrichment level of 9.6% uranium-235 is about twice the level of conventional reactor fuel.
The reliance on enriched uranium will encourage the use and perhaps proliferation of enrichment plants, which can be used to produce highly-enriched uranium for weapons.

PLUTONIUM BREEDER REACTORS

Fast neutron reactors use plutonium as the primary fuel. They do not require a moderator as the fuel fissions sufficiently with fast neutrons to maintain a chain reaction. The various possible configurations include ‘breeders’ which produce more plutonium than they consume, ‘burners’ which do the reverse, and configurations which both breed and burn plutonium. (World Nuclear Association, 2005B.)

There are various possible configurations of breeder systems. Most rely on irradiation of a natural or depleted uranium blanket which produces plutonium which can be separated and used as fuel. (Hirsch et al., 2005, pp.33-35; von Hippel and Jones, 1997.)

According to the World Nuclear Association (2004), worldwide experience with fast neutron reactors amounts to just 200 reactor-years and only “some” of that experience involves reactors in breeder mode. According to an IAEA scientist, the introduction of breeder reactors into the competitive electricity market is not expected before 2030, at which time breeders are expected to provide 1-2% of nuclear energy output, and this prediction may be “optimistic” (Oi, 1998).

Small breeder R&D programs are ongoing in a few countries (e.g. India, Russia, France) but in other countries the technology has been stalled or abandoned (e.g. the UK, the US, and Germany) or never developed in the first place. Japan’s plans for breeder reactors have been limited and delayed by accidents including the sodium leak and fire at the experimental Monju reactor in 1995. (Leventhal and Dolley, 1999.)

One reason for the limited interest in plutonium breeder power sources has been the cheap, plentiful supply of uranium. That situation may change, but while breeder technology certainly holds out the promise of successfully addressing the problem of limited conventional uranium reserves, it is doubtful whether the wider range of technical, economic, safety and proliferation issues can be successfully addressed.

Breeder technology is highly problematic in relation to proliferation because it involves the large-scale production and separation of plutonium (although separation is not required in some proposed configurations). (Feiveson, 2001.) The proliferation of reprocessing capabilities is a likely outcome.

Interest in breeder and reprocessing technology in South Korea and China is arguably driven in part by concerns over Japan’s plutonium policies (which involve the large-scale separation and stockpiling of plutonium). (Burnie and Smith, 2001.)

FUSION POWER

Fusion fuel – using different isotopes of hydrogen – must be heated to extreme temperatures of some 100 million degrees Celsius, and must be kept dense enough, and confined for long enough to enable fusion to become self-sustaining.

A major fusion R&D program is underway called the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor. (www.iter.org) It involves the European Union, Japan, China, India, South Korea, Russia, and the USA. An experimental plant is to be built at Cadarache in the South of France.

Australian interest in fusion is concentrated in a coalition called the Australian ITER Forum. (www.ansto.gov.au/ainse/fusion/index.html)

Fusion power remains a distant dream. According to the World Nuclear Association (2005C), fusion “presents so far insurmountable scientific and engineering challenges”.

Australian proponents of fusion claim it is “intrinsically clean” and “inherently safe” (Hole and O’Connor, 2006). However, in relation to radioactive waste issues, the World Nuclear Association (2005C) states: “[A]lthough fusion generates no radioactive fission products or transuranic elements and the unburned gases can be treated on site, there would a short-term radioactive waste problem due to activation products. Some component materials will become radioactive during the lifetime of a reactor, due to bombardment with high-energy neutrons, and will eventually become radioactive waste. The volume of such waste would be similar to that due to activation products from a fission reactor. The radiotoxicity of these wastes would be relatively short-lived compared with the actinides (long-lived alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes) from a fission reactor.”

In relation to safety issues, the World Nuclear Association (2005C) points to potential problems identified by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS): “These include the hazard arising from an accident to the magnetic system. The total energy stored in the magnetic field would be similar to that of an average lightning bolt (100 billion joules, equivalent to c45 tonnes of TNT). Attention was also drawn to the possibility of a lithium fire. In contact with air or water lithium burns spontaneously and could release many times that amount of energy. Safety of nuclear fusion is a major issue. But the AAAS was most concerned about the release of tritium into the environment. It is radioactive and very difficult to contain since it can penetrate concrete, rubber and some grades of steel. As an isotope of hydrogen it is easily incorporated into water, making the water itself weakly radioactive. With a half-life of 12.4 years, tritium remains a threat to health for over one hundred years after it is created, as a gas or in water. It can be inhaled, absorbed through the skin or ingested. Inhaled tritium spreads throughout the soft tissues and tritiated water mixes quickly with all the water in the body. The AAAS estimated that each fusion reactor could release up to 2×1012 Bequerels of tritium a day during operation through routine leaks, assuming the best containment systems, much more in a year than the Three Mile Island accident released altogether. An accident would release even more. This is one reason why long-term hopes are for the deuterium-deuterium fusion process, dispensing with tritium.”

Some proponents of fusion falsely claim that fusion power systems pose no risk of contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In fact, there are several risks (Gsponer and Hurni, 2004; WISE/NIRS, 2004; Hirsch et al., 2005):
* The production or supply of tritium which can be diverted for use in boosted nuclear weapons.
* Using neutron radiation to bombard a uranium blanket (leading to the production of fissile plutonium) or a thorium blanket (leading to the production of fissile uranium-233).
* Research in support of a (thermonuclear) weapon program.

Fusion power R&D has already contributed to proliferation problems. According to Khidhir Hamza (1998), a senior nuclear scientist involved in Iraq’s weapons program: “Iraq took full advantage of the IAEA’s recommendation in the mid 1980s to start a plasma physics program for “peaceful” fusion research. We thought that buying a plasma focus device … would provide an excellent cover for buying and learning about fast electronics technology, which could be used to trigger atomic bombs.”

THORIUM

The use of thorium-232 as a reactor fuel is sometimes suggested as a long-term energy source, partly because of its relative abundance compared to uranium.

Some experience has been gained with the use of thorium in power and research reactors – but far less experience than has been gained with conventional uranium reactors. The Uranium Information Centre (2004) states that: “Much development work is still required before the thorium fuel cycle can be commercialised, and the effort required seems unlikely while (or where) abundant uranium is available.”

According to the World Nuclear Association (2006): “Problems include the high cost of fuel fabrication due partly to the high radioactivity of U-233 which is always contaminated with traces of U-232; the similar problems in recycling thorium due to highly radioactive Th-228, some weapons proliferation risk of U-233; and the technical problems (not yet satisfactorily solved) in reprocessing. Much development work is still required before the thorium fuel cycle can be commercialised, and the effort required seems unlikely while (or where) abundant uranium is available.”

Neutron bombardment of thorium (indirectly) produces uranium-233, a fissile material which can be used in nuclear weapons (1 Significant Quantity of U-233 = 8kg).

The USA has successfully tested weapons using uranium-233 cores, and India may have investigated the military use of thorium/uranium-233 in addition to its civil applications.

The proliferation risk is exacerbated with existing and proposed configurations involving uranium-233 separation from irradiated fuel. As the World Nuclear Association (2006) notes: “Given a start with some other fissile material (U-235 or Pu-239), a breeding cycle similar to but more efficient than that with U-238 and plutonium (in slow-neutron reactors) can be set up. The Th-232 absorbs a neutron to become Th-233 which normally decays to protactinium-233 and then U-233. The irradiated fuel can then be unloaded from the reactor, the U-233 separated from the thorium, and fed back into another reactor as part of a closed fuel cycle.”

(A research reactor in India operates on U-233 fuel extracted from thorium which has been irradiated and bred in another reactor.)

The possible use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium to initiate a thorium-232/uranium-233 reaction, or proposed systems using thorium in conjunction with HEU or plutonium as fuel present the risk of diversion of HEU or plutonium for weapons production.

Kang and von Hippel (2001) conclude that “the proliferation resistance of thorium fuel cycles depends very much upon how they are implemented”. For example, the co-production of uranium-232 complicates weapons production but, as Kang and von Hippel note, “just as it is possible to produce weapon-grade plutonium in low-burnup fuel, it is also practical to use heavy-water reactors to produce U-233 containing only a few ppm of U-232 if the thorium is segregated in “target” channels and discharged a few times more frequently than the natural-uranium “driver” fuel.”

See also this webpage on the proliferation risks of thorium: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/thorium-and-wmd-proliferation-risks-2/

A thought for thorium

Nuclear Engineering International, 03 November 2009

www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?sectionCode=76&storyCode=2054564

The question of thorium fuel comes up every so often, says [Albert Machiels, senior technical executive at the USA’s Electric Power Research Institute]. “I really cannot claim that there is a great interest in thorium fuel – it is more a matter of curiosity. …

Experts disagree about whether thorium fuel is more proliferation-resistant than uranium. …

Many in the industry remain sceptical with regard to thorium. Now that uranium infrastructure is in place, developing a thorium fuel cycle is a ‘big risk,’ ‘unnecessary’ and a ‘distraction,’ according to some in the industry.

I put the question to Thorium Power; if thorium fuel is so good why aren’t we using it? Their response:

“Essentially the answer is because the nuclear industry started using UO2 on a large scale first and they’ve had 50 years to improve it and become comfortable with it. Due to a highly conservative nature of nuclear utilities (‘why change something that works just fine’), there has been little incentive for a commercial utility to switch from UO2 fuels even though ThO2-based fuels have many advantages.”

For this reason, if thorium fuel is going to take off it will need to be introduced in light water reactors first, notwithstanding the interesting reactor concepts currently being developed that use thorium. In accelerator-driven systems, or ADS, a particle accelerator knocks neutrons off a heavy element such as mercury, and those neutrons cause thorium to breed fissile uranium- 233. In molten salt reactors, thorium dissolved in a 650°C fluoride salt coolant breeds uranium-233, which undergoes fission.

“ADS and breeder reactors, such as molten-salt reactors, are so far in the future that if thorium has to wait for one of those developments it’s not going to happen. The point of entry must be the existing infrastructure, at least for the United States,” Machiels says.

Comparison of thorium and uranium fuel cycles

UK National Nuclear Laboratory Ltd.

A report prepared for and on behalf of Department of Energy and Climate Change

Issue 5, 5 Mar 2012

http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/meeting-energy-demand/nuclear/6300-comparison-fuel-cycles.pdf

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

REFERENCES

Ansolabehere, Stephen, et al., 2003, “The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study”, web.mit.edu/nuclearpower
Burnie, Shaun and Aileen Mioko Smith, May/June 2001, “Japan’s nuclear twilight zone”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 57, no.03, pp.58-62, www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=mj01burnie
Feiveson, Harold, 2001, “The Search for Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power”, The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, September/October 2001, Volume 54, Number 5, www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n5/nuclear.htm
Friedman, John S., 1997, “More power to thorium?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No.5, September/October
Gsponer, A., and J-P. Hurni, 2004 “ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Implications of Thermonuclear-Fusion Energy Systems”, Independent Scientific Research Institute report number ISRI-04-01, http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0401110
Harding, Jim, 2004, “Pebble Bed Modular Reactors—Status and Prospects “, www.rmi.org/sitepages/pid171php#E05-10
Hamza, Khidhir, 1998, “Inside Saddam’s secret nuclear program”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October, Vol.54, No.5, www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=so98hamza
Hirsch, Helmut, Oda Becker, Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, April 2005, “Nuclear Reactor Hazards: Ongoing Dangers of Operating Nuclear Technology in the 21st Century”, Report prepared for Greenpeace International, www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/nuclearreactorhazards
Hole, Matthew and John O’Connor, June 8, 2006, ” Australia needs to get back to the front on fusion power”, www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/we-need-to-get-back-to-the-front-on-fusion/2006/06/07/1149359815047.html
Hore-Lacy, Ian, 2003, Nuclear Electricity, published by: Uranium Information Centre Ltd and World Nuclear Association, Seventh edition, www.world-nuclear.org/education/ne/ne4.htm#4.3
Kang, Jungmin, and Frank N. von Hippel, 2001, “U-232 and the Proliferation-Resistance of U-233 in Spent Fuel”, Science & Global Security, Volume 9, pp 1-32, www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/pdf/9_1kang.pdf
Leventhal, Paul, and Steven Dolley, 1999, “The Reprocessing Fallacy: An Update”, presented to Waste Management 99 Conference, Tucson, Arizona, March 1, 1999, www.nci.org/p/pl-wm99.htm
Oi, Noboru, March 1998, “Plutonium Challenges: Changing Dimensions of Global Cooperation”, IAEA Bulletin, www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull401/article3.html
Thomas, Steve, 1999, “Arguments on the Construction of Pebble Bed Modular Reactors in South Africa”, www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/environment/research/pbmr.html
Uranium Information Centre, 2004, “Thorium”, Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper # 67, November, www.uic.com.au/nip67.htm
von Hippel, Frank, and Suzanne Jones, 1997, “The slow death of the fast breeder”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.53, No.5, September/October.
WISE/NIRS, February 13, 2004, “The Proliferation Risks of ITER”, WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor, #603, www.antenna.nl/wise/603/index.php
World Nuclear Association, January 2004, “Energy Analysis of Power Systems”, world-nuclear.org/info/printable_information_papers/inf11print.htm
World Nuclear Association, 2005, “Nuclear Power Reactors”, www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf32.htm
World Nuclear Association, 2005B, “Fast Neutron Reactors”, www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf98.htm
World Nuclear Association, 2005C, “Nuclear Fusion Power”, www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf66.htm
World Nuclear Association, 2006, “Thorium”, www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf62.htm
World Nuclear Association, 15 December 2009, ‘Fast moves? Not exactly…’, www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_France_puts_into_future_nuclear_1512091.html

Integral Fast Reactors

Notes by Jim Green jim.green@foe.org.au

Why would anyone want to know about IFRs?

Because well-known climate scientist James Hansen is promoting them (and an Australian scientist, Barry Brook). Australian nuclear lobbyist Ben Heard (whose lobby group ‘Bright New World’ accepts secret corporate donations) led a united push to develop IFRs during the 2015-16 SA Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission. To its credit, the Royal Commission flatly rejected their arguments, stating that “fast reactors or reactors with other innovative designs are unlikely to be feasible or viable in South Australia in the foreseeable future. No licensed and commercially proven design is currently operating. Development to that point would require substantial capital investment. Moreover, the electricity generated has not been demonstrated to be cost-competitive with current light water reactor designs.”

Barry Brook, Tom Blees et al.

Some of the comments below (re Barry Brook, Tom Blees and George Stanford) refer to comments posted at the Brave New Climate BNC blog/website:

* http://bravenewclimate.com/2009/02/12/integral-fast-reactors-for-the-masses

* http://bravenewclimate.com/2009/02/21/response-to-an-integral-fast-reactor-ifr-critique

The second of those webpages is a critique of an earlier version of this FoE webpage. Sadly, there’s nothing in the critique which allays concerns about IFR and WMD proliferation and nothing on proliferation risks that hasn’t already been addressed in this FoE webpage.

Here’s a letter which sums up some concerns:

Old-style spin
Letter published in The Advertiser, 18 Nov 2009
BARRY Brook promotes what he optimistically labels “next generation” reactors with old-style spin (“Follow Britain’s lead on nuclear power”, The Advertiser, 10/11/09).
For example, he repeatedly has claimed the non-existent “integral fast reactors” he champions “cannot be used to generate weapons-grade material”. Unfortunately, that simply is not true. Worse still, Brook persists with that claim although he knows it has been contradicted by, among others, a scientist with hands-on experience working on a prototype integral fast reactor in the US.
Brook and other promoters of “next generation” reactors have another credibility problem. They acknowledge the need for a rigorous safeguards system to prevent the use of peaceful nuclear facilities to produce weapons of mass destruction, and they acknowledge the existing safeguards fall well short of being rigorous.
None of them, however, is willing to get off his backside to support important, ongoing efforts to strengthen safeguards. This simply is irresponsible. Moreover, it is hypocritical for Brook to criticise Friends of the Earth and other groups which have worked long and hard to strengthen safeguards – with absolutely no help from such people as him.
Brook also berates Friends of the Earth for failing to acknowledge “technological developments that solve the long-lived nuclear waste problem”. Those developments, however, involve another non-existent technology, called pyroprocessing.
South Korea recently announced its intention to embark on a research and development program which aims to provide a “demonstration” of the viability of operating reactors in conjunction with pyroprocessing by the year 2028. That is almost 20 years – just to demonstrate the concept.
Brook offers nothing but false and extravagant claims based on non-existent technology. We deserve better.
Jim Green, Friends of the Earth, Melbourne, VIC.

What are IFRs?

* reactors proposed to be fuelled by a metallic alloy of uranium and plutonium. ‘Fast’ because they use ‘fast’ unmoderated neutrons.

* coolant: liquid sodium

* electrolytic ‘pyroprocessing’ to separate actinides/transuranics (inc plutonium) from spent fuel and to re-irradiate (both as an additional energy source and to convert long-lived waste products into shorter-lived, less problematic radioactive wastes).

Pyroprocessing is troubled / failed technology – see this 2017 article by physicist Dr Ed Lyman.

Here is one description of pyroprocessing:

“Pyroprocessing differs completely from conventional spent fuel reprocessing (and its associated proliferation dangers) because it doesn’t produce a pure stream of separated plutonium. In pyroprocessing, spent fuel is cut into pieces, heated, and turned into a powder. This process burns off volatile fission products such as krypton and xenon as well as some semi-volatile fission products such as iodine and cesium. (The hotter the process, the more is burned off.) The powder is then transformed into a metal and placed in a molten bath of lithium and potassium chloride salts. An electric current is run through the bath to dissolve the radioactive metal and to separate its elements in several stages, beginning with the recovery of uranium. This operation continues until the concentration of transuranics (plutonium, neptunium, americium, and curium) in the molten salt reaches a level where they also can be separated from the bath, along with a significant amount of fission products (cerium, neodymium, and lanthanum). It then can be directly refabricated into metallic fuel for use in fast reactors without any further processing or purification.”

http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/why-south-korea-needs-pyroprocessing

Here is another description of pyroprocessing:

The pyrometallurgical process (“pyro” for short) extracts from used fuel a mix of transuranic elements instead of pure plutonium, as in the PUREX route. It is based on electroplating— using electricity to collect, on a conducting metal electrode, metal extracted as ions from a chemical bath. Its name derives from the high temperatures to which the metals must be subjected during the procedure. Two similar approaches have been developed, one in the U.S., the other in Russia. The major difference is that the Russians process ceramic (oxide) fuel, whereas the fuel in an ALMR is metallic.

In the American pyroprocess, technicians dissolve spent metallic fuel in a chemical bath. Then a strong electric current selectively collects the plutonium and the other transuranic elements on an electrode, along with some of the fission products and much of the uranium. Most of the fission products and some of the uranium remain in the bath. When a full batch is amassed, operators remove the electrode. Next they scrape the accumulated materials off the electrode, melt them down, cast them into an ingot and pass the ingot to a refabrication line for conversion into fast-reactor fuel. When the bath becomes saturated with fission products, technicians clean the solvent and process the extracted fission products for permanent disposal.

Thus, unlike the current PUREX method, the pyroprocess collects virtually all the transuranic elements (including the plutonium), with considerable carryover of uranium and fission products. Only a very small portion of the transuranic component ends up in the final waste stream, which reduces the needed isolation time drastically. The combination of fission products and transuranics is unsuited for weapons or even for thermal-reactor fuel. This mixture is, however, not only tolerable but advantageous for fueling fast reactors.

Although pyrometallurgical recycling technology is not quite ready for immediate commercial use, researchers have demonstrated its basic principles. It has been successfully demonstrated on a pilot level in operating power plants, both in the U.S. and in Russia. It has not yet functioned, however, on a full production scale.

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=smarter-use-of-nuclear-waste&print=true

DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF IFR COMPONENTS

Complete IFR systems don’t exist.

Blees cites five reactors with some IFR characteristics.

Brook gives this summary of the state of development of IFR components: “IFRs are sodium-cooled fast spectrum nuclear power stations with on-site pyroprocessing to recycle spent fuel. Fast spectrum power reactors exist … Indeed, even sodium-cooled fast reactors (a type of Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor, ALMR), the type an IFR facility would likely use, already exist (others include lead- or gas-cooled). Metallic alloy fuels (uranium-plutonium-zirconium), operating within a reactor, existed, in the Experimental Breeder Reactor II at the Argonne National Laboratory. Just because they are not currently used in any operating nuclear power plant doesn’t mean they don’t (haven’t) existed). The only thing that doesn’t currently exist is the full systems design of the integrated plant.”

In short:

* Fast neutron reactors (breeders) exist but experience is limited and they have had a troubled history (accidents, and their WMD proliferation potential).

* The pyroprocessing and transmutation technologies intended to operate as part of IFR systems are some considerable distance from being mature. See the references below for further discussion.

* South Korea is investigating IFRs but plans to spend the next 18-19 YEARS just to ASSESS their viability.

For a properly functioning IFR system, the individual components would need to work and the components would need to be integrated, with potential technical and social obstacles. For example, there’s no point having the capacity to irradiate significant quantities of fissile material from outside sources if states and/or nuclear utilities won’t surrender fissile material or if IFR operators don’t want to irradiate outside sources of fissile material. And its no good overcoming those potential social obstacles if the technology doesn’t meet its proponents’ expectations.

The possibilities are endless, e.g.:

* Pyroprocessing is scrapped in favour of conventional reprocessing.

* IFRs are rolled out in the absence of rigorous international safeguards.

* The potential non-proliferation benefits of IFR are not realised because they are not used to irradiate outside sources of fissile material to any degree.

* IFR proponents envisage each IFR reactor having on-site pyroprocessing (thus minimising transportation of nuclear materials and the attendant risks of accidents, terrorism etc) but one can readily imagine centralised processing facilities being preferred on economic grounds.

The MOX plant and the THORP reprocessing plant at Sellafield (UK) provide two recent examples of nuclear plants which have been conspicuous failures despite considerable historical experience with the basic technology, despite the UK’s lengthy and extensive experience with many facets of nuclear technology, and despite the UK’s relative economic strength and relative technological/industrial strength.

Potential advantages of IFRs

IFRs would breed their own fuel (plutonium) and would therefore not be dependent on outside fuel sources (e.g. uranium) except for the initial fuel load. Hence less demand for uranium with its attendant problems (finite resource, social and environmental impacts of uranium mining) and less demand for enrichment and thus enrichment plants.

Recycling of plutonium extracts more energy, and gets rid of the plutonium with its attendant proliferation risks.All the above could potentially be achieved with conventional reprocessing and plutonium use in MOX (uranium/plutonium) reactors or fast neutron reactors. IFR offers one further potential advantage: irradiating long-lived waste radionuclides, which wouldn’t produce any extra energy but it would convert (some/most) long-lived radionuclides into shorter-lived radionuclides.

PROBLEMS WITH IFRs

IFRs and WMD PROLIFERATION

IFRs can be used to produce plutonium for weapons in the same ways that conventional reactors can:

1. Production of weapon grade plutonium in the fuel, using a shorter-than-usual irradiation time. As George Stanford notes, proliferators “could do [with IFRs] what they could do with any other reactor – operate it on a special cycle to produce good quality weapons material.”

Conventional PUREX reprocessing can be used to separate the plutonium from irradiated fuel/targets/blanket. Blees notes that: “IFRs are certainly not the panacea that removes all threat of proliferation, and extracting plutonium from it would require the same sort of techniques as extracting it from spent fuel from light water reactors. The bottom line is that fissile material has to be subject to oversight …”

Another option is to separate reactor grade plutonium from IFR fuel and to use that in weapons instead of weapon grade plutonium.

2. Production of weapon grade plutonium by irradiating a uranium or depleted uranium targets/blanket, and separation using PUREX reprocessing. Unlike research reactors, power reactors aren’t generally designed to facilitate the insertion and removal of targets/blankets, but where there’s a will there’s a way.

As with conventional reactors, IFRs can be used to produce large quantities of fissile material for nuclear weapons, which must weigh very heavily against them in any rational comparative assessment of energy options. Whether IFRs are somewhat more or less proliferation resistant than conventional reactors is a marginal debate.

IFR advocates propose using IFRs to draw down global stockpiles of fissile material, whether derived from nuclear research, power or WMD programs. Well and good, but reprocessing/MOX/breeders promised the same thing but have demonstrably increased rather than decreased proliferation risks (discussed later). Some specific problems:

* WMD proliferators won’t use IFR to draw down stockpiles of their own fissile material let alone anyone else’s. They will use them to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.

* The proposal confronts the familiar problem that the countries with the greatest interest in WMD production will be the least likely to forfeit fissile material stockpiles and vice versa.

* The proposal may (or may not) also face practical limitations. Numerous states/utilities etc would gladly get rid of their stockpiles of spent fuel (and perhaps other nuclear materials), but what is the incentive for the operators of IFR plants to irradiate/transmute/destroy nuclear materials produced elsewhere and what are the costs/risks of so doing? Presumably the incentive is financial, in which case what’s the cost and who’s paying?

Brook says “The net effect of the IFR will be reduced availability of bomb material worldwide. What is your solution to eliminating the existing stockpiles if it is not via fission transmutation?” In response:

* IFRs could be used to get rid of fissile material from outside sources but that doesn’t mean they necessarily will (except for their initial fuel load).

* Whatever benefits arise from the consumption of outside sources of fissile material must be weighed against the problem that IFRs could themselves be used to produce fissile material for weapons.

* If it seems unduly pessimistic to be suggesting a neutral or negative effect on non-proliferation grounds, witness the increased proliferation risks from reprocessing/MOX/breeders – systems which were also meant to reduce proliferation risks by consuming fissile material.

* Stopping / minimising the production of fissile material is obviously the single most important step forward. As for stockpiles, all the options are problematic.

* Plutonium should be left in spent fuel because spent fuel provides the best protection against diversion (radioactivity and heat).

The intention is to avoid separating plutonium from irradiated IFR fuel except in a stream that incorporates the plutonium with a waste stream (which is preferable to conventional PUREX reprocessing). This would be unsuitable for nuclear weapons. However:

* the plutonium could be separated from the waste radionuclides with further reprocessing (using conventional PUREX reprocessing).

* the plutonium/waste stream would be suitable for use in ‘dirty bombs’.

Blees says: “Spent LWR [light water reactor] fuel can be put through a PUREX process to extract virtually pure plutonium, though its isotopic composition will be far less than ideal for weapons.” Reactor grade plutonium, whatever its source (LWR, IFR etc), can be used for weapons even though it is less than ideal.

This paper:

Proliferation Resistance Assessment Of The Integral Fast Reactor

Harold F. McFarlane, Argonne National Laboratory

www.ipd.anl.gov/anlpubs/2002/07/43534.pdf

includes the acknowledgment that

“The reactor … could be used for excess plutonium consumption or as a breeder if needed …”

and acknowledges uncertainties and proliferation risks:

“The key to objectively assessing the proliferation resistance of the IFR concept is to recall that much of what Bengelsdorf and Wymer said years ago still pertains in large measure today, i.e., that some elements of the technology still remain to be developed and demonstrated. The reactor aside, neither the recovery of transuranics from the molten salt system nor the remote fabrication of fuel has been demonstrated. Even the concept for transuranic recovery has evolved through two generations since those early assessments were done. For every chemist worried about degradation of proliferation-resistant characteristics, there is another worried about obtaining a product sufficiently decontaminated to be useful in fuel fabrication. The assessment of this fuel cycle should be an ongoing analysis that keeps up with the research rather than one based on the presumptions of either the advocates or the critics.”

Proponents of IFR paper over the cracks in their arguments by imagining, in Blees’ words, “rigorous international oversight” to prevent misuse of IFR for WMD production. But there is no rigorous international oversight. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, has noted that the IAEA’s basic rights of inspection are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system suffers from “vulnerabilities” and it “clearly needs reinforcement”, that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted”, and that the safeguards system operates on a “shoestring budget … comparable to that of a local police department “.

IFR advocates acknowledge the need for a rigorous safeguards system (and implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the WMD potential of IFR), but there’s no evidence of them getting off their backsides to engage in the laborious task of trying to bring about improvements in safeguards.

Do IFR advocates accept the need for a rigorous safeguards system to be in place before a large-scale IFR roll-out? What is their timeframe for the establishment of a rigorous safeguards system? How do they propose to hasten progress, which has to date been painfully slow?

Another argument from IFR advocates is to explicitly or implicitly acknowledge the WMD potential of IFR but to argue that proliferators would most likely find a simpler method to produce fissile material for bombs. Blees says: “In point of fact, anyone hoping to make a bomb from plutonium will likely try to obtain an isotopically more pure plutonium by creating it from U-238 at a small research reactor.”

But IFR can be used to produce isotopically pure (weapon grade) plutonium, either in the fuel or targets/blanket. As for using a research reactor instead of IFR, proliferators might do just that, depending on the options available to them. Historically, would-be weapons states have simultaneously pursued multiple different methods/technologies e.g. R&D into both plutonium and highly-enriched uranium production, and diversifying fissile material production sources. For example, India has for decades operated research reactors to produce a reliable supply of fissile material for weapons, but India nevertheless uses its uranium/plutonium/thorium power program to further its WMD program (as evidenced by its refusal to allow safeguards to be applied to numerous reactors).

Another variable is how much fissile material is wanted – if a large amount, then power reactors (inc IFR) will be favoured over research reactors (see the debate between Fainberg and Holdren in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1983, January and May editions).

As an aside, a large number of research reactors exist which are too small (<1MWt) to produce Significant Quantities of plutonium – though perhaps over a long period of time they could produce enough plutonium for one weapon.

Blees says: “As for breeding high-quality … plutonium, virtually any reactor (including research reactors) can do that by wrapping a U-238 blanket around the core and letting it get bombarded with neutrons for a while, then removing it and extracting the Pu with the PUREX method. It requires relatively brief exposure, which is NOT what one would have in a reactor core operated for power purposes.”

Thus we have an (implicit) acknowledgement from Blees (if any was needed) that IFR can produce high purity, weapon grade plutonium. And we have the problem that weapons proliferators simply won’t use IFR as Blees would want them to, i.e. they will use IFR to produce plutonium for weapons regardless of the implications for power generation. The same argument applies to irradiated fuel – IFR proponents want plutonium to be separated from irradiated fuel in a mixed plutonium/waste stream but proliferators will use standard PUREX reprocessing to separate the plutonium for use in weapons. The same argument applies to breeders vs burners, as mentioned above – IFR proponents would use IFR to draw down plutonium stockpiles, proliferators will use them to increase plutonium stockpiles. So on at least three counts, IFR proponents are making implausible claims about the likely use of IFR by WMD proliferators, and papering over the remaining cracks in their arguments by imagining “rigorous international oversight”.

Blees offers this: “Almost 80% of greenhouse gas emissions come from nuclear-capable countries anyway …” Brook says: “If you deploy IFRs … first in nuclear club countries – those that already possess, or are capable of making, nuclear weapons, then there is no additional proliferation risk.” However:

* in weapons states or weapons-capable states, IFR could facilitate vertical proliferation, which in turn motivates horizontal proliferation.

* why would Brook’s proposal not be rejected or seriously curtailed as with every other proposal for selective deployment of (‘sensitive’) ‘civil’ nuclear technologies?

* are we to assume that the current weapons capable/incapable status of all countries is locked in forever (which is both unlikely and problematic)? Will countries that obtain weapons-capable status then be given the option of IFR technology? Couldn’t that (if only marginally) encourage states to develop a nuclear weapons capability? Will countries that move in the opposite direction be asked/forced to abandon their IFR programs and couldn’t that (if only marginally) discourage disarmament?

So we begin with IFR rhetoric including the claim that they are proliferation resistant, but we’re left with the argument that, to paraphrase, IFR can in fact be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons – but so can other reactor types, and in any case some countries already have nuclear weapons.

Blees trots out the tired old lie that: “Every country that’s developed nuclear weapons has done so separately from, and usually prior to, nuclear power program development.” In a few countries, power reactors have been directly involved in WMD programs. In numerous countries, power programs have indirectly facilitated WMD programs – these links are no less important for being indirect. The links between nuclear power and weapons are detailed at https://nuclear.foe.org.au/power-weapons/. To give some sense of the scale of the problem, of the 60+ countries to have developed a nuclear industry of some significance (including power and/or research reactors), over 20 have used their ‘peaceful’ nuclear facilities for some level of WMD research and/or production. Of the 10 states to have built nuclear weapons, five did so on the back of their ‘peaceful’ nuclear programs:

* Pakistan and South Africa by misusing enrichment expertise/technology acquired ostensibly for their power programs.

* India using research reactors to produce plutonium and, later, using its uranium/plutonium/thorium power program in support of its WMD program.

* Israel using a research reactor.

* North Korea using a so-called ‘Experimental Power Reactor’ to produce plutonium for bombs.

Conventional reprocessing with plutonium and uranium use/reuse in MOX and/or breeders held the same promise as IFR – reducing proliferation risks by getting rid of plutonium once and for all (as well as other potential advantages, namely reducing demand for uranium and partially addressing waste management problems). In practice, the result has been very little use of plutonium or recycled uranium, but very extensive stockpiling of plutonium separated from spent fuel. Proliferation risks have been increased not reduced because the separated plutonium can be used directly in weapons. Global stockpiles of separated civil plutonium amount to 270+ tonnes and counting – enough for 27,000 nuclear weapons. That problem is alarming because of its scale, because it is so completely unnecessary and indefensible, and because its resolution could hardly be simpler – suspending or reducing the rate of reprocessing such that plutonium stockpiles are drawn down rather than continually increasing.

IFR advocates demonstrate little or no understanding of the realpolitik imposed by the strife of commercial, political and military interests responsible for, amongst other things, unnecessarily creating the problem of 270+ tonnes of separated civil plutonium and failing to take the simplest steps to address the problem.

Blees says “Nuclear power isn’t going to go away, like it or not. Wouldn’t it be far more effective to work for an international regime and the safest, most proliferation-resistant design of nuclear power plant to be standardized and deployed under comprehensive and dependable supervision.” Anti-nuclear people/NGOs have a long history of working to improve safeguards even though that work implicitly acknowledges ongoing operation of nuclear facilities. IFR advocates have, by and large, abstained from that laborious work and are therefore, by and large:

* irresponsible in their actions (promoting dual use technology but failing to take responsibility for the WMD proliferation risks)

* hypocritical in their criticisms of opponents of nuclear power / IFR.

As for Blees’ comment that nuclear power isn’t going to go away, everyone would agree that nuclear power is likely to be around for some decades at least, like it or not. Beyond Blees’ banal observation, the future of nuclear power is of course contested and uncertain.

WASTE

IFR still produces radioactive waste – albeit (in theory) a more manageable waste stream than conventional reactors. But to lessen the long-term hazards, the short-term public health, environmental and proliferation risks are increased through reprocessing, plutonium recycling etc. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Interdisciplinary Study states that:

“Decisions about partitioning and transmutation must … consider the incremental economic costs and safety, environmental, and proliferation risks of introducing the additional fuel cycle stages and facilities necessary for the task. These activities will be a source of additional risk to those working in the plants, as well as the general public, and will also generate considerable volumes of non-high-level waste contaminated with significant quantities of transuranics. Much of this waste, because of its long toxic lifetime, will ultimately need to be disposed of in high-level waste repositories. Moreover, even the most economical partitioning and transmutation schemes are likely to add significantly to the cost of the once-through fuel cycle.”

Ansolabehere, Stephen, et al., 2003, “The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study”, web.mit.edu/nuclearpower

SAFETY

Brook says IFR reactors would be “safe from melt down”. But technologies fail, and well-intentioned humans err. And even if we generously assume that safety mechanisms will certainly prevent a serious accident, there’s still the problem of sabotage or outside attack resulting in a large release of radioactivity.

Easy to make wild claims about non-existent reactors since such claims cannot be tested or disproved. As a nuclear industry representative has noted about non-existent reactor types: “We know that the paper-moderated, ink-cooled reactor is the safest of all. All kinds of unexpected problems may occur after a project has been launched.”

Australian nuclear engineer Tony Wood notes that probabilistic risk assessment failed to anticipate the world’s worst reactor accident (Chernobyl) and the worst reactor accidents in the UK (Windscale) and the USA (Three Mile Island).

In response, Blees says: “And this one’s a doozy: “…probabilistic risk assessment failed to anticipate the world’s worst reactor accident (Chernobyl)…”” But as mentioned it is simply a statement from a nuclear engineer – a statement Blees does not dispute.

MORE INFO ON REPROCESSING, TRANSMUTATION etc.

* briefing papers on GNEP and new reactor types at www.energyscience.org.au

* Hisham Zerriffi and Annie Makhijani, August 2000, The Nuclear Alchemy Gamble: An Assessment of Transmutation as a Nuclear Waste Management Strategy, www.ieer.org/reports/transm/report.pdf

* Arjun Makhijani, Hisham Zerriffi and Annie Makhijani, “Magical Thinking: another go at transmutation”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2001, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 34-41.

* The more ambitious aspects of GNEP were deprioritised under the Bush presidency and that will continue under Obama: Past, present and future: Who’s voting for GNEP?, August 01, 2008, www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?sectioncode=188&storyCode=2050691

* The future of GNEP www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/reports/the-future-of-gnep

How to make nuclear power safe in 5 easy steps!

Jim Green, 2007

National nuclear campaigner – Friends of the Earth, Australia

Acknowledge immediate deaths that were undoubtedly caused by a nuclear accident. Ignore long-term deaths from exposure to lower levels of radiation. For example, immediate deaths from Chernobyl were about 50, credible estimates of long-term deaths range from 9,000 to 93,000.
Consider nuclear power reactor accidents and ignore the impacts of accidents across the nuclear fuel cycle, e.g. serious and sometimes fatal accidents at uranium mines, uranium enrichment plants, reprocessing plants etc.
Ignore the greatest danger of nuclear power, a problem that is unique among energy sources – its direct and repeatedly-demonstrated connection to the production of nuclear weapons.
Make wild claims about the safety of ‘new generation’ reactors. Impossible to prove or disprove these claims, since the new reactors exist only as designs on paper. One cynic from within the nuclear industry has quipped that “the paper-moderated, ink-cooled reactor is the safest of all.”
And, among many other ways to ‘prove’ the safety of the nuclear industry, claim that a nuclear accident did not effect any member of the ‘community’… without mentioning that a number of nuclear industry workers were harmed or killed. For example, the Lucas Heights nuclear agency ANSTO pretends that no research reactor accident has ever harmed a member of the surrounding community, which is a disingenuous way of avoiding mention of five or six fatal research reactor accidents that have killed workers.

The Death Toll from Chernobyl – how can there be such disagreement?

Jim Green − national nuclear campaigner, Friends of the Earth, Australia

April 2014

The never-ending debate over the Chernobyl cancer death toll turns on the broader debate over the health effects of low-level radiation exposure.

The overwhelming weight of scientific opinion holds that there is no threshold below which ionising radiation poses no risk. Uncertainties will always persist. In circumstances where people are exposed to low-level radiation, public health (epidemiological) studies are unlikely to be able to demonstrate a statistically-significant increase in cancer rates. Cancers are common diseases and most are multi-causal. Other complications include the long latency period for some cancers; and limited or uneven data on cancer incidence and mortality. The upshot is that cancer incidence and mortality statistics are being pushed up and down by a myriad of factors at any point in time and it becomes impossible or near-impossible to isolate any one factor.

While the overwhelming weight of scientific opinion holds that there is no threshold below which radiation exposure is harmless, there is less scientific confidence about how to quantify the risks. Risk estimates for low-level radiation exposure are typically based on a linear extrapolation of better-understood risks from higher levels of exposure.

This ‘Linear No Threshold’ (LNT) model has some heavy-hitting scientific support. For example a report in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences states: “Given that it is supported by experimentally grounded, quantifiable, biophysical arguments, a linear extrapolation of cancer risks from intermediate to very low doses currently appears to be the most appropriate methodology.”¹ Likewise, the 2006 report of the US National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionising Radiation (BEIR) states that “the risk of cancer proceeds in a linear fashion at lower doses without a threshold and … the smallest dose has the potential to cause a small increase in risk to humans.”²

Nonetheless, there is uncertainty with the LNT model at low doses and dose rates. The BEIR report makes the important point that the true risks may be lower or higher than predicted by LNT − a point that needs emphasis and constant repetition because nuclear apologists routinely conflate uncertainty with zero risk. That conflation is never explained or justified; it is simply dishonest.

The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and the International Commission on Radiological Protection recommend against using collective dose figures and risk estimates to estimate total deaths. The problem with that recommendation is that there is simply no other way to arrive at an estimate of the death toll from Chernobyl (or Fukushima, or routine emissions from the nuclear fuel cycle, or weapons tests, or background radiation, etc).

Indeed UNSCEAR itself (PDF) co-authored a report which cites an estimate from an international expert group − based on collective dose figures and risk estimates − of around 4,000 long-term cancer deaths among the people who received the highest radiation doses from Chernobyl.³ And UNSCEAR doesn’t claim that low-level radiation exposure is harmless − its 2010 report states that “the current balance of available evidence tends to favour a non-threshold response for the mutational component of radiation-associated cancer induction at low doses and low dose rates.”⁴

The view that low-level radiation is harmless is restricted to a small number of scientists whose voice is greatly amplified by the nuclear industry (in much the same way as corporate greenhouse polluters and their politicians amplify the voices of climate science sceptics). In Australia, for example, uranium mining and exploration companies such as Cameco, Toro Energy, Uranium One and Heathgate Resources have sponsored speaking tours by Canadian junk scientist Doug Boreham, who claims that low-level radiation exposure is beneficial to human health. Medical doctors have registered opposition to this dangerous quackery and collusion.⁵

About 50 people died in the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. Beyond that, studies generally don’t indicate a significant increase in cancer incidence in populations exposed to Chernobyl fallout. Nor would anyone expect them to because of the data gaps and methodological problems mentioned above, and because the main part of the problem concerns the exposure of millions of people to low doses of radiation from Chernobyl fallout.

For a few fringe scientists and nuclear industry insiders and apologists, that’s the end of the matter – the statistical evidence is lacking and thus the death toll from Chernobyl was just 50. (If they were being honest, they would note an additional, unknown death toll from cancer and from other radiation-linked diseases including cardiovascular disease). But for those of us who prefer mainstream science, we can still arrive at a scientifically defensible estimate of the Chernobyl death toll by using estimates of the total radiation exposure, and multiplying by an appropriate risk estimate.

The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates a total collective dose of 600,000 person-Sieverts over 50 years from Chernobyl fallout.⁶ Applying the LNT risk estimate of 0.10 fatal cancers per Sievert gives an estimate of 60,000 deaths. Sometimes a risk estimate of 0.05 is used to account for the possibility of decreased risks at low doses and/or dose rates (in other words, 0.05 is the risk estimate when applying a ‘dose and dose rate effectiveness factor’ or DDREF of two). That gives an estimate of 30,000 deaths.

On the other hand, LNT may underestimate risks. The BEIR report states that “combined analyses are compatible with a range of possibilities, from a reduction of risk at low doses to risks twice those upon which current radiation protection recommendations are based.” Likewise the BEIR report states: “The committee recognizes that its risk estimates become more uncertain when applied to very low doses. Departures from a linear model at low doses, however, could either increase or decrease the risk per unit dose.” So the true death toll could be lower or higher than the LNT-derived estimate of 60,000 deaths.

A number of studies apply that basic method − based on collective radiation doses and risk estimates − and come up with estimates of the Chernobyl cancer death toll varying from 9,000 (in the most contaminated parts of the former Soviet Union) to 93,000 deaths (across Europe).

UN reports in 2005-06 estimated up to 4,000 eventual deaths among the higher-exposed Chernobyl populations (emergency workers from 1986−1987, evacuees and residents of the most contaminated areas) and an additional 5,000 deaths among populations exposed to lower doses in Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.⁷

The estimated death toll rises further when populations beyond those three countries are included. For example, a study by Cardis et al reported in the International Journal of Cancer estimates 16,000 deaths.⁸ Dr Elisabeth Cardis, head of the Radiation Group at the World Health Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer, said: “By 2065 (i.e. in the eighty years following the accident), predictions based on these models indicate that about 16,000 cases of thyroid cancer and 25,000 cases of other cancers may be expected due to radiation from the accident and that about 16,000 deaths from these cancers may occur. About two-thirds of the thyroid cancer cases and at least one half of the other cancers are expected to occur in Belarus, Ukraine and the most contaminated territories of the Russian Federation.”⁹

UK radiation scientists Dr Ian Fairlie and Dr David Sumner estimate 30,000 to 60,000 deaths.¹⁰ Dr Fairlie notes that statements by UNSCEAR indicate that it believes the whole body collective dose across Europe from Chernobyl was 320,000 to 480,000 Sv, from which an estimate of 32,000 to 48,000 fatal cancers can be deduced (using the LNT risk estimate of 0.10).¹¹

According to physicist Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund: “53,000 and 27,000 are reasonable estimates of the number of excess cancers and cancer deaths that will be attributable to the accident, excluding thyroid cancers. (The 95% confidence levels are 27,000 to 108,000 cancers and 12,000 to 57,000 deaths.) In addition, as of 2005, some 6,000 thyroid cancers and 15 thyroid cancer deaths have been attributed to Chernobyl. That number will grow with time. Much lower numbers of cancers and deaths are often cited, but these are misleading because they only apply to those populations with the highest radiation exposures, and don’t take into account the larger numbers of people who were exposed to less radiation.”¹²

A 2006 report commissioned by Greenpeace estimates a cancer death toll of about 93,000.¹³ According to Greenpeace: “Our report involved 52 respected scientists and includes information never before published in English. It challenges the UN International Atomic Energy Agency Chernobyl Forum report, which predicted 4,000 additional deaths attributable to the accident as a gross simplification of the real breadth of human suffering. The new data, based on Belarus national cancer statistics, predicts approximately 270,000 cancers and 93,000 fatal cancer cases caused by Chernobyl. The report also concludes that on the basis of demographic data, during the last 15 years, 60,000 people have additionally died in Russia because of the Chernobyl accident, and estimates of the total death toll for the Ukraine and Belarus could reach another 140,000.”

Those are the credible estimates of the eventual death toll from Chernobyl. Another defensible position (or non-position) is that the long-term cancer death toll is unknown and unknowable because of the uncertainties associated with the science. The third of the two defensible positions, unqualified claims that the death toll was just 50, should be rejected as dishonest or uninformed spin from the nuclear industry and some of its scientifically-illiterate supporters … and from every last one of the self-proclaimed pro-nuclear environmentalists − James Hansen, Patrick Moore, Mark Lynas, George Monbiot, James Lovelock, etc.

References:

1. Brenner, David, et al., 2003, ‘Cancer risks attributable to low doses of ionizing radiation: Assessing what we really know’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, November 25, 2003, vol.100, no.24, pp.13761–13766,

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14610281

2. US Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionising Radiation, US National Academy of Sciences, 2006, ‘Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: BEIR VII Phase 2’, www.nap.edu/books/030909156X/html

3. The Chernobyl Forum: 2003–2005, ‘Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine’, Second revised version, p.16, www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf

See also: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2005/pr38/en/

4. UNSCEAR, 2010, Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation on the Effects of Atomic Radiation 2010′,

www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2010/UNSCEAR_2010_Report_M.pdf

5. Doctors’ response to Toro Energy’s junk science:

www.mapw.org.au/news/cameco-stop-promoting-radiation-junk-science

Doctors’ response to Cameco’s junk science:

www.mapw.org.au/files/downloads/Medical%20Statement%20-%20Toro%20-%20final2.pdf

6. IAEA, 1996, “Long-term Committed Doses from Man-made Sources,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol.38, No.1,
https://nuclear.foe.org.au/wp-content/uploads/600k-p-Sv-IAEA-Bull.pdf

7. Chernobyl Forum, 2005, ‘Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts’, www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf

World Health Organization, 2006,

www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2006/pr20/en/index.html

www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/backgrounder/en/

8 Cardis E, Krewski D, Boniol et al, ‘Estimates of the Cancer Burden in Europe from Radioactive Fallout from the Chernobyl’, International Journal of Cancer, Volume 119, Issue 6, pp.1224-1235, Published Online: 20 April 2006,

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16628547

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ijc.22037/pdf

9. Cardis, Elizabeth, 2006, www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/pr/2006/pr168.html

10. Ian Fairlie and David Sumner, 2006,’ The Other Report on Chernobyl’, www.chernobylreport.org

11. www.ianfairlie.org/news/new-unscear-report-on-fukushima-collective-doses/

12. Lisbeth Gronlund, 17 April 2011, ‘How Many Cancers Did Chernobyl Really Cause?’, http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/4704112149/how-many-cancers-did-chernobyl-really-cause-updated

13. Greenpeace, 2006, ‘The Chernobyl Catastrophe − Consequences on Human Health’,

www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/reports/chernobylhealthreport/

www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet-2/report/2006/4/chernobylhealthreport.pdf

Links to literature on clean energy options

References to literature on renewable electricity and sustainable energy options more broadly.

Last updated January 2019

Please advise of other useful studies, dead links etc. jim.green@foe.org.au

INDEX TO THIS WEBPAGE

Australia ‒ Renewables Growth, Wind, Solar
Australian Deep Emissions Cuts Studies
Australia ‒ Information Sources on Renewables (and energy efficiency etc.)
Economics of Renewable Energy in Australia
Renewable Energy Jobs in Australia
South Australia
Responses to Anti-Renewables Propagandists and Paid Lobbyists
Global Growth of Renewables
Economics of Global Renewables
International Deep Emissions Cuts Studies
International Deep Emissions Cuts Studies ‒ Mark Jacobson / Stanford Research
Other International Literature
Country Studies
Countries with High Percentages of Power from Renewables
Canada
China
Europe
India
Japan
USA

1. AUSTRALIA ‒ RENEWABLES GROWTH, WIND, SOLAR

Australia could be at 86% wind and solar by 2050 – on economics only

Giles Parkinson, 10 July 2018

Australia could source 86 per cent of its electricity from wind and solar by 2050, based on economics only and regardless of any climate or emissions policy, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance.

The global research and news group says that level of wind and solar could be reached quicker, and will need to in order to match the Paris climate target of 2°C, let alone 1.5°C, but the transition to wind and solar is inevitable.

2. AUSTRALIAN DEEP EMISSIONS CUTS STUDIES

Business Council of Australia

The Business Council of Australia’s 2020 report argues for a rapid, renewables-led decarbonisation. This is an extraordinary and welcome turn-around given the BCA’s former role as energy troglodytes. The report is online.

How to run the National Electricity Market on 96 per cent renewables

David Osmond, 3 March 2020, RenewEconomy, https://reneweconomy.com.au/how-to-run-the-national-electricity-market-on-96-per-cent-renewables-91522/

Windlab has conducted a simulation of a 96% renewable national electricity market (NEM). The goal of the study was to show that very high renewable penetration levels can be achieved by expanding wind and solar generation, which is firmed by existing hydro and readily achievable levels of storage. It differs from other 100% renewable studies as it is based primarily on actual wind, solar and demand data from AEMO. Other studies have relied on simulated data. …

To summarise, this study has indicated that a very high penetration rate of renewables on the NEM is possible with readily achievable levels of storage and interconnector upgrades.

100% Renewable Electricity in Australia

Andrew Blakers, Bin Lu and Matthew Stocks (Australian National University), February 2017, ‘100% Renewable Electricity in Australia’.

Abstract: We present an energy balance analysis of the Australian national electricity market in a 100% renewable energy scenario in which wind and photovoltaics (PV) provides 90% of the annual electricity. The key outcome of our modelling is that the additional cost of balancing renewable energy supply with demand on an hourly basis throughout the year is modest: A$25-30/MWh (US$19-23/MWh).

For a summary article click here.

100 percent renewable energy by 2030

November 2017

Australia can have an electricity grid entirely run by renewable energy by 2030, according to a new research paper by Renew, formerly the Alternative Technology Association (ATA).

The paper, 100% Renewable Grid by 2030, says the target can be achieved by accelerating the installation of wind and solar power by 80% backed up by pumped hydro energy storage facilities and extra transmission lines.

Lead author Andrew Reddaway, energy analyst at Renew, said reaching full renewable energy by 2030 was cheaper and less risky than building new coal-fired power stations.

Renew’s forecasts towards a fully renewable grid in the national electricity market are based on recent research by the Australian National University. The paper considered recent trends and developments in projects such as Snow Hydro 2.0

Read the report 100% Renewable Grid by 2030.

Summary article here.

Australia could be 100% renewable by 2030s, meet Paris targets by 2025

Sophie Vorrath, 10 September 2018

Australia could reach the equivalent of 100 per cent renewables for its electricity needs by the early 2030s by doing nothing more than maintaining the current pace of wind and solar development, a new research report has found.

The report – published by a heavy-hitting team of Australian National University researchers, including solar PV and pumped hydro expert Andrew Blakers – says keeping up the current rate of renewable energy deployment would also meet Australia’s entire emissions reduction task “for the whole economy” by 2025.

To reach these conclusions, the team analysed data for the federal government’s own Clean Energy Regulator, showing that during 2018 and 2019 the nation would install about 10,400MW of new renewable energy.

ANU Energy Change Institute director Professor Ken Baldwin said that at that rate, Australia would eclipse the Renewable Energy Target, reaching 29 per cent in 2020, and by 2025 would reach 50 per cent – a number the federal Coalition likes to say is “recklessly high”, even for 2030.

Perhaps even more importantly, staying on the current trajectory would see electricity sector emissions reduced by 26 per cent in 2021, and the Paris economy-wide emissions reductions target of 26 per cent met five years early, in 2025. …

The ANU forecast compares to recent modelling from the Australian Energy Market Operator, which shows renewables making up 46 per cent of NEM generation by 2030 in their “neutral scenario”, and 61 per cent of generation by 2030 in their “fast change” scenario.

ANU report here and article by ANU scientists here.

New report shows 100% renewable by 2030 can save Australia money

Giles Parkinson, 19 April 2016, RenewEconomy

A new report from the Institute for Sustainable Futures in Sydney says a rapid transition to a 100 per cent renewable energy system can save Australia money – with avoided fuel costs to quickly offset the extra capital expenditure of building wind, solar and other renewable energy installations.

“The transition to a 100 per cent renewable energy system by 2050 is both technically possible and economically viable in the long term,” the report says. And by 100 per cent renewable, it means all energy use, including transport and heating.

The report canvasses two renewable energy scenarios, one based on a high level of renewable energy in the electricity grid, but with transport largely reliant on fossil fuels. The second is the Advanced Renewables scenario, which canvasses a totally renewable electricity system by 2030 and a fully renewable energy system by 2050.

Australians can have zero-emission electricity, without blowing the bill

6 Dec 2016

Paul Graham ‒ Chief economist, CSIRO energy

In a report released by CSIRO and Energy Networks Australia ‒ titled Electricity Network Transformation Roadmap Key Concepts Report ‒ we show that Australia is so far making rocky progress on reducing emissions, maintaining energy security and keeping prices low. But we also show how Australia can regain world leadership, delivering cheap electricity with zero emissions by 2050.

Beyond Zero Emissions (BZE) reports

Beyond Zero Emissions, 2015, ‘Zero Carbon Australia: Renewable Energy Superpower‘,

Beyond Zero Emissions, 2010, ‘Zero Carbon Australia Stationary Energy Plan‘.

Other Beyond Zero Emissions’ reports posted at www.beyondzeroemissions.org

Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in Australia

ClimateWorks Australia, 2014, ‘Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in Australia’.

Report webpage and PDF

Australian Energy Market Operator, July 2013, ‘100 Per Cent Renewables Study ‒ Modelling Outcomes’

The modelling undertaken presents results for four selected cases, two scenarios at two years, 2030 and 2050. The first scenario is based on rapid technology transformation and moderate economic growth while the second scenario is based on moderate technology transformation and high economic growth. The modelling includes the generation mix, transmission requirements, and hypothetical costs for each.

Media reports here, here, here and here.

University of New South Wales Simulation Study (2012)

Ben Elliston, Mark Diesendorf and Iain MacGill, 2012, ‘Simulations of scenarios with 100% renewable electricity in the Australian National Electricity Market’, Energy Policy, vol. 45, pp.606-613

Abstract

As a part of a program to explore technological options for the transition to a renewable energy future, we present simulations for 100% renewable energy systems to meet actual hourly electricity demand in the five states and one territory spanned by the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) in 2010. The system is based on commercially available technologies: concentrating solar thermal (CST) power with thermal storage, wind, photovoltaic (PV), existing hydro and biofuelled gas turbines. Hourly solar and wind generation data are derived from satellite observations, weather stations, and actual wind farm outputs. Together CST and PV contribute about half of total annual electrical energy supply.

A range of 100% renewable energy systems for the NEM are found to be technically feasible and meet the NEM reliability standard. The principal challenge is meeting peak demand on winter evenings following overcast days when CST storage is partially charged and sometimes wind speeds are low. The model handles these circumstances by combinations of an increased number of gas turbines and reductions in winter peak demand. There is no need for conventional base-load power plants. The important parameter is the reliability of the whole supply-demand system, not the reliability of particular types of power plants.

Highlights

We simulate 100% renewable electricity in the Australian National Electricity Market.

The energy system comprises commercially available technologies.

A range of 100% renewable electricity systems meet the reliability standard.

Principal challenge is meeting peak demand on winter evenings.

The concept of ‘base-load’ power plants is found to be redundant.

3. AUSTRALIA ‒ INFORMATION SOURCES ON RENEWABLES (AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY ETC.)

The Renewable Energy Index tracks the amount of renewable energy in Australia, the jobs it’s creating, the power bill savings it is delivering for Australian households, and the environmental benefits of the rising use of clean power. It’s updated every month by Green Energy Markets’ and funded by GetUp.

Clean Energy Council

RenewEconomy ‒ subscribe to the free daily e-newsletter

Yes 2 Renewables is Friends of the Earth Melbourne’s campaign for 100 per cent renewable energy.

University of NSW academics – numerous reports and articles:

Australian Government – Department of the Environment and Energy

See the topics page – e.g. renewable energy – energy – energy efficiency – energy markets – National Electricity Market review

Reputex

Climate Change Authority

Australian Energy Market Commission

CSIRO ‒ Renewables and energy

Energy Efficiency Council

Solar Citizens

Solar Calculator (estimate cost savings by installing solar)

Alternative Technology Association

Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets

See esp. the publications page

Energy Strategies (EnerStrat)

Climate Action Network of Australia

4. ECONOMICS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY IN AUSTRALIA

Renewables to be cheaper than coal even without climate policy, CSIRO says

2 January 2019

The CSIRO and the energy market operator say existing coal plants are still one of the lowest cost forms of power but new wind and solar farms will soon be cheaper, even without a carbon price.

Australia solar costs hit “extraordinary” new lows – $50s/MWh

Sophie Vorrath & Giles Parkinson, 27 June 2018

The cost of building new large-scale solar energy generation in Australia has fallen to an “extraordinary” new low, the head of the Australian Renewable Energy Agency has said, citing industry reports of numbers down around the $50/MWh mark.

Australia’s PV price plunge has seen the cost of utility-scale solar fall from around $135/MWh when ARENA launched its first auction in 2015, to “somewhere in the $50s” today, or $1/W, ARENA chief Ian Kay said on Wednesday.

Wind and solar slashing corporate energy costs by 40%
Giles Parkinson, 1 June 2018

The continuing fall in the cost of new wind and solar farms, and the emergence of new firming contract products, is allowing large corporate and industrial users to slash energy costs by up to 40 per cent.

TFS Green, a Melbourne-based wholesale energy and environmental market broker, is on Friday launching its new “Renewable Energy Hub”, a day after the formal announcement of its first transaction with the Kiamal solar farm and Mars Australia.

TFS Greens’s Chris Halliwell says wind and solar is clearly delivering electricity at a 40 per cent discount from what is available to medium and large users elsewhere on the grid.

That assessment is shared by Sanjeev Gupta and his team at SIMEC ZEN Energy, which is looking at similar savings from building a massive suite of large-scale solar, pumped hydro and battery storage to power the Whyalla steelworks and other big energy users.

A cost curve for emissions reductions & energy storage

Reputex, March 2017, ‘An Energy Trilemma: A cost curve for emissions reductions & energy storage in the Australian electricity sector’

See media release and report summary.

From the media release:

The rising price of gas, coupled with the falling cost of energy storage, has now made renewable energy storage cheaper than gas-fired power in providing reliable generation, such as instantaneous peaking or load-following supply.
Flexible renewable supply – such as a solar plant with battery storage that can ramp up even if the sun is not shining – is expected to create a decreasing need for “baseload-only” facilities, enabling states to rely on storage to overcome intermittency concerns and provide clean, reliable supply – at least cost.
Notably, findings also indicate “clean coal” will not be commercially mature before 2030, meaning it will not contribute to Australia’s 2030 target under the Paris Agreement.

From the report summary:

Key findings include:

Demand reduction via the take-up of solar PV has the lowest marginal cost of emissions reductions in the electricity sector, in line with an anticipated drop in capital costs, and continued availability of financing.
“Clean coal” such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and High Efficiency, Low Emissions” (HELE) coal is not forecast to be commercially mature until at least 2025. Subsequently, clean coal is projected to have a limited impact in support of Australia’s 2030 target under the Paris Agreement.
New low cost: Wind is displacing existing generation, causing existing facilities to generate less energy, recover revenue less frequency, and exit the market. As this occurs, system reliability has become an issue, most noticeably where intermittent generation has a high penetration rate, given it does not necessarily coincide with peak demand (timing) and cannot be easily ramped up to follow a load forecast (controllability).
Intermittent technologies do not provide the same contribution to system reliability as dispatched technologies, and may therefore require additional system investment (for example in storage) to ensure guaranteed supply.
Analysing the “full cost” of renewables, with energy storage, raises the cost recovery for low-cost intermittent generators significantly above their LCOE, however, findings indicate that on a like-for-like basis clean energy is now cheaper than gas-fired generation, driven by higher gas prices and falling storage technology costs.
Renewables with energy storage have therefore surpassed gas as the cheapest source of new flexible power in Australia, with analysis indicating these sources may alleviate system pressure by providing load-following and peaking generation services.
Analysis indicates that this will create a decreasing need for baseload-only facilities, while enabling South Australia, Victoria, Queensland and New South Wales to rely on new storage technologies to provide affordable, clean, and secure energy – while improving system reliability.

Wind energy’s biggest month, and how it keeps prices down

Giles Parkinson, 8 June 2016

Wind energy in Australia has enjoyed its biggest every month in May, producing nearly a quarter more electricity than its previous record month, and overtaking hydro to provide 8.5 per cent of electricity demand in the country’s main grid.

The record output came, coincidentally, in the same month that the last coal fired power station in South Australia was closed (May 9). And a new analysis from energy consultants Pitt & Sherry points to how wind generation is keeping a lid on wholesale electricity prices.

The Pitt & Sherry analysis notes that four states recorded record monthly totals in May – South Australia (where wind met 49 per cent of demand), Victoria, New South Wales and Tasmania. (There is only one very small wind farm in Queensland and Western Australia operates on a separate grid).

How rooftop solar is saving billions on energy bills for all consumers

Giles Parkinson, 16 October 2017

A major new study has underlined the crucial role played by rooftop solar in moderating energy prices: without it, the study says, the aggregate cost of electricity would have been several billion dollars higher over the past year.

The study by Energy Synapse, commissioned by the community lobby group Solar Citizens, reinforces previous estimates of the broad benefits of the more than 6GW of rooftop solar installed on more than 1.7 million household and business rooftops.

That capacity is often demonised by vested interests as “free-loading” on the network and other consumers, but the study proves otherwise.

Cheap wind, solar will make Australia a magnet ‒ Bloomberg

Ben Potter, 15 June 2017

Cheap wind and solar power will make Australia a magnet for energy-intensive industries such as smelting again within a decade or two, reversing the current trend for large smelters to back off production or threaten closure because of soaring electricity prices, Bloomberg New Energy Finance says in its 2017 Outlook.

Prices for solar PV rooftop panels, wind power and batteries will fall rapidly and quickly undercut coal and gas power, driving rapid uptake of these “distributed energy” technologies and making Australia one of the most decentralised energy markets in the world with a massive 45 per cent of power capacity “behind the meter” by 2040.

Small-scale PV will be the largest single source of generation capacity by 2040, with 44 gigawatts ‒ 31 per cent of the mix. Solar PV will “take the place of coal as the backbone of the national energy supply”, BNEF’s New Energy Outlook 2017 says.

Batteries in homes and business premises will supply another 15GW, helping to stabilise the grid at times of peak demand through “demand response” as coal supplies a diminishing share of demand. It projects that levelised (all in) costs of wind power will fall from $US57/MWh ($76/MWh) today to $US33/MWh in 2040, and solar PV will plummet from $US71/MWh today to $US26/MWh in 2040.

The solar PV boom will be joined by a boom in batteries, Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s New Energy Outlook 2017 projects Bloomberg New Energy Finance, New Energy Outlook 2017

Wind and solar already significantly undercut the cost of power from new coal plant ‒ which BNEF estimates at $US94-172/MWh ‒ and by 2023 will undercut the cost of power from refurbished coal plant.

Solar’s new sweet spot: Low cost, compact PV plants at $1/watt

Giles Parkinson, 22 June 2017

There’s been a lot of attention paid to the big boom in large scale solar in Australia over the past nine months, with more than 2.4GW under construction across the country, and another 8GW in the pipeline, by RenewEconomy’s estimates.

The focus has been on the big end of this construction boom, but something interesting is happening at the smaller end of the market – the emergence of quick-to-build, compact MW scale solar plants that are redefining the technology’s economics.

The majority of large scale solar plants are slowed down by connection issues and getting a power purchase agreement and finance. But there has been no such inhibition for YD Projects, which this week completed the first of a number of solar projects on the NSW/Queensland border.

5. RENEWABLE ENERGY JOBS IN AUSTRALIA

Wind farms power big surge in renewable energy jobs

Cole Latimer, 25 January 2018

A boom in wind farms is fuelling a jobs surge in the renewable energy industry with 17 per cent employment growth in the sector in December.

Nationwide, there are now 15,691 renewable energy jobs, rising to 21,168 when including those in small-scale rooftop solar installation. This is a 17 per cent month on month increase from November job figures. …

Renewables delivering – despite enemies and “lukewarm defenders”

Tristan Edis, 28 August 2017

Today Green Energy Markets has released the Renewable Energy Index, which is a monthly publication tracking: the amount of power produced from renewable energy; the jobs it’s creating; the power bill savings it is delivering for Australian households and businesses; and the environmental benefits of the rising use of clean power.

The story is an impressive one. At the end of June, large-scale renewable energy projects under construction were estimated to create enough jobs to employ 8,868 people full-time for a year. Then in our July edition it had grown by more than a thousand to 9,897 job-years (a person employed full time for a year) thanks to the commitment of a further seven projects.

On top of this we estimate almost 4,000 people were employed full-time in installation, design and sales of rooftop solar systems over the 2016-17 financial year. Renewable energy has now grown to 17 per cent of our power supply across the main east and west coast grids, up from about 7 per cent 10 years ago.

Renewables record: solar and wind power blow gas out of the water
16 October 2017

Climate Council, June 2016, ‘Renewable Energy: Future Jobs and Growth’ report

Report webpage or PDF of full report.

Moving to 50% renewables by 2030 would create more than 28,000 jobs nationally, new research by Ernst & Young (EY) and the Climate Council has found.

The Renewable Energy: Future Jobs and Growth report finds that 50% renewable electricity by 2030 will create almost 50% more employment than our business as usual trajectory.

The research uses EY modelling to project the employment outcomes of 50% renewable electricity by 2030. Climate Councillor and energy expert Andrew Stock said every state would gain many more jobs than it would lose.

Climate Institute ‒ Clean Energy Jobs

The website has an interactive digital map presenting the findings of a study into the potential national, state and regional employment impacts of this shift to a clean, low-pollution energy sources.

6. SOUTH AUSTRALIA

South Australia on track to meet 75% renewables target

25 July 2018

South Australia’s energy minister says the state is on track to have 75% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2025 – the target set by the former Labor premier Jay Weatherill and once rejected by his Liberal government. … The Australian Energy Market Operator has projected South Australia would have 73% renewable power by 2020/21 while consultants Green Energy Markets found it could reach 74% by 2025 without any additional policies being introduced.

SA Climate Change Strategy

A new Climate Change Strategy for South Australia was released by Premier Jay Weatherill and Minister for Climate Change Ian Hunter on 29 November 2015. South Australia’s Climate Change Strategy 2015-2050 – Towards a low carbon economy sets a framework for significantly reducing emissions in SA while maximising economic opportunities.

SA Low Carbon Economy Experts Panel

South Australia’s Low Carbon Economy Experts Panel, Nov. 2015, Findings and Recommendations.

As a result of its assessment, the Panel found that it is feasible for South Australia to achieve a target of net zero emissions by 2050 and that a commitment to this target will position South Australia well in a low carbon world.

The modelling for the Panel did not include consideration of whether the nuclear and carbon capture and storage scenarios modelled at the national level are a cost-effective means to move to low carbon electricity for South Australia. The Deep Decarbonisation Pathways modelling found that nuclear power stations generally need to be of a certain size to be cost effective and thus precluded their consideration for use in smaller States such as South Australia. In addition, South Australia’s capacity for cost-effective carbon capture and storage is unknown.

Climate Institute ‒ Clean Energy Jobs: South Australia Snapshot (c.2011)

Some highlights of the South Australia study include:

‒ A large untapped resource: The modelling results show strong growth in South Australia’s electricity sector, with an additional 5,400 MW of generating capacity projected to be installed by 2030. This includes renewable energy, including wind, solar and geothermal, as well as gas.

‒ State-wide employment: Based on the modelling results it is estimated that close to 5,000 new jobs will be created in South Australia’s electricity sector by 2030, including 1,089 permanent ongoing jobs, 2,688 construction jobs and 1,189 manufacturing jobs. The vast majority of these jobs will be in renewable energy.

‒ Regional clean energy jobs: Thousands of jobs are up for grabs in regional South Australia, including over 1,200 on the Eyre Peninsula and over 1,300 in the York and Lower North region.

AEMO sees South Australia at 73% renewables by 2020/21

Giles Parkinson, 2 March 2018

The Australian Energy Market Operator has predicted, in a document published in December, that – based largely on the federal renewable energy target – it expects South Australia to reach 73% renewable energy by 2020/21. It goes further. It says that SA will likely reach between 75% and 80% renewable energy share by 2026/27, depending on the policy pathway.

Nicky Ison / Solar Citizens, 2017, ‘Repowering South Australia’

See also the related article in RenewEconomy:

South Australia should aim for 100% renewables by 2025, not 50%

Dan Spencer, 8 February 2018

Solar Citizens worked with Nicky Ison from the Community Power Agency on a new blueprint called Repowering South Australia, which not only shows how South Australia can get to 100% renewables by 2025, but also how we can ensure nobody is left behind along the way.

7. RESPONSES TO ANTI-RENEWABLES PROPAGANDISTS AND PAID LOBBYISTS

Greenpeace: Renewable Energy Myths: 6 Myths About Renewable Energy, Blown Away

The Feasibility Of 100% Renewable Electricity Systems: A Response To Critics

Diesendorf M, Elliston B, October 2018, The Feasibility Of 100% Renewable Electricity Systems: A Response To Critics, Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 93:318-330

Highlights:

Large-scale electricity systems based on 100% renewable energy can meet the key requirements of reliability, security and affordability.
This is even true where the vast majority of generation comes from variable renewables such as wind and solar PV.
Thus the principal myths of critics of 100% renewable electricity are refuted.
Arguments that the transition to 100% renewable electricity will necessarily take as long or longer than historical energy transitions are also refuted.
The principal barriers to 100% renewable electricity are neither technological nor economic, but instead are primarily political, institutional and cultural.

Abstract:

The rapid growth of renewable energy (RE) is disrupting and transforming the global energy system, especially the electricity industry. As a result, supporters of the politically powerful incumbent industries and others are critiquing the feasibility of large-scale electricity generating systems based predominantly on RE. Part of this opposition is manifest in the publication of incorrect myths about renewable electricity (RElec) in scholarly journals, popular articles, media, websites, blogs and statements by politicians. The aim of the present article is to use current scientific and engineering theory and practice to refute the principal myths. It does this by showing that large-scale electricity systems that are 100% renewable (100RElec), including those whose renewable sources are predominantly variable (e.g. wind and solar PV), can be readily designed to meet the key requirements of reliability, security and affordability. It also argues that transition to 100RElec could occur much more rapidly than suggested by historical energy transitions. It finds that the main critiques published in scholarly articles and books contain factual errors, questionable assumptions, important omissions, internal inconsistencies, exaggerations of limitations and irrelevant arguments. Some widely publicised critiques select criteria that are inappropriate and/or irrelevant to the assessment of energy technologies, ignore studies whose results contradict arguments in the critiques, and fail to assess the sum total of knowledge provided collectively by the published studies on 100RElec, but instead demand that each individual study address all the critiques’ inappropriate criteria. We find that the principal barriers to 100RElec are neither technological nor economic, but instead are primarily political, institutional and cultural.

See also this article drawing on the above study: Giles Parkinson, 19 June 2018, ‘The Fake Arguments Against 100% Renewable Energy‘,

Can we get 100 percent of our energy from renewable sources?

New article gathers the evidence to address the sceptics

Public release ‒ 17 May 2018

Lappeenranta University of Technology

Is there enough space for all the wind turbines and solar panels to provide all our energy needs? What happens when the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow? Won’t renewables destabilise the grid and cause blackouts?

In a review paper last year in the high-ranking journal Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Master of Science Benjamin Heard and colleagues presented their case against 100% renewable electricity systems. They doubted the feasibility of many of the recent scenarios for high shares of renewable energy, questioning everything from whether renewables-based systems can survive extreme weather events with low sun and low wind, to the ability to keep the grid stable with so much variable generation.

Now scientists have hit back with their response to the points raised by Heard and colleagues. The researchers from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Lappeenranta University of Technology, Delft University of Technology and Aalborg University have analysed hundreds of studies from across the scientific literature to answer each of the apparent issues. They demonstrate that there are no roadblocks on the way to a 100% renewable future.

“While several of the issues raised by the Heard paper are important, you have to realise that there are technical solutions to all the points they raised, using today’s technology,” says the lead author of the response, Dr. Tom Brown of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.

“Furthermore, these solutions are absolutely affordable, especially given the sinking costs of wind and solar power,” says Professor Christian Breyer of Lappeenranta University of Technology, who co-authored the response.

Brown cites the worst-case solution of hydrogen or synthetic gas produced with renewable electricity for times when imports, hydroelectricity, batteries, and other storage fail to bridge the gap during low wind and solar periods during the winter. For maintaining stability there is a series of technical solutions, from rotating grid stabilisers to newer electronics-based solutions. The scientists have collected examples of best practice by grid operators from across the world, from Denmark to Tasmania.

Furthermore, these solutions are absolutely affordable, especially given the sinking costs of wind and solar power.

The response by the scientists has now appeared in the same journal as the original article by Heard and colleagues.

“There are some persistent myths that 100% renewable systems are not possible,” says Professor Brian Vad Mathiesen of Aalborg University, who is a co-author of the response.

“Our contribution deals with these myths one-by-one, using all the latest research. Now let’s get back to the business of modelling low-cost scenarios to eliminate fossil fuels from our energy system, so we can tackle the climate and health challenges they pose.”

The research papers for further information:

‒‒ T.W. Brown, T. Bischof-Niemz, K. Blok, C. Breyer, H. Lund, B.V. Mathiesen, 2018 “Response to ‘Burden of proof: A comprehensive review of the feasibility of 100% renewable-electricity systems’,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, DOI:10.1016/j.rser.2018.04.113, www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032118303307

‒‒ B.P. Heard, B.W. Brook, T.M.L. Wigley, C.J.A. Bradshaw, “Burden of proof: A comprehensive review of the feasibility of 100% renewable-electricity systems,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, DOI:10.1016/j.rser.2017.03.114, 2017.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.03.114, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032117304495?via%3Dihub

8. GLOBAL GROWTH OF RENEWABLES

Renewables 2017: Analysis and Forecasts to 2022

International Energy Agency, 2017, ‘Renewables 2017: Analysis and Forecasts to 2022’, Executive Summary

See also: Jocelyn Timperley, 4 Oct 2017, ‘IEA: Renewable electricity set to grow 40% globally by 2022‘

2016: Another Record Year for Renewables

A new report by the International Renewable Energy Agency, Renewable Energy Capacity Statistics 2017, states that global renewable electricity generation capacity (including hydro) increased by 161 gigawatts (GW) in 2016, making it the strongest year ever for new capacity additions.

International Renewable Energy Agency, 2017, ‘Renewable Energy Capacity Statistics 2017’

A Whole New World: Tracking the Renewables Boom from Copenhagen to Paris

Climate Council (Australia) ‒ 2015 ‒ Renewable energy is rapidly becoming the preferred choice for new electricity generation across the globe, our latest report has revealed. ‘A Whole New World: Tracking the Renewables Boom from Copenhagen to Paris’ reveals how the world is in the midst of a dramatic energy revolution.

9. ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL RENEWABLES

Unsubsidised wind and solar now cheapest form of bulk energy

Giles Parkinson, 20 November 2018

The unsubsidised cost of wind and solar now beats coal as the cheapest form of bulk generation in all major economies except Japan, according to the latest levellised cost of electricity analysis by leading energy analyst BloombergNEF.

The latest report says the biggest news comes in the two fastest growing energy markets, China and India, where it notes that “not so long ago coal was king”. Not any more.

“In India, best-in-class solar and wind plants are now half the cost of new coal plants,” the report says, and this is despite the recent imposition of import tariffs on solar cells and modules.

The China experience is also significant. While local authorities have put a brake on local installations, causing the domestic market to slump by one third in 2018, this has created a “global wave of cheap equipment” that has more than compensated for increased financing costs caused by rising interest rates.

The cost of battery storage is also falling – so much so that in countries like Australia and India, pairing unsubsidised wind and solar with four hours of battery storage can be cost competitive with new coal or gas plants.

10. INTERNATIONAL DEEP EMISSIONS CUTS STUDIES

Abstracts of 47 peer-reviewed published journal articles from 13 independent research groups with 91 different authors supporting the result that energy for electricity, transportation, building, heating/cooling, and/or industry can be supplied reliably with 100% or near-100% renewable energy at difference locations worldwide https://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/CombiningRenew/100PercentPaperAbstracts.pdf

Climate News Network reported:

Virtually all the world’s demand for electricity to run transport and to heat and cool homes and offices, as well as to provide the power demanded by industry, could be met by renewable energy by mid-century.

This is the consensus of 47 peer-reviewed research papers from 13 independent groups with a total of 91 authors that have been brought together by Stanford University in California.

Some of the papers take a broad sweep across the world, adding together the potential for each technology to see if individual countries or whole regions could survive on renewables.

Special examinations of small island states, sub-Saharan Africa and individual countries like Germany look to see what are the barriers to progress and how they could be removed.

In every case the findings are that the technology exists to achieve 100% renewable power if the political will to achieve it can be mustered.

“It seems that every part of the world can now find a system that edges fossil fuels out in costs”

The collection of papers is a powerful rebuff to those who say that renewables are not reliable or cannot be expanded fast enough to take over from fossil fuels and nuclear power.

Once proper energy efficiency measures are in place, a combination of wind, solar and water power, with various forms of storage capacity, can add up to 100% of energy needs in every part of the planet.

Stanford puts one of its own papers at the top of the list. It studies the impacts of the Green New Deal proposals on grid stability, costs, jobs, health and climate in 143 countries.

With the world already approaching 1.5°C of heating, it says, seven million people killed by air pollution annually, and limited fossil fuel resources potentially sparking conflict, Stanford’s researchers wanted to compare business-as-usual with a 100% transition to wind-water-solar energy, efficiency and storage by 2050 – with at least 80% by 2030.

By grouping the countries of the world together into 24 regions co-operating on grid stability and storage solutions, supply could match demand by 2050-2052 with 100% reliance on renewables. The amount of energy used overall would be reduced by 57.1%, costs would fall by a similar amount, and 28.6 million more long-term full-time jobs would be created than under business-as-usual.

The remarkable consensus among researchers is perhaps surprising, since climate and weather conditions differ so much in different latitudes. It seems though that as the cost of renewables, particularly wind and solar, has tumbled, and energy storage solutions multiplied, every part of the world can now find a system that edges fossil fuels out in costs.

That, plus the benefit of clean air, particularly in Asian countries like India and China, makes renewables far more beneficial on any cost-benefit analysis.

The appearance of so many papers mirrors the consensus that climate scientists have managed to achieve in warning the world’s political leaders that time is running out for them to act to keep the temperature below dangerous levels.

Since in total the solutions offered cover countries producing more than 97% of the world’s greenhouse gases, they provide a blueprint for the next round of UN climate talks, to be held in Glasgow in November. At COP-26, as the conference is called, politicians will be asked to make new commitments to avoid dangerous climate change.

This Stanford file shows them that all they need is political will for them to be able to achieve climate stability.

https://climatenewsnetwork.net/renewable-energy-could-power-the-world-by-2050/

——————————-

An article published in Energy in May 2019 found that 180 studies on 100% renewables had been published since 2004. The authors of that paper say that six months later the number has jumped to 280.

Energy 15 May 2019 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0360544219304967

How rapidly can we transition to 100% renewable electricity?

Mark Diesendorf, 21 June 2018

This article focuses on the transition of the electricity industry to 100% renewable electricity together with energy efficiency.

Vaclav Smil, an expert on historical energy transitions, argues in his book that ‘the process of restructuring the modern high-energy industrial and postindustrial civilization on the basis of nonfossil, that is, overwhelmingly renewable, energy flows will be much more challenging that [sic] was replacing wood by coal and then coal by hydrocarbons.’

To question Smil’s conclusions it’s sufficient to refute the assumptions underlying his key arguments.

A more extensive critique, in Section 6 of our recent peer-reviewed paper ‘The feasibility of 100% renewable electricity’, is available free upon request from m.diesendorf@unsw.edu.au.

FoE International Report: An Energy Revolution Is Possible

A report by Friends of the Earth International (FoEI), launched a week before the 2015 UN climate summit in Paris, estimates that it would take US$5,148 billion of extra investment to generate half the world’s electricity with 100% renewables by 2030. No small amount, but to put it in perspective, FoEI points out that this is an investment equal to the wealth currently held by 0.00001% of the global population, or 782 people.

This means that the personal fortunes of the 782 wealthiest people on the planet – many of them CEOs of major corporations – could power Africa, Latin America and most of Asia with 100% renewable energy by 2030. The wealth of the richest 53 people globally could power the whole of Africa with 100% renewable energy by 2030, and the wealth of the richest 32 people could power most of Latin America with 100% renewable energy by 2030.

The report details the mix of renewable energy sources most appropriate for each region and discusses relevant technical issues regarding capacity factors, storage technologies and so on. But just as importantly, it argues that the energy revolution is necessarily a social revolution as well.

Friends of the Earth International, November 2015, ‘An Energy Revolution Is Possible’

Summary and full report

Deep Decarbonization studies (many countries; renewables and nuclear)

Transition to a fully sustainable global energy system

September 12, 2012. Transition to a fully sustainable global energy system. New study published in Energy Strategy Reviews details an energy future for 2050 powered 95% by renewables: Yvonne Y. Deng, , Kornelis Blok, Kees van der Leun, ‘Transition to a fully sustainable global energy system’, Energy Strategy Reviews, Volume 1, Issue 2, September 2012, Pages 109–121

Reply to the letter from Dr. Hansen and others

Excerpt from: Jusen Asuka, Seung-Joon Park, Mutsuyoshi Nishimura and Toru Morotomi, 31 Jan 2014, ‘Reply to the letter from Dr. Hansen and others’

Several studies have been conducted in the past to determine whether this ambitious climate change target is achievable without any reliance on nuclear power. Edenhofer et al. (2010) compared low-carbon scenarios using five different energy-economy models, and identified that the additional costs needed to stop nuclear investment in 2000 would be only around 0.7% of GDP in 2100. Recently other researchers have conducted studies in consideration of the denuclearization movement after the Fukushima accident. Bauer et al. (2012), for example, state that the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions required to limit global average temperature rise to two degrees C from the pre-industrial era would be achievable for the additional cost of less than 0.1% of GDP by 2020, and less than 0.2% by 2050 without nuclear power. Duscha et al. (2013) state that denuclearization would increase global greenhouse gas emissions by 2% in 2020, but that developed countries would be able to achieve their share of the two degrees C target at an additional cost of 0.1% GDP. The same Duscha et al. (2013) reviewed other existing research, and concluded that most existing studies also indicated that ambitious greenhouse gas emissions reductions could be achieved at the additional cost of 1% GDP globally without nuclear power generation.

Edenhofer, O., Knopf, B., Barker, T., Baumstark, L., Bellevrat, E., Chateau, B., van Vuuren, D. P., 2010. “The economics of low stabilization: Model comparison of mitigation strategies and costs”, The Energy Journal, 31 (Special Issue 1), 11–48.

Bauer, N., Brecha, R. J., & Luderer, G., 2012. “Economics of nuclear power and climate change mitigation policies”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109, 16805–16810. DOI:10.1073.pnas.1201264109.

Duscha V., Schumacher K., Schleich J. & Buisson P., 2013. “Costs of meeting international climate targets without nuclear power”, Climate Policy, DOI:10.1080/14693062.2014.852018

Renewable Energy Outlook 2030

Stefan Peter, Harry Lehmann, Renewable Energy Outlook 2030: Energy Watch Group Global Renewable Energy Scenarios

Exec Summ: http://isusi.de/downloads/REO_2030_EE_ExcecSummary_en.pdf

Full report: http://isusi.de/downloads/REO_2030_EE_fullText_en.pdf

Nuclear Information & Resource Service: ‘Nuclear-Free, Carbon-Free’

Many reports listed on this NIRS webpage (mostly USA, some global and Europe)

World Future Council

World Future Council’s Global 100% Renewable Energy − Studies and reports

http://www.go100re.net/e-library/studies-and-reports/

http://www.go100re.net/e-library/websites-and-links/

Global http://www.go100re.net/e-library/studies-and-reports/#tab1

Europe http://www.go100re.net/e-library/studies-and-reports/#tab2

America http://www.go100re.net/e-library/studies-and-reports/#tab3

Asia http://www.go100re.net/e-library/studies-and-reports/#tab4

Pacific http://www.go100re.net/e-library/studies-and-reports/#tab5

Others http://www.go100re.net/e-library/studies-and-reports/#tab6

Energy [R]evolution: A sustainable world energy outlook 2015

Greenpeace International, September 2015, ‘Energy [R]evolution: A sustainable world energy outlook 2015’,

The Energy [R]evolution Scenario has become a well known and well respected energy analysis since it was first published for Europe in 2005. In 2015, the fifth Global Energy [R]evolution scenario was published; earlier editions were published in 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2012.

Greenpeace has been publishing its Energy [R]evolution scenarios since 2005, more recently in collaboration with the scientific community, in particular the German Aerospace Centre (DLr). While our predictions on the potential and market growth of renewable energy may once have seemed fanciful or unrealistic, they have proved to be accurate. the US-based Meister Consultants Group concluded earlier this year that “the world’s biggest energy agencies, financial institutions and fossil fuel companies for the most part seriously under-estimated just how fast the clean power sector could and would grow”. It wasn’t the IEA, Goldman Sachs or the US Department of Energy who got it right. It was Greenpeace’s market scenario which was the most accurate.

100% Renewables by 2050

Mae-Wan Ho, Brett Cherry, Sam Burcher & Peter Saunders, 2009, ‘Green Energies: 100% Renewables by 2050’, ISIS/TWN Special Report

Preview

11. INTERNATIONAL DEEP EMISSIONS CUTS STUDIES ‒ MARK JACOBSON / STANFORD UNI RESEARCH

Research by Mark Jacobson and colleagues

Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering

Stanford University

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Clean Energy Roadmaps for the 50 United States and 139 countries and The Solutions Project

Wind, water, solar roadmaps for 50 states and 139 countries (and here is an alternative link)
The Solutions Project
139 COUNTRY 100% INFOGRAPHICS: A new study finds that countries around the world could shift their economies entirely to renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind and hydroelectric, by the year 2050. The researchers map out the blend of energy sources that each of 139 countries would need to completely switch their energy to electric power. The report was first published in the journal “The idea here is to electrify all energy sectors — transportation, heating, cooling, industry, agriculture, forestry, and fishing — and provide that electricity with 100 percent wind, water and solar power,” says Mark Z. Jacobson, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford and one of the authors of the report.

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Studies on Grid Reliability With High Penetrations of Wind, Water, and Sunlight

http://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/CombiningRenew/combining.html

Matching demand with supply at low cost in 139 countries among 20 world regions with 100% intermittent wind, water, and sunlight (WWS) for all purposes (Renewable Energy, 2018) (pdf)

—– One set of simulations (Case A) from paper: 2050-2054 simulations matching all-sector energy demand with 100% WWS supply, electricity storage (CSP with storage, batteries, pumped-hydro, existing hydroelectric reservoirs with zero added turbines ), heat storage, cold storage, and hydrogen storage in 20 world regions encompassing 139 countries: Africa (pdf) Australia (pdf) Central America (pdf) Central Asia (pdf) China-Mongolia-Hong Kong-North Korea (pdf) Cuba (pdf) Europe (pdf) Haiti-Dominican Republic (pdf) Iceland (pdf) India-Nepal-Sri Lanka (pdf) Jamaica (pdf) Japan-South Korea (pdf) Mideast (pdf) New Zealand (pdf) Philippines (pdf) Russia-Georgia (pdf) South America (pdf) Southeast Asia (pdf) Taiwan (pdf) U.S.-Canada (pdf)

—– Global cooling due to wind turbines (pdf)

A low-cost solution to the grid reliability problem over 48 contiguous U.S. states with 100% penetration of intermittent wind, water, and solar for all purposes (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2015) (pdf) Clarification (pdf)

—– Paper awarded Cozzarelli Prize from PNAS (link)

—– Reply to Bistline commentary (pdf) Reply to Clack commentary in journal format (pdf) Reply to Clack commentary line-by-line (pdf) Reply to Clack commentary for general readers (link) Corrections suggested for Clack et al. (pdf) FAQs about correcting record (pdf) Response to Caldeira about hydro assumption (pdf) Reply to Bryce-National Review (link) Reply to Conca-Forbes (link) Reply to Porter-NYT (link) Interview-GreenTech Media (link) Setting Record Straight-CleanTechnica (link) Hydropower times series (xlsx)

—– 30 peer-reviewed published research articles supporting grid stability with or near 100% renewable energy penetration (pdf)

Combining wind, solar, geothermal, and hydroelectric to match contemporary power demand in California with 99.8% carbon-free sources (Renewable Energy, 2010) (pdf)

Review of potential of intermittent renewables to meet power demand (Proceedings of IEEE, 2012) (pdf)

The carbon abatement potential of high penetration intermittent renewables (Energy and Environmental Science, 2012) (pdf)

Effects of aggregating electric load in the United States (Energy Policy, 2012) (pdf)

Variability and uncertainty of wind power in the California electric power system (Wind Energy, 2013) (pdf)

Optimized mixes of wind and solar on a fully-renewable U.S. electricity grid (Energy, 2014) (pdf)

Flexibility mechanisms and pathways to a highly renewable U.S. electricity future (Energy, 2016) (pdf)

Temporal and spatial tradeoffs in power system modeling with assumptions about storage: An application of the POWER model (Energy, 2016) (pdf)

Combining offshore wind and electrolytic hydrogen storage (J. Power Sources, 2017) (pdf)

Matching hourly and peak demand by combining renewables (Stanford VPUE Report, Hoste et al., 2009) (pdf)

Studies on combining wind and wave power (link)

Studies on powering the world, U.S., and individual states with wind, water, and sunlight (link)

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Avoiding blackouts with 100% renewable energy

Stanford University, 8 Feb 2018

Renewable energy solutions are often hindered by the inconsistencies of power produced by wind, water and sunlight and the continuously fluctuating demand for energy. New research by Mark Z. Jacobson, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford University, and colleagues at the University of California, Berkeley, and Aalborg University in Denmark finds several solutions to making clean, renewable energy reliable enough to power at least 139 countries.

In their paper, published as a manuscript this week in Renewable Energy, the researchers propose three different methods of providing consistent power among all energy sectors ‒ transportation; heating and cooling; industry; and agriculture, forestry and fishing ‒ in 20 world regions encompassing 139 countries after all sectors have been converted to 100 percent clean, renewable energy. Jacobson and colleagues previously developed roadmaps for transitioning 139 countries to 100 percent clean, renewable energy by 2050 with 80 percent of that transition completed by 2030. The present study examines ways to keep the grid stable with these roadmaps.

===

Some papers organized by topic

http://stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/

Roadmaps for transitioning the world, countries, states, cities, and towns to 100% clean, renewable wind, water, and sunlight (WWS) in all energy sectors

Studies on grid reliability with up to 100% penetration of WWS

Studies examining impacts of energy and transportation technologies on climate, health, and energy security

Studies examining global and regional wind and solar resources and impacts of wind energy

12. OTHER INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE

WWF report: Critical materials for the transition to a 100% sustainable energy future

This February 2014 WWF study examines whether non-energy raw material supply bottlenecks could occur in the transition to a fully sustainable energy system.

International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)

IRENA REsource database and country statistics: http://resourceirena.irena.org/gateway/

RenewableEnergyWorld

REN21 ‒ Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century

See esp. Renewables 2017 Global Status Report

Clean Technica

Greentech Media

The Solutions Project

With over 200 businesses, cities, and countries committed to 100% clean, renewable energy, momentum is building. Solutions Project is here to support that momentum and accelerate the transition to clean energy for all.

International Energy Agency ‒ energy issues by topic, Data & Publications, annual ‘World Energy Outlook‘ reports, Market Report Series: Renewables 2017, ‘Energy Technology Perspectives‘ reports

Renewable Energy Directory publishes articles about renewable energy, new technologies, etc. Our news pages aggregate headlines from around the web to keep you informed on a daily basis. Visit the directory to view informative websites and resources.

Nearly 50 countries vow to use 100% renewable energy by 2050

Payton M., 18 November 2016, ‘Nearly 50 countries vow to use 100% renewable energy by 2050’, The Independent

The signatories are countries who are disproportionately affected by global warming such as Ethiopia and the Maldives

Global Energy Assessment

The Global Energy Assessment (GEA), launched in 2012, defines a new global energy policy agenda – one that transforms the way society thinks about, uses, and delivers energy. Involving specialists from a range of disciplines, industry groups, and policy areas, GEA research aims to facilitate equitable and sustainable energy services for all, in particular the two billion people who currently lack access to clean, modern energy.

Coordinated by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), GEA was led by some of the world’s leading energy experts in research, academia, business, industry and policy, representing both the developed and the developing world. GEA is the first ever fully integrated energy assessment that analyzes energy challenges, opportunities and strategies, for developing, industrialized and emerging economies. It is supported by government and non-governmental organizations, the United Nations Systems, and the private sector.

Website

Final Report: GEA, 2012: Global Energy Assessment ‒ Toward a Sustainable Future, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.

Free download ‒ Final Report summary:
From the final report: “Nuclear energy as a choice, not a requirement. The GEA pathways illustrate that it is possible to meet all GEA goals even in the case of a nuclear phase-out. Nuclear energy can play an important role in the supply-side portfolio of some transition pathways; however, its prospects are particularly uncertain because of unresolved challenges surrounding its further deployment, as illustrated by the Fukushima accident and unresolved weapons proliferation risks”.

Renewable Energy ‒ The Green Alternative Way to Heat your Home

Energy Innovation Policy and Technology LLC is an energy and environmental policy firm.

Renewables International

Renewable Energy World

‘The World’s #1 Renewable Energy Network for News, Information, and Companies.’

World Wind Energy Association

Guardian renewable energy article collection

New Scientist ‒ articles on many energy / clean energy issues

13. COUNTRY STUDIES

Pathways to Deep Decarbonization ‒ Country Case Studies

International Energy Agency country reports

14. COUNTRIES WITH HIGH PERCENTAGES OF POWER FROM RENEWABLES

A 100% renewable grid isn’t just feasible, it’s already happening

Joe Romm, 22 May 2018

The ongoing debate around whether it’s feasible to have an electric grid running on 100 percent renewable power in the coming decades often misses a key point: many countries and regions are already at or close to 100 percent now.

According to data compiled by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, there are seven countries already at, or very, near 100 percent renewable power: Iceland (100 percent), Paraguay (100), Costa Rica (99), Norway (98.5), Austria (80), Brazil (75), and Denmark (69.4). The main renewables in these countries are hydropower, wind, geothermal, and solar.

A new international study, which debunks many myths about renewable energy, notes that many large population regions are “at or above 100%” including Germany’s Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Hostein regions, New Zealand’s South Island, and Denmark’s Samsø island. In Canada, both Quebec and British Columbia are at nearly 100 percent renewable power.

Last summer, China’s State-run Xinhua News Agency reported that “Qinghai Province has just run for seven straight days entirely on renewable energy … only wind, solar and hydro.” This was part of a test by the country’s State Grid Corporation to show a post-fossil-fuel future was practical.

Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) has projected that by 2040, Germany’s grid will see nearly 75 percent renewable penetration, Mexico will be over 80 percent, and Brazil and Italy will be over 95 percent. BNEF was not looking at what could theoretically happen by mid-century if countries pushed as hard as required by the Paris Climate Accord. They were just looking at business as usual over the next two decades.

A study out earlier this month found, “Indonesia has far more than enough pumped hydro storage sites to support a 100% renewable electricity grid.” Storage is one of the most straightforward ways to integrate wind and solar power into the grid, to account for the times when the wind doesn’t blow or the sun doesn’t shine. … And pumped hydro is but one of many strategies for integrating more renewables into the grid.

15. CANADA

Canada could go 100% renewable by 2035 if its government gets serious

Katie Valentine, 24 March 2015

Canada can be a world leader in emissions reductions and renewable energy use, but only if its federal government decides to take climate change seriously, according to a new report.

The report, published by 70 Canadian academics, looked at Canada’s potential to shift its electricity production to renewable sources and cut its emissions. It found that the country could get 100% of its electricity from low-carbon sources like wind, solar, and hydropower by 2035 and reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050. To achieve these goals, the report recommended that the federal government implement a nationwide price on carbon and eliminate subsidies to Canada’s fossil fuel industry – particularly, its tar sands industry.

16. CHINA

Unsubsidised wind and solar now cheapest form of bulk energy

Giles Parkinson, 20 November 2018

The latest report says the biggest news comes in the two fastest growing energy markets, China and India, where it notes that “not so long ago coal was king”. Not any more. …

China could get 85% of its electricity and 60% of total energy from renewables by 2050, according to government agencies.

Emissions will peak by 2025 if wind, solar and bioenergy are rolled out quickly, finds the report led by the China National Renewable Energy Centre claims.

In a “high renewable” scenario, the country’s coal use would peak in 2020 and its greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 – five years ahead of target.

The report:

Energy Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission, April 2015, ‘China 2050 High Renewable Energy Penetration Scenario and Roadmap Study‘

Summary / analysis: Megan Darby, 22 April 2015, ‘China’s electricity could go 85% renewable by 2050 – study‘

The Solutions Project:

http://thesolutionsproject.org/

China: http://thesolutionsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/100_China.pdf

17. EUROPE

The Solutions Project:

http://thesolutionsproject.org/resource/139-country-100-infographics/

Roadmap 2050 (Europe)

The Roadmap 2050 project is an initiative of the European Climate Foundation (ECF) and has been developed by a consortium of experts funded by the ECF.

Europe 100% Renewable by 2050,

NuClear News No. 18, May 2010 discusses this study among others:

100% Renewable Electricity: A roadmap for Europe and North Africa, Price Waterhouse Coopers, March 2010

Europe ‒ 2014 report:

Phase out of Nuclear Power in Europe – From Vision to Reality
Authors:
Gustav Resch, Lukas Liebmann, Michael Lamprecht, Reinhard Haas ‒ TU Wien / Energy Economics Group (EEG)
Fabian Pause, Markus Kahles – Stiftung Umweltenergierecht (SUER)

Nuclear Information & Resource Service: ‘Nuclear-Free, Carbon-Free’: Many reports listed on this NIRS webpage (mostly USA, some global and Europe)

Zero Carbon Britain is the research project of the Centre for Alternative Technology, showing that a modern, zero-emissions society is possible using technology available today.

France: 2018 report

France’s environment ministry ADEME released a report finding that France will save €39 billion (US$44.5 billion) if it refrains from building 15 new nuclear plants by 2060, and instead replaces reactors with renewable energy sources.

France should spend €1.28 trillion over the next four decades, the report states, mostly on clean power production and storage capacities, networks, and imports. If it does this, France would progressively shut down its 58 reactors and renewable energy would comprise 85% of electricity generation by 2050 and 95% by 2060, up from 17% last year.

Bloomberg reported: “Falling costs means that photo-voltaic facilities won’t need subsidies from 2030, nor will onshore wind from 2035, the [ADEME] report said. That’s assuming that EDF halts 30 percent of its reactors after 40 years of operation and an additional 30 percent when they turn 50. Otherwise, surplus production capacity would undermine the economics of both nuclear power and renewables, ADEME said. The study doesn’t take into account the impact on jobs, industry and the environment. However, “we’re expecting job creations in renewables and energy efficiency to largely make up for job losses in the nuclear industry,” said ADEME Chairman Arnaud Leroy.”

ADEME, 10 Dec 2018, ‘Étude : Quelle Trajectoire D’évolution du #Mix #Électrique Français D’ici 2060?’, https://presse.ademe.fr/2018/12/etude-quelle-trajectoire-devolution-du-mix-electrique-francais-dici-2060.html

Francois De Beaupuy, 11 Dec 2018, ‘France Would Save $44.5 Billion by Betting on Renewable Energy, Agency Says’, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-10/french-power-costs-will-rise-if-renewables-are-sidestepped

Geert De Clercq / Reuters, 11 Dec 2018, ‘Building new nuclear plants in France uneconomical – environment agency’, https://uk.reuters.com/article/france-nuclearpower/building-new-nuclear-plants-in-france-uneconomical-environment-agency-idUKL8N1YF5HC

France: 2015 report

A 2015 report by ADEME, a French government agency under the Ministries of Ecology and Research, shows that a 100% renewable electricity supply by 2050 in France is feasible and affordable. For an all-renewables scenario, the report proposes an ideal electricity mix: 63% from wind, 17% from solar, 13% from hydro and 7% from renewable thermal sources (including geothermal energy). The report estimates that the electricity production cost (currently averaging 91 euros per MWh) would be 119 euros per megawatt-hour in the all-renewables scenario, compared with a near-identical figure of 117 euros per MWh with a mix of 50% nuclear, 40% renewables, and 10% fossil fuels.

English language summary: Terje Osmundsen, 20 April 2015

Full report (in French): L’Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l’Energie (ADEME), 2015, ‘Vers un mix électrique 100% renouvelable en 2050’

18. INDIA

India Energy Minister Flags Massive 100GW Solar Tender
By Giles Parkinson, 21 June 2018

Future bids for renewable projects to have 50 pc manufacturing component: R K Singh

June 25, 2018

Union Power Minister R K Singh said, “We will add 175 GW of renewable energy by 2022. We have already added around 70 GW of renewable energy that is solar and wind and around 40 GW is under implementation.”

On lowering emission goals, he said, “We have pledged in 2015 that by 2030, 40 per cent of our installed capacity will come from renewables.”

The minister said that with the addition of large hydro power of 45 GW to 70 GW of renewables, it has already crossed 30 per cent, and by 2030, about 53 or 55 per cent of installed power generation capacity will be renewables.

Talking about investment in clean energy in India, he said about USD 42 billion investment has come in renewables in the last four years which was done by facilitating the market and India did not invest except in the transmission.

On India’s household electrification programme, he said, “In the sphere of power and renewables, we are engaged in massive expansion programme. We are adding about 40 million electricity consumers. We have already added about 7.5 million consumers till date. We have added 100,000 km lines to transmission country.”

Unsubsidised wind and solar now cheapest form of bulk energy

Giles Parkinson, 20 November 2018

The latest report says the biggest news comes in the two fastest growing energy markets, China and India, where it notes that “not so long ago coal was king”. Not any more.

“In India, best-in-class solar and wind plants are now half the cost of new coal plants,” the report says, and this is despite the recent imposition of import tariffs on solar cells and modules.

100% Renewable Energy by 2050 for India

Dec. 2013: Even India could reach nearly 100% renewables by 2051, Emma Fitzpatrick, 17 Jan 2014.

19. JAPAN

A Sustainable Energy Outlook for Japan

Greenpeace, 2011, ‘The Advanced Energy [R]evolution: A Sustainable Energy Outlook for Japan’

Renewables 2013 Japan Status Report

Overall, Japan has given the go-ahead to over 70 GW of renewable energy projects, most of which are solar. Longer term, a ‘100% by 2050’ ISEP renewables scenario has around 50GW of wind, much of it offshore, and 140GW of PV.

20. USA

Nuclear Information & Resource Service: ‘Nuclear-Free, Carbon-Free’: Many reports listed on this NIRS webpage (mostly USA, some global and Europe)

Stanford / Jacobson: Roadmaps to convert the 50 United States to 100% Wind, Water, and Sunlight (WWS) for all purposes

Summary paper: Energy and Environmental Sciences 2015

State-by-state infographics from The Solutions Project / 100.org

National Geographic article and graphics on 50-state roadmaps

Powerpoint-WWS-map

50-state xlsx-spreadsheets

Frequently-asked questions

See other material posted at http://stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/WWS-50-USState-plans.html

Some other US studies from Jacobson et al.:

Mark Z. Jacobson et al., 2015, 100% clean and renewable wind, water, and sunlight (WWS) all-sector energy roadmaps for the 50 United States, Energy Environ. Sci., 2015, 8, 2093-2117
A low-cost solution to the grid reliability problem over 48 contiguous U.S. states with 100% penetration of intermittent wind, water, and solar for all purposes (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2015) (pdf) Clarification (pdf)

The Solutions Project

Study: wind and solar can power most of the United States
Wind, solar, and storage could meet 90–100% of America’s electricity needs
2018 study: Wind and solar PV could meet 80% of US electricity demand

A new study finds that wind power and solar photovoltaics could by themselves meet 80 percent of all U.S. electricity demand. “Five years ago, many people doubted that these resources could account for more than 20 or 30 percent,” co-author Steven Davis of the University of California at Irvine (UCI) explained in a news release. So, “the fact that we could get 80 percent of our power from wind and solar alone is really encouraging.”

From the news release: “But beyond the 80 percent mark, the amount of energy storage required to overcome seasonal and weather variabilities increases rapidly. “Our work indicates that low-carbon-emission power sources will be needed to complement what we can harvest from the wind and sun until storage and transmission capabilities are up to the job,” said co-author Ken Caldeira of the Carnegie Institution for Science. “Options could include nuclear and hydroelectric power generation, as well as managing demand.””

Also from the news release: “We looked at the variability of solar and wind energy over both time and space and compared that to U.S. electricity demand,” Davis said. “What we found is that we could reliably get around 80 percent of our electricity from these sources by building either a continental-scale transmission network or facilities that could store 12 hours’ worth of the nation’s electricity demand. The researchers said that such expansion of transmission or storage capabilities would mean very substantial – but not inconceivable – investments. They estimated that the cost of the new transmission lines required, for example, could be hundreds of billions of dollars. In comparison, storing that much electricity with today’s cheapest batteries would likely cost more than a trillion dollars, although prices are falling.”

Comments from Think Progress: “It’s especially encouraging for two additional reasons. First, the price of solar and wind have been dropping rapidly. Second, the study only examined how wind and solar could power the grid. In doing so, it found these two sources alone could provide 80 percent of the power. This still leaves 20 percent that could be provided by a variety of alternative types of carbon-free power. And in terms of alternate carbon-free power sources, hydropower already provides 6.5 percent of U.S. power while geothermal and biomass together add another 2 percent. All of those can be expanded.”

Matthew R. Shaner, Steven J. Davis, Nathan S. Lewisa and Ken Caldeira, 2018, ‘Geophysical constraints on the reliability of solar and wind power in the United States’, Energy & Environment Science.

News release

Think Progress article

Radioactive Exposure Tours

Radioactive Exposure Tour, April 2018

Ray Acheson from Reaching Critical Will writes about her experience of the 2018 Rad Tour to South Australia: A journey to the heart of the antinuclear resistance in Australia: 2018 Rad Tour

Radioactive Exposure Tour 2015: Red dirt, porridge and the nuclear industry

Gem Romuld

The 2015 Radioactive Exposure Tour was a multi-dimensional whirlwind dive into the nuclear landscapes of New South Wales and South Australia. We got up close and personal with Australia’s only nuclear reactor, former uranium mine sites, both of Australia’s two currently operating uranium mines, vast areas under uranium exploration and the five thousand kilometres of “nuclear freeway” in between.

This year’s radtour packed around 25 people into two mini-buses and a ute running on vegetable oil and started with the traditional pre-dawn packing session at Friends of the Earth on Smith St, Collingwood.

Our first two nights were spent on a beautiful bush property of our friends from Uranium Free NSW. The camp at Jervis Bay was located near the site that was to be home to Australia’s first nuclear power reactor under the government of John Gorton in the late 1960s. Gorton later acknowledged that there was a secret weapons agenda driving the Jervis Bay reactor project. Thankfully, a change of government dampened that sinister plan and we were able to swim the glorious waters of Jervis Bay without a nuclear reactor’s shadow.

A couple of hours north we were greeted by a large contingent of staff at the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Australia’s only research reactor at Lucas Heights. We were fed promotional videos and various misinformation including “radiation is radiation”, and therefore all the same. We asked lots of questions, and challenged the organisation on their role in ensuring responsible radioactive waste management. This includes preventing the manipulation of remote Aboriginal communities for a radioactive waste dump with such mythologies as the necessity of a remote waste dump for cancer patients to receive their treatments.

After some campaign history from the “Atom Free Embassy” days outside ANSTO, we high-tailed it to the Blue Mountains in time for a public meeting in Katoomba. Eco-pella sang their ratbag tunes and we heard Donna Mulhearn’s stories of acting as a human shield in Iraq and the devastating legacy of depleted uranium weapons use. After some classic group + banner photos at the Three Sisters the next morning we pushed on, heading west.

Upon our arrival in Dubbo, we walked into a fascinating collision of locals and an Alkane Resources employee at a meeting organised by Uranium Free Dubbo, discussing the proposed rare earths mine 20 kms out of town. As rare earths are typically found in conjunction with radioactive materials, the mine poses radiological risks − nearby residents would get elevated radiation exposure levels when the mine operated, and the town would be left with radioactive tailings forever and a day. Locals are worried about drinking water contamination, and doubted whether they could trust the company and what benefit they would derive from the mine.

Further west through open plains teeming with kangaroos and feral goats, we met with the thriving group “Nuclear Free Cobar” (one person) and eventually found the Broken Hill Racecourse Hall, a roof over our swags. The huge shed was somehow made cosy by the big feed that Kerry and Biscuit laid out for our weary arrival. While there are no current mine proposals, several companies have been prospecting for uranium around Western NSW.

Leaving Broken Hill meant leaving big towns for a while, and heading for the territories of the nuclear cowboys. We built our first desert camp under a full moon, en route to the Gammon Ranges. We woke, packed and left before sunrise. Emus welcomed us to Adnyamathanha country, where protest broke out against the Beverley uranium mine in its first years of operation from 1997. One particular protest was subject to a ten-year legal battle to hold the police accountable for their use of force, capsicum spray and locking nine people in a shipping container for several hours.

At the site, we had a brief tour of the controversial in-situ-leach mine before scones, tea and, of course, a Powerpoint presentation. The staff ducked and weaved through our questions, hand-balling them to each other and shying away from giving us numbers e.g. daily water usage of the mine. When questioned about the federal government’s tender for a radioactive waste dump site, they said ‘we think here would be a pretty good place’. Never mind what the Adnyamathanha community thinks …

We travelled on, skirting north of the Flinders Ranges and west along the Oodnadatta Track. Now on Arabunna country, we unfortunately had to skip the famous Marree Camel Cup, an annual highlight, to make Lake Eyre for sunset.

Everything slowed down for our dreamy “Oodnadatta Day”. We visited several of the mound springs, lush desert oases of endemic flora and fauna that are dependent on the natural flow of the mineral-rich waters of the Great Artesian Basin to the surface. The springs have sadly been drying up since the Olympic Dam mine started sucking 37 million litres of water per day from underneath them.

We shifted camp to the site of the Keepers of Lake Eyre camp, where Uncle Kev, Bilbo and others kept a constant watch on BHP Billiton for many years. After another incredible sunset and sunrise we had to tear ourselves away from that place for our uranium mine tour appointment at the gates of hell − Olympic Dam.

In Woomera we toured the missile park with Avon Hudson, nuclear veteran and whistleblower for the Maralinga nuclear weapons testing program. During his time working at Woomera and Maralinga he amassed a trove of damning stories and information, which we are so lucky to hear every year on the radtour.

Woomera locals Mick and Glenn shared our red dune campfire and told us some of their proud Kokatha family history of resisting uranium mining and the radioactive waste dump. Their families won the Irati Wanti campaign (the poison, leave it) more than a decade ago, and they are preparing for another campaign against radioactive waste in light of the SA Royal Commission into nuclear expansion, currently underway.

From Woomera we found ourselves in Adelaide all too quickly, with some of the tour preparing to stay for the Students of Sustainability conference and others preparing for the drive back to Melbourne. After the opening fire ceremony we heard from some of the Aboriginal champions for a nuclear-free-world like Uncle Kevin Buzzacott, Mitch and Aunty Sue Coleman-Haseldine. Their words reinforced the relevance of the journey we’d just travelled, and the need to keep the fight alive for an end to the atomic age.

The Radioactive Exposure Tour means many different things to different people. It is an education … of the land, of the struggles faced by Aboriginal people, a window into what happens out there when the city isn’t watching and a history lesson for the future. The radtour is a temporary community that must learn to get along, to work collectively and unravel patriarchal patterns in the way we function day-to-day. While travelling thousands of kilometres, we are fermenting information, ideas and conversation. Perhaps most importantly, the radtour is one way we grow the movement, maintain connections across vast distances, spark wild ideas and fortify ourselves for the next steps. Bring it on!

Gem Romuld is a member of FoE Melbourne’s Anti-nuclear and Clean Energy (ACE) Collective and was one of the organisers of the 2015 radtour.

More information and photos are posted at www.radioactivetour.com

If you’d like to register interest in next year’s radtour, email use at: radexposuretour@gmail.com

Radioactive Exposure Tours – a short history

Ila Marks

The first Nuclear Exposure Tour was organised in 1990, six years after the Roxby Blockades of 1983 and 1984 where hundreds of people blockaded and hindered the establishment of Olympic Dam Operations (the copper/uranium mine at Roxby Downs in northern South Australia). During these blockades people had the powerful experience of seeing a uranium mine and listening to Aboriginal people who opposed the mine. Blockaders also had the opportunity to show their opposition to uranium mining in creative, colourful and sometimes dramatic ways.

It was in this tradition that the idea of Nuclear Exposure Tours evolved. The Anti-Uranium Collective at Friends of the Earth organised the tours with the aim of letting people witness and experience the nuclear industry first hand. People would be able to see and walk on the country affected, to hear what Aboriginal people had to say, learn about the anti-nuclear movement and strengthen opposition to the nuclear industry. We wanted to give people the opportunity to support traditional land owners in their opposition to the nuclear industry, so that the tour participants could return to their colleges, work places or communities with the story of their experience and to encourage them to play a role in the anti-nuclear movement.

The first tour to Roxby Downs was carefully planned, with members of the Friends of the Earth anti-uranium collective doing what we call, a “dry-run”. Such a trip was not new; members of the collective had been visiting the Mound Springs area in northern South Australia and working with the Marree/Arabunna community there since 1987. The Mounds Springs are 120 Kilometres north of the Olympic Dam copper/uranium mine at Roxby Downs. Water for the mine, metallurgy plant and town was, and still is, being taken from the Great Artesian Basin and unique springs have dried completely and others have had a drastic reduction of flow. A trip to the Springs area led us to do a round trip to the town at Roxby Downs, the mine there and the tailings dam. Members of the anti-uranium collective were becoming familiar with the Springs and Roxby; this was another motivation for the tour, to share this experience with other people in an organised and constructive way.

The “dry-run” was important as permission from traditional land owners was needed to camp in their country and to obtain information on culturally appropriate behaviour. The anti-uranium collective also needed to meet with communities whose land they would be passing though to organise joint actions against nuclear activities in their areas. These included CRA’s proposed mineral sands development near Horsham in Victoria and the Rare Earth Tailings dump at Port Pirie. Future tours took in the Beverley Uranium Mine and the Honeymoon Project, and at the invitation of the Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta, camping at Ten Mile Creek just out of Coober Pedy. Recent tours have become focused on the proposal for a low to intermediate level nuclear waste dump in the Woomera area.

In organising the tours we at FoE always endeavour to make them more than just an out-back adventure! At Roxby Downs we organised public meetings on radiation exposure levels at the community centre, we leafleted the entire town on workers’ and community health issues, we organised awareness stalls with local environmentalists and produced a performance at the Woomera Primary School that involved all of the students as well as the people on the tour.

Following a tour in 1996 the participants formed a collective and organised the ‘Roxstop Action and Music Festival’ in 1997, where over 300 people gathered at Roxby to protest against the expansion of the mine. Here they hosted a public meeting attended by over 120 people with the United States epidemiologist Dr David Richarson as the key note speaker talking about his work and the effects of low level radiation exposure on nuclear workers. Roxstop also included an exhibition of paintings by the Melbourne Artist Lyn Hovey in the Roxby Library. After three days at Roxby the protestors moved to Alberrie Creek on Finnis Springs Station where a music festival was held over three nights to celebrate the Mound Springs, while during the day there were cultural workshops and tours given by members of the Arrabunna community including Reg Dodd and Kevin Buzzacott.

In August 1998 the collective that had organised Roxstop received a fax from the Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta. It said: “We’re trying hard about this rubbish – the radio-active waste dump. We don’t want that… We want your help! We want you to come up here to Coober Pedy and have a meeting with Aboriginal people (and any whitefellas from here who want to come)”. In September of that year a group of over a dozen people travelled from Melbourne to Coober Pedy and held a public meeting with the Aboriginal people to discuss the dump.

Things have not always run smoothly for the anti-uranium collective. One year we were stranded for a night on the Borefield Road between the Oodnadatta Track and Roxby Downs with forty people and three buses when the road became impassable due to rain! Another time at Mambury Creek in the southern Flinders Rangers, emus raided our camp and scattered our provisions including cereal, bread and fruit all over the campsite while the campers were protesting in Port Pirie! But, there have been great high-lights. The first time we were invited to the Ten Mile Creek (just outside of Cooper Pedy) by the Kungka Tjuta, we saw the beautiful sight of moon rising over Lake Eyre South. At Ten Mile Creek we saw the effects of the leaflet on workers’ health and exposure to low levels of radiation, we protested outside the Woomera Detention Centre, we saw the representatives of the Honeymoon Uranium Project squirm as tour participants asked difficult questions about the chemical structure of the waste solution to be pumped back into the aquifer. And we will never forget the warm greeting from members of the Adnyamathanha community at Nepabunna, even though we were four hours late!

There have been many great and rewarding outcomes from the Nuclear Exposures Tours. What stands out for us and what must be acknowledged here is the strengthening of the close working relationships we at Friends of the Earth have with the Aboriginal communities and the many individuals who have taken part in our tours. Every person who has gone on a tour has had an amazing, never-to-be-forgotten experience and many of the participants from various tours have made a considerable contribution to the anti-nuclear movement.

Originally published in the FoE Australia book 30 Years of Creative Resistance

Thorium power has a protactinium problem

Thorium ‒ a better fuel for nuclear technology

Thor-bores and uro-sceptics: thorium’s friendly fire

Thorium and nuclear weapons

Excerpt from: Thorium Fuel: No Panacea for Nuclear Power

Excerpt from: ICNND Research Paper No. 8, Revised

Comparison of thorium and uranium fuel cycles

Further reading on thorium and weapons proliferation

Thorium

Nuclear Weapons and ‘Generation 4’ Reactors

James Hansen’s Generation IV nuclear fallacies and fantasies

Fusion scientist debunks fusion power

OVERVIEW

ENRICHMENT

NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

INDIRECT LINKS BETWEEN POWER AND WEAPONS

PLUTONIUM GRADES

ALTERNATIVE REACTOR TYPES AND ALTERNATIVE FUEL CYCLES

SAFEGUARDS

MORE INFORMATION

REFERENCES

INTRODUCTION

GENERATIONS I-II

GENERATION III

GENERATION IV

PEBBLE BED MODULAR REACTORS (PBMR)

PLUTONIUM BREEDER REACTORS

FUSION POWER

THORIUM

REFERENCES

Why would anyone want to know about IFRs?

Barry Brook, Tom Blees et al.

What are IFRs?

DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF IFR COMPONENTS

Potential advantages of IFRs

PROBLEMS WITH IFRs

IFRs and WMD PROLIFERATION

WASTE

SAFETY

MORE INFO ON REPROCESSING, TRANSMUTATION etc.

INDEX TO THIS WEBPAGE

1. AUSTRALIA ‒ RENEWABLES GROWTH, WIND, SOLAR

2. AUSTRALIAN DEEP EMISSIONS CUTS STUDIES

3. AUSTRALIA ‒ INFORMATION SOURCES ON RENEWABLES (AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY ETC.)

4. ECONOMICS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY IN AUSTRALIA

5. RENEWABLE ENERGY JOBS IN AUSTRALIA

6. SOUTH AUSTRALIA

7. RESPONSES TO ANTI-RENEWABLES PROPAGANDISTS AND PAID LOBBYISTS

8. GLOBAL GROWTH OF RENEWABLES

9. ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL RENEWABLES

10. INTERNATIONAL DEEP EMISSIONS CUTS STUDIES

11. INTERNATIONAL DEEP EMISSIONS CUTS STUDIES ‒ MARK JACOBSON / STANFORD UNI RESEARCH

12. OTHER INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE

13. COUNTRY STUDIES

14. COUNTRIES WITH HIGH PERCENTAGES OF POWER FROM RENEWABLES

15. CANADA

16. CHINA

17. EUROPE

18. INDIA

19. JAPAN

20. USA

Radioactive Exposure Tour, April 2018

Radioactive Exposure Tour 2015: Red dirt, porridge and the nuclear industry

Radioactive Exposure Tours – a short history