Articles about radtours

3CR radio show about the history of the radioactive exposure tours – click here or to download directly click here.

2008 radtour

Click here to download Jessie Boylan’s article + pics about the 2008 Radioactive Exposure Tour (PDF file)

2014 radtour:

2013 radtour:

Photos from the 2013 radtour:

Photos from the 2011 radtour:

Photos from the 2010 radtour:

Photos from the 2006 radtour:

 

Radioactive Exposure Tours

A summary of the tours from 1990 – 2004, taken from the book ’30 years of creative resistance’, a history of Friends of the Earth Australia.

The first Nuclear Exposure Tour was organised in 1990, six years after the Roxby Blockades of 1983 and 1984 where hundreds of people blockaded and hindered the establishment of Olympic Dam Operations (the copper/uranium mine at Roxby Downs in northern South Australia). During these blockades people had the powerful experience of seeing a uranium mine and listening to Aboriginal people who opposed the mine. Blockaders also had the opportunity to show their opposition to uranium mining in creative, colourful and sometimes dramatic ways.It was in this tradition that the idea of Nuclear Exposure Tours evolved. The Anti-Uranium Collective at Friends of the Earth organised the tours with the aim of letting people witness and experience the nuclear industry first hand. People would be able to see and walk on the country affected, to hear what Aboriginal people had to say, learn about the anti-nuclear movement and strengthen opposition to the nuclear industry. We wanted to give people the opportunity to support traditional land owners in their opposition to the nuclear industry, so that the tour participants could return to their colleges, work places or communities with the story of their experience and to encourage them to play a role in the anti-nuclear movement.

The first tour to Roxby Downs was carefully planned, with members of the Friends of the Earth anti-uranium collective doing what we call, a “dry-run”. Such a trip was not new; members of the collective had been visiting the Mound Springs area in northern South Australia and working with the Marree/Arabunna community there since 1987. The Mounds Springs are 120 Kilometres north of the Olympic Dam copper/uranium mine at Roxby Downs. Water for the mine, metallurgy plant and town was, and still is, being taken from the Great Artesian Basin and unique springs have dried completely and others have had a drastic reduction of flow. A trip to the Springs area led us to do a round trip to the town at Roxby Downs, the mine there and the tailings dam. Members of the anti-uranium collective were becoming familiar with the Springs and Roxby; this was another motivation for the tour, to share this experience with other people in an organised and constructive way.

The “dry-run” was important as permission from traditional land owners was needed to camp in their country and to obtain information on culturally appropriate behaviour. The anti-uranium collective also needed to meet with communities whose land they would be passing though to organise joint actions against nuclear activities in their areas. These included CRA’s proposed mineral sands development near Horsham in Victoria and the Rare Earth Tailings dump at Port Pirie. Future tours took in the Beverley Uranium Mine and the Honeymoon Project, and at the invitation of the Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta, camping at Ten Mile Creek just out of Coober Pedy. Recent tours have become focused on the proposal for a low to intermediate level nuclear waste dump in the Woomera area.In organising the tours we at FoE always endeavour to make them more than just an out-back adventure! At Roxby Downs we organised public meetings on radiation exposure levels at the community centre, we leafleted the entire town on workers’ and community health issues, we organised awareness stalls with local environmentalists and produced a performance at the Woomera Primary School that involved all of the students as well as the people on the tour.

Following a tour in 1996 the participants formed a collective and organised the ‘Roxstop Action and Music Festival’ in 1997, where over 300 people gathered at Roxby to protest against the expansion of the mine. Here they hosted a public meeting attended by over 120 people with the United States epidemiologist Dr David Richarson as the key note speaker talking about his work and the effects of low level radiation exposure on nuclear workers. Roxstop also included an exhibition of paintings by the Melbourne Artist Lyn Hovey in the Roxby Library. After three days at Roxby the protestors moved to Alberrie Creek on Finnis Springs Station where a music festival was held over three nights to celebrate the Mound Springs, while during the day there were cultural workshops and tours given by members of the Arrabunna community including Reg Dodd and Kevin Buzzacott.

In August 1998 the collective that had organised Roxstop received a fax from the Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta. It said: “We’re trying hard about this rubbish – the radio-active waste dump. We don’t want that… We want your help! We want you to come up here to Coober Pedy and have a meeting with Aboriginal people (and any whitefellas from here who want to come)”. In September of that year a group of over a dozen people travelled from Melbourne to Coober Pedy and held a public meeting with the Aboriginal people to discuss the dump.

Things have not always run smoothly for the anti-uranium collective. One year we were stranded for a night on the Borefield Road between the Oodnadatta Track and Roxby Downs with forty people and three buses when the road became impassable due to rain! Another time at Mambury Creek in the southern Flinders Rangers, emus raided our camp and scattered our provisions including cereal, bread and fruit all over the campsite while the campers were protesting in Port Pirie! But, there have been great highlights.

The first time we were invited to the Ten Mile Creek (just outside of Cooper Pedy) by the Kungka Tjuta, we saw the beautiful sight of moon rising over Lake Eyre South. At Ten Mile Creek we saw the effects of the leaflet on workers’ health and exposure to low levels of radiation, we protested outside the Woomera Detention Centre, we saw the representatives of the Honeymoon Uranium Project squirm as tour participants asked difficult questions about the chemical structure of the waste solution to be pumped back into the aquifer. And we will never forget the warm greeting from members of the Adnyamathanha community at Nepabunna, even though we were four hours late!

There have been many great and rewarding outcomes from the Nuclear Exposures Tours. What stands out for us and what must be acknowledged here is the strengthening of the close working relationships we at Friends of the Earth have with the Aboriginal communities and the many individuals who have taken part in our tours. Every person who has gone on a tour has had an amazing, never-to-be-forgotten experience and many of the participants from various tours have made a considerable contribution to the anti-nuclear movement.

— Ila Marks


Radioactive Exposure Tour 2014

Tour exposes radioactive racism

April 26, 2014, Rachel Evans & Yuya Mori, https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/56316

Radical Exposure Tourists at Roxby Downs, home of Australia’s largest uranium mine, Olympic Dam.

Forty people travelled over 6000 kilometres as part of an anti-nuclear educational trip from Melbourne to Tennant Creek in the Northern Territory and back from April 12 to 27.

The annual “Rad Tour” weaved its way through Victoria, South Australia and the Northern Territory to educate people about the dangers of the nuclear industry.

The Rad Tourers came from across Australia and several international guests took part. The tour visited Roxby Downs in South Australia, had a tour of the Olympic Dam mine and finished by visiting the community opposing a national radioactive waste dump on their land at Muckaty, 100 km north of Tennant Creek in the NT.

Tour organiser Gemma Romuld told Green Left Weekly: “The tour was a great success. We had 40 people participating from Australia, India, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, England, New Zealand and France. It assisted the campaign to stop the waste dump at Muckaty, by helping people understand the Muckaty story, and [giving them] the confidence to take the message back home and share the experience with Indigenous elders whose country they are from.

“I thought the highlights were drawing the connections between uranium mining, atomic energy, racism and radioactive waste. It was great hearing from the most important defenders of the country on their own land. Really, we can’t talk about uranium mining and dumping radioactive waste without talking about the NT Intervention, racism, colonisation and corporate capitalism.”

The first Radioactive Exposure Tour was organised in 1990, six years after the Roxby Blockades of 1983 and 1984 in which hundreds of people blockaded and hindered the establishment of Olympic Dam. During these blockades people had the powerful experience of seeing a uranium mine and listening to Aboriginal people who opposed the mine. Blockaders also had the opportunity to show their opposition to uranium mining in creative, colourful and sometimes dramatic ways.

It was in this tradition that the idea of Radioactive Exposure Tours evolved. The Anti-Uranium Collective at Friends of the Earth organised the tours with the aim of letting people witness and experience the nuclear industry first-hand. People would be able to see and walk on the country affected, to hear what Aboriginal people had to say, learn about the anti-nuclear movement and strengthen opposition to the nuclear industry.

Adam Sharah, an activist in Australian Nuclear Free Alliance spoke to GLW as he was helping construct a humpy.

“This tour is poignant as it allows people to experience the Aboriginal story behind apartheid policy in the NT,” he said.

“It is an education against the global nuclear movement and imperialist militarism and how the government willfully attacks land rights.

“It also highlighted to me the ineffectiveness of Native Title. In terms of the Muckaty waste dump, the Radioactive Waste Management Act, introduced by ALP minister Martin Ferguson, overrides Native Title. Like the BHP Billiton mega mine up in Lake Eyre on Arabunna land — Aboriginal rights are overridden.

“Elders that travelled from Muckaty to Melbourne to talk to Ferguson about the legislation were refused a meeting — he literally shut the door on them.” …

Noor Alifa Ardiamimgrum is an Indonesian environment postgraduate student in environment studies at Melbourne University who was on the tour. She said: “Indonesia has a nuclear plan – but the geology is not stable, we have areas that have been hit by earthquakes – and the plans for nuclear expansion on an energy front have been rejected by the community.

“There was a survey of people in the area about a nuclear plant and 70% were pro-nuclear — that was in 2004 or 2005 — they felt we needed the energy. But they have never surveyed people living in the areas.

“Then in East Java we had a big earthquake and they stopped the plan. In Indonesia there is no uranium mining — they are not consciously extracting uranium, but they are probably taking uranium out when they mine copper. Australian mining companies are very active in Indonesia — especially gold mining in the east Indonesia region. The largest gold mine in Indonesia is in East Java and the Australian company mining it is taxed really low.

“There is no strong law, no strong environmental risk management assessment and law enforcement is weak. There is a terrible power imbalance between the company and the local community. It’s very hard. If the local community does not give permission, then the companies just come in anyway.

“This tour has helped me get the context with the environment struggle — in Indonesia, the indigenous people have also been fighting the companies. The alliances we need to build are with Indigenous people. West Papua is also an area of exploitation — not so much of mining companies but of agribusiness — it’s a land grab off indigenous tribes and it is hard to help as West Papua is very closed. The tour inspired me to recognise the importance of the indigenous and environmentalist connection.”

Kumar Sundaram, who is the international campaigner for the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, in India was also on the tour. He told GLW: “The CNDP is an umbrella coalition of anti-nuclear organisations across India. There are 10 to 12 places that are protesting nuclear reactors across India.

“Elections in India take place on May 12 and we are organising a nation wide conference of anti-nuclear campaigners in Delhi, so we can come out of the election period with a clear statement. CNDP organises protests, conferences and works on a college student program. The city-centres are quite pro-nuclear — in the urban centres people have swallowed a pro-consumption, pro-development argument and they think that involves nuclear energy.

“In 1998 the coalition against the nuclear cycle was strengthened because India conducted nuclear tests in 1998. The movement is still strong. We are able to organise big rallies with several hundred people in attendance.

“The Indian and Australian governments have a nuclear agreement, which seeks to open ways to supply uranium to India. We oppose this, because the supply of uranium would fuel newly proposed reactors — pushed by a government which brutally overrides community opposition, environmental concerns and safety issues while the international community moves away from nuclear energy since the Fukushima accident in Japan.

“Secondly, we oppose the agreement because of the brutal oppression meted out against fisherfolk, agricultural workers, tribes and petty traders. This is not a small amount of people in India. Lots of people have been forced to give away their land and there have been large grassroots protests.

“The southernmost tip of India is Koodankulam — at this place 30,000 people protested against a proposed reactor. Two people were killed and several hundred people were kept in jail for three months. Ten thousand people face charges from police, fictitious charges of murder and sedition. This is a human rights crisis. If you oppose the nuclear industry then you are a traitor. Farmers and local community land is owned by half a dozen people — the government uses the carrot and the stick and then re-takes the land.”

“A major concern is that an Australian uranium expansion will fuel the expansion in contempt of a worldwide turn away from nuclear energy post Fukushima. The expansion taking place in India is being pushed through in a brutal fashion. Also, Australian uranium will fuel the arms race in south-east Asia. As part of the tour I met with the officials of the uranium mine in Roxby Downs.

“This tour has been about learning about the context of the nuclear industry expansion and seeing the parallels. India’s anti-nuclear movement is not just about a choice of technology, about what we do and don’t want. It’s about control of land. There are parallels between Aboriginal Australia and Indian indigenous struggles. These issues are class and social justice issues.

“We saw this most acutely on the tour when we met Yami Lester, an Aboriginal man now completely blind due to being exposed to atomic weapon tests at Maralinga. In India and Australia, whether it’s the fight against dangerous nuclear energy or the fight by tribal people over losing land, the fight against radiation poisoning or being deprived of basic immunities — it is all because the local elites decided their priorities are profits. We must resist. This tour was a wonderful exchange of information.”

Tour participants will provide ongoing solidarity with the Muckaty battle. Tour spokeswoman Emma Kefford said: “We are travelling all the way from Melbourne to Tennant Creek to show our support to the Muckaty Traditional Owners saying no to a radioactive waste dump on their land. They are taking their case to the federal court in June and we hope they get the justice they deserve after seven years of struggle.”

——————->


Radioactive Exposure Tour 2005

Pioneered by Ila Marks and Eric Miller, the Radioactive Exposure Tours have been providing amazing opportunities for people to learn about the impacts of uranium mining first-hand by travelling to South Australia visiting existing uranium mines and talking with locals and indigenous communities about their experiences with the nuclear industry. Tour participants get to experience affinity groups, consensus decision making, desert camping and delicious organic, vegetarian, communal cooking whilst travelling to some of the most beautiful and ecologically significant environments in Australia.

The 2005 tour was held in April. The following is feedback from some of the participants.

“The tour encompassed many areas involved in the local nuclear fuel cycle, from mining to dumping to nuclear testing, and those activists devoting their lives to preventing this chain of death. More importantly, it also encompassed so much that will be lost if mining companies and the government continue to have their way; ­ the remaining cohesion of indigenous groups and culture; the incredible Mound Springs that are drying up as a result of overdrawing the Great Artesian Basin, the existence of other ecological life that the GAB supports, and human good health.”- Sophie Green

“You could never have imagined what you would learn, what you would see and how much of an impact this would have on you. Never. Your thoughts now are; how are you going to use your images, your knowledge, your ideas to tell other people, to explain the importance of understanding what is happening to this land and the indigenous people of this land. What they think, what they are experiencing is nothing we could ever go through, we are so privileged and so well looked after that we can actually choose to care about things or not. They don’t get that choice. Uranium mining in South Australia and everywhere else is damaging so much indigenous land, and so many indigenous and non-indigenous people. “ – Jessie Boylan

”During the trip, participants were given first-hand accounts of the history of the anti-nuclear movement in South Australia by activists that had been involved in past protests against the mining companies and had the opportunity to participate in a new campaign to inform residents of Roxby Downs about the Olympic Dam operation. Some of the issues discussed … include the environmental damage caused by mining, the Government’s apparent failure to take problems with mining operations seriously, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the Aboriginal consultation process. Examples of current and past anti-nuclear activism are also given.” – Joel Williams


Radioactive Exposure Tour 2008

Hideko Nakamura’s feedback from the 2008 radtour:

The tour was one of the most memorable events in my life. I had some knowledge on the British nuclear tests conducted during the 50s and 60s in SA because I am very much interested in nuclear issues, notably the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki of 1945. I, however, had not been aware of the unimaginable effects of the tests on people and environments until I listened to Avon Hudson’s talk. I can relate the tragedy of the bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Avon’s story. I was inspired by his long-term courageous campaign in trying to tell the truth. When I stood on the outback, I could not help but imagine how indigenous people loved and looked after the land with care for so many years. At the same time I noticed how much core members of Friends of the Earth made efforts to cultivate and strengthen bonds with these beautiful indigenous people we have met. Now I miss each participant of the tour. Thank you for sharing ideas and aspirations with me.


Radioactive Exposure Tour 2011

A participant’s account by Cherie Spaulding

Controlled power flight first occurred at the hands of an improbable pair. The Wright Brothers had no money nor were they university educated. What they did have was a purpose. Everyone who worked beside them believed in what they were doing. Passion was their fuel and it drove them toward their goal with solid conviction. Against the odds, their airplane took flight in 1903.

Activism, like that daring airplane flight, is never an easy endeavor. The odds are stacked against you, the road periled, pot-holed and poorly funded. Activism requires individuals to stand against the status quo: to stand on principal for the collective good. The 2011 Radioactive Exposure Tour combined activists, tribal elders, nuclear veterans and concerned citizens seeking to understand the social, cultural and environmental impacts of uranium mining. Through firsthand accounts of aboriginal elders, a nuclear veteran of the British missile tests, concerned citizens, community activists and mine representatives, participants were exposed to the concerns of uranium mining and nuclear endeavors. Together, the group sought to understand more in depth the climate surrounding the extraction and use of nuclear materials.

This years RAD Tour included five children. Immediately apparent were FIVE REASONS why we should pause to consider the use of radioactive materials to feed nuclear reactors or fuel atomic weapons. Our children’s futures will be shaped by the actions of their parents, aunties and uncles, and elders. Along with thirty adults., the group traversed the South Australian outback for ten days, camping in some of the states most scenic locations. Along the way they made new friends, sampled local cuisine, imbibed fine music and explored the natural environment. The following excerpt journals our trip.

Day one: early morning in Melbourne. Trip leaders, Jessie and Kasey, arrived at FOE with the vans and trailers and began loading our gear. Before long, both trailers and buses were packed. The journey to Adelaide began as the bus marched through city streets that turned to suburbs that grew into sprawling green pastures of flocked sheep, and then sprung into wheat fields that stretched into dry desert, where cattle grazed in the distance. The drive consumed most of the day. Arriving at Single Step after dark, friend’s from Adelaide awaited with dinner. Promptly, we unrolled our swags on the soft lawn beneath the stars.

On the second day, we discovered that repacking the trailer required strategy and skill. Gangis and Jared organized the system while strong backs and helping hands piled the gear on the trailer’s tailgate. With a farewell to our gracious hosts, we were back on the bus heading toward stops at Port Wakefield and then Point Pirie for lunch.

At Point Pirie we met Adnymathanha elder, Enice Marsh. Gathering in the shade, we listened as she shared stories and experiences of growing up on native land and her early awareness of the water “poisoned” by radioactivity. She described some of the challenges to the Native Title agreement and the exclusion of some aboriginal peoples in the decision-making concerning land use and mine expansions. Though a small women and soft spoken, her voice was clear and confident, deepening our awareness with her story.

By nightfall we were making camp away from the traditional amenities of urban life. Kasey, the co-leader and instrument of complete kitchen construction, possibly magician, pulled a kitchen out of a trailer—voilà! Suddenly, on the edge of a sea inlet, between freshly unrolled swags, we had the makings of a dinner! Busy hands set about chopping and lighting, sautéing and simmering, until at last, a meal appeared. Heavy in veggies, the dinner call sounded; torch-lit heads began sashaying to the table for the good night’s tucker. With bellies full, we listened to Dr. Andrew Melville Smith describe the Roxby Downs plan to build a desalination plant at Point Lowly, potentially jeopardizing the breeding ground of the giant cuttlefish. Plans to dump the access salt in the bay, he said, would disrupt the ecological balance that maintained a suitable habitat for this exotic cephalopod. The true threat is that a slight variation in the water pH can disrupt the breeding habits of the cuttlefish. A simple equation, really. No breeding, no cuttlefish. The almost electric bodies of the meter long fish could disappear from Point Lowly—forever. The group was called to action. In the morning, we would travel to the Point and stand in defense of the cuttlefish.

After breakfast, the activist campers tucked loose ends in the trailer and loaded the buses. Because I had not properly introduced myself to our resident whistle-blower, I thought I would become better acquainted if I road along in his car. We had first met up with Avon Hudson the previous afternoon, at Point Wakefield, only to discover that his self-serviced Toyota was having some engine trouble. Maybe the fan or the thermostat, he speculated. The engine wasn’t cooling properly. Such a scenario might incline one to reconsider a caravan across South Australian in an old jalopy. Not Avon. Equipped with replacement parts, he motored on. When the tour schedule afforded him a spare moment, he popped the hood and began repairing the trouble. Beneath the hood he revealed an immaculate engine, deceptively so, considering the age and condition of the car. You could have sautéed tofu on the engine block, and it would have been petrol-flavor free: each part was cleaned and dated with the time of service. Having contemplated my own safety as a potential passenger, I now felt reassured by the apparent competency of the onboard mechanic. This was day two. Saying good luck to the cuttlefish at Point Lowly, we loaded up. The adventure of the RAD Tour was full on.

The days driving covered miles and miles of South Australian landscape. The soil turned from dusty grayish-ochre to burnt umber and red. The earth rolled under us, past roving steer, mile after mile. The wheels on the bus, as the children sang, rolled round and round. Old friends were reconnecting and new friends were becoming acquainted. Trailing in the Toyota, Avon recollected history with one eye on the rising needle; he recited experiences with the accuracy of a scientist, but with a poet’s passion and potency. Propelled by stories and prayers, we rolled on toward the next town.

At Maralinga, statue-like missile bodies sprung from the dry ground: once aimed toward destruction, now hollow and empty. Outside a small school painted with aboriginal faces, Avon offered a detailed account of the missile testing. The fallout after a nuclear explosion can be radioactive for decades, contaminating the dust that intermingles with breathable air. Avon described how the men working at Maralinga were uninformed (by their British officers) about the harmful effects of the nuclear radiation. Men were sent out in severely contaminated fields wearing only shorts and t-shirts, while higher officials wore white suits and silk gloves for full body protection. Time and history would reveal the deception to those involved in the nuclear testing. The unseen sacrifice to the men and their families was to their cells and genes; from the fallout of the nuclear missiles, the environment remained contaminated by radiation…and so did the men.

After lunch, our caravan forged along miles of dusty gravel roads, heading deeper and deeper into the country toward Lake Eyre. To understand what we were about to experience, you would have to know that Lake Eyre has not been a “lake” in 35 years. Twelve meters below sea level, the salty lakebed sat empty, crusted with white flaky salt crystals. Because of the heavy rain in northern Australia, water began to fill the bed—and fill it did! As the group prepared camp, children tromped in the mucky soft soil that had been cracked and dry for over three decades. Some dredged to the salty waters’ edge for a wade. Here we were joined by the Adelaide mob that brought along Uncle Kevin Buzzacott, an Arabunna elder. Uncle Kevin planned to share stories with us, but urged us to watch the sunset over Lake Eyre first; knowing the land, he also knew the experience was rare, one we would want to see and remember.

Much of the activity of the next few days occurred around Lake Eyre. The first, an easy morning: breakfast and a chance to relax. The mornings generally revolved around coffee, children and campfire. Cups clanging and fire stoking, morning meetings organised the camp duties and the plans for our day. We also compared notes from the night: Any mice in your swag? Did you stay warm? Dry? In the afternoon a bus loaded with twenty campers, including the five children, left to check out the local culture of Andamooka, an opal-mining town nearby. By nightfall, we were back around the fire, preparing for the Olympic Dam Tour at Roxby Downs.

The next morning the group left for Roxby Downs and the mine tour. As we drove onto the premises of the mining operation, the tour leader began describing the history and resources of the mine. Uranium is one of the four resources extracted from Olympic Dam, along with copper, gold and silver. With approximately 1,000 employees on site at any given hour, the mine is a tremendous operation. The above ground infrastructure was reminiscent of a city newly under construction, consisting of few walls and deeply trenched pits. Iron and steel beams shot at right angles, cutting horizontal and vertical planes of steel into the blue sky.

Because of a growing concern for the Olympic Dam expansion, and the potential environmental threats to Spencer Gulf (at Point Lowly) the group inquired: Would the mine oppose relocation of the desalination plant? What if the excess salt turned Spencer Gulf into a “dead sea?” Was there proper consideration of the cuttlefish? Other questions concerned the working operations and safety of mine employees handling uranium and other waste products. Unfortunately, our guide could not offer solid answers to our critical inquiries, referring us instead to a newly published mining document. Leaving the mine, the tour bus drove over a small bridge and the tires were sprayed to remove potential contaminates. Post-mine tour, we ate lunch at a nearby park and posed for a photo op with a local newspaper; standing in the foreground was Uncle Kevin, arms crossing his chest, saying “NO DEAL” to the mine expansion.

Day six took us to fragile Mound Springs. Uncle Kevin captivated the children with his story about the two snakes that became the mounds, one the source of the life giving spring. Lunch at Coward Springs afforded some coveted reprieve from showerlessness. While falafel sizzled on the burner, children danced to Madeline’s ukulele renditions of favorite songs. Others showered or sat in the bubbly warm spring that looked like a wooden Jacuzzi, powered by nature. Driving back to Lake Eyre, our bus turned onto a mucky path and the wheels sunk in deep. Within minutes, everyone was off the bus, giving a big heave-ho shove. By now our group was united. Working together, we were becoming an excellent team: a solid force of collective awareness.

Day seven broke camp at Lake Eyre and said goodbye to the strange and wonderful region, the source of many Arubunna dreamings. Jessie, co-leader extraordinaire, had us salivating at the mention of quandong and roo pies at Copley. As an appetizer we stopped off in Marree to see the aboriginal cultural center and found ourselves pulled by near gravitational force toward another kind of culture: the general store. Suddenly, we found ourselves ordering chips and coffees—captivated by the strange array of items from camping equipment to cough drops to authentic bush attire, all available in one convenient location. The cultural center, by contrast was filled with art, artifacts and relics from the desert; a brief talk offered another dimension to the aboriginal struggle to ward off further mining on native land. For the last leg with Uncle Kevin, we stopped off at the Ochre Pits, a deep hand-dug canyon, millennia in the making. Used for the purpose of ceremonial painting, medicine and trading, the clay walls of the canyon echoed the colors of region: mustard, beige, ivory, pumpkin, and rust. Before saying goodbye, Uncle Kevin appealed to the group one last time. He wanted our experience to incite change. We said farewell and then drove for pies. By torchlight we made camp at Nepoire Creek.

The next morning a bus left camp and drove to the Beverly Mine. In contrast to the very public location of the Olympic Dam, the Beverly Mine is tucked below the Gammon Ranges, far from observing eyes. With a gated periphery, the bus awaited chaperone. Escorted into the conference room, we were welcomed with a tray of yellow frosted yellow cake, warm cups of tea, coffee and a slideshow. Prepped for the potential spear flinging Rad Toursits, the presenters were forthright on some occasions, however, they deflected many tough questions, leaving palpable dissatisfaction. We were hungry for concrete answers. The company reassured us that stored tailings sealed underground aquifer was a secure solution for the long haul. Their convictions validated by current scientific standards. The skeptics among the group were well acquainted with the occasional misgivings of scientific validation. Unfortunately, the gap between the present and future sometimes presents a void too great to predict potential calamities.

Our next stop was lunch and showers at Balcanoona Station. The warm camp showers were a sweet reprieve from the dust and grit of camp life. By mid-afternoon we would be settled in the Gammon Ranges. Marsupial mice were rumored to be lurking about and the site was lively with the adventures of hiking explorations. Camped near a creek bed on the rolling slope of hillside, we made shelter for the evening. By accidentally digging the pit toilet in the creek bed, I witnessed firsthand the salt of my fellow camper, Kate, pregnant as could be, who helped me dig a second hole across the road. Though digging silently, I felt a sense of comfort in knowing that my traveling companions followed their conviction with solid action.

Day nine brought us to Arkaroola. Our fearless explorers examined the mountains and the gift shop with equal fervor. We met with Marg Sprigg, whose family once journeyed across Australia and settled in the Arkaroola wilderness area. Widely known as caretakers of the region, Marg spoke of opposing Marathon mining company if their explorations of the sanctuary proved fruitful. After lunch, we boarded the bus. With plenty of daylight and miles to cover, we pressed on toward the Flinders Ranges, through mountain valleys, once thirsty, now fed by brimming streams, past hopping kangaroos and camels, rolling hillsides and plains.

The final days were heavy with driving. Near nightfall, we said goodbye to Avon and pressed on toward Adelaide, leaving others there, until only the Melbourne mob remained. To lessen the miles, we drove late and made camp around midnight. The small group cozied around a warm fire, on soft, grassy terrain. In high spirits the fire brimmed with laughter; the worn and weary were raised by the hand of friendship—swag and all—to higher ground and restful sleep.

By the time we arrived in Melbourne, everyone was tired, but giddy. Hugs and laughter peppered Smith Street as we unloaded swags and gear from the bus. The trip had gathered an incredible group of people, uniting them toward a common cause. If we struggled at all, the lesser force was the wind. Though the tour had equipped us with a better understanding of the challenges the greater resistance lie ahead, in a future we would need to create.

The 2011 Radioactive Exposure Tour began almost three decades ago as a simple idea that manifest into action. This year the RAD Tour brought together a melting pot of citizens: students, activists, professionals and tradesman. People concerned about the well being of both Australia and the earth. Participants gained an over-whelming awareness of the potential impact of the human use of radioactive materials. They were learning by doing…and only by action can our ideas take flight.


Radiaoctive Exposure Tour – 2009

Write-up of the radtour by Ania Anderst

As a student living in Perth, I found myself remarkably lucky to have made it out to the South Australian desert for ten days in May on the Friends of the Earth Radioactive Exposure Tour. The ‘radtour’ is a unique experience allowing people interested in learning about the nuclear industry to go out on country to see uranium mines and to meet people directly affected by the nuclear industry past and present.

Tackling the nuclear industry can be an overwhelming experience, mostly because there is no end to the amount of information on the issue; from uranium mining, nuclear reactors, waste issues, to nuclear proliferation, it’s easy to get lost in the information. And there’s also the added factor of the multi-million dollar mining companies we’re fighting, not to mention the governments siding with them.

The big picture can be rather scary, but actually stepping out onto uranium mines, onto country, and making connections with people who have for years been directly affected by these mining operations makes it easier to understand. It’s no longer some abstract mine in some landscape you can’t imagine, affecting some people you’ve never met before; these are real people with the real deal on their doorstep.

That abstract image of a mine in the back of your head becomes the physical site of the ugly and protruding Olympic Dam uranium/copper mine, or the hundreds of white pipes sticking out of the ground at Beverley uranium mine where they practice in-situ leach uranium mining. Those people become real when you hear the stories of Arabunna Elder Uncle Kevin Buzzacott, Maralinga veteran Avon Hudson and Adnyamathanha custodian Jillian Marsh. Their personal stories, dating decades back, make the issues more human, more accessible.

There’s no better way than to see it yourself – and not only tour the mines and ask the workers questions, but then to juxtapose that intense, sometimes hostile experience with the peaceful time shared around the campfire with people who share your passions and willingness to fight the machine.

When BHP Billiton took us on a tour of Olympic Dam – which takes 35 million litres of water daily from the Great Artesian Basin for free – it was hard to believe some of the things they had to say. According to the BHP employee giving the tour, the mine had less of an environmental impact than pastoralism would have, and the nuclear industry was alleviating people from poverty by providing poor countries with power. It was difficult not to get hostile and emotional hearing that somewhat bent rationale for the existence of such an unsound industry. There was an answer to every one of our questions and the tour bus was filled with suffocating negative energy, lie after lie.

For me, Heathgate Resources’ Beverley mine was even harder to stomach because of the propaganda which included giant placards covering an entire wall concerning their ongoing relationship with Aboriginal communities in the area and showing pictures of Aboriginal kids smiling. When in fact, in May 2000, local Aboriginal communities were at the gates of Beverley protesting and were subsequently put in a shipment container and capsicum sprayed by the SA police. An 11-year-old local Adnyamathanha girl was capsicum sprayed.

BHP Billiton really seemed to believe what they were saying, they were proud of what they were doing. In comparison, the PR chump at Heathgate Resources was a blundering boy behind a company t-shirt. He didn’t answer questions properly, referring mostly to reports he hadn’t seemed to have read, and it felt like he had something to hide. When asked about the shipping container episode, he refused to comment.

Both companies claimed to have excellent relations with Aboriginal communities, but after listening to Jillian and Uncle Kevin talk, it seemed more like mining companies were deliberately creating an ongoing war of attrition amongst Aboriginal communities who are not consulted properly, and are instead split over whether to take a mining company’s money. If resources are needed in a remote community, people living there shouldn’t have to have a uranium mine (or a waste dump for that matter) in order to have health care and infrastructure. These are basic human rights and Aboriginal communities shouldn’t have to settle on corporate sponsorship and give up land rights for health and housing.

Coming face to face with these issues on country was confronting but the land itself allowed some peace of mind. Being out there, seeing the landscape and setting foot on red earth or on Lake Eyre, I had the strong sense that this country was alive. It surprised me how alive it was, with it’s gentle and soft sands, yet rough, hard, contrasts in colour.

Every night we camped somewhere different, and by the end it felt like we’d been all over the state of South Australia – Woomera, Roxby Downs, Lake Eyre, Copley for coffee and quandong pie (more than once thanks to a trailer tyre which caught on fire), Marree, a bit of a crazed dip into the hot springs at Coward Springs, the Blanche Cup and Bubbler Mound Springs with Uncle Kevin, the Beverley uranium mine, Arkaroola Wilderness Sanctuary, the ochre cliffs near Lyndhurst, Brachina Gorge, the surrounding Gammon Ranges, Port Pirie …

Aside from the heavy nature of what we were doing, life on tour was a lot of fun. As a group of 40 people with a range of ages, levels of experience, and approaches to the issue, it was what some called a social experiment. It was particularly lovely having a few children on the tour to emphasise the importance of the issues. Each night a different group helped set up dinner and campfires, and slowly the swags would surround the fires and the stars would come out at full capacity. Music was around all the time, singing tunes on the bus, off the bus, while the bus was bogged, while tyres were flat, while the bus wouldn’t start, while faffing …

And while we were out in the desert it was interesting to see the newspapers filling with related stories; with BHP announcing its proposal to the federal government for a uranium mine at Yeelirrie in WA, followed by the nuclear bomb test in North Korea. While North Korea gets a slap on the wrists from the UN, BHP in WA gets a tidal wave of anti-nuclear groups on it’s ass. This spells out to me that it’s better to stop them before the mines get going, because the safeguards against nuclear proliferation aren’t safe, and while they’re not we shouldn’t be touching uranium (amongst other reasons to leave it in the ground).

Seeing such amazing country, meeting so many beautiful people and seeing the mines for what they are was an inspiring experience, and thanks to this opportunity I feel a lot more equipped to do whatever I can to make sure uranium stays where it belongs – in the ground.

Articles about Lucas Heights and its nuclear reactors

The case for a Royal Commission into the proposal for a new nuclear reactor in Sydney’s southern suburbs

Produced by the Nuclear Reactor Taskforce
Sutherland Shire Council
PO Box 17, Sutherland, NSW, 1499.
1999

Summary

The Commonwealth Government and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) plan to build a new nuclear reactor in the Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights. This is Australia’s largest ever scientific investment, with profound implications for foreign policy and the direction of future Australian science, as well as significant health and property risks for the population of Australia’s largest city. Yet the design and approval process for the reactor has been shrouded in extraordinary secrecy and unaccountability, with the effect of blocking public debate and Parliamentary oversight.

Vital documents and studies have not been made public or do not exist:
* No detailed costings or economic analysis have been released
* No reactor design has been prepared
* No credible accident scenarios appear to exist
* No alternatives have been seriously considered
* No independent analyses apparently exist
* The waste processing contract with France is “Cabinet in confidence” and cannot be viewed, even by Parliament.
* The alternative sites study is “Cabinet in confidence”.

Further, scientists’ concerns over the public health and environmental risks associated with the planned new reactor and associated facilities have been trivialised or ignored; opponents of the reactor plan have been threatened with defamation suits; emergency planning procedures are far from adequate; a plethora of economic issues remain unanswered and unresolved; the Executive Director of ANSTO sat on a selection panel to interview applicants for the position of CEO of the regulatory agency which, in theory, regulates ANSTO’s activities.

Many more issues could be added to this list of concerns. Above all, two recurring themes have prompted this demand for a Royal Commission:
* secrecy, so pervasive that even the President of the Australian Nuclear Association has recently complained about the “culture of secrecy” at ANSTO; and
* dishonesty, which prompted a former ANSTO engineer with over 25 years experience to write last year, “It is an unfortunate state of affairs that dear old ANSTO, which lives off taxpayer’s money, is feeding us all this propaganda and very little objective information. I thought governmental agencies are there to serve the public – not just to perpetuate themselves.”

The effect of these failings, plus the gaps contained a weak and partisan Environmental Impact Statement, mean that neither the public nor Parliament have the possibility of rationally assessing or debating this proposal. In order to create the conditions for public confidence and trust, and make possible Parliamentary oversight of the proposed project, it is vital that a independent and rigorous inquiry is made into the siting, costs, alternatives, waste management and safety aspects.

We therefore call upon the federal government to establish a Royal Commission into the nuclear reactor proposal and the licensing process which has accompanied it.

A saga of deception

The Government ignored the 1993 Research Reactor Review’s recommendation for a Public Inquiry to investigate any future proposal for a new reactor. More recently the Government ignored the recommendation of the Senate Economics References Committee for a public inquiry into the proposal. The Senate committee said the decision to build a new reactor was “premature and open to ongoing controversy” because of the failure to carry out a public inquiry into the proposal, to properly investigate alternative sites, to take into account community views, and to resolve radioactive waste management issues.

Instead of a public inquiry, ANSTO prepared its own Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which was duly approved by the federal government. The government refused a request from the Sutherland Shire Council to appoint an independent auditor to oversee the Environment Impact Assessment. The EIS was neatly, though generously, summarised by a former head of Engineering and Reactors at ANSTO: “If it is normal for the proponent (of an EIS) to tell the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth, then ANSTO’s presentation is normal. Sometimes the difference between the truth and the whole truth is quite remarkable.”

A senior government bureaucrat said on ABC Radio National on March 29, 1998, that: “The government decided to starve the opponents of oxygen, so that it could dictate the manner of the debate that would follow the announcement. Because the government couldn’t win it on rational grounds … they decided, right, we’ll play the game and in the lead up to the announcement catch them totally unawares, catch them completely off-guard and starve them of oxygen until then. No leaks, don’t write letters arguing the point, just keep them in the dark completely.”

Such comments on the public record, yet the Prime Minister stated last year that the government has been “open and honest” in its handling of the reactor controversy.

Both ANSTO and the government have sought to cloak rational discussion about the costs and benefits of a reactor under a dishonest claim that the reactor is vital for nuclear medicine. In fact medical isotopes can be easily obtained from a global market which already supplies many Australian hospitals.

Peter McGauran, then science minister, began his press release announcing the decision to build a new reactor with the words, “The construction of a replacement research reactor at Lucas Heights will build on Australia’s life-saving nuclear medicine capabilities.” McGauran said on ABC radio on March 29, 1998, that “There’s no doubt that health issues concluded the matter beyond any doubt whatsoever.”

It has indeed been a dishonest argument according to a senior government bureaucrat who was quoted on the same ABC radio program saying: “The government decided to push the whole health line, and that included appealing to the emotion of people. … So it was reduced to one point, and an emotional one at that. They never tried to argue the science of it, the rationality of it”.

When Dr. Geoff Bower, head of the Australian and New Zealand Association of Physicians in Nuclear Medicine, was asked if it would be a “life threatening” situation if Australia did not produce medical isotopes locally, he said, “Probably not life threatening. I think that’s over-dramatising it and that’s what people have done to win an argument. I resist that.”

The medical isotope rhetoric has become so implausible that the government is itself backing away from it. The parliamentary Public Works Committee produced a bipartisan report in August 1999 which said: “A number of organisations and individuals challenged the need for a research reactor based on a requirement to produce medical radiopharmaceuticals. … The Committee recognises that this issue has not been resolved satisfactorily.”

Over two years have passed since the government’s decision to build a new reactor, $300 million has been committed to the project, a sham Environmental Impact Assessment has been completed, the tendering process is underway. Yet we now observe the government acknowledging that the debate over medical isotope supply – the issue which “concluded the matter beyond any doubt whatsoever” according to the former Science Minister – has not been resolved satisfactorily.

Nor was the Department of the Environment and Heritage prepared to accept this rhetoric when required to examine the EIS produced by ANSTO. It said that “a combination of alternatives, such as funding for ‘suitcase science’, importation of radioisotopes, and possible development of spallation and other technologies, could substitute in part for not constructing a new reactor.” A further reflection of the Department’s unwillingness to parrot the rhetoric was its statement that, “The Department’s assessment concludes that the need and justification for the proposal is ultimately a matter for Government, particularly in defining how best to meet national interest objectives.”

A blank cheque

The proposal requires spending over $500 million of Commonwealth funds in the short term, with well over a billion dollars committed for on-going expenditure during the 40-50 year life of the reactor.

The absence of financial honesty in the proposal is astonishing – neither the public nor Parliament have been provided with detailed costings or a credible cost-benefit analyses. At a time of acute financial accountability and restraint in Commonwealth expenditures, ANSTO is apparently being handed a blank cheque.

ANSTO’s claim that the reactor will cost taxpayers $286 million. This is a 1993 figure which does not take cost escalations into account. It is a deceptive figure which fails to take into account obvious foreseeable costs. Here is a more honest accouting:

Cost of reactor – up to $400 million (1)
Instrumentation – up to $150 million (1)
Decommissioning old reactor – $70 million (1)
Spent fuel reprocessing – $120 million (3)
Isotope processing – $13 million p.a. (2)
Reactor operating costs – $20 million p.a. (1)

Total likely costs = over $500 million

Plus ± $20 million Commonwealth subsidy per year for 40-50 years.

(1) McKinnon Research Reactor Review 1993
(2) ANSTO Annual Report 1998-99
(3) ANSTO EIS 1998

To these costs must be added the unknown cost of a waste repository for long-lived intermediate level wastes (ie. spent fuel when returned to Australia from reprocessing overseas).

The costs of such a waste repository are likely to be immense. The US government plans to spend US$30 billion on a high level waste repository in Nevada. The cancelled Nirex intermediate waste facility in the UK was to cost £2 billion. Pangea Ltd’s high level waste proposal in Australia was supposed to cost US$6 billion.

Does the federal government intent to hand ANSTO a blank cheque? It certainly seems so.

A key task for the Royal Commission would be to obtain credible independent assessments of the likely costs of the reactor proposal, so that an informed debate can occur.

A failure of science policy

As with the rhetoric about medical isotopes, claims that a new reactor is required for “world-class” scientific research are also questionable. The reactor, if built, would be the single largest investment in a science facility in Australia’s history yet the government failed to consult its science advisers – the Office of the Chief Scientist, the Australian Science, Technology and Engineering Council (ASTEC) and the CSIRO – before making the decision. The CSIRO said in 1993 that “more productive research could be funded for the cost of a reactor.”

There is little scientific or medical support for a new reactor beyond those individuals and organisations with financial and/or career interests in reactor technology. Needless to say alternative technologies – such as cyclotrons – have not received such enthusiastic and uncritical support; indeed the development of alternative technologies has been impeded because of the push for reactor technology.

Distorting Australia’s foreign policy

So why does the government want a new reactor? The Public Works Committee said that the “national interest criterion forms the cornerstone of the need for a replacement research reactor”. ANSTO said in its Draft EIS that national interest issues were addressed “comprehensively” by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards Office in their submission to the Senate Nuclear Reactor Inquiry – but that submission was just seven pages long and it was unreferenced.

It appears that a seven-page, unreferenced document on “national interest” issues forms the principle justification for the new reactor.

In fact, a nuclear reactor is likely to commit Australia decisively to the “nuclear club” by ensuring a seat on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA regulates the world’s nuclear industry and is also the world’s biggest promoter of nuclear energy.

It is unclear how our national interest is served by participating in the global spread of nuclear energy with its associated risks and waste problems. Professor McKinnon, who carried out the government’s 1993 Reactor Review, agreed, stating: “There may be national advantages in not being so closely associated with IAEA stances.”

The serious accident in September 1999 at Tokaimura, Japan, suggests a far more sensible ‘national interest’ for Australia might be to encourage regional countries to adopt safer non-reactor technologies.

(Note that on page 38 of the 1998-99 Annual Report, ANSTO boasts a 14 year collaboration with Tokaimura on the management of waste!)

These ought to be vital matters for Parliamentary, and public, discussion.

A culture of secrecy

ANSTO’s operations are shrouded in secrecy. Some of the issues of concern include the following:
* the Federal Government claims to have evaluated alternative sites but refuses to release the site selection study report, claiminig it is “Cabinet in confidence”.
* ANSTO has refused to release copies of the spent fuel reprocessing contracts between ANSTO and the French nuclear agency Cogema to the Senate Economic References Committee, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, and the Sutherland Shire Council.
* progress on a Community Right to Know Charter has been stalled. In 1998, ANSTO rejected a Charter put forward by the local community group involved in these negotiations. More recently, the Environment Minister, Senator Robert Hill, has refused to facilitate the introduction of a Charter despite his agreement that the establishment of a Charter should be a “high priority” before the reactor is built.
* several accidents took place at ANSTO’s Lucas Heights plant in February 1999 with one worker taking contamination home. Local residents and schools were not informed, nor was the NSW Health Department, nor was the Sutherland Shire Council. The information only came to light when released by a concerned ANSTO employee. One accident involved a spent fuel rod falling from its container, where it remained for a period of months. Four ANSTO staff members were exposed to radiation. On two other occasions, radiation releases above routine levels required closure of ANSTO’s radioisotope processing plant. Discussing one of these accidents, an ANSTO employee said, “ANSTO have covered this incident up and have not even told the staff that this incident occurred. Many staff believe that a site emergency should have been declared.” ANSTO management claims that the radiation releases posed no environmental or health risk. Who is to be believed? The February accidents require detailed investigation. A Royal Commission will also have the power to determine if there have been other accidents and other cover-ups.

Radioactive waste – where is the promised solution?

A major increase in radioactive waste production is projected by ANSTO if a new reactor is built. In the words of a senior bureaucrat quoted on ABC radio, waste management is “an issue for another generation”, “someone else can worry about it”.

Of particular concern is the government’s failure to develop a strategy to manage spent fuel from the Lucas Heights reactors.

ANSTO plans to send most of its spent fuel for reprocessing in Europe by the French nuclear agency Cogema. But where will the long-lived intermediate-level wastes arising from reprocessing spent fuel be stored when returned to Australia?

In 1997, the Commonwealth/State Consultative Committee on the Management of Radioactive Waste decided that “co-location” of an interim, above-ground store for long-lived intermediate-level wastes with the planned underground dump for low-level waste “should be considered as a first siting option.” The Government plans to establish a low-level dump in South Australia. ANSTO said in the Draft EIS in 1998 that it is “expected” that long-lived intermediate-level wastes will be stored adjacent to the proposed nuclear dump in South Australia.

However, South Australian Premier John Olsen said in state parliament on November 19 that while the SA Government supports a low-level dump: “the storage of long-lived intermediate-level waste, such as reprocessed fuel rods from Lucas Heights, is an entirely separate issue. … I wish to make it very clear that I am opposed to medium- to high-level radioactive waste being dumped in South Australia.”

Will the Government attempt to co-locate a store with the dump in the face of opposition from the South Australian Government? Will any other State or Territory Government accept spent fuel wastes originating at the Lucas Heights reactor plant? Or is ANSTO’s Lucas Heights site destined to remain a de factor nuclear dump?

No progress whatsoever has been made towards establishing a deep underground dump for long-lived intermediate-level wastes. The Government and ANSTO claim that the volume of existing long-lived intermediate-level wastes is insufficient to warrant construction of a deep underground dump. What volume would justify a deep geological dump? The Department of Industry, Science and Resources says that no decision has been made on what “magical volume” would trigger moves to establish a deep underground dump. Will the deep geological dump be sited in South Australia? What are the environmental and public health implications?

With so many waste management issues unresolved, it is irresponsible for the government and ANSTO to proceed with a plan for a new reactor which will generate another 1500-2000 spent fuel rods and which will also result in a 12-fold increase in the production of intermediate-level liquid wastes and a four-fold increase in other wastes according to ANSTO documents.

These ad hoc, politically-expedient waste management plans fly in the face of the 1993 Research Reactor Review’s statement: “A crucial issue is final disposal of high-level wastes, which depends upon identification of a site and investigation of its characteristics. A solution to this problem is essential and necessary well prior to any future decision about a new reactor. … It would be utterly wrong to decide on a new reactor before progress is made on identification of a high level waste repository site.”

Nuclear waste is just one issue that needs to be tested by public debate – a debate which cannot occur in the present atmosphere of secrecy and deception.

For the above reasons we call upon the federal government to establish a Royal Commission to independently investigate the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor proposal with the aim of returning public confidence and trust, encouraging informed public debate, and making possible Parliamentary oversight of the proposed project.

 


Proposed new reactor at Lucas Heights: decision-making processes

Jim Green
October 2000 (updated May 2002)

“[C]atch them totally unawares, catch them completely off-guard and starve them of oxygen” — Senior Canberra bureaucrat involved in the reactor push. ABC Radio National, March 29, 1998

1992 ASTEC REPORT

ANSTO’s reactor Draft EIS (1998, p.3-14) refers to the 1992 Australian Science Technology and Engineering Council (ASTEC) report on major national research facilities in support of the new reactor proposal. DISR and Hughes MP Danna Vale have done likewise. However the 1992 ASTEC Review was a preliminary sifting of almost a hundred proposals for science funding; it was anything but a searching analysis of the cases for and against a new reactor. This can easily be confirmed by consulting the flimsy ASTEC report.

The ASTEC report itself says (p.xiii), in bold type: “It must be emphasised that, while the present study has identified a number of timely proposals for major national research facilities, ASTEC has not employed peer review, on-site visits or other steps necessary for a full evaluation of proposals. It will be essential for this to be carried out rigorously before final decisions are taken about which facilities should be given the highest priority for funding.”

Prof. Anne Henderson-Sellers, an ASTEC member (and now an ANSTO division manager), expressed serious doubts about the medical, scientific and commercial reasons for a reactor in the 1993 Research Reactor Review (RRR) report. Henderson-Sellers was one of three members of the RRR panel,

During the 1993 RRR, ASTEC said a decision on a new reactor “…. must not be based solely on the needs of scientific research and industrial production. It must also take account of a number of social, political and cost factors. …. The detailed, rigorous evaluation advocated by ASTEC has yet to be made – ASTEC sees this as the responsibility of the Research Reactor Review.”

If built the reactor will be the single biggest investment in a science facility in Australia’s history, yet the Government did not consult its science advisory bodies – the Office of the Chief Scientist, ASTEC, or the CSIRO – before the 1997 decision to build a new reactor. The CSIRO said in its 1993 submission to the Research Reactor Review that “more productive research could be funded for the cost of a new reactor”.

ASTEC, 1992, Major National Research Facilities: A National Program, Canberra: AGPS.

 

1993 RESEARCH REACTOR REVIEW

ANSTO/DIST (submission to Senate Economics References Committee, May 1998, pp.497-498) state that the 1993 Research Reactor Review (RRR) “identified the necessity for a replacement research reactor.” That is a lie.

In 12 August, 1996 letter, then science minister Peter McGauran said: “Although the Research Reactor Review recommended that a decision on a new reactor be made ‘in about five years time’, it did not recommend that a new inquiry be undertaken.” That is false. The 1993 Research Reactor Review (p.4) specifically said that “if, at some later stage, a new reactor is envisaged, it should be assessed by a new panel possibly operating within the Environmental Protection Act 1974”. The RRR clearly had in mind a public inquiry, conducted by a panel such as that which conducted the RRR, not a sham Environmental Impact Assessment which was conducted not by “a new panel” but by ANSTO itself.

The RRR said (p.xv):

“If, at the end of a further period of about five years,
– a high level waste repository site has been firmly identified and work started on proving its suitability
– there is no evidence that spallation technology can economically offer as much or more than a new reactor
– there has been no practical initiation of a cyclotron anywhere worldwide to produce technetium-99m
– there is good evidence of strong and diverse applications of neutron scattering capability in Australian science, including many young scientists, and a complex of industrial uses
– the national interest remains a high priority
it would be appropriate to make a positive decision on a new reactor. The most suitable site would need to be identified.
If any one of these onerous requirements is not met, either a negative decision, or a decision to delay further, would be indicated.”

1994 BAIN-BATELLE REPORT

ANSTO’s reactor Draft EIS (1998, p.3-16) attempts to justify the reactor proposal with reference to the 1994 Bain-Batelle report. The Draft EIS fails to note that this report was commissioned by ANSTO and thus its independence is open to debate. Moreover the report’s treatment of substantive issues such as waste management is cursory; this can easily be proved by consulting the report.

Bain International Inc., Batelle Memorial Institute, and Pacific Northwest Laboratories, 1994, Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation: Strategy Review Recommendations: Final Report, Lucas Heights: ANSTO.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

“If it is normal for the proponent to tell the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth, then ANSTO’s presentation is normal. Sometimes the difference between the truth and the whole truth is quite remarkable.” –Tony Wood, Former Head, Engineering and Reactors, ANSTO, 1998, EIS submission.

A substantive critique of the Final EIS was prepared by the Sutherland Shire Council. I can also supply a substantive critique of the Draft EIS and Final EIS on request. The following comments address process issues only.

The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was an expensive bureaucratic whitewash. The fact that ANSTO prepared the EIS is completely unacceptable given its vested interest in a new reactor and ANSTO’s demonstrated track record of secrecy and dishonesty. That this was within the parameters of the EPIP legislation does not make it any less farcical.

The Sutherland Shire Council (submission to 1997-99 Senate Economics References Committee) called on the Federal Government to put in place an environmental auditor to oversee the reactor EIS process. That call went unanswered.

ANSTO had millions of dollars of tax-payers’ money to prepare the EIS whereas local residents and other opponents of the reactor plan had no funding whatsoever.

ANSTO hired PPK Environment and Infrastructure to help prepare the EIS. PPK was heavily criticised by an independent auditor during the Holsworthy airport EIS. The PPK project team has no expertise in nuclear sciences. PPK’s “information stalls” were high farce: PPK distributed information on the EIA/EIS process but hardly any information on the reactor proposal per se.

PPK refused to organise a public meeting at which both proponents and opponents would speak.

PPK refused to publicly release research documents being produced by ANSTO and NNC (the sub-contractor) during the preparation of the Draft EIS.

Any number of other specific examples could be provided to illustrate problems experienced by the public during the EIS process. To give one of many examples, Dr. Furzer’s (Sydney University) submission on the Draft EIS notes that he twice asked ANSTO to supply four papers listed in the Draft EIS. The papers were not supplied and Dr. Furzer said his submission was “limited in scope” because of ANSTO’s failure to supply information.

The fact that there was no opportunity for public comments to be made on the Final EIS was unacceptable.
THE REALPOLITIK OF THE SEPTEMBER 1997 DECISION TO BUILD A NEW REACTOR

The government’s Public Relations strategy in relation to the proposed new reactor was explained by a senior government bureaucrat, based in Canberra, on Radio National’s “Background Briefing” program (March 29, 1998, www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/bbing/bb980329.htm): “The government decided to starve the opponents of oxygen, so that they could dictate the manner of the debate that would follow the announcement. Because they couldn’t win it on rational grounds … they decided, right, we’ll play the game and in the lead up to the announcement catch them totally unawares, catch them completely off-guard and starve them of oxygen until then.”

A Department of Industry, Science and Tourism (DIST) briefing paper, dated April 1998, obtained by Sutherland Shire Council under Freedom of Information legislation, says: “There is “no point in consulting with potential/hypothetical recipients of a new reactor. It was discovered through the course of inquiry into the new airport that such a course of action serves only to inflame the communities for no good reason.”

1997-99 SENATE ECONOMICS REFERENCES COMMITTEE INQUIRY

The government has ignored the recommendation of the Senate Economics References Committee (1999) for a public inquiry into the reactor proposal.

The Committee’s majority report said the decision to build a new reactor was “premature and open to ongoing controversy” because of the failure to carry out a public inquiry into the proposal, to properly investigate alternative sites, to take into account community views, and to resolve radioactive waste management issues.

The majority report also said that the decision “relied largely on the vested interests of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and those involved in, and dependent on, the nuclear industry.”

The majority report argued that no reactor should be constructed “until a permanent site for disposal of the Lucas Heights nuclear waste is determined.”

The majority report recommended the establishment of a public inquiry “similar to the 1993 Research Reactor Review”.

Report by the Senate Economics References Committee on a New Reactor at Lucas Heights, September 1999:
www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/economics_ctte/lucas/index.htm.

NO COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

The federal Department of the Environment and Heritage (1999, p.42), in its assessment of ANSTO’s EIS, said, “The Department accepts that a formal cost-benefit analysis for the proposal is not appropriate, in view of the comprehensive analysis by the Research Reactor Review (RRR).”

The Department (1999, p.34) also said that the “The RRR undertook a comprehensive examination of costs and benefits of a new reactor.”

However, the RRR (1993) said that “a complete cost-benefit analysis of the case for a new reactor could not be done because of the inescapable arbitrariness of the financial values put on the national interest and benefits from science aspects.”
1999 PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE

Senator Minchin describes the Public Works Committee as an “independent public inquiry”. In fact, the Public Works Committee process was a rubber stamp and a complete waste of time. This can easily be confirmed by consulting the Committee’s report, which merely parrots ANSTO information/misinformation ad nauseum.

Public Works Committee (Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works), 1999, Report relating to the proposed Replacement Nuclear Research Reactor, Lucas Heights, NSW, Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia.
www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pwc/ansto/ncpindex.htm

Transcripts of hearings:
www.aph.gov.au/hansard/joint/commttee/j-pub-wk.htm
1999-2001 SENATE INQUIRY

A federal senate committee slammed the proposal in a report released on May 23, 2001. The majority report of thecommittee is a joint production of the Labor Party and the Democrats. The Democrats also wrote a minority report, taking a more critical line on the reactor project than the Labor Party, and a minority report from Liberal and National Party senators restates the government’s support for a new reactor.

On the alleged need for a research reactor in Australia, the committee concluded that “… no conclusive or compelling case has been established to support the proposed new reactor and … the proposed new reactor should not proceed.”

The committee found that “the decision to build a new reactor was taken without a detailed investigation of Australia’s present and future scientific and medical needs”. It was not convinced that logistical difficulties constitute a serious obstacle to the importation of radioisotopes, and also noted the expanding medical and scientific applications of alternative technologies such as cyclotrons.

On the foreign policy agenda driving the Coalition government’s plan for a new reactor, the committee found that “… the justification for the new research reactor solely on national interest grounds is not strong where national interest is defined on purely ‘security’ and non-proliferation grounds.” The committee said the government’s argument that a new reactor is required to facilitate nuclear disarmament and the implementation of nuclear safeguards is “tenuous”.

The committee went on to say, “The argument for the new research reactor on national interest grounds is more convincing when all areas of nuclear technology are considered, including its role in the region as an educational, research and training centre. The Committee believes, however, that this reason alone is not sufficient to justify the new research reactor. If the reactor is to go ahead, then the main considerations in establishing the need for a reactor must be its place as a research tool providing a neutron source for Australian researchers and products for industry, the health care system and the potential impacts on the environment.”

The committee recommended that before the government proceeds any further with the project it should establish an independent public inquiry into the alleged need for a new nuclear reactor and related issues such as funding for both medical and scientific research in Australia. The government rejected that recommendation on the same day the senate report was released.

The senate committee was particularly critical of the Coalition government and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) for their secrecy. It said, “The Committee is highly critical of ANSTO’s attitude which seeks to make a parliamentary committee subordinate to the whims of a government agency and prevents that committee from exercising its responsibility to scrutinise the executive. The Committee therefore appreciates the frustration experienced by the Sutherland Shire Council and members of the public who have experienced a similar attitude.”

The report also states, “The Committee is highly critical of ANSTO’s approach to providing documents. Its attitude seems to stem from a culture of secrecy so embedded that it has lost sight of its responsibility to be accountable to the Parliament.”

Even Liberal and National Party senators conceded that point, accepting “… that ANSTO could have been more helpful in providing certain less commercially sensitive information to the Committee and could have been more willing to seek a compromise when sensitive material was involved.”

The committee recommended that Senator Nick Minchin, the minister for industry, science and resources, should be censured for his refusal to comply with an order of the senate to table various documents relating to project including the reactor contract between ANSTO and the Argentinean company Invap, and the spent fuel reprocessing contract between ANSTO and the French company Cogema.

The committee recommended that the Australian National Audit Office “consider examining the tender and contract documents for the new reactor” with a view to determining whether documents sought by the committee and the senate should be made public; whether the cost estimate for the reactor is accurate; and whether, during the tendering process, ANSTO ensured that there was adequate and appropriate independent verification and validation of the tenderers’ claims.

The committee also expressed numerous concerns about the failure of ANSTO and the federal government to put in place plans to manage radioactive wastes arising from the existing HIFAR reactor or the planned new reactor.

2001 Senate Select Committee for an Inquiry into the Contract for a New Reactor at Lucas Heights, final report: www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/lucasheights_ctte
Transcripts of public hearings: www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/s-lh.htm

REGULATOR APPROVES REACTOR CONSTRUCTION – APRIL 2002

The head of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA), John Loy, approved construction of a new 20-megawatt nuclear reactor in the Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights on April 5, 2002.

The approval came as no surprise – so much so that the Associated Press and The Australian reported it before it had even taken place. ARPANSA describes itself as the ‘independent regulator’ and the ‘nuclear watchdog’, but it’s a puppet regulator, more poodle than watchdog. The head of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) sat on the panel which recommended Loy’s appointment to the health minister. Moreover, ARPANSA and ANSTO are linked by a revolving door – six ex-ANSTO employees now work for ARPANSA.

The announcement was accompanied with the usual propaganda about the ‘need’ for a reactor to produce medical isotopes. “The government had a clear choice”, said science minister Peter McGauran, “do we save lives or pander to extremists?” No mention of the fact that few if any doctors noticed the three-month closure of the existing reactor from February to May 2000.

ARPANSA has back-tracked from previous ‘commitments’ that a licence to construct a reactor would not be issued unless ANSTO demonstrated progress on radioactive waste management. For example, Loy said in June 2000 that before issuing a licence, “there would need to be progress on the strategy to establish a store for intermediate level waste, including for the waste arising from the reprocessing of spent fuel”.

All the ‘progress’ on storage of intermediate level waste has been in the wrong direction. The federal government has given up on its previous plan to store the waste in South Australia because of overwhelming public opposition and state legislation prohibiting such a store. With no other options available, the federal government has gone back to the drawing board with the establishment of an ‘advisory panel’ to suggest siting options later this year.

In a statement which purports to justify the issuing of a reactor construction licence, Loy notes his previous ‘commitment’ not to issue a licence unless progress had been made on intermediate level waste storage, he notes the abandonment of plans to store the waste in SA, and then he moves on to the next topic as if there was no contradiction to be explained. (ANSTO discusses storage of intermediate level waste in such a way as to imply that a store actually exists, while McGauran asserted on April 5 that plans for a store are “well advanced”.)

Loy says in his latest statement that a licence to operate the reactor (in or about 2005) will not be issued unless ‘significant progress’ is made on waste management plans, but this may prove to be as hollow as his previous commitments.

Plans for a national low level waste dump in SA also face fierce opposition, with 86-93% of South Australians opposed to the planned dump and the incoming state Labor government also opposed. The federal government will release an environmental impact statement justifying the planned dump in the near future.

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty now facing the reactor project concerns the Argentinian company Invap, which won the contract to build the new reactor. Invap is in a perilous financial situation and recently had to apply for a $10.5 million loan from the Argentinian government. Invap is also facing legal action over the constitutionality of the reactor contract, which contains a provision for conditioning of spent fuel from the Lucas Heights reactor in Argentina as a fall-back option if reprocessing contracts with the French agency Cogema fall through. This provision appears to breach Argentina’s constitution, which explicitly prohibits importation of radioactive waste. ANSTO and Invap make the unlikely claim that spent reactor fuel is not radioactive waste and thus the constitutional prohibition does not apply.


ANSTO staff speak

ANSTO “Staff Representing Truth in Science” wrote to a Sutherland Shire Councillor on April 3, 2000. Their comments are transcribed below:

“The reactor HIFAR will be shut down from 7 February to 1 May, 2000. ANSTO’s radioisotope production has suffered no dislocation as a result of the shutdown, since bulk supplies of radioisotopes are purchased from the big international players in Canada and South Africa. Indeed it is understood that we can purchase bulk supplies of radioactive molybdenum (ANSTO’s major seller in the form of a ‘generator’) from one supplier more cheaply than ANSTO can produce it. If HIFAR was so essential to the supply of radioisotopes why has there been no effective production dislocation during the shutdown.”

“It has been heavily rumoured that ANSTO is financially in the red to the tune of $6 million. The radioisotope production group is in the red by $2.2 million. If ANSTO cannot manage simple finances, although it has a large number of staff devoted to the task, how can it possibly hope to manage a complex reactor.”

“Further, it is known that the reactor replacement costs are projected to blow out considerably more than the amounts told to the Federal Government, but once the project is started it will have to be completed irrespective of costs. A number of staff believe there should be an independent external review of financial management at ANSTO and the real costs of a new reactor.”

“Because of inept executive management there is no succession planning within the organisation. Although it will be strongly denied by ANSTO, it is well known by those in the field that the new reactor project is having difficulty finding sufficient nuclear literate staff to address the tender process. It is understood that the current full-time staff on the program had their origins in the AAEC and are up for retirement. Inept management, no succession planning? Who is going to safely operate a new reactor in Sutherland Shire.”

“The last 4 years have seen unprecedented industrial actions resulting in lost-time for ANSTO. The staff morale is exceptionally low … because of unprecedented ineptitude at senior management level.”

“The ANSTO Board has a very limited idea of what is really transpiring at Lucas Heights. For instance, the radiation contamination scare last year was only brought to the staff’s attention because of a local newspaper. The incident was of such gravity, that the executive should have made an announcement over the site-emergency monitor about the incident to inform the staff. Instead the management practiced a culture of secrecy and cover-up, even to the extent of actively and rudely dissuading staff from asking too many questions about the event. The unions were outraged at the executive management concerning this incident but passively towed the management line because they wanted job security with a new reactor.”

“The ANSTO management appears to be endeavoring to muzzle staff comments external to the organisation (through the use of) Acknowledgment Undertaking (forms).”

“We understand that ANSTO has been obtaining supplies of samarium from South Africa since the HIFAR shutdown in February with no dislocation, this isotope is usually manufactured by ANSTO. It is further understood that ANSTO has stopped its importation of samarium from South Africa to “prove” the need for a new reactor. If this is the case it would appear that ANSTO is orchestrating its own circumstances to ensure a new reactor.” (Note: ANSTO and the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa have been asked to supply details of shipments of samarium-153 (and other radioisotopes) – but both organisations will not even say whether or not samarium-153 has been shipped to Australia let alone providing further details.)

 


Quotable quotes on the plan for a new reactor at Lucas Heights

Posted at:

http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/30410/20090218-0153/www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/quotes.html

 


Lucas Heights: Over Reaction?

Australian Broadcasting Corporation – Background Briefing
March 29, 1998.

Transcript of some of the most interesting comments below. Full transcript posted at

http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/30410/20090218-0153/www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/bbriefing.html

Senior government source: “The Government decided to starve the opponents of oxygen, so that they could dictate the manner of the debate that would follow the announcement. Because they couldn’t win it on rational grounds, though they would happily engage anybody on that basis, but seeing as they couldn’t they decided, ‘Right, we’ll play the game and in the lead-up to the announcement, get them totally unawares, catch them completely off guard and starve them of oxygen until then. No leaks, don’t write letters arguing the point, just keep them in the dark completely.”

Bronwyn Adcock (journalist): The benefits of the new reactor’s role in nuclear medicine were “deliberately overstated”.

Senior government source: “The government decided to push the whole health line, and that included appealing to the emotion of people – the loss of life, the loss of children’s lives, and all that data was available to the government from the nuclear medical profession. So it was reduced to one point, and an emotional one at that. They never tried to argue the science of it, the rationality of it.”

Adcock: The announcement on a new reactor was delayed for a month to minimise the political fallout. Senior government source: “When Cabinet finally made the official decision in August, it was decided that tactically, it would be a good idea to wait for the Minister for Transport, John Sharp’s, announcement on Holsworthy, so that on the one day the people of Hughes would see a good and a bad decision. The strategy was to appeal to the people of Hughes on the day of the announcement especially, so you have the relief of their fears about Holsworthy, and supposedly confirmation of their fears about a reactor.”

Senior government source: “I understand that Cabinet considered reprocessing, but decided it was an issue for another generation. They knew that they could dispose of the current spent fuel rods in the US and the UK and then not have a storage problem until the year 2015. You see the new reactor comes on stream 2005, the spent fuel rods have to cool down for seven years and then be stored for another five, so 2015 they’ve got to worry about their spent fuel rods. Someone else can worry about it. And reprocessing is a possibility then. The technology might be better, the costs lower, but that’s 20 years away. So the government thought, we’re not going to make decisions about reprocessing 20 years before we have to. But there was a strong lobby within the science community and even industry that said ‘Its a legitimate technology. Its safe and relatively inexpensive. Do it.’ In fact the reprocessing option was roughly the same cost as the repatriation of the spent fuel rods.”

Senior government source: “The big ticket item was the new reactor and it was felt that politically you just couldn’t win the reprocessing argument and the new reactor.”

Jean McSorley: if Australia builds a new reactor, that encourages other countries to build reactors; reactors are part of the proliferation problem.

Prof. Ken McKinnon (Chair of the 1993 Research Reactor Review): “There is no way that a research reactor, a new one, built in Australia, would ever make a return on the investment for scientific, commercial and medical uses, which would even get towards a fraction of what it would cost for a cost-benefit analysis on the normal industry basis.”

Prof. Barry Allen (former Chief Research Scientist at ANSTO): “We’ve now moved on and its a question of whether we move into the 21st century or whether we’re committing ourselves to 20th century science and the reactor and all the things we can do on the reactor are quite clearly 20th century science.”

Prof. Barry Allen: “One couldn’t escape the conclusion that because you can’t generate alpha-emitting radioisotopes on a reactor, then it wasn’t core …. business of ANSTO. The question is really what the tax-payer of Australia’ wants. Do they want new therapies or do they want the reactor to be the centre of all research.”

Prof. Barry Allen: “Its reported that if we don’t have the reactor people will die because they won’t be getting their nuclear medicine radioisotopes. I think that’s rather unlikely. Most of the isotopes can be imported into Australia. Some are being generated on the cyclotron. But on the other hand alot of people are dying of cancer and we’re trying to develop new cancer therapies which use radioisotopes which emit alpha particles which you cannot get from reactors. And if it comes down to cost-benefit, I think alot more people will be saved if we can proceed with targeted alpha cancer therapy than being stuck with the reactor when we could in fact have imported those isotopes.”

Prof. Barry Allen: “What worries me is that it might have an impact on the scientific development of new directions for the 21st century because at ANSTO for instance it will certainly require a lot of focussing of research to utilise the new reactor. That’s absolutely inevitable. Nobody builds a $300 million new reactor and then lets people do non-reactor-based research. So there’s really two aspects of it. There’s the dollar cost and then there’s the redirection of research interests into areas where the potential is already known I would say. There’s no blue sky there on that reactor whereas with other approaches, they may or may not fail, but the other approaches have some blue sky and if you can’t see blue sky, then you’re not going to get alot out of it. The blue sky is the future. And I think the reactor is, you’re just looking at a rain-cloud from the past, you can’t see too far.”

Prof. Barry Allen: “I don’t see why these things have to be closed door. I mean this is science and technology. If there are better facilities which would demonstrably serve us better in the 21st century we should be looking at them and comparing them to a new reactor. And if it turns out the new reactor stands head and shoulders above everything else, OK ….. But I really don’t think that would be the case so that’s the real problem. There’s nothing intrinsically wrong with the new reactor; its just that its too late and its not taking us in the new directions we should be going.”

Chief Scientist John Stocker didn’t want to comment. He learnt about the plan to build a new reactor in the press and wasn’t asked to advise the government before the decision to build a new nuclear reactor.

The government did not consult with the current head of the CSIRO about the plan to build a new reactor.

Full transcript posted at

http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/30410/20090218-0153/www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/bbriefing.html

 


Senate investigates Sydney’s Collins-class reactor

Jim Green

November 2000

A federal Senate inquiry into the plan for a new nuclear research reactor in Sydney has heard evidence about a string of problems surrounding the project in the past fortnight.

Numerous government departments made submissions in support of the proposed reactor, including the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), the department of industry, science and resources, the so-called radiation protection agency, the department of foreign affairs and the so-called Australian safeguards and non-proliferation office. The inquiry also heard evidence from numerous critics of the plan for a new reactor, including Greenpeace, the Australian Conservation Foundation, the Medical Association for the Prevention of War, and the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre Council.

The Liberal Party senators on the Senate inquiry – Ross Lightfoot and Grant Chapman – were a constant source of amusement. I am told that Chapman appeared to be asleep during hearings on October 25. Lightfoot – notorious for describing Aborigines as the lowest end of the colour spectrum when he was first appointed as a senator representing Western Australia – wavered between aggressive questioning of opponents of the reactor plan about their qualifications and sources of income, to complete disinterest. Lightfoot’s tactic of grilling opponents of the reactor plan on their qualifications backfired with Garry Smith, Sutherland Shire Council’s senior environmental scientist:

Senator Lightfoot: Dr Smith, could you tell us what your qualifications are.

Dr Smith: “I have a Bachelor of Science from the University of Sydney, a PhD in Biochemistry from the University of Western Australia and a Master of Planning from the University of Technology Sydney. I am currently the honorary chair of environmental science at the University of Wollongong and I am on the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) committees. … As Director of the New South Wales Cancer Council Carcinogenesis Research Unit at the University of New South Wales for 10 years, I used radionuclides very frequently – imported and local. For the last nine years I have been attending the ANSTO site four times a year and, based on my scientific, biochemical and toxicity academic qualifications, I have been participating on that Committee. I was appointed by the Commonwealth government to the Probabilistic Safety Assessment Committee and the Seismic Hazard Committee on the basis of my expertise rather than my affiliation with the council.”

Smith told the Senate hearing:

“Frankly, based on the evidence I have seen over many years and on the evidence presented in the EIS process, this [reactor] proposal is an ill-judged proposal. The benefits are highly inflated for this proposal. I have a serious concern that it is a Commonwealth bureaucracy attempting to promote a development under loose Commonwealth laws and very poor accountability criteria. It is not even producing a design at the EIS stage for a major hazardous facility. The economics are questionable as two totally independent and highly eminent economists have advised us – highly questionable.”

“In a scenario where a Commonwealth government does not ask the right questions, does not allow testing of information at a public inquiry – as would occur overseas – and where two unsuccessful tenderers raise the same types of questions about the proposal that we have been raising for over eight years, I think to move ahead with this proposal is ill judged and highly risky commercially, on safety grounds and on nuclear waste management grounds. That is my professional opinion on this proposal.”

Dozens of medical organisations and doctors submitted form letters arguing the specious case that a new reactor is required for isotope production. The president of the Association of Physicians in Nuclear Medicine, Barry Elison, was asked to comment on reports that he did not know that the Lucas Heights HIFAR reactor was shut down from February to May for maintenance. “I’m not sure if I said that”, was his curious response.

The submissions from doctors and medical organisations were notable for their numerous factual errors, stemming from the fact that doctors have no direct involvement in radioisotope production and most have little or no knowledge of the subject. The medical submissions also made numerous misleading assertions, a reflection of the vested interest of sections of the medical profession in an ongoing supply of subsidised isotopes from ANSTO. As Garry Smith told the inquiry, the assertions made to justify a new reactor for isotope supply “seem very much unaccompanied by evidence”.

Just to give a few examples of the errors in the medical submissions from Volume 1 of written submissions:

* Dr. McCarthy says ALL therapeutic isotopes are reactor produced. Wrong. Therapeutics such as iodine-125 and palladium-103 are produced in cyclotrons.

* a medical physicist by the name of Martin Carolan says that molybdenum-99 (which decays to form technetium-99m, used in about 75% of all nuclear medicine procedures) “could” be imported; apparently he doesn’t know that molybdenum-99 already is imported, by Nycomed Amersham from Europe on a weekly basis, by ANSTO from South Africa on a regular / semi-regular basis, and by ANSTO from South Africa and Canada during HIFAR reactor shut-downs.

* Dr. Daunt is concerned that without a new reactor the isotope strontium-87 for the secondary bone cancer therapy will not be available. In fact, it’s strontium-89 not strontium-87 (more precisely, strontium-89 chloride, marketed as Metastron), and it has never been produced by ANSTO because it is patented by Nycomed Amersham and is imported into Australia. Also, it’s not for therapy but for palliation (pain relief), although to be fair, some define therapy to include palliation.

* Dr. Chatterton says without a new reactor in Australia we would be dependent on one overseas reactor (in Canada) for molybdenum-99. Nonsense, there are numerous overseas reactors irradiating targets to produce fission-product molybdenum-99. As the International Atomic Energy Agency said in IAEA Technical Document 1065, April 1999: “The present installed processing capacity [for molybdenum-99] is substantially larger than the demand (of about 6000 Ci per week (6-day precalibrated)), and the capacity for irradiation of targets is even higher. The large demand for Mo-99 has given it an ‘industrial scale production’ status.” Chatterton has been one of the most vocal medical supporters of a new reactor – and he hasn’t got his basic facts right. This issue of molybdenum-99 production is not a minor or tangential issue: on the contrary, about two-thirds of ALL nuclear medicine procedures around the world use technetium-99m drawn from imported molybdenum-99.

* Dr. Bibbo and Dr. Cain said in their Senate submission, “At present, there are no alternative modalities to nuclear medicine and it is envisaged there will not be in the future.” Rubbish. Compare that comment with this from Dr. A.F. Jacobson, “Nuclear medicine and other radiologic imaging techniques: competitors or collaborators?”, European Journal of Nuclear Medicine, Vol.21(12), pp.1369-1372: “The future holds the potential for many unpleasant battles between competing imaging specialists as the need to obtain the maximum information in the minimum time and at the lowest cost intensifies. The applications of the radionuclide technique are not as broad as those of ultrasound, CT, or MRI, and this places great demands on the practitioners of our specialty to remain vigilant in the competition to retain a role in diagnostic imaging evaluations.”

Some of the most interesting submissions to the Senate inquiry came from nuclear engineers including ex-ANSTO stock. Alan Parkinson, a nuclear engineer with over 40 years experience, including experience at ANSTO’s predecessor the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) said in his Senate submission that he is “pro-nuclear and has no concerns about the construction of a new reactor at Lucas Heights”. However he provides detailed, first-hand evidence to substantiate damning claims about the competence, honesty and openness of the Department of Industry Science and Resources (DISR): “[DISR’s] record in project management and their lack of understanding of radiation and other technical subjects, as demonstrated publicly in recent months, leaves very much to be desired.”

Parkinson also provided ample evidence in support of his criticisms of the “independent regulator”: “The newly formed Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) also has not performed particularly well in its first major assignment – the Maralinga project. Unless their performance as regulators improves, then the new reactor project will be a trail of compromises as is the case on the Maralinga project.”

Collins-class reactor

The choice of the Argentinean company Invap to build the proposed new Lucas Heights reactor was “risky” according to ex-ANSTO engineer Tony Wood, who likened Invap to “the new boy on the block”.

Wood told the Senate inquiry, “… the literature does not support the minister’s [Nick Minchin] claim that INVAP has a ‘solid track record’. It is not that it has a poor track record. It has no track record on the reactor of significance – that is, a 20-megawatt reactor. My fairly long exposure to the engineers of Technicatome, Siemens and Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd leads me to the view that the INVAP choice, though possibly a good choice, was a risky one. When considered against the backdrop of the Collins submarine project, where we again chose to forsake experienced vendors in favour of the new boy on the block, I might even suggest that the decision was courageous.”

Another pro-nuclear Trojan horse to make a submission to the Senate inquiry was Dr Robert Turtle, a fellow of the Institution of Engineers Australia and a member of the Australian Nuclear Association. Turtle said he “strongly supports” the construction of a new reactor but he objects to the selection of Invap for the following reasons:

– “The Australian Contract is believed to be the largest contract undertaken by Invap. This violates financial and management criteria of prudential and sustainable development.”

– “It is not considered sound financial or management practice for an Organisation to undertake work greater than say 25-30% of its normal annual turnover. It is additionally imprudent to advance the scale and scope of work by large increments. Invap appears to be violating both these areas. … Such companies are poorly placed to meet contingencies which arise, largely because of their lack of experience.”

– it has proved difficult or impossible to obtain Invap’s financial reports and accounts even though it is a government-owned agency.

Siemens, the German company which competed for the reactor project but lost, said in its Senate submission that Invap was the least experienced of the four short-listed tenderers. Siemens said the Australian government had allocated too little funding and that only a “highly subsidised” offer could comply with all performance and safety specifications and still come in on-budget.

Technicatome, the losing French tenderer for the reactor project, said in its written Senate submission:

– that ANSTO’s assessment of tenders was “mainly based on scientific calculations, and not on proven experience as asked by the tender documentation”;

– that ANSTO’s approach of having separate assessors working on different aspects of the assessment may have led to insufficient consideration of “the overall consistency of the concept proposed for the reactor, where the overall optimum is not the sum of each local optimum”;

– that ANSTO’s separate assessment of fuel and reactor issues was surprising “considering the strong dependence of both matters when designing a high performance reactor”; and

– that the reliance on theoretical assessment of performance parameters overlooks the “many technological reasons to decrease the neutron flux transmission at the point of use compared to the theoretical levels”.

Technicatome said, “We were surprised that the tender process … led to the selection of the competitor which is generally considered to be the least experienced. For example, as far as we know none of the reactors built so far by the winning competitor have … cold or hot sources or neutron guide hall installed, silicide fuel or containment.”

At a Senate inquiry hearing in Canberra on October 9, ANSTO admitted that it had not even visited Invap’s head office in Argentina. The May 16 Bulletin summarised a leaked report from a bureaucrat in Minchin’s department which describes a working tour of overseas research reactors. The report discusses taxi rides in Indonesia, wine making in Korea, the pyramids and a museum in Egypt, and the usual tourist haunts in France and Canada. As for the research reactors, “I’m obviously at the foot of a very steep learning curve”, the bureaucrat said.

Numerous concerns about the operations of Invap were raised by Dr. Raúl Montenegro, Professor of Evolutionary Biology at the National University of Cordoba, in his written submissions to the inquiry and in his phone link-up with the senators. Montenegro’s concerns span Invap’s experience, safety and performance records, and Invap’s ability to fulfill agreements it made during the reactor contracting process in relation to spent reactor fuel.

So why was Invap chosen? On paper, it probably had the best bid – but there’s a huge question as to whether it can meet performance and safety specifications. Perhaps Invap’s bid is subsidised or underwritten by the Argentinean government, an advantage which other tenderers may not have enjoyed.

Waste

Part of the reasoning for Invap’s selection is likely to relate to promises made about spent fuel. It may be necessary to use silicide fuel in the proposed new reactor until an alternative fuel type is available. Siemens said in its Senate submission, “It has been suggested to [Siemens] at the formal debriefing meeting that the successful tenderer has mitigated the risk to ANSTO should more than approximately two cores be required.”

One of the possibilities for spent fuel from the proposed new reactor is that it would be sent to Argentina for conditioning and then returned to Australia as long-lived intermediate-level waste for indefinite storage. However, Argentina’s constitution precludes the importation of radioactive waste. Invap may (or may not) be able to circumvent the constitution by defining spent fuel as something other than radioactive waste. Montenegro believes the reactor contract between Invap and ANSTO is null and void because of the constitutional breach. Another difficulty is that Argentina may not have the facilities to treat spent fuel.

Secrecy

Montenegro has received four letters from Invap threatening legal action and urging him to stop disseminating comments “injurious” to Invap. Montenegro has drawn this matter to the attention of the Australian Senate inquiry, in the hope that public scrutiny of Invap’s tactics will allow for an open, public debate.

The situation is no better in Australia. Several opponents of the new reactor plan have been threatened with defamation suits. A senior government bureaucrat has publicly gloated about the government’s decision “to starve the opponents of oxygen … just keep them in the dark completely.” Similarly, a Department of Industry, Science and Resources briefing document said there is “no point in consulting with potential/hypothetical recipients of a new reactor.”

ANSTO staff are also feeling the heat. ANSTO “Staff Representing Truth in Science” said in their March 3 letter that “ANSTO management appears to be endeavoring to muzzle staff comments external to the organisation”. Even the president of the Australian Nuclear Association has recently complained about the “culture of secrecy” at ANSTO.

In October, the Sydney Morning Herald was told by ANSTO that it would cost $7099.78 to obtain two pages of information about the tender decision-making process following a freedom of information application. Greenpeace was told by ANSTO that it would have to pay $6,809.25 for 22 pages of information and that almost 1300 pages of relevant information would not be made available at any price.

The federal government claims to have conducted a study on potential siting options around Australia but refuses to release the study. The reactor contract is secret. Spent fuel reprocessing contracts are secret. Calls for an independent public inquiry into the reactor issue – from the Sutherland Shire Council, the 1993 Research Reactor Review, the Senate Economics References Committee, and many other organisations and individuals – have been ignored. The establishment of a “Community Right to Know Charter” has been stone-walled by ANSTO for several years.

Tony Wood told the Senate inquiry, “If I had to sum up my concerns in one sentence, it would be that for the first time in my long association with the AAEC and ANSTO I do not feel comfortable with what the organisation is telling the public and its own staff.” An ANSTO engineer with 25 years experience said in 1997, “(It is an) unfortunate state of affairs that dear old ANSTO, which lives off taxpayer’s money, is feeding us all this propaganda and very little objective information.” On DISR’s handling of the Maralinga “clean-up”, Alan Parkinson says, “A very disturbing feature of the Maralinga project is the lack of openness about what was done. Even those who might be the future custodians of the land have not been kept truthfully informed on the project.”

 


Senate report slams reactor plan

Jim Green

June 2001

A federal senate committee which inquired into the plan for a new nuclear research reactor in the southern Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights has slammed the proposal in a report released on May 23.

The majority report of the committee is a joint production of the Labor Party and the Democrats. The Democrats also wrote a minority report, taking a more critical line on the reactor project than the Labor Party, and a minority report from Liberal and National Party senators restates the government’s support for a new reactor.

On the alleged need for a research reactor in Australia, the committee concluded that “… no conclusive or compelling case has been established to support the proposed new reactor and … the proposed new reactor should not proceed.”

The committee found that “the decision to build a new reactor was taken without a detailed investigation of Australia’s present and future scientific and medical needs”. It was not convinced that logistical difficulties constitute a serious obstacle to the importation of radioisotopes, and also noted the expanding medical and scientific applications of alternative technologies such as cyclotrons.

On the foreign policy agenda driving the Coalition government’s plan for a new reactor, the committee found that “… the justification for the new research reactor solely on national interest grounds is not strong where national interest is defined on purely ‘security’ and non-proliferation grounds.” The committee said the government’s argument that a new reactor is required to facilitate nuclear disarmament and the implementation of nuclear safeguards is “tenuous”.

The committee went on to say, “The argument for the new research reactor on national interest grounds is more convincing when all areas of nuclear technology are considered, including its role in the region as an educational, research and training centre. The Committee believes, however, that this reason alone is not sufficient to justify the new research reactor. If the reactor is to go ahead, then the main considerations in establishing the need for a reactor must be its place as a research tool providing a neutron source for Australian researchers and products for industry, the health care system and the potential impacts on the environment.”

The committee recommended that before the government proceeds any further with the project it should establish an independent public inquiry into the alleged need for a new nuclear reactor and related issues such as funding for both medical and scientific research in Australia. The government rejected that recommendation on the same day the senate report was released.

Secrecy

The senate committee was particularly critical of the Coalition government and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) for their secrecy. It said, “The Committee is highly critical of ANSTO’s attitude which seeks to make a parliamentary committee subordinate to the whims of a government agency and prevents that committee from exercising its responsibility to scrutinise the executive. The Committee therefore appreciates the frustration experienced by the Sutherland Shire Council and members of the public who have experienced a similar attitude.”

The report also states, “The Committee is highly critical of ANSTO’s approach to providing documents. Its attitude seems to stem from a culture of secrecy so embedded that it has lost sight of its responsibility to be accountable to the Parliament.”

Even Liberal and National Party senators conceded that point, accepting “… that ANSTO could have been more helpful in providing certain less commercially sensitive information to the Committee and could have been more willing to seek a compromise when sensitive material was involved.”

The committee recommended that Senator Nick Minchin, the minister for industry, science and resources, should be censured for his refusal to comply with an order of the senate to table various documents relating to project including the reactor contract between ANSTO and the Argentinean company Invap, and the spent fuel reprocessing contract between ANSTO and the French company Cogema.

The committee recommended that the Australian National Audit Office “consider examining the tender and contract documents for the new reactor” with a view to determining whether documents sought by the committee and the senate should be made public; whether the cost estimate for the reactor is accurate; and whether, during the tendering process, ANSTO ensured that there was adequate and appropriate independent verification and validation of the tenderers’ claims.

Waste

The committee expressed numerous concerns about the failure of ANSTO and the federal government to put in place plans to manage radioactive wastes arising from the existing HIFAR reactor or the planned new reactor.

Arrangements for spent fuel are particularly tenuous. ANSTO has a contract with the French company Cogema to reprocess spent fuel from the HIFAR reactor, and the contract also has provisions covering spent fuel from a new reactor. However, Cogema’s medium- to long-term future cannot be assured giving mounting political pressure to end reprocessing in Europe.

In March, a French court prohibited the unloading of a shipment of ANSTO’s spent fuel at a French port. While the decision was overturned on appeal, and the spent fuel was transferred to Cogema’s plant at La Hague, further court action is underway. Greenpeace France is awaiting the judgement of a French court as to whether Cogema’s storage of spent fuel from ANSTO is legal under the provisions of the 1991 Waste Management Act which seeks to prevent La Hague being used as a DE FACTO waste storage site. ANSTO and the federal government hope that reprocessing wastes will not be returned to Australia for at least 10-15 years. Regardless of the outcome of the current court case, Cogema does not yet have the licenses required to reprocess spent fuel from ANSTO.

For the new reactor, ANSTO plans to use a uranium-molybdenum fuel type, but this fuel type is still under development. If the reactor project proceeds and the uranium-molybdenum fuel type is not yet available, ANSTO plans to use a uranium-silicide fuel as an interim measure. It is far from certain that Cogema could or would reprocess silicide spent fuel. The ANSTO/Cogema contract specifically precludes reprocessing of silicide spent fuel, although ANSTO claims to have subsequently obtained an in-principle agreement from Cogema to reprocess silicide spent fuel.

A back-up plan for silicide spent fuel – sending it to Argentina for ‘processing’ – is still more tenuous. This would generate a political controversy and, most likely, legal challenges, in Argentina. One basis for a legal challenge would be Argentina’s constitution, which prohibits the importation of radioactive waste – unsurprisingly, ANSTO’s claim that spent fuel is not radioactive waste is not universally accepted.

Moreover, Invap has admitted that there are no facilities to process spent fuel in Argentina despite ANSTO’s statement in October 2000 that “Invap has satisfied ANSTO that they already have the basic facilities and technology that would be required should processing by Invap be needed.” In fact, Invap has no processing facilities, while the Argentinean nuclear agency CNEA only has partly-constructed, partly-operational experimental processing facilities at the Ezeiza Atomic Center.

Because of the uncertainties surrounding spent fuel, the senate committee recommended that ANSTO prepare and fully cost a contingency plan for spent fuel conditioning and disposal within Australia, fully describing the technologies which would be used.

Even if ANSTO is able to send spent fuel overseas for reprocessing (or similar processes called processing or conditioning), the resulting wastes will be returned to Australia and there is no store to receive this material. The government is stalling on this issue, and does not plan to announce a site for a store for long-lived intermediate-level wastes (LLILW), including reprocessing wastes, until late 2002 at the earliest.

In 1998 and 1999, the federal government was attempting to fast-track plans for an underground dump for low-level nuclear waste in South Australia. However, planning for an underground dump for low-level waste has also been stalled, with the government deciding to hand-ball this problem to the next government.

In 1998, the government said it planned to begin construction of the dump in the year 2000. The current timetable is for a draft environmental impact statement to be released in 2002, with construction probably not beginning until the following year. With several polls indicating that 86-93% of South Australians are opposed to the dump, it remains doubtful whether the dump will ever be built.

Labor Party obfuscation

Although the Labor Party endorsed the majority report of the senate committee, it has not committed to stopping the reactor project if it wins the federal election later this year. Nor does the senate report commit the Labor Party to establishing an independent public inquiry into the project if it wins government.

Labor’s public statements on the reactor have been contradictory. Environment spokesperson Nick Bolkus said in a March 16, 2001 media release, “Labor today stepped up its calls on the Government to abandon plans for a new nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights”. In January 2001, Bolkus sent a letter to the People Against a Nuclear Reactor Campaign group in which he says, “A Labor Government will subject the contract to the closest scrutiny with a view to attempting to stop the construction of a new nuclear reactor.” Industry spokesperson Carmen Lawrence said in a January 22, 2001 media release that the “the Federal Opposition repeats its calls on the Government to scrap plans for the construction of a $326 million new reactor at Lucas Heights” and recommended investing instead in “innovative technologies for a cleaner, greener future”.

On the other hand, Labor was embarrassed by a report in the March 28 Sydney Morning Herald which said that Labor’s science spokesperson Martyn Evans had admitted telling the Argentinean ambassador that Labor had “never been in the business of simply cancelling contracts”. In 1999, federal Labor MPs endorsed a report of the federal parliament’s Public Works Committee which concluded that “that a need existed to replace HIFAR with a modern reactor”. In 1998, a letter from then Labor deputy leader Gareth Evans to ANSTO was released in which Evans said that Labor’s stated policy of opposing the construction of a reactor at Lucas Heights (but not necessarily elsewhere) was due to “the realities of politics in an election year, and in particular our need to win [the federal seat of] Hughes”.

Bolkus said in the March 17, 2001 Sydney Morning Herald, “We [a Labor government] will closely scrutinise the contract and the legal commitments and make an economic assessment … but obviously we’ll be looking … to see how to get the Australian people out of it. … If we found we have to pay $200 million in damages [to Invap] or something, it’s a pretty hard decision.” Cancelling the reactor contract would require payment to Invap and its sub-contractors for work already carried out plus penalties for breaking the contract – the total would probably be between $50-70 million if the contract was cancelled early- to mid-2002.

If elected, Labor will also assess the political costs of pursuing or cancelling the reactor project. The next government will also have to deal with the growing stockpile of spent fuel and other radioactive wastes – a problem which will be far more difficult to resolve if a new reactor is built.

The senate report can be downloaded at

http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/lucasheights_ctte

Medical radioisotope supply options for Australia

Jim Green

National nuclear campaigner – Friends of the Earth, Australia

January 2012

jim.green@foe.org.au

Does Australia need a new nuclear reactor to produce medical isotopes? The short answer is ‘no’. A better strategy would be to close the existing HIFAR reactor at Lucas Heights in southern Sydney combined with:

1. Greater reliance on imported radioisotopes;

2. Ongoing use of the existing cyclotrons in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth and others that are likely to be built in Australia;

3. Further research into advanced, non-reactor radioisotope sources such as cyclotrons, with the aim of sharply reducing demand for imported, reactor-produced radioisotopes (so other countries don’t have to deal with the adverse impacts of reactors such as intractable radioactive waste management problems); and

4. Greater use of alternative clinical modalities such as MRI, and Computerised Tomography.

None of these four strategies alone will suffice, but combined, they are more than adequate.

The above strategies are tried and tested. Over 250 cyclotrons are operating around the world. Many countries – including Australia – import isotopes. Alternative clinical modalities are well advanced – in fact they are used far more frequently than nuclear medicine! So there’s no risk involved in closing the existing reactor without replacement.

IMPORTATION

You might hear the argument that radioisotopes with short half-lives cannot be imported. True, but almost all of the short-lived radioisotopes used in nuclear medicine are produced in cyclotrons, not research reactors. With no research reactor in Australia, over 99% of nuclear medicine procedures would be unaffected, using either cyclotron-produced radioisotopes or imported radioisotopes. As for the small number of rarely-used radioisotopes that would not be available, alternative clinical technologies can easily fill this gap.

The Lucas Heights reactor was closed for three months from February-May 2000 and many doctors – including the President of the Association of Physicians in Nuclear Medicine – did not even know about the closure of the reactor! ANSTO staff members wrote to Sutherland Shire Council during the three-month reactor shutdown noting: “ANSTO’s radioisotope production has suffered no dislocation as a result of the shutdown, since bulk supplies of radioisotopes are purchased from the big international players in Canada and South Africa.”

Properly funded research into alternative radioisotope production technologies and alternative clinical technologies will enable reduced reliance on imported reactor-produced radioisotopes. To the extent that there is still a requirement for reactor-produced radioisotopes, the fewer reactors the better.

The major global radioisotope suppliers have the capacity to supply world demand several times over. More than three-quarters of all nuclear medicine procedures carried out around the world use imported radioisotopes. Countries largely reliant on imported radioisotopes include advanced industrial countries such as the United States, Britain, and Japan; in these countries nuclear medicine is widely practised and technically sophisticated despite the heavy reliance on imported radioisotopes.

CYCLOTRONS

Most nuclear medicine procedures are diagnostic (90-99% depending on the country): radioisotopes are administered to the patient (usually by injection) and as the radioisotopes ‘decay’ they emit radiation which is captured by a camera and used to generate an image. Only a small minority (1-10%) of nuclear medicine procedures are palliative (pain-relieving) or therapeutic.

About 75% of all nuclear medicine procedures use the radioisotope technetium-99m. There are several non-reactor methods of producing this, but none of these techniques is in routine use. ANSTO operates the National Medical Cyclotron but has not used it to pursue this important line of research.

Cyclotrons beyond to a class of machines called particle accelerators – electromagnetic devices that accelerate charged particles to enormous velocities. The particles can then be directed to hit a target and thus produce radioisotopes.

Because they are powered by electricity rather than the uranium fission reaction of a nuclear reactor, cyclotrons have important advantages:

– they generate only a tiny fraction of the waste of research reactors (typically less than 10%, and none of the spent fuel containing fission products and transuranics)

– they pose no risk in relation to nuclear weapons proliferation; and

– cyclotrons are much safer (for comparison, there have been five fatal research reactor accidents according to the International Atomic Energy Agency).

OTHER ALTERNATIVES

The alternative clinical technologies that compete with nuclear medicine include magnetic resonance imaging, X-radiology, computerised tomography and ultrasound. Moreover, the competition is not only between imaging techniques; there are also many chemical and biological alternatives to radioisotopes for in vitro studies and research.

In 2000, the President of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Radiologists told a Senate inquiry that the potential to reduce demand for reactor produced isotopes through greater reliance on cyclotron-produced isotopes is constrained by the current Commonwealth Government policy “specifically barring” the use of cyclotron-based Positron Emission Tomography (PET) as a substitute for conventional nuclear medicine.

Professor Hicks from the Peter MacCallum Cancer Institute said that PET had proved more accurate than any other diagnostic technology in diagnosing tumors, and that it had saved hundreds of lives and thousands of dollars and had the potential to revolutionise cancer treatment. (Sydney Morning Herald 12/3/01; The Age 28/1/01).

At the moment, there are only two hospitals in Australia with PET facilities. This compares starkly with the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on a new reactor at Lucas Heights.

QUOTABLE QUOTES

Former ANSTO scientist Murray Scott says: “The most publicly appealing rationale for a replacement reactor is the provision of medical radioisotopes. … But of all the programs associated with the replacement reactor this operation also carries the greatest risk, the greatest potential for massive contamination release and the most significant future weapons proliferation potential.”

Dr. Geoff Bower, then President of the Association of Physicians in Nuclear Medicine, was asked if it would be a life threatening situation if Australia did not produce medical isotopes locally on ABC radio in late 1998. ABC-JJJ radio. “Probably not life threatening. I think that’s over-dramatising it and that’s what people have done to win an argument. I resist that.”

Professor Barry Allen, former chief research scientist at ANSTO, says, “It’s reported that if we don’t have the reactor people will die because they won’t be getting their nuclear medicine radioisotopes. I think that’s rather unlikely. Most of the isotopes can be imported into Australia. Some are being generated on the cyclotron. But on the other hand a lot of people are dying of cancer and we’re trying to develop new cancer therapies which use radioisotopes which emit alpha particles which you cannot get from reactors. And if it comes down to cost-benefit, I think a lot more people will be saved if we can proceed with targeted alpha cancer therapy than being stuck with the reactor when we could in fact have imported those isotopes. … The question is really what the taxpayer of Australia wants. Do they want new therapies or do they want the reactor to be the centre of all research?”

MORE INFORMATION:


Australian Labor Party position

4/11/01 Joint Media Release by:
Martyn Evans (Shadow Minister for Science and Resources)
Jenny Macklin (Shadow Minister for Health)
Nick Bolkus (Shadow Minister for the Environment).

Howard Wrong on Medical Isotopes

Australia will have a secure supply of medical isotopes for cancer treatment, medical research and other applications under Labor’s policy of not building a nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights.

John Howard is living in the past – the Lucas Heights reactor is not significant to Australia’s security and it is not the only source of medical isotopes.
The principle isotope from the Lucas Heights reactor used in medical treatment is Molybdenum. This is in turn used to produce Technetium on site at hospitals. Bulk supplies of Molybdenum can be readily imported and made up into ‘Technetium generators’ in Australia.

Other countries, including the United States and Japan do not produce their own medical Molybdenum. In fact, the great bulk of this material is currently produced in Canada and shipped around the world.

Australia already imports this material on a regular basis when the existing reactor is shut down for up to three months every year for maintenance.

The Senate Inquiry into Lucas Heights examined this issue in detail and was not convinced that logistical difficulties constitute a serious obstacle to the successful importation of radioisotopes.

In addition, other nuclear materials are already produced in Australia using the National Medical Cyclotron. The future direction of nuclear medicine lies with cyclotron produced products and accelerators.

Labor remains unconvinced of the arguments for the need for a new reactor and believes it is completely inappropriate for a reactor in suburban Sydney at Lucas Heights.

The Howard Government has committed more than $300 million for the new Argentinian designed reactor. This is not the best investment of that money. It is the wrong way forward for Australian nuclear science.

Labor supports the continuation of the other activities at Lucas Heights campus as a centre for medical, environmental, industrial and scientific applications on nuclear technologies under ANSTO.

A Non-Reactor Future for Lucas Heights

Jim Green
National nuclear campaigner – Friends of the Earth, Australia
jim.green@foe.org.au
This paper was written in 2003.

1. Summary
* most of the work at ANSTO’s Lucas Heights facility does not depend on the operation of a reactor.
* a good case can be made for greater investment in non-reactor technologies/programs at Lucas Heights.
* pursuit of a non-reactor future for ANSTO offers several advantages, including a large reduction in the generation of radioactive waste.

2. Most of ANSTO’s activities do not depend on the reactor:
* Prof. Geoffrey Wilson analysed ANSTO’s program expenditure and found that in 1991-92, reactor-dependent research cost $8.35 million (31%), reactor-independent research cost $18.45 million (69%). (Research Reactor Review, 1993, Appendix 1, pp.31-32, 41-43.)
* Drawing on ANSTO’s 1992-93 Program of Research, former ANSTO scientist Murray Scott concluded that the HIFAR and MOATA reactors were used in 8 of 17 projects. In person-years this amounted to 45/215 or 21%. The figure fell to 14% when the adjacent CSIRO facilities were included. (Submission to 1993 Research Reactor Review.)

3. Advantages of a non-reactor future at Lucas Heights:

A good case could be made for further investment in non-reactor technologies if HIFAR is permanently shut down without replacement. These alternatives include particle accelerators (linear accelerators and cyclotrons), possibly spallation technology, safeguards projects using particle accelerators, etc etc. This would open up a win-win scenario:
* few if any job losses (possibly more jobs)
* broadly equivalent (perhaps greater) benefits for medicine and science
* advantages in relation to ‘national interest’ / non-proliferation objectives
* a large reduction in radioactive waste generation (and no more generation of spent nuclear reactor fuel)
* less contentious management of existing waste stockpiles in the context of a serious attempt to minimise waste production by the closure and non-replacement of HIFAR
* public support for ANSTO instead of division and hostility
* public and occupational health and safety advantages (e.g. there have been no fatal cyclotron accidents, but at least five fatal research reactor accidents).

4. Research reactors are yesterday’s technology:

“The future direction of nuclear medicine lies with cyclotron produced products and accelerators. … Labor remains unconvinced of the arguments for the need for a new reactor and believes it is completely inappropriate for a reactor in suburban Sydney at Lucas Heights. … The Howard Government has committed more than $300 million for the new Argentinian designed reactor. This is not the best investment of that money. It is the wrong way forward for Australian nuclear science.” (Joint media release by then Shadow Ministers Martyn Evans, Jenny Macklin, and Nick Bolkus, 4/11/01.)

Over half of all research reactors ever built have been closed and the number in operation continues to decline. For example, according to the IAEA, there were 297 in operation in December 1994 but only 265 in May 1998, i.e. 32 permanent shut-downs in 3.4 years or almost 10 annually. Conversely, the number of cyclotrons in operation continues to increase.

Some multipurpose research reactors are being replaced by reactors, but most are not being replaced or are being replaced by non-reactor technologies. To give a few examples:
* plans for a new research reactor in the USA were scrapped in favour of a spallation source.
* in the USA, plans to resume production of the important medical isotope molybdenum-99 were scrapped in favour of ongoing reliance on imported Mo-99.
* Belgium is planning to replace a research reactor with a spallation source.

5. Jobs at Lucas Heights:

Staff numbers at Lucas Heights peaked at 1354 in 1976. Staffing has fallen to the current level of about 750-800 despite the operation of the HIFAR reactor throughout this period. The new reactor will not ensure job security for ANSTO employees. History suggests that staff cuts and cuts to program funding will partially fund the $300 million new reactor. Staff cuts are all the more likely if/when cost blow-outs associated with the new reactor project begin to bite.

6. Alternatives to a domestic reactor for medical isotope supply:

Ongoing reliance on existing cyclotrons in Australia, plus a greater reliance on imports, is a perfectly viable alternative to a domestic reactor. This option is tried and tested whenever the HIFAR reactor is shut down for extended periods for maintenance.

The only problem with greater reliance on imported reactor-produced isotopes is that it leaves other countries to address the waste legacy. Therefore, a R&D program should be initiated to reduce reliance on imports in favour of non-reactor technologies, esp. particle accelerators including cyclotrons. Important in this regard is a paper by nuclear physicist Dr. Robert Budnitz, and energy and technology consultant Dr. Gregory Morris (the report is at: <www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/medicine5.html>). The report argues that “importation of radioisotopes and more extensive use of accelerators for isotope production represent a viable alternative to the building of a new reactor in Australia.” The report argues that this approach would have several benefits when compared with the plan for a new reactor, including reduced generation of radioactive waste, possible cost benefits, similar or better employment prospects, and better intellectual property opportunities (arising from the development of accelerator/cyclotron technology).

Specifically, the Budnitz/Morris report argues that Australia ought to pursue a R&D project into accelerator/cyclotron production of technetium-99m (the most commonly used medical isotope): “Development of accelerator based production of Tc-99m would probably require a one-to-two year effort involving several person-years of work, and a few million dollars of investment. The pay-off would be that Australia would develop and possess valuable expertise in a nearly radioactive waste and proliferation free route to the production of the world’s medically most important radioisotope.”

Serious pursuit of a R&D program along the lines suggested by Budnitz and Morris would probably require investment of a medium-sized research cyclotron, and a good case could be made for locating it at Lucas Heights given the concentration of Australia’s nuclear expertise there. The only other cyclotron of potential value for this R&D program is the National Medical Cyclotron in Sydney, but the NMC is already overstretched with its existing isotope-production role.

Closure and non-replacement of the HIFAR reactor might also free up resources – and generate political momentum – for the more rapid spread of small PET cyclotrons (costing a few million dollars each) for the production of short-lived isotopes for use in Positron Emission Tomography (the cutting-edge of nuclear medicine). Currently there are two PET cyclotrons in Melbourne and one is being built in Perth.

More information on medical isotope production and supply options:

* https://nuclear.foe.org.au/ansto/

* Medical Association for the Prevention of War, 2004, “A New Clear Direction: Securing Nuclear Medicine for the Next Generation”, www.mapw.org.au/download/new-clear-direction

* Papers at: http://web.archive.org/web/20071130183244rn_1/www.geocities.com/jimgreen3

7. Alternatives to a domestic reactor for scientific research:

HIFAR’s contribution to scientific research has been modest, at best. See the comments by Professor Barry Allen (former Chief Research Scientist at ANSTO), former ANSTO scientist Murray Scott, Professor Ian Lowe, the 1993 Research Reactor Review and others at <www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/science2.html>.

Even a more powerful, new reactor will be well down the global list (e.g. comparing neutron flux) and simply won’t be capable of ‘world class’ research despite the government’s claims to the contrary.

There is little scientific support for a new reactor beyond the small number of scientists with a direct interest in neutron beam research. There would be still less scientific support if not for the government’s highly-questionable insistence that science funding has not been reduced to pay for the reactor. As then Shadow Science Minister Martyn Evans said in 1997, “The money should have been competitively offered and judged against other needs for science.” (‘Search’ science magazine, 1997, Vol.28(10), p.296.)

There are several alternatives to a new reactor for scientific research, including particle accelerators, spallation sources, synchrotron radiation sources, and suitcase science (i.e. funding for Australian scientists to access overseas facilities). In all cases, the alternatives are preferable to a reactor in relation to radioactive waste and safety. Claims that synchrotron, accelerator and spallation facilities complement (but cannot replace) reactors understate the extent to which different facilities can be used for identical or similar applications. Alternatives to a new reactor were not properly evaluated prior to the September 1997 decision to fund a new reactor.

8. Alternatives to a domestic reactor for national interest / foreign policy objectives:

ANSTO is involved in useful environmental sampling safeguards work – but this uses ANSTO’s tandem accelerator, not the reactor. No doubt there is scope to increase ANSTO’s involvement in safeguards work using accelerators and other non-reactor technologies. And of course non-proliferation and disarmament objectives are fundamentally political/diplomatic in nature (e.g. expanded IAEA inspection rights), not technical.

The HIFAR reactor is of little or no direct value in pursuing non-proliferation objectives. It has been used for a video monitoring safeguards project, but of course that project could have easily been carried out elsewhere. Whatever advantages stem from training scientists on a domestic reactor i) are minimal, ii) can be compensated for by overseas training, and iii) are negated by a range of problems which also stem from the operation of a reactor in Australia.

The operation of a reactor compromises Australia’s capacity to pursue non-proliferation / disarmament objectives in several ways:
* For example, it creates a political imperative to downplay the proliferation risks associated with research reactors and associated technologies. Research reactors are used to produce plutonium for the nuclear arsenals of India and Israel, and research reactors have been used in support of covert weapons programs (some systematic, some preliminary) in 20+ countries – see <www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/rrweapons.html>. The government’s argument that building a new reactor will assist with non-proliferation objectives is circular, foolish and may be setting a dangerous new precedent.
* Ongoing generation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) creates a political imperative to downplay the proliferation and safety risks associated with SNF reprocessing. This contradiction is most acute for SNF from HIFAR, which contains highly-enriched uranium (DFAT has said that reprocessing HEU-SNF is “contrary to sound non-proliferation principles”) but also applies to the new reactor.

There is no direct connection between the operation of a reactor and Australia’s place on the Board of Governors of the IAEA. In any case the IAEA position raises numerous problems, not least the active role played by the IAEA in the promotion of dual-use nuclear technologies. The 1993 Research Reactor Review said that there “was no evidence before the Review sustaining the view that permanent membership of the Board of the IAEA is crucial to advancement of Australia’s national interest” and that there might even be advantages in not being so closely identified with some of the IAEA’s stances (p.xix, pp.100-103).

Cancellation of the plan for a new reactor, and pursuit of non-reactor technologies for medicine, science and safeguards work opens up another potential benefit: Australian promotion of non-reactor technologies in the Asia Pacific region. The development and promotion of non-reactor technologies would represent a useful, if modest, non-proliferation initiative.

ANSTO’s Lucas Heights nuclear research reactor

ANSTO’s never-ending accidents, lies, misleading Parliament, cover-ups, bullying and intimidating staff, etc.

A Non-Reactor Future for Lucas Heights

Jean McSorley’s 1998 analysis of the foreign policy or ‘national interest’ agenda behind the new reactor at Lucas Heights. See also this article by Jean McSorley, an article by Jim Green, and a 1998 ABC radio documentary which discussed the ‘national interest’ agenda.

Lucas Heights and nuclear weapons

A new reactor for ‘world class’ scientific research?

Articles about Lucas Heights (Senate inquiries, Sutherland Shire Council call for a Royal Commission, etc.)

Articles about Lucas Heights – accidents, emergency planning, insurance etc

Friends of the Earth 2005 submission to ARPANSA re OPAL reactor operating licence application

ANSTO / ARPANSA whistleblower saga – 2007–ongoing

MEDICAL ISOTOPES

Medical radioisotope supply options for Australia

Reactor and Non-reactor Production of Molybdenum-99/Technetium-99m

Linking nuclear medicine to waste dump proposals: debunking ANSTO/government lies

Uranium Miners Turning Water Into Liquid Waste

Jim Green
Article published in The Advertiser (SA), July 25 2009

World Water Day on March 22 encouraged widespread reflection on worsening water depletion and pollution problems around the world. As the driest state in the driest continent, South Australia is the canary in the coal mine. But while many South Australians are pulling their weight by reducing water consumption and installing rainwater tanks, some industries are pulling in the opposite direction.

The uranium mining industry is perhaps the most egregious example. The daily extraction of about 35 million litres of Great Artesian Basin water for the Olympic Dam uranium/copper mine has adversely affected a number of precious Mound Springs – unique habitats which support rare and delicate micro flora and fauna, some species of which are unique to a particular Mound Spring.

BHP Billiton pays nothing for its massive water take for the Olympic Dam mine despite recording a $17.7 billion profit in 2007-08. That arrangement is enshrined in the Roxby Downs Indenture Act 1982 – as anachronistic a piece of legislation as you’re ever likely to see.

In February 2007, then Prime Minister John Howard wrote to state Premiers seeking their agreement “to establish proper entitlements, metering, pricing and reporting arrangements for water extracted from the Great Artesian Basin.” Asked whether his proposed new arrangements would apply to Olympic Dam, Mr Howard said: “Everybody’s got to make a contribution to solving this problem.” But within days, he voiced support for BHP Billiton’s “right” to free water from the Artesian Basin. In other words, everyone except BHP Billiton has to make a contribution to solving this problem.

As The Advertiser noted in a November 2005 Editorial, it is “essential … to safeguard the artesian basin water supplies”. To that end, most users are subject to the Great Artesian Basin Management Plan. But BHP Billiton is a law unto itself – its Olympic Dam mine is not subject to the Management Plan and also enjoys exemptions from the SA Natural Resources Act 2004 and the Environment Protection Act 1993.

Another problem at Olympic Dam concerns the liquid tailings dams which are constantly expanding as water is turned into liquid waste. In 2005 it was revealed that over 100 bird deaths were recorded in a four-day period – the birds had drunk liquid tailings waste from the mine. Ongoing seepage from tailings dams are a further concern. Last Monday (March 23), photos taken by an Olympic Dam mine worker were released clearly showing radioactive tailings liquid leaking from the so-called rock ‘armoury’ of a tailings dam. The leaks were ongoing for at least eight months and probably amounted to several million litres, but were not publicly reported at all. Serious questions must be raised as to BHP Billiton’s capacity to safely manage radioactive tailings if, as planned, tailings production increases seven-fold to 70 million tonnes annually and water consumption increases to over 150 million litres daily (over 100,000 litres every minute).

BHP Billiton proposes continuing with its water take from the Artesian Basin and also building a desalination plant in the Upper Spencer Gulf to provide an additional 120 million litres daily. The proposed desalination plant has raised concerns over its impacts on marine species and fishing industries – in particular from the discharge of brine. The Upper Spencer Gulf is a low flushing fragile marine environment unsuited to siting a desalination plant and BHP Billiton’s preferred site at Port Bonython is the breeding ground of the Charismatic Giant Australian Cuttle Fish.

In-situ leach (ISL) uranium mining is used at the Beverley uranium mine and is the mining method proposed for use at other SA mines including Oban, Beverley Four Mile and Honeymoon. ISL involves pumping acid into an aquifer, dissolving the uranium ore and other heavy metals and pumping the solution back to the surface. After separating the uranium, liquid radioactive waste – containing radioactive particles, heavy metals and acid – is simply dumped in groundwater. From being inert and immobile in the ore body, the radionuclides and heavy metals are now bioavailable and mobile in the aquifer.

Proponents of ISL mining claim that ‘attenuation’ will occur over time – that the groundwater will return to its pre-mining state. However there is considerable scientific uncertainty about the future of ISL-polluted groundwater and uncertainty about the timeframe for attenuation if it does occur. A 2003 Senate References and Legislation Committee report recommended banning the discharge of radioactive liquid mine waste to groundwater. The Rann Government responded by commissioning a study which had all the hallmarks of a whitewash yet still acknowledged that attenuation is “not proven” and could only cite a period of “several years to decades” for it to occur. Yet the companies proposing to use ISL mining at Beverley Four Mile want to absolve themselves of any future responsibility for the site just seven years after they have finished mining. The future of ISL mining is plain to see – short-lived mines leaving South Australians with a lasting legacy of polluted aquifers.

The Australian Nuclear Free Alliance – which brings together Aboriginal custodians with representatives from environmental, medical and public health groups – is calling on the Rann Government to initiate an independent public inquiry into the impacts of uranium mining on SA’s water resources. This inquiry ought to take place in the 12 months leading up to next year’s state election. It would provide political parties with an opportunity to demonstrate their resolve to properly regulate the state’s dwindling water resources and to address the contradiction between corporate water profligacy and the responsible attitude and actions of ordinary South Australians.

Dr Jim Green is Friends of the Earth’s national nuclear campaigner and a member of the Australian Nuclear Free Alliance’s national committee.

Water, uranium and nuclear power – longer paper

Feature: Water & The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor #770, 24 October 2013

http://www.wiseinternational.org/node/4031

Click here to download the full issue (PDF).

Articles (online):


Water, uranium and nuclear power

Jim Green jim.green@foe.org.au

National nuclear campaigner – Friends of the Earth, Australia

  • 1. Introduction and summary
  • 2. Water and nuclear power plants
  • 3. Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants
  • 4. Uranium
  • 4.1 Olympic Dam GAB Grab
  • 4.2 Olympic Dam desalination plant
  • 4.3 Beverley ISL uranium mine
  • 4.4 Ranger mine

1. INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY

A number of problems associated with the nuclear industry are much-discussed – the repeatedly demonstrated link between “peaceful” nuclear programs and weapons proliferation, the nuclear waste legacy, and the small risk of catastrophic accidents.

Less well understood are the various impacts of uranium mines and nuclear facilities on water resources.

Water & Nuclear Power Plants

* Nuclear power plants consume large amounts of water – 20-83% more than coal-fired plants. Water consumption for nuclear reactors is typically 13-24 billion litres per year, or 35-65 million litres per day. Conversely, the water consumption of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency/conservation measures is negligible or zero.

* Water outflows from nuclear plants expel relatively warm water which can have adverse local impacts in bays and gulfs, as can heavy metal and salt pollutants. The warming effect is particularly problematic if exacerbated by heat waves. For example, a number of European reactors had to be taken offline during a heat wave in 2006, and others had to operate at reduced power.

* Water problems in Australia would be exacerbated by nuclear power. Current examples include the problems in Queensland – pumping water to a (coal-fired) power plant because of dwindling local water supplies, the likelihood of increased prices for electricity, and an increased likelihood of blackouts, and increased competition for scarce water resources.

* Another set of problems will arise for coastal nuclear plants as sea levels rise.

Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plants

* The largest commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, in France and the UK, are major sources of radioactive marine pollution.

* Many European countries have for many years been calling for a sharp reduction in radioactive emissions from the reprocessing plants in France and the UK.

Roxby Downs: The GAB Grab

* The daily extraction of 35 million litres of Great Artesian Basin water for the Roxby Downs mine in South Australia has destroyed some of the precious Mound Springs and adversely impacted on others.

* Also controversial is the arrangement whereby BHP Billiton pays nothing for this massive water take.

Roxby Downs: Desalination

* There are concerns about the potential impacts on marine life and fishery operations of a proposed desalination plant in the Spencer Gulf region of South Australia. The plant would produce up to 120 million litres of water daily, most of it for the planned expansion of the Roxby Downs mine.

Beverley In-situ Leach Uranium Mine

* Debates over the the environmental impacts of mining typically revolve around the risk of environmental pollution. There is no such debate with the Beverley uranium mine in South Australia. Mining company Heathgate Resources pollutes the aquifer with heavy metals, acid and radionuclides as a routine aspect of its operations, and is under no obligation to rehabilitate the aquifer.

Ranger Uranium Mine

* An increasing series of spills, leaks, incidents and reporting failures since 2000 have undermined the credibility of both mining company Energy Resources of Australia and the current environmental protection framework and highlighted serious regulatory deficiencies.

* The incidents are part of a litany of operational errors and procedural failures at ERA’s Ranger operation. Whilst some of these are not of great individual impact, others are. Cumulatively they document a pattern of systemic under-performance and non-compliance and highlight the growing credibility gap that exists between ERA’s self promotion and the reality of its performance.

2. WATER & NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Coal-fired electricity plants consume large amounts of water. Tim Flannery (2007) states that for cities such as Sydney, one fifth of the city’s water needs is consumed by electricity generation.

Unfortunately, nuclear power is even more water-intensive than coal.

Water for a nuclear power plant can be sourced from a river, lake, dam, or the ocean. The water has two uses:

  • it is converted to steam to drive a turbine; and
  • cooling water converts the steam back to water.

As Woods (2006) notes, the distinction between water usage and consumption is important. ‘Once through’ power stations use large quantities of water, but most of this water is returned to the source and can be used again. In ‘closed cycle’ systems, the steam is cooled in towers or ponds and the water that is not lost to evaporation is recycled through the plant again. Regardless of the system used, all power stations consume some of the water they use, mostly by evaporation. A closed cycle system uses about 2-3 % of the water volumes used by the once-through system, but the water consumption of the two systems is of a similar order of magnitude.

Woods (2006) concludes a parliamentary research paper by stating that: “Per megawatt existing nuclear power stations use and consume more water than power stations using other fuel sources. Depending on the cooling technology utilised, the water requirements for a nuclear power station can vary between 20 to 83 per cent more than for other power stations.” (See EPRI, 2002 for detailed figures).

Woods (2006) calculates that nuclear power plants consume 13-24 million litres per year per megawatt of electrical output. He bases his calculations on the lower end of the estimates of water consumption, so the true figures can be higher.

A typical nuclear reactor generates 1,000 megawatts, which equates to annual water consumption of 13-24 billion litres, or 35-65 million litres per day.

Water usage (as opposed to consumption) for once-through nuclear power systems can reach one trillion litres per year.

WATER CONSUMPTION OF DIFFERENT ENERGY SOURCES:

(litres per kilowatt-hour of electrical output)

Nuclear 2.3–2.8

Coal 1.9 #

Oil 1.6

Combined Cycle Gas 0.95

Solar PV 0.11

Wind 0.004

Above table compiled from various sources:

  • Paul Gipe, 1995, Wind Energy Comes Of Age, John Wiley & Sons.
  • American Wind Energy Association.
  • Meridian Corp., “Energy System Emissions and Materials Requirements”, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC. 1989, p. 23.
  • Rose (2006)

# A small number of air-cooled coal-fired electricity plants exist but they have a number of disadvantages – higher capital cost, lower efficiency resulting from the higher turbine back pressure, greater greenhouse gas emissions. (Rose, 2006.)

To give an example, operating a 2,400 Watt fan heater for one hour consumes 4.5 litres of water if coal is the energy source and 6 litres if nuclear power is the energy source. That calculation does not account for the water consumption associated with uranium mining.

Tim Flannery (2007) notes that wind, solar, hydro and geothermal power consume little or no water. Likewise, the vast array of energy efficiency/conservation measures which reduce demand for electricity in the first place are highly advantageous in relation to water consumption, a point emphasised by Flannery.

The extraction of water for a nuclear power plant can impact on the water source, through pollution with heavy metals and salts and because the water returned to the water source (in a once-through system) is warmer than the extracted water. These issues are summarised by the US Environmental Protection Agency <www.epa.gov/cleanrgy/nuc.htm>:

“Nuclear power plants use large quantities of water for steam production and for cooling. When nuclear power plants remove water from a lake or river for steam production and cooling, fish and other aquatic life can be affected.

“Water pollutants, such as heavy metals and salts, build up in the water used in the nuclear power plant systems. These water pollutants, as well as the higher temperature of the water discharged from the power plant, can negatively affect water quality and aquatic life.

“Although the nuclear reactor is radioactive, the water discharged from the power plant is not considered radioactive because it never comes in contact with radioactive materials. However, waste generated from uranium mining operations and rainwater runoff can contaminate groundwater and surface water resources with heavy metals and traces of radioactive uranium.”

The Christian Science Monitor reported on the impacts of the mid-2006 heat wave in western Europe on nuclear power plants (Sachs, 2006):

“The extended heat wave in July aggravated drought conditions across much of Europe, lowering water levels in the lakes and rivers that many nuclear plants depend on to cool their reactors. As a result, utility companies in France, Spain, and Germany were forced to take some plants offline and reduce operations at others. Across Western Europe, nuclear plants also had to secure exemptions from regulations in order to discharge overheated water into the environment. Even with an exemption to environmental rules this summer, the French electric company, Electricité de France (EDF), normally an energy exporter, had to buy electricity on European spot market, a way to meet electricity demand.

“Overall, about one-third of all water used in Europe is used for cooling electrical generators, including those powered by both nuclear and fossil fuels. Environmental officials in several European countries, including France and Germany, have warned that water levels in some reservoirs are at historic lows and have not returned to pre-2003 heat wave levels.”

Nuclear power would only exacerbate the problems being experienced in Queensland, as reported in The Australian newspaper:

* “Queenslanders are footing a $300 million bill so water can be pumped to a power generator for just four years before the plant is shut down. And they face hefty power bill increases because of the cost of supplying recycled water to the two main power stations servicing the drought-ravaged southeast of the state – Swanbank and Tarong. The revelations came as the Tarong station announced yesterday a 70 per cent cut in output in response to water restrictions. With anger already rising over the Beattie Government’s intention to pay for its $8 billion water infrastructure plans with water price increases of up to 150 per cent, the 2.5 million residents of southeast Queensland face the prospect of power blackouts and hikes in electricity bills.” (March 15, 2007, <www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21384755-2702,00.html>)

* “Southeast Queensland’s 2.5 million residents are facing power blackouts and level-five water restrictions as the region’s two main power stations are forced to cut production because of the worsening drought. As unions warned of possible job losses in the power sector, the Queensland Water Commission announced yesterday that water supplies for cooling the Tarong and Swanbank stations would be slashed from April 10 as part of the level-five restrictions.” (March 9, 2007, <www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21350071-2702,00.html>.)

Former Queensland Premier Peter Beattie was less than enthusiastic about nuclear power: “At a time when our farming communities are hurting badly, it is a folly for [Prime Minister John] Howard to be entertaining the thought of nuclear power stations in Queensland or anywhere else. Many towns and shires in our state are struggling to get enough drinking water, let alone enough to satisfy the amount a nuclear station would need to guzzle.” (28/10/06)

So we have the problems which have affected nuclear power in Europe:

  • lower water levels in lakes and rivers from which nuclear power plants draw water
  • water warming due to climate change
  • water warming due to a heat wave
  • local water warming from water outflows from nuclear power plants.

And the problems being experienced – or looming – in coal-powered Queensland, which would be exacerbated by nuclear power since it is more water intensive:

  • expensive water pumping to power plants because of dwindling local supplies
  • increased competition for scarce water resources
  • increased prices for water
  • reduced electricity output
  • increased power prices
  • increased probability of blackouts.

The consumption of large volumes of water is not nearly so much of a problem for coastal sites using sea-water – but other problems arise. A US report, ‘Licensed to Kill: How the Nuclear Power Industry Destroys Endangered Marine Wildlife and Ocean Habitat to Save Money’, details the nuclear industry’s destruction of delicate marine ecosystems and large numbers of animals, including endangered species. Most of the damage is done by water inflow pipes, while there are further adverse impacts from the expulsion of warm water. (See the report and video at: <www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensedtokill>.) Another documented problem is ‘cold stunning’ – fish acclimatise to warm water but die when the reactor is taken off-line and warm water is no longer expelled. In New Jersey, local fishermen estimated that 4,000 fish died from cold stunning when a reactor was shut down.

Another concern is the potential impact of rising sea levels on coastal nuclear power plants. Stéphane Lhomme from Sortir du Nucléaire argues: “Nuclear is not saving us from climate change. It’s in trouble because of climate change.” (Quoted in Sachs, 2006.)

References:

EPRI – Electric Power Research Institute, March 2002, Water & Sustainability (Volume 3):U.S. Water Consumption for Power Production—The Next Half Century, Topical Report EPRI, Concord. www.epriweb.com/public/000000000001006786.pdf

Tim Flannery, February 12, 2007, “Saving precious water at the flick of a switch”, www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/saving-precious-water-at-the-flick-of-a-switch/2007/02/11/1171128807960.html

Dr. Ian Rose, ROAM Consulting, paper commissioned by Queensland government, October 26, 2006, www.thepremier.qld.gov.au/library/office/NuclearPowerStation261006.doc

Susan Sachs, August 10, 2006, “Nuclear power’s green promise dulled by rising temps”, Christian Science Monitor, www.csmonitor.com/2006/0810/p04s01-woeu.html

Guy Woods (Department of Parliamentary Services), December 4, 2006, “Water requirements of nuclear power stations”, Research Note no. 12, 2006–07, ISSN 1449-8456. www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2006-07/07rn12.pdf

3. NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING PLANTS

Civil reprocessing plants – which process spent nuclear reactor fuel – release significant quantities of radioactive wastes into the sea and gaseous discharges into the air. Cogema’s reprocessing plant at La Hague in France, and BNFL’s plant at Sellafield in the UK, are the largest sources of radioactive pollution in the European environment (WISE-Paris, 2001). The radioactive contamination from these facilities can be traced through the Irish Sea, the North Sea, along the Norwegian coast into the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, and gives rise to elevated contamination levels in biota. There are increases in the rates of childhood leukaemia and other radiation-linked diseases in the vicinity of both Sellafield and La Hague although the link between the reprocessing plants and these increases is contested.

The OSPAR Commission regulates marine pollution in the North-East Atlantic under the terms of the 1992 OSPAR Convention (<www.ospar.org>). Fifteen European countries are parties to the Convention, as is the European Union. Most of these countries have been calling for a sharp reduction in radioactive emissions from Sellafield and La Hague.

At the Ministerial-level OSPAR meeting in 1998, all parties agreed to progressive and substantial reductions in radioactive discharges to achieve, by the year 2020, close to zero concentrations in the marine environment above historic levels.

At the 2000 OSPAR meeting, a resolution was passed stating that: “The current authorisations for discharges or releases of radioactive substances from nuclear reprocessing facilities shall be reviewed as a matter of priority by their competent national authorities with a view to, inter alia, implementing the non-reprocessing option (for example, dry storage) for spent nuclear fuel management at appropriate facilities.” (OSPAR, 2000.)

The 2000 OSPAR resolution was supported by 12 countries – Denmark, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Norway, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Iceland, and Ireland – but not by France or the UK.

References:

OSPAR, 2000, “OSPAR Decision 2000/1 on Substantial Reductions and Elimination of Discharges, Emissions and Losses of Radioactive Substances, with Special Emphasis on Nuclear Reprocessing”, <www.ospar.org/v_ospar/strategy.asp?v0=5&lang=1>.

WISE-Paris, 2001, “Possible Toxic Effects from the Nuclear Reprocessing Plants at Sellafield and Cap de la Hague”, European Parliament Directorate General for Research, www.wise-paris.org/english/stoa_en.html

4.1 URANIUM – ROXBY DOWNS: THE GAB GRAB

The Great Artesian Basin (GAB) is a vast body of underground water that lies deep under the surface from central to north-eastern Australia.

The GAB supports many Mound Springs – natural up-wellings of water which deposit water-borne minerals that form into mounds. These unique arid land habitats support rare and delicate micro flora and fauna, some species of which are unique to a particular Spring.

South Australia’s Mound Springs have great ecological, scientific, anthropological and economic significance. They are listed as endangered ecological communities under the Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. That followed the 2001 recommendation from the Threatened Species Scientific Committee, which found that ongoing extraction of artesian water is likely to play a continued role in the decline of the Mound Springs and that an intensification of water extraction may cause the extinction of many more Springs.

BHP Billiton extracts 35 million litres of GAB water daily for the Roxby Downs (a.k.a. Olympic Dam) uranium/copper/gold/silver mine. The company is licensed to extract up to 42 million litres daily. The mine is the largest single-site industrial user of ground water in the Southern Hemisphere.

Since GAB water extraction for the Roxby Downs mine began in the 1980s, many Mound Springs have experienced reduced flows and some have ceased flowing altogether.

BHP Billiton (and previous mine owner WMC Resources) sometimes acknowledges the adverse impacts of its GAB grab on Mound Springs, albeit reluctantly. Sometimes BHP/WMC deny it. Sometimes the company obfuscates, claiming for example that no “major” springs are affected. In fact, there is no doubt that water extraction for the mine has ruined some Mound Springs and adversely affected others.

WMC Resources invested in borefield infrastructure on the false assumption that impermeable faults separated their borefields from the Mound Springs.

BHP Billiton does not pay one cent for the water it extracts from the GAB. In February 2007, BHP Billiton announced an $8 billion half-yearly profit – but the company still refuses to pay one cent for its massive GAB grab.

In 1996, the then Liberal SA government said it could not impose charges for WMC Resources’ water extraction because it would breach the Roxby Indenture Act. Whether or not that was true, the government could of course have moved to amend the Indenture Act.

In a disingenuous defence of the company’s failure to pay one cent for GAB water, BHP Billiton says it has funded the construction of infratructure such as pipelines and pumps. So what? That in no way justifies the extraction of water free of charge.

BHP Billiton states that the company saves more water through its pastoral bore-capping program than it uses for the Roxby Downs mine. But the draw-down effects from its water take are localised – and more to the point they are localised in areas which adversely impact on Mound Springs.

BHP/WMC claims that it has an incentive to minimise water usage since it has invested in water extraction and piping infrastructure. The claim is false and illogical. Having invested in the infrastructure, there is no incentive to minimise water extraction from the GAB.

The Prime Minister wrote to state premiers in early 2007 stating: “I seek your agreement … to establish proper entitlements, metering, pricing and reporting arrangements for water extracted from the Great Artesian Basin.” But the Prime Minister later defended BHP Billiton’s “right” to free GAB water.

The SA Government recognises that “the major threat to maintaining habitat diversity is a reduction in Great Artesian Basin pressure resulting in the extinction of Springs and loss of habitat diversity.” Yet the Roxby Downs mine enjoys indefensible legal favours, with the Roxby Indenture Act giving the mine a raft of exemptions from the Natural Resources Act 2004 (including the Water Resources Act 1997), the Environment Protection Act and the Aboriginal Heritage Act.

BHP Billiton was considering increasing its daily water take from the GAB by an additional 120 million litres as part of the proposed mine expansion, but currently its preferred plan is to source the additional water by building a deslination plant near the Spencer Gulf.

With the proposed mine expansion, BHP Billiton would be using 62 Olympic size swimming pools of water each day for its operations (155ML/2.5ML=62), sourced from some combination of GAB water, a desalination plant taking water from the Spencer Gulf, and possibly also Murray River water.

WMC Resources mounted an extensive campaign against the World Heritage nomination of the Lake Eyre Basin in the 1990s. WMC had (and BHP Billiton has) a vested interest in preventing World Heritage nomination because of its profligate use of water from the GAB. In February 1995, Liberal SA Premier Dean Brown wrote to Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating stating that a prerequisite for SA government support for a national nuclear waste dump in SA was that the federal government abandoned the pursuit of World Heritage nomination for the Lake Eyre Basin. (<www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/waste9.html>).

The Mound Springs are of profound cultural significance to the Aboriginal people of the region. The Arabunna people are the traditional custodians of the Lake Eyre South region, where affected Mound Springs are located. In the mid-1990s, WMC Resources used divide-and rule tactics against Indigenous communities in order to secure a water pipeline across Arabunna land to the Roxby Downs mine. This led to violence and one death. WMC Resources could not foresee the violence and the death but it could certainly foresee the divisions and tensions arising from its tactics. Some years later, WMC Resources no longer attempted to defend or justify this disgraceful behaviour. (More information: <www.geocities.com/olympicdam/articles.html>.)

In 1994, WMC admitted that some 5-6 billion litres of waste had leaked from the tailings dams at Roxby Downs and into the groundwater and soil below. The leak had occurred unchecked for at least two years. (More information: <www.sea-us.org.au/roxby/sa-inquiry.html>.)

On March 10, 2006, The Australian newspaper reported on documents obtained under Freedom of Information legislation. The documents, written by scientific consultants to BHP, state that the mine needs urgent improvements in radioactive waste management and monitoring.

 They call on government regulators to “encourage” changes to the tailings management, noting that radioactive slurry was deposited “partially off” a lined area of a storage pond thereby contributing to greater seepage and rising ground water levels.

Another problem with the tailings ponds is bird deaths. The ABC reported in January 2005 that over 100 bird deaths were recorded in one four-day period (<www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1279971.htm>).

Major recommendations:

BHP Billiton should be required to:

  • Close as soon as possible Borefield A, which is immediately within the Mound Spring arc as well as a wind-back rather than an expansion of Borefield B which directly threatens the Hermit Hill spring group.
  • Pay for its water – just as all other Australians are required to pay for water.
  • Relinquish the indefensible legal privileges provided by the Roxby Indenture Act

More information:

* Mudd, G M, 2000, Mound Springs of the Great Artesian Basin in South Australia: A Case Study From Olympic Dam. Environmental Geology, 39 (5), pp 463-476. (Not available online.)

* Mudd, G M, 1998, The Long Term Sustainability of Mound Springs In South Australia: Implications For Olympic Dam. Proc. “Uranium Mining & Hydrogeology II Conference”, Freiberg, Germany, September 15-17 1998, pp 575-584. <http://civil.eng.monash.edu.au/about/staff/muddpersonal/1998-UMH-2-ODam-v-MoundSprings.pdf>.

* More info from Dr Mudd:

http://users.monash.edu.au/~gmudd

http://web.archive.org/web/20091027070000/www.sea-us.org.au/roxby/springsdrying.html

* Daniel Keane, “The sustainability of use of groundwater from the Great Artesian Basin, with particular reference to the south-western edge of the basin and impact on the mound springs”, https://nuclear.foe.org.au/olympic-dam-uranium-copper-mine/

Pictures of the Mound Springs:

Sophie Cook: www.flickr.com/photos/cookielovescake (Radioactive Exposure Tour)

http://web.archive.org/web/20091027070000/www.sea-us.org.au/roxby/springsdrying.html

http://web.archive.org/web/20091027070000/www.sea-us.org.au/roxstop97/index.html

4. 2 – URANIUM – ROXBY DOWNS: DESALINATION

BHP Billiton provides the following information regarding its plans for a desalination plant:

* BHP Billiton and the SA government have signed a Memorandum of Understanding to jointly study the desalination option.

* The Roxby Expansion EIS is investigating: locations for a desalination plant, the intake pipeline, and the discharge outlet; and the potential short and long term impact of brine discharge.

* BHP Billiton says the proposed desalination plant would draw about 320 million litres of seawater per day from the Upper Spencer Gulf via an intake pipeline and, after desalination, about 200 million litres of brine would be piped into the Gulf.

* The brine would have salinity levels of around 65 parts per thousand, compared with 37 parts per thousand for normal seawater.

* BHP Billiton is studying the potential effects of brine on marine species and communities such as cuttlefish, prawns and yellow-tail kingfish.

* The desalination plant would use approximately 30 megawatts of electricity. Options for the supply of this energy include electricity from the state grid and the supply of renewable energy such as solar and wind.

(Seawater Desalination Plant, Information Sheet #4, August 2006, www.olympicdameis.com/downloads/index.htm#guidelines)

A joint media release from the SA government and BHP Billiton on February 17, 2006 states:

* The proposed desalination plant has an estimated cost in excess of $300 million.

* BHP Billiton would establish a 330km pipeline to Roxby Downs.

* The plant would also supply water to the Upper Spencer Gulf and the Eyre Peninsula.

* BHP Billiton says it is likely to need an additional 70-120 million litres of water each day to meet its expansion targets. The proposed desalination plant would produce up to 150 million litres of water daily.

The prawn and sardine fishing industries have expressed concern over the potential impact of the desalination plant on nursery waters in the upper Spencer Gulf. The combined value of the two industries is estimated at $60 million a year, and the sardine industry supplies the blue fin tuna farming industry in Port Lincoln, valued at $220 million a year. The upper Spencer Gulf is a shallow body of water which receives very little rainwater inflow from the surrounding land. In 2006 the SA Environment Department proposed the upper Spencer Gulf attract the highest level of zoning protection as part of a new statewide marine protection system. (Jeremy Roberts, March 12, 2007, ” BHP warned over mine’s desal plant”, The Australian, <www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21364561-2702,00.html>.)

The Australian newspaper, drawing on documents obtained under Freedom of Information legislation, reported that the endangered southern giant petrel and the southern right whale may live in areas affected by the proposed desalination plant. The animals are included in BHP Billiton’s list of flora and fauna potentially affected by the expansion. Southern right whales were recently seen near Port Augusta in the upper Spencer Gulf, The Australian reported in July 2006. The BHP Billiton documents obtained by FoI refer to the Spencer Gulf as “a unique breeding ground” for the cuttlefish which may be affected by the desalination plant. (Michelle Wiese Bockmann, July 10, 2006, “Whale may threaten Olympic Dam”, <www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,19735435-2702,00.html>.)

4.3. URANIUM – BEVERLEY IN-SITU LEACH URANIUM MINE

Since 2001 a fast tracked in-situ leach (ISL) mine, the Beverley uranium mine, has been operating in the northern Flinders Ranges in South Australia. The mine is owned by General Atomics, a US-based company, and managed by its subsidiary, Heathgate Resources.

ISL involves pumping acid into an aquifer. This dissolves the uranium ore and other heavy metals and the solution is then pumped back to the surface. The small amount of uranium is separated at the surface. The liquid radioactive waste – containing radioactive particles, heavy metals and acid – is simply dumped in groundwater. From being inert and immobile in the ore body, the radionuclides and heavy metals are now bioavailable and mobile in the aquifer.

There has never been a commercial acid leach mine in the USA given environmental approval. Experiences with its use in the Eastern Bloc and elsewhere have left aquifers heavily polluted.

Heathgate has no plans to clean up the aquifer as it says the pollution will ‘attenuate’ – that the aquifer will return to its pre-mining state over time. This claim has been queried by the scientific community as being highly speculative with little or no firm science behind it.

According to Dr. Gavin Mudd, a hydrogeologist based at Monash University: “The critical data which could answer scientific questions concerning contaminant mobility in groundwater has never been released by General Atomics. This is especially important since GA no longer maintain the mine is ‘isolated’ from surrounding groundwater, with desires to expand the mine raising legitimate concerns over the groundwater contamination legacy left at Beverley.”

Jillian Marsh, Adnyamathanha Traditional Owner, noted in her submission to 2002-03 Senate References and Legislation Committee that: “The government chose not to demand that the groundwater be rehabilitated, an unacceptable situation for the Australian public at large given our increasing reliance on groundwater and the increasing salinity of land surfaces and water systems.”

(<www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/ecita_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-04/uranium/report/index.htm>)

The 2003 report of the Senate Committee noted “a pattern of under-performance and non-compliance” in Australia’s uranium mining industry, it identified “many gaps in knowledge and found an absence of reliable data on which to measure the extent of contamination or its impact on the environment”, and it concluded that changes were necessary “in order to protect the environment and its inhabitants from serious or irreversible damage”.

On ISL mining, the 2003 Senate report stated:

“The Committee is concerned that the ISL process, which is still in its experimental state and introduced in the face of considerable public opposition, was permitted prior to conclusive evidence being available on its safety and environmental impacts.

“The Committee recommends that, owing to the experimental nature and the level of public opposition, the ISL mining technique should not be permitted until more conclusive evidence can be presented on its safety and environmental impacts.

“Failing that, the Committee recommends that at the very least, mines utilising the ISL technique should be subject to strict regulation, including prohibition of discharge of radioactive liquid mine waste to groundwater, and ongoing, regular independent monitoring to ensure environmental impacts are minimised.”

A sham inquiry was subsequently convened by the SA government to justify ISL mining and to justify the government’s indefensible decision not to require rehabilitation of groundwater.

The 2003 Senate report also noted: “Another serious claim made by the ACF concerns the status and release of Heathgate Resources’ reports on the Beverley FLTs [Field Leach Trials], including the Groundwater Monitoring Summary. The ACF states that release of these reports under the Freedom of Information Act was delayed by company claims of commercial-in-confidence for more than two years. A successful ACF appeal to the South Australian Ombudsman finally secured the release of some of these reports, the Ombudsman finding that in no case was a commercial-in-confidence claim justified.”

Another feature of ISL mining is surface contamination from spills and leaks of radioactive solutions. There have been several dozen spills at Beverley, such as the spill of 62,000 litres of contaminated water in January 2002 after a pipe burst, and the spill of 15,000 litres of contaminated water in May 2002.

——————-

ISL Uranium Mining Method Far From ‘Benign’

By Dr. Gavin Mudd

Hydrogeologist / Environmental Engineer, Monash University

The mining technique of in situ leaching (ISL), often referred to as solution mining, is becoming an increasingly favoured method for the extraction of uranium across the world. This is primarily due to its low capital and operating costs compared to conventional mining. Little is known about the environmental impact of this method, and mining companies have been able to exploit this to promote the method as “environmentally benign”.

The ISL process involves drilling groundwater bores or wells into a uranium deposit, injecting corrosive chemicals to dissolve the uranium within the ore zone, then pumping back the uranium-laden solution.

The method should only be applied to uranium deposits located within a groundwater system or confined aquifer, commonly in palaeochannel deposits (old buried river beds).

Although ISL is presented in simplified diagrams by the nuclear industry, the reality is that geological systems are inherently complex and not easily predictable.

There are a range of options for the chemistry of the mining solutions. Either acidic or alkaline chemical agents can be used in conjunction with an oxidising agent to dissolve the uranium.

Typical oxidising agents include oxygen or hydrogen peroxide, while alkaline agents include ammonia or sodium-bicarbonate or carbon dioxide. The most common acidic chemical used is sulphuric acid, although nitric acid has been tried at select sites and in laboratory tests.

The chemicals can have serious environmental impacts and cause long-term and potentially irreversible changes to groundwater quality.

The use of acidic solutions mobilises high levels of heavy metals, such as cadmium, strontium, lead and chromium. Alkaline solutions tend to mobilise only a few heavy metals such as selenium and molybdenum. The ability to restore the groundwater to its pre-mining quality is, arguably, easier at sites that have used alkaline solution chemistry.

A review of the available literature on ISL mines across the world can easily counter the myths promulgated about ISL uranium mining. Whether one examines the USA, Germany, Russia and former annexed states, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Australia or new ISL projects across Asia, the truth remains the same – the ISL technique merely treats groundwater as a sacrifice zone and the problem remains “out of sight, out of mind”.

ISL uranium mining is not controllable, is inherently unsafe and is unlikely to meet “strict environmental controls”. It is not an environmentally benign method of uranium mining.

The use of sulphuric acid solutions at ISL mines across Eastern Europe, as well as a callous disregard for sensible environmental management, has led to many seriously contaminated sites.

Perhaps the most severe example is Straz pod Ralskem in the Czech Republic, where up to 200 billion litres of groundwater is contaminated. Restoration of the site is expected to take several decades or even centuries. For the USA, solution escapes outside of the ‘controlled mining zone’ and difficult restorations have been documented at ISL sites in Texas and Wyoming – including both acid and alkaline leach sites. Australia has encountered these same difficulties, especially at the controversial Honeymoon deposit in South Australia during pilot studies in the early 1980s and at Manyingee in Western Australia until 1985.

The Honeymoon pilot project used sulphuric acid in conjunction with ferric sulphate as the oxidising agent. The wells and aquifer experienced significant blockages due to the minerals jarosite and gypsum precipitating, lowering the efficiency of the leaching process and leading to increased excursions. The aquifers in the vicinity of Honeymoon are known to be connected to aquifers used by local pastoralists to water stock.

For Australia, water of any quality is precious – and particularly so when the only secure supply of water in a region is from groundwater. With the rise of water treatment technologies such as desalination, water of any quality is a valuable resource – environmentally as well as for possible community and industry use. An acid leach-type ISL project, especially as approved for Beverley and Honeymoon without remediation of polluted groundwater, therefore imposes a major environmental risk and pollution burden on future users of groundwater in these regions. ISL mining is therefore far from sustainable.
Journal articles, conferences papers etc. by Dr. Mudd: http://users.monash.edu.au/~gmudd

4.4 URANIUM – RANGER URANIUM MINE

The impacts of the Ranger uranium mine on the Kakadu wetlands in the Northern Territory are dealt with extensively in: Australian Conservation Foundation, 2005, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee, submission #48 at <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/isr/uranium/subs.htm>.

The following excerpts are copied from the ACF submission:

An increasing series of spills, leaks, incidents and reporting failures since 2000 have undermined the credibility of both mining company Energy Resources of Australia and the current environmental protection framework and highlighted serious regulatory deficiencies.

In April 2000 ERA identified and repaired a leak in a tailings water return pipe located within the Ranger uranium mine Restricted Release Zone (RRZ). Contaminant materials in the RRZ are required to be maintained and managed in this designated area and not be released to the wider Ranger Project Area or the Kakadu environment. Between December 1999 and April 2000 an estimated two million litres of material containing high levels of manganese along with uranium, radium and a suite of other contaminants escaped from this broken pipe and the RRZ. This severe operational failure was compounded by the fact that more than twenty days elapsed before ERA notified the relevant Northern Territory (NT) and Commonwealth authorities of the leak despite the clear reporting requirement contained in section 16 of the Ranger Environmental Requirements …”

Further serious operational problems were exposed at the Ranger with the incorrect stockpile placement of a large volume of low grade uranium ore. 84,500 tonnes of material was placed in the wrong area between the period of January 14 to February 26, 2002. This error resulted in the movement of large volumes of rainfall seepage through the uncompacted stockpile with the subsequent mobilisation of high concentrations of uranium. Although the incorrect dumping of material commenced on January 14 ERA failed to report both this and the resultant increases in uranium contamination in water samples until February 27, 2002. Further, during this period ERA staff provided incorrect information on the stockpile status to an inspection team comprised of Commonwealth and NT supervising authorities.

The deficiencies in infrastructure and corporate culture seen with ERA’s tailings pipeline and stockpile issues were further highlighted with the high profile water contamination and vehicle clearance issues during 2004. Energy Resources of Australia’s Ranger uranium mine in Kakadu was recently found guilty and fined $A150,000 and costs over breaches of the NT Mining Management Act in relation to a contamination incident in March 2004 where around 150 people were exposed to drinking water containing uranium levels 400 times greater than the maximum Australian safety standard. Twenty-eight mineworkers suffered adverse health effects including vomiting and skin irritation as a result of the exposure.

The recent contamination event at Ranger is the latest in over 120 leaks, spills and license breaches since the mine opened in 1981. Aging infrastructure and a deficient safety/management culture at the Ranger mine has seen the frequency and severity of these incidents increase in recent years.

The incidents detailed above are part of a litany of operational errors and procedural failures at ERA’s Ranger operation. Whilst some of these are not of great individual impact, others are. Cumulatively they document a pattern of systemic under-performance and non-compliance and highlight the growing credibility gap that exists between ERA’s self promotion and the reality of its performance.

Water, uranium and nuclear power – short summary

Jim Green

National nuclear campaigner – Friends of the Earth, Australia

jim.green@foe.org.au

2007

A number of problems associated with the nuclear industry are much-discussed – the repeatedly demonstrated link between “peaceful” nuclear programs and weapons proliferation, the nuclear waste legacy, and the small risk of catastrophic accidents.

Less well understood are the various impacts of uranium mines and nuclear facilities on water resources.

Water & Nuclear Power Plants

* Nuclear power plants consume large amounts of water – 20-83% more than coal-fired plants. Water consumption for nuclear reactors is typically 13-24 billion litres per year, or 35-65 million litres per day. Conversely, the water consumption of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency/conservation measures is negligible or zero.

* Water outflows from nuclear plants expel relatively warm water which can have adverse local impacts in bays and gulfs, as can heavy metal and salt pollutants. The warming effect is particularly problematic if exacerbated by heat waves. For example, a number of European reactors had to be taken offline during a heat wave in 2006, and others had to operate at reduced power.

* Water problems in Australia would be exacerbated by nuclear power. Current examples include the problems in Queensland – pumping water to a (coal-fired) power plant because of dwindling local water supplies, the likelihood of increased prices for electricity, and an increased likelihood of blackouts, and increased competition for scarce water resources.

* Another set of problems will arise for coastal nuclear plants as sea levels rise.

Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plants

* The largest commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, in France and the UK, are major sources of radioactive marine pollution.

* Many European countries have for many years been calling for a sharp reduction in radioactive emissions from the reprocessing plants in France and the UK.

Roxby Downs: The GAB Grab

* The daily extraction of 35 million litres of Great Artesian Basin water for the Roxby Downs mine in South Australia has destroyed some of the precious Mound Springs and adversely impacted on others.

* Also controversial is the arrangement whereby BHP Billiton pays nothing for this massive water take.

Roxby Downs: Desalination

* There are concerns about the potential impacts on marine life and fishery operations of a proposed desalination plant in the Spencer Gulf region of South Australia. The plant would produce up to 120 million litres of water daily, most of it for the planned expansion of the Roxby Downs mine.

Beverley In-situ Leach Uranium Mine

* Debates over the the environmental impacts of mining typically revolve around the risk of environmental pollution. There is no such debate with the Beverley uranium mine in South Australia. Mining company Heathgate Resources pollutes the aquifer with heavy metals, acid and radionuclides as a routine aspect of its operations, and is under no obligation to rehabilitate the aquifer.

Ranger Uranium Mine
* An increasing series of spills, leaks, incidents and reporting failures since 2000 have undermined the credibility of both mining company Energy Resources of Australia and the current environmental protection framework and highlighted serious regulatory deficiencies.

* The incidents are part of a litany of operational errors and procedural failures at ERA’s Ranger operation. Whilst some of these are not of great individual impact, others are. Cumulatively they document a pattern of systemic under-performance and non-compliance and highlight the growing credibility gap that exists between ERA’s self promotion and the reality of its performance.

Water consumption and pollution – uranium and nuclear power

Feature: Water & The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor #770, 24 October 2013

http://www.wiseinternational.org/node/4031

Click here to download the full issue (PDF).

Articles (online):


Older Information

Impacts of Nuclear Power and Uranium Mining on Water Resources – short summary

Impacts of Nuclear Power and Uranium Mining on Water Resources – longer paper

Uranium Miners Turning Water Into Liquid Waste (article published in The Advertiser, July 25 2009)

Dr Ian Rose (Roam Consulting), 2006, Nuclear Power Station (PDF)

Guy Woods, Department of Parliamentary Services, 2006, ‘Water requirements of nuclear power stations’ (PDF)

Union of Concerned Scientists – 2007 briefing paper on nuclear power & water consumption (PDF)

Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool, January 2009, ‘Running On Empty: The Electricity-Water Nexus and the U.S. Electric Utility Sector’, Energy Law Journal, Vol.30:11, pp.11-51. (PDF)

Benjamin K. Sovacool and Kelly E. Sovacool, “Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States,” Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 34(2) (Summer, 2009), pp. 333-393. (PDF)

World Economic Forum, ‘Energy Vision Update 2009, Thirsty Energy: Water and Energy in the 21st Century’. (PDF)

US Nuclear Information & Resource Service, ‘Licensed to Kill: How the Nuclear Power Industry Destroys Endangered Marine Wildlife and Ocean Habitat to Save Money’

US NRC whistleblowers warn of nuclear accidents caused by dam failures and effort to suppress disclosure

Dawn Stover, ‘Treading Water’, 22 August 2012, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Human guinea-pigs in the British N-tests in Australia

‘An act of indefensible callousness’

Human guinea-pigs in the British N-tests in Australia

Jim Green, May 2001 jim.green@foe.org.au

The British government has finally admitted that military personnel were used in radiation experiments during the nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga in South Australia in the 1950s.

Confirming statements made repeatedly by veterans over the years, the British Ministry of Defence acknowledged on May 11 that it had used military personnel from Britain, Australia and New Zealand in radiation experiments. A statement released by the British government said that military personnel were “transported to or walked in various uniforms to an area of low-level fallout”.

The admission followed publicity surrounding documents found in the Australian National Archive in February by Sue Rabbitt Roff, a senior research fellow from Scotland’s Dundee University.

An October 12, 1956, document on an “Australian Military Forces – Central Command” letterhead refers to the ‘Buffalo’ series of four atmospheric nuclear tests conducted at Maralinga in September and October, 1956. The document names 70 Australian military personnel and one civilian, plus five New Zealand officers, all listed as exposed to radiation on September 28 or 29.

“As far as can be determined the individual dose for round one was received over a period of two to three hours while the various indoctrinee groups were touring the target response area. … Certain people were exposed to radiation on dates other than 28 and 29 Sep, during clothing trials or for a limited number during a tour of the contaminated area after round two”, the document said. The September 27 weapons test was 15 kilotonnes, about the same magnitude as the Hiroshima weapon.

The Central Command document reveals that at least 26 of the 76 people named as being exposed to radiation from tests in 1956 received a dose greater than the “maximum permissible exposure” of 0.3 roentgens in a week; the highest exposure was 0.66 roentgens in a few hours.

Some men were chosen for ‘clothing trials’ from an “indoctrinee force” of British, Australian and New Zealand military personnel. The men walked, crawled and were driven through a fallout zone three days after a nuclear test at Maralinga. Roff says 24 men were involved in the ‘clothing trials’, whereas Ric Johnstone, national president of the Australian Nuclear Veterans Association (ANVA), said in the May 19 Melbourne Age, “There were a whole lot more than 24 used as guinea pigs, there were men sent into the hot area with and without protective clothing.”

Roff dismisses the British government’s claim that it was testing clothing, not humans, and says that thousands of Commonwealth military personnel not directly involved in the nuclear tests at Maralinga were required to be outdoors to observe the detonations.

“The issue is that they (the British government) have always denied doing these experiments and they have never conducted any medical support or follow-up for the men who were involved in these experiments”, Roff told the BBC.

Roff said the Central Command document contradicts claims by the British government in the European Court of Human Rights in 1997 that no humans were used in experiments in nuclear-weapons trials; a claim which enabled the British government to successfully defeat compensation claims.

“I was in the court in 1997 when the government denied using humans [in] studies of the effects of radiation”, Roff said. “In fact the government said it would be ‘an act of indefensible callousness to have done so'”.

A New Zealand veteran, John (Blackie) Burns, told the May 15 New Zealand Herald that after one of the nuclear tests at Maralinga, “From time to time, trucks would speed past and raise dust to make sure we got a bit of the fallout over the top of us. Then we were taken back and hosed down and put through showers and monitored.”

Ric Johnstone from the ANVA said in a July 2000 statement: “Men were ordered to enter into ground zero (point of explosion) immediately following detonation of atomic bombs. Planes flew into and tracked mushroom clouds over Australia taking air samples and photos. Ships and ground crews washed down equipment and themselves with irradiated water. They drank contaminated water while eating food contaminated by dust from the red sand and soil in which they lived. The men worked and manoeuvred on Plutonium contaminated soil. They were provided with little or no protective clothing and seldom badged while some badges and dosimeters were falsified or not recorded because of high readings. In spite of this long lived dangerous level of radioactivity, the Australian Government expect us to believe that the test participants were exposed to only minimal non-hazardous levels of radiation.”

Retired Australian army major and Maralinga veteran Alan Batchelor said on ABC radio on May 11, “We had to go in and uncover equipment shelters that were located somewhere between 100 and 150 metres away from ground zero. We would do that commencing at about one hour afterwards, without protective clothing”.

Other British radiation experiments

The official British claim that it had never conducted human radiation experiments was undermined in 1996 when documents were released detailing experiments at Aldermaston, Harwell and Porton Down. The experiments involved radioactive substances being inhaled, injected, swallowed or eaten. Systematic efforts were made to keep information about the experiments from the public, and also from the trade unions at Britain’s nuclear laboratories. The government’s code of practice on human radiation experiments showed that people taking part in the experiments were told little about the experiment and its potential risks. Efforts were also made to prevent scientists who might query the need for human subjects from intervening. Government officials worked out an elaborate system for denying liability and damages to anyone harmed in the experiments. (WISE News Communique, #463, December 13, 1996, “British human radiation experiments”.)

Human guinea-pigs were also used in a series of tests near Christmas Island – five British hydrogen bomb tests in 1958 and 27 joint US-British nuclear tests in 1962 (Sue Rabbitt Roff, “The ghost of Christmas past”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1997). Military personnel were lined up on a soccer pitch during tests in 1958 and 1962 to act as guinea-pigs.

During a 1996-97 European Commission of Human Rights hearing on the Christmas Island tests, the British government claimed that “indoctrinees” were required to witness the blasts as part of their “indoctrination”, so that they would not be unduly frightened of nuclear weapons in the event the bombs were ever used on the battlefield. However, this was difficult to reconcile with a 1953 memo issued by the British “Defense Research Policy Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee”. The memo, titled “Atomic Weapons Trials” and marked “Top Secret”, stated, “The army must discover the detailed effects of various types of explosions on equipment, stores and men with and without various types of protection.”

British governments have relied on dubious studies by the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) to claim that military personnel were not effected by the weapons tests. Both the US Advisory Committee of Human Radiation Experiments and the European Commission of Human Rights have criticised the NRPB for its research methodology and for drawing conclusions from data that they did not analyse. The European Commission of Human Rights wondered in a 1997 report why the British government “entrusted the investigation into its own liability to a government body when other bodies, whose impartiality could not be reasonably questioned, were available to do the work.”

The NRPB announced in 1996 that it was going to erase for ‘financial reasons’ a database containing the medical records of 40,000 veterans, half of whom are believed to have been participants in the nuclear tests. This plan was scrapped following vigorous protests by veterans.

Tony Blair’s New Labor government has followed in the footsteps of the Tories, refusing to settle compensation claims, denying veterans access to their medical records (citing ‘national security’ concerns, as the Tories did) and backing the NRPB ‘studies’. Ken McGinley, chair of the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, said, “This is not a Conservative government cover-up, but a joint cover-up by the respective governments since the 1960s. There’s embarrassment that we have unintentionally rewritten the history of the British nuclear test program.”

Australian governments’ complicity

McGinley’s comments apply just as well to successive Australian governments. Buck-passing between British and Australian governments has been a familiar ploy. Another ploy has been to stall for time in the expectation that the political controversy will fade away as veterans die. A large majority of people involved in weapons tests in Australia have already died.

Bruce Scott, Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, responded to the release of Roff’s research by saying that his office has contacted Roff in Scotland to ask her to forward the archival documents. But the documents are held in the national archive in Canberra, and Scott has access to further information which is still classified.

In 1999, the federal government announced it would compile a “nominal roll” of veterans, Aborigines and others who may have been exposed to radiation from the Maralinga tests. The roll is expected to be complete in June or July 2001. A cancer incidence study is promised following compilation of the roll.

A bureaucrat from the Veterans’ Affairs department said in a Senate hearing in May 2000 that the cancer incidence study would be complete by the end of 2000 – yet it has not even begun as at May 2001.

Ric Johnstone said in his July 2000 statement: “We are still waiting [for the nominal roll and cancer study] and more nuclear veterans have died, we believe and feel that minister Scott is aware that less than one quarter of the original 8000 are still living and compiling a national register at this late stage will be impossible, it is just another stalling tactic as the Government are now fully aware that time is on their side.”

Scott says that issues raised by Roff in recent weeks will only be pursued if “there is any new material in these documents that hasn’t been raised before in the context of the royal commission”. The Royal Commission into the British weapons tests in Australia did raise the issue of ‘clothing trials’ in its 1985 report, quite possibly basing its findings on the same document uncovered by Roff. The 1985 report said, “Some members of the indoctrinee force were required to undertake further work on day 3 after the detonation, where volunteers were marched through specified areas of levels of radiation to assess the degree of protection afforded by military clothing.”

However, the fact that the royal commission discussed the ‘clothing trials’ is no reason for the Coalition government to ignore the matter. Rather, it adds strength to the victims’ claims for the compensation they are being denied. Johnstone says this issue was “buried” following the royal commission. Scott seems keen to keep it that way.

Johnstone derided the government’s claim that victims are being adequately dealt with under the Military Compensation Scheme: “… the onus of proof is on the claimant and not on the Government as it is under the Veterans Entitlement Act. So go ahead and prove it if you can, knowing full well that since all of the tests were done under maximum secrecy (some aspects of the tests will never be revealed) and that all records are held by the Australian or the British governments it is going to be almost impossible for a claimant to prove the relationship between radiation exposure and illness, disease or death without their help which has been constantly refused.”

Johnstone also addressed the Coalition government’s refusal to provide funding for medical tests to assist in the determination of past radiation exposure on the basis of the specious and circular argument that victims of the nuclear weapons tests are not covered by the Veterans Entitlement Act: “Given the attitude of the Government you might think this would be a great opportunity for them to prove once and for all that nuclear veterans had never been exposed to harmful amounts of radiation, but no they are well aware of the truth and will not assist in supporting a test that will help the survivors prove their case.”


British Atomic Testing

ABC Radio National Science Show

June 2, 2001

Summary: A spate of documents unearthed from official Australian Archives has fuelled a rash of publicity on the effects of British nuclear tests on soliders. Now, a memo has been discovered which has international ramifications and could detonate a minor nuclear blast of its own.

Transcript: Peter Pockley:

Former servicemen from Australia, Britain and New Zealand have been searching over four decades for documents to verify any exposure to harmful radiation during Britain’s tests of 12 atomic bombs in the 1950s on the Monte Bello Islands of Western Australia and at Maralinga in South Australia.

They needed evidence for pursing claims for compensation against the Australian and British governments which have consistently denied that any tests for the effects of radiation were conducted with the troops. The official line has been that those near the blasts received nothing more than harmless doses.

Now the veterans seem to have a treasure trove of documents. As each set has emerged from archives or sheds, the authorities have been forced to acknowledge that there were tests involving hundreds of men. They were called ‘indoctrinees’ or ‘moles’ according to whether they stood in the open or were placed in trenches near the blasts.

They wore normal clothing or wrapped themselves in blankets and were ordered to run and roll through the radioactive dust where the bombs were let off. However, the British Ministry of Defence has asserted that they were only testing clothing and not the soldiers wearing them.

All the documents released recently have come from sources in the military and public service. But the latest one is the first to reveal the concerns of nuclear scientists about safety and that they were overruled.

I have here two pages of secret minutes of a top-level meeting held at the British Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) on the 15th July, 1958 to determine, quote: “radiological safety precautions at Christmas Island”. This 20 mile by 10 mile island in the Pacific was the place to establish Britain had its own hydrogen bomb, following proof of its plutonium bombs at Maralinga.

The meeting was only five weeks before “Operation Grapple Z” began with detonating two plutonium bombs and two hydrogen bombs above Christmas Island. Some hundreds of British troops were to be close to the blasts and the rest within 8 to 10 miles. Fijian and New Zealand personnel were also involved.

Australian support was refused by Prime Minister Bob Menzies. But, Christmas Island is highly relevant to the thousands of Australians who served at the Monte Bello and Maralinga tests as the operation was run by the same Britons.

The minutes record that senior scientists warned the military brass of the ‘medico-legal’ implications of not conducting blood tests on all participants before and after the tests. But the British were in a hurry to secure their independent deterrent before a moratorium was imposed and the officers decided on a short cut.

Air Vice-Marshal J. Grandy, the Commander of Operation Grapple Z said: “It was clearly impossible for over 4,500 service personnel on the island to be given blood counts”. Other officers, including the head of a Royal Air Force Hospital, labelled the proposal as “unsound” and not “of any use whatever”.

However, Dr J. Lynch of AWRE argued that blood counts were integral to medical examinations of all its personnel and that there was a statutory requirement under a new Factories Act for blood tests of all civilians exposed to radiation in the normal course of their duties. “AWRE were concerned about the political repercussions which might ensue of charges of negligence, however unfounded, could be proved. It would prejudice the case if no blood count was taken and a person became ill later”.

In the end, blood counts were recommended only for personnel “employed in the forward area where they might be subject to radiation hazards”. Forty three years on, nobody has been able to trace where the results have been kept.

The document was found by Sue Rabbitt Roff, a medical sociologist at the University of Dundee in Scotland, in the dossier of a veteran whose claim she has been supporting.

Guests on this program:

Dr Peter Pockley

Australian Correspondent, “Nature”


Nuclear guinea pigs lawyer doubts the official fallout

Sydney Morning Herald

May 23, 2001

The lawyer representing Australian troops seeking compensation for nuclear exposure at Maralinga has cast doubt over Government claims that atomic tests did not go ahead.

Documents show Britain planned to move up to 800 troops as close as possible to nuclear explosions in Australia during the 1950s to test the bombs’ impact.

The documents, obtained by a Scottish newspaper, show that the men – 560 of them Australian – were to occupy networks of trenches dug around the sites of four nuclear tests at Maralinga, in the South Australian desert.

The top-secret experiment, codenamed Operation Lighthouse, was called off only when the British, United States and Soviet governments agreed to a moratorium on all nuclear testing in October 1958.

Mr Morris May, the lawyer representing 30 Australian troops seeking compensation, said yesterday that he was sceptical of claims the tests did not go ahead.

“I find that somewhat surprising because everything that has been said has been done in order to test the survival of humans under the circumstances of atomic fallout … has been shown to be true,” he told ABC Radio. “I’m somewhat surprised that they could say that this particular experiment was abandoned.

“I’m somewhat sceptical about it. It may have gone ahead, yes.”

He said he would not be surprised if the government of the day knew what was occurring.

“The Australian government’s role in all the tests – and that has been consistently shown – has been that of suppliers of the troops and not asking any more questions that was absolutely necessary,” Mr May said.


Nuclear test inquiry ordered

By Mark Forbes

The Age

May 23, 2001

The Federal Government will investigate evidence of plans to expose hundreds of troops to the full force of atomic blasts at Maralinga in the 1950s, along with previous allegations of experiments on troops to test protective clothing.

About 50 classified documents detailing the plans, examined by The Age, reveal that Australia advocated placing troops close to the site of atomic blasts to be conducted with the UK at Maralinga, South Australia, in 1958.

The documents state the troops were to be the subject of biomedical experiments to test the impact of the blast on them and their clothing.

The British and Australian governments have previously denied they would propose using troops as guinea pigs.

The blasts were cancelled because of an international agreement placing a temporary halt on nuclear tests.

A spokesman said Veterans Affairs Minister Bruce Scott was seeking an urgent briefing on the documents. They would be likely to be included in investigations already under way into the alleged use of human guinea pigs during the 1950s testing program.

Initial advice suggested the tests were not undertaken, the spokesman said.

The president of the Ex-Atomic Veterans’ Association, Ric Johnstone, called on Mr Scott to provide full medical care to the survivors while further investigations were undertaken so some could “die with dignity”. Both governments were continuing to cover up the facts of the tests, he said.

“They claim this operation never went ahead, but what about the smaller operations? In earlier blasts they were sending out groups of 10 and 20 for tests,” Mr Johnstone said.

The documents revealed extensive plans to use troops in Operation Lighthouse tests, advocated by Australia and with the support of the Defence Department. They said two groups would be used, the “indoctrinees” and the “moles” who would be stationed in trenches near ground zero – the site of the blasts.

“There is no UK objection to the Australian plans to have 564 indoctrinees of whom 385 will be in trenches,” one memo from the secretary of the Defence Department states.

Minutes of the working party running the tests state that biomedical tests were “reaffirmed for inclusion. The purpose is to study the effects of heat and blast on men at rest and wrapped in a blanket designed for use in the tropics”.

The documents were retained by a senior official involved in the program. They were stored in a garden shed until given to a researcher investigating the testing, Ann Munslow-Davies.

Ms Munslow-Davies said she was shocked by the size of the experiments and the “blatant disregard for people involved”. “The troops were to be put in as close to ground zero as possible for no other reason than to be nuked,” she said.


Secret documents detail plan to use servicemen in atomic tests

ABC TV ‘7.30 Report’ Transcript

May 21, 2001

KERRY O’BRIEN: And now to new evidence about an episode in Australian history which has already been under the scrutiny of another royal commission – the testing of Britain’s atomic bomb at Maralinga in South Australia.

Australian and British veterans of the tests have long claimed they were used as guinea pigs, and in the past fortnight, documents have emerged in Britain which give more substance to that claim.

Now, the 7:30 Report has received more secret documents.

They detail an official plan to subject nearly 2,000 servicemen to exposure to atomic blasts.

The object, among other things, was to assess the effectiveness of tropical blankets.

Code-named ‘Operation Lighthouse’, and scheduled for 1959, the plans were never implemented, largely perhaps because the British had by then acquired access to American testing grounds in Nevada. But the intent was chilling.

This report from Geoff Hutchison.

PETER WEBB, MARALINGA VETERAN: They said, “Count down 90 seconds, you’ll turn your back to the tower, “cover your eyes, shut your eyes, cover your hands,” and they count down 10, 9, 8…

Vivid flash and even with your eyes shut and you’re looking through your hands – you can see an x-ray of your hands – heat hit the back of your neck and, you know, blasts went through.

GEOFF HUTCHISON: Peter Webb spent just three months at the Maralinga test site between August and October 1956 witnessing detonations at One Tree Hill and Marcoo, in the frontline of British and Commonwealth experiments to develop a nuclear capability.

What instructions did you have?

What were you there for?

PETER WEBB: I don’t know and I still don’t know.

GEOFF HUTCHISON: And like thousands of Australia’s nuclear veterans, Peter Webb has spent the last 45 years fighting both illness and a conspiracy of secrecy.

What conclusions have you drawn about the experience?

PETER WEBB: I always thought we were put in there as guinea pigs.

SIR ERNEST TITTERTON, ATOMIC WEAPONS TESTS SAFETY COMMISSION, FOUR CORNERS, 1985: The fact of the matter, as I understand it, is that the investigations conducted by the Royal Commission have not produced a single verifiable case of injury to a person – far less a death to any person – in either the white or Aboriginal population of Australia.

GEOFF HUTCHISON: But the conspiracy of secrecy is fast falling apart, documents long hidden now re-emerging.

ANNE MUNSLOW-DAVIES, RESEARCHER NUCLEAR VETERANS ISSUES: They were concealed in a person’s back shed in Perth and for me to find these documents – it had on the title “‘Operation Lighthouse’ – pertaining to Maralinga” was like, “Oh, wow, what have I got here?”

GEOFF HUTCHISON: Anne Munslow-Davies, herself a daughter of a nuclear veteran, has found a staggering new plan for Maralinga which would intensify testing and use more people.

The plan – to expose the equivalent of a whole battalion to a series of atomic blasts.

OPERATION LIGHTHOUSE, SECRET GUARD: ‘Lighthouse’ is being planned on the basis of the first round being fired on the 30 September, 1959, and thereafter up to three more at eight day intervals.

It is not possible at this stage to indicate the yields of the rounds which will be fired.

The purpose is to study the effects of heat and blast on men at rest and wrapped in a blanket designed for use in the tropics.”

DR WAYNE REYNOLDS, HISTORIAN, UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE: The interesting thing, Geoff, about the document is that it’s ‘Secret Guard’.

Guard documents were usually those documents you didn’t show the Americans.

They were very sensitive.

They were for the intimate use of British Commonwealth members and from my reading of these documents, this would lend legitimacy to this as a bona fide British Commonwealth operation.

GEOFF HUTCHISON: Far from being dictated to by their British masters, the Australians clearly wanted to be part of it.

OPERATION LIGHTHOUSE, SECRET GUARD: “The Australian Services are desirous that during the Lighthouse series, an indoctrination force of approximately 1,750 troops take part in an exercise involving construction of a trench system (upwind from ground zero) including command post, troop accommodation and weapon pits and that the system be occupied during the explosion. All participating troops to be blood counted before arrival on site.”

ANNE MUNSLOW-DAVIES: The theory at the time, I assume, was that if we lose a few good men in the process then far be it, if we save the country and they were dispensable.

And that’s what is indictable – the fact they ran these tests, made mistakes, people’s health were affected and they have never come clean with that.

DR WAYNE REYNOLDS: You must also remember that by 1956 Australia has a battalion deployed in Malaya as part of the strategic reserve – the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve – and the documents show that one of the assumptions in the event of a limited war – or, indeed, a global war — would be that tactical nuclear weapons would be used in that theatre – in the jungle.

Now, what these documents are demonstrating is a concern about the effects of a tactical nuclear device on a battalion in a tropical setting.

So, to me, the timing is about right.

GEOFF HUTCHISON: Dr Wayne Reynolds is a senior lecturer in history at Newcastle University who has written extensively about Australia’s link with the atomic bomb.

DR WAYNE REYNOLDS: But the sorts of things you are seeing here, the Americans had been doing in the early 1950s.

GEOFF HUTCHISON: Is this an indication that a good number of men were going to be used as guinea pigs?

DR WAYNE REYNOLDS: I think that’s a very fair assessment.

They’ve already done that.

I think that needs to be stressed.

In 1956, they had already tested a nuclear device with personnel one mile from ground zero.

PETER WEBB: And when you think, they knew what was going to happen and they put troops in there that, in my opinion, should never have been there anyway. …

GEOFF HUTCHISON: ‘Operation Lighthouse’ and the exposure of a battalion to atomic blasts never happened.

The British, having patched up their prickly relations with the Americans, then took their testing program to the Nevada Desert.

But for those who did experience the Maralinga blasts and continue to fight a Department of Veterans Affairs which still refuses to call their service ‘hazardous’ and thus give them the medical benefits they demand, time is running out.

ANNE MUNSLOW-DAVIES: What I would really like to see in those documents is the records from the Maralinga hospital.

To date, they have never been found and no-one knows their whereabouts.

PETER WEBB: But every now and again, when something comes up like this, Peter Webb comes up and says, “Hey! I’m still here, I’m still alive, I’m still breathing’. What are you going to do about it?” I still get the same answer – “Nothing, bugger off and die,” and that’s the sad part.

KERRY O’BRIEN: We should point out that Veterans Affairs Minister Bruce Scott has been out of the country and unavailable for interview.


Maralinga – how much more?

ABC Radio National – The World Today

May 22, 2001

ELEANOR HALL: Well let’s go now to an issue that’s sparked its own royal commission a couple of decades ago but is still causing lots of questions. Following discovery of yet another document exposing planned nuclear testing on Australian troops by the British Government in the 1950s, the question being asked today is how much more is yet to be revealed? The document, unearthed by an anti-nuclear activist, refers to Operation Lighthouse, a plan to place British and Australian troops as close as possible to ground zero. The British Government says the tests didn’t go ahead, but lawyers and veterans are asking can they believe that. The Federal Opposition wants confirmation the British gave information on Operation Lighthouse to an Australian Royal Commission in the 1980s, saying anything else would display contempt for Australia and its service personnel. Leigh Sales reports.

LEIGH SALES: Eight hundred men positioned in trenches as close as possible to a nuclear explosion, having their blood monitored to check the effects of radiation. It was a plan at one time sanctioned by the British Government. Britain says it called off the tests before they started when it, the United States and the Soviet Union, placed a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1958. The Australian Government held a royal commission into British nuclear testing in 1984-85, chaired by former Senator Jim McClelland. Shadow Veterans Affairs Minister, Chris Schacht, speaking from Singapore Airport, says if the Operation Lighthouse document was not in the material provided to the McClelland Royal Commission, it’s a matter of grave concern.

CHRIS SCHACHT: It would indicate that the British Government of the day did not come clean, or was not effective enough in providing that commission with all relevant documents. And if the document is authentic, it means the Australian Government now must demand of the British Government all documents to be made available. And this is a matter, within two weeks time when the Senate Estimates Committee take part with the Veterans and Defence Department, I will be pushing very hard. And if they can’t give satisfactory answers, the Government, that is, in Australia, what it’s doing to clarify this, well then we will certainly be asking for an independent inquiry.

LEIGH SALES: The veterans that I’ve spoken to this morning say that they believe there’s been a cover-up on the part of both the Australian and the British Governments. What would be your response to that?

CHRIS SCHACHT: We’d try to get to the bottom of it, but if it’s now coming out that a British government of the day did not provide the documents, well then I think that is a very, at the least, disappointing response that the British Government has treated Australia and its Service people with contempt.

LEIGH SALES: While Jim McClelland died last year, senior sources involved in the royal commission say they believe they got access to every document they wanted. But at the same time they admit the commission would not have known if there were other documents the British Government, quote, had hidden in a back drawer. Rick Johnstone, the head of the Australian Nuclear Veterans Association, is personally convinced the commission was hoodwinked.

RICK JOHNSTONE: There are documents and various evidence that were never ever put before the Royal Commission because they were first vetted by British public servants who decided they were too sensitive.

LEIGH SALES: So, was that royal commission effective then?

RICK JOHNSTONE: Well, Diamond Jim as he was called, is on record before he died as saying that he felt then that the Hawke Government used him to make it look as if they were doing something. They didn’t take any notice of his recommendations.

LEIGH SALES: Mr Johnstone is asking how much more is yet to come and says he doesn’t trust either the British or Australian Governments.

RICK JOHNSTONE: I don’t particularly believe either the British or the Australian Government on this matter at all because it’s obvious if you go back through past documents and past newspaper reports that both have lied.

LEIGH SALES: What do you think is going to be the extent of these sort of revelations?

RICK JOHNSTONE: I’ve got no idea. Both Governments keep ducking for cover and they control all the documentation and the evidence that people need, and they keep it pretty well covered up. We have living eyewitnesses still, and albeit some of the evidence is anecdotal, there’s enough anecdotal evidence there in eyewitnesses that any court in the world would give the benefit of the doubt to the claimants.

LEIGH SALES: How much longer are those eyewitnesses going to be around for though?

RICK JOHNSTONE: Not long, probably five or six years.

LEIGH SALES: And then what will happen?

RICK JOHNSTONE: And then it will all be swept under and there’ll be nobody worried about it.

ELEANOR HALL: Rick Johnstone is the head of the Australian Nuclear Veterans Association. Leigh Sales with our report.


More Maralinga revelations

ABC Radio National – ‘AM’

May 22, 2001

LINDA MOTTRAM: More secret documents have come to light underscoring Britain’s willingness to use Australian troops as guinea pigs at Maralinga in the 1950s. Unearthed by an anti-nuclear activist, the documents reveal that a series of planned nuclear tests would have placed nearly a battalion of Australian troops as close as possible to ground zero, according to the documents. The troops were spared when the tests were called off, after a temporary moratorium on nuclear testing in 1958. Matt Peacock reports.

MATT PEACOCK: The secret documents unearthed by an Australian anti-nuclear activist in a Perth garden shed reveal detailed planning by the British and Australian armed forces for the code named ‘Operation Lighthouse’. It proposed a series of four nuclear explosions at Maralinga beginning in October 1959 and, despite British denials since that it ever deliberately exposed servicemen to harmful levels of radiation, the documents make it clear that the indoctrinee force was to be placed as close as possible to so-called ground zero where the bombs were to be detonated. Sheila Grey of the British Nuclear Tests Veterans’ Association described the proposed tests as immoral and inhumane when I asked her reaction to the documents.

SHEILA GREY: Absolute disgust and dismay.

MATT PEACOCK: Why is that? I mean you knew that these tests were going on.

SHEILA GREY: Well yes, we knew the tests were going on but, I mean, although we didn’t believe it, the Government kept insisting that safety precautions were being taken; none of our men were put in any danger whatsoever. And we knew that was slightly untrue. But what they planned to do with this ‘Operation Lighthouse’ is just unbelievable. They were going to virtually put our men beneath the bomb blast, just out of scientific curiosity – no thought to what would happen to the men or future generations that they knew would be affected by radiation.

MATT PEACOCK: Sheila Grey says she’s ceased to believe the assurances from the British Ministry of Defence which, whilst it agrees ‘Operation Lighthouse’ was planned, says that it like other tests which did go ahead was not designed to test humans and that the troops would have only been exposed to low levels of radiation.

SHEILA GREY: Every time we turn the corner, we came across another – there’s no other word for it – a lie. They’re just trying to persuade us that everything was safe and we’ve got proof. I have about 500 death certificates in my house at the moment. Two of the same illness; three of the same illness … coincidence. But when you’re talking of 30, 40 even 100, there is no coincidence. The only thing they have in common are they all served at the British nuclear tests.

MATT PEACOCK: Both the Australian and British Governments have maintained there’s no evidence of greater incidence of disease amongst the nuclear test veterans. This is Matt Peacock in London for AM.


Australian Senate – Question without Notice, 22 May 2001

Questioner: Allison, Sen Lyn (Democrats, Victoria)

Responder: Minchin, Sen Nick (Minister for Industry, Science and Resources, Liberal Party, South Aust)

Page: 23633

Veterans: Maralinga

Senator ALLISON – My question is to the Minister representing the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs. Minister, in the light of admissions by the British government in the last few weeks that Australian servicemen were deliberately exposed to ionising radiation at Maralinga in the 1950s, will your government now provide proper pensions and compensation for those veterans and their families?

Senator MINCHIN – I thank Senator Allison for her question. This matter has arisen because of the recent publicity obtained by Ms Rabbitt Roff in relation to certain documents that were released. As I am advised, those documents were available to the 1984-85 McClelland royal commission and were analysed carefully by the commission in its report, and the National Archives made those documents open to the public in March 1986 – in other words, there is nothing really new in all of this. The Department of Veterans’ Affairs has checked its records and, according to the documents, the 25 Australians who received the dangerous dosage were all commissioned officers. Of the 25 the department can confirm, 14 are deceased and 11 are believed to be alive. Of the 17 for whom we have been able to locate any health records, only three have developed a cancer.

If any Australian veteran has suffered from an illness or injury related to service during this nuclear testing program, there are a number of avenues open for compensation under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. Such claims are now administered by the Military Compensation and Rehabilitation Service, under the Department of Veterans’ Affairs on behalf of the Department of Defence. There is also the special administrative scheme administered by the Department of Industry, Science and Resources. That scheme provides compensation to test participants who have developed multiple myeloma or leukaemia other than chronic lymphatic leukaemia. Since 1995, compensation was only provided if the leukaemia had developed within 25 years since participation. There are, of course, common law claims through the courts. The recent revelations do not really change the facts. Our government and the previous government put in place appropriate arrangements to deal with any veterans affected by those tests.

Senator ALLISON – Madam President, I ask a supplementary question. I thank the minister for his answer, but I asked him about the admissions of the British government and not about the revelation of the documents, which I am aware were known at the time of the royal commission. I note the minister’s answer about compensation, but isn’t it the case that the royal commission in the 1980s recommended shifting the onus of proof with regard to compensation and proper compensation not just for veterans but for indigenous people and other civilians and workers in the area? Will you now undertake a study as a matter of urgency into the health effects of exposure on these people and their families at Maralinga, Monte Bello and Emu? Will you also conduct an investigation into the ongoing denial by Australian governments that Australians were not used as guinea pigs?

Senator MINCHIN – These issues are very old. There is nothing new in what has been revealed. These issues have been adequately dealt with over a very long period by both the previous government and ourselves. We believe the compensation arrangements that we have in place are appropriate. Of course, we have enormous sympathy for those affected by this. That is why these arrangements, which we believe are comprehensive and adequate, have been put in place.


Australian Senate – 22 May 2001

Speaker: Senator Lyn Allison (Democrats, Victoria)

Page: 23640

Veterans: Maralinga

Senator ALLISON (Victoria) – I move: That the Senate take note of the answer given by the Minister for Industry, Science and Resources (Senator Minchin) to a question without notice asked by Senator Allison today, relating to veterans and other persons exposed to British nuclear tests in the 1950s.

I must say it was a predictable and shameful response. The minister says that it is all history, that there is no need for the government to consider this matter again, that it has all been dealt with, that there is compensation available for veterans who served in this area and that effectively the book is closed on this issue. There are a couple of points I want to make. Firstly, I understand the budget will announce some measures which will compensate prisoners of war who were in the Second World War. It seems, if there is compensation relating to the Second World War, which is even earlier than Maralinga, that compensation for this is appropriate in this day and age. A couple of weeks ago, we had the German government announce that it would be finalising its compensation package for the Jewish people who were treated so appallingly during the Second World War. So I cannot possibly accept that this is history and that it is a closed book.

The worst point in the minister’s response was that there was no acknowledgment that in the last few weeks the British government has actually admitted that Australian veterans were deliberately exposed to the fallout from these nuclear tests. Just a week or so ago, we had the shameful situation of governments suggesting that the exposure was just to the clothing and that it was not meant to look at the health effects on the men who were testing that protective clothing. We have been fed lies. The veterans have been put through not only terrible exposure but ongoing illnesses which affect their families as well as them. But this government keeps turning its back on that situation, as did the previous government.

I referred in my question to the royal commission. I will just read a couple of the recommendations of that commission. It said:

“16.0.3 Most of the people exposed to ionising radiation at Emu, Maralinga and Monte Bello Islands are thus covered by this Act”

– that is, the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971.

It continues:

“However, it is possible to identify other groups of people who are not so covered. These are people who worked at the test sites during and after the nuclear program and who may have been exposed to ionising radiation and who were not in the above categories of employment. This would include, for example, some day workers at the Kwinana construction company who remained at Maralinga after the explosion at One Tree and people employed in salvage operations. A further group of people includes some who were exposed to the Black Mist following the Totem 1 explosion, and the Milpuddie family.”

“16.0.4 The Royal Commission believes that access to the benefits of the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971, including the shifting of the onus of proof from the claimant to the Commonwealth imposed by sections 30 and 31, should be extended to include civilians not presently covered by the Act who were at the test sites at the relevant times, and to Aborigines and other civilians who were exposed to the Black Mist.”

Back in 1989, Senator McLean, a Democrats senator, raised this at the first official atomic test anniversary at Monte Bello. He pointed out:

(ii) that it is estimated that only 12 nuclear veterans of more than 15 000 people involved in the program will qualify for compensation under the Government’s recently announced provisions;

(iii) that Mr Doug Rickard, a civilian whose case was critical in triggering the McClelland Royal Commission, will not be compensated and that this illustrates the grossly discriminatory nature of the recent compensation provisions, and

(iv) that Mr Ric Johnstone, the first nuclear veteran to fight and win compensation, took 35 years to succeed and will retain, after legal costs and reimbursements, less than $200 000 of the $700 000 awarded to him …

The point the commission was making is that the onus of proof should not be placed on the veterans concerned. There is ample evidence to show that, if you were in this area at the time when those tests were conducted, there is a grave likelihood that you would be affected by them. We have the situation at present where the Department of Veterans’ Affairs is working to translate the information from the electronic version of the late 1980s, when the commission was held (Time expired)

Question resolved in the affirmative.


Over exposure

Sydney Morning Herald

May 27, 2001.

Atomic test survivors say the least they are entitled to is top medical treatment. Craig Skehan reports.

Ann Munslow-Davies this week got a call from a senior official of the National Archives seeking access to boxes of dusty documents which illuminate a dark chapter of Australia’s past.

“I told him I had posted copies on the Internet if he wanted to read them,” she told the Herald.

Munslow-Davies, 36, is a registered nurse and the daughter of a member of the Australian Army who died at the age of 48 following his participation in the British atomic bomb tests in Australia during the ’50s and ’60s. She believes the tests contributed to myriad health problems which drastically shortened her father’s life.

The now yellowing piles of official documents she holds, many of them typed carbon copies, were recovered some years ago from the garden shed in Perth of an atomic test veteran. Munslow-Davies had decided to release them because of a recent spurt of publicity about other documents showing Australian military personnel were used for radiation experiments during the atomic tests.

The documents recovered in Perth detail plans for a series of up to four British test explosions at Maralinga in South Australia during September 1959, in addition to tests conducted since the early ’50s.

However, in late 1958 the United States finally agreed to a longstanding British request to share atomic test data and as a result future testing shifted primarily to the Nevada desert.

An official Australian memo dated July 31, 1958, in reply to correspondence from the then Australian Department of Navy, stated that it had been decided to accept a British “offer to participate” in what was dubbed “Operation Lighthouse”.

It states that 14 Australian naval personnel were to be “above ground” during the first planned 1959 test explosion and of 500 army personnel, 350 would be in a “trench system” with the rest above ground.

Thirty-five members of the air force were to be in the trench system and 15 at ground level.

The briefing stipulated that all the troops were to be “blood tested” before being sent to the test site at Maralinga.

It was “desired” that the Australian personnel be as “close as possible to GZ”, the ground zero point of detonation.

Munslow-Davies, who lives in Maitland, said yesterday that the reference to blood testing of the Australian personnel planned to be used in the 1959 tests was extremely important. It showed that the British scientists in charge wanted to find out how the red and white blood cell counts were affected by varying levels of exposure to radiation.

“They wanted the blood reading for a baseline,” Munslow-Davies said.

“The documents we have refer to those who were going to be put into the trenches as ‘moles’. They were moles who were to be used as guinea pigs.”

Although the 1959 tests were aborted, Munslow-Davies says the modus operandi squared with earlier clothing trials during atomic blasts and cases of servicemen being sent into contaminated areas after first having their blood tested.

This included testimony from ex-servicemen at a 1984-85 royal commission into the 12 major atomic explosions in South Australia and Western Australia in the ’50s as well as some small trials in the ’60s. The servicemen told of being dressed in different types of military clothing and then sent into the test area following blasts at Maralinga.

British researcher Sue Rabbitt Roff, previously involved in studies purporting to show high incidence of cancer and death among test victims, earlier this month cited a National Archives document related to the clothing tests. Roff also referred to earlier accounts of test veterans who said they had been ordered to walk close to the “ground zero”.

The British Government last week finally admitted that Australian military personnel were transported to or walked in various uniforms to an area of “low-level fallout”.

Previously, the British had denied that troops were used as human guinea pigs.

The Federal Government was caught on the hop by the renewed media focus on Australia’s nuclear veterans. Despite cyclical interest over nearly five decades, including the royal commission, only a handful of the estimated 16,000 Australian military personnel and civilians involved have been compensated.

And many suffering serious illness still don’t get the type of health care entitlements extended to people who served in theatres of war.

A spokesman for the Veterans’ Affairs Minister, Bruce Scott, said that while the documents cited by Roff were not new, the associated claims being made by the researcher were being looked into. And he confirmed that an examination would be made of the material brought to light by Munslow-Davies.

“Many of these documents are known to us, but some are new,” he said.

The spokesman said that by the end of next month the Government hoped to have completed a register of the military personnel and civilians who participated in the atomic tests. Their health and mortality data would then be compared with national statistics to determine any variations from the norm.

“It will be a lengthy but accurate process,” he said.

Compilation of the national register began in mid-1999, and the national president of the Australian Ex-services Atomic Survivors Association, Max Kimber, said it had already dragged on for far too long.

He said that with the British Government having made admissions in relation to troops being deliberately exposed to radiation, action should be taken immediately to assist with the health problems of test veterans.

As a teenaged Australian Navy seaman, Kimber participated in atomic tests in the Montebello Islands off Western Australia in the ’50s.

“I was walking around Montebello with a group of scientists and when I came back I was completely radioactive,” he said yesterday.

“They hosed me down with salt water from where the explosion was. There is still a sign on the island stating that people should not stay there for more than one hour.”

He described the study being promoted by Scott as “a joke”.

“A health study 50 years after the event is only going to prove who is alive,” he said. “It is not going to show how people’s health was affected.”

Kimber said the Government should allow atomic test veterans to come under the hazardous service provisions of the Veterans’ Affairs Act, which would provide an entitlement to a health gold card. “It is not the compensation issue really, it is that they should not be denied medical treatment.”

Munslow-Davies said it was clear that more than half those who participated in the Australian atomic tests were already dead and the number increased every year.

“With the government study, if somebody in a car ploughed into a power pole and died, the cause of death would have been put down as ‘car accident’,” she said. “But they could have been riddled with cancer.”

The documents can be found at <http://members.optusnet.com.au/~seanmd/nuke/index.html>


Maralinga guinea pigs demand justice

By Brendan Nicholson

The Age

May 27, 2001

Camped out in the desert at Maralinga in 1957, Lance-Corporal Johnny Hutton* and his mates were a resourceful lot.

Within hours of British scientists exploding their atomic bombs, it was the 19-year-old NCO’s job to head out to near Ground Zero and dig up instruments buried there to monitor the blasts. For that, the army gave them shovels – and steaks for a good feed afterwards.

But it didn’t provide frying pans, so Corporal Hutton and his section just washed the dirt off these shovels and cooked up their steak and eggs on them over a fire.

Most of the time the men wore just shorts and boots, but they were given protective gear to wear when they drove out to the crater to collect the instruments. By the time they’d worn the gear for an hour or so the heat built up inside the suits and the masks fogged up so badly that they couldn’t see what they were doing. “We took them off and breathed in dust and pure radiation,” Mr Hutton said.

The six men in the tiny engineering unit were mostly British national servicemen. They started falling ill with nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea, and when the mystery sickness hit Corporal Hutton he was rushed off to join his men in Maralinga Village Hospital. He spent 10 days there being fed through a tube thrust down his throat. Eventually the vomiting stopped without a cause being found and he was sent back to work. “You couldn’t see radiation, so you didn’t think it could hurt you,” Mr Hutton told The Sunday Age.

When the tests ended, he went on to serve in Malaya. He developed severe stomach pains and doctors eventually discovered massive ulceration in his stomach.

When he checked his army medical records there was no mention in them of his time in Maralinga Hospital. But when he applied to the Department of Veterans Affairs for compensation on the basis of his service in Malaya, he was told that the department believed his illness was caused by the conditions he was exposed to at Maralinga. Because that was not a war zone he was not entitled to veteran benefits.

To support its argument, the department sent him a copy of his clinical notes from Maralinga Village Hospital. “Clearly the records existed then,” Mr Hutton said.

As the campaign for compensation for bomb test veterans mounted in the 1980s, then Senator Gareth Evans, who handled defence matters for the government in the Senate, was asked to comment on test veterans’ claims that medical records had been falsified or lost.

Despite extensive searches, the records of Maralinga Hospital “have yet to be located”, he said.

Nurse Anne Munslow-Davies, a Maralinga test veteran’s daughter, has spent years trying to track down enough information to convince the government that the bomb test veterans should be given the same benefits as war veterans, and to support their claims for compensation in the courts.

She recently discovered, and posted on the Internet, extraordinary details of “Operation Lighthouse”, a British plan to expose nearly 2000 servicemen to the nuclear explosions. Some, referred to in the documents as “moles”, were to shelter in trenches only 3200 metres away from the explosion. This insane plan was abandoned when the test series ended prematurely.

Ms Munslow-Davies said the records from Maralinga Hospital could provide crucial evidence proving that servicemen suffered burns from the nuclear blasts and the symptoms of radiation sickness. Those records vanished years ago and were possibly taken to Britain at the end of the test series. “If that’s the case then you can bet the shredders have been working flat out,” she said.

The latest disclosures follow revelations that Australian troops were used in “clothing trials” to see how much protection various materials gave troops exposed to radiation.

The veterans are fighting an invisible enemy that is steadily killing them off, and officials reluctant to own up to anything that might help them win compensation cases.

*Mr Hutton was born John Woodley and enlisted under that name, but when the stepfather who raised him was dying, he adopted his surname as a gesture to him.


Radiation tests on Aborigines

By Mark Dunn

Herald-Sun (Herald and Weekly Times Limited)

10 July 2002

Radiation experiments were carried out on Aborigines in the 1960s, without proper consent, to test human survival in the desert.

 

Other radiation experiments on indigenous people included tests for cretinism and genetic flaws in Papua New Guinean tribespeople, according to a report by the Australian Radiation Laboratory.

Water laced with radiation was given to an unknown number of Aborigines north of Woomera in 1962 so metabolic studies could monitor their fluid retention in arid conditions.

Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency health director Peter Burns said the level of radioactive isotopes in the experimental drinking water did not pose excessive health risks to the subjects.

The issue was the participants’ lack of informed consent to the experiments, he said.

“It was a different world then,” Mr Burns said.

Australian scientists also used radiation tests on PNG highlanders, detecting a genetic imbalance of isotopes.

This led to the large-scale prevention of goitreism, a severe inflammation of the throat and related deafness and muteness.

The ARL report, written in 1994, refers to radioactive tests to research cretinism and metabolism which were carried out on Central Australian Aborigines and PNG Chimbu tribesmen. Radioisotope tests were conducted on PNG children as young as three months.

Adult Aborigines in an area north of the former Woomera rocket range were proposed as test samples for other experiments.

“It is reasonable to assume that (the Aborigines and PNG tribespeople’s) knowledge and understanding of the implications of the administration of radioisotopes to humans would have been limited,” the ARL report states.

“It has not been made clear … whether any effort was made to obtain some sort of informed consent from the two groups of native people.”