Vale Uncle Kevin Buzzacott, fierce advocate for his people and a nuclear free Australia

Arabunna Elder Uncle Kevin Buzzacott passed away in Alice Springs on November 29, 2023. A fierce advocate for his people and for a nuclear-free Australia, Kevin will be sorely missed.

Kevin Buzzacott on Arabunna country in front of a water pumping station for the Olympic Dam mine.

Kevin was born in 1946 at Finniss Springs, on Arabunna country in South Australia. As a youngster, he learnt culture, language, how to live off the land, and he learnt to work with cattle and horses. Over the years, Kevin and his family lived in many places including Alice Springs, Tarcoola and Gawler. He worked on the railways for many years.

In 1984, Kevin moved to Port Augusta, where he worked as alcohol and drug worker. In 1985 he moved to Alice Springs where he worked on the successful campaign to stop the damming of the Todd River. He helped establish the Arrernte Council in Alice Springs and served as an ATSIC regional Councillor.

In the mid-1990s Kevin returned to South Australia to protect Arabunna country. One of his major campaigns was to try to stop the rapacious water take from the Great Artesian Basin by mining company WMC (and later BHP) to supply the Olympic Dam copper/uranium mine at Roxby Downs. The daily extraction of around 40 million litres of water has adversely affected the precious Mound Springs on Arabunna country ‒ desert oases supported by the underlying Great Artesian Basin. Kevin’s campaign might eventually succeed: there are plans to build a desalination plant on Spencer Gulf which could lead to a reduction and possible cessation of the water take from the Great Artesian Basin.

Kevin explained:

“I’ve been at this game of calling for justice and peace for 30, maybe 40 years, but what really got me going was when Western Mining Corporation (WMC) set up the Olympic Dam mine. They started doing deals with the government on pastoral leases. So they did deals with S. Kidman & Co. and took up one of their cattle stations, Stuart’s Creek Station, which is on Arabunna land. Because of our native title and ongoing land rights campaigning, we’ve been fighting for these places for a long time. Stuart’s Creek is a very special, sacred place for us, and we’ve been trying to get it back for a long time.

“I thought that just before they bought that place I’d go and protest and camp on it. Also, it is on that station, on the shores of the Lake Eyre, where WMC started taking the sacred water out of the Lake Eyre Basin. That was where they started sucking the life blood out of us. That is where they put their big bore down, right on the shores of the lake. That was a real kick in the guts for me and really got me going.”

Protest camp

Kevin set up a protest camp on Arabunna country:

“I weighed it all up and I said to the mob, ‘I need some help out here. We’ll set up camp and contest WMC.’ There were a lot of levels involved with fighting the mine, but making the camp was like reclaiming the land or making a statement.

“We had a lot of tourists that came to visit, and were interested in finding out what was going on. Thousands of people came through the camp. We had flyers at an information tent, and free tea and coffee; we set up a lot of things. People who came across us on a trip to the desert and Lake Eyre learnt about the issues and were concerned about what was going on. When they talked with us they were upset about what was going on. Nobody knew about it, and that was one of the reasons in my mind why that was happening out in the desert.”

The protest camp was established in March 1999. WMC was among the most viciously racist mining companies in Australia and true to form, the company tried to have Arabunna Elder Kevin Buzzacott evicted from Arabunna country. The protest camp lasted until it was busted up by WMC goons and local police in December 1999.

Kevin initiated court actions against WMC and the federal government. These actions weren’t successful in the courts but helped draw attention to the issues Kevin was fighting for:

“I did a court action against Hugh Morgan, who was the head of WMC. I charged Hugh Morgan with genocide, trying to flush him out and some of the shareholders. Hugh Morgan is based in Victoria. People in Melbourne deserve to live in a good place, they don’t need to live with these criminals and warmongers. Another court action I did was one I brought against Alexander Downer and Senator Robert Hill for stopping Lake Eyre from becoming a World Heritage site.”

After the protest camp on Arabunna country was busted up, Kevin set up a protest camp at Genocide Corner ‒ outside the SA Governor’s residence in the centre of Adelaide:

“I had to go to Adelaide for the court case against Hugh Morgan, and when I was there the charges against Hugh Morgan were dismissed. The judge was a pastor in the Lutheran Church, and I asked him to stand down because I believed he had a conflict of interest as his church was a shareholder in the WMC. When he refused to do so I told him to get stuffed, walked out and went straight down to Government House to start a protest. I took banners, and whatever things I had.

“While I was talking to the media I was confronted by the cops. I looked over the road and saw a patch of grass and thought, “Bugger it, I’ll make camp and a fire here.” I ended up calling it genocide Corner, and renamed Adelaide the City of Genocide. It was on the intersection of King William Street and North Terrace [one of the main intersections in the city] so loads of people were passing by. Four ceremonial fires for peace were lit, and after 21 days the Adelaide City Council and 50 police came down and arrested me for failing to cease to loiter. It was one of those laws they hadn’t used in a long time, but they used it to clear away all my stuff and my supporters. One of the court conditions was that I was not able to walk within the vicinity of Genocide Corner. I was of a mind just to walk straight back there, but I had the Peace Walk from Lake Eyre to Sydney coming up so I had to let that one go.”

Peace Walk

The Peace Walk was timed to reach Sydney for the Olympics in September 2000:

“We walked for months, for 3,000 kilometres, and all sorts of people from all walks of life joined us. We were carrying the fire for peace and justice. I made sure that we went through lots of different Aboriginal communities. I got a lot of support, but the government also pressured a lot of people not to support me by threatening their jobs and funding. Each place we went to, people took us through their land and we respected each mob.

“There were all types of pressure put on people along the way. The cops were nasty and threatened some of the walkers with guns and everything. I visited all the jails along the way from Broken Hill to Dubbo and Bathurst. It was sad to see so many young brothers confined and locked up.

“We went to Canberra and met up with the Tent Embassy mob. A couple of politicians came to meet us and then we all went to Government House to present the Governor-General with a document of peace and justice.

“When we arrived in Sydney for the Olympic Games the Tent Embassy mob had already set up a camp [in Victoria Park], so we joined up with them. We did all sorts of things. We did a re-enactment at the beach where Captain Cook came in. We re-enacted the bad way in which he came with guns and all that and then the next day we did how they should have come.”

In 2002, Kevin reclaimed the Emu and Kangaroo totems from the Australian Coat of Arms hanging outside Parliament House, Canberra:

“I had watched the Federal Police arresting our people at the Tent Embassy and other places. They all wore these caps with the Emu and Kangaroo emblem on them. I knew how sacred these animals were to us and I had talked with old people about how the government was misusing them while they locked us up and treated us like dirt. On the 30th anniversary of the embassy I told everyone that I had a plan and that they should join me with their cameras. We went up to Parliament and I climbed up one of the pillars and grabbed the Coat Of Arms and walked off with it. It was in broad daylight and I said: “I’m not stealing this, I’m reclaiming it and taking back the use of our sacred animals.”

“Years later [in 2005] when I was visiting Canberra the cops came down to the Tent Embassy with a summons for theft and defacing government property and so on. During the court case I questioned their authority and jurisdiction over me and over this land. I talked to the jury about the imposition of foreign laws upon our people and the theft of our lands and got a 12-month suspended sentence with good behaviour.”

Peace Pilgrimage to Japan

In 2004, Kevin participated in the Peace Pilgrimage from the Olympic Dam uranium mine to Hiroshima, Japan:

“During the first walk and then in Sydney we met people from all over and that got everything going. Aboriginal nations from Queensland were saying there should be a walk up the coast to show the world the things they were suffering. Then some people made contact with people in Hiroshima to have a walk from the uranium mine in Roxby to where the bomb was dropped in order to show how all these things are linked. Aboriginal people, Japanese monks, all sorts of people were involved. It started at Roxby and then went to Canberra and then an aeroplane took us to Japan where we walked all over the country. We visited Nagasaki and Hiroshima and met a lot of people who were kids when the bombs were falling. We did talks and took part in a huge ceremony on the anniversary of the bomb being dropped. There were people everywhere and lanterns lit and people crying, it was full on.”

In 2006, Kevin went to Melbourne for the Stolenwealth Games:

“After the court case I came down to Melbourne where Robbie Thorpe and others were setting up a camp in Kings Domain during the Commonwealth, or Stolenwealth, Games. We had hundreds of people camping and visiting. We also had all sorts of hassles from the cops and council and everyone else, but we stayed put and proved our point.

“When the games came we had rallies and big marches and ceremonies and I talked about the need for justice and the need for white Australia to respect our cultural values and to stop the destruction of our sacred sites and our country.”

And Kevin was back in Melbourne in 2008 for BHP’s Annual General Meeting:

“BHP have taken over WMC. They now own Olympic Dam and want to make it bigger. Myself and others who want to stop the mine got to be proxies for shareholders, they gave us tickets and we got to go inside on their behalf. I got to speak and I told the people there about the damage they are doing and that they need to stop it immediately.

“Aboriginal people have lived here for more than 40,000 years and cared for this country, but now its being turned into a sick and evil place. Myself, and others around this country, were born to be peacemakers.

“We mustn’t be frightened to educate others and fight, but not in a warlike way, to protect the earth and let everything run free. I don’t want to shoot or bomb the people from BHP and the others who are destroying this country because two wrongs don’t make a right. I think if I can help them to wake up to what they are doing then that will be punishment enough.”

Kevin was at the first meeting of the Alliance Against Uranium (later renamed the Australian Nuclear Free Alliance) in 1997, and for many years he served as the Alliance’s President. He actively supported countless campaigns against uranium mining and plans to dump nuclear waste on Aboriginal land. He was at the Beverley uranium mine supporting Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners in May 2000 when SA police viciously and illegally attacked protesters, children and journalists. Kevin was at the Lizard’s Revenge protest at Olympic Dam in 2012.

Awards

In 2001, Kevin was awarded Nuclear-Free Future Resistance Award by the Nuclear-Free Future Foundation and travelled to Ireland to accept the award.

In 2006, Kevin was awarded the SA Conservation Council’s Jill Hudson Award.

In 2007, Kevin was awarded the Australian Conservation Foundation’s 2007 Peter Rawlinson Award for two decades of work highlighting the impacts of uranium mining and promoting a nuclear free Australia. ACF Executive Director Don Henry said:

“Kevin is a cultural practitioner, an activist, an advocate and an educator.  He has travelled tirelessly, talking to groups large and small about the impacts of uranium mining and the threats posed by the nuclear industry.  Kevin has had a profound impact on the lives of many people – especially young people – with his many tours and ‘on-country’ events.  For many young activists ‘Uncle Kev’ is truly an unsung hero and, against the current pro-nuclear tide, his is a very important struggle and story.”

Kevin participated in many of the Radioactive Exposure Tours run by Friends of the Earth. We camped at the ‘Old Lake’ (Lake Eyre) and generations of young activists learnt first-hand about the impacts of the Olympic Dam mine on country and culture.

Kevin’s partner Margret Gilchrist passed on Kevin’s final message when he returned to Alice Springs with his health failing: “Keep that old fire burning, don’t stop til we’ve won, Lake Eyre for World Heritage.”

Kevin’s funeral service can be viewed online and many videos featuring Kevin can be found at Cinemata and YouTube.

[Written by Jim Green, national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia.]

Samphire uranium

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH AUSTRALIA SUBMISSION IN RESPONSE TO ALLIGATOR ENERGY’S APPLICATION FOR A RETENTION LEASE OVER THE BLACKBUSH DEPOSIT (SAMPHIRE URANIUM PROJECT)

To: Mining Regulation Branch

SA Department for Energy and Mining

September 2023

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. The SA Department for Energy and Mining should reject Alligator Energy’s application to conduct a Field Recovery Trial at the Samphire lease due to inadequate provisions for solid and liquid waste management.
  2. Alligator Energy should be required to lodge a financial bond with the SA government to ensure that adequate financing is available for rehabilitation if the Field Recovery Trial proceeds.
  3. The Field Recovery Trial should not be approved because Alligator Energy has no credible plan for disposal of solid low-level radioactive waste.
  4. The Department for Energy and Mining should consider promises vs. delivery at the Beverley and Honeymoon mines. Undoubtedly spills were far more frequent and voluminous than envisaged. At a minimum, Alligator Energy should be required to have a credible plan to manage radioactive liquid spills far in excess of one cubic metre.
  5. There may be technical or logistical reasons why Heathgate may reject the offer of eluate and Alligator should be required to come up with credible contingency plans for eluate disposal before a Field Recovery Trial is allowed to proceed.
  6. The Department for Energy and Mining should investigate issues raised by the Heathgate whistleblower and its implications for other mining projects including the proposed Field Recovery Trial at the Samphire lease.
  7. The Department for Energy and Mining should conduct or commission a thorough comparative assessment of the options for managing liquid waste rather than assuming that dumping contaminated liquid waste in groundwater is an adequate solution.

INTRODUCTION

Friends of the Earth Australia opposes uranium mining for various reasons including the weapons proliferation risks associated with the industry, and the intractable problem of high-level nuclear waste management. Those issues are beyond the scope of the SA Department for Energy and Mining’s consideration of the Samphire project application. Nevertheless we call on the Department to reject Alligator Energy’s application to conduct a Field Recovery Trial at the Samphire lease due to inadequate provisions for solid and liquid waste management.

It is more than likely that the Samphire mine will not proceed to commercial production due to:

  • The modest size of the uranium deposit (18.1Mlbs U3O8 at a 250ppm cut-off grade (combined Inferred and Indicated) from 11.4Mt @ 720ppm U3O8).[1]
  • Stubbornly low uranium prices over the past decade, notwithstanding a price increase in 2023 which may or may not be sustained.[2]
  • Near-zero prospects for significant worldwide uranium demand increase.[3]
  • The largest worldwide producers ‒ Cameco and Kazatomprom ‒ have put large uranium mine projects into care-and-maintenance in recent years and the re-entry of those large projects will put downward pressure on prices and severely limit the prospects for small start-ups such as Alligator Energy.
  • Alligator Energy notes that the company plans “to undertake a Feasibility Study in 2024, with all activity requiring further State and Federal Government approvals, and the securing of project financing amongst other key matters, before a mine could be developed.”

The Samphire project was abandoned a decade ago and will likely be abandoned again. This highlights the need for full rehabilitation of the site if approval is granted for a Field Recovery Trial.

Recommendation: Alligator Energy should be required to lodge a financial bond with the SA government to ensure that adequate financing is available for rehabilitation if the Field Recovery Trial proceeds.

SOLID WASTE

A 2003 SA government audit of radioactive wastes stated that the Radium Hill waste repository contains some contaminated equipment from test work conducted at the Honeymoon site in the early 1980s.[4] The same audit noted that the Radium Hill waste repository “is not engineered to a standard consistent with current internationally accepted practice.”

Dumping contaminated solid waste at the sub-standard repository at Radium Hill is not an option for Alligator Energy. What plans does Alligator Energy have for the disposal of solid wastes contaminated with radionuclides and other toxins?

Alligator Energy’s Retention Lease Proposal states that low-level radioactive waste generated during the Field Recovery Trial will include:

“Soil wastes generated within operational areas that have been in contact with process fluids or material from the mineralised zone, are waste streams derived from processing, and/or are waste materials that do not meet specified radiological clearance limits.”

The Retention Lease Proposal also provides the following information on solid low-level radioactive wastes:

The Retention Lease Proposal goes on to state:

“Low level radioactive wastes will be securely stored on site during the leach trials in compliance with the Radiation Protection and Control Act 2021 and associated regulations the specific requirements that will be detailed in the site Radiation Management Plan and Radioactive Waste Management Plan (RMP/RWMP).”

The Retention Lease Proposal envisages disposal in a “licensed disposal facility”. To the best of our knowledge, SA does not have a “licensed disposal facility” for low-level radioactive waste, in which case Alligator Energy has no credible plan for disposal of low-level radioactive waste.

Recommendation: The Field Recovery Trial should not be approved because Alligator Energy has no credible plan for disposal of solid low-level radioactive waste.

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID SPILLS

A feature of ISL mining is surface contamination from spills and leaks of radioactive solutions. The SA Department of Primary Industry and Resources listed 59 spills at Beverley from 1998-2007 and presumably there have been many more since 2007.

Alligator Energy’s Retention Lease Proposal states that spills of low-level radioactive liquid waste are anticipated to amount to no more than one cubic metre. It further states: “All low-level radioactive waste streams will be transferred to the liquid waste storage vessel, then directed to the liquid disposal zone where disposal will occur.”

Recommendation: The Department for Energy and Mining should consider promises vs. delivery at Beverley and Honeymoon. Undoubtedly spills were far more frequent and voluminous than envisaged. At a minimum, Alligator Energy should be required to have a credible plan to manage radioactive liquid spills far in excess of one cubic metre.

LIQUID WASTE AND ATTENUATION

Alligator Energy’s Retention Lease Proposal states that eluate (containing ~6000lbs of dissolved uranium) from the ion exchange stripping process will be the end product and will be stored in tanks onsite. Alligator proposes retaining the stored eluate for approximately one year post the end of the Field Recovery Trial to allow sufficient time for a formal decision on whether or not to proceed to a full-scale mining operation with the two options cited being: eluate retained onsite for future Alligator Energy production or donated for precipitation at one of SA’s producing ISR mines.

Recommendation: There may be technical or logistical reasons why Heathgate may reject the offer of eluate and Alligator should be required to come up with credible contingency plans before a Field Recovery Trial is allowed to proceed. Alligator talks about plural in-situ recovery (ISR) mines although it surely knows that only Beverley is operating.

Alligator Energy’s Retention Lease Proposal states:

“If field natural attenuation monitoring cannot be verified within 5 years, a reassessment of the model against field parameters will be undertaken and model rerun (if required). Natural attenuation monitoring for model verification will be undertaken until model validation is accepted by relevant regulatory agencies. In the event, model validation cannot be achieved, Alligator will undertake active groundwater restoration methods such as groundwater flush or sweep.”

Further detail is required on groundwater restoration options. The Retention Lease Proposal is unacceptably vague.

Alligator Energy will have precious little interest in groundwater restoration if a decision is made not to proceed to commercial mining. The company may not have the resources for groundwater restoration. The company may not even exist in five years’ time. All this points to the need for a financial bond to be lodged with the SA government to ensure that adequate resources are available for full site rehabilitation including groundwater restoration.

BEVERLEY/HEATHGATE WHISTLEBLOWER

A former Heathgate worker contacted Friends of the Earth in 2022 and provided the following information:

* Heathgate breaks every rule in the book and Beverley may be the worst-run mine in SA.

* Regulation is deficient in many respects within and between the SA EPA, Safe Work SA and SA Water.

* Heathgate should have been hit with one or more $30,000 fines by Safe Work SA but Safe Work SA has been negligent.

* Gross mismanagement by Heathgate has led to high staff turn-over ‒ in particular with respect to staff responsible for worker safety.

* Lids have come off uranium drums at the Beverley plant and also on one or more ships transporting uranium to the USA. The handling of uranium spillages at Beverley has grossly violated safety protocols.

* Problems arising from a revolving door between regulators and Heathgate.

* Heathgate isn’t prepared to spend the money required to fix problems at Beverley, and there is little or no pressure from regulators.

* Problems with radioactive monitoring badges, e.g. not replaced if lost.

* Culture of acceptance of safety lapses, anyone speaking up may be fired. NDAs are part of the problem.

Clearly the concerns raised by the former Heathgate employee raise concerns regarding other mines including the Samphire proposal, in particular whether regulatory deficiencies will have adverse consequences.

Have there been ICAC and/or Office of Public Integrity investigations into aspects of Heathgate’s operations at Beverley? If so, what lessons if any were learned and how is that knowledge impacting assessment of other projects including Alligator Energy’s Samphire project?

Recommendation: The Department for Energy and Mining should investigate issues raised by the Heathgate whistleblower and its implications for other mining projects including the proposed Field Recovery Trial at the Samphire lease.

HISTORY OF IN-SITU LEACH URANIUM MINING

In-situ leach (ISL) uranium mining involves pumping an acid solution (or an alkaline solution in some cases) into an aquifer. This dissolves the uranium ore and other heavy metals and the solution is then pumped back to the surface. The small amount of uranium is separated at the surface. The liquid radioactive waste – containing radioactive particles, heavy metals and acid – is simply dumped in groundwater.

A 2004 CSIRO report states:[5]

“As stated in the Beverley Assessment Report, the bleed solutions, waste solutions from uranium recovery, plant washdown waters and bleed streams from the reverse osmosis plants are collected prior to disposal into the Namba aquifer via disposal wells. These liquid wastes are combined and concentrated in holding/evaporation ponds, with excess injected into selected locations within the mined aquifer. The injected liquid is acidic (pH 1.8 to 2.8) and contains heavy metals and radionuclides originating from the orebody.

From being inert and immobile in the ore body, the radionuclides and heavy metals are now mobile in the aquifer.

The 2004 CSIRO report endorsed the dumping of liquid waste in ground-water yet the information and arguments it used in support of that conclusion were tenuous. The CSIRO report notes that attenuation is “not yet proven” and the timeframe of “several years to decades” could hardly be more vague. The 2004 CSIRO report states in its Executive Summary:

“The use of acid rather than alkaline leaching and disposal of liquid wastes by re-injection into the aquifer is contentious. Available data indicate that both the leach solution and liquid waste have greater concentrations of soluble ions than does the pre-mining groundwater. However as this groundwater has no apparent beneficial use other than by the mining industry, this method of disposal is preferable to surface disposal. Although not yet proven, it is widely believed and accepted that natural attenuation will result in the contaminated water chemistry returning to pre-mining conditions within a timeframe of over several years to decades.”

Elsewhere the 2004 CSIRO report notes uncertainties associated with attenuation:

“The EIA for Beverley and Honeymoon suggest that natural attenuation will occur, however, exact timeframes are not given. The issue of predicting attenuation is made more complex by not fully understanding the microbiological or the mineralogy of the surrounding ore bodies, before and after mining, and how these natural conditions will react with the altered water quality introduced by the injection of leachate, and re-injection of wastewaters. Following general practice, geochemical modelling was undertaken with a series of assumptions where data were not available. Although these assumptions are considered reasonable by the review team, some technical experts have a differing opinion. In any case the results must be considered approximate.

The monitoring results from Beverley are limited by the short duration of mining and operation, and there are currently no completely mined-out areas for which the water chemistry can be followed after mining to verify the extent of the expected natural attenuation. However, pH results for an area that was trial-mined in 1998 and then left until full-scale mining of the same area was due are shown in Figure 13.

Note that whilst other data are available for these wells there are not consistent trends in other analytes. There has been little recovery of groundwater chemistry towards background in the test-production wells other than a favourable change for pH. There are presently no equivalent monitoring data for the northern area, which is presently being mined.”

Even if full attenuation does occur over time, it is unlikely to occur in the timeframe of post-mine-closure monitoring proposed by the mining proponent. The 7/1/09 Beverley Four Mile Project Public Environment – Report and Mining Lease Proposal document states:

“Heathgate proposes an initial period of five years from the conclusion of commercial operations to complete the decommissioning of facilities. A monitoring and maintenance program is proposed to run for a further two years, for a total of seven years from the final conclusion of mining activities. The total monitoring period will be reviewed with the regulatory authorities and may be extended.

“Facilities will therefore be fully decommissioned within seven years from the conclusion of the commercial operation. This period includes a post-completion monitoring period for vegetation maintenance, groundwater sampling, drainage repairs and other activities to ensure the long-term permanent rehabilitation of the site.

The 2004 CSIRO report states:

“Natural attenuation is preferred to adjusting the chemistry of the wastewater prior to re-injection as the latter would result in the need for additional chemicals on-site, generation of contaminated neutralisation sludges which would have to be disposed of, risk of potential clogging of pore spaces in the aquifer and associated higher costs.

Those are not insurmountable problems. Moreover there are alternatives to adjusting the chemistry of waste-water then reinjecting it into the aquifer, such as evaporation followed by management of solid wastes. As the CSIRO report notes:

“10.6 Alternatives to Liquid Waste Re-Injection

“Suggestions made during the community consultation process included not re-injecting the liquid wastes into the aquifer, and neutralisation of waste before re-injection.

“Not re-injecting the waste into the aquifer would require either sophisticated water treatment and/or the installation of much larger evaporation ponds. Both would generate solid wastes to be disposed of in a solid waste repository. When the wastes dried out they would become a possible dust source, which could increase the potential radiation exposure of workers, in particular in relation to dust inhalation, but also from radon inhalation and gamma exposure. Environmental radiation levels at the surface would also increase. These are presently negligible issues associated with the existing ISL practices.

“Neutralisation of the waste liquid prior to re-injection would precipitate out some metal salts, which would need to be filtered before re-injection, and be disposed of in a solid waste repository.

“Also following re-injection it is likely that the re-injection bores would rapidly clog owing to precipitation around the bores, as the injected water and existing acidic water in the aquifer interact. Clogging of re-injection wellfields and associated problems with pipelines and pumps may increase the risk of spills due to operational problems with equipment and increased maintenance.”

None of the issues raised by the CSIRO amount to compelling reasons to support dumping liquid waste in groundwater. Some of the reasons cited are absurd and cast serious doubt over the credibility of the CSIRO review ‒ for example dust suppression is simple and inexpensive.

Recommendation: The SA Department for Energy and Mining should conduct or commission a thorough comparative assessment of the options for managing liquid waste rather than assuming that dumping contaminated liquid waste in groundwater is an adequate solution.

The 2003 Senate References and Legislation Committee report into the regulation of uranium mining in Australia reported “a pattern of under-performance and non-compliance”, it identified “many gaps in knowledge and found an absence of reliable data on which to measure the extent of contamination or its impact on the environment”, and it concluded that changes were necessary “in order to protect the environment and its inhabitants from serious or irreversible damage”. On ISL mining, the 2003 Senate report stated:

“The Committee is concerned that the ISL process, which is still in its experimental state and introduced in the face of considerable public opposition, was permitted prior to conclusive evidence being available on its safety and environmental impacts.”

“The Committee recommends that, owing to the experimental nature and the level of public opposition, the ISL mining technique should not be permitted until more conclusive evidence can be presented on its safety and environmental impacts.”

“Failing that, the Committee recommends that at the very least, mines utilising the ISL technique should be subject to strict regulation, including prohibition of discharge of radioactive liquid mine waste to groundwater, and ongoing, regular independent monitoring to ensure environmental impacts are minimised.”

 In relation to the Beverley mine, Assoc. Prof. Gavin Mudd notes: “The critical data which could answer scientific questions concerning contaminant mobility in groundwater has never been released by General Atomics. This is especially important since GA no longer maintain the mine is ‘isolated’ from surrounding groundwater, with desires to expand the mine raising legitimate concerns over the groundwater contamination legacy left at Beverley.”

Assoc. Prof. Mudd states:

The mining technique of in situ leaching (ISL), often referred to as solution mining, is becoming an increasingly favoured method for the extraction of uranium across the world. This is primarily due to its low capital and operating costs compared to conventional mining. Little is known about the environmental impact of this method, and mining companies have been able to exploit this to promote the method as “environmentally benign”.

The ISL process involves drilling ground water bores or wells into a uranium deposit, injecting corrosive chemicals to dissolve the uranium within the ore zone, then pumping back the uranium-laden solution.

The method can be applied only to uranium deposits located within a ground water system or confined aquifer, commonly in palaeochannel deposits (old buried river beds).

Although ISL is presented in simplified diagrams by the nuclear industry, the reality is that geological systems are inherently complex and not predictable.

There are a range of options for the chemistry of the mining solutions. Either acidic or alkaline chemical agents can be used in conjunction with an oxidising agent to dissolve the uranium.

Typical oxidising agents include oxygen or hydrogen peroxide, while alkaline agents include ammonia or sodium-bicarbonate or carbon dioxide. The most common acidic chemical used is sulphuric acid, although nitric acid has been tried at select sites and in laboratory tests.

The chemicals can have potentially serious environmental impacts and cause long-term changes to ground water quality.

The use of acidic solutions mobilises high levels of heavy metals, such as cadmium, strontium, lead and chromium. Alkaline solutions tend to mobilise only a few heavy metals such as selenium and molybdenum. The ability to restore the ground water to its pre-mining quality is, arguably, easier at sites that have used alkaline solution chemistry.

A review of the available literature on ISL mines across the world can easily counter the myths promulgated about ISL uranium mining. Whether one examines the USA, Germany, Russia and associated states, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Australia or new ISL projects across Asia, the truth remains the same – the ISL technique merely treats ground water as a sacrifice zone and the problem remains “out of sight, out of mind”.

ISL uranium mining is not controllable, is inherently unsafe and is unlikely to meet “strict environmental controls”. It is not an environmentally benign method of uranium mining.

The use of sulphuric acid solutions at ISL mines across Eastern Europe, as well as a callous disregard for sensible environmental management, has led to many seriously contaminated sites.

Perhaps the most severe example is Straz pod Ralskem in the Czech Republic, where up to 200 billion litres of ground water is contaminated. Restoration of the site is expected to take several decades or even centuries.

Solution escapes and difficult restorations have been documented at ISL sites in Texas and Wyoming.

Australia has encountered the same difficulties, especially at the controversial Honeymoon deposit in South Australia during pilot studies in the early 1980s and at Manyingee in Western Australia until 1985.

The Honeymoon pilot project used sulphuric acid in conjunction with ferric sulphate as the oxidising agent. The wells and aquifer experienced significant blockages due to the minerals jarosite and gypsum precipitating, lowering the efficiency of the leaching process and leading to increased excursions. The aquifers in the vicinity of Honeymoon are known to be connected to aquifers used by local pastoralists to water stock.

Journal articles, conferences papers etc. on ISL mining (and other issues) by Assoc. Prof. Mudd are available online.[6]

A 2007 Friends of the Earth Adelaide report noted:[7]

Field trials” of acid in-situ leach (acid ISL) uranium mining have already occurred at the Beverley uranium mine and the proposed Honeymoon site in north-eastern South Australia. Given the history of leaks and spills that occurred at Honeymoon and Beverley during their “trial” phases, there is significant cause for concern around further such “trials”. Six spills were recorded at the Honeymoon trial mine in 1999, including one “excursion” of 9,600 litres of “process fluid”, which had a significant uranium and toxic radon gas content, and another in which sulphuric acid injected into the groundwater as part of the mine process unexpectedly traveled upwards, contaminating a higher aquifer. None of these spills were revealed to the public until after the project had been granted state and federal approvals.

During the trial at Beverley through 1998, 500 litres of extraction fluid were spilt, the accident not revealed until 5 months after it occurred. Beverley also experienced a major underground leak of radioactive mining solution to groundwater in 1999, also not confirmed until after state government approvals in 2001.

While one purpose of conducting a “trial” may be to determine the extent and nature of a groundwater system, the injection of acid and radioactive mine waste into aquifers is not an acceptable way of doing this. The South Australian community has a democratic right to participate in decision-making regarding activities with significant environmental impact such as mining. The history of leaks, spills and accidents that characterise ISL mining emphasise the urgent need for full environmental assessment to be conducted before the commencement of any mining, “trial” or otherwise.

The 2007 Friends of the Earth Adelaide report also pointed to severe problems with ISL mining overseas:[8]

Both acid and alkaline ISL mines across the world have left a track record of contamination of surrounding groundwater systems, some of which are the main water supply for communities, with attempts to rehabilitate the groundwater often unsuccessful. Some of the European cases include:

  • Königstein (Germany): as of 2005, there was still 1,900 million m3 of radioactive and heavy metals contaminated water within the mining zone. This pollution lies within an aquifer that supplies Dresden with drinking water;
  • Devladovo (Ukraine): the surface of the site was heavily contaminated from spills, and groundwater contamination is spreading downstream from the site at a speed of 53m per year. By 1995 it had already traveled a distance of 1.7km, and will reach the village of Devladovo in the next 12 years;
  • Bolyarovo, Tenevo/Okop, Haskovo(Bulgaria): very high concentrations of sulfate ions are found in surface water and in the wells of private owners as a result of accidental spilling of solution. All uranium mining and milling in Bulgaria was closed down by government decree in 1992, after over 20km2 of the country was contaminated by uranium industry activity.

The contamination at these and many other sites, including the high concentrations of major ions, heavy metals and radionuclides, has not attenuated significantly over time (as uranium mining companies claim), and instead often migrates through groundwater to pollute other areas.

US geochemist and environmental scientist Richard Abitz comments on his own experience attempting to rehabilitate groundwater at ISL uranium mines in Ohio, Texas and Wyoming. When the mining chemicals are injected into groundwater, he observes, uranium contamination “goes through the roof”. “Once it is in there, the damage has been done”, he says. “It takes hundreds, perhaps thousands of years to transform aquifer water back into a drinkable condition”, and “regardless of the millions of dollars and years of efforts, the water has never been restored.”

Australia’s own problematic experience with ISL uranium mining (limited to the Beverley mine, and the Honeymoon and Manyingee, WA, “trials”), combined with the experience of ISL overseas emphasise the serious risks and impacts of this mining method. That such mining should be permitted in South Australia on a “trial” basis, without environmental impact or public consultation is a grave concern that demands legislative amendment.

[1] Alligator Energy, 2023 Retention Lease Proposal, Executive Summary

[2] https://www.cameco.com/invest/markets/uranium-price

[3] https://reneweconomy.com.au/is-nuclear-power-in-a-global-death-spiral/

[4] Radiation Protection Division, SA Environment Protection Authority, September 2003, ‘Audit of Radioactive Material in South Australia’

[5] Taylor, G.; Farrington, V.; Woods, P.; Ring, R.; Molloy, R. (2004): Review of Environmental Impacts of the Acid In-Situ Leach Uranium Mining Process.- CSIRO Land and Water Client Report.

[6] http://web.archive.org/web/20100228164521/http://civil.eng.monash.edu.au/about/staff/muddpersonal More recent ISL papers can be obtained directly from Assoc. Prof. Mudd: https://www.rmit.edu.au/contact/staff-contacts/academic-staff/m/mudd-dr-gavin

[7] Friends of the Earth Adelaide, November 2007, Driving without a license: uranium mining ‘trials’ in SA, http://archive.foe.org.au/sites/default/files/TrialBriefNov2007.pdf

[8] Friends of the Earth Adelaide, November 2007, Driving without a license: uranium mining ‘trials’ in SA, http://archive.foe.org.au/sites/default/files/TrialBriefNov2007.pdf

Stop the nuclear dump on Barngarla Country

Please write to senior SA Labor Government politicians and ask them to contact their federal Labor colleagues calling on them to respect the rights of Barngarla Traditional Owners, respect the Federal Court’s July 18 decision, and to abandon the plan to impose a national nuclear waste dump on Barngarla country in SA.

  1. Send individual emails (not a group email).
  2. The politicians’ names and details ‒ including email addresses ‒ are reproduced below.
  3. Sample text is copied below. You can use this text but feel free to edit and to add your own thoughts.
  4. Make sure to add your name, address and email address at the bottom of your emails.
  5. If you have time, please also send some emails to federal Labor politicians: relevant info is posted at https://nuclear.foe.org.au/kimba/

Thanks!

Friends of the Earth Nuclear-Free Campaign

https://nuclear.foe.org.au/waste

————

premier@sa.gov.au

Peter Malinauskas

Premier of South Australia

————

officeofthedeputypremier@sa.gov.au

Susan Close

Deputy Premier of South Australia

————

attorneygeneral@sa.gov.au 

Kyam Maher 

Attorney General of South Australia

————

badcoe@parliament.sa.gov.au

Jayne Stinson

Chair of the Environment, Resources and Development Committee

=====================================================

Politician’s name / position / email address

Date

Dear

The Federal Court on July 18 quashed the declaration of a proposed national nuclear waste dump site near Kimba in SA, citing ‘pre-judgement’ and ‘apprehended bias’. The court case was initiated by Barngarla Traditional Owners, who are unanimous in their opposition to the proposed nuclear dump.

I’m writing to ask you to contact your federal Labor colleagues ‒ in particular Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and resources minister Madeleine King ‒ asking them to respect the human rights of the Barngarla Traditional Owners and to abandon the plan to impose a nuclear dump on Barngarla country.

These are some of the reasons why it would be unfair and unwise to continue to attempt to impose a nuclear dump on Barngarla country:

  1. It is an unacceptable that the Albanese government has been attempting to impose a national nuclear waste dump on Barngarla country despite the unanimous opposition of the Traditional Owners.
  2. It is deeply hypocritical that the Albanese government has been championing a Voice to Parliament at the same time as it ignores and overrides the unanimous voice of the Barngarla Traditional Owners. Jayne Stinson, Labor Chair of the SA Parliament’s Environment, Resources and Development Committee, said: “In this day and age, when we’re talking about Voice, Treaty and Truth, we can’t just turn around and say, ‘Oh, well, those are our values but in this particular instance, we’re going to ignore the voice of Aboriginal people’. I think that’s just preposterous.”
  3. It is unacceptable that the Albanese government has been willing to violate the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ‒ which states that “no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and informed consent”. It would be worse still for the Albanese Government to continue to violate the UN Declaration by continuing with its efforts to impose a nuclear dump on Barngarla country.
  4. Barngarla Traditional Owners were excluded from a so-called ‘community ballot’ by the Coalition government. An independent, professional ballot of Barngarla Traditional Owners found no support whatsoever for the proposed dump. Jason Bilney, Chair of the Barngarla Determination Aboriginal Corporation, said: “It is a simple truth that had we, as the First People for the area, been included in the Kimba community ballot rather than unfairly denied the right to vote, then the community ballot would never have returned a yes vote.”
  5. Federal parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights unanimously concluded in an April 2020 report that the Coalition government was violating the human rights of Barngarla people. Even the Coalition members of the committee endorsed the report. It is unacceptable that the Albanese Government has continued the previous government’s violation of the human rights of Barngarla Traditional Owners, and it would be worse still if the Albanese Government continues to violate their rights by continuing with the Kimba nuclear dump proposal.
  6. Dr. Susan Close, now Deputy Premier of South Australia, said in 2019 that it was a “dreadful process” from start to finish that led to the nomination of the Kimba dump site and that SA Labor is “utterly opposed” to the “appalling process” which led to Kimba being targeted.
  7. Dr. Close noted in 2020 statement, titled ‘Kimba site selection process flawed, waste dump plans must be scrapped’, that SA Labor “has committed to traditional owners having a right of veto over any nuclear waste sites, yet the federal government has shown no respect to the local Aboriginal people.”
  8. After the July 18 Federal Court decision, Dr. Close called for the Albanese Government to abandon the Kimba dump proposal once and for all and to find a site with which has community acceptance. Dr Close noted that the previous Coalition government had botched the process, exaggerating the urgency for the facility and excluding the Indigenous community.
  9. At its state Convention in October 2022, SA Labor adopted a position that: “SA Labor Caucus supports a veto right for the Barngarla community on this facility. This aligns with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, stating that no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of Indigenous Peoples without their free, prior and informed consent. More recently Premier Peter Malinauskas reaffirmed that the South Australian Labor party strongly opposes this facility and still supports the right of the Barngarla people to have veto powers.”

Please call on the federal Albanese Government to:

  1. Immediately announce that the plan to impose a nuclear waste dump on Barngarla country will not proceed.
  2. Adopt SA Labor’s policy giving traditional owners a right of veto over proposed nuclear waste dump sites. That would give traditional owners across the country some confidence that their voices will be heard as the Government progresses plans to store and dispose of waste arising from nuclear-powered submarines.
  3. Review and amend the undemocratic, racist National Radioactive Waste Management Act, an earlier and similar version of which was described by Labor MPs as “extreme”, “arrogant”, “draconian”, “sorry”, “sordid”, and “profoundly shameful”.
  4. Hold the Australian Radioactive Waste Agency accountable for its racist, incompetent mismanagement of this issue.
  5. Establish a national Independent Commission of Inquiry to map out a path forward for the responsible management of radioactive waste in Australia.

Yours sincerely,

NAME:

ADDRESS:

EMAIL ADDRESS:

Stop the nuclear dump on Barngarla Country

Please write to federal Labor politicians calling on them to respect the rights of Barngarla Traditional Owners, to respect the Federal Court’s July 18 decision and to abandon the plan to impose a national nuclear waste dump on Barngarla country in SA.

  1. Send individual emails (not a group email).
  2. The politicians’ names and details ‒ including email addresses ‒ are reproduced below.
  3. Sample text is copied below. You can use this text but feel free to edit and to add your own thoughts.
  4. Make sure to add your name, address and email address at the bottom of your emails.
  5. If you have time, please also send some emails to SA Labor politicians: relevant info is posted at https://nuclear.foe.org.au/kimba-sa/

Thanks!

Friends of the Earth Nuclear-Free Campaign

https://nuclear.foe.org.au/waste

————

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese

Please use the online contact form at:

https://www.pm.gov.au/contact-your-pm

————

Linda.Burney.MP@aph.gov.au

Linda Burney MP

Minister for Indigenous Australians

————

senator.wong@aph.gov.au

Senator Penny Wong

Senator for South Australia

Leader of the Government in the Senate

Minister for Foreign Affairs

————

senator.grogan@aph.gov.au

Senator Karen Grogan

Chair of Environment and Communications Legislation Committee

Deputy Chair of Environment and Communications References Committee

————

Mark.Butler.MP@aph.gov.au, minister.butler@health.gov.au

Mark Butler MP

Minister for Health and Aged Care

Deputy Leader of the House

————

trade.minister@dfat.gov.au, senator.farrell@aph.gov.au

Senator Don Farrell

Special Minister of State

Minister for Trade and Tourism

Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate

————

Madeleine.King.MP@aph.gov.au

Madeleine King MP

Minister for Resources

Minister for Northern Australia

————

Minister.husic@industry.gov.au

Ed Husic MP

Minister for Industry and Science

===========================================

Politician’s name / position / email address

Date

Dear

The Federal Court on July 18 quashed the declaration of a proposed national nuclear waste dump site near Kimba in SA, citing ‘pre-judgement’ and ‘apprehended bias’. The court case was initiated by Barngarla Traditional Owners, who are unanimous in their opposition to the proposed nuclear dump.

Please reassure me that the federal Labor Albanese Government will respect the rights of Barngarla Traditional Owners, respect the Federal Court’s decision, and abandon the plan to impose a national nuclear waste dump on Barngarla country in SA.

The Albanese Government could appeal to the Full Bench of the Federal Court. These are some of the reasons why that would be unfair and unwise:

  1. It is an unacceptable that the Albanese government has been attempting to impose a national nuclear waste dump on Barngarla country despite the unanimous opposition of the Traditional Owners.
  2. It is deeply hypocritical that the Albanese government has been championing a Voice to Parliament at the same time as it ignores and overrides the unanimous voice of the Barngarla Traditional Owners. Jayne Stinson, Labor Chair of the SA Parliament’s Environment, Resources and Development Committee, said: “In this day and age, when we’re talking about Voice, Treaty and Truth, we can’t just turn around and say, ‘Oh, well, those are our values but in this particular instance, we’re going to ignore the voice of Aboriginal people’. I think that’s just preposterous.”
  3. It is unacceptable that the Albanese government has been willing to violate the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ‒ which states that “no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and informed consent”. It would be worse still for the Albanese Government to continue to violate the UN Declaration by continuing with its efforts to impose a nuclear dump on Barngarla country.
  4. Barngarla Traditional Owners were excluded from a so-called ‘community ballot’ by the Coalition government. An independent, professional ballot of Barngarla Traditional Owners found no support whatsoever for the proposed dump. Jason Bilney, Chair of the Barngarla Determination Aboriginal Corporation, said: “It is a simple truth that had we, as the First People for the area, been included in the Kimba community ballot rather than unfairly denied the right to vote, then the community ballot would never have returned a yes vote.”
  5. Federal parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights unanimously concluded in an April 2020 report that the Coalition government was violating the human rights of Barngarla people. Even the Coalition members of the committee endorsed the report. It is unacceptable that the Albanese Government has continued the previous government’s violation of the human rights of Barngarla Traditional Owners, and it would be worse still if the Albanese Government continues to violate their rights by continuing with the Kimba nuclear dump proposal.
  6. Dr. Susan Close, now Deputy Premier of South Australia, said in 2019 that it was a “dreadful process” from start to finish that led to the nomination of the Kimba dump site and that SA Labor is “utterly opposed” to the “appalling process” which led to Kimba being targeted.
  7. Dr. Close noted in 2020 statement, titled ‘Kimba site selection process flawed, waste dump plans must be scrapped’, that SA Labor “has committed to traditional owners having a right of veto over any nuclear waste sites, yet the federal government has shown no respect to the local Aboriginal people.”
  8. After the July 18 Federal Court decision, Dr. Close called for the Albanese Government to abandon the Kimba dump proposal once and for all and to find a site with which has community acceptance. Dr Close noted that the previous Coalition government had botched the process, exaggerating the urgency for the facility and excluding the Indigenous community.
  9. At its state Convention in October 2022, SA Labor adopted a position that: “SA Labor Caucus supports a veto right for the Barngarla community on this facility. This aligns with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, stating that no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of Indigenous Peoples without their free, prior and informed consent. More recently Premier Peter Malinauskas reaffirmed that the South Australian Labor party strongly opposes this facility and still supports the right of the Barngarla people to have veto powers.”

I call on the Albanese Government to:

  1. Immediately announce that the plan to impose a nuclear waste dump on Barngarla country will not proceed.
  2. Adopt SA Labor’s policy giving traditional owners a right of veto over proposed nuclear waste dump sites. That would give traditional owners across the country some confidence that their voices will be heard as the Government progresses plans to store and dispose of waste arising from nuclear-powered submarines.
  3. Review and amend the undemocratic, racist National Radioactive Waste Management Act, an earlier and similar version of which was described by Labor MPs as “extreme”, “arrogant”, “draconian”, “sorry”, “sordid”, and “profoundly shameful”.
  4. Hold the Australian Radioactive Waste Agency accountable for its racist, incompetent mismanagement of this issue.
  5. Establish a national Independent Commission of Inquiry to map out a path forward for the responsible management of radioactive waste in Australia.

Yours sincerely,

NAME:

ADDRESS:

EMAIL ADDRESS:

ANSTO’s never ending accidents, lies, cover-ups, bullying and intimidation

2023 Senate nuclear inquiry:

Senator Canavan asked at the May 15 hearing of the Senate nuclear inquiry: “Has there ever been a safety incident or an issue of radioactive waste at ANSTO?”

That question was taken on notice and the Department of Industry, Science and Resources responded as follows:

“ANSTO advises that it has safely managed its radioactive waste since its establishment 70 years ago. ANSTO publishes comprehensive information on its safety performance in its annual reports. Detailed information related to ANSTO’s safety record is also available on the ARPANSA website.”

Here are a couple of waste-related safety incidents that the Department chose not to inform the Committee about:

1. In early 1998, it was revealed that “airtight” spent fuel storage canisters had been infiltrated by water ‒ 90 litres in one case ‒ and a number of rods had corroded as a result. When canisters were retrieved for closer inspection, three accidents took place (2/3/98, 13/8/98, 1/2/99), all of them involving the dropping of canisters containing spent fuel. The public may never have learnt about those accidents if not for the fact that an ANSTO whistleblower told the local press. One of those accidents (1/2/99) subjected four ANSTO staff members to radiation doses of up to 500 microsieverts (half the public dose limit).

2. On March 15, 2002, an accident occurred during the cropping (cutting) of a spent fuel rod, releasing radioactivity to the spent fuel pond.

 We have no doubt that there have been other relevant incidents and accidents that should have been reported to the Senate inquiry by the Department and/or ANSTO.

A string of incidents and accidents at ANSTO in the 2010s resulted in ARPANSA requiring ANSTO to select and appoint an expert independent review team to recommend how to improve safety in Building 23 and related matters. The final report by the independent expert review team contained 85 recommendations to improve safety performance IN JUST ONE AREA OF ANSTO’S OPERATIONS. We shudder to think how many recommendations might arise from a site-wide evaluation. The independent review detailed inadequate safety standards and other alarming findings including that 20% of ANSTO Health staff had experienced bullying over a six-month period.

The accidents in the mid- to late-2010s followed a string of accidents from 2007‒2012. Indeed we doubt if there has been any length of time this century without recurring incidents, accidents and a raft of safety-related problems at ANSTO. 

Information on accidents and incidents at ANSTO from 2007 to 2012:

 

 

Nuclear power myth-busting Q&A

Last updated April 2022.

  1. What do scientists say about nuclear power in relation to other energy sources?
  2. Isn’t nuclear power better than coal in the short term because of immediate danger of fuelling climate change?
  3. How does nuclear power stack up against other energy sources by cost of production?
  4. Thorium reactors … aren’t they a good option?
  5. Isn’t nuclear fusion power just around the corner?
  6. Aren’t there new reactors that are fuelled by nuclear waste ‒ wouldn’t this solve the problem of radioactive waste?
  7. Isn’t it true that Finland and Sweden are about to start operating high-level nuclear waste dumps?
  8. Won’t Small Modular Reactors be safer and cheaper?
  9. Doesn’t nuclear power have zero emissions?
  10. Nuclear accidents are rare, aren’t they?
  11. Isn’t it true that Chernobyl only killed 31 people and Fukushima hasn’t killed anyone?
  12. How much water does a nuclear power plant consume?
  13. Are there vested interests in the current resurgence of arguments for nuclear power?

  1. What do scientists say about nuclear power in relation to other energy sources?

  • In January 2019, the Climate Council, comprising Australia’s leading climate scientists, issued a policy statement concluding that nuclear power plants “are not appropriate for Australia – and probably never will be”. The Climate Council statement continued: “Nuclear power stations are highly controversial, can’t be built under existing law in any Australian state or territory, are a more expensive source of power than renewable energy, and present significant challenges in terms of the storage and transport of nuclear waste, and use of water”.
  • Nuclear supporters often claim scientific support even where none exists. For example the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is said to support nuclear power on the basis of a 2018 report, but in fact the report simply maps out multiple energy/climate scenarios without endorsing any particular energy sources. In the IPCC’s low-carbon scenarios, nuclear power accounts for only a small fraction of electricity supply (even if nuclear output increases) whereas renewables do the heavy lifting. For example, in one 1.5°C scenario, nuclear power more than doubles by 2050 but only accounts for 4.2% of primary energy whereas renewables account for 60.8%. Moreover, the IPCC reports discusses serious problems with nuclear power, including its contribution to nuclear weapons proliferation, the connection between nuclear power and childhood leukemia, and nuclear power’s high costs.
  1. Isn’t nuclear power better than coal in the short term because of immediate danger of fuelling climate change?

  • Nuclear power and fossil fuels aren’t the only choices. Renewable power has doubled over the past decade and now accounts for 29% of global electricity generation while nuclear’s contribution is 10% and continues to fall.
  • The federal Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources expects 69% renewable supply to the Australian National Electricity Market by 2030. South Australia has already reached 67% renewable supply and will comfortably meet the target of 100% net renewable supply by 2030.
  • Taking into account planning and approvals, construction, and the energy payback time, it would be a quarter of a century or more before nuclear power could even begin to reduce greenhouse emissions in Australia … and then only assuming that nuclear power replaced fossil fuels. So nuclear power clearly isn’t a short-term option or a ‘bridging’ technology to ease the shift from fossil fuels to renewables.
  • On the contrary, nuclear power would slow the shift away from fossil fuels, which is why fossil-fuel funded political parties and politicians support nuclear power (e.g. the Nationals) and why organisations such as the Minerals Council of Australia support nuclear power. As Australian economist Prof. John Quiggin notes, support for nuclear power in Australia is, in practice, support for coal.
  • Nuclear power plants are vulnerable to threats which are being exacerbated by climate change. These include dwindling and warming water sources, sea-level rise, storm damage, drought, and jelly-fish swarms. Retired nuclear engineer David Lochbaum states: “You need to solve global warming for nuclear plants to survive.”
  • Nuclear power programs have provided cover for numerous covert weapons programs and an expansion of nuclear power would exacerbate the problems. Australian energy expert Dr. Mark Diesendorf states: “On top of the perennial challenges of global poverty and injustice, the two biggest threats facing human civilisation in the 21st century are climate change and nuclear war. It would be absurd to respond to one by increasing the risks of the other. Yet that is what nuclear power does.”
  • Nuclear warfare is the quickest path to climate catastrophe. Earth and paleoclimate scientist Andrew Glikson writes: “When Turco et al. (1983) and Carl Sagan(1983) warned the world about the climatic effects of a nuclear war, they pointed out that the amount of carbon stored in a large city was sufficient to release enough aerosols, smoke, soot and dust to block sunlight over large regions, leading to a widespread failure of crops and extensive starvation. The current nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia could potentially inject 150 teragrams of soot from fires ignited by nuclear explosions into the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere, lasting for a period of 10 years or longer, followed by a period of intense radioactive radiation over large areas.”
  1. How does nuclear power stack up against other energy sources by cost of production?

  • Nuclear power is far more expensive than other energy sources. Since 2010, the cost of wind and solar PV has decreased by 70‒90% while nuclear costs have increased 33%.
  • Lazard investment firm provides these figures in its October 2021 report on ‘levelised costs of electricity’:

            Nuclear                                   US$131‒204 (A$186‒289)

            Wind ‒ onshore                       US$26‒50

            Solar PV ‒ utility scale             US$28‒41

  • In its 2021 GenCost report, CSIRO provides these 2030 cost estimates:

            Nuclear (small modular): A$128‒322 / MWh

            90% wind and solar PV with storage and transmission costs: A$55‒80 / MWh

  • The latest estimates for all reactors under construction in western Europe and the U.S. range from A$17.6 billion to A$30.6 billion per reactor and have been subject to spectacular cost overruns amounting to A$10 billion or more. A twin-reactor project in South Carolina was abandoned after the expenditure of A$12 billion.
  1. Thorium reactors … aren’t they a good option?

  • There are no fundamental differences between thorium and uranium: thorium reactors produce nuclear waste, and they are vulnerable to catastrophic accidents, and they can be (and have been) used to produce explosive material for nuclear weapons.
  • Thorium reactor technology is not commercially available or viable. Dr Peter Karamaskos states: “Without exception, [thorium reactors] have never been commercially viable, nor do any of the intended new designs even remotely seem to be viable. Like all nuclear power production they rely on extensive taxpayer subsidies; the only difference is that with thorium and other breeder reactors these are of an order of magnitude greater, which is why no government has ever continued their funding.”
  1. Isn’t nuclear fusion power just around the corner?

  • At best, fusion is decades away and most likely it will forever remain decades away. Two articles in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by Dr. Daniel Jassby ‒ a fusion scientist ‒ comprehensively debunk all of the false claims made by fusion enthusiasts.
  1. Aren’t there new reactors that are fuelled by nuclear waste ‒ wouldn’t this solve the problem of radioactive waste?

  • “Advanced” reactors are not advanced: they are not safer and in many cases are more dangerous and with even greater weapons potential.
  • Theoretically, these reactors would reduce nuclear waste streams but in practice, fancy concepts such as molten salt reactors and sodium-cooled fast reactors “will actually exacerbate spent fuel storage and disposal issues” according to Dr. Allison Macfarlane, a former chair of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
  • Likewise, ‘integral fast reactors’ coupled with ‘pyroprocessing’ could reduce waste streams in theory … but in practice the opposite has occurred. Commenting on a R&D program in the U.S., Dr. Edwin Lyman notes that “Pyroprocessing has taken one potentially difficult form of nuclear waste and converted it into multiple challenging forms of nuclear waste. DOE [Department of Energy] has spent hundreds of millions of dollars only to magnify, rather than simplify, the waste problem.” See also Dr. Lyman’s important 2021 report, ‘Advanced” Isn’t Always Better: Assessing the Safety, Security, and Environmental Impacts of Non-Light-Water Nuclear Reactors’.
  1. Isn’t it true that Finland and Sweden are about to start operating high-level nuclear waste dumps?

  • Finland and Sweden have been working on repositories for high-level nuclear waste for decades ‒ their plans are many years behind schedule and operation has yet to begin. They haven’t demonstrated safe disposal of high-level nuclear waste for a single year let alone the 300,000 years that it takes for high-level nuclear waste to decay to the level of radioactivity of the original uranium ore.
  • Other countries operating nuclear power plants ‒ including the US, the UK, Japan, South Korea, Germany, etc. ‒ have not even established a site for a high-level nuclear waste repository, let alone commenced construction or operation. To give one example of a protracted, expensive and failed attempt to establish a high-level nuclear waste repository, plans for a high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada were abandoned in 2009. Over 20 years of work was put into the repository plan and A$12 billion was wasted on the failed project.
  • A January 2019 report details the difficulties with high-level nuclear waste management in seven countries (Belgium, France, Japan, Sweden, Finland, the UK and the US) and serves as a useful overview of the serious problems that Australia has avoided.
  • No operating deep underground repository for high-level nuclear waste exists, but there is one deep underground repository for long lived intermediate-level nuclear waste − the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in the US state of New Mexico. In 2014, a chemical explosion ruptured one of the barrels stored underground at WIPP. This was followed by a failure of the filtration system meant to ensure that radiation did not reach the outside environment. Twenty-two workers were exposed to low-level radiation. WIPP was closed for three years. A deeply troubling aspect of the WIPP problems is that complacency and cost-cutting set in within the first decade of operation of the repository.
  1. Won’t Small Modular Reactors be safer and cheaper?

  • Small modular reactors (SMRs), if they existed, would be just as accident-prone as large reactors. Proposals to situate SMRs underground pose unique safety threats from flooding and accessibility. They would still produce long-lived radioactive waste and be useful for weapons production.
  • Only two SMRs are said to exist ‒ one in Russia and one in China ‒ but neither meets the ‘modular’ part of the definition: serial factor production of reactor components (or ‘modules’).
  • Electricity from SMRs is expected to be more expensive than that from large, conventional nuclear reactors. There is no current market for SMRs and companies are refusing to make the huge investments required because of the high risks.
  • Most of the handful of SMRs under construction are over-budget and behind schedule; there are disturbing connections between SMRs, weapons proliferation and militarism more generally; and about half of the SMRs under construction are intended to be used to facilitate the exploitation of fossil fuel reserves (in the Arctic, the South China Sea and elsewhere).
  1. Doesn’t nuclear power have zero emissions?

  • A 2009 paper prepared for the Australian Uranium Association estimated that the nuclear power life cycle generates between 10‒103 grams of CO2 equivalent per kWh, which is far lower than fossil fuels ‒ but as uranium ore grades decline emissions would increase to as much as 248 gCO2e/kWh. As well as emissions from mining and milling uranium ore there are emissions associated with the transport and processing of fuel.
  1. Nuclear accidents are rare, aren’t they?

  • There have been over 200 nuclear power accidents.
  • Nuclear theft and smuggling are serious, unresolved problems. As of 31 December 2018, an International Atomic Energy Agency database contained a total of 3,497 confirmed incidents reported by participating States since 1993, of which 285 incidents involved a confirmed or likely act of trafficking or malicious use, and for an additional 965 incidents there was insufficient information to determine if it was related to trafficking or malicious use.
  • There have been an alarming number of deliberate attacks on nuclear plants. Examples include Israel’s destruction of a research reactor in Iraq in 1981; the United States’ destruction of two smaller research reactors in Iraq in 1991; attempted military strikes by Iraq and Iran on each other’s nuclear facilities during the 1980‒88 war; Iraq’s attempted missile strikes on Israel’s nuclear facilities in 1991; and Israel’s bombing of a suspected nuclear plant in Syria in 2007.
  1. Isn’t it true that Chernobyl only killed 31 people and Fukushima hasn’t killed anyone?

  • United Nations’ reports in 2005/06 estimated around 9,000 deaths among those people most heavily exposed to radioactive fallout from Chernobyl and populations exposed to lower doses in Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The estimated death toll rises further when populations beyond those three countries are included. For example, a study published in the International Journal of Cancer estimates 16,000 deaths across Europe. The Union of Concerned Scientists estimates that there will be 27,000‒108,000 excess cancers and 12,000‒57,000 excess cancer deaths due to exposure of radiation from Chernobyl.
  • In a study of the health impacts of the March 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan (multiple nuclear reactor meltdowns, fires and explosions), the World Health Organisation stated that for people in the most contaminated areas in Fukushima Prefecture, the estimated increased risk for all solid cancers will be around 4% in females exposed as infants; a 6% increased risk of breast cancer for females exposed as infants; a 7% increased risk of leukaemia for males exposed as infants; and for thyroid cancer among females exposed as infants, an increased risk of up to 70% (from a 0.75% lifetime risk up to 1.25%).
  • Radiation biologist Ian Fairlie estimates around 5,000 fatal cancer deaths resulting from exposure to radioactive Fukushima fallout. In addition, there is no dispute that at least 2,000 people died due to the botched evacuation of Fukushima and the mistreatment of evacuees over the following years.
  1. How much water does a nuclear power plant consume?

  • Nuclear requires water in the mining and production of uranium fuel, generation of electricity and cooling at nuclear reactors, and for the management of wastes.
  • Reactors are generally situated near lakes, rivers or the ocean to meet cooling water requirements. There are two types of cooling systems used for nuclear power ‒ either ‘once-through’ or recirculating. With once-through systems, warmer water is discharged back into the environment, often having a significant impact on the local ecology.
  • A single nuclear power reactor operating for a single day typically consumes 36‒65 million litres of water. A 2006 paper by the Commonwealth Department of Parliamentary Services states: “Per megawatt existing nuclear power stations use and consume more water than power stations using other fuel sources. Depending on the cooling technology utilised, the water requirements for a nuclear power station can vary between 20 to 83 per cent more than for other power stations.”
  • By contrast, the REN21 ‘Renewables 2015: Global Status Report’ states: “Although renewable energy systems are also vulnerable to climate change, they have unique qualities that make them suitable both for reinforcing the resilience of the wider energy infrastructure and for ensuring the provision of energy services under changing climatic conditions. System modularity, distributed deployment, and local availability and diversity of fuel sources − central components of energy system resilience − are key characteristics of most renewable energy systems.”
  1. Are there vested interests in the current resurgence of arguments for nuclear power?

  • Yes, corporations with vested interests in nuclear power and uranium routinely promote dishonest arguments in support of nuclear power. For example, the Minerals Council of Australia promotes ‘clean nuclear’ and ‘clean coal’.
  • In addition, right-wing ideologues promote nuclear power as part of the ‘culture wars’ and they hope that nuclear promotion will divide the Labor Party and the environment movement. Those efforts have been unsuccessful and self-defeating ‒ the only splits that have emerged in recent years are within the Coalition parties, with the SA, NSW and Tasmanian Liberal parties and the Queensland branch of the Liberal-National Party opposing nuclear power and calling for more support for the expansion of renewable energy sources. At the federal level, there is bipartisan support for Howard-era legislation banning nuclear power in Australia.
  • Lastly, beware of pro-nuclear ‘greenwashing’ ‒ corporate-funded fake environmentalism. An Australian example was the ‘Bright New World‘ group which accepted secret corporate donations. Another example is the fake ‘Australian Greens for Nuclear Energy‘ group.

Paladin Energy goes bust

Jim Green, Nuclear Monitor #847, 21 July 2017

https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/847/paladin-energy-goes-bust

“It has never been a worse time for uranium miners.” ‒ Alexander Molyneux, CEO of Paladin Energy, October 2016.1

Paladin Energy Ltd appointed administrators on July 3 after Electricité de France (EDF) called in a US$277 million debt that Paladin was unable to pay.2 Paladin is a uranium mining company based in Perth, Western Australia. The company is 75% owner of the Langer Heinrich uranium mine in Namibia, 85% owner of the Kayelekera uranium mine in Malawi (in care and maintenance since 2014), and it owns sundry ‘nonproducing assets’ in Australia, Canada and Niger.

The administrators, from KPMG, will continue to operate Paladin on a business-as-usual basis until further notice. Paladin said its management and directors “remain committed” to working with the administrators to restructure and recapitalise the company.2

Paladin “was formerly a multi-billion-dollar company and was once the best-­performed stock in the world” according to The Australian newspaper.3 The company’s share price went from one Australian cent in 2003 to A$10.80 in 2007, but has fallen more than 200-fold and traded at 4.7 cents before trading was suspended in early June 2017.4 Paladin had just US$21.8 million in cash at the end of March 2017.4 The company’s losses totalled US$1.9 billion between 1994 and 2014.5

Later this year, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), which already owns 25% of the Langer Heinrich mine, may purchase Paladin’s 75% stake. The move comes as a result of CNNC seeking to exercise a debt-default option to acquire the 75% stake. Paladin wanted to challenge CNNC in court, but after consulting with debt holders agreed not to do so due to prohibitive cost.6 Paladin could gain US$500 million from the sale but will still be in debt. In addition to the US$277 million it owes EDF, Paladin owes bondholders US$372 million.3

Assuming the Langer Heinrich sale goes ahead, Paladin will have nothing other than ‘nonproducing assets’ and the Kayelekera mine – which also a nonproducing asset since it is in care and maintenance. So the administrators have very little to work with. Just keeping Kayelekera in care and maintenance costs about US$10 million per year.7

Paladin said in 2014 that its decision to place Kayelekera on care and maintenance “is the latest in a sequence of closures, production suspensions and deferrals of major planned greenfield and brownfield expansions in the uranium sector, including Paladin’s decision in 2012 to suspend evaluation of a major Stage 4 expansion of the Langer Heinrich Mine in Namibia.”8

Paladin said in 2015 that a price of about US$75 per pound would be required for Kayelekera to become economically viable9 ‒ but that price hasn’t been seen since 2011 and it is more than three times the current spot price and more than double the long-term contract price.10 Paladin also said that the availability of grid power supply would be necessary to restart Kayelekera, to replace the existing diesel generators.9

Selling nonproducing assets

Late last year, Paladin was reduced to selling nonproducing assets for a song. Paladin sold a number of Australian uranium exploration projects to Uranium Africa for A$2.5 million, including Oobagooma in Western Australia and the Angela/Pamela and Bigrlyi projects in the Northern Territory.11 Paladin told shareholders that the assets were ‘noncore’ and it was unlikely the company would be in a position to conduct any meaningful work developing the projects over the next decade.11 The A$2.5 million did little to improve Paladin’s financial situation, but the company is also spared from further spending on rates, rents and statutory commitments payable to keep the tenements in good standing.11

Last year, Paladin also sold its 257.5 million shares in uranium exploration company Deep Yellow for A$2.6 million, with shares priced at one Australian cent a share.11 Deep Yellow, like Paladin, is an Australian-based company whose main interests are in Africa. Deep Yellow is now headed by John Borshoff, who founded Paladin in 1993 and agreed to step down as managing director and chief executive in August 2015.

Some ‘nonproducing assets’ can’t be sold, not even for a song. Paladin hoped to sell a 30% stake in the Manyingee uranium project in Western Australia to Avira Energy for A$10 million, but Avira did not raise the required capital by the 31 March 2017 deadline.12 Avira said in April 2017 that investors who had previously committed to support its capital increase had withdrawn as a consequence of a “challenging” environment for new uranium projects in Western Australia.12 Development of Manyingee (and all other non-approved deposits) is prohibited under the policy of the current Western Australian government.

The Australian Financial Review reflected on happier days for Paladin: “John Borshoff was once one of Western Australia’s wealthiest businessmen. The founder of Perth-based Paladin Energy developed an enviable portfolio of African uranium mines supposed to satiate booming global demand for yellowcake. When the company’s Langer Heinrich mine began shipments in March 2007, as the spot price for uranium eclipsed $US100 per pound, Paladin was worth more than $4 billion.”13

Borshoff, described as the grandfather of Australian uranium, made his debut on the Business Review Weekly’s ‘Rich 200’ list in 2007 with estimated wealth of A$205 million.13 Reuters describes Paladin as the world’s second largest independent pure-play uranium miner after Cameco and the seventh or eighth largest globally.1 When the company’s two mines in Africa were operating, annual production capacity was about eight million pounds of uranium oxide ‒ about 5% of world demand.

Paladin gambled and lost

Paladin gambled and lost, relying heavily on debt financing to quickly develop the Langer Heinrich and Kayelekera mines in Africa.13 Another failed gamble was to sell primarily on the spot market, thus missing the opportunity to lock in long-term contracts when the price was relatively high13 ‒ the long-term contract price has halved since the Fukushima disaster.

Another failed gamble was Paladin’s A$1.2 billion hostile takeover bid for Summit Resources in 2007.13 Paladin owns 82% of Summit, which is sitting on uneconomic uranium deposits in Queensland ‒ an Australian state which bans uranium mining. In 2015, Paladin booked a A$323.6 million write-down on its exploration assets in Queensland.14

A July 2013 mining.com article said that “to put things lightly, management is overpaid”, and suggested that management’s focus may be “on its own best interests rather than the interests of all shareholders”.15

Dave Sweeney, nuclear free campaigner with the Australian Conservation Foundation, told Nuclear Monitor:

“Paladin’s ambition and appetite has always exceeded its capacity and competence and now the gap between its inflated promises and its profound under-performance is absolute. This company has always been a uranium bull. It’s former CEO John Borshoff promised unrealistic wealth for Africa while dismissing Fukushima as a ‘sideshow’. When the market was buoyant they paraded their portfolio and were market darlings, now they are desperate, dateless and on administrative life-support.

“A real concern here is the impact on the environment and communities in which Paladin operate. The risk is that more corners will be cut in African operations in relation to rehabilitation, worker entitlements and environmental protection. Paladin’s boom to bust case study is a further clear example of the lack of independent scrutiny of the uranium sector and also reflects poorly on the activities of Australian miners operating in nations with limited governance and regulatory capacity.”

References:

  1. Geert De Clercq, 3 Oct 2016, ‘Desperate uranium miners switch to survival mode despite nuclear rebound’, www.reuters.com/article/us-uranium-nuclearpower-idUSKCN1230EF
  2. World Nuclear News, 3 July 2017, ‘Paladin Energy enters administration’, http://world-nuclear-news.org/UF-Paladin-Energy-enters-administration-0307177.html
  3. Paul Garvey, 4 July 2017, ‘French debt forces uranium miner Paladin into administration’, www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies/french-debt-forces-uranium-miner-paladin-into-administration/news-story/b366be6e20bbaa2cf8b0439b64ef6168
  4. Nick Evans, 11 Aug 2015, ‘Borshoff cedes control of debt-laden Paladin’, West Australian.
  5. Mike King, 19 Jan 2015, ‘Paladin Energy Ltd revenues soar 79% but shares sink’, www.fool.com.au/2015/01/19/paladin-energy-ltd-revenues-soar-79-but-shares-sink/
  6. Greg Peel, 11 July 2017, ‘Uranium Week: Taking Its Toll’, www.fnarena.com/index.php/2017/07/11/uranium-week-taking-its-toll/
  7. Rachel Etter-Phoya and Grain Malunga / OpenOil, Oct 2016, ‘Kayelekera Model & Narrative Report’, http://openoil.net/kayelekera-model-narrative-report/
  8. Paladin Energy, 7 Feb 2014, ‘Suspension of Production at Kayelekera Mine, Malawi’, www.marketwired.com/press-release/paladin-energy-ltd-suspension-of-production-at-kayelekera-mine-malawi-tsx-pdn-1876805.htm
  9. Sarah-Jane Tasker, 8 Jan 2015, ‘Paladin Energy alerts ASX to spill at Malawi uranium mine’, www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/paladin-energy-alerts-asx-to-spill-at-malawi-uranium-mine/story-e6frg9df-1227177696428
  10. https://www.cameco.com/invest/markets/uranium-price
  11. Esmarie Swanepoel, 15 Dec 2016, ‘Paladin holds a fire sale’, www.miningweekly.com/article/paladin-holds-a-fire-sale-2016-12-15
  12. World Nuclear News, 3 April 2017, http://us1.campaign-archive1.com/?u=140c559a3b34d23ff7c6b48b9&id=4499e9a24a&e=ae5ca458a0
  13. Tess Ingram, 7 July 2017, ‘Paladin Energy: from market hero to administration’, www.afr.com/business/mining/uranium/paladin-energy-from-market-hero-to-administration-20170706-gx6a84
  14. Henry Lazenby, 14 May 2015, ‘Paladin Energy narrows nine-month net loss’, www.miningweekly.com/article/paladin-energy-narrows-nine-month-net-loss-2015-05-14
  15. Tommy Humphreys, 10 July 2013, ‘Uranium outlook and Paladin Energy risk profile’, www.mining.com/web/uranium-outlook-and-paladin-energy-risk-profile/

Paladin Energy’s social and environmental record in Africa

Jim Green, Nuclear Monitor #847, 21 July 2017,

https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/847/paladin-energys-social-and-environmental-record-africa

Paladin Energy’s operations in Africa ‒ the Kayelekera uranium mine in Malawi and the Langer Heinrich mine in Namibia ‒ have been marked by regular accidents and controversies. The WISE-Uranium website has a ‘Hall of Infamy’ page dedicated to the company.1 Some of the accidents and controversies are listed here and a more detailed account is posted on the Nuclear Monitor website.2

April 2006: Paladin CEO John Borshoff told ABC television: “Australia and Canada have become overly sophisticated. They measure progress in other aspects than economic development, and rightly so, but I think there has been a sort of overcompensation in terms of thinking about environmental issues, social issues, way beyond what is necessary to achieve good practice.”3

November 2006: NGOs groundWork and the Centre for Civil Society gave out the ‘Southern African Corpse Awards’ ‒ an annual mock ceremony for big business ‒ in Durban. Paladin was awarded the ‘Pick the Public Pocketprize’ thanks to a nomination from Malawian NGOs.4

2007: Criticisms of operations at Kayelekera outlined by the Catholic Church and other Malawian community and environmental organisations included the following issues of concern: inadequacy of the Environmental Impact Assessment; flaws in community consultation; government deferring its role in safeguarding community interests to the company; destruction of cultural and historic sites; increased social disorder; unfair compensation for those forcibly relocated; and undue interference with makeup of community based organisations.5

4 January 2007: Two Malawian NGO members were ordered to go to the Karonga Police Station by the Chief of Police and threatened with arrest for taking an Australian photojournalist sponsored by the two Australian unions (MUA and CFMEU) to Kayelekera. The Chief of Police said they were acting on a complaint from Paladin.6

March 2007: Paladin’s Kayelekera project would not be approved in Australia due to the major flaws in the assessment and design proposals, independent reviewers concluded. Their report covered baseline environmental studies, tailings management, water management, rehabilitation, failure to commit to respecting domestic laws, use of intimidation and threatening tactics against local civil society, improper community consultation and payments to local leaders, and destruction of cultural heritage.7

27 March 2008: The open pit at Paladin’s Langer Heinrich mine was flooded with run-off water from a rainstorm and was out of use for about one month.8

April 2008: A spill of a large quantity of sulphuric acid at the Langer Heinrich mine raised questions about safety procedures at the mine. The Namibian newspaper was informed that a mine employee lost grip on the hose transferring the acid from a truck to a storage facility. The employee apparently fled to call for help, after which a forklift dumped a large quantity of caustic soda on the spill to neutralise the acid. The result was explosive ‒ a series of loud bangs could be heard from a distance, but nobody was injured.9

16 March 2009: A chemical fireball and explosion killed two workers and badly injured another at the Kayelekera mine. Over the next two days, the fatal accident prompted 200 contract workers to strike over pay and working conditions. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists noted in a 2015 report that three more workers, including a contractor, died in other incidents at Kayelekera in the years after the fireball.10

18 March 2009: Malawian police fired tear-gas at workers at the Kayelekera mine construction site. The workers, mostly casual laborers, were on a sit-in since the previous day to pressure management for better working conditions. The strike forced Paladin management to temporarily shut down the mine and evacuate its senior managers to Lilongwe.11

August 2009: Neville Huxham from Paladin Energy Africa said: “We’re taking the uranium out of the ground, we’re exporting it to be used for productive purposes, so we should be getting a medal for cleaning up the environment.”12

September 2009: Australia’s Fairfax press reported on the Kayelekera mine: “The company’s approach has caused friction with local non-government groups, which took legal action to impose tougher controls on the project in 2007. The case was settled out of court. Since then it has been accused of lax safety standards (three workers have died in accidents this year) and failing to bring promised benefits to local communities …”13

Australian-based scientific consultant Howard Smith said regulations were ”essentially a self-regulation system, which will ultimately result in releases [of contaminated water] that are under-reported, uncontrolled and hidden from the affected public.”13

October 2009: Fourth death in 2009 at Kayelekera. The company said that an employee had died at the mine as a result of a mini-bus rollover on October 7. Paladin said 19 people including the driver were injured, with 15 admitted to hospital. Paladin advised on August 25 that a construction contractor had died at the mine, also as a result of a motor vehicle incident. The company reported on April 5 that two sub-contractors had died in a flash fire at the mine construction site on March 16.14

September 2010: Paladin orders miners to work at Kayelekera in spite of a shortage of dust masks. A Nyasa Times undercover journalist who visited the mine on 23 September 2010 found that most miners did not wear masks, and their hands and face were caked with uranium ore. The workers protested to management about the development. The geology superintendent of the mine, Johan De Bruin, confirmed the lack of dust masks. In a September 23 email sent to mine workers, he ordered staff to continue working despite the shortage of dust masks. “Mining is a 24 hour operation and cannot be stopped as a result of a shortage of available dust masks,” said De Bruin in his September 23 email.15

June 2011: A truck driver died in an accident at the Kayelekera mine ‒ the Tanzanian national died after the truck he was driving struck a water tank.16

15 August 2011: Progress on Expansion Phase Three of the Langer Heinrich mine came to a standstill after employees of the main contractor, Grinaker LTA, downed tools due to grievances related to impending layoffs. According to a workers committee representative, more than 600 employees stopped work at noon on August 15 and continued to strike the following day.17

2012: CRIIRAD, a French NGO specialising in independent radiation monitoring, conducted radiation monitoring activities around the Kayelekera mine. Its report stated: “CRIIRAD discovered hot spots in the environment of the mine and a high uranium concentration in the water flowing from a stream located below the open pit and entering the Sere river. Results that relate to the radiological monitoring of the environment performed by the company are kept secret. The company should publish on its web site all environmental reports. No property right can be invoked to prevent public access to Paladin environmental reports (especially as Malawi State holds 15 % of the shares of the uranium mine). It is shocking to discover that million tonnes of radioactive and chemically polluting wastes (especially tailings) are disposed of on a plateau with very negative geological and hydrogeological characteristics.”18

11 May 2012: Workers at Kayelekera went on strike over labor conditions: The local workers told Nyasa Times that they were demanding a pay increase from Paladin. Workers downed tools on May 11, halting production at the site. On May 16, Paladin announced than an agreement in principle was achieved for a return to work by the striking employees.19

December 2012: Paladin threatened 75-year old Australian pensioner Noel Wauchope with legal action for posting on her antinuclear.net website an article critical about Paladin’s operations in Malawi. The threat backfired when it was publicised in the widely-read Fairfax press in Australia. Fairfax business columnist Michael West wrote: “The price of Noel Wauchope’s concern for the people Karonga was a long and intimidating letter of demand from Ashurst on behalf of the uranium company Paladin Energy … “20

2013: A detailed report by the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development states:21

“Consistent with what many analysts and commentators have said, this research study unequivocally established that the benefits that Malawi, as a country, is gaining from the deal made with Kayelekera are tangential and dismal. Among the reasons why benefits are skewed more favourably towards the mining company are that the negotiations were done hastily under an atmosphere that was not transparent. Furthermore, the government officials involved were not experienced and were no match for the skilled negotiators for Paladin.

“Above and beyond this, the major problem that contributed to the disproportionate sharing of benefits are the country’s archaic laws that fail to hold the Multinational Corporation (MNCs) more accountable to pay taxes and remit profits to Malawi. … The investment incentives offered to Paladin have revenue implications to the Malawi government. These include; (1) 15% carried equity in project company to be transferred to the Republic of Malawi, (2) Corporate tax rate reduced from 30% to an effective 27.5%, (3) 10% resource rent reduced to zero, (4) Reduced Royalty rate from 5% to 1.5% (years 1 to 3) and 3% (thereafter), (5) removal of 17 % import VAT or import duty during the stability period, (6) immediate 100% capital write off for tax purposes, The capitalisation (debt: equity) ratio of 4:1 for the project, and (7) stability period of 10 years where there will be no increase to tax and royalty regime and commitment to provide the benefit of any tax and royalty decrease during the period. This clause in the agreement statement implies amortization of profits. This means that there shall be a reduction or cancellation of taxes to be paid during future years of subsequent profits as a means to compensate the debt accrued by the company during years of registering losses.”

27 June 2013: About 300 workers, including mine staff and contractor employees, picketed at the Langer Heinrich mine, protesting the way they were being treated and paid. The protesting workers and media were barred from the mine site where the demonstration was supposed to take place.22

July 2013: UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, rubbished the Kayelekera uranium mine deal between Malawi and Paladin, saying Malawi had a raw deal that is robbing the poor. He said that over the lifespan of the mine, Malawi is expected to lose almost US$281 million. “Mining companies are exempt from customs duty, excise duty, value added taxes on mining machinery, plant and equipment. They can also sign special deals on the rate of royalty owed to the government,” he said.23

30 July 2013: An employee died in an accident in the Kayelekera mine’s engineering workshop after being struck in the chest by a light vehicle wheel he was inflating.24

October 2013: The Opposition People’s Transformation Party (PETRA) appealed to government authorities to renegotiate what it called the “stinking development agreement” between Malawi and Paladin regarding the Kayelekera mine.25

3 October 2013: Three miners were injured at Langer Heinrich following a “serious electrical incident”. Paladin said two of the workers received significant burns while a third worker suffered smoke inhalation. One of the workers was flown to South Africa for treatment.26 On October 30, Paladin announced that the injured worker flown to South Africa had died in hospital.27

February 2014: Paladin reported that a truck carrying a container of uranium from Kayelekera overturned. The container fell loose and was punctured by a tree stump, and a “small quantity” of uranium oxide concentrate spilled out. Paladin said the uranium and the soil it came in touch with were removed and taken back to the tailings dam at the mine.28

2 October 2014: About 50 employees staged a protest at the Langer Heinrich Uranium (LHU) mine’s head office in Swakopmund before handing over a petition listing their complaints. Workers employed by companies sub-contracted to LHU claim they had been mistreated at work. The workers from Sure Cast, Gecko Drilling, LBS, Quick Investment, RVH and NEC Stahl claimed they were made to work without benefits, such as medical aid, transport allowances and pension.29

November 2014: Paladin came under fire from a coalition of 33 Malawian civil society groups and chiefs over its proposal to discharge mining sludge into the Sere and North Rukuru rivers. The toxic substances that would flow from the tailings pond at the Kayelekera mine into Lake Malawi 50 kms downstream include waste uranium rock, acids, arsenic and other chemicals used in processing the uranium ore, the coalition said. The lake provides water for drinking and domestic use to millions of Malawians. Part of the lake is protected as a national park.30

2015: A report by the office of Namibia’s Prime Minister said there is a lack of safety at the Langer Heinrich mine and that workers are not aware of policies, rules and procedures as outlined in the radiation management plan.31

January 2015: At the Kayelekera mine, heavy rain caused a liner in the plant run-off tank to rupture, releasing some 500 cubic metres (500,000 litres) of material to the bunded areas of the site. Up to 50 litres may have overtopped one of the containment bunds.32

February 2015: About 60 permanent employees of the Langer Heinrich mine participated in a demonstration to hand over a petition to mine management. Employees sought the removal of the manager for human resources on allegations of victimising employees as well as disregarding employees’ safety. They also accused him of implementing a new salary structure without union agreement. The workers, through the Mineworkers’ Union of Namibia (MUN), also demanded the removal of the mine’s managing director, saying he had total disregard for the union. Workers also said the mine never implemented recommendations made after a 2013 accident that claimed the life of a miner. The workers’ petition said: “Our members are exposed to safety hazards. The company does not properly investigate incidents at the mine.” The workers also alleged that the removal of contract workers from the mine resulted in a lack of rest and increase in fatigue.33

April 2015: Despite opposition from a group of 33 civil society organizations, Paladin began discharging treated waste water from the Kayelekera mine into the Sere River. The discharge of contaminated water was expected to take place for three months. Paladin decided to discharge the waste because the dam at the Kayelekera mine was full, raising the possibility of unplanned and uncontrolled discharges after heavy rains.34

June 2015: A report by ActionAid stated that Malawi ‒ the world’s poorest country ‒ lost out on US$43 million revenue from the Kayelekera mine over the previous six years due to “harmful exemptions from royalty payments from the Malawi government, and tax planning using treaty shopping by Paladin.”35

Australia’s Fairfax press reported: “Between 2009 and 2014, Paladin Energy moved $US183 million out of Malawi to a holding company in the Netherlands and then on to Australia. A 15-page report by London-based ActionAid has found the Dutch transfers and a special royalties deal – in which Malawi’s mining minister agreed to drop the initial tax rate applied to the uranium mine from 5 per cent to 1.5 per cent – have cost the Malawi public $US43 million. In Africa’s poorest nation, where per capita GDP is just $US226 a year and life expectancy 55, that money could provide the equivalent of 39,000 new teachers or 17,000 nurses, according to the aid group.”36

December 2015: Matildah Mkandawire from Citizens for Justice wrote: “In August this year, Citizens for Justice and Action Aid Malawi, with support from the Tilitonse Fund, organized an interface meeting with the local communities, government representatives at district level and Paladin representatives. The aim of this meeting was to discuss the concerns of the community regarding the failure of Paladin to stick to the agreements in the MOU. Paladin cancelled with us at the 11th hour claiming they needed a formal letter of invitation and not the one they got from the community. The meeting had to go ahead without them although this left the community furious as the issues they wanted to raise were key to their health and sanitation, environmental health and social well-being. The lack of clean water, and the delay in providing educational and health facilities as agreed, spoke volumes of the company’s lack of responsibility for the community it operates in.”37

2016: A human rights body in Malawi sued Paladin Africa Ltd for alleged damage the Kayelekera mine has caused to some miners and the surrounding communities in Karonga district. The Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation accused Paladin of not prioritising the welfare of its employees and the community.38

16 June 2016: Security guards at the mothballed Kayelekera mine downed tools over poor working conditions.39

September 2016: Human Rights Watch released a detailed report on mines in the Karonga region of Malawi, including the Kayelekera uranium mine: “Using Karonga district in northern Malawi as a case study, the report documents how Malawi currently lacks adequate legal standards and safeguards to ensure the necessary balance between developing the mining industry and protecting the rights of local communities. It examines how weak government oversight and lack of information leave local communities unprotected and uninformed about the risks and opportunities associated with mining.”40

20 December 2016: Eight Tanzanians were arrested while travelling to participate in a fact-finding mission of the Kayelekera mine. They are from the area where the Mkuju River uranium mine is planned in Tanzania. They were accused of trespassing, spying and working as foreign agents. They were denied bail and held in sub-standard conditions; their legal access was impeded and their legal team harassed with death threats and the mysterious disappearance of their laptops; their legal defence team was prevented from fully cross-questioning witnesses; and the trial was postponed on six occasions, each time disrupting the defence team that travelled from Lilongwe and Dar-es-Salaam. In April 2017, after almost five months in detention, the eight people were convicted of Criminal Trespassing and carrying out a reconnaissance operation without a permit, and given suspended four-month sentences.41

January 2017: Paladin and the Malawi government rejected requests to disclose the results of water monitoring performed in the surroundings of the Kayelekera mine.42

References:

  1. WISE-Uranium, ‘Paladin Energy Ltd Hall of Infamy’, www.wise-uranium.org/ucpalhi.html
  2. ‘Paladin’s social and environmental record, https://wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/847/nuclear-monitor-847-21-july-2017
  3. http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22committees%2Fcommjnt%2F12858%2F0004%22
  4. Patrick Bond, 24 Dec 2006, ZNet.

Paladin persecutes Australian photojournalist in Malawi

  1. Background on Recent Developments at the Kayelekera Uranium Mine, 2007, www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=1429
  2. MUA News, 15 Jan 2007, ‘Australian Company Uses Malawian Police Against Critics’, http://mua.org.au/news/general/malawi.html
  3. Mineral Policy Institute, March 2007, ‘Paladin Resources Kayelekera Uranium Project in Malawi, Africa would not be approved in Australia, concludes independent reviewers’, http://web.archive.org/web/20080719214944/http://www.mpi.org.au/campaigns/waste/malawi/
  4. Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 March 2008; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#LANGERH
  5. Namibian, 25 April 2008; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#LANGERH
  6. Will Fitzgibbon, Martha M. Hamilton and Cécile Schilis-Gallego / International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 10 July 2015, ‘Australian Mining Companies Digging A Deadly Footprint in Africa’, www.icij.org/project/fatal-extraction/australian-mining-companies-digging-deadly-footprint-africa
  7. Nyasa Times, 18 March 2009; The Nation, 19 March 2009.
    12. IPS, 24 August 2009.
  8. Tom Hyland, 20 Sept 2009, ‘Miner accused on slack safety’, www.smh.com.au/world/miner-accused-on-slack-safety-20090919-fw3q.html
  9. Sydney Morning Herald, 8 Oct 2009; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#MW; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#KAYELEKERA
  10. Nyasa Times, 25 Sep 2010; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#MW
  11. Nyasa Times, 19 June 2011; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#MW
  12. The Namibian, 17 Aug 2011; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#LANGERH
  13. Bruno Chareyron, 2015, ‘Impact of the Kayelekera uranium mine, Malawi’. EJOLT Report No. 21, www.ejolt.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/150222_Report-21.pdf
  14. Nyasa Times, 11 May 2012; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#MW; www.miningweekly.com/article/kayelekera-production-back-on-track-2012-05-16
  15. http://antinuclear.net/2013/09/02/ashurst-paladin-attack-this-website-with-legal-threats/
  16. African Forum and Network on Debt and Development, 2013, ‘The Revenue Costs and Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment in the Extractive Industry in Malawi: The Case of Kayelekera Uranium Mine’, www.afrodad.org/index.php/en/resource-centre/publications/category/22-economic-governance.html
  17. The Namibian, 2 July 2013; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#LANGERH
  18. 22 July 2013, ‘End of mission statement by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food’, www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13567&LangID=E
  19. Paladin Energy Ltd July 31, 2013; Esmarie Swanepoel, 31 July 2013, ‘Fatality at Paladin mine’, www.miningweekly.com/article/fatality-at-paladin-mine-2013-07-31
  20. Nyasa Times, 5 March 2013.
  21. Esmarie Swanepoel, 3 Oct 2013, ‘Electrical accident injures three at Langer Heinrich’, www.miningweekly.com/article/accident-injures-3-at-langer-heinrich-2013-10-03
  22. www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#LANGERH
  23. 17 Feb 2014, ‘Product Shipment Incident near Kayelekera Mine, Malawi’, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/paladin-energy-ltd-product-shipment-120000130.html
  24. Namib Times, 7 Oct 2014; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#LANGERH
  25. Environmental News Service, 25 Nov 2014, ‘Uranium Mine Sludge Discharge Permit Threatens Lake Malawi’, http://ens-newswire.com/2014/11/25/uranium-mine-sludge-discharge-permit-threatens-lake-malawi/
  26. The Namibian, 10 July 2015; www.opm.gov.na; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#LANGERH
  27. Esmarie Swanepoel, 10 Feb 2015, ‘Kayelekera no threat to environment – Paladin’, www.miningweekly.com/article/kayelekera-no-threat-to-environment—paladin-2015-02-10
    Esmarie Swanepoel, 7 Jan 2015, ‘Paladin reports spill at Malawi mine after minor storm’, www.miningweekly.com/article/paladin-reports-spill-at-malawi-mine-after-minor-storm-2015-01-07

Sarah-Jane Tasker, 8 Jan 2015, ‘Paladin Energy alerts ASX to spill at Malawi uranium mine’, www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/paladin-energy-alerts-asx-to-spill-at-malawi-uranium-mine/story-e6frg9df-1227177696428

  1. New Era, 20 Feb 2015; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#LANGERH
  2. www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#MW

Sarah-Jane Tasker, 8 Jan 2015, ‘Paladin Energy alerts ASX to spill at Malawi uranium mine’, www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/paladin-energy-alerts-asx-to-spill-at-malawi-uranium-mine/story-e6frg9df-1227177696428

  1. ActionAid, 17 June 2015, ‘An Extractive Affair: How one Australian mining company’s tax dealings are costing the world’s poorest country millions’, www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/malawi_tax_report_updated_table_16_june.pdf
  2. Heath Aston, 11 July 2015, ‘Australian miner accused of dodging tax in world’s poorest country’, www.theage.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australian-miner-accused-of-dodging-tax-in-worlds-poorest-country-20150710-gi6uzv.html
  3. Matildah M. Mkandawire, 17 Dec 2015, ‘Uranium mining in Malawi: the case of Kayelekera’, Nuclear Monitor #816, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/816/uranium-mining-malawi-case-kayelekera
  4. Norbert Mzembe, 22 June 2016, ‘Malawi: Paladin Africa Sued for ‘Gross Damage”, www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=13429

Capital Radio Malawi, 22 June 2016, www.capitalradiomalawi.com/news/item/6349-paladin-africa-sued-for-gross-damage 
www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#MW

  1. Nyasa Times, 17 June 2016; www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#MW
  2. Human Rights Watch, 27 Sept 2016, ‘”They Destroyed Everything”: Mining and Human Rights in Malawi’, www.hrw.org/report/2016/09/27/they-destroyed-everything/mining-and-human-rights-malawi or www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/accessible_document/malawi0916_etr_web_1.pdf
  3. David Fig, 2 April 2017, ‘Why Malawi’s case against the Tanzanian eight is a travesty of justice’, https://theconversation.com/why-malawis-case-against-the-tanzanian-eight-is-a-travesty-of-justice-75555

Menschenrechte 3000 e.V., 28 Feb 2017, ‘Report on 8 Tanzanian Environmental and Human Rights Defenders arbitrarily detained in Malawi since 22. Dec. 2017’, www.uranium-network.org/images/pics/REPORT-MR3000-TUAM-update-1.pdf

Front Line Defenders, www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/8-tanzanian-environmental-defenders-convicted

www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#KAYELEKERAVT

Malawi Times, 12 April 2017.

Bright Phiri & Nicely Msowoya, ‘REPORT on the continuation of court case against 8 Tanzanians detained in Malawi, on 13. and 14. February 2017’, www.wise-uranium.org/pdf/PhiriMsowoya17214.pdf

  1. BBC, 25 Jan 2017, ‘Fears of river poisoning in Malawi’, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38751257

www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html#MW

 

‘Dam busters: Aborigines battle BHP over water rights’, and ‘Why BHP is facing a minefield’

‘Dam busters: Aborigines battle BHP over water rights’

Chris Mitchell, 4 March 2022, The Australian

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/dam-busters-aborigines-battle-bhp-over-water-rights/news-story/5771234ab2fca122009e83720ecbaf01

In the driest state in the driest continent on earth, tremors from Rio Tinto’s destruction of the Juukan Gorge sacred site have travelled through the outback dust to buffet BHP, the globe’s second biggest miner – ironically over water.

The May 2020 Juukan fiasco has put the spotlight on BHP’s giant Olympic Dam project, its use of Great Artesian Basin water and its ongoing failure to strike financial agreements with native title claimants on its giant mining lease.

BHP is defending legal rights providing it free access to artesian basin water and a mining tenement granted before the High Court’s Mabo decision up-ended land rights in Australia three decades ago.

But Indigenous advocates say the Juukan fiasco has changed mining and the way it interacts with heritage issues and argue BHP needs to take into account developments in native title recognition in the decades since the original leases were struck with governments in the 1980s.

BHP’s legal rights start with the 1982 Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act signed with former mine owner Western Mining. BHP inherited the rights when it bought the mine in 2005 and has almost unprecedented powers over resources and water within its 12,000sq km Stuart Shelf exploration lease.

BHP is also in discussions with native title groups about the original Olympic Dam Agreement it settled in 2008 with the Kokotha, Barngarla and Kuyani. Of these only the Kokotha have been granted formal native title over parts of BHP’s Stuart Shelf exploration area.

Essentially BHP’s problem now is how to balance the very valuable 40-year-old legal rights it has under the indenture with later rights found in a native title determination in favour of the Kokotha in 2014 and the rights of the other two claim groups. It is also negotiating with the Arabana and the Diyari (sometimes spelt Dieri) over other their rights associated with the Mound Springs.

In the absence of firm commitments for change by BHP, Indigenous groups and conservationists are becoming increasing frustrated at what they see as stonewalling by the mining giant.

The report into Rio Tinto’s Juukan Caves destruction, released in October and titled A Way Forward, has shone a light on indigenous engagement in the mining industry. It contained criticism of BHP by Aboriginal interests, including the Arabana tribe, and South Australian conservation groups. They focused on Olympic Dam’s heavy reliance on water from the Great Artesian Basin and expressed concerns it represented an environment risk – particularly to the Mound Springs Aboriginal heritage sites north of the mine.

“Unfortunately our springs are disappearing … The cause … is water taken from the GAB by BHP’s mine at Roxby Downs,” Arabana chairperson Brenda Underwood told the Juukan Caves report.

While BHP and the state government believe the springs remain healthy, environmentalists fear a possible expansion of the Oak Dam copper-gold-uranium project, 65km southeast of Olympic Dam, could take daily water use from the basin to well beyond 50 million litres a day. BHP says it is averaging 34 million litres a day now. BHP moved to allay concerns in February, backing a $15m “study”, partly funded by state and federal governments, into a desalination plant proposed for the Spencer Gulf to pump water to the state’s northern mines.

But conservation and Indigenous groups see the move as a bid to alleviate political pressure on the company even as it tries to protect its rights under the 1982 (Indenture Ratification) Act, which confers almost unprecedented powers over resources and water within its 12,000sq km Stuart Shelf exploration lease.

Conservationists say BHP is trying to control the water agenda, to maintain its privileges under the Indenture Act. But some hope it will be pragmatic enough to cut water demand from the basin if it eventually decides to proceed with Oak Dam.

Asked last week if BHP management was formally committed to ending Great Artesian Basin water use, a spokesperson could not point to any firm commitments.

“We continuously monitor and publicly report our water draw under a program approved by the South Australian government,” the BHP spokesperson said.

Environment campaigner and consultant David Noonan, who provided extensive submissions to the Juukan inquiry, is sceptical of the desalination plant announcement first published in Adelaide’s The Advertiser in February.

“BHP’s Oak Dam copper-uranium project usurps due process. BHP is claiming 1982 legal privileges (under) the Indenture Act special water licence grant of priority rights to extract … GAB public water resources free of charge for multi-decades.”

Noonan says even if the desalination plant were built BHP could be taking Great Artesian Basin water until the end of the decade. He wants to hear a formal commitment from senior management about alternative water sources.

The company’s position is not easy. It paid for a project that came with the rights set out in the indenture and these rights have a very substantial economic value to shareholders. Yet as Juukan shows, much corporate damage can be done when short cuts are taken in the area of Aboriginal heritage.

A BHP spokesperson said on heritage issues, “We recognise that the framework for protecting Aboriginal cultural heritage in South Australia can be improved. Our submission to the (SA) parliamentary inquiry (last year) suggests ways to further strengthen the 1988 Act, including requiring land users and traditional owners to prepare management plans, providing rights of appeal, and increasing financial penalties for breaches.”

The company committed last year to updating the indenture, which was legislated on the 1979 Heritage Act.

BHP has publicly said it will work with the government to update the indenture in line with the 1988 Act, with which most of the State’s miners must comply. The Kokotha fought a long battle to win their native title determination in 2014 after a claim was lodged in 1996.

Kokotha directors say dealing with BHP on the Olympic Dam Agreement before and after their native title court win has been challenging. At this point they are not receiving mining royalties and are unhappy with employment opportunities for Kokotha people.

BHP is powerful in South Australia. There has been a flow of senior company managers into the bureaucracy and vice versa for many years under both sides of politics.

Premier Steven Marshall is Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, and well regarded by stakeholders.

BHP paid the South Australian government royalties of $136m last year. Its Olympic Dam project 560km north of Adelaide is the state’s largest mining venture and the world’s biggest uranium mine, a global top four copper mine and producer of gold and lead.

But it would be fair to say native title holders and groups with established heritage interests do not wield the sort of power in Adelaide that big miners do.

On royalty payments, BHP says its 2008 Olympic Dam agreement was originally negotiated for the proposed Olympic Dam expansion (ODX) that was shelved in 2020 for cost reasons and that a new agreement needs to be worked out. ODX a was to include an open pit 4.1km long, 3.5km wide and 1km deep.

The company’s Aboriginal engagement team are mindful expectations have changed across the industry since Juukan and BHP will need to be seen to be engaging seriously on the expectations of traditional owners and groups with prior interests in heritage sites.

Some among the Kokotha believe that like the Indenture Act itself, an Olympic Dam agreement negotiated before the Kokotha achieved native title should be written off completely and an entirely new agreement established.

BHP’s leadership is facing a different set of circumstances from either 2005 when it bought the mine or 1982 when the indenture was legislated.

Its commitment to try to comply with the 1988 Heritage Act could create an opportunity for the Kokotha, as native title holder, to demand more power over Olympic Dam heritage issues given it has just been appointed a RARB (Registered Aboriginal Representative Body) with formal power over heritage determinations in its native title area. Legal documents considered by the Kokotha board late last year make it clear one option now is to seek an entirely new Olympic Dam agreement.

The Kokotha board has also considered options for how its RARB status may work in the interests of the other ODA signatories, the Barngarla and the Kuyani.

BHP has flagged some changes to the way it operates that could reduce its own power over its own asset.

BHP’s new local Indigenous engagement boss, Allan James, understands exactly how important it is to the company and a possible expansion to Oak Dam that BHP is seen to be negotiating with traditional owners in good faith. A Way Forward says mining companies need to ensure native title holders give “free, prior and informed consent” for future projects. This will also make miners work harder to improve the skills of board members on registered Native Title Bodies Corporate and to ensure they share internal company knowledge with traditional owners.

James is himself a native title holder from the northern Goldfields in WA where he was born and raised as a Wongi/Yamatji man. He was brought in to oversee local engagement across Australia four months ago and has previously worked for Rio and Newmont.

“We have a number of local traditional owners involved in this team and participating on the front line in these negotiations. The organisation is really serious about how we approach engagement. We are out there on the ground, having these really difficult conversations walking in both worlds. We are sitting in an industry perspective but we also know we wear a community hat.”

It remains to be seen if BHP’s senior management will prove as receptive to the changing expectations of miners in Aboriginal social performance as those who work in its engagement team – and traditional owners – want the company to be.
As for the state government, there seems to be little pressure on BHP. A spokesman this week said: “BHP currently complies with its obligations to the government but if its operations were proposed to change, then its obligations would also be reconsidered.”

But Michael Turner, a former director of Kokotha and current adviser on the Kokotha Native Title Compensation Settlement Trust and the Kokotha Charitable Trust, says he has been dealing with BHP for much of his adult life and the experience has not been positive.

“Compared with dealing with OZ Minerals there is just no comparison really. In terms of our agreement with OZ Minerals we are all one. We successfully negotiated a long-term agreement between the two parties with little involvement of lawyers. We worked directly with OZ Minerals and the agreement took just over 12 months,” Turner said.

OZ Minerals provides compensation, employment opportunities and long-term educational packages including scholarships to the Kokotha community from its Carapateena copper mine operations site. “The relationship between the Kokotha and OZ Minerals is very respectful,” Turner said.

“Don’t get me wrong. We have had our ups and downs but overall it’s been great.” Negotiations on BHP’s Olympic Dam Agreement had been disappointing.

“We have been calling for a review of the Olympic Dam agreement for many years and it has constantly been deferred. They’re refusing to move forward but we have continually engaged with BHP. It would be great if BHP could keep to its word and respect the wishes of the Kokotha people and review the ODA for the benefit of generations to come,” Turner said.

Former Kokotha Aboriginal Corporation deputy chair Chris Larkin, a director on the Kokotha Culture and Heritage Committee, doubts that BHP is negotiating in good faith.

“While Kokotha’s lawyers think BHP’s negotiating with them in good faith BHP is backdooring Kokotha by harassing the government to try to extend the Indenture Act,” he said.

But a spokesperson for BHP said: “The ODA remains in effect notwithstanding the determination of native title, and requires all three groups to be consulted. While this can be complex at times, we have processes in place … We will continue to work collaboratively and respectfully with all parties …”

“BHP will continue to work … on employment, training, business and community investment opportunities …” the spokesperson said.


‘Why BHP is facing a minefield’

Chris Mitchell, 5 March 2022, The Advertiser

https://todayspaper.adelaidenow.com.au/infinity/article_popover_share.aspx?guid=23a5b7bd-e6d5-4a82-972e-347f65874b3a

Australia’s biggest company and the world’s second biggest miner, BHP, may disappoint conservationists and Aboriginal native title holders who had hoped for commitments to reform of heritage issues and underground water use at its Olympic Dam mine before the March 19 state election BHP, the Big Australian, with market capitalisation of $230bn, paid the state government royalties of $136m last year. Its Olympic Dam project 560km north of Adelaide is South Australia’s largest mining venture and the world’s biggest uranium mine, a global top-four copper mine and producer of gold and lead. BHP is powerful in SA.

Premier Steven Marshall is Aboriginal Affairs Minister but it would be fair to say native title holders do not wield the sort of power in Adelaide that big miners do.
Yet BHP has flagged some changes to the way it operates that could reduce its own power over its own asset.

Under the 1982 Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act signed with former mine owner Western Mining, BHP, which bought the mine in 2005, has almost unprecedented powers over resources and water within its 12,000sq km Stuart Shelf exploration lease.

BHP has been criticised by conservation groups and Aboriginal interests in last year’s report into rival Rio Tinto’s destruction of Juukan Gorge in Western Australia. The report includes criticism from the Arabana tribe of the mine’s heavy reliance on water from the Great Artesian Basin (GAB), and particularly from the so-called “Mound Springs” Aboriginal heritage sites north of the mine.

On February 15, The Advertiser revealed BHP would back a new $15m study, partly funded by state and federal governments, into a Spencer Gulf desalination plant to pump water to SA’s northern mines. But BHP is still far short of publicly committing to end its use of GAB water.

Conservationists say BHP is trying to control the water agenda, to maintain its privileges under the Indenture Act. But some hope it will be pragmatic enough to cut water demand from the GAB if it eventually decides to proceed with its Oak Dam copper-gold-uranium mine 65km southeast of Olympic.

Asked last week if BHP was formally committed to ending GAB water use, a spokesman said: “We continuously monitor and publicly report our water draw under a program approved by the SA government.”

BHP is not just under pressure for environmental reasons. It is in discussion with three native title groups about the Olympic Dam Agreement it settled in 2008 with the Kokatha, Barngarla and Kuyani.

Of these, only the Kokatha have been granted formal native title over parts of BHP’s Stuart Shelf.

BHP’s problem now is how to balance the very valuable 40-year-old legal rights it has under the indenture with rights found in a native title determination in favour of the Kokatha in 2014.

The company committed last year to updating the indenture, which was legislated on the 1979 Heritage Act.

BHP has publicly said it will work with the government to update the indenture in line with the 1988 Act, with which most of the state’s miners must comply.

The Kokatha fought a long, 18-year battle to win their native title in 2014. Kokatha directors say dealing with BHP on the ODA before and after their native title court win has been challenging.

At this point, they are not receiving mining royalties and are unhappy with employment opportunities for Kokatha people.

Michael Turner, a former Kokatha director and current adviser on the Kokatha Native Title Compensation Settlement and Kokatha Charitable trusts, says he has been dealing with BHP for much of his adult life.

“Compared with dealing with OzMinerals, there is just no comparison, really,” he said. “In terms of our agreement with OzMinerals, we are all one. We successfully negotiated a long-term agreement between the two parties with little involvement of lawyers.”

OzMinerals provides compensation, employment and long-term educational packages to the Kokatha community from its Carapateena copper mine. “The relationship between the Kokatha and OzMinerals is very respectful,” Mr Turner said.

But negotiations on BHP’s Olympic Dam Agreement had been disappointing.
“We have been calling for a review of the ODA for many years and it has constantly been deferred,” he said.

“They’re refusing to move forward. It would be great if BHP could keep to its word and respect the wishes of the Kokatha people and review the ODA for the benefit of generations to come.”

A BHP spokesman this week said: “The ODA remains in effect notwithstanding the determination of native title, and requires all three groups to be consulted.
We will continue to work collaboratively and respectfully with all parties.”

The final report into the May 24, 2020 destruction by Australia’s second-biggest miner, Rio Tinto, of the Juukan Caves in Western Australia’s Pilbara was released in October. In it, Arabana chair Brenda Underwood says: “Unfortunately, our springs are disappearing. The cause … is water taken from the GAB by BHP’s mine at Roxby Downs.”

BHP and the state government believe the springs remain healthy but environmentalists fear a possible expansion to the Oak Dam could take daily GAB water use well beyond 50 million litres a day. BHP says it is averaging 34 million litres a day.

Environment campaigner and consultant David Noonan, who provided submissions to the Juukan Inquiry, is sceptical of the desalination plant announcement.

Mr Noonan says even if it was built, BHP could be taking GAB water until the end of the decade. He wants to hear a formal commitment about alternative water sources.
BHP’s Aboriginal engagement team is mindful expectations have changed across the industry since Juukan and BHP will need to be seen to be engaging seriously with traditional owners. Some believe an ODA negotiated before the Kokatha achieved native title should be written off and a new agreement established.

The company’s position is not easy. It paid for a project that came with indenture rights that have a substantial economic value to shareholders.

Yet, as Juukan shows, much corporate damage can be done in the area of Aboriginal heritage.

“We recognise that the framework for protecting Aboriginal cultural heritage in SA can be improved,” a BHP spokesman said.

Mining is changing in the wake of Juukan. Rio Tinto’s decision to blow up an area sacred to traditional owners – which led to the sacking of its global CEO, Jean-Sebastien Jacques, and two senior local executives – is still reverberating around the industry.

BHP’s new Indigenous engagement boss, Allan James, knows it is important to be seen to be negotiating with traditional owners in good faith.

“We have a number of local traditional owners involved in this team and participating on the frontline in these negotiations,” says Mr James, a Wongi/Yamatji man from WA. “We are out there on the ground, having these really difficult conversations, walking in both worlds. We are sitting in an industry perspective but we also know we wear a community hat.”

It remains to be seen if BHP’s management will prove as receptive to the changing expectations as those who work in its Aboriginal engagement team – and traditional owners – want it to be.

A BHP spokesman said it had invested $2m in Indigenous grants in SA in the past 18 months and spent $3.3m with Indigenous contractors this financial year. He said the company had taken more than 50 traditional owner recruits into Olympic Dam since 2020.

Nuclear threats in Ukraine

28 March 2022: Several nuclear facilities have been hit by Russian military strikes in Ukraine since the invasion began: a nuclear research facility called the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology; two radioactive waste storage sites; the Chernobyl nuclear site (which no longer has operating reactors); and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Thankfully there have not been any significant radiation releases yet.

Friends of the Earth is compiling information on the nuclear threats in Ukraine and posting information and updates on this webpage – see below.

Historical precedents: There is a history of nuclear facilities being targeted, mostly in the Middle East and mostly involving research reactor facilities suspected of being used for nuclear weapons proliferation. See this FoE webpage for details and see this University of Maryland ‘Nuclear Facility Attack Database‘.

Some useful sources of information on nuclear threats in Ukraine:

Nuclear facilities targeted in Russia’s war on Ukraine

This article was written on March 11 article and is being regularly updated. Last update March 14. Article and updates compiled by jim.green@foe.org.au, national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia.

“I cannot say what could be done to completely protect [nuclear] installations from attack, except to build them on Mars.” ‒ Head of the Ukrainian nuclear regulator SNRIU, 2015.

Contents

  • Summary
  • Comparing a worst-case scenario with the conflict in Ukraine
  • Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant — details of the attack
  • NPR report on the Zaporizhzhia attack
  • Zaporizhzhia attack — worldwide condemnation and risks
  • Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant as a military base
  • Control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
  • Zaporizhzhia staff
  • No independent regulatory oversight of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
  • Zaporizhzhia power supply
  • Zaporizhzhia communications
  • Nuclear waste at Zaporizhzhia
  • Chernobyl attack and staff-hostages
  • Chernobyl ‒ lack of regulatory oversight
  • Chernobyl ‒ communications
  • Chernobyl ‒ power supply lost then restored
  • Why has Russia seized control of nuclear power plants?
  • Radioactive waste storage and disposal sites in Ukraine
  • Neutron Source at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology
  • Other nuclear facilities / nuclear theft and smuggling risks
  • Breakdown of nuclear regulation
  • Inability of IAEA and other international organisations to reduce nuclear risks in Ukraine
  • Nuclear safety and security upgrades in Ukraine prior to the 2022 invasion
  • Nuclear warfare
  • Safeguards
  • Cyber-warfare

Summary

Several nuclear facilities in Ukraine have been attacked by the Russian military over the past fortnight: a nuclear research facility at Kharkiv; two radioactive waste storage sites; the Chernobyl nuclear site (which no longer has operating reactors); and the operating Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.

Thankfully there have not been any significant radiation releases … yet.

The operating nuclear power plants pose by far the greatest risks. Ukraine has 15 power reactors located at four sites. Eight of the reactors are currently operating.

The Zaporizhzhia plant – the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, with six reactors — is under the control of the Russian military. At least one reactor is operating at each of the other three plants. The Russian military might fight to take control of these plants over the coming days and weeks.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has repeatedly warned about the grave risks. He said on March 2:

“The situation in Ukraine is unprecedented and I continue to be gravely concerned. It is the first time a military conflict is happening amidst the facilities of a large, established nuclear power program.

“I have called for restraint from all measures or actions that could jeopardise the security of nuclear and other radioactive material, and the safe operation of any nuclear facilities in Ukraine, because any such incident could have severe consequences, aggravating human suffering and causing environmental harm.”

Grossi noted a 2009 decision by the IAEA General Conference that affirmed that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency.”

Comparing a worst-case scenario with the conflict in Ukraine

It’s worthwhile comparing a worst-case scenario with the current situation in Ukraine. A worst-case scenario would involve war between two (or more) even-matched nations with a heavy reliance on nuclear power. War would drag on for years between evenly-matched nations. The heavy reliance on nuclear power would make it difficult or impossible to shut down power reactors.

Sooner or later, a deliberate or accidental military strike would likely hit a reactor – or the reactor’s essential power and cooling water supply would be disrupted. Any ‘gentleman’s agreement’ not to strike nuclear power plants would be voided and multiple Chernobyl- or Fukushima-scale disasters could unfold concurrently – in addition to all the non-nuclear horrors of war.

In the current conflict, the nations are not evenly matched and the fighting is limited to one country. There won’t be large-scale warfare dragging on for years – although low-level conflict might persist for years, as has been the case since Russia’s 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

Ukraine does share one component of a worst-case scenario: its heavy reliance on nuclear power. Fifteen reactors at four sites generate 51.2 percent of the country’s electricity. It is one of only three countries reliant on nuclear power for more than half of its electricity supply.

Power reactors have continued to operate throughout the conflict. In the weeks prior to the February 24 invasion, 0-3 reactors were disconnected. The number rose to five on February 26 and has remained at 6-7 since then. Daily updates from the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) list which reactors are operating and which are disconnected.

Even before the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s reactor fleet was ageing, its nuclear industry was corrupt, regulation was inadequate, and nuclear security measures left much room for improvement.

Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant — details of the attack

The Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant is home to six reactors and lies near one of Russia’s main invasion routes, north of Crimea. The plant was contentious long before the recent invasion due to mismanagement and the ageing of the Soviet-era reactors. A 2017 Austrian government assessment of Zaporizhzhia concluded that: “The documents provided and available lead to the conclusion that a high probability exists for accident scenarios to develop into a severe accident that threatens the integrity of the containment and results in a large release.”

The Russian military assault on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant on March 4 damaged the “reactor compartment building” of reactor #1, two artillery shells hit the dry storage facility containing spent nuclear fuel (without causing significant damage), a fire severely damaged a training building, and a laboratory building was damaged.

SNRIU reported that the reactor #6 transformer had been taken out of service and was undergoing emergency repair after damage to its cooling system was detected following the attack.

The European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group said that it is “extremely disconcerting” that “damage has been reported to have occurred to unit 1 building, the gallery and grid infrastructure.”

Two people were injured in the fire, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said, while Ukraine’s nuclear utility Energoatom said that three Ukrainian soldiers were killed and two wounded.

SNRIU reported on March 11: “The ZNPP personnel continues carrying out walkdowns to detect and dispose of hazardous items that appeared on the site during the shelling and capture of the Zaporizhzhia NPP by Russian troops. The SNRIU emphasizes that any explosive items at the NPP pose a direct threat not only to the safety of personnel but also to the NPP in general!”

NPR report on the Zaporizhzhia attack

NPR reported on March 11:

“Last week’s assault by Russian forces on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant was far more dangerous than initial assessments suggested, according to an analysis by NPR of video and photographs of the attack and its aftermath. A thorough review of a four-hour, 21-minute security camera video of the attack reveals that Russian forces repeatedly fired heavy weapons in the direction of the plant’s massive reactor buildings, which housed dangerous nuclear fuel. Photos show that an administrative building directly in front of the reactor complex was shredded by Russian fire. And a video from inside the plant shows damage and a possible Russian shell that landed less than 250 feet from the Unit 2 reactor building.

“The security camera footage also shows Russian troops haphazardly firing rocket-propelled grenades into the main administrative building at the plant and turning away Ukrainian firefighters even as a fire raged out of control in a nearby training building. …

“In fact, the training building took multiple strikes, and it was hardly the only part of the site to take fire from Russian forces. The security footage supports claims by Ukraine’s nuclear regulator of damage at three other locations: the Unit 1 reactor building, the transformer at the Unit 6 reactor and the spent fuel pad, which is used to store nuclear waste. It also shows ordnance striking a high-voltage line outside the plant. The IAEA says two such lines were damaged in the attack.

“”This video is very disturbing,” says Edwin Lyman, director of nuclear power safety at the Union of Concerned Scientists. While the types of reactors used at the plant are far safer than the one that exploded in Chernobyl in 1986, the Russian attack could have triggered a meltdown similar to the kind that struck Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011, he warns.

“It’s completely insane to subject a nuclear plant to this kind of an assault,” Lyman says. …

“Much of the fire was directed toward the training center and the plant’s main administrative building. But at various points in the battle, Russian forces lobbed rounds deep into the nuclear complex in the direction of the reactor buildings. …

“The afternoon after the battle, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine reported that the reactor compartment of Unit 1, which lay in the direction of some of the Russian fire, had sustained damage. It also reported that two shells had landed in an area used to hold old nuclear waste that lay to the north of the battle. Later statements by the regulator and the IAEA reported further damage to the power transformer for the Unit 6 reactor.

“At one point, the video shows Russian forces directing their firepower northward toward Unit 6 and the spent fuel area, corroborating those reports. …

“By 2:25 a.m. on March 4, the fighting was largely over. Reinforcements arrived, including a Russian-built MRAP armored vehicle with a gray paint job resembling those used by the Russian National Guard.

“Firefighting vehicles arrived at around 2:50 a.m., likely from the nearby town of Enerhodar. But even as the fire raged in the training building, Russian forces apparently forced the firefighters to turn around.

“In the days after the assault, Energoatom, the Ukrainian state-owned utility that ran Zaporizhzhia, released several photos showing damage to the site on the social media platform Telegram. Most notably, a short video shows what might be a Russian artillery shell on an elevated walkway leading toward the Unit 2 reactor building. …

“The location of the possible shell and the damage is within just a few hundred feet of the Unit 2 reactor building, says Tom Bielefeld, an independent nuclear security analyst based in Germany.

“Bielefeld says that the walkway also runs alongside a building used to handle radioactive waste from the plant. That building is not as hardened, or reinforced against attacks and other catastrophic events, as the nuclear reactor buildings are. Had it been struck, there would have been the potential for a localized release of radioactive contamination. …

“Bielefeld says he is deeply worried about the prospects of firefights at Ukraine’s three remaining nuclear power stations. At Rivne Nuclear Power Plant in the country’s north, the plant’s director, Pavlo Pavlyshyn, told NPR that Ukrainian forces were prepared to mount a defense should Russian troops try to take the plant. And Russian forces are now advancing toward a second plant, the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Station.”

Zaporizhzhia attack — worldwide condemnation and risks

The military assault on Zaporizhzhia drew worldwide condemnation.

In a March 15 letter, EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson said: “The international nuclear community adopted Resolution GOV/2022-17 in the IAEA Board of Governors, condemning Russia’s ill-considered, violent seizure of control of the Chornobyl site, and calling on Russia to cease all such violent actions at nuclear sites, warning that activities of this type raise the risk of a nuclear accident. However, Russia did not heed this warning and proceeded to violently and recklessly take control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, inflicting damage at the site.”

To say that the attack was reckless would be an understatement. Dr Edwin Lyman from the Union of Concerned Scientists summarised the risks:

“There are a number of events that could trigger a worst-case scenario involving a reactor core or spent fuel pool located in a war zone: An accidental – or intentional – strike could directly damage one or more reactors. An upstream dam failure could flood a reactor downstream. A fire could disable plant electrical systems. Personnel under duress could make serious mistakes. The bottom line: Any extended loss of power that interrupted cooling system operations that personnel could not contain has the potential to cause a Fukushima-like disaster.”

Dr Lyman notes that a Chernobyl-style catastrophe — a massive steam explosion and long-duration fire — is implausible, but that the “consequences of a nuclear accident at one of the four operational Ukrainian nuclear plants could be similar to that of Fukushima.”

The risks of the military attack were all the greater because one of the six reactors at Zaporizhzhia was operating at the time. SNRIU listed three reactors as operating on March 3 at 8am local time. The military attack began at 1am on March 4. SNRIU listed one reactor as operating on March 4 at 8am local time, with two reactors listed as operating from March 6, onwards.

Was Ukraine operating reactors because the electricity they produced was absolutely essential? Was the Ukrainian government hoping that continuing to operate reactors would minimise the risk of a military attack on the nuclear plant? Are Zaporizhzhia reactors currently being operated under the direction of the Russian military for the same reason — to deter any attempt by Ukrainian forces to take back the site? How will the lessons learned from the Zaporizhzhia experience play out at the other three nuclear power plants?

Number of reactors operating or in shutdown at Zaporizhzhia

SNRIU said on March 18 that two reactors were operating, two were under repair (units 1 and 6), and the other two were in shutdown mode.

Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant as a military base

Currently, Russian troops are using the Zaporizhzhia plant as a military base, presumably on the assumption that it won’t be attacked by Ukrainian forces. Energoatom said on March 9 that there were 50 units of heavy Russian equipment, 400 military staff and “lots of explosives and weapons” at the Zaporizhzhia plant. SNRIU said the Russian military is turning the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant “into a military facility, deploying heavy weapons in this territory to blackmail the entire world.”

Control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant

Reuters reported on March 11/12: “Russian officials have attempted to enter and take full operational control of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the head of Ukrainian state nuclear company Energoatom said on Friday. Energoatom chief Petro Kotin said Russian forces had told the plant’s Ukrainian staff that the plant now belonged to Russian state nuclear company Rosatom after its capture last week. Ten officials from Rosatom, including two senior engineers, then unsuccessfully attempted to enter the plant and take control of operations, he said in a televised interview. “On the territory (of the plant) there are around 500 Russian soldiers with automatic weapons … our staff are in an extremely bad psychological state,” Kotin said.”

SNRIU said on March 12 that Zaporizhzhia staff deny information that is currently circulating in the media about the nuclear plant’s transition into the ownership of the Rosatom Corporation.

SNRIU said on March 22 that “the operation of the nuclear power plant is carried out exclusively by the staff of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, there is a constant rotation of the staff.”

Zaporizhzhia staff

Ukrainian staff staff are currently operating the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant under Russian control: any action, including measures related to the technical operation of the reactors, requires approval from the Russian commander.

Grossi noted that the arrangement violates one of the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security, that “operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure”.

These are the Seven Pillars of the IAEA Framework:

  1. The physical integrity of the facilities – whether it is the reactors, fuel ponds, or radioactive waste stores – must be maintained;
  2. All safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times;
  3. The operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure;
  4. There must be secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites;
  5. There must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites;
  6. There must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems and emergency preparedness and response measures; and
  7. There must be reliable communications with the regulator and others.

Dr Najmedin Meshkati, a nuclear safety expert at the University of Southern California, commented:

“War adversely affects the safety culture in a number of ways. Operators are stressed and fatigued and may be scared to death to speak out if something is going wrong. Then there is the maintenance of a plant, which may be compromised by lack of staff or unavailability of spare parts. Governance, regulation and oversight – all crucial for the safe running of a nuclear industry – are also disrupted, as is local infrastructure, such as the capability of local firefighters. In normal times you might have been able to extinguish the fire at Zaporizhzhia in five minutes. But in war, everything is harder.”

Zaporizhzhia staff are operating in three daily shifts according to SNRIU. There are problems with food availability and supply, SNRIU said. Ukrainian energy minister Herman Galushchenko said managers at the nuclear plant were being forced to record an address to be used as propaganda. “The employees of the station are physically and psychologically exhausted,” Galushchenko said.

The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) said on March 10 that “there cannot be interference of any kind with Ukrainian member operators’ ability to safely perform their work”. WANO’s concerns include: staff not getting proper rest; difficulties in providing supplies to power plants; risks to power supplies and availability of fuel supplies for long-term use of emergency diesel generators; external pressures jeopardising decision-making and disrupted communication with the regulator and support organisations like the IAEA and WANO. WANO said it supports the “immediate establishment of a nuclear safety framework at all nuclear facilities in Ukraine that ensures that the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security are achieved and maintained”.

Forbes senior contributor Craig Hooper writes: “It seems unlikely that Russia has mobilised trained reactor operators and prepared reactor crisis-management teams to take over any ‘liberated’ power plants. The heroic measures that kept the Chernobyl nuclear accident and Japan’s Fukushima nuclear disaster from becoming far more damaging events just will not happen in a war zone.”

SNRIU said on March 22: “The ZNPP personnel and their families are under constant psychological pressure due to the presence of hostile military occupiers on the NPP site and in the satellite city, as well as a large number of military vehicles. Permanent stressful conditions, shortage of food and medicine increase the likelihood of personnel errors, which can lead to emergencies/accidents and directly affect the NPP safety.”

SNRIU said on March 26: “The Zaporizhzhia NPP and Enerhodar city are occupied by the Russian military units since 4 March 2022. Apart from the aggressor-country military, representatives of the State Atomic Energy Corporation of the Russian Federation “Rosatom” are illegally present at the ZNPP site for a long time.”

No independent regulatory oversight of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant

SNRIU reported on March 11: “Independent regulatory oversight over nuclear and radiation safety directly at the ZNPP site is currently not carried out due to the potential danger to life and health of the SNRIU state inspectors, as well as due to the damage to inspectors’ workplaces as a result of shelling and seizure of the Zaporizhzhia NPP by the occupiers.”

SNRIU said on March 22: “Regulatory supervision of nuclear and radiation security directly on the site of the Zaporizhzhya NPP is impossible.”

Zaporizhzhia power supply

The IAEA reported on March 9 that the Zaporizhzhia site has four high-voltage (750 kV) offsite power lines plus an additional one on standby, but that it had been informed by the Ukrainian operator that two lines have been damaged and thus there are now two operating lines plus one on standby. The operator said that power requirements could be maintained with one line. “Nevertheless, this is another example of where the safety pillar to secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites has been compromised,” Grossi said.

If grid power is lost, the adequacy of backup power generators to maintain essential cooling of reactors and spent fuel will depend on factors such as the integrity of the diesel fuel store, and the viability of securing further diesel fuel. The inability to run generators was one of the causes of the Fukushima disaster.

Dr Meshkati said: “My biggest worry is that Ukraine suffers from a sustained power grid failure. The likelihood of this increases during a conflict, because pylons may come down under shelling or gas power plants might get damaged and cease to operate. And it is unlikely that Russian troops themselves will have fuel to keep these emergency generators going — they don’t seem to have enough fuel to run their own personnel carriers.”

The adequacy of backup generators at Zaporizhzhia has long been a concern as detailed in a March 2 Greenpeace International report. In 2020, the Ukrainian NGO EcoAction received information from nuclear industry whistleblowers about problems with the generators at Zaporizhzhia, including a lack of spare parts. In the same year, the regulator SNRIU reported on a generator malfunction. An upgrade of the generators was due to be complete by 2017 but the completion date has been pushed back to 2023, i.e. it remains incomplete.

It’s not easy to work out how many power lines have been operational and how many have been disconnected at any particular point in time. Here are some reports in chronological order tohelp make sense of the situation:

SNRIU said on March 17 that two of the power lines were connected (and two disconnected) and thus the power of the two operating reactors was “reduced”.

SNRIU said on March 19 that one of high-voltage lines was restored and that two out of four lines were now operational. The restored power line was out of service from March 16 to March 18, SNRIU sad.

SNRIU said on March 19: “Three of the four 750 kV high-voltage lines (Zaporizhzhya, South Donbas, and Kakhovka) were damaged due to hostilities in the region. In addition, on 17 March 2022, in the period from 14:00 to 20:00, as a result of damage, the ZNPP inductive coupling line (750/330 kV) with the Zaporizhzhya thermal power plant was disconnected. This line can be used by the ZNPP to ensure power supply to the process systems of power units and power output in the event of failure of all four regular high-voltage lines. After eliminating the detected damage, the line operability was restored.” SNRIU made very similar comments on March 18, adding that: “Due to hostilities in the region and the seizure of the ZNPP site and adjacent territories by the Russian occupation forces, there is a potential threat of the ZNPP blackout. According to the safety analysis reports of the ZNPP power units, the complete loss of external power supply to a power unit is the initiating event of a design basis accident.”

So it seems that at one stage, Zaporizhzhia lost three out of four power lines and also lost the standby power line. Or perhaps, given ongoing efforts to repair damaged lines, the worst situation involved the loss of three out of the five lines (including the standby line). The IAEA said on March 19 that three out of five power lines (four lines plus the standby line) had been disconnected in recent weeks. And the IAEA said on March 18 that two power lines were operating, including the standby line, with three lines disconnected. The IAEA added that a power line had been repaired on the same day it was damaged. On balance, it seems likely that two out of five lines were available at all times.

As of March 23, it seems that two out of four power lines are operational and the standby line is available. The IAEA said on March 21 that it was informed by SNRIU that the two operating reactors at Zaporizhzhia continued to operate at two thirds of their maximum capacity after the repair last week of two power lines, one off-site and one on-site. The IAEA said that Zaporizhzhia now has three high voltage (750 kV) off-site power lines available, including one on standby.

Zaporizhzhia communications

SNRIU said that its nuclear safety inspectors are not allowed to access the Zaporizhzhia plant due to the Russian troops deployed in the area.

SNRIU said on March 6/7 that phone lines, email and fax were not functioning at Zaporizhzhia, with only some poor quality mobile phone service possible, so “reliable information from the site cannot be obtained through normal channels of communication”.

Grossi said that the “deteriorating situation regarding vital communications” between the regulator and the nuclear plant is a “source of deep concern, especially during an armed conflict that may jeopardise the country’s nuclear facilities at any time. Reliable communications between the regulator and the operator are a critical part of overall nuclear safety and security.”

The IAEA said on March 11: “It was not currently possible to deliver necessary spare parts, equipment and specialized personnel to the site to carry out planned repairs, and maintenance activities at Unit 1 had been reduced to the minimum level required by the plant operational procedures.”

Nuclear waste at Zaporizhzhia

A report by Greenpeace International nuclear specialists notes that as of 2017, Zaporizhzhia had 2,204 tons of spent fuel in storage at the site – 855 tonnes in the spent fuel pools within the reactor buildings, and 1,349 tonnes in a dry storage facility.

The spent fuel pools contain far more radioactivity than the dry store. Without active cooling, the pools risk overheating and evaporating to a point where the fuel metal cladding could ignite and release much of the radioactive inventory. Damage to the reservoirs which supply cooling water to Zaporizhzhia could disrupt cooling of reactors and spent fuel.

The Guardian reported in 2015 that the dry store at Zaporizhzhia is sub-standard, with more than 3,000 spent nuclear fuel rods in metal casks within concrete containers in an open-air yard close to a perimeter fence. Neil Hyatt, a professor of radioactive waste management at Sheffield University, told the Guardian that a dry storage container with a resilient roof and in-house ventilation would offer greater protection from missile bombardment.

Chernobyl attack and staff-hostages

No reactors have operated at the Chernobyl site since the year 2000 but the site still has a large quantity of spent nuclear fuel, as well as the radioactive mess left by the 1986 disaster in reactor #4.

The Russian military took control of the Chernobyl site on February 24. Radiation levels were elevated due to heavy military equipment disturbing the contaminated dust around the site.

Russian occupiers have kept around 210 plant operators and guards at the Chernobyl site since February 24 without a new shift to relieve them. A relative of one worker told the BBC that the Russian military was willing to let them swap shifts, but that they could not guarantee their safety on the journey home, nor of workers travelling to take their place. “All the staff are super exhausted and desperate. They doubt that anyone cares about them. Right now they don’t see anyone doing anything to rescue them,” the relative said.

According to the Ukrainian government, workers are being subjected “to psychological pressure and moral exhaustion” with “limited opportunities to communicate, move, and carry out full-fledged maintenance and repair work.”

SNRIU said on March 17: “Given the psychological, moral, and physical fatigue of the personnel, as well as the absence of day-time and repair staff, maintenance and repair activities of equipment important to the safety of the facilities at the Chornobyl NPP site are not carried out, which may lead to the reduction of its reliability, which in turn can lead to equipment failures, emergencies, and accidents.”

The IAEA said on March 20: “The difficult staffing situation at the Chornobyl NPP over the past few weeks has put at risk one of seven indispensable nuclear safety pillars that he outlined earlier this month, which states that “operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure”.”

SNRIU said on March 20: “From the very beginning of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine, all Chornobyl NPP facilities, and facilities located in the Exclusion Zone are under the control of the country’s military aggressor. For 24 days in a row, the Chornobyl NPP personnel has been courageously and heroically performing their functions without rotation to ensure the safe operation of these facilities. Given the psychological, moral, and physical fatigue of the personnel, as well as the absence of day-time and repair staff, maintenance and repair activities of equipment important to the safety of the facilities located at the Chornobyl NPP site are not carried out, which may lead to the reduction of its reliability, and result in equipment failures, emergencies, and accidents.”

The IAEA said on March 21 that Ukraine informed the IAEA “that the long-delayed rotation of technical staff at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) was completed today, enabling them to go home and rest for the first time since Russian forces took control of the site last month”.

The IAEA added: “Ukraine’s regulatory authority said about half of the outgoing shift of technical staff left the site of the 1986 accident yesterday and the rest followed today, with the exception of thirteen staff members who declined to rotate. Most Ukrainian guards also remained at the site, it added. Damaged roads and bridges had complicated the transportation of staff to the nearby city of Slavutych, the regulator said. The staff had been at Chornobyl since the day before Russian forces took control of the site on 24 February. They left after handing over operations to newly arrived Ukrainian colleagues who replaced them after nearly four weeks. The new work shift also comes from Slavutych and includes two supervisors instead of the usual one to ensure that there is back-up available on the site, the regulator said. An agreement had been reached on how to organize future staff rotations at the NPP, where various radioactive waste management facilities are located, it said.”

SNRIU said on March 22:

“According to the updated information received from the Chornobyl NPP, on 20 March 2022, it became possible to organize only a partial rotation of operational personnel who remained on the occupied site territory since 24 February 2022. The day-time and repair personnel, as well as personnel of contractors, is absent on the Chornobyl NPP site.

“The information received from the Chornobyl NPP on the on-site safety parameters and the radiation situation state indicates a trend of the steady deterioration of a number of indicators. The occupier continues to grossly violate the radiation safety requirements and strict access control procedures at the NPP and in the Exclusion Zone, which leads to deterioration of the radiation situation at the plant and in the Exclusion Zone and contributes to the spread of radioactive contamination outside the Exclusion Zone.

“Scheduled activities, maintenance, and repair of systems and equipment of the Chornobyl NPP facilities, which must be performed by day-time personnel, are not carried out due to the occupation since 24 February 2022. In addition, the activities performed with the involvement of contractors’ personnel are not carried out.

“It needs to be recalled that this situation has already led to the impossibility to restore the operation of individual neutron flux sensors, gamma radiation dose rate and radiation contamination sensors, further non-fulfillment of repair activities may lead to failures of other systems and components important to safety. The inoperability of the equipment complicates carrying out full control over the criticality and a number of radiation parameters in one of the Shelter premises.”

SNRIU said on March 24:

“The information received from the Chornobyl NPP indicates that the operational personnel maintain the safety parameters of the facilities at the NPP site within the standard values. At the same time, the Russian military continue to grossly violate the radiation safety requirements and strict access control procedures at the NPP and in the Exclusion Zone, which leads to deterioration of the radiation situation at the site.

“Moreover, right now the enemy is trying to seize the Slavutych city and is conducting shelling of the checkpoints. Personnel working at the Chornobyl NPP facilities, as well as at facilities and enterprises located in the Exclusion Zone live in Slavutych.

“The current situation endangers the lives and health of Chornobyl NPP employees and their families, creates significant psychological and moral pressure on operational personnel ensuring nuclear and radiation safety of the Chornobyl NPP facilities, and makes it impossible to ensure the personnel rotation.”

SNRIU said on March 26: “According to the Chornobyl NPP management, the Slavutych city has been also seized by Russian invaders, and enemy military vehicles are deployed in the city. This endangers the lives and health of all city residents. As is commonly known, Slavutych is the residence city of personnel working at the Chornobyl NPP facilities, and at facilities and enterprises located in the Exclusion Zone, as well as of members of their families, which in turn creates a significant psychological and moral pressure on the operational personnel now ensuring the nuclear and radiation safety of facilities at the Chornobyl NPP site.”

The IAEA said on March 26:

“There has been no staff rotation at the NPP for nearly a week now, the regulator said. Slavutych is located outside the Exclusion Zone that was set up around the Chornobyl NPP after the 1986 accident. Russian forces took control of the NPP on 24 February. Earlier this week, Ukraine’s regulatory authority said that Russian shelling of checkpoints in Slavutych prevented technical staff of the Chornobyl NPP from travelling to and from the site. In an update this morning, the regulator said Slavutych was surrounded. A few hours later, it cited Chornobyl NPP management as confirming media reports that the city had been seized.

“The regulator said the last staff rotation was on 20-21 March, when a new shift of technical personnel arrived from Slavutych to replace colleagues who had worked at the Chornobyl NPP since the day before the Russian military entered the site, where radioactive waste management facilities are located. There was “no information when or whether” a new change of work shift would take place, it said.”

Chernobyl – forest fires in the Exclusion Zone

SNRIU said on March 21 that there are increased radioactivity levels in and beyond the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone as a result of forest fires in radioactively contaminated areas, and that extinguishing the fires is impossible as a result of the occupation of the Exclusion Zone by Russian troops. SNRIU said the areas of fire between 11 and 18 March 2022 were mainly in the western and central parts of the Exclusion Zone. SNRIU said that the automated radiation control system in the Exclusion Zone is not working and thus there is a lack of data on the current state of radiation pollution. SNRIU said: “Forest fires in the cold season are an atypical phenomenon for the Exclusion Zone. There is a high probability that in the spring and summer the intensity of forest fires in the Exclusion Zone may reach the maximum possible limits, which will lead (in the absence of any firefighting measures) to almost complete burning of radioactively contaminated forests in the Exclusion Zone and, consequently, to significant deterioration of radiation in Ukraine and throughout Europe.”

The IAEA said on March 23:

“Earlier today, Ukraine’s regulatory authority informed the IAEA that firefighters were trying to extinguish wildfires near the Chornobyl NPP, an area which has seen such outbreaks also in previous years. The fire brigade from the town of Chornobyl has extinguished four fires, but there are still ongoing fires. The local fire station does not currently have access to the electricity grid, the regulator said. In the meantime, the station is relying on diesel generators for power, for which fuel is required, it added. The NPP site, where radioactive waste management facilities are located, continues to have off-site power available.

“The regulator informed the IAEA last week that it was closely monitoring the situation in the Chornobyl NPP Exclusion Zone ahead of the annual “fire season” when spontaneous fires often occur in the area, still contaminated by radioactive material from the accident 36 years ago next month. Russian forces took control of the site on 24 February.

“In today’s update, it said “fire events” were registered in the area of the Chornobyl NPP’s Exclusion Zone. In the Exclusion Zone, the regulator said radiation measurements are not currently being performed. It said slight increases in caesium air concentrations had been detected in Kyiv and at two NPP sites west of Chornobyl, but the regulator told the IAEA that they did not pose significant radiological concerns. The IAEA is continuing to engage with the regulator to obtain further information about the fire situation.”

The IAEA said on March 24: “Earlier today, the regulator also informed the IAEA that it does not expect wildfires burning in the vicinity of the Chornobyl NPP to cause any significant radiological concern, a day after the country’s regulator said Ukrainian firefighters were trying to extinguish blazes in the area. Ukraine’s regulatory authority said radiation measurements were currently not carried out in the Chornobyl NPP Exclusion Zone. But the regulator still assessed the radiological risks as low based on years of experience of such fires and detailed data on the locations and amounts of residual radioactive contamination in the soil following the 1986 accident.”

Beyond Nuclear said on March 23:

“Areas contaminated by the ruined reactor, including the red forest, have been ablaze a number of times: 1992, 2002, 2008, 2010, 2015 and 2018. Under ever more extreme climate conditions, wildfires will get larger and more frequent.

“In 2020, a forest fire, reportedly the result of arson, set the Chernobyl Zone ablaze, coming within one kilometer of the facility, which stores radioactive waste not only from normal reactor operation, but also the ruined fuel from the 1986 meltdown and explosion.

“But the Chernobyl site itself doesn’t have to catch fire to set aloft the radioactivity trapped in the area. During just three fires in the Zone in the early 2000s, eight percent of the original cesium 137 released was redistributed. And during the 2020 fire, radiation levels increased to 16 times higher than they had been previously.

“Each time a fire ignites, it threatens people within and around the Zone, particularly firefighters, who have exhibited acute radiation exposure symptoms such as a tingling of the skin, and may be exposed to more radiation than the current Chernobyl workers themselves.”

Chernobyl ‒ lack of regulatory oversight

SNRIU said on March 11: “Regulatory control over the state of nuclear and radiation safety at the Chornobyl NPP site and in the Exclusion Zone, as well as control over nuclear materials at the enterprise is impossible to exercise.” SNRIU has repeated those comments in many updates, e.g. on March 24.

Chernobyl ‒ communications and automated monitoring

The IAEA reported on March 11 that SNRIU lost communications with the Chernobyl site on 10 March and therefore cannot provide information to the IAEA about the radiological monitoring at the facility. 

Grossi said on March 9 that in recent days the IAEA has lost remote data transmission from its safeguards systems at Chernobyl and also the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant.

SNRIU said on March 17: “The operation of the Exclusion Zone automated radiation monitoring system has not been restored up to now. There is no information on the real situation at the Chornobyl NPP site, as there is no contact with the NPP personnel present directly at the site for the 22nd day in a row without rotation.”

Chernobyl ‒ power supply lost then restored

The European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group warned on March 6 about the “current fragility of the electrical supplies to the site, with only one supply line out of three available and back-up diesel power having sufficient fuel supplies for only 48 hours”.

The situation worsened with the loss of power from a 750 kV high-voltage line to the area on March 9, thus disconnecting the Chernobyl site entirely from the grid. On-site emergency diesel generators were activated “to power systems important to safety”.

Energoatom said a loss of power made “it impossible to control the nuclear and radiation safety parameters at the facilities”, adding that repairs to restore the area’s power supply could not happen at the moment because of “combat operations in the region”.

Whether the spent fuel at Chernobyl is at risk due to the loss of power is debated. Energoatom said there are about 20,000 spent fuel assemblies at Chernobyl that could not be kept cool during a power outage and warned of the release of radioactive substances into the environment. The IAEA is less concerned, saying that it saw “no critical impact on safety” due to the low heat load and the volume of cooling water.

SNRIU said on March 10 that in the event of a total blackout, including loss of emergency power supply, staff responsible for spent fuel pools will lose the possibility of remote monitoring of the radiological situation in the storage facility rooms; remote control of the water level and temperature in the cooling pool; makeup of the cooling pool and its water treatment; fire alarm monitoring; and maintenance of required temperature in spent fuel buildings.

The IAEA said on March 10: “If emergency power was also to be lost, the regulator said it would still be possible for staff to monitor the water level and temperature of the spent fuel pool. But they would carry out this work under worsening radiation safety conditions due to a lack of ventilation at the facility. They would also not be able to follow operational radiation safety procedures.”

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that Russia must observe a temporary ceasefire to enable repairs at the Chernobyl plant.

Energoatom CEO Petro Kotin said on March 10 that workers at transmission system operator Ukrenergo were ready to repair and restore the power supply, but an agreement was needed on a safe “corridor” for them to carry out the work.

The IAEA said in a March 11 update that it has been informed by Ukraine that technicians have started repairing damaged power lines in an attempt to restore external electricity supplies to the site of the Chernobyl plant that were entirely cut earlier in the week. The IAEA continued: “Ukraine’s regulatory authority said work that began on the evening of 10 March had succeeded in repairing one section, but off-site electrical power was still down, indicating there was still damage in other places. The repair efforts would continue despite the difficult situation outside the NPP site, it added. Emergency diesel generators have been providing back-up power to the site since 9 March, and the regulator has reported that additional fuel had been delivered to the facility.” Grossi said: “From day to day, we are seeing a worsening situation at the Chornobyl NPP, especially for radiation safety, and for the staff managing the facility under extremely difficult and challenging circumstances.”

The World Nuclear Association reported on March 11: “SNRIU said that the loss of communications meant the situation at Chernobyl was “currently unknown” but it said “an additional supply of diesel fuel for diesel generators ensuring emergency power supply to the spent nuclear fuel storage facilities (ISF-1 and ISF-2), as well as to the New Safe Confinement above the Shelter, was delivered to the plant site. Attempts to restore the external power supply to the site are in progress.”

SNRIU said on March 17: “According to the information received from the Chornobyl NPP management, the power supply of all facilities located on the Chornobyl NPP site was restored on 14 March 2022.”

The IAEA noted on March 19 that off-site grid power had been lost for five days before being restored on March 14.

The World Nuclear Association said on March 15 that diesel generators had been providing back-up electricity to the site and that: “The damaged power line was initially fixed on 13 March, but Ukraine’s energy company Ukrenergo said it was damaged again “by the occupying forces” before the power supply could be fully restored. However, further work meant that the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) was able to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later on 14 March that external power “had again been restored and that staff at the Chernobyl NPP had restarted operations to reconnect the NPP to the grid”.”

Rivne nuclear power plant

The IAEA said on March 24:

“It also emerged on 24 March that Russia’s mission to the IAEA said that four Rosatom workers had been detained at the Rivne nuclear power plant, where they had delivered a fresh shipment of nuclear fuel on 23 February, the day before the Russian attack on Ukraine began.

“Since then the Russian specialists are forcefully detained on the site … in the wagon where the shipment was previously held,” the statement, circulated by the IAEA, said.

They requested that the IAEA “provide any possible assistance in solving this humanitarian issue, as well as to circulate this information among all IAEA member states as soon as possible”.

“Energoatom disputed the Russian mission’s version of events. It said there were four armed guards from Russia who had “accompanied the cargo” and “according to the contract, until the moment of unloading and transfer to the Ukrainian side, they guarded it. Yesterday this cargo was unloaded. After the completion of these works, the guards left the territory of the station accompanied by SBU officers, who ensure their security and transfer to the Russian side”.”

Rivne plant director Pavlo Pavlyshyn told NPR that Ukrainian forces were prepared to mount a defense should Russian troops try to take the plant.

Beyond Nuclear said on March 21: “Russia’s defense ministry has said it hit a Ukrainian military installation in the northwestern city of Rivne with cruise missiles on Monday, raising fears for the safety and security of Rivne’s four-reactor nuclear power plant, the second largest nuclear power plant in Ukraine and the biggest power station of any kind in western Ukraine.”

Why has Russia seized control of nuclear power plants?

Why was Chernobyl seized by the Russian military? Timothy Mousseau from the University of South Carolina writes:

“The reactor site’s industrial area is, in effect, a large parking lot suitable for staging an invading army’s thousands of vehicles. The power plant site also houses the main electrical grid switching network for the entire region. It’s possible to turn the lights off in Kyiv from here, even though the power plant itself has not generated any electricity since 2000, when the last of Chernobyl’s four reactors was shut down.

“Such control over the power supply likely has strategic importance, although Kyiv’s electrical needs could probably also be supplied via other nodes on the Ukrainian national power grid. The reactor site likely offers considerable protection from aerial attack, given the improbability that Ukrainian or other forces would risk combat on a site containing more than 5.3 million pounds (2.4 million kilograms) of radioactive spent nuclear fuel.”

William Potter from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, and director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, commented on March 10:

“It is tempting to portray Russian military action against Ukraine’s nuclear power infrastructure as not only immoral and illegal — which it is — but also irrational. This may well prove to be the case. However, it appears that Russian military planners were motivated to seize Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia — and possibly Yuzhnoukrainsk, Rivne, and Khmelnytskyi as well — in pursuit of several military objectives.

“The first, particularly relevant to the seizure of the Chernobyl plant, has to do with its location: about 12 miles from the Belarussian-Ukrainian border along the northern invasion route to Kyiv. Not only did it serve as a useful point of encampment for Russian troops in preparation for the attack on the Ukrainian capital, but it must have been viewed by Russian military planners as a safe haven from counter-attacks due to the huge quantity of radioactive material still present in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. The Russian attack on and seizure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station near the city of Enerhodar, about 340 miles southeast of Kyiv, may also have been motivated in part by its location along a route of advancing forces. However, unlike at Chernobyl, there was little need in that sector for an encampment point.

“A second likely military objective is threatening to freeze the inhabitants of Kyiv and other cities into submission by turning off their electricity. The Zaporizhzhia plant is the largest power station in Europe and accounts for slightly over 20 percent of the total electricity generated in Ukraine. Were Russia also to take control of the Yuzhnoukrainsk power station, the second largest nuclear plant in Ukraine, it would control approximately 60 percent of Ukraine’s nuclear energy-generating capacity, which accounts for more than 50 percent of all electricity production in Ukraine.”

Jeffrey Merrifield, US NRC Commissioner from 1998 to 2007, argues in the Wall Street Journal that a “misunderstood motive for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that Kiev was positioning itself to break away from its longtime Russian nuclear suppliers, while the United States was encroaching on Russia’s biggest nuclear export market.” Merrifield claims that spent fuel at Chernobyl could be shipped to a reprocessing facility in Russia; that Westinghouse provides fuel for six of Ukraine’s 15 nuclear reactors and could supply all of them if not for Russia’s invasion; and that plans to build Westinghouse AP1000 reactors in Ukraine will not proceed if Russia takes full control of Ukraine (and, by implication, any new reactors will be Russian).

Comment on the above: Those arguments are a bit of a stretch. If Russia takes full control of Ukraine, spent fuel at Chernobyl could be reprocessed in Russia but there’s every likelihood it won’t be … and that certainly hasn’t motivated the invasion, even to a small degree. The Russian government and Rosatom may have been annoyed that Ukraine was increasingly sourcing fuel from Westinghouse rather than Rosatom … but it isn’t a big deal and couldn’t be described as a motivation for war. Westinghouse has proven itself quite incapable of building reactors (hence its bankruptcy filing in 2017 following disastrous projects in the US states of Georgia and South Carolina) and there is little likelihood that Westinghouse AP1000 reactors would be built in Ukraine … so once again it’s a stretch to be citing that as a motivation for war.

Radioactive waste storage and disposal sites in Ukraine

Russian missiles hit a radioactive waste storage site near Kyiv on February 27. The IAEA said in a March 1 update:

“SNRIU said that all radioactive waste disposal facilities of the State Specialized Enterprise Radon were operating as usual, and the radiation monitoring systems did not indicate any deviations from normal values. On 27 February, the SNRIU informed the IAEA that missiles had hit the site of such a facility in the capital Kyiv, but there was no damage to the building and no reports of a radioactive release.”

The Kyiv radioactive waste storage site appears to be at least 1 km from any other human structures, suggesting the possibility of a deliberate strike.

Also on February 27, an electrical transformer was damaged at a radioactive waste storage site in Kharkiv, also without any reports of a radioactive release. According to SNRIU, a research reactor at the site has been shut down.

Grossi said:

“These two incidents highlight the very real risk that facilities with radioactive material will suffer damage during the conflict, with potentially severe consequences for human health and the environment. I urgently and strongly appeal to all parties to refrain from any military or other action that could threaten the safety and security of these facilities.”

The Kyiv and Kharkiv facilities typically hold disused radioactive sources and other low-level waste from hospitals and industry, the IAEA said, but do not contain high-level nuclear waste. However the Kharkiv site may also store spent nuclear fuel from the research reactor.

Neutron Source at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology

SNRIU reported that a ‘Neutron Source‘ — a subcritical assembly with 37 nuclear fuel elements, controlled by a linear electron accelerator — at Kharkiv’s Institute of Physics and Technology was subjected to artillery fire on March 6. Ukraine claimed that the Russian military fired missiles from truck-mounted ‘Grad’ launchers, which do not have precise targeting. “Radiation condition on the playground is ok,” according to a reassuring if imprecise automatic translation of an SNRIU statement.

The World Nuclear Association reported on March 11: “[SNRIU] said the building housing the Neutron Source facility at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, which is used for research and to produce radioisotopes for medical and industrial applications, had suffered fresh “minor damage” during shelling on Thursday. SNRIU said on Friday that the “power supply to the systems/components important to safety has been restored and damage which would affect the state of nuclear and radiation safety have not been detected. The radiation situation on the site is within the standard limits.””

SNRIU said on March 19 that external power supply to the Neutron Source was absent due to the ongoing hostilities in the Pyatykhatky district of Kharkiv, which resulted in damage to the power supply lines.

SNRIU said on March 23:

“According to the information received from the operating organization (NRC KIPT), following the results of the NSI “Neutron Source” site examination conducted on 22-23 March 2022, the personnel:

* detected an object preliminarily qualified as an unexploded rocket of the multiple launch rocket system 9K58 “Smerch”, which poses a potential danger of a new explosion in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear installation;

* confirmed the absence of damage to systems/components and the NSI “Neutron Source” buildings, pumping and cooling towers buildings, isotope laboratory, which would affect safety, but numerous damages to windows and external surface of buildings were identified.

“The NSI “Neutron Source” personnel informed the relevant services on the explosive-hazardous item, but work organization on the disposal of the detected ordnance is impossible due to the ongoing hostilities in the area of the NSI “Neutron Source” location.

“According to updated information, the site was shelled once again at the final stage of the examination. The consequences will be specified after completion of the shelling and absence of danger to the personnel.

“It needs to be recalled that on 6 and 10 March 2022, the NSI “Neutron Source” was under bombing and shelling. In addition, combat operations are ongoing in the area of its location. As a result, the off-site power supply system, the air conditioning systems of the linear electron accelerator cluster gallery, and buildings (such as the nuclear installation building, pumping, and cooling towers buildings, isotope laboratories) were damaged.

“As of 23 March 2022, 15:00:

operational personnel monitor the state of the NSI “Neutron Source”;

* the nuclear installation has been transferred into a deep subcritical state (“long-term shutdown” mode since 24 February 2022);

* off-site power supply to the NSI “Neutron Source” is absent, but due to constant shelling of the site, there is no possibility to restore it;

* the on-site radiation situation is within the standard limits;

* the personnel continue implementing measures to eliminate the consequences of the hostilities and maintain the operability of the nuclear installation equipment.

Please note the NSI “Neutron Source”, as well as any other nuclear installation, is not designed for use in conditions of combat operations. Continuation of bombing can lead to severe radiation consequences and contamination of the surrounding territories.”

SNRIU said on March 25 that off-site power supply is absent and that “due to constant shelling of the adjacent territories, there is no possibility to restore it”. SNRIU added: “The probability of new damage to the research nuclear installation remains quite high due to the constant shelling of the area of the NSI “Neutron Source” location. For the same reason, no measures have yet been taken to dispose of the explosive ordinance (previously classified as an unexploded rocket of the multiple launch rocket system 9K58 “Smerch”), which was detected in the immediate vicinity of the installation.”

The IAEA said on March 26: “In the north-eastern city of Kharkiv, the regulator said shelling was for a second day preventing measures to dispose of an unexploded rocket near a nuclear research facility. The previously damaged facility has been used for research and development and radioisotope production for medical and industrial applications. Its nuclear material is subcritical and the radioactive inventory is low. Personnel at the facility were maintaining the operability of the nuclear installation’s equipment and radiation was within “standard limits”. However, it was not possible to restore off-site power to the facility due to the shelling, the regulator added.”

SNRIU said on March 26: “According to the information received from the operating organization (NRC KIPT) on 26 March 2022, the NSI “Neutron Source” came under fire once again. It is not possible to estimate the extent of the damage due to the hostilities, which does not cease in the nuclear installation area.”

On March 27, SNRIU said that shelling by Russian troops on March 26 caused significant damage to the thermal insulation lining of the NSI “Neutron Source” building; and partial shedding of lining materials in the experimental hall of the installation. SNRIU said the probability of further damage to the research nuclear installation remains quite high due to the constant shelling of the area.

Other nuclear facilities / nuclear theft and smuggling risks

An Oncology Center in Kharkiv was destroyed by Russian shelling, jeopardising the safety and security of high-level radiation sources.From the SNRIU

SNRIU said on March 6 that there continued to be no communication with enterprises and institutions using Category 1-3 radiation sources in the eastern port city of Mariupol, including its Oncology Center, and that the safety and security of the radiation sources could not be confirmed. Such material can cause serious harm to people if not secured and managed properly, the IAEA noted.

The European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group said in a March 6 statement that it is “very concerned about the safety of several research reactors as well as sites holding highly radioactive sources.”

The IAEA said on March 24: “Also in Chornobyl town, the State Agency for the Management of the Exclusion Zone reported that an environmental laboratory had been “looted by marauders” and its equipment stolen. It was not possible to verify the whereabouts of the laboratory’s radiation calibration sources and environmental samples, it added. The Agency is seeking to obtain more information from the operators of the laboratory. However, based on the information provided, the IAEA assesses that the incident does not pose a significant radiological risk.” The State Agency of Ukraine for Exclusion Zone Management said that occupiers “robbed and destroyed” the November Central Analytical Laboratory in Chernobyl, and that the laboratory was based on “highly active samples” and samples of radionuclides “which are in the hands of the enemy today, hoping it will harm himself, not the civilized world.”

Vadim Chumak, head of the external exposure dosimetry lab at Ukraine’s National Research Center for Radiation Medicine, told RMIT Technology Review on March 25, in response to a question as to whether radioactive materials in hospitals pose a risk:

“It is something we need to consider, because in this war, many unthinkable things have become real. There are two medical sources of radiation. One is machinery, like X-ray machines or linear accelerators, which are used to treat cancer. They emit some radiation, but only if they are switched on. Once you switch it off, it’s just a piece of metal. 

“But the second source uses isotopes like cobalt or cesium, which are used in nuclear medicine and radiation therapy, for instance in positron emission tomography (PET). They are physically protected in the hospital, which means they are protected from theft. But they are not protected against being hit by a bomb. 

“If they were compromised, we might see something like the Goiânia accident in Brazil in 1989. Then, some people stole and dismantled a radiotherapy device from an abandoned hospital site in order to sell the parts as scrap metal. They discovered this small ampule filled with cesium, which glowed blue at night. It’s a long story, but the single destroyed source of radiation contaminated much of Goiânia. Four people died, 20 needed hospital treatment, and 249 people were contaminated. Eighty-five houses were significantly contaminated, and 200 of the people living in these homes were evacuated. So this kind of scenario needs to be considered. And that’s without thinking about malevolent use of the sources.” 

Chumak also commented on the risks of dirty bombs: “The spent fuel assemblies, for example, are a very good material for making a dirty bomb, which is a scenario for a terrorist attack. The more technical term is a radiological dispersion device. If you attach such radioactive sources to a device and explode it, then it will result in contamination of a large area with radioactive material. There are a lot of radiological scenarios of this kind now on the table.”

Pre-2022 concerns

Ex-Soviet states have been at the centre of global networks of nuclear theft and smuggling since the break-up of the Soviet Union, and there will undoubtedly be incidents of lost, stolen and smuggled nuclear materials arising from Russia’s war on Ukraine and the breakdown of national and international security arrangements.

In May 2014, Ukrainian authorities announced the seizure of radioactive material that had been smuggled into the country from a separatist region, and speculated that the intention may have been to use the material as a radiological weapon.

Ukraine noted in its report to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit that state nuclear inspectors were unable to safely perform their duties in Crimea and certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014.

Breakdown of nuclear regulation

SNRIU reported on March 12 that the implementation of licensed activities involving radioactive waste were suspended, including the transportation of radioactive materials, limited participation in the elimination of radiation accidents, and regulatory work ensuring the safety of radioactive waste storage.

See also the above sections titled:

No independent regulatory oversight of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant

and

Chernobyl ‒ lack of regulatory oversight

Inability of IAEA and other international organisations to reduce nuclear risks in Ukraine

SNRIU’s Acting Chair Oleh Korikov said on March 8: “I have to state that so far, despite the active initiatives of the Ukrainian party, unfortunately, no diplomatic efforts of the IAEA and other international partners have led to real results in reducing or eliminating military risks at Ukraine’s nuclear facilities. It is no exaggeration to note that today in Ukraine, due to the military aggression of the Russian Federation, the risks not only of radiation accidents of various scales, loss of control over radiation sources, but also unprecedented risks of global nuclear catastrophe have been created.”

In a March 15 letter, EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson said the EC, the EU national safety authorities meeting in the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) and Heads of the European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities (HERCA) are working to provide support to Ukraine in the area of nuclear risk assessment and contribute to a coordinated emergency response at the European level, but that “in order for the international community to engage and provide practical support on the group, guaranteed safe travel to the concerned nuclear facilities and unhindered access to the concerned sites is needed”.

The IAEA has been trying to reduce nuclear risks since the conflict began in February 2022, but without any success. The IAEA said on March 20: “The challenging and uncertain situation at the Chornobyl NPP has underlined the importance of an IAEA initiative aimed at ensuring the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, the Director General [Grossi] said. He said he was continuing consultations with a view to agreeing on a framework for the delivery of IAEA assistance. “With this framework in place, the Agency would be able to provide effective technical assistance for the safe and secure operation of these facilities,” he said.”

The World Nuclear Association said on March 18: “IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi met with the foreign ministers of Russia and Ukraine in Turkey on 10 March for what he called “constructive” talks. Since then the IAEA has been drawing up detailed proposals for ways to ensure that nuclear facilities in Ukraine are not put at risk during the military conflict. Measures being considered include the deployment of IAEA staff at nuclear sites.”

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said on March 23:

“For the past few weeks, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been actively working to ensure the safety and security of all nuclear installations in Ukraine during these dramatic and unique circumstances where major nuclear facilities are operating in an armed conflict zone. I remain gravely concerned about the safety and security of the nuclear facilities in Ukraine. … As I have stated many times, there is an urgent need to conclude an agreed framework to preserve nuclear safety and security in Ukraine by establishing a clear commitment to observe and respect the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security. I have personally expressed my readiness to immediately come to Ukraine to conclude such an agreement, which would include substantial assistance and support measures, including on-site presence of IAEA experts at different facilities in Ukraine, as well as the delivery of vital safety equipment. This agreed framework will also help create the conditions for the IAEA to carry out safeguards verification activities.

“Intensive consultations have been ongoing for many days now, but a positive outcome still eludes us. Despite this, the distressing situation continues and the need to prevent a nuclear accident becomes more pressing with each day that passes. I want to thank the United Nations Secretariat and the many Governments that from the highest levels have expressed support for my initiative and the efforts of the IAEA. I reiterate today that the IAEA is ready and able to deploy immediately and provide indispensable assistance for ensuring nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. This assistance is essential to help avert the real risk of a severe nuclear accident that could threaten public health and the environment in Ukraine and beyond. I hope to be able to conclude this agreed framework without further delay. We cannot afford to lose any more time. We need to act now.”

Nikolai Steinberg, chief engineer of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant from May 1986 (one month after the April 26 disaster) to March 1987, wrote in a March 17 ‘Оpen letter to the IAEA Director General’:

“It is well known, that national regulators have the power to secure nuclear facilities in their country and to protect their citizens from events abroad, without being able to influence those events. Other organizations, WANO and OECD/NEA only act if invited by nuclear operators or governments. Only IAEA has the right to intervene and “take control”, but as a UN body, it can only do so with a mandate from the Security Council.

“Did you call the aggressor the aggressor? Did you insist that the UN Security Council be convened in connection with the global threat to nuclear safety and security? Did you immediately try to send IAEA missions to the Ukrainian nuclear facilities, which would at least provide a defense mechanism, since then any attack on the nuclear facilities would be an attack on the UN personnel? It was at least some specific step in support of nuclear safety.

“How long ago did you and your staff read the IAEA Statute? Do you remember the goals, functions and tasks of the IAEA?

“In your opinion, who today can be responsible for guarantees of non-proliferation of nuclear materials at the Zaporizhzhya and Chernobyl nuclear power plants seized by the Russian troops?

“In your opinion, can the personnel of the Zaporozhye and Chernobyl nuclear power plants ensure the safety of the facilities entrusted to them under the threat of the aggressor’s tanks and guns?

“By the way, did you know that the safety reports, on the basis of which, licenses for the operation of nuclear facilities are issued do not contain the limits and conditions of safety in war conditions?

“Do you know that the nuclear safety standards issued by the IAEA do not contain recommendations justifying nuclear safety in the context of hostilities? The standards also do not contain recommendations for emergency preparedness in case of war.

“Do you think there is a nuclear safety culture in a country that has dozens of nuclear installations and allows itself to attack nuclear power plants, spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and personnel training centers in another country?

“Does the Agency you lead have a culture of safety that is afraid to speak openly about what is happening today, that the world is once again on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe?

“What kind of safety culture can we talk about if, with their tails between their legs, the leaders of the world nuclear community are afraid to say aloud the names of the criminals including professionals who have taken the world hostage?

“The attack on Ukraine nuclear facilities by Russian troops dealt a terrible blow to the international nuclear safety & security and non-proliferation regime. The reaction of the IAEA may well be perceived as “everything and everyone is permitted”. Have you, the Director General of the IAEA, still not understood this?

“I would very much like to hope that the Agency finally realize the essence of the event, call everything by its right name and take measures that will make it possible to save and improve the nuclear safety regime and save the World from a nuclear catastrophe.

“Time doesn’t wait.”

On March 24, a month after the invasion began, Grossi said that a positive outcome in his talks with the two sides had yet to be reached despite “intensive consultations”, and “the need to prevent a nuclear accident becomes more pressing with each day that passes. He added: “I hope to be able to conclude this agreed framework without further delay. We cannot afford to lose any more time. We need to act now.”

Russia’s role in the IAEA

In a letter to the IAEA, European Union Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson criticised Russia’s ongoing role on the IAEA’s Board of Governors. “I find it unacceptable that Russia can continue its privileged role at the IAEA in view of its irresponsible military actions on the ground in Ukraine,” she said.

Lana Zerkal, Adviser to the Minister of Energy of Ukraine, ex-deputy foreign minister, said in an interview with Radio NV in late March: “Ukraine and our partners currently work towards removing Russia from the IAEA, or at least reducing its role there and removing all Russians from the key positions they hold in the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

Nuclear safety and security upgrades in Ukraine prior to the 2022 invasion

Summarised below is a generous assessment of nuclear safety and security upgrades in Ukraine since the 2011 Fukushima disaster. For more critical assessments, see the Greenpeace International report on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and the extensive research by the Bankwatch Network.

Mark Hibbs, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program, offers this (generous) assessment of safety and security upgrades in Ukraine since the Fukushima disaster:

“Partly in response to growing awareness of terrorist threats over the past two decades, more attention has been paid to potential hostile incursions. Encouraged by the United States government, which held a series of nuclear security summits beginning in 2010, Ukraine identified and addressed weaknesses in nuclear stations’ physical protection and security. Ukraine reported significant progress, especially after Russia occupied Crimea and interfered in eastern Ukraine beginning in 2014. …

“The Ukrainian government and industry systematically investigated all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants to find weaknesses, with the intention to stiffen plants’ defenses in part through modern upgrades of the plants’ original engineering systems.

“For all extreme external events—armed attacks as well as severe storms—the ultimate initiators of a dire nuclear safety crisis may be the same: a station blackout, loss of off-site power, and/or loss of emergency cooling capacity. Between 2011 and 2021, Ukraine designed and implemented 80 percent of a comprehensive upgrading program for all fifteen nuclear power plants, encompassing critical areas such as black-out conditions, emergency power and coolant supplies, and qualification of plant equipment for extreme conditions.

“One critical line of defense at a nuclear power plant is the outer structure surrounding the reactor and its fuel. Most reactors are outfitted with concrete-steel containments designed to withstand extreme impacts, such as a collision with fighter jet aircraft aimed directly at the reactor, or attacks by targeted explosive charges. But not all reactors are equal. A few older units, including two at Rivne in Ukraine, were built without concrete-steel containments. Measures to improve the robustness of confinement equipment for such reactors are limited. …

“Ukraine took steps to defend its nuclear plants against threats from sabotage, cyberattacks, and terrorism, but the Zaporizhzhia station was not prepared to withstand an onslaught from an invading foreign army. Likewise, despite efforts in Ukraine to systematically incorporate emergency preparedness and accident management principles, if operators are intimidated, stressed, deterred from taking sound actions, or replaced by outside personnel unfamiliar with an installation whose safety systems have been modified, including with Western technology and equipment, advance preparation may not suffice.”

Nuclear warfare

Putin reportedly has greater ambitions than invading and controlling Ukraine, so who knows where the escalation will lead, what risks will emerge, how long it will drag on, and whether it triggers a response from NATO countries and the US/NATO alliance more generally.

The risk of nuclear warfare is very low, but it is not zero. Perhaps the greatest risk is that one or another nuclear-armed nation will mistakenly believe itself to be under nuclear attack and respond in kind.

Near-misses have happened before. For example, in 1979, a US training tape showing a massive attack was accidentally played. In 1983, a Soviet satellite mistakenly signalled the launch of a US missile. In 1995, Russia almost launched its missiles because of a Norwegian rocket studying the northern lights.

It doesn’t help that NATO and Russian military doctrines allow for the use of tactical nuclear weapons to fend off defeat in a major conventional war. It doesn’t help that some missiles can carry either conventional weapons or nuclear weapons, increasing the risk of worst-case thinking and a precipitous over-reaction by the adversary.

And it doesn’t help that Putin’s recent statements could be construed as a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons, or that a referendum in Belarus revoked the nuclear-weapon-free pledge in its constitution, or that Belarusian president Aleksander Lukashenko joined Putin to watch the Russian military carry out a nuclear weapons exercise, or that Lukashenko has said Belarus would be open to hosting Russian nuclear weapons.

Beatrice Fihn, executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, points to other concerns. “Russia and Belarus are not alone in their aggressive and irresponsible posture either,” she writes.

“The United States continues to exploit a questionable reading of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that prevents states from ‘possessing’ nuclear weapons but allows them to host those weapons. Five European states currently host approximately 100 US nuclear weapons: Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey …”

In a worst-case scenario, the direct impacts of nuclear warfare would be followed by catastrophic climatic impacts.

Earth and paleoclimate scientist Andrew Glikson noted in a recent article

“When Turco et al. (1983) and Carl Sagan (1983) warned the world about the climatic effects of a nuclear war, they pointed out that the amount of carbon stored in a large city was sufficient to release enough aerosols, smoke, soot and dust to block sunlight over large regions, leading to a widespread failure of crops and extensive starvation.

“The current nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia could potentially inject 150 teragrams of soot from fires ignited by nuclear explosions into the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere, lasting for a period of 10 years or longer, followed by a period of intense radioactive radiation over large areas. …

“Such an extreme event would arrest global warming for 10 years or longer, possibly in part analogous to the consequences of a less abrupt flow of polar ice melt into the oceans …”

Safeguards

Richard Garwin poses these questions: “What happens with a failed state with a nuclear power system? Can the reactors be maintained safely? Will the world – under the IAEA and UN Security Council – move to guard nuclear installations against theft of weapon-usable material or sabotage, in the midst of chaos? Not likely.”

There are examples of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards being suspended in the event of war or domestic political turmoil, including in Iraq in 1991, some African states, Yugoslavia, and most recently in Ukraine itself.

In 2014, Ukraine’s ambassador to the IAEA circulated a letter to the organisation’s board of governors warning that an invasion could bring a “threat of radiation contamination on the territory of Ukraine and the territory of neighbouring states.” Ukraine’s parliament called for international monitors to help protect the plants.

No special measures were put in place to safeguards nuclear facilities in Ukraine. IAEA safeguards inspections have been compromised in Crimea since Russia’s 2014 invasion – indeed there may not have been any inspections whatsoever. IAEA safeguards inspections in eastern Ukraine have also been compromised as a result of Russia’s 2014 invasion.

Thus the IAEA has been unable to conclude that all civil nuclear materials and facilities in Ukraine have remained in peaceful use. Not that such conclusions carry much weight: the IAEA routinely reaches comforting conclusions based on the flimsiest of evidence.

During the conflict in Ukraine beginning February 2022, apart from the lack of any IAEA on-site safeguards inspections, remote monitoring communications have been disrupted. Grossi said on March 10 that the IAEA is not losing all information regarding nuclear material, but is losing a significant amount. “Safeguards is predicated on the basis of a constant monitoring capacity,” he said.

The IAEA said on March 21: “In relation to safeguards, the Agency said that the situation remained unchanged from that reported previously. The Agency was still not receiving remote data transmission from its monitoring systems installed at the Chornobyl NPP, but such data was being transferred to IAEA headquarters from the other NPPs in Ukraine.”

Cyber-warfare

Cyber-warfare is another risk which could jeopardise the safe operation of nuclear plants. Russia is one of the growing number of states actively engaged in cyber-warfare. James Acton from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes that a Russian cyber-attack disrupted power supply in Ukraine in 2015.

Nuclear facilities have repeatedly been targets of cyber-attack, including the Stuxnet computer virus targeted by Israel and the US to disrupt Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuges in 2009.

Reports from the UK-based Chatham House and the US-based Nuclear Threat Initiative have identified multiple computer security concerns specific to nuclear power plants.