NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND AUSTRALIAN URANIUM EXPORT POLICY

This is the safeguards section from the August 2015 submission to the SA Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission, by Friends of the Earth, Australia; the Australian Conservation Foundation; and the Conservation Council of SA.

The submission is online.

Sections below:

  • Two reasons why safeguards are vital: uranium exports, and Australia’s compromised position regarding nuclear weapons
  • The limitations of safeguards − summary
  • Australia’s uranium export policy / customer countries
  • Provisions in bilateral agreements − enrichment and reprocessing
  • Not all facilities processing AONM are subject to IAEA inspections
  • Australia’s uranium exports are shrouded in secrecy
  • Safeguards and Australia’s uranium exports − proposed uranium sales to India
  • Safeguards and Australia’s uranium exports − uranium sales to Russia
  • The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO)
  • The realpolitik of Australian safeguards policy
  • New reactors types − proliferation-resistant?

Two reasons why safeguards are vital: uranium exports, and Australia’s compromised position regarding nuclear weapons

The issues of safeguards is highly relevant to Australia’s uranium exports.

As mentioned previously (‘Enrichment and proliferation), Australia’s active support for and reliance on (US) nuclear weapons is well-known and Australia is thus regarded as untrustworthy regarding nuclear weapons proliferation. As former IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei noted:

“Why, some ask, should the nuclear-weapon States be trusted, but not others − and who is qualified to make that judgment? Why, others ask, is it okay for some to live under a nuclear threat, but not others, who continue to be protected by a ‘nuclear umbrella’?”[1]

Australia’s historical efforts to lower the lead time for weapons production are well documented. For example, Prime Minister John Gorton undoubtedly had military ambitions for a nuclear power reactor he wanted to have constructed in the late 1960s at Jervis Bay. He later said: “We were interested in this thing because it could provide electricity to everybody and it could, if you decided later on, it could make an atomic bomb.”[2] Since the mid-1980s (when then foreign minister Bill Hayden wanted Australia to develop a “pre-nuclear weapons capability”[3]), there has been very little or no interest in developing weapons or developing the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Thus, for example, Australia was quick to sign an Additional Protocol allowing the IAEA greater safeguards inspection rights.

What might eventuate if problems or uncertainty emerged with the US nuclear alliance? Given the bipartisan support for and reliance on nuclear weapons, it is possible that Australia might take steps towards developing a nuclear weapons capability through with the development of enrichment technology, or reactors and reprocessing, etc. The question of Australia revisiting the option of an Australian nuclear weapons capacity has been raised by several analysts in recent years.[4]

Australian efforts to move towards a weapons capability − either deliberately or as an unavoidable consequence of the pursuit of a civil nuclear program − would encourage other regional countries (e.g Indonesia) to do likewise.

The limitations of safeguards − summary

There are many problems and limitations with the international safeguards system.[5] In articles and speeches during his tenure as IAEA Director General from 1997− 2009, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei said that the Agency’s basic rights of inspection are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system suffers from “vulnerabilities” and “clearly needs reinforcement”, that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted”, and that the safeguards system operates on a “shoestring budget … comparable to that of a local police department”.

Problems with safeguards include:

  1. Chronic under-resourcing.[6] El Baradei told the IAEA Board of Governors in 2009: “I would be misleading world public opinion to create an impression that we are doing what we are supposed to do, when we know that we don’t have the money to do it.”[7] Little has changed since 2009. Meanwhile, the scale of the safeguards challenge is ever-increasing as new facilities are built and materials stockpiles grow.
  2. Issues relating to national sovereignty and commercial confidentiality adversely impact on safeguards.
  3. The inevitability of accounting discrepancies. Nuclear accounting discrepancies are commonplace and inevitable due to the difficulty of precisely measuring nuclear materials. The accounting discrepancies are known as Material Unaccounted For (MUF). There have been incidents of large-scale MUF in Australia’s uranium customer countries such as the UK and Japan.[8]
  4. Incorrect/outdated assumptions about the amount of fissile material required to build a weapon.
  5. The fact that the IAEA has no mandate to prevent the misuse of civil nuclear facilities and materials − at best it can detect misuse/diversion and refer the problem to the UN Security Council. As the IAEA states: “It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion or the setting up of an undeclared or clandestine nuclear programme.”[9] Numerous examples illustrate how difficult and protracted the resolution (or attempted resolution) of such issues can be, e.g. North Korea, Iran, Iraq in the 1970s and again in the early 1990s. Countries that have breached their safeguards obligations can simply withdraw from the NPT and pursue a weapons program, as North Korea has done.
  6. Safeguards are shrouded in secrecy − to give one example, the IAEA used to publish aggregate data on the number of inspections in India, Israel and Pakistan, but even that nearly worthless information is no longer publicly available.
  7. There are precedents for the complete breakdown of nuclear safeguards in the context of political and military conflict − examples include Iraq, Yugoslavia and several African countries.
  8. Currently, IAEA safeguards only begin at the stage of uranium enrichment. Application of IAEA safeguards should be extended to fully apply to mined uranium ores, to refined uranium oxides, to uranium hexafluoride gas, and to uranium conversion facilities, as well as enrichment and subsequent stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Joint Standing Committe on Treaties (JSCT) recommended in 2008 that “the Australian Government lobbies the IAEA and the five declared nuclear weapons states under the NPT to make the safeguarding of all conversion facilities mandatory.”[10] However the Australian Government rejected the recommendation in its 2009 response to the JSCT report.[11]
  9. There is no resolution in sight to some of the most fundamental problems with safeguards such as countries invoking their right to pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and developing a weapons capability as North Korea has done. More generally, responses to suspected non-compliance with safeguards agreements have been highly variable, ranging from inaction to economic sanctions to UN Security Council-mandated decommissioning programmes. Some states prefer to take matters into their own hands: Israel bombed and destroyed a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, the US bombed and destroyed a reactor in Iraq in 1991 and Israel bombed and destroyed a suspected reactor site in Syria in 2007.

In 1982, Mike Rann identified the core problem: “Again and again, it has been demonstrated here and overseas that when problems over safeguards prove difficult, commercial considerations will come first.”[12]

For more information on the limitations of safeguards see:

Medical Association for the Prevention of War and Australian Conservation Foundation, 2006, “An Illusion of Protection: The Unavoidable Limitations of Safeguards”, www.mapw.org.au/download/illusion-protection-acf-mapw-2006

Henry Sokolski (ed.), Feb 2008, “Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom”, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=841

Alan J. Kuperman, David Sokolow, and Edwin S. Lyman, March 18, 2014, ‘Can the IAEA Safeguard Fuel-Cycle Facilities?’, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin (www.NPPP.org), http://blogs.utexas.edu/nppp/files/2014/03/NPPP-working-paper-2-2014-Mar-18.pdf

Looking beyond Iran and North Korea for Safeguarding the Foundations of Nuclear Nonproliferation, former IAEA Safeguards Director Pierre Goldschmidt, Nov 15, 2011, www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1115&tid=4

Building Support for the Agencys Safeguards Mission, Henry Sokolski, Nov 03, 2010, Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre, www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=50&rtid=6

Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre www.npolicy.org and see in particular the section on the non-proliferation regime www.npolicy.org/topics.php?page=0&tid=4

Nuclear Power Joint Fact Finding Dialogue, June 2007, https://www.keystone.org/policy-initiatives-center-for-science-a-public-policy/energy/nuclear-power-joint-fact-finding.html

Value-subtracting: Form vs. substance in Australian uranium safeguard policy, Richard Leaver, Austral Special Report 09-08S, 11 December 2009, Nautilus Institute, http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/leaver-safeguards.pdf

Nuclear Safeguards: some Canadian questions about Australian policy, Richard Leaver, Austral Policy Forum 09-5A, 23 February 2009, http://nautilus.org/apsnet/nuclear-safeguards-some-canadian-questions-about-australian-policy/

The Nuclear Safeguards System: An Illusion of Protection, 2010, www.mapw.org.au/files/downloads/iIlusion_of_protection_full3.5MB.pdf

Australia’s uranium export policy / customer countries

Here brief comment is made about the choice of uranium customer countries. In 1998, the then Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation office (ASNO) said: “One of the features of Australian policy … is very careful selection of our treaty partners. We have concluded bilateral arrangements only with countries whose credentials are impeccable in this area.”[13]

That was not true at the time (e.g. sales to declared nuclear weapons states that pay scant regard to their NPT obligations) and it is certainly not true now.

Recommendation 33: The Royal Commission should recommend that state and federal governments no longer permit uranium sales to:

  • repressive, secretive countries (e.g. China and Russia − albeit the case that sales to Russia have been suspended)
  • nuclear weapons states that are not fulfilling their disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (US, Russia, China, France, UK)
  • countries that have not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (China, USA, India)
  • countries with a history of weapons-related research based on their civil nuclear programs (South Korea and Taiwan).

Provisions in bilateral agreements − enrichment and reprocessing

In addition to IAEA safeguards, countries purchasing Australian uranium must sign a bilateral agreement. However there are no Australian inspections of nuclear materials stockpiles or facilities using Australian Obligated Nuclear Materials (AONM − primarily uranium and its by-products such as plutonium) – Australia is entirely reliant on the inadequate and underfunded inspection system of the IAEA.

The most important provisions in bilateral agreements are for prior Australian consent before Australian nuclear material is transferred to a third party, enriched beyond 20% uranium-235, or reprocessed. However no Australian government has ever refused permission to separate plutonium from spent fuel via reprocessing (and there has never been a request to enrich beyond 20% U-235). Even when reprocessing leads to the stockpiling of plutonium (which can be used directly in nuclear weapons), ongoing or ‘programmatic’ permission has been granted by Australian governments. Hence there are stockpiles of Australian-obligated separated plutonium in Japan and in some European countries.

Japan, a major customer of Australian uranium, has a nuclear ‘threshold’ or ‘breakout’ capability − it could produce nuclear weapons within months of a decision to do so, relying heavily on facilities, materials and expertise from its civil nuclear program. An obvious source of fissile material for a weapons program in Japan would be its stockpile of plutonium − including Australian-obligated plutonium. In April 2002, the then leader of Japan’s Liberal Party, Ichiro Ozawa, said Japan should consider building nuclear weapons to counter China and suggested a source of fissile material: “It would be so easy for us to produce nuclear warheads; we have plutonium at nuclear power plants in Japan, enough to make several thousand such warheads.”

Japan’s plutonium program increases regional tensions and proliferation risks. Diplomatic cables in 1993 and 1994 from US Ambassadors in Tokyo describe Japan’s accumulation of plutonium as “massive” and questioned the rationale for the stockpiling of so much plutonium since it appeared to be economically unjustified.[14] A March 1993 diplomatic cable from US Ambassador Armacost in Tokyo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, obtained under the US Freedom of Information Act, posed these questions: “Can Japan expect that if it embarks on a massive plutonium recycling program that Korea and other nations would not press ahead with reprocessing programs? Would not the perception of Japan’s being awash in plutonium and possessing leading edge rocket technology create anxiety in the region?”[15]

Japan’s plutonium stockpiling and reprocessing plans continue to cause regional concern − for example  China has recently voiced concern.[16] Moreover it continues to complicate efforts to prevent other regional countries (esp. South Korea) from going down the same plutonium/reprocessing path.

Despite this, Australia continues to provide open-ended (‘programmatic’) approval for Japan to separate Australian-obligated plutonium. The government could and should prohibit the stockpiling of Australian-obligated plutonium. At the very least, the government should revert to the previous Australian policy of requiring approval for plutonium separation / reprocessing on a case-by-case basis.

It is frequently claimed that the “strict” or “stringent” conditions placed on AONM encourage a strengthening of non-proliferation measures generally. However, by permitting the stockpiling of plutonium the Australian government is not ‘raising the bar’ but is setting a poor example and encouraging other uranium exporters to adopt or persist with equally irresponsible policies. While the Australian government does not have the authority to prohibit stockpiling, it does have the authority to permit transfers and reprocessing of AONM and could therefore put an end to the stockpiling of Australian-obligated plutonium.

Recommendation 34: The Royal Commission should recommend that state and federal governments prohibit high enrichment of Australian uranium and prohibit the separation and stockpiling of Australian-obligated plutonium.

Not all facilities processing AONM are subject to IAEA inspections

Australia allows the processing of AONM in facilities which are not covered by IAEA safeguards at all. While AONM is meant to be subject to IAEA safeguards from the enrichment stage onwards, ASNO is willing to make exceptions.

For example ASNO has recommended that the Australian government agree to the processing of Australian uranium in unsafeguarded enrichment plants in Russia and the recommendation was readily accepted by the federal government. ASNO states: “Russia does not propose to place these enrichment facilities on its Eligible Facilities List because the facilities were never designed for the application of safeguards and could not be readily adapted for safeguards purposes.”[17]

The enrichment facilities would not require any adaptation whatsoever. Russia simply needs to permit the application of safeguards and the IAEA could then adopt safeguards measures such as inspections, the use of video monitoring etc.

Recommendation 36: The Royal Commission should recommend that state and federal governments prohibit the processing of Australian Obligated Nuclear Materials in facilities beyond the scope of IAEA safeguards.

Australia’s uranium exports are shrouded in secrecy

Nuclear transfers and developments demand the highest level of transparency, however this is often not the case. Some example of unjustified secrecy include the refusal of successive Australian governments to publicly release:

  1. Country-by-country information on the separation and stockpiling of Australian-obligated plutonium.
  2. ‘Administrative Arrangements’ which contain vital information about the safeguards arrangements required by Australia.
  3. Information on nuclear accounting discrepancies (Material Unaccounted For) including the volumes of nuclear materials, the countries involved, and the reasons given to explain these accounting discrepancies. The JSCT recommended that: “Further consideration is given to the justification for secrecy of Material Unaccounted For’.”[18] There is no legitimate justification for the secrecy surrounding MUF. ASNO has done no better than to cite commercial confidentiality.[19] All MUF information, past, present and future, should be reported publicly and this should be done on a country-by-country and facility-by-facility basis. Some other countries (e.g. Japan) release MUF data and thus Australia’s secrecy clearly fails to meet best practice.
  4. The quantities of AONM held in each country are confidential. ASNO states: “The actual quantities of AONM held in each country, and accounted for by that country pursuant to the relevant agreement with Australia, are considered by ASNO’s counterparts to be confidential information.”[20]

Recommendation 37: The Royal Commission should recommend public release of country-by-country information on the separation and stockpiling of Australian-obligated plutonium; all current and future ‘Administrative Arrangements’ pertaining to uranium exports; detailed information on nuclear accounting discrepancies including the volumes of nuclear materials, the countries involved, and the reasons given to explain accounting discrepancies; and the quantities of Australian Obligated Nuclear Materials held in each country.

Safeguards and Australia’s uranium exports − proposed uranium sales to India

The Australian government is in the process of further compromising the safeguards system by pursuing a nuclear cooperation agreement with India that weakens safeguards standards in many respects. The agreement is currently before the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCT). In its current form, the agreement has been strongly opposed by, among others, a former Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (John Carlson), a former Chair of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Ronald Walker), a former Assistant Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Prof. Lawrence Scheinman), and an Australian nuclear arms control expert (Crispin Rovere).[21]

John Carlson, who headed Australia’s safeguards office for 21 years, argues that the agreement with India “represents a serious weakening of Australia’s … safeguards conditions” and that weaknesses in the agreement “mean Australian material could be used in support of India’s nuclear weapon program.”[22]

If the uranium agreement is approved, there will be sustained pressure for Australia to apply equally inadequate standards to other countries. As John Carlson noted in a submission to JSCT: “If the Government does compromise Australia’s safeguards conditions, inevitably this will lead to other agreement partners asking for similar treatment.”[23]

Moreover, other nuclear and uranium exporting countries will follow Australia’s lead and weaken their safeguards requirements. This disturbing and cascading retreat from responsibility would further compromise non-proliferation objectives and mechanisms.

Recommendation 38: The Royal Commission should recommend that state and federal governments do not permit uranium sales to countries that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and are actively expanding their nuclear weapons arsenals (e.g. India).

Safeguards and Australia’s uranium exports − uranium sales to Russia

Submissions to the JSCT India inquiry by John Carlson and some others argued that Australia’s safeguards requirements were robust other than the seriously defective Australia−India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

Those arguments do not stand up to scrutiny, and there is no clearer illustration of profound problems than the Australia−Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.[24] The JSCT rejected[25] the agreement to sell uranium to Russia when it learnt that IAEA safeguards inspections in Russia are nearly non-existent. Among other recommendations the JSCT said it is “essential that actual physical inspection by the IAEA occurs at any Russian sites that may handle” Australian uranium and that uranium exports “should be contingent upon such inspections being carried out.” The major parties in Canberra rejected the recommendation − they were prepared to allow uranium sales to Russia despite being well aware that IAEA safeguards inspections are very nearly non-existent.

ASNO failed to advise the JSCT that safeguards inspections in Russia are very nearly non-existent − until that information was provided to the JSCT by an NGO. In other words, ASNO misled the JSCT and thereby misled Parliament. Further, ASNO’s submission to the JSCT inquiry into uranium sales to Russia said that Australia exports uranium under “strict non-proliferation conditions.” The reality of near-zero safeguards inspections cannot be squared with the claimed of strict conditions.

Likewise, ASNO’s ‘Regulation Impact Statement’ stated: “These agreements establish strict safeguards and control measures to ensure that exported uranium, nuclear equipment, or technology, are used solely for peaceful, non-military purposes.” That claim cannot be squared with the reality of nearly non-existent safeguards inspections in Russia.

Recommendation 39: The Royal Commission should investigate the deficiencies in the process leading to the approval of uranium sales to Russia, including statements made by the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office

The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO)

A 2007 EnergyScience Coalition paper detailed many problems with ASNO. The paper concluded:[26]

“The authors of this paper believe there is a compelling case for major reform of ASNO as a matter of urgency. An alternative course of action would be for the Australian government to establish an independent public inquiry. Such an inquiry should have a broad mandate to review all aspects of ASNO’s structure and function, should be adequately resourced, and should have powers similar to those of a Royal Commission to access witnesses, documents and other evidence.

“Such an inquiry should be carried out independently of ASNO. It should also be carried out independently of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), given that the current relationship between ASNO and DFAT is arguably one of the areas in need of review. DFAT has declined a request to review a paper detailing numerous inaccurate statements made by ASNO (letter to NGOs, 28 May 2007, available on request).

“Such an inquiry should address the competence and performance of ASNO; its scientific and technical expertise; whether its current management, organisation, structure and relationships best serve its mandate; any conflicts of interest; the implications of ASNO’s structural connection to DFAT (whether it has sufficient independence or operates as a ‘captured bureaucracy’); and options for reform including consideration of organisational models in other countries.

Since the 2007 paper was written, ASNO’s performance has become even more problematic, e.g. misleading the JSCT regarding safeguards in Russia, e.g. ASNO’s defence of the indefensible Australia−India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

Recommendation 40: The Royal Commission should recommend an independent public inquiry covering all aspects of the operation of the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office.

The following article summarises some of ASNO’s failings:

Who’s watching the nuclear watchdog?

Richard Broinowski and Tilman Ruff

Online Opinion

10 September 2007

www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=6339

Australia has been poorly served by the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, the Commonwealth agency tasked with preventing nuclear proliferation dangers associated with Australia’s uranium exports. Its failures are so numerous and significant that, along with other members of the EnergyScience Coalition, we have written a comprehensive critique of the Office and call on the federal government to establish an independent public inquiry.

The Safeguards Office makes the absurd claim that Australia only sells uranium to countries with “impeccable” non-proliferation credentials. In fact, Australia has uranium export agreements with nuclear weapon states (all of which are failing to fulfill their disarmament obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty) as well as with states with a history of covert nuclear weapons research based on their “civil” nuclear programs (such as South Korea and Taiwan).

The government also permits – and the Safeguards Office supports – uranium sales to countries (including the United States) which are blocking progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

Now the government proposes allowing uranium sales to India, not even a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is a serious blow to the international non-proliferation regime yet has been met with silence from the Safeguards Office.

Last year’s debate on uranium sales to China showed the Safeguards Office at its worst. In testimony to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, the Office did not know the number of nuclear facilities in China, nor how many or which of these would process uranium and its by-products. Nor did it know how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) selected nuclear facilities for inspection. The Safeguards Office was dismissive of China having the worst record of exports of proliferation-sensitive materials and know-how of any of the nuclear weapon states.

The Safeguards Office routinely misleads us when it asserts that nuclear safeguards “ensure” or “provide assurances” that Australian uranium will not contribute to weapons proliferation. These assurances contrast with the frankness of Dr Mohamed El Baradei, head of the IAEA, who acknowledges that the international safeguards system suffers from “vulnerabilities”, not least because it runs on a “shoe string budget”, and that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted”.

The Safeguards Office claims that all nuclear materials derived from Australia’s uranium exports are “fully accounted for”. That claim is false. There are frequent accounting discrepancies involving Australia’s nuclear exports. What the Safeguards Office means when it says that nuclear material is “fully accounted for” is that it has accepted all the explanations provided by uranium customer countries for accounting discrepancies, however fanciful those explanations may be. Secrecy is another feature of the Safeguards Office – it refuses to provide specific or even aggregate data on nuclear accounting discrepancies.

Perhaps the most misleading of the claims made by the Safeguards Office is its repeated assertion that nuclear power does not present a weapons proliferation risk. In fact, power reactors have been used directly in weapons programs. Some examples include India, which is reserving eight out of 22 power reactors for weapons production; the use of a power reactor in the United States to produce tritium, used to boost the yield of nuclear weapons; and North Korea’s use of an “Experimental Power Reactor” to produce plutonium for weapons.

Nuclear power programs also indirectly facilitate weapons programs by providing a rationale for acquiring proliferative technologies such as research reactors, uranium enrichment plants and reprocessing plants.

The IAEA, the US Department of Energy and other authorities consider almost all plutonium to be weapons-usable, yet the Safeguards Office continues to claim that plutonium derived from power reactors is not suitable for weapons. This is not only wrong; it is dangerous.

The inevitable conclusion arising from our detailed critique of the Safeguards Office (posted at www.energyscience.org.au) is that, at best, it is ineffectual, providing an illusion that an independent agency is protecting the interests of the Australian people when it comes to the vital matter of preventing nuclear proliferation. At worst, the Safeguards Office serves the commercial interests of the nuclear industry and the political interests of those who promote it, and contributes more to the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation than to the solutions.

We call on the federal government to establish an independent public inquiry to review all aspects of the Safeguards Office – its performance; scientific and technical expertise; whether its current management, organisation and relationships best serve its mandate; any conflicts of interest; whether it has sufficient independence; and options for reform. The inquiry should be adequately resourced, and should have powers similar to those of a Royal Commission to access witnesses, documents and other evidence.

For more information on ASNO see: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/safeguards/

The realpolitik of Australian safeguards policy

It is sometimes claimed that Australia’s safeguards requirements are the equal of or better than those applied by any other uranium-exporting country. However the IAEA is responsible for safeguards regardless of the origin of uranium supplies. And there are serious flaws with Australia’s safeguards policies:

  • Australia can claim little or no credit for the provisions of bilateral agreements given that key provisions have never been invoked (high enrichment), or, in the case of plutonium separation/stockpiling, permission has never been denied.
  • In some cases Australia allows AONM to be processed in non-safeguards-eligible facilities.
  • Australia allows uranium sales to nuclear weapons states which show little inclination to abide by their NPT disarmament obligations; states with a history of weapons-related research based on their civil nuclear programs; states blocking progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; and to undemocratic, repressive, secretive states with extensive and documented human rights abuses.
  • Uranium exports are shrouded in secrecy at many levels.
  • ASNO is in great need of radical reform, or abolition and replacement with a more credible safeguards agency.

Australia could use its status as the world’s largest holder of uranium reserves to leverage non-proliferation and disarmament outcomes. Australia could, for example, have promoted the adoption of ‘Additional Protocols’, strengthened safeguards agreements which provide the IAEA with greater authority to inspect suspected diversion of nuclear materials. Australia could have led by insisting that all of Australia’s uranium customer countries must have an Additional Protocol in place. Indeed Australia does now require Additional Protocols of all customer countries − but that policy was only adopted after all of Australia’s customer countries had already concluded an Additional Protocol with no prompting or persuasion from Australia. Repeatedly Australia has demonstrated a reluctance to actively advance and strengthen non-proliferation initiatives.

ASNO states: “The non-proliferation regime is also strengthened through Australia’s requirement that recipients of Australian obligated nuclear material adhere to the Additional Protocol.” But Australia had nothing at all to do with that strengthening of the safeguards system. Instead of using Australia’s position to leverage a positive outcome, Australia indulged in a cynical, retrospective PR exercise in relation to Additional Protocols.

New reactors types − proliferation-resistant?

Advocates of every conceivable type of reactor claim that their preferred reactor type is proliferation-proof or proliferation-resistant.

For example, a thorium enthusiast claims that thorium is “thoroughly useless for making nuclear weapons.”[27] But the proliferation risks associated with thorium fuel cycles can be as bad as − or worse than − the risks associated with conventional uranium reactor technology.[28]

An enthusiast of integral fast reactors (IFR) claims they “cannot be used to generate weapons-grade material.”[29] But IFRs can be used to produce plutonium for weapons.[30] Dr George Stanford, who worked on an IFR R&D program in the US, notes that proliferators “could do [with IFRs] what they could do with any other reactor − operate it on a special cycle to produce good quality weapons material.”[31]

Nuclear advocates frequently make statements which are true, but misleading. For example, thorium itself is not a proliferation risk, but the uranium-233 that is produced when thorium is irradiated can be (and has been) used in weapons. And strictly speaking, it is true that IFRs “cannot be used to generate weapons-grade material” − because IFRs don’t exist. And neither new or old reactor types can produce weapon grade plutonium or weapons-useable plutonium in the sense that plutonium cannot be used in weapons until it is separated from materials irradiated in a reactor, by reprocessing.

Fusion illustrates how difficult it is to disentangle the peaceful atom from its siamese twin, the military atom. Fusion has yet to generate a single Watt of useful electricity but it has already contributed to proliferation problems. According to Khidhir Hamza, a senior nuclear scientist involved in Iraq’s weapons program in the 1980s: “Iraq took full advantage of the IAEA’s recommendation in the mid 1980s to start a plasma physics program for “peaceful” fusion research. We thought that buying a plasma focus device … would provide an excellent cover for buying and learning about fast electronics technology, which could be used to trigger atomic bombs.”[32]

All existing and proposed reactor types and nuclear fuel cycles pose proliferation risks. The UK Royal Society notes: “There is no proliferation proof nuclear fuel cycle. The dual use risk of nuclear materials and technology and in civil and military applications cannot be eliminated.”[33]

Likewise, John Carlson, former Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, notes that “no presently known nuclear fuel cycle is completely proliferation proof”.[34]

Proponents of new reactor types claim that proliferation-resistance is an important driver of technological innovation. However there is little or no evidence to support the claim. Moreover, precious few nuclear industry insiders or nuclear advocates show the slightest concern about proliferation problems such as the growing stockpiles of separated civil plutonium, or the inadequate safeguards system, or the troubling implications of opening up civil nuclear trade with non-NPT states such as India.

Climate scientist James Hansen states: “Nuclear reactors can also be made more resistant to weapons proliferation than today’s reactors.”[35] But are new reactors being made more resistant to weapons proliferation than today’s reactors? In a word: No.

Hansen claims that “modern nuclear technology can reduce proliferation risks and solve the waste disposal problem by burning current waste and using fuel more efficiently.”[36] While that is true, it is equally true that modern (Generation IV) technology could worsen proliferation problems. For example, India plans to produce weapons-grade plutonium in fast breeder reactors for use as driver fuel in thorium reactors.[37] Compared to conventional uranium reactors, India’s plan is far worse on both proliferation and security grounds.

In a 2013 article, Pushker Kharecha and James Hansen wave away the proliferation problem with the assertion that they have “discussed it in some detail elsewhere”.[38] But the paper they cite[39] barely touches upon the proliferation problem and what it does say about proliferation is mostly false:

  • It falsely claim that thorium-based fuel cycles are “inherently proliferation-resistant”.
  • It claims that integral fast reactors “could be inherently free from the risk of proliferation”. At best, integral fast reactors could reduce proliferation risks; they could never be “inherently free” from proliferation risks.
  • And it states that if “designed properly”, breeder reactors would generate “nothing suitable for weapons”. India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor will be the next fast neutron reactor to begin operation (scheduled for September 2015). It will be ideal for producing weapon grade plutonium for India’s weapons program, and it will likely be used for that purpose since India is refusing to place it under safeguards.[40]

Hansen and his colleagues argue that “modern nuclear technology can reduce proliferation risks”.[41] India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor is modern − but it will exacerbate, not reduce, proliferation risks.

References

[1] http://web.archive.org/web/20070829214153/http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/05/24_ElBaradei_Preventing_Nuclear_Catastrophe.htm

[2] Pilita Clark, 1 Jan 1999, ‘PM’s Story: Very much alive… and unfazed’, Sydney Morning Herald.

[3] Bill Hayden, 1996, Hayden: An Autobiography, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, pp.422-423.

[4] Nautilus Institute, n.d., ‘Australian nuclear proliferation – contemporary’, http://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/aus-indo/aust-ind-nuclear1/australia-nuclear-proliferation/aust-prolif-now/

[5] For information on safeguards see the papers listed at https://nuclear.foe.org.au/links/#safeguards

[6] See section 6 in: ‘The Nuclear Safeguards System: An Illusion of Protection’, 2010, https://nuclear.foe.org.au/wp-content/uploads/CNF-Safeguards-web-2010-rev2018.pdf

[7] Mohamed El Baradei, 16 June 2009, ‘Director General’s Intervention on Budget at IAEA Board of Governors’, www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/director-generals-intervention-budget-iaea-board-governors

[8] See section 4 in: ‘The Nuclear Safeguards System: An Illusion of Protection’, 2010, https://nuclear.foe.org.au/wp-content/uploads/CNF-Safeguards-web-2010-rev2018.pdf

[9] IAEA, 1993, Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Safeguards in the 1990s.

[10] Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 2008, ‘Report 94: Review into Treaties tabled on 14 May 2008’, www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jsct/14may2008/report1/fullreport.pdf

[11] Australian Government, 2009, ‘Government Response to Report 94 of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties: Australia-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement’

[12] Mike Rann, March 1982, ‘Uranium: Play It Safe’.

[13] John Carlson, 1998, http://web.archive.org/web/20040217071924/http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/joint/commttee/j2022.pdf, p.15

[14] http://web.archive.org/web/20081114064230/http://archive.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/nuctrans/1999sep1.html

[15] http://web.archive.org/web/20081114064230/http://archive.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/nuctrans/1999sep1.html

[16] Jonathan Tirone and Jacob Adelman, 24 March 2014, ‘Japan’s Plutonium Plans Stoke China Tensions on A-Bomb Risk’, www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-23/japan-s-plutonium-potential-stokes-china-tensions-on-a-bomb-risk.html

[17] ASNO, 2008, Answer ‘DD’ in response to Questions on Notice to ASNO, Question 20, Output 1.1.10, October 2008 session of Senate Estimates, questions by Senator Ludlam.

[18] Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 2008, ‘Report 94: Review into Treaties tabled on 14 May 2008’, List of Recommendations,

www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jsct/14may2008/report1/fullreport.pdf

[19] www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jsct/14may2008/subs/sub22_1.pdf

[20] ASNO − Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office, 2001-02, Annual Report, www.asno.dfat.gov.au/annual_report_0102/asno_annual_report_2001_2002.pdf

[21] See their submissions to the JSCT: www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Treaties/28_October_2014/Submissions

[22] www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=35fb7f72-904c-4d44-b387-f34e4afb77f9&subId=301365

[23] www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=79a1a29e-5691-4299-8923-06e633780d4b&subId=301365

[24] www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/u/cc#russia

[25] www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=/jsct/14may2008/report1/fullreport.pdf

[26] EnergyScience Coalition, 2007, ‘Who’s Watching the Nuclear Watchdog – A Critique of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office’, www.energyscience.org.au/BP19%20ASNO.pdf

[27] Tim Dean, 16 March 2011, ‘The greener nuclear alternative’, www.abc.net.au/unleashed/45178.html

[28] ‘Thor-bores and uro-sceptics: thorium’s friendly fire’, Nuclear Monitor #801, 9 April 2015, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitors or www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/nfc/power-weapons/thorium

[29] Barry Brook, 9 June 2009, ‘An inconvenient solution’, The Australian, http://bravenewclimate.com/2009/06/11/an-inconvenient-solution/

[30] Friends of the Earth, Australia, ‘Nuclear Weapons and ‘Generation 4′ Reactors’, www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/nfc/power-weapons/g4nw

[31] George Stanford, 18 Sep 2010, ‘IFR FaD 7 – Q&A on Integral Fast Reactors’, http://bravenewclimate.com/2010/09/18/ifr-fad-7/

[32] Khidhir Hamza, Sep/Oct 1998, ‘Inside Saddam’s Secret Nuclear Program’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, No. 5, www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/bas-hamza-iraqnuke-10-98.htm

[33] UK Royal Society, 13 Oct 2011, ‘Fuel cycle stewardship in a nuclear renaissance’, http://royalsociety.org/policy/projects/nuclear-non-proliferation/report

[34] John Carlson, 2009, ‘Introduction to the Concept of Proliferation Resistance’, www.foe.org.au/sites/default/files/Carlson%20ASNO%20ICNND%20Prolif%20Resistance.doc

[35] James Hansen, 7 June 2014, ‘Scientists can help in planet’s carbon cut’, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-06/07/content_17570035.htm

[36] 3 Nov 2013, ‘Top climate change scientists’ letter to policy influencers’, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/03/world/nuclear-energy-climate-change-scientists-letter/index.html

[37] John Carlson, 2014, submission to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=79a1a29e-5691-4299-8923-06e633780d4b&subId=301365

[38] Pushker Kharecha and James Hansen, March 2013, ‘Prevented Mortality and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Historical and Projected Nuclear Power’, Environment, Science and Technology, http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es3051197

[39] P. Kharecha et al., 2010, ‘Options for near-term phaseout of CO2 emissions from coal use in the United States’, Environmental Science & Technology, 44, 4050-4062, http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es903884a

[40] John Carlson, 2015, first supplementary submission to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=cd70cb45-f71e-4d95-a2f5-dab0f986c0a3&subId=301365

[41] K. Caldeira, K. Emanuel, J. Hansen, and T. Wigley, 3 Nov 2013, ‘Top climate change scientists’ letter to policy influencers’, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/03/world/nuclear-energy-climate-change-scientists-letter/index.html

Arguments against turning SA into the world’s nuclear waste dump

This is the summary of a 2016 submission by Friends of the Earth, Australia, the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Conservation Council of SA to the SA Joint Select Committee on the Findings of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission. To read the entire submission click here.

“Tonnes of enormously dangerous radioactive waste in the northern hemisphere, 20,000 kms from its destined dump in Australia where it must remain intact for at least 10,000 years. These magnitudes − of tonnage, lethality, distance of transport, and time − entail great inherent risk.” ‒ Prof. John Veevers, Macquarie University [1]

Our organisations expressed deep reservations over the Royal Commission process, with particular concern over the Commission’s pro-industry terms of reference and the pro-nuclear bias in the composition of the Royal Commission (e.g. a majority of the members of the Expert Advisory Committee were clearly partisan nuclear advocates).[2] We maintain that the Royal Commission’s report is not a credible, even-handed report; instead it should be regarded as an advocacy document.[3] The report fails to demonstrate that a high level nuclear waste facility is practical or economic for SA, it downplays and ignores risks and uncritically presents arbitrary and highly optimistic forecasts of economic impacts.

The Royal Commission report fails to adequately reflect the clear international history of complexity, cost, contest and project failure in relation to radioactive waste management. This experience is of profound importance in framing any future discourse on this highly contested public policy arena. Our organisations believe that as a foundation document for framing and advancing any such discourse the Commission report is deeply deficient.

Importing waste before a repository is established

No country has completed construction and begun operation of a high level nuclear waste repository – at a national, let alone an international level. Many countries have failed or in their attempts to establish a repository. Successive Australian governments have repeatedly failed in their efforts to establish a repository for low level waste and plans to establish an intermediate level waste repository were abandoned in 2004 when the National Store Committee was disbanded. Yet the Royal Commission proposed importing high level nuclear waste on the assumption that it will be possible to establish a high level nuclear waste repository. This is highly irresponsible and should be rejected by the Joint Select Committee.

The so-called ‘Interim Storage Facility’ is proposed to accumulate 50,000 tonnes of high level nuclear waste before a repository begins accepting waste. There is a significant risk that high level waste will be imported and will have to remain in ‘interim’ storage ad infinitum due to i) the lack of a repository, ii) the lack of a return-to-sender clause in contracts and iii) the inability to send the waste on to a third country.

International experience

The Royal Commission insists that a nuclear waste storage and dumping business could be carried out safely. But would it be carried out safely? The Royal Commission ought to have considered evidence that can be drawn upon to help answer the question ‒ but it failed to do so.

What sort of evidence might be considered? The experience of the world’s one and only deep underground nuclear waste dump ‒ the Waste Isolation Pilot Plan (WIPP) in the U.S. ‒ is clearly relevant yet it was completely ignored in the Royal Commission’s Tentative Findings report and receives one token paragraph in the Final Report. WIPP is a case study of a sharp decline in safety and regulatory standards over a short space of time (www.foe.org.au/wipp). A chemical explosion in a nuclear waste barrel in February 2014 was followed by a failure of the filtration system, resulting in 22 workers receiving small doses of radiation and widespread contamination in the underground caverns. WIPP has been shut down for 2.5 years since the accident. Costs associated with the accident are likely to exceed US$500 million.

The Royal Commission ignored the fundamental lesson from the WIPP fiasco – initially high safety and regulatory standards gave way to complacency, cost-cutting and corner-cutting in the space of just 10–15 years. The Royal Commission correctly notes that high level waste “requires isolation from the environment for many hundreds of thousands of years”. How can we be confident that high safety and regulatory standards in SA would be maintained over centuries and millennia when WIPP shows that the half-life of human complacency, cost-cutting and corner-cutting is measured in years or at most decades?

The Royal Commission gives great weight to abstract, theoretical safety assessments while ignoring what is happening in the real world. It ignores clear and important examples of the spectacular mismatch between theoretical safety assessments and real-world experience. For example, a safety analysis conducted before WIPP opened predicted one radiation release every 200,000 years. Yet WIPP was open for just 15 years before the chemical explosion in February 2014.

There is no logical reason to believe that the SA government would perform any better than the U.S. government. On the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that nuclear waste management would be more difficult here given that the U.S. has vastly more nuclear waste technical and management expertise, experience and capacity than Australia.

The Royal Commission had little or nothing to say about other problems overseas, e.g. fires at radioactive waste repositories[4], the current project to exhume 126,000 waste barrels from a dump in Germany following extensive water infiltration and corrosion, the liquid nuclear waste explosion at Mayak in the USSR, and many others.

Political decisions are reinforcing the selectivity of the Royal Commission. The leaders of the SA Labor and Liberal parties plan to visit the waste facility under construction in Finland (20 times smaller than that proposed for SA). Why aren’t they visiting WIPP, or the German repository, or Mayak? Why aren’t they visiting places whose names are synonymous with dangerous and hideously expensive nuclear waste mismanagement ‒ Dounreay, Sellafield, Hanford, etc.? Why aren’t they visiting the wine producers in France who took the operator of a nuclear waste dump to court in a failed attempt to have the dump shut down? The SA Joint Select Committee should recommend that the Premier and the Leader of the Opposition extend their overseas trip to visit the above-mentioned locations, or at the least to meaningfully engage with international critics and not merely advocates.

While ignoring the world’s one and only existing deep underground nuclear waste dump (WIPP), the Royal Commission talks at length about deep underground repositories under construction in Finland and Sweden. According to the Royal Commission, those two countries “have successfully developed long-term domestic solutions” for nuclear waste. But in fact, neither country has completed construction of a repository let alone demonstrated safe operation over any length of time. After over 30 years Finland is still seven years away from first disposal of high level waste ‒ said to start in 2023. Sweden’s Forsmark Geological Disposal Facility has not yet even been licensed to start construction and isn’t planned to open until the late 2020s. Also both facilities are clearly focussed on addressing domestic nuclear waste arisings, not the far more complex international issues.

Mismanagement of radioactive waste in SA

Just as the Royal Commission glossed over countless serious examples of nuclear waste mismanagement around the world, it also glossed over numerous problems in SA.

A radioactive waste repository at Radium Hill, for example, “is not engineered to a standard consistent with current internationally accepted practice” according to a 2003 SA government audit ‒ yet there is no current intention to rectify the situation.

The Port Pirie uranium treatment plant is still contaminated over 50 years after its closure. It took a six-year community campaign just to get the site fenced off and to carry out a partial rehabilitation. As of July 2015, the SA government website states that “a long-term management strategy for the former site” is being developed.

Management of mine wastes has also been problematic. For example SA regulators failed to detect Marathon Resource’s illegal dumping of radioactive materials in the Arkaroola Wilderness Sanctuary. The incident represents a serious failure of SA government regulation yet to the best of our knowledge there have been no legislative or regulatory changes to reduce the risks of a recurrence.

The ‘clean-up’ of nuclear waste at the Maralinga nuclear test site in the late 1990s provides no cause for comfort with an expansion of nuclear waste in SA:

  • Nuclear engineer Alan Parkinson said of the ‘clean-up’: “What was done at Maralinga was a cheap and nasty solution that wouldn’t be adopted on white-fellas land.”
  • Scientist Dale Timmons said the government’s technical report was littered with “gross misinformation”.
  • Dr Geoff Williams, an officer with the Commonwealth nuclear regulator ARPANSA, said that the ‘clean-up’ was beset by a “host of indiscretions, short-cuts and cover-ups”.
  • Nuclear physicist Prof. Peter Johnston (now with ARPANSA) noted that there were “very large expenditures and significant hazards resulting from the deficient management of the project”.

The Royal Commission claims that “South Australia has a unique combination of attributes which offer a safe, long-term capability for the disposal of used fuel”. But instead it can be credibly argued that SA has a track record of mismanaging radioactive waste (Radium Hill, Maralinga, Port Pirie, Arkaroola, etc.) and no experience managing high-level nuclear waste.

If there was clear recognition of the mismanagement of radioactive waste in SA, coupled with remediation of contaminated sites, we might have some confidence that lessons have been learnt and that radioactive waste would be managed more responsibly in future. But there is no such recognition in the Royal Commission’s report or from state or federal governments, and there are no plans to remediate contaminated sites. On the contrary, the plan is to make a bad situation much worse with the importation of vast amounts of international intermediate and high level nuclear waste.

As mentioned, successive Australian governments have repeatedly failed in their efforts to establish a repository for low level waste and an interim store (or deep geological repository) for intermediate level national waste ‒ yet the current assumption is that it will be possible to establish a repository for high level international nuclear waste. This assumption is not consistent with past experience and needs focussed interrogation.

A moral responsibility to import nuclear waste?

Some argue that Australia has a moral responsibility to accept the high-level nuclear waste arising from the use of Australian uranium in power reactors overseas given that Australia is a uranium exporting nation. But there are no precedents for Australia or any other country being morally or legally responsible for managing wastes arising from the use of exported fuels, or from the export of any other mineral products. The responsibility for managing nuclear waste lies with the countries that make use of Australian uranium.

One plausible scenario is uranium being mined on Aboriginal land regardless of Aboriginal opposition, and high level nuclear waste being dumped on Aboriginal land, again without consent. That scenario is immoral twice over.

Indeed we maintain that the most consistent ‘moral’ argument is that Australia seek to prevent the creation of further nuclear waste rather than attempt to facilitate its import and dumping.

Aboriginal Traditional Owners

Our organisations hold serious concerns over past and continuing nuclear industry practices and impacts and the following comments highlight the often poor treatment of Aboriginal people by the nuclear/uranium industries in Australia and by governments pursuing or facilitating nuclear/uranium projects.

From evidence provided to the Royal Commission it is evident that a large majority of Aboriginal people oppose the plan to import intermediate and high level nuclear waste.[5]

The SA Government’s handling of the Royal Commission process systematically disenfranchised Aboriginal people. The truncated timeline for providing feedback on draft Terms of Reference disadvantaged people in remote regions, people with little or no access to email and internet and people for whom English is a second language. This was compounded when the Commission was formulated as there was no translation of the draft Terms of Reference, and a regional communications and engagement strategy was not developed or implemented. Subsequent efforts by the Royal Commission to provide translators and to translate written material were highly selective, partial and simply inadequate. Aboriginal people repeatedly expressed frustrations with the Royal Commission process.

At a minimum, we call on the Joint Select Committee to develop and implement a strategy to facilitate Aboriginal participation in the Committee’s inquiry, including holding hearings in regional and remote locations, and the provision of translators and translated written material. If this requires an extension of the timeline for the Committee’s work, so be it.

The federal government tried but failed to impose a national nuclear waste dump on Aboriginal land in SA from 1998‒2004, then tried but failed to impose a dump on Aboriginal land in the NT from 2005‒14, and now the federal government appears to again be seeking to impose a dump on Aboriginal land in SA against the near-unanimous opposition of Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners.

At the federal level Labor and the Coalition both supported the National Radioactive Waste Management Act, which permits the imposition of a dump on Aboriginal land without any consultation with or consent from Aboriginal Traditional Owners (to be precise, the nomination of a site is not invalidated by a failure to consult or secure consent).

In SA, there is bipartisan support for the South Australian Roxby Downs Indenture Act. The Act was amended in 2011 but it retains indefensible exemptions from the SA Aboriginal Heritage Act. Traditional Owners were not even consulted about the amendments. The SA government’s spokesperson in Parliament said: “BHP were satisfied with the current arrangements and insisted on the continuation of these arrangements, and the government did not consult further than that.”

As things stand, BHP Billiton must partially comply with an old version of the Aboriginal Heritage Act ‒ a version that was never proclaimed. That extraordinary situation needs to be rectified. Moreover it sets an extremely poor precedent in the context of the proposal to import foreign nuclear waste.

Economics

The Royal Commission ‒ and the Jacobs MCM consultancy ‒ base their economic calculations on an entirely arbitrary estimate as to how much waste might be imported. And their estimate of the price per tonne is highly questionable. Plausible estimates of tonnage and price per tonne result in economic losses as explained by Prof. Richard Blandy: “In fact, if South Australia’s dump could only attract a quarter of the world’s high level nuclear waste, at prices equal to Swedish or Finnish costs of construction (approximately A$1.13m/tonne of heavy metal and A$0.65m/tonne of heavy metal, respectively), our dump would lose money and would have a negative net present value.”

The nuclear waste import proposal privileges short-term economic interests at the expense of the long-term interests of South Australians. Again this is neatly explained by Prof. Blandy: “We are bequeathing a stream of costs to our successor generations. They will be poorer as a result, and will have reason to curse their forebears for selfishly making themselves better off at their expense. The problem with the high level nuclear waste dump is the inescapable risk (the Royal Commission says that “it is not possible to know the geological and climatic conditions in the distant future”) of severely adverse outcomes that we might be passing on to tens of thousands of future generations of South Australians. We should think of what we will leave to our descendants – and not do it.”

The Royal Commission (and the Jacobs MCM consultancy) make some provision for cost overruns but nothing on the scale of the near-doubling of cost estimates evident in France and the UK:

  • Estimates of the clean-up costs for a range of (civil and military) UK nuclear sites including Sellafield have jumped from a 2005 estimate of £56 billion (A$97.6b) to over £100 billion (A$174b).
  • In 2005, the French government’s nuclear waste agency Andra estimated the cost of a deep geological disposal facility at between €13.5 and €16.5 billion (A$19.7‒24.1 billion). In 2016, Andra estimates the cost of the facility at between €20 billion to €30 billion (A$29.1‒43.7 billion).

The promised 600 jobs associated with the nuclear waste project (once operations began) represent less than 0.1% of the 800,000 jobs presently in South Australia. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, there are 11,909,900 ’employed persons’ in Australia as of January 2016 ‒ thus the nuclear waste storage/disposal project would increase the total by 0.005%.

If the nuclear waste project has even a marginal adverse impact on tourism, the jobs created in the nuclear waste project could be equalled by job losses in the tourism industry. According to the SA Tourism Commission, 57,000 are employed in tourism in South Australia (direct and indirect). Thus a 1% reduction in the tourism industry would result in the loss of ~570 jobs, very similar to the 600 promised long-term jobs associated with the nuclear waste project. Visitor expenditure is estimated at $5.7 billion annually, thus a 1% reduction would amount to $57 million annually, or $570 million per decade or $5.7 billion over a 100-year period.

This negative economic impact has not been adequately identified or addressed across a range of potentially adversely exposed sectors including agricultural, wine and fisheries production.

Transport risks

The SA Joint Select Committee might want to consider the implications of any proposal to abandon plans for dedicated, new infrastructure (e.g. port, rail) in favour of existing infrastructure. It should be noted that from 1999‒2002 Pangea Resources initially envisaged dedicated infrastructure but as its plans advanced it increasingly favoured the use of existing infrastructure. A shift from dedicated to existing infrastructure would have significant implications for the economics of the project as well as public health and environmental risks.

The Royal Commission report states: “During the past 50 years, approximately 7000 international shipments of used nuclear fuel, including nine that have left Australia for reprocessing, have been undertaken. In this time, no accident involving a breach of the package and the release of its contents has occurred. The same record applies to international transport of high and intermediate level waste.”

That claim is incorrect and is refuted by documented evidence provided to ‒ and ignored by ‒ the Royal Commission. For example a whistleblower sparked a major controversy over frequent excessive radioactive contamination of waste containers, rail cars, and trucks in France and Germany. International transport regulations for spent fuel shipments were constantly over a period of many years and this was done knowingly. Another example concerns the derailment of a train wagon carrying spent fuel in December 2013, 3 km from Paris, with testing by AREVA revealing a hotspot on the rail car.

Numerous other train derailments involving nuclear materials transport have been documented. It is unsettling to consider the multiple derailments on the Ghan train line in Australia in the relatively short period of time it has been in operation.

Transport incidents and accidents are routine in countries with significant nuclear industries. The case of the UK is pertinent. A UK government database contains information on 1018 events from 1958 to 2011 (an average of 19 incidents each year).

There were 187 events during the shipment of irradiated nuclear fuel flasks from 1958−2004 in the UK (an average of four per year):

  • 33% involved excess contamination on the surface of the flask;
  • 24% involved collisions and low speed derailments of the conveyance;
  • 16% involved flask preparation faults, and loading/unloading faults;
  • 13% involved excess contamination of conveyance;
  • 11% involved faults with the conveyance; and
  • the remainder included three cases involving fire on a locomotive with no damage to flasks.

The French nuclear safety agency IRSN produced a report summarising radioactive transport accidents and incidents from 1999−2007. The database lists 901 events from 1999−2007 − on average 100 events annually or about two each week. The IRSN report notes that events where there is contamination of packages and means of transport were still frequent in 2007.

Potential costs of transport accidents: Spent fuel / high level nuclear waste transport accidents have the potential to be extraordinarily expensive. Dr. Marvin Resnikoff and Matt Lamb from Radioactive Waste Management Associates in New York City calculated 355−431 latent cancer fatalities attributable to a “maximum” hypothetical rail cask accident, compared to the US Department of Energy’s estimate of 31 fatalities. Using the Department of Energy’s model, they calculated that a severe truck cask accident could result in US$20 billion to US$36 billion in clean-up costs for an accident in an urban area, and a severe rail accident in an urban area could result in costs from US$145 billion to US$270 billion.

Transport and nuclear security: Nuclear engineer Dr John Large writes: “Movement of nuclear materials is inherently risky both in terms of severe accident and terrorist attack. Not all accident scenarios and accident severities can be foreseen; it is only possible to maintain a limited security cordon around the flask and its consignment; … terrorists are able to seek out and exploit vulnerabilities in the transport arrangements and localities on the route; and emergency planning is difficult to maintain over the entire route.”

A number of nuclear transport security incidents are listed in the body of this submission (section 3.8).

Security and proliferation risks

As the Chernobyl disaster proved, dispersal of nuclear material from just one reactor core can have devastating national and international effects. The Royal Commission proposes that Australia accept an amount of nuclear waste that is more radioactive than the Chernobyl #4 reactor core by orders of magnitude. The proposed import of 138,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel equates to 6,900 reactor-years of nuclear waste generation (a single reactor produces approx. 20 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel per year).

Nuclear engineers Alan Parkinson and John Large have warned that Australia’s proposed national radioactive waste facility would be attractive to terrorists wanting to make a ‘dirty bomb’, a radioactive weapon delivered by conventional means. The same risk applies to any comparable store of nuclear materials.

Historical examples of military attacks on nuclear plants include attacks and attempted attacks on reactors in Iraq, Iran, Israel and Syria. Those incidents were motivated by attempts to prevent weapons proliferation. Nuclear plants might also be targeted with the aim of widely dispersing radioactive material. High level nuclear waste stores in Australia might be targeted for both reasons.

Numerous security incidents at ANSTO’s Lucas Heights site are noted in the body of this submission (section 3.7).

Importation of 138,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel would contain 1,380 tonnes of plutonium − sufficient to build approx. 138,000 nuclear weapons. Thus Australia, regardless of intent, would be far closer to a weapons capability than is currently the case and regional countries might therefore decide to take steps towards a weapons capability.

Claims that Australia would be making a contribution to global non-proliferation efforts by accepting foreign nuclear waste are highly questionable. Australia’s acceptance of spent fuel would add to the number of countries with large stockpiles of fissile material − in that sense it would contribute to proliferation risks, not to the resolution of those risks.

References:

[1] http://web.archive.org/web/20120410062832/http://eps.mq.edu.au/media/veevers1.htm

[2] ‘A Critique of the South Australian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission’, December 2015, https://nuclear.foe.org.au/critique-of-the-sa-nuclear-fuel-cycle-royal-commission/

[3] www.foe.org.au/sites/default/files/NFCRC-response-tent-findings-CCSA-ACF-FoE-18March2016-final_0.pdf

[4] https://nuclear.foe.org.au/fire/

[5] www.anfa.org.au/traditional-owners-statements/

Pangea Resources’ plan for a high-level nuclear dump in Australia

Pangea Resources was an international consortium that was planning an international high-level nuclear waste repository in Australia.
Pangea set up an office in Australia in the late 1990s but gave up in 2002 in the face of overwhelming public and political opposition.
The existence of Pangea Resources was a closely guarded secret until a corporate video was leaked to the media.
Pangea chief Jim Voss denied meeting with federal government ministers when he had in fact met at least one minister. A Pangea spokesperson said: “We would not like to be lying … we very much regret getting off on the wrong foot.” Ironically, ARIUS, the successor to Pangea, now states: “An essential element of any approach is the open and complete flow of information.”
Here is Pangea Resources’ corporate video which was leaked to Friends of the Earth (UK) in the late 1990s. Until this video was leaked, Australians had no idea that we were being targeted as the world’s nuclear dump.


And here is an ABC Four Corners program from 1999:

Pangea reborn as ARIUS

Some people from Pangea thought they might do better if they presented themselves in the guise of a not-for-profit group. Thus ARIUS — the Association for Regional and International Underground Storage — was born. And some of these people were commissioned by the South Australian Royal Commission in 2015/16 to do the economic analysis on the proposal to turn SA into the world’s nuclear dump. Incredibly, the Royal Commission relied completely on this one economic analysis.

The farcical and dishonest engineering of a positive economic case to proceed with the nuclear waste plan was neatly exposed by ABC journalist Stephen Long on November 8, 2016:

“Would you believe me if I told you the report that the commission has solely relied on was co-authored by the president and vice president of an advocacy group for the development of international nuclear waste facilities? Charles McCombie and Neil Chapman of the consultants MCM head the advocacy group ARIUS ‒ the Association for Regional and International Underground Storage.

“They prepared the report in conjunction with Jacobs, a global engineering and consulting firm which has a lucrative nuclear arm and boasts of its “more than 50 years of experience across the complete nuclear asset cycle”.

“When I interviewed the royal commissioner last week, he initially denied that the consultants who prepared the modelling ‒ that is the sole basis of the commission’s recommendation in favour of a nuclear waste dump ‒ faced any conflict of interest.

“He then said there would have been a conflict of interest had it been the only material the commission had relied upon, but said it was “reviewed by our team of experts and found to be an appropriate estimation of what the costs, risks and benefits might be if we were involved in the storage of waste”.

“That is the same “team of experts” who, apparently, recommended the consultants in the first place.”

See also the Channel 7 video posted here.

The Citizens’ Jury was deeply unimpressed by the economic propaganda produced by Jacobs MCM and promoted by the Royal Commission and the SA government. The Jury’s report said:

“It is impossible to provide an informed response to the issue of economics because the findings in the RCR [Royal Commission report] are based on unsubstantiated assumptions. This has caused the forecast estimates to provide inaccurate, optimistic, unrealistic economic projections. We remain unconvinced that estimates relating to the cost of infrastructure.”

“The advice of two contributing authors to the Jacobs MCM economic and safety assessment, who are lobbyists for the organisation “Arius”, has called into question the objectivity of elements of the RC report. Given the authoritative nature and optimistic outcome of the economic analysis in particular, concern has been expressed that RC decisions and recommendations may not be free from bias and manipulation. The issue with the inherent bias could have been abrogated by seeking additional independent economic and safety analysis. The jury is not calling into question the impartiality of the Commission but is concerned that advocates for international nuclear waste storage may have influenced RC outcomes and damaged the integrity of the RC process and may not permit an informed decision.

“The economic modelling has a number of flaws, including not accounting for negative externalities or opportunity costs, compared to other potential investments and relies on a very optimistic interest rate.”

South Australian economist Prof. Richard Blandy said: “I congratulate the Second Citizens’ Jury on their overwhelming decision against the proposed nuclear dump. They have shown courage and common sense. A large majority could see that the bonanza that the dump was supposed to bring to the State was based on very flimsy evidence. They saw that the real path to a better economic future for our State is based on our skills, innovative capabilities and capacity for hard work, not a bizarre gamble based on guesses. I am proud of my fellow South Australians on the Jury – including those who were in the minority. I would like to thank them all for their efforts on behalf of their fellow South Australians.”

The Jacobs MCM claims uncritically regurgitated in the Royal Commission’s report were scrutinised by experts from the US-based Nuclear Economics Consulting Group (NECG), commissioned by a Joint Select Committee of the SA Parliament. The NECG report said the waste import project could be profitable under certain assumptions ‒ but the report then raised serious questions about most of those assumptions. The report noted that the Royal Commission’s economic analysis failed to consider important issues which “have significant serious potential to adversely impact the project and its commercial outcomes”; that assumptions about price were “overly optimistic” in which case “project profitability is seriously at risk”; that the 25% cost contingency for delays and blowouts was likely to be a significant underestimate; and that the assumption the project would capture 50% of the available market had “little support or justification”.

For more information on the 2015-17 debate on turning SA into the world’s nuclear waste dump, please visit: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/waste-import/

Paul Howes’ howlers

Correcting some howlers by Australian Workers’ Union national secretary Paul Howes – who resigned from the AWU in 2014.


Paul Howes’ u-propaganda is radioactive

Jim Green, 19 Aug 2009, www.crikey.com.au/2009/08/19/paul-howes-u-propaganda-is-radioactive

I knew Australian Workers Union national secretary Paul Howes during his activist days in Sydney — he knew nothing about uranium mining or nuclear power then, and it seems nothing has changed. His speech to the Sydney Institute last night comprised a string of howlers and detracts from informed debate.

Howes falsely claimed that nuclear power is undergoing a “renaissance”. In fact, nuclear power has been stagnant for the past 15 years. It accounted for 16% of global electricity generation in 2005, 15% in 2006 and 14% in 2007. The global fleet of reactors is middle-aged and the industry will be kept busy just maintaining current output over the coming 20-30 years let alone expanding output.

Howes promoted nuclear power as a low-carbon energy source, but even the Switkowski report found that six nuclear power reactors would reduce Australia’s emissions by just 4% if they displaced coal-fired plants or just 2% if they displaced gas. Energy efficiency and conservation measures can generate much greater reductions, much more quickly and at a tiny fraction of the cost of nuclear power.

Howes stated that Australia’s share of the world’s uranium market is “greater than Saudi Arabia’s share in the planet’s oil”. However, the value of Saudi Arabia’s oil exports is 325 times greater than Australia’s uranium exports (which account for about one-fifth of global uranium demand). Even if factoring in a growth in demand and a sustained, high price for uranium, the comparison with Saudi Arabian oil exports would still miss the mark by a couple of orders of magnitude. A better comparison would be with Australia’s cheese exports. Cheese and uranium have been in an ongoing tussle for export value supremacy in recent years. Cheese is winning — and it tastes much better and can’t be used to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Howes provides a figure on the uranium resource at Olympic Dam which differs from BHP Billiton’s figure by an order of magnitude.

Howes claimed that the cost of nuclear power “is not significantly higher than current coal power generation”. But the Victorian Department of Infrastructure, the Energy Supply Association of Australia and the National Generators Forum all put the cost of nuclear power at 1.7 to 2.3 times the cost of power from coal plants.

Howes noted that Finland is building its fifth nuclear plant. He might also have noted that it is A$2.9 billion over budget, construction is 3.5 years behind schedule, and construction company Areva and Finnish utility TVO are locked in protracted dispute and arbitration over the project.

Howes pointed to new reactors being built in Europe. However, the 146 reactors operating in the EU is well down from the 177 reactors operating in 1989. Four reactors are under construction in the EU but dozens of reactors are ageing and are expected to go offline in the coming decade.

Howes detailed the findings of the Lenzen report without noting that it was funded by the industry-funded Australian Uranium Association.

Howes said that “international agreements, technology and the development of 4th Generation fusion reactors will lower … proliferation risks.”

However, Kevin Rudd has repeatedly warned about the “fracturing” of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. All existing and proposed nuclear fuel cycles pose WMD proliferation risks. Five of the ten countries to have produced nuclear weapons did so under cover of a ‘peaceful’ nuclear program.

Fusion power has yet to generate a single watt of useful electricity but it has already contributed to proliferation problems, e.g. in the 1980s when Iraq took advantage of an IAEA fusion training program to further its covert nuclear weapons program.

Howes referred approvingly to a nuclear waste dump in the Champagne region of France. In fact, it was revealed in 2006 that the nuclear dump had been contaminating groundwater — albeit at low levels — for 10 years as a result of a cracked waste storage container.

Howes falsely claimed that there have been millions of movements of nuclear materials and nuclear waste “with no accidents affecting people”. To give one example, Angela Merkel (now the German Chancellor) suspended nuclear waste shipments in Germany in 1997 after elevated radiation emissions and exposures.

Howes falsely claimed that a high-level nuclear waste repository project is underway in the USA. In fact, the Yucca Mountain project was a $10 billion fiasco which was 23 years behind schedule when President Obama permanently abandoned the project earlier this year. There is not a single repository for high-level nuclear waste anywhere in the world.

Howes proposed a domestic uranium enrichment industry without noting that BHP Billiton and the Switkowski report have unequivocally rejected that proposal on economic grounds, and without noting that the Howard and Rudd governments have been actively engaged in and supportive of international initiatives to stop the spread of enrichment technology because of its WMD proliferation potential.

Howes approvingly cites a claim that there are no credible nuclear-free scenarios for reducing greenhouse emissions. In fact, there are dozens of detailed reports which do just that.

Regurgitating industry propaganda might go down well at the Sydney Institute but it is no substitute for informed debate.

Dr Jim Green is a national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth.


Paul Howes’ response

AWU National Secretary Paul Howes writes: Re. “Paul Howes’ u-propaganda is radioactive” (Wednesday, item 4).

www.crikey.com.au/2009/08/21/comments-corrections-clarifications-and-cck…

Friends of the Earth spokesman Dr Jim Green in Crikey this week repeatedly claimed I have lied about the benefits of a domestic nuclear power industry and questioned my qualifications for speaking out on this subject.

Whilst it is true that I left school in Year 9, unlike Dr Jim I do believe working people and their representatives have a right to speak out on matters of public importance and it shouldn’t be left solely in the hands of the academic elite.

Dr Jim has an ultra leftist belief system that does not allow him to change his position on issues, despite the world manifestly changing around him.

This is despite the urgent need to address climate change. Despite the need for the world to grow its energy resources to secure rising standards of living. Despite the fact that the UK, Sweden, Italy and many other countries have said in the last 18 months that they are or want to be nuclear powered countries.

Unlike JM Keynes, people like Dr Jim don’t change their minds when new facts change the circumstances. That’s ideology. Here are some facts for Dr Jim:

  • Just about every scenario, forecast and projection of future world electricity demand foresees an increase in demand for nuclear power, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
  • Demand for electricity will continue to grow in response to world economic growth, energy security concerns and climate change challenges.
  • The world will need to make use of all its energy resources  — clean coal, oil and gas, renewables, nuclear.

To quote Ivo De Boer, Secretary of the IPCC; “I have never seen a credible scenario for reducing emissions that did not include nuclear energy”.


Response to Howes’ response

Dr Jim Green, national nuclear/energy campaigner with Friends of the Earth, writes:

www.crikey.com.au/2009/08/24/comments-corrections-clarifications-and-cck…

AWU secretary Paul Howes takes me to task (Friday, comments) for pointing out that many of his statements to the Sydney Institute about uranium mining and nuclear power were demonstrably false. But Howes does not challenge a single point of fact in my original Crikey piece. Instead he offers ridiculous ad hominen and straw man attacks.

Howes claims that I accused him of repeatedly lying. I did no such thing. I said he appears to know next to nothing about uranium mining and nuclear power and provided considerable evidence in support of that view  — evidence which Howes does not challenge. Howes says that, unlike me, he believes “working people and their representatives have a right to speak out on matters of public importance”. Needless to say, I never suggested otherwise.

Howes falsely claims that “Just about every scenario, forecast and projection of future world electricity demand foresees an increase in demand for nuclear power”. But my original Crikey piece provided a web-link to many reports which map out clean energy futures without recourse to nuclear power.

Howes accuses me of having an “ultra leftist belief system”. This contrasts with Howes  — he gave up social justice and environmental activism to become, in his words, a “committed democrat”. Which led him naturally to the right-wing of the NSW Labor machine!


Labor Signs Up To The Arms Race

By Jim Green, 5 Dec 2011, https://newmatilda.com/2011/12/05/labor-signs-arms-race/

Paul Howes might think the Cold War is over but the nuclear arms race hasn’t slowed. South Asia is a nuclear minefield and Labor’s decision to sell uranium to India makes it more dangerous, writes Jim Green

Paul Howes dropped out of left-wing socialist party politics and left-wing activism just over a decade ago, claiming to have had an epiphany and to have been reborn as a “committed democrat”. Stirring stuff. He headed straight to Sussex St, to the right wing of the NSW Labor machine — committed democrats one and all.

In fact Howes said at the time that he saw a choice between activism and pursuing a career and he chose the latter. Fair enough, but spare us the Martin Luther King democracy speech. From Sussex St of all places! I gave up left-wing party politics because of burn-out but I manage to avoid the temptation to dress up that mundane reality as a tale of biblical redemption.

Later I saw Howes at a meeting to build support for the Mirarr traditional owners’ campaign against uranium mining at Jabiluka; he was representing Unions NSW. He had another epiphany on his first day at work for the union he now heads, the pro-uranium Australian Workers Union (AWU): suddenly it was OK to trash Aboriginal land rights and Aboriginal land in order to mine uranium, and to trash Kakadu National Park and the Arkaroola Wilderness Sanctuary and anything else, and to sell uranium to dictatorships, nuclear weapons states and anyone else, with or without safeguards.

I pointed out in 2008 that most of his pro-nuclear-power comments at a Sydney Institute talk were demonstrably false. Howes appeared to justify his ignorance on his lack of schooling: “Whilst it is true that I left school in Year 9, unlike Dr Jim I do believe working people and their representatives have a right to speak out on matters of public importance and it shouldn’t be left solely in the hands of the academic elite,” said. He didn’t attempt to defend a single one of the points I’d taken issue with.

Of all the idiotic, asinine contributions to Labor’s faux-debate on uranium sales to India, Howes trumped the lot with his assertion that “The Cold War is over and it’s time for Labor to embrace that fact”.

Since the end of the Cold War the existing weapons states have been busily “modernising” their nuclear arsenals:

  • Pakistan and North Korea joined the nuclear weapons club by testing nuclear bombs for the first time.
  • France, India, the US and Russia have also tested weapons.
  • The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty remains in limbo, with the culprits including India and some of Australia’s existing uranium customers.
  • Pakistan has spread weapons technology (originally stolen from a European consortium) to Iran, North Korea, Libya and probably elsewhere.
  • The tradition of bombing nuclear plants in the Middle East is alive and well with strikes on nuclear plants in Iraq in 1991 and 2003 and Israel’s attack on a suspected secret reactor in Syria in 2007.
  • South Korea (one of Australia’s uranium customers) ‘fessed up to a secret nuclear weapons research program.
  • Japan continues to separate and stockpile obscene amounts of plutonium (some of it produced from Australian uranium).
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency still doesn’t have reliable “core” funding even for its basic inspection program let alone a rigorous safeguards program; and so on.

No point trying to explain any of that to Howes — as an AWU member said of him, he’s quicker to send than to receive. And he deals in Bob Katter-like revelations (“the Cold War is over”) and straw-man inanities (“working people have a right to speak out”; “Indians have a right to power”) rather than conventional, logical argument. All the better to paper over the breadth and depth of his ignorance and indifference.

The Labor conference heard all the usual furphies from Right faction delegates:

  • We should sell uranium to India because it is democratic (and to China and Russia and the United Arab Emirates because they aren’t).
  • We should sell to India because it hasn’t exported nuclear weapons technology (though it has, and we should sell to China and Russia and the US and France because they have too).
  • The bilateral safeguards agreement will ensure peaceful use of Australian uranium (though it won’t and can’t — Australia has no capacity or authority to independently monitor uranium exports).
  • The Labor Party respects and supports the Non-Proliferation Treaty (but should undermine and weaken it by selling uranium to non-NPT states).
  • India is a responsible nuclear weapons power (even as it expands its weapons arsenal and its missile capabilities). And so on.

As expected, the vote went along factional lines with the Right narrowly defeating the Left and overturning Labor’s policy of opposition to uranium sales to countries refusing to sign the NPT.

A reliable source — well, a journo — tells me Kevin Rudd is filthy with Prime Minister Gillard’s uranium decision and thinks India ought to have been forced to make some concessions in return for uranium sales, such as ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. If so, Rudd ought to say so publicly.

The push to open up nuclear trade with India began with the US government of George W. Bush in 2005, leading to the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement three years later. The politics were neatly summed up by Mian and Ramana in Arms Control Today: “Recruiting India may help reduce the immediate costs to the United States of exercising its military, political, and economic power to limit the growth of China as a possible rival … India is seen as a major prize, and support for its military buildup and its nuclear complex seems to be the price the Bush administration is willing to pay. This goal is, it seems, to be pursued regardless of how it will spur the spiral of distrust, political tension, and dangerous, costly, and wasteful military preparedness between the United States and China, between China and India, and between India and Pakistan.”

The US-India agreement contains no requirement for India to curb its weapons program. The consequences have been predictable. Pakistan is citing the US-India agreement to justify its intransigent attitude towards a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. China is using the precedent of the US-India agreement to justify plans to sell more reactors to Pakistan.

Both India and Pakistan continue to develop nuclear-capable missiles; both are expanding their capacity to produce fissile material; both refuse to sign or ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; both are estimated to have increased the size of their weapons arsenals by 25-35 per cent over the past year alone.

US cables released by Wikileaks warn of the potential for incidents such as the Mumbai terror attacks to escalate into warfare and for warfare to escalate into nuclear warfare. Scientists warn that a “limited” nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could cause catastrophic climate change in addition to the direct impacts. Wikileaks cables reveal Kevin Rudd privately urging the US to ignore its NPT disarmament obligations and to maintain a ”reliable” and ”credible” nuclear arsenal, and to be prepared to use force against China.

South Asia is a dangerous nuclear minefield. All the more so in the wake of the US-India agreement, and all the more so in the wake of Labor’s decision to sell uranium to India with no conditions which would curb its weapons program or de-escalate the South Asian nuclear arms race. It is spineless, cringeworthy sycophancy which puts Australia to shame and makes the world a more dangerous place.

Military and terrorist attacks on nuclear plants

A separate webpage details the nuclear threats resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.


See the Nuclear Facilities Attack Database — a global database recording assaults, sabotages and unarmed breaches of nuclear facilities. It doesn’t include incidents such as attacks on Iraq’s research reactor … possibly because those attacks were launched by nation-states not sub-national groups / terrorists.


Nation-states haven’t launched any military attacks on operational nuclear power plants, or accidentally hit any operational nuclear power plants. (UPDATE! See the  webpage on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.) There is however a history of conventional military strikes on ostensibly peaceful nuclear facilities in the Middle East, driven by proliferation fears.

Historical examples of military strikes on nuclear plants include the following:

Most of those attacks were directed at ‘research’ reactors capable of producing plutonium for weapons, while Iraq attacked the partially-built Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran in 1987.

Nuclear plants might also be targeted with the aim of widely dispersing radioactive material or, in the case of power reactors, disrupting electricity supply.

If and when nuclear-powered nations go to war, they will have to choose between shutting down their power reactors, or taking the risk of attacks potentially leading to widespread, large-scale dispersal of radioactive materials. Spent fuel stores, which typically contain enormous quantities of radioactive materials, may be more vulnerable than reactors as they are generally less well protected.

Richard Garwin poses these questions: “What happens with a failed state with a nuclear power system? Can the reactors be maintained safely? Will the world (under the IAEA and U.N. Security Council) move to guard nuclear installations against theft of weapon-usable material or sabotage, in the midst of chaos? Not likely.”

There are examples of IAEA safeguards being suspended in the event of war or domestic political turmoil, including Iraq in 1991, some African states, Yugoslavia, and most recently in Ukraine.


Proliferation and Security

Excerpt from a Nuclear Monitor article.

Tied to proliferation issues are security issues such as potential military strikes and cyber-attacks on nuclear plants, and the murder of nuclear scientists and others involved in Iran’s nuclear program.

Israel has repeatedly threatened to launch military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program.1

In addition to the Stuxnet cyber-attack on Iran’s enrichment program, there has been speculation that Bushehr was also targeted and that Stuxnet may have caused problems leading to the removal of fuel from the reactor in early 2011.2

The Bushehr plant (then under construction) sustained damage from numerous Iraqi bombing raids during the 1980−88 war.3,4

In September 2014, Iran arrested a Ukrainian man suspected of sabotaging the Bushehr plant. The suspect pretended to be an expert from Russia, the Iranian newspaper Hamshahri cited authorities as saying. The nature of the alleged sabotage was not disclosed.5

An explosion occurred inside the Arak reactor building in late 2013 according to Israeli sources. According to Israeli website Debkafile, Tehran did its utmost to conceal the blast. Debkafile speculated that the blast resulted from physical sabotage, a viral attack on computers, or the result of inferior steel materials that were unable to withstand intense pressure during testing.6

In March 2014, the deputy head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, Asghar Zarean, accused “foreigners” of trying unsuccessfully to sabotage the Arak plant.7

Zarean said: “Several cases of industrial sabotage have been neutralized in the past few months before achieving the intended damage, including sabotage at a part of the IR-40 facility at Arak.”8

Arak is regarded as particularly vulnerable to attacks in its partially-built state, since attacks could damage or destroy the reactor and associated infrastructure without resulting in widespread radioactive contamination. Israel’s former chief of military intelligence, Amos Yadlin, who piloted one of the planes that bombed Iraq’s Osirak heavy-water reactor in 1981 before it was due to become operational, said: “Whoever considers attacking an active reactor is willing to invite another Chernobyl, and no one wants to do that.”9

In addition to the strike on Osirak in 1981, Israel destroyed a suspected reactor site in Syria in 2007 and has refused to rule out bombing Arak.10

In August 2012, saboteurs blew up power lines supplying Iran’s underground uranium enrichment plant near the city of Qom.11

In August 2014, Iran said it had shot down an Israeli drone that was heading for its uranium enrichment site near the town of Natanz.12

At least five people associated with Iran’s nuclear program have been murdered since 2007, including the deputy head of Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz (killed by a car bomb in 2012), the head of the country’s ballistic missile program, and the head of Iranian cyber warfare (who was shot dead).13-16

In 2012, Iran hanged a man it claimed was a Mossad agent over the killing of an Iranian nuclear scientist in 2010.17

References:

  1. Associated Press, 25 Nov 2013, ‘Israeli leader Netanyahu condemns Iran nuclear deal as a ‘historic mistake’ and threatens to use military action if needed’, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2513092/Israeli-PM-Netanyahu-condemns-Iran-nuclear-deal-HISTORIC-MISTAKE-says-Israel-use-military-action-needed.html
  2. BBC, 26 Feb 2011, ‘Iran nuclear plans: Bushehr fuel to be unloaded’, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12588621
  3. Robert Tait, 25 Jan 2009, ‘Iran Makes First Test-Run of Bushehr Nuclear Reactor,’ www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/25/iran-reactor-bushehr-trial
  4. AP, 18 Nov 1987, ‘Iran says nuclear plant hit’, The Lewiston Journal, http://tinyurl.com/iraq-iran-1987
  5. Vasudevan Sridharan, 7 Sept 2014, ‘Iran Arrests Ukrainian for ‘Sabotaging’ Bushehr Nuclear Plant’, www.ibtimes.co.uk/iran-arrests-ukrainian-sabotaging-bushehr-nuclear-plant-1464376
  6. Julian Kossoff, 4 Nov 2013, ‘Was Iran’s Arak Nuclear Reactor Hit by Saboteurs?’, www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/519466/20131104/iran-nuclear-arak-reactor-sabotage-mossad.htm
  7. Umid Niayesh, 17 March 2014, ‘Iran gives details of sabotage at IR-40 nuclear site’, http://en.trend.az/regions/iran/2253805.html
  8. Associated Press, 15 March 2014, ‘Iran says sabotage prevented at nuclear facility’, www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.579998
  9. Julian Kossoff, 4 Nov 2013, ‘Was Iran’s Arak Nuclear Reactor Hit by Saboteurs?’, www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/519466/20131104/iran-nuclear-arak-reactor-sabotage-mossad.htm
  10. Simon Sturdee / AFP, 13 Nov 2013, ‘Iran’s Arak reactor: a second route to a nuclear bomb?’, www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hu6ibS88Ro6pTL6dkTc-Xmb753yQ?docId=e3d42d3a-7cf2-4555-adff-e289f506aa1f
  11. www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-06/iran-says-four-arrested-for-trying-to-sabotage-nuclear-site/5001674
  12. Fredrik Dahl, 12 Sept 2014, ‘Iran wants U.N. atomic agency to condemn Israeli drone ‘aggression”, www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/12/us-iran-nuclear-israel-idUSKBN0H71LL20140912
  13. Patrick Cockburn, 6 Oct 2013, ‘Just who has been killing Iran’s nuclear scientists?’, www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/just-who-has-been-killing-irans-nuclear-scientists-8861232.html
  14. 2 March 2014, ‘Obama pushes Israel to stop assassinations of Iran nuclear scientists – report’, http://rt.com/news/iran-obama-assassination-scientists-443/
  15. 12 Jan 2012, ‘Iran’s history of nuclear incidents’, www.abc.net.au/news/2012-01-12/iran27s-history-of-nuclear-incidents/3769454
  16. William Tobey, 12 January 2012, ‘Nuclear scientists as assassination targets’, http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/nuclear-scientists-assassination-targets
  17. 16 May 2012, ‘Iran hangs ‘Mossad agent’ for scientist killing’, www.abc.net.au/news/2012-05-16/iran-hangs-27mossad-agent27-for-scientist-killing/4013644

The Chernobyl Factor in the Ukraine Crisis

Bennett Ramberg, 14 April 2014

www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bennett-ramberg-calls-attention-to-the-dangers-of-fighting-near-nuclear-power-stations

LOS ANGELES – Twenty-eight years after its Chernobyl nuclear plant exploded, Ukraine confronts a nuclear specter of a different kind: the possibility that the country’s reactors could become military targets in the event of a Russian invasion. Speaking at the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in March, Andrii Deshchytsia, Ukraine’s acting foreign minister, cited the “potential threat to many nuclear facilities” should events deteriorate into open warfare.
Earlier in the month, Ihor Prokopchuk, Ukraine’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, circulated a letter to the organization’s board of governors warning that an invasion could bring a “threat of radiation contamination on the territory of Ukraine and the territory of neighboring states.” In Kyiv, Ukraine’s parliament responded by calling for international monitors to help protect the plants as the cash-strapped government attempts to boost its own efforts.
Are Ukraine’s concerns mere hyperbole – a “malicious slander,” as the Kremlin puts it – or should we take them seriously? For Ukraine’s government, the angst is real. Even Ukrainians born after 1986 understand what a Chernobyl-type disaster brought about by battle could look like.
History offers little guidance as to whether warring countries would avoid damaging nuclear sites. With the exception of the 1990’s Balkan conflict, wars have not been fought against or within countries with nuclear reactors. In the case of the Balkans, Serbian military jets overflew Slovenia’s Krško nuclear power plant in a threatening gesture early in the conflict, while radical Serbian nationalists called for attacks to release the radioactive contents.
Serbia itself later issued a plea to NATO not to bomb its large research reactor in Belgrade. Fortunately, the war ended with both reactors untouched.
While that case provides some assurance that military and political leaders will think twice about attacking nuclear reactors, the sheer scale of Ukraine’s nuclear enterprise calls for far greater global concern. Today, 15 aging plants provide 40% of Ukraine’s electricity. (Ukraine shut several reactors operating adjacent to the damaged Chernobyl reactor years ago.) Concentrated in four locations, Ukraine’s pressurized water reactors differ from the less stable Chernobyl RBMK design, yet still remain capable of releasing radioactive contents should safeguards fail.
Given that Russia, too, suffered serious consequences from the Chernobyl accident, it is to be hoped that the Kremlin would recoil at the idea of bombing the plants intentionally. But warfare is rife with accidents and human error, and such an event involving a nuclear plant could cause a meltdown.
A loss of off-site power, for example, could be an issue of serious concern. Although nuclear plants are copious producers of electricity, they also require electrical power from other sources to operate. Without incoming energy, cooling pumps will cease functioning and the flow of water that carries heat away from the reactor core – required even when the reactor is in shutdown mode – will stop.
To meet that risk, nuclear plants maintain large emergency diesel generators, which can operate for days – until their fuel runs out. The reactor meltdowns at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi power station in 2011 demonstrated what happens when primary and emergency operating power are cut.
Such vulnerabilities raise troubling questions in the event of a war. Fighting could disrupt off-site power plants or transmission lines servicing the reactor, and could also prevent diesel fuel from reaching the plant to replenish standby generators. Operators could abandon their posts should violence encroach.
Moreover, combatants could invade nuclear plants and threaten sabotage to release radioactive elements to intimidate their opponents. Others might take refuge there, creating a dangerous standoff. A failure of military command and control or the fog of war could bring plants under bombardment.
Serious radiological contamination could result in each of these scenarios. And, though no one stands to gain from a radioactive release, if war breaks out, we must anticipate the unexpected.
In Ukraine, nuclear emissions could exceed both Chernobyl and Fukushima. Wartime conditions would prevent emergency crews from getting to an affected plant to contain radiological releases should reactor containments fail. And, with government services shut down in the midst of fighting, civilians attempting to escape radioactive contamination would not know what to do or where to go to protect themselves.
Such risks might be one reason for Russian President Vladimir Putin to think twice about ordering a military invasion of Ukraine. But, should war come, combatants must do all they can to keep conflict away from the nuclear sites and the off-site power sources feeding them.
Plant operators should stockpile diesel fuel to keep emergency generators operating. They should perform review and maintenance of generators to ensure that they are set to go. In the event of fighting near reactors, the West should prepare to ferry forces to secure the plants and keep the generators operating; and, in the event of a meltdown, the West should rally both governments to initiate a cease-fire to deal with the disaster. Given the stakes, failure to prepare for the worst is not an option.


 

National Radioactive Waste Management Act

In 2005, the Howard Coalition government passed the appalling Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act despite opposition from the ALP and minor parties. In 2012, the ALP government – with Coalition support – passed the National Radioactive Waste Management Act which was a cut-and-paste job, almost as bad as the legislation it replaced.

Now (2018), the Coalition is in government again and spin-doctors like departmental bureaucrat Bruce Wilson say the National Radioactive Waste Management Act is ‘worlds best practice’. It isn’t.

A 2017 report by law student Amanda Ngo summarises the problems with the National Radioactive Waste Management Act 2012.

Undemocratic nuclear waste legislation should be dumped

Jim Green, 10 April 2017, Online Opinion,

http://onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=18961

A new report released by Friends of the Earth Australia points to serious problems with Commonwealth legislation governing the push to establish a national nuclear waste facility in South Australia. The report ‒ written by Monash University fifth-year law student Amanda Ngo ‒ concerns the National Radioactive Waste Management Act 2012 (NRWMA). Its release comes against the backdrop of the federal government’s targeting of a site near Hawker in SA’s Flinders Ranges for a national radioactive waste store and repository.

The NRWMA gives the federal government the power to extinguish rights and interests in land targeted for a radioactive waste facility. In so doing the relevant Minister must “take into account any relevant comments by persons with a right or interest in the land” but there is no requirement to secure consent -‘or to back off if consent is not forthcoming.

Aboriginal Traditional Owners, local communities, pastoralists, business owners, local councils and State/Territory Governments are all disadvantaged and disempowered by the NRWMA.

The NRWMA goes to particular lengths to disempower Traditional Owners ‒ in this case Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners from the Flinders Ranges. The nomination of a site for a radioactive waste facility is valid even if Aboriginal owners were not consulted and did not give consent. Federal Labor MPs complained long and loud about similar provisions in the Howard government’s legislation, describing it as ‘extreme’, ‘arrogant’, ‘draconian’, ‘sorry’, ‘sordid’, and ‘profoundly shameful’. At its 2007 national conference, Labor voted unanimously to repeal the legislation.

But it took five years for Labor Resources Minister Martin Ferguson to repeal the legislation, and Labor’s NRWMA isn’t much different to the legislation it replaced. It states that consultation should be conducted with Traditional Owners and consent should be secured ‒ but that the nomination of a site for a radioactive waste facility is valid even in the absence of consultation or consent.

The NRWMA has sections which nullify State or Territory laws that protect the archaeological or heritage values of land or objects, including those which relate to Indigenous traditions. The Act curtails the application of Commonwealth laws including the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 and the Native Title Act 1993 in the important site-selection stage. The Native Title Act 1993 is expressly overridden in relation to land acquisition for a radioactive waste facility.

Adnyamathanha Traditional Owners have been clear in their opposition to the planned radioactive waste facility in the Flinders Ranges. “I call upon the Federal and State Governments to put an end to this volatile position that the Adnyamathanha people are facing,” said Adnyamathanha Traditional Owner Enice Marsh. “Native Title and the Aboriginal Heritage Act are not protecting our land. This needs a complete review or a Royal Commission. The Barndioota site in the Flinders Ranges must be struck off as a potential radioactive waste dump site and the National Radioactive Waste Management Act needs to be amended to give us the right to say ‘no’.”

Adnyamathanha Traditional Owner Regina McKenzie, who lives on Yappala Station near the proposed dump site, said: “The NRWMA is a political attack on Adnyamathanha women’s spiritual beliefs. The destruction of our culture and significant woman’s sites is a form of assimilation and thus breaches the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”

The NRWMA has been criticised in both Senate Inquiries and a Federal Court challenge to an earlier federal government attempt to impose a national radioactive waste facility at Muckaty in the Northern Territory.

The NRWMA also puts the federal government’s radioactive waste agenda above environmental protection as it seeks to curtail the application of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.

Successive governments have taken baby-steps towards a fair, responsible approach to radioactive waste management. The NRWMA outlines a process for land-owners to volunteer land for a waste facility. That’s clearly an improvement on earlier, failed attempts to impose facilities on unwilling communities. But land-owners weren’t required to consult neighbours or local communities or councils before nominating their land. Thus the process led to acrimonious disputes at many of the nominated sites. The Flinders Ranges site was nominated by a formal Liberal Party politician and the nomination was accepted by the federal government despite overwhelming opposition from Traditional Owners, including those living near the proposed dump site.

Over the past year, the government has revised its process such that it will not accept any future nominations of land for a radioactive waste facility unless the applicant can demonstrate “broad community support”. Again, that’s a welcome step towards a consent-based process. But the government still holds a very big stick behind its back ‒ the NRWMA ‒ which allows it to override opposition from communities, councils and Traditional Owners.

A senior government official told a public meeting in Hawker, near the proposed dump site, that the NRWMA is based on ‘world’s best practice’. In fact, the legislation systematically disempowers local communities and Traditional Owners and weakens environmental protections. It needs to be radically amended or replaced with legislation that protects the environment and gives local communities and Traditional Owners the right to say ‘no’ to radioactive waste facilities.

The ALP’s racist, undemocratic National Radioactive Waste Management Act 2012

The Australian Labor Party voted against the Howard government’s 2005 Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act, with Labor parliamentarians describing it as “extreme”, “arrogant”, “draconian”, “sorry”, “sordid”, and “profoundly shameful”. At its 2007 national conference, Labor voted unanimously to repeal the legislation. Yet after the 2007 election, the Labor government passed legislation − the National Radioactive Waste Management Act (NRWMA) − which was almost as draconian and still permitted the imposition of a nuclear dump with no Aboriginal consultation or consent (to be precise, the nomination of a site was not invalidated by a failure to consult or secure consent).

Here’s some information about the NRWMA and the ALP’s duplicity and racism.


Half-truths and half-lives double community resolve to stop Muckaty nuclear dump

Media Release / March 13, 2012

https://beyondnuclearinitiative.files.wordpress.com/2008/10/120313_mr_muckaty-law-passes.pdf

The Beyond Nuclear Initiative (BNI) says radioactive waste management legislation passed this afternoon in the Senate is deeply flawed and will not slow down the campaign against the proposed Muckaty radioactive waste dump in the Northern Territory. The dump is earmarked for low and long-lived intermediate level waste, including spent fuel rods and decommissioned reactor parts from the Lucas Heights nuclear facility in Sydney.

The National Radioactive Waste Management Bill was introduced two years ago and is strongly opposed by the Northern Territory government, Traditional Owners and a growing number of trade unions and civil society groups.

Minister Ferguson’s legislation repeals three Department of Defence site nominations made by the Howard government ‒ Harts Range, Mt Everard and Fisher’s Ridge ‒ but preserves the highly contested Muckaty nomination.

Mitch, a spokesperson for Harts Range and Mt Everard said “It is almost seven years since the NT dump plan was announced. We are happy that Harts Range is now off the list but we support the Muckaty people to say no. This proposal is based on politics not science. This is a very sad day”.

Muckaty Traditional Owners have launched a federal court case against both the federal government and the Northern Land Council, which nominated the Muckaty site in 2007.

Muckaty Traditional Owner Penny Phillips said, “At the start Senator Nigel Scullion said ‘not on my watch’ will the waste dump happen. He should be fighting against it and look after people in the Territory. Its very confusing for us ‒ the Senators are meant to represent us. Do they care about Traditional Owners, do they care about people in the Barkly, the cattlemen? The government should come and see this country. We have been inviting them many times and they have ignored us”.

“The government should wait for the court case before passing this law. Traditional Owners say no to the waste dump. We have been fighting against this for years and we will keep fighting. We don’t want it in Muckaty or anywhere in the NT,” Ms Phillips added.

BNI coordinator Natalie Wasley said, “Passing this law before consulting with the affected community is putting the radioactive cart before the horse. The Minister has never visited Tennant Creek to talk with Traditional Owners or the broader community. The discussion about Muckaty should be had sitting on red dust, not the red carpet of the Senate”.

Ms Wasley concluded “BNI welcomes the passing of Senator Scott Ludlam’s amendment that international waste cannot be stored at the facility, however, the rest of the legislation is neither new nor good. It builds on the mistakes of the Howard era and lacks credibility and consent. There are still many hurdles for the government before a dump is up and running, and this proposal will be challenged every step of the way.”


Renewed call for Muckaty dump plan to be scrapped as ‘draconian’ nuclear waste legislation hits two-year mark.

March 13, 2014, Media release

http://beyondnuclearinitiative.com/renewed-call-for-muckaty-dump-plan-to-be-scrapped-as-draconian-nuclear-waste-legislation-hits-two-year-mark/

Marking two years since passage of the National Radioactive Waste Management Act (NRWMA), Traditional Owners and supporters have renewed calls for the government to drop plans for locating the first national radioactive waste dump at Muckaty, 120km north of Tennant Creek in the NT.

Beyond Nuclear Initiative convenor Natalie Wasley said, “The National Radioactive Waste Management Act is draconian and gives the Minister absolute discretion in key aspects of radioactive waste management. It overrides any state or territory law that would ‘hinder’ the plan, and limits the application of environmental protection laws, Aboriginal heritage protection legislation, and appeal rights. It does not grant ‘procedural fairness’ in relation to the existing Muckaty nomination.”

“Radioactive waste management laws should require engagement with civil society stakeholders in line with international standards. Australia’s targeting of remote communities considered politicially expedient through application of draconian legislation like the NRWMA is an international embarrassment.”

Traditional Owner Penny Phillips said “We had very hurt feelings when the legislation passed the Senate two years ago. We had been saying no for a long time- my old aunty Bunny Nabarula cried her heart out. People are upset that the new government is pushing ahead, but we are not going to stop fighting. We want the government to put a full stop to the nomination.”

“If the Northern Land Council prepares another nomination on Muckaty then we will stand up to them again. This country is very important to us. We also want people to remember the transport accidents that have happened on the road and rail in the NT. If the waste travels a long way, then any of those areas could be affected.”

Ms Wasley added, “Muckaty is the only site currently under consideration but the community is not being left to fight the proposal themselves. The Public Health Association of Australia, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and other national groups are calling for the proposal to be dropped in favour of an independent Commission to examine all options radioactive waste management. A federal court trial challenging the site nomination will be heard throughout June.” added Ms Wasley.

Ms Phillips concluded “Minister MacFarlane said he will visit Tennant Creek and meet with us. It is time for him to see the country and learn why we are saying no. People are getting tired, especially the old people, but we all work together and we haven’t backed down, we are still strong against it and will keep going until the Muckaty plan is stopped.”


Below are responses to the 2010 tabling of the National Radioctive Waste Management Bill


Ferguson To Dump Nuclear Waste On ‘Soft Target’

Natalie Wasley, New Matilda, 24 Feb 2010
http://newmatilda.com/2010/02/24/ferguson-dump-nuclear-waste-soft-target

The Government wants to go ahead with its radioactive waste dump plans — and it’s no coincidence that those plans involve Aboriginal land far from marginal seats, writes Natalie Wasley

Federal Resources Minister Martin Ferguson announced on Tuesday that he intends to pursue plans for a national radioactive waste repository at Muckaty, 120 kilometres north of Tennant Creek in the Northern Territory.

Ferguson’s media release asserted that he was restoring “fairness” to the difficult issue of managing Australia’s radioactive waste. Elements of the Minister’s announcement do just that — in particular, the repeal of the 2005-06 Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act, extraordinary legislation which permitted the imposition of a dump in the absence of any consultation with or consent from Traditional Owners.

However the Minister’s new legislation entrenches another unfair process which began under the Howard government. Section 11 of the National Radioactive Waste Management Bill 2010 provides the Minister with the power to override any and all State/Territory laws, which might in any way impede his nuclear waste dump plans. Ferguson said yesterday “Our new law will effectively have the same application as the previous government in respect of that area. In no way can we allow any state or territory government to get in the way of establishing a repository”.

Overall then, the Minister is pursing an approach with is scarcely less draconian than that of the Howard government.

Indeed, a reading of the Bill reveals that Ferguson also intends to override the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act and the Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 in relation to site selection. Thus Ferguson is denying the Environment Minister any role in the site selection process.

Ferguson claims that Ngapa Traditional Owners support the nomination of the Muckaty site. He well knows that many Ngapa Traditional Owners oppose the dump — as well as numerous requests for meetings, he received a letter opposing the dump in May 2009 signed by 25 Ngapa Traditional Owners and 32 Traditional Owners from other Muckaty groups. When quizzed about the letter on ABC radio yesterday, Ferguson quickly changed the topic.

Ferguson is also well aware of the unanimous resolution passed by the NT Labor Conference in April 2008 which called on the Federal Government to exclude Muckaty on the grounds that the nomination “was not made with the full and informed consent of all Traditional Owners and affected people and as such does not comply with the Aboriginal Land Rights Act”.

And Ferguson knows that Indigenous Affairs Minister Jenny Macklin among many others has acknowledged the distress and opposition of many Muckaty Traditional Owners.

As well, a joint ALP media release issued in 2007, from Senator Trish Crossin, Senator Kim Carr, Minister Peter Garrett and Minister Warren Snowdon said “Labor understands that many families in the area are strongly opposed to the waste dump idea, and that these families are concerned their rights have been ignored in the process”.

The nomination of the Muckaty site hinges on a contract signed between the Northern Land Council, Federal Government and Muckaty Land Trust, but requests to view this contract — requests made by Traditional Owners and by a Senate Committee dedicated to the issue — have been denied.

The Australian National Audit Office was approached to assess the validity of the “commercial in confidence” status of the contract, but merely referred the request to the Department, which replied that the NLC had requested it remain confidential.

If the negotiations are truly to be “open, transparent and accountable”, as the Rudd Government claims, the site selection study and site nomination deed must be available for independent scrutiny. If not, they will continue to be mistrusted by Traditional Owners and stakeholders who have been shut out of many stages of the process to date.

Traditional Owners opposed to the radioactive waste dump will continue fighting to keep their country clean — and they may prevail after yet another protracted struggle. Muckaty Traditional Owner Dianne Stokes has been speaking against the proposal since its inception and is determined to see it through. “We have been writing letters to the government body signed by the Traditional Owners. We have been asking for someone to come and sit with us so that we can talk to them face to face. We want to keep talking about it and continue to fight it until we are listened to. The big capital N‐O.”

Yesterday, while outlining his new dump process, Ferguson mentioned nuclear medicine repeatedly. But the practice of nuclear medicine in no way depends on securing a dump site — let alone the hotly contested Muckaty site — and it is simply scare-mongering for the Minister to suggest otherwise.

How should we handle the contentious issues surrounding nuclear waste? It’s easier said than done, but all we need is a little common sense. Firstly, as with the production of all other hazardous materials, it needs to be demonstrated that radioactive waste is not being produced unnecessarily. It is by no means clear that Australia needs to operate the research reactor at Lucas Heights — our sole reactor. Measured by radioactivity, the reactor (and in particular its spent nuclear fuel) is the source of well over 90 per cent of the waste in question. For its part, the Labor Party, when in opposition, was itself opposed to the construction of the new “OPAL” research reactor.

Secondly, all options for radioactive waste management need to be considered — not just the option of “remote” repositories (which are always more remote for some people than for others). This includes the option of ongoing storage at the Lucas Heights site, which is operated by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation. ANSTO is the source of most of the waste and is host to most of Australia’s radioactive waste management expertise. All the relevant organisations have acknowledged that ongoing storage at Lucas Heights is a viable option — those organisations include ANSTO, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, the Australian Nuclear Association and even Ferguson’s own department.

Additionally, requiring ANSTO to store its own waste is the best — and perhaps the only — way of focussing the organisation’s collective mind on the importance of waste minimisation principles.

Thirdly, if a site selection process is required it ought to be based on scientific and environmental siting criteria, as well as on the principle of voluntarism — if a community gets a site like this, it should be because that community can see benefits in it. At the moment site selection is made for rather different reasons. In 2005, the Howard government chose the Northern Territory, and ruled out NSW, on purely political reasons.

When the federal Bureau of Resource Sciences conducted a national repository site selection study in the 1990s, informed by scientific, environmental and social criteria, the Muckaty site did not even make the short-list as a “suitable” site. The fact that Martin Ferguson now favours it isn’t about the site being genuinely suitable — it’s about Muckaty being seen as a politically soft target.


Nuclear waste dump likely for NT

Sara Everingham, February 23, 2010
www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2010/s2828142.htm

MARK COLVIN: The Federal Government has announced plans to repeal legislation which could force the Northern Territory to accept a national nuclear waste dump.

But a dump is likely to be located there anyway. It looks increasingly likely that waste will be kept at a remote pastoral property on Aboriginal land north of Tennant Creek. It has been offered to the Federal Government as a possible site. But there’s debate about whether Aboriginal custodians have been properly consulted.

SARA EVERINGHAM: The Federal Government says low and medium level nuclear waste being reprocessed overseas has to be returned to Australia and a nuclear waste facility is needed to store it. The longstanding question has been where it will go. Muckaty Station, 120 kilometres north of Tennant Creek could be the site.

The Federal Resources Minister Martin Ferguson.

MARTIN FERGUSON: The initial consideration will be for the site that has volunteered to be by the Northern Land Council on behalf of the Ngapa people.

SARA EVERINGHAM: In 2005 the Howard government introduced legislation that would override any Northern Territory law opposing a nuclear waste dump being established in the Northern Territory. It looked to the Northern Territory after South Australia won a High Court challenge against a federal government’s plan to build the facility there.

The former government nominated three sites on defence force land in the Northern Territory as possible locations. The Northern Land Council nominated another Muckaty Station on Aboriginal land.

Now Martin Ferguson says his Government plans to overturn that legislation.

MARTIN FERGUSON: I will introduce in its place a process which requires me as the Minister to actively engage to establish a purpose-built facility, having proper regard to the normal processes that exist in Australia, going to issue of heritage and environmental protection.

SARA EVERINGHAM: The bill rules out the three sites proposed by the previous government. That leaves Muckaty Station. The traditional owners at Muckaty Station offered a one and a half square kilometre patch of land for a one-off payment of $12 million.

In 2007 one of those traditional owners told the ABC they made the decision for their children’s future but 57 other traditional owners from the Muckaty Land Trust have signed a petition opposing its use as a nuclear waste dump.

Diane Stokes is one of them.

DIANE STOKES: I want to get the traditional owners together, talk about it and then maybe have a ceremony to show Martin Ferguson who we are, because he didn’t come when we asked him.

We’ve written him a letter to come, he never come towards us. He never came and faced us. He never came and talked to us. None of the people, not even the NLC came and talked to the traditional owners.

SARA EVERINGHAM: The Northern Land Council wasn’t available for an interview today. A spokesman says the council is still waiting to see the full detail of the legislation. In the past the council has said it has consulted with the relevant traditional owners within the Muckaty Land Trust.

Natalie Wasley from the Beyond Nuclear Initiative says all the traditional owners in the land trust have the right to be consulted.

NATALIE WASLEY: There’s a large number of traditional owners who have written to the Minister, the latest letter which was received by the Minister in the middle of 2009 has 57 signatures from traditional owners who have strong cultural connections to that area, expressing opposition to the proposal.

And this is a very important document because there’s a large number of people from the Ngapa group which is the group the Minister is purporting are all in support of this proposal. So it clearly does not have consent from all of the affected people.

SARA EVERINGHAM: Have you spoken to the traditional owners who have nominated their site?

NATALIE WASLEY: I haven’t spoken directly to those traditional owners. They have been mostly in discussion with the Northern Land Council but I have spent a number of years around Tennant Creek and speaking with people affected by this proposal and they have said they will sustain their opposition, they strongly believe they have a right to be speaking about this proposal.

SARA EVERINGHAM: The Muckaty nomination has also been criticised by Martin Ferguson’s own Labor colleagues. In opposition in 2007, Peter Garrett said the consultation process was a joke and that the project needed the full consent of communities.

Martin Ferguson says Muckaty Station will be subject to a full scientific and environmental assessment and most importantly, the approval of Muckaty’s traditional owners including those who don’t approve of the proposal.

MARTIN FERGUSON: Well I’ve indicated to the Northern Land Council that I’m prepared to meet with the traditional owners. It would then be a requirement for them through my department to have full and proper negotiations.

SARA EVERINGHAM: If Muckaty Station fails those tests, the Minister says he’ll call for other nominated sites around the country.


Central Land Council reponse to dump law

The Central Land Council (CLC) expressed “profound disappointment” that the Senate passed the National Radioactive Waste Management Bill on March 13, describing the legislation as “fundamentally flawed”.

CLC Director David Ross said: “This legislation retains many of the provisions that are in the old Act (Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act 2005). It seeks to find a politically expedient solution, shows contempt for state and Territory laws, and a disregard for decision making processes enshrined in the Land Rights Act.

“This legislation is shameful, it subverts processes under the Land Rights Act and is clearly designed to reach the outcome of a dump being located on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory, whether that’s the best place for it or not.

“The passage of this legislation will further inflame the tensions and divisions amongst families in Tennant Creek, and cause great stress to many people in that region. The Minister should have acknowledged some time ago that the Muckaty nomination is highly contested, and he should have insisted on a thorough and proper consultation process as set out in the Land Rights Act.”


MEDIA RELEASE – GREENS SENATOR SCOTT LUDLAM

23 February 2010
Radioactive Waste Dump: Territory still the target
The Government has foreshadowed the introduction of legislation to repeal the Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act, but left Muckaty Station outside Tenant Creek as the most likely target for the national radioactive waste dump.
“If Resources Minister Martin Ferguson is serious when he says, ‘there is no pre-determined site outcome’ and that he is putting in place proper processes for site selection, then he should scrap Muckaty and start from scratch, then we’ve got half a chance of an honest process,” said Greens spokesperson on nuclear issues Senator Scott Ludlam.
“The nomination of Muckaty Station as a site for the dump was only possible under the Radioactive Waste Management Amendment Act (2006) – which the ALP opposed, and described as ‘a major attack on the rights of Traditional Owners and an abuse of power’
“How can the Government continue to progress the nomination of Muckaty, while claiming to repeal the Act that made it possible?
“Muckaty has been contested from the start – this proposal promises to make the debate even more divisive,” Senator Ludlam said.


Nuclear waste likely to be dumped in NT

By Jano Gibson and Kirsty Nancarrow
www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/02/23/2827837.htm?site=darwin
February 23, 2010

Resources and Energy Minister Martin Ferguson has revealed Muckaty Station, about 120 kilometres north of Tennant Creek, as the location the Federal Government will pursue for a national radioactive waste repository.

“We will proceed firstly with the only voluntary site that we have, and that goes to the Ngapa land with respect to the Muckaty Station,” he told 105.7 ABC Darwin.

Mr Ferguson said several sites preferred by the Howard government would no longer be pursued.

“We have knocked out the three sites which were not volunteered by the community but were determined by politicians in Canberra,” he said.

This is “despite the fact that scientifically they actually stack up”.

Should environmental and scientific assessments fail at the Muckaty site, Mr Ferguson said the nuclear waste dump could be located elsewhere in Australia.

“I also have the capacity, if I assess that that is not a proper site, to then open up to a national voluntary site nomination process.”

Mr Ferguson said the Government would this week repeal Howard government legislation that would have enabled it to force the waste dump on the Northern Territory.

He said radioactive waste stored at the site would not be linked to Australia’s uranium exports, but to isotopes used in medical treatments.

Ownership disputed

He said the Muckaty site had been nominated by the Northern Land Council, however he acknowledged that some traditional owners were not in agreement.

“Clearly there are some differences in terms of the Muckaty Land Trust.”

He said before the site could be approved as a waste dump, the Northern Land Council would “have to prove that it’s been done in accordance with the law of the Northern Territory”.

He said a final decision on the dump site would still take a long time.

“If the science stacks up, and if it meets environmental approvals – but thirdly and more importantly, it obtains the necessary approval from the Ngapa people, through the Northern Land Council – then it will potentially be the appropriate site.”

Natalie Wasley from the Beyond Nuclear Initiative says the decision is extremely disappointing.

“There is an agreement that was made between the Northern Land Council, the Federal Government and some traditional owners of the land trust,” she said.

“This agreement has never been made public and there’s been a number of documents submitted by other traditional owners calling for the contract and the agreement to be made public so they can see what’s actually been agreed upon for their country.

“It’s a very contested nomination.”

A woman representing some traditional owners of the Muckaty Land Trust says she wants the Federal Resources Minister to visit her country before making decisions about a nuclear waste facility.

Dianne Stokes represents the area’s Miyilwayi traditional owners and says any past agreement with the Ngapa people is not valid.

“I want to get the traditional owners together, talk about it and maybe have a ceremony to show Martin Ferguson who we are, because he didn’t come when we asked him,” she said.

“We’ve written him a letter to come.

“He never came towards us, he never came and faced us, he never came and talked to us.

“None of the people, not even the NLC, came and talked to the traditional owners.”

‘Unilateral nomination’

The Greens Senator Scott Ludlum has asked whether Mr Ferguson actually read correspondence from traditional landowners who oppose the waste dump.

“The Muckaty nomination for a nuclear waste dump is heavily contested,” he said.

“It was at the time that it does not have the continued support of the Ngapa clan as the Minister’s press release wrongly states.

“And can the Minister outline what appeal rights will be available to people aggrieved by the Northern Land Council’s unilateral nomination of their land for this facility.”

The Territory Government says it may try to block the Federal Government if it attempts to establish a nuclear waste facility at Muckaty Station.

The Chief Minister, Paul Henderson, says he is pleased the Government intends to remove its legislation blocking the Territory’s environmental assesment processes.

But Mr Henderson says the Government should have considered other sites in Australia.

He says the Territory is preparted to get into a stoush and it could win if the science shows Muckaty is not the best location.

He says recent earthquakes in the area raise questions about the appropriateness of the site.


FERGUSON DUMPING ELECTION PROMISES

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, AUSTRALIA
FEBRUARY 23, 2010

Federal resources minister Martin Ferguson’s announcement that he will pursue plans for a national nuclear waste dump at the Muckaty site, north of Tennant Creek in the NT, continues the shabby and unfair process set in train by the Howard government.

Mr Ferguson’s media release falsely claims that the nomination of the Muckaty site has the support of the Ngapa Traditional Owners. He well knows that many Ngapa Traditional Owners oppose the dump; for example he was sent a letter opposing the dump in May 2009 signed by by 25 Ngapa Traditional Owners and 32 Traditional Owners from other Muckaty groups.

Mr Ferguson is also well aware of the unanimous resolution passed by the NT Labor Conference in April 2008 which called on the federal government to exclude Muckaty on the grounds that the nomination “was not made with the full and informed consent of all Traditional Owners and affected people and as such does not comply with the Aboriginal Land Rights Act”.

Mr Ferguson should redress the glaring conflict of interest whereby Land Councils are meant to represent Traditional Owners yet stand to profit if they can persuade Traditional Owners to host a dump.

His comments linking the dump to nuclear medicine are disingeuous. The ongoing practice of nuclear medicine is in no way dependent on securing a dump site anywhere let alone pursuing the hotly-contested Muckaty nomination. Only 10-20% of the waste arises from nuclear medicine.

Mr Ferguson’s claims that it is low-level waste and that it will be safely buried are false. Measured by radioactivity, over 90% of the waste comes from the overseas reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from Lucas Heights nuclear research reactors. This long-lived intermediate-level nuclear waste (LLILW) will be stored above ground adjacent to the dump site. This ‘interim’ above-ground storage could last for decades or centuries since the government has made no progress establishing a deep underground repository for LLILW.

Mr Ferguson’s handling of the issue has been highly secretive – a clear breach of Labor’s 2007 election promise to handle the issue in a transparent and accountable manner. He says he intends to consult after announcing a dump site. But that is not consultation – it is an insult.

None of the sites under consideration in the NT was short-listed when scientific and environmental criteria were used by the federal government’s Bureau of Resource Sciences to assess alternative sites around in Australia for a radioactive waste repository in the 1990s. The NT was selected on purely political grounds, just as NSW was excluded on purely political grounds.

Mr Ferguson should repeal the nomination of the Muckaty site and start from scratch with an inquiry into all the options available for managing Australia’s radioactive waste, including the option of ongoing storage at the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor site – the source of most of the waste and most of Australia’s radioactive waste management expertise. Mr Ferguson’s department, the Lucas Heights nuclear agency ANSTO, the regulator ARPANSA, and the Australian Nuclear Association have all said that waste can continue to be stored at Lucas Heights.


LUDLAM, Senator Scott, Western Australia

I move That the Senate take note of the answer given by the Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research (Senator Carr) to a question without notice asked by Senator Ludlam today relating to a nuclear waste dump.

I rise to take note of the answer that was given by the Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, Senator Carr, a short time ago on behalf of the Minister for Resources and Energy, Mr Martin Ferguson, who we are told will tomorrow introduce legislation, presumably into the House of Representatives, repealing the Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act 2005 and the amendments to it that were passed in 2006. Both the original act and the amendments in 2006 were opposed by the Labor Party, who were in opposition at the time. I can remember their words well. I was working for Senator Siewert at the time and we were gobsmacked that the Howard government was moving with such speed to coercively land a radioactive waste dump, which is the responsibility of the entire country, on a series of politically vulnerable communities in the Northern Territory. I can remember very clearly the positions that were taken at the time by ALP senators in this place, who spoke with heart and conviction I believe on the absolutely unjust tactics that were being used against politically vulnerable communities in the Northern Territory. It is entirely the wrong way to go about dealing with some of the most intractable and most dangerous categories of waste that industrial society has ever produced.

It is profoundly sad to see how close Minister Carr could have come to getting it right with the announcement that we have seen today. The government has announced that it is opening the process up to take another look and to take nominations for other sites, and that is an acknowledgement that the former process was really going nowhere. But it leaves live the nomination of a site on Muckaty Station—an Aboriginal managed cattle station outside Tennant Creek—and that is absolutely unconscionable. It was based on a nomination that was flawed. It was based on legislation that members of the present government opposed when it was passed. They said that it ran ‘roughshod over affected Indigenous communities’ and that it was legislation ‘driven at the behest of one land council in the Northern Territory’ that effectively shut out traditional owners. The government thinks that it will somehow be able to let that nomination—which has been put forward under the 2006 amendments to the act—stand, built on that foundation that was condemned at the time by the Australian Greens, by the Democrats and by the Labor Party.

A little bit of history: I think it would really have helped if the minister had read the unanimous report that the Senate Environment, Communications and the Arts Legislation Committee produced at the end of 2008. Senator Birmingham, who is in the room at the moment, attended those hearings, and I am sure that it made as strong an impression on him and other senators as it did on me to hear the evidence from the people most closely affected at Muckaty—people with traditional responsibilities for the lands around Muckaty Station who gave clear and unambiguous evidence at the time that the nomination around that area was absolutely contested and not shared by the five families who make up the Muckaty Land Trust. I read one quote—and I wish the minister had read it or been in the room at the time that it was said—from Ms Marlene Bennett. She tendered this evidence to the committee in Alice Springs on 17 November 2008, and she travelled a long way to be there. She said:

I am also very disappointed in the NLC consultation process. The NLC is the Aboriginal people’s voice, and they failed to represent them.

She went on:

I think the consultation process was very flawed and that the time for trying to pull the wool over people’s eyes is past. Open and honest discussion should be happening involving all the right people, not just with certain elements of the people.

All they are asking for is inclusion and for the opportunity for their voice to be heard. When the committee visited Alice Springs—we have never been to Muckaty Station—it was the first time that those people had been invited to have their voice heard in this debate. I thought that was shameful at the time. They really appreciated the opportunity to do that and I hope that that same committee, or whichever committee the Senate chooses to refer the bill to when it is finally introduced into this place, will be given time to sit down with the people most intimately concerned rather than with bureaucrats sitting in offices thousands of kilometres away and making these decisions which have profound implications for the lives of people with responsibilities for culture and country a long way from this building.

Finally, I touch on the fact that there is no engineering or scientific reason why we prefer remote sites, for why we continually choose remote Aboriginal communities as repositories for this waste. We heard from Mr Bradley Smith from the Federation of Australian Scientific and Technological Societies, who said:

It would appear that politically the pragmatics seem to be that that is the only viable site at the moment that I am aware of for a Commonwealth facility.

Similarly, Mr Steven Mackintosh, from ANSTO, when asked ‘Why does Australia mainly look at remote sites?’ answered:

I believe it is for political reasons, Senator.

There is a lot more of this story yet to tell.


MAPW debunks medical need for Muckaty nuclear dump

Medical Association for Prevention of War
Media Release, 23/02/2010

http://www.mapw.org.au/news/doctors-debunk-medical-need-nuclear-waste-dump

MAPW today issued a statement expressing concern over today’s announcement by Energy Minister Martin Ferguson that the Australian Government will pursue Muckaty Station in the Northern Territory as the preferred site for a nuclear waste dump. MAPW President Dr Bill Williams said:

“Mr Ferguson is quoted as saying that the waste requiring storage in this dump is isotopes used in medical treatments. This dump is absolutely not needed for this purpose. MAPW believes that the safest current option for management of this toxic waste is likely to be continued storage at the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor.”

“The decision to store the waste on Aboriginal land at Muckaty station fails to meet world standards, either for scientific appraisal, or for community consultation.”

“The Minister has not fully assessed all options available for storage of the waste, including the costs, risks and benefits of continued storage at Lucas Heights,” Dr Williams said.

MAPW policy notes that nuclear waste is a long-lived and serious environmental hazard, and remains an unresolved problem in every place that has nuclear power or nuclear weapons. The policy also notes that that Indigenous Australians have already suffered from imposition of nuclear contamination through the British nuclear bomb tests at Maralinga.


Public Health Association of Australia

POLITICS AHEAD OF HEALTH:

CONTRADICTION BETWEEN LABOR NUCLEAR WASTE PLAN AND INDIGENOUS HEALTH POLICY

Decision to proceed with Muckaty Station Nuclear Waste Dump based on ideology not science

The Public Health Association of Australia today expressed its disappointment at the Commonwealth Government’s announcement to proceed with attempting to locate a national nuclear waste dump on Mukarty Station, a remote Aboriginal owned station in the Northern Territory.

“The decision to push ahead with a proposed nuclear waste dump on Muckaty Station in the Northern Territory goes against good health and environmental policy”, said PHAA environmental health spokesperson and NT Branch Secretary Clive Rosewarne.

“The ALP has produced an unsatisfactory outcome for all Northern Territorians but most especially those traditional owners of Muckaty station that have for the last 5 years expressed their opposition to having the facility placed on their land”.

“This decision defies the logic of best practice in radioactive waste management and is an abrogation of a clear promise by the ALP prior to the last election”.

There is no scientific imperative to force this dump on any NT community. The Bureau of Resource Sciences identified a region in SA, even the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation has stated that its waste could be stored on site at Lucas Heights. Therefore there is no need then to have a waste dump unless there is an intention to import waste from overseas. This is a political decision.

The Public Health Association in submissions to both the Howard and Rudd governments and in public evidence to a Senate inquiry called for the Commonwealth government not to proceed with attempting to force a nuclear waste dump on the Northern Territory.

In 2008 the Public Health Association, in a joint letter to the Prime Minister asked the Government to honour its pre-election commitment to repeal the Howard government’s Radioactive Waste Management Act. Today’s announcement by Minister Ferguson does not honour that promise, but rather attempts to wriggle out of it, by repealing one piece of legislation with another version focused solely on one community. This new proposal is slap in the face to all Territorians and most particularly Aboriginal Territorians with legitimate concerns for their community’s health.

“While the transportation and storage of radioactive waste pose a potential health threat, the experience of marginalisation and disempowerment felt by Aboriginal people because of the government’s approach may contribute to negative health outcomes that are stress related”.

“This process has placed Aboriginal people under incredible stress. Today’s announcement greatly increases that stress and sends a message to Aboriginal Australia that the nuclear industry in this country comes first. The Rudd government’s credibility on Aboriginal health and its commitment to closing the health gap must be questioned when on an issues with obvious health consequences they ride rough shod over clearly expressed local community opposition”, said Mr Rosewarne.


NT Government still opposed to dump

Debates – Eleventh Assembly, First Session – 02/16/2010 – Parliamentary Record No: 11
Topic Date: 02/23/2010
Question: Nuclear Waste Facility in Territory– Government Opposition
Question Date: 02/23/2010

Member: Mr TOLLNER
To: CHIEF MINISTER

Today, your comrades in the federal parliament have said they will be repealing legislation which allowed the nuclear waste facility to be built in the Northern Territory. However, in the same breath, they are saying they are negotiating to build the facility at Muckaty Station and this, in fact, is their preferred site. It is a fact that your federal Labor comrades ran a completely deceptive and dishonest campaign and intended to place the facility in the Northern Territory the whole way through. Are you going to continue to oppose the facility coming here, or will you roll over, say one thing at election time, and do another.

ANSWER

Madam Speaker, it is patently clear that Territorians know the government’s position has been clear, consistent, and it continues today. We oppose the establishment of a nuclear waste facility at Muckaty Station. We oppose that, unlike the member of Fong Lim and Senator Scullion from the Northern Territory who support the establishment of a nuclear waste facility in the Northern Territory.

We will continue to oppose the establishment of that facility at Muckaty Station. The reason why we do oppose, and will continue to oppose, that facility is that it has not been through the same rigorous scientific process that occurred from 1992 to 2004 – a rigorous and scientific process that was established to look at sites around Australia. It is very clear to me that this whole process needs to be revisited and we need to begin again. Scientific criteria need to be established and agreed on for what the site should contain. Sites across Australia that comply with those scientific criteria should be volunteered or nominated for examination.

I have been very clear in the media today that the Australian government should be accepting nominations from other sites around Australia, not just considering Muckaty in isolation. The sites should be narrowed down until the best sites are discussed, full-blown environmental and scientific and heritage assessments should occur, and consultations should occur with the broader local community. And then, and only then, should a final decision be made.

We have been very clear, we have been very consistent, and we will continue to oppose the siting of a nuclear waste facility at Muckaty Station in the Northern Territory.


The Hon Martin Ferguson AM MP

23 Feb 2010

FAIRNESS RESTORED TO RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROCESS

10/024

The Minister for Resources and Energy, Martin Ferguson AM MP, will this week introduce the National Radioactive Waste Management Bill 2010 to the Australian Parliament.

This honours our longstanding commitment to repeal the Howard Government’s Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act 2005.

The new legislation finally provides a proper process to establish a purpose-built facility for managing radioactive waste generated by Australia’s medical, industrial, agricultural, and research use of nuclear material.

Minister Ferguson said: “The Bill being introduced this week means that a site can no longer be automatically imposed on a community in any State or Territory.

“Firstly, the three sites selected by the Howard Government on Defence land in the Northern Territory have been ruled out, as we promised before the 2007 election.

“Secondly, there is no pre-determined site outcome – the new Bill requires any site to be volunteered by the landowners.

“Affected landowners and communities must also be consulted.

“Thirdly, the Bill restores procedural fairness rights that were stripped away by the Howard Government.

“Fourthly, the Bill ensures the selected site will go through full environmental, heritage and other approvals processes.”

The Bill contains provisions for two volunteer nomination processes.

The first allows a Land Council to volunteer Aboriginal land on behalf of Traditional Owners and the second provides for a nation-wide volunteer process.

The Bill also recognises that Ngapa land on Muckaty Station was a volunteer nomination by the Northern Land Council in 2007 and that the Commonwealth entered into a Site Nomination Deed in relation to that land.

The nomination has the continuing support of the Ngapa clan and the Full Council of the Northern Land Council.

The Deed has no termination date and the parties to it have the reasonable expectation that the Commonwealth will act in good faith and good spirit to implement the 2007 agreement.

For that reason, the new Bill allows the nomination of Ngapa land on Muckaty Station to stand and it will also allow the Land Council to nominate other Ngapa land if that is the wish of the Traditional Owners.

Minister Ferguson said: “Australia has been attempting to meet its international obligations to properly manage its own radioactive waste since 1988.

“It is about time we did so.”

Australia’s radioactive waste stockpile is presently stored at more than 100 less-than-ideal sites at Australian universities, hospitals, offices and laboratories, mostly in our capital cities.

While safe, this situation is not consistent with international best practice.

Australian research reactor waste is also presently stored in Scotland and France.

We have both contractual obligations and a moral responsibility to accept the return of our own waste for proper management by 2015-16.

Australia’s low and intermediate level radioactive waste is an unavoidable result of very many worthwhile activities including the screening and treatment of cancer and other diseases, as well as medical research.

Every year, around 500,000 Australians undergo medical procedures using radioisotopes produced by the research reactor at Lucas Heights.


ACF: Wasted opportunity: Minister gets it wrong on radioactive dump

23 Feb 2010, www.acfonline.org.au/articles/news.asp?news_id=2703

Resources Minister Martin Ferguson’s intention to locate a radioactive waste dump at Muckaty in the Northern Territory continues the Howard Government’s approach to nuclear waste and is inconsistent with Labor promises and policy, the Australian Conservation Foundation said today.
Minister Ferguson today ruled out three of the four sites on his shortlist, leaving Muckaty, 120 kilometres north of Tennant Creek, as the only one he would pursue.
“By putting Muckaty in the frame and advancing a process based on secrecy Minister Ferguson has wasted an opportunity to fulfil federal Labor’s clear 2007 election promise,” said ACF nuclear campaigner Dave Sweeney.
“Anything less than full repeal of the Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act and a site selection process that is open, transparent and consultative would be inconsistent with Labor’s 2007 election pledges and would continue the Howard Government approach to nuclear waste and Indigenous communities.
“Attempts to dump nuclear waste at Muckaty will be fiercely contested.
“Every state and territory in Australia has laws preventing the establishment of a nuclear waste dump so moves to open up a ‘national voluntary site nomination process’, where marginalised communities bid to host a nuclear dump, are not only ethically questionable but face serious legislative barriers.
“The carrot, stick and secrecy approach is no way to manage radioactive waste.
“It is time for a fresh start and an open and responsible process from the Federal Government,” he said.
ACF is urging the Federal Government to fulfil its promise to establish a “consensual process of site selection” based on “agreed scientific grounds for determining suitability” and “community consultation and support”.


Warren Mundine’s nuclear allegiances

Warren Mundine’s nuclear allegiances

Jim Green, Online Opinion, 11 April 2012, www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=13478&page=0

Warren Mundine, a member and former National President of the ALP, and co-convener of the Australian Uranium Association’s Indigenous Dialogue Group, has been promoting the nuclear industry recently. Unfortunately he turns a blind eye to the industry’s crude racism, a problem that ought to be core business for the Indigenous Dialogue Group.

Mundine could have mentioned the legacy of uranium mining in the Wiluna region of WA; to pick one of many examples. Uranium exploration in the region in the 1980s left a legacy of pollution and contamination. Greatly elevated radiation levels have been recorded despite the area being ‘cleaned’ a decade ago. Even after the ‘clean up’, the site was left with rusting drums containing uranium ore. A sign reading “Danger − low level radiation ore exposed” was found lying face down in bushes.

In August 2000, coordinator of the Wiluna-based Marruwayura Aboriginal Corporation Steve Syred said that until 1993, 100−150 people were living three kilometres from the spot where high radiation levels were recorded. Syred told the Kalgoorlie Miner that the Aboriginal community had unsuccessfully resisted uranium exploration in the area in the early 1980s. Since then many people had lived in the area while the Ngangganawili Aboriginal Corporation was based near the contaminated site. Elders still hunted in the area.

Another example ignored by Mundine was in late March when the NSW government passed legislation that excluded uranium from provisions of the NSW Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 thus stripping Aboriginal Land Councils of any say in uranium mining.

Yet another example ignored by Mundine was the 2011 amendments to the S.A. Roxby Downs Indenture Act 1982. This is the legislation that governs operations at the Olympic Dam uranium and copper mine and retains exemptions from the S.A. Aboriginal Heritage Act. Traditional Owners were not even consulted in the amendments or exemptions. The S.A. government’s spokesperson in Parliament said: “BHP were satisfied with the current arrangements and insisted on the continuation of these arrangements, and the government did not consult further than that.”

That disgraceful performance illustrates a broader pattern. Aboriginal land rights and heritage protections are feeble at the best of times. But the legal rights and protections are repeatedly stripped away whenever they get in the way of nuclear or mining interests. The Olympic Dam mine is largely exempt from the S.A. Aboriginal Heritage Act and any uranium mines in NSW are to be exempt from provisions of the NSW Aboriginal Land Rights Act. Likewise, sub-section 40(6) of the Commonwealth’s Aboriginal Land Rights Act exempts the Ranger uranium mine in the N.T. from the Act.

Mundine claims that Australia has “a legal framework to negotiate equitably with the traditional owners on whose land many uranium deposits are found”. That claim is disingenuous.

Native Title rights were extinguished with the stroke of a pen by the Howard government to seize land for a radioactive waste dump in South Australia. Aboriginal heritage laws and Aboriginal land rights are being trashed with the current push to dump in the Northern Territory. Federal Resources Minister Martin Ferguson’s National Radioactive Waste Management Act overrides the Aboriginal Heritage Act, sidesteps the Aboriginal Land Rights Act, and allows for the imposition of a dump on Aboriginal land even in the absence of any consultation with or consent from Traditional Owners.

David Ross, Director of the Central Land Council, noted in a March 14 media release: “This legislation is shameful, it subverts processes under the [Aboriginal] Land Rights Act and is clearly designed to reach the outcome of a dump being located on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory, whether that’s the best place for it or not. This legislation preserves the Muckaty nomination without acknowledging the dissent and conflict amongst the broader traditional owner group about the process and the so-called agreement. The passage of this legislation will further inflame the tensions and divisions amongst families in Tennant Creek, and cause great stress to many people in that region.”

A small number of Traditional Owners support the N.T. dump proposal. However most are opposed and the Northern Territory Government supports that opposition, key trade unions including the Australia Council of Trade Unions, church groups, medical and health organisations, and environmental groups. If push comes to shove, there will be a blockade at the site to prevent construction of the dump.

A pro bono legal team is assisting Traditional Owners with their legal challenge against the nomination of the Muckaty site. At a Federal Court hearing on March 27, a Commonwealth lawyer argued that the government’s legislation allows the nomination of a dump site to stand even if the evidence regarding traditional ownership is false.

These patterns are evident in other countries. North American Indigenous activist Winona LaDuke from the Anishinabe Nation told the Indigenous World Uranium Summit in 2006: “The greatest minds in the nuclear establishment have been searching for an answer to the radioactive waste problem for fifty years, and they’ve finally got one: haul it down a dirt road and dump it on an Indian reservation”.

Here in Australia the situation is scarcely any better than it was in the 1950s when the British were exploding nuclear bombs on Aboriginal land. Which brings us to another of Mundine’s blind spots. He could have mentioned the latest ‘clean up’ of the Maralinga nuclear test site, which was done on the cheap. Nuclear engineer and whistleblower Alan Parkinson said of the ‘clean-up’: “What was done at Maralinga was a cheap and nasty solution that wouldn’t be adopted on white-fellas land.”

Mundine’s claim to support Aboriginal empowerment is contradicted by his consistent failure to speak out when mining and nuclear interests and governments that support those interests disempower Aboriginal people.

—————>

Environmentalists respond to Warren Mundine’s attacks

1 Aug 2014, Indymedia

http://indymedia.org.au/2014/08/01/environmentalists-respond-to-warren-m…

Tony Abbott says he wants to make a ”new engagement” with indigenous people. But there’s nothing new about finding opportunists like Warren Mundine to provide political cover for a racist government. That tactic is tried and tested. Only the names change.

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Mine deal allegations against Warren Mundine and Aboriginal corporation

July 11, 2014, Richard Baker and Nick McKenzie

http://www.theage.com.au/national/mine-deal-allegations-against-warren-m…

A company that was part-owned and directed by the federal government’s chief indigenous adviser, Warren Mundine, helped broker a highly questionable deal that gave a mining company access to an Aboriginal sacred site in outback Western Australia.

—————>

The sorry tale of Lake Disappointment, the missing mining millions and Warren Mundine

July 10, 2014, Richard Baker and Nick McKenzie

http://www.theage.com.au/national/the-sorry-tale-of-lake-disappointment-…

—————>

Legal advice questioned controversial mining deal

July 15, 2014, Richard Baker and Nick McKenzie

http://www.theage.com.au/national/legal-advice-questioned-controversial-…

—————>

Questions over Warren Mundine’s involvement in mining deal

12 Jul 2014, Richard Baker and Nick McKenzie

http://www.afr.com/p/national/questions_over_warren_mundine_involvement_…

—————>

First principles owed to our first people

July 14, 2014, The Age – Editorial

http://www.theage.com.au/comment/the-age-editorial/first-principles-owed…

—————>

Cash, missing cars fail to spark criminal probe in to indigenous body

July 12, 2014, Richard Baker, Nick McKenzie

http://www.smh.com.au/national/cash-missing-cars-fail-to-spark-criminal-…

Responses to the above Fairfax articles:

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Jeff McMullen: Neoliberalism, market fundamentalism and the colonization of Aboriginal policy

by Colin Penter, March 14th, 2014

http://thestringer.com.au/jeff-mcmullen-neoliberalism-market-fundamental…

The Australian journalist, writer and social justice campaigner Jeff McMullen has written two cogent and articulate critiques of the colonization of Aboriginal policy making in this country by the cancer of neo-liberalism (or what others call market fundamentalism).

One of Jeff McMullen’s articles The New Land Grab is available on line here (in The New Internationalist blog). The second piece is a book chapter titled Dispossession- Neoliberalism and the Struggle for Aboriginal Land and Rights in the 21st Century which appears in a new book In Black and White: Australians at the Cross Roads (edited by Rhonda Craven, Anthony Dillon & Nigel Parbury). This article is available here on Jeff McMullen’s own website

McMullen is scathing about the role played by influential Aboriginal leaders, such as Noel Pearson, Marcia Langton and Warren Mundine who have become influential advocates and brokers for neoliberal policies and have gathered adherents and supporters in both political parties and corporate Australia.

——————->

I don’t represent anyone but Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, says Warren Mundine

25 June 2014

Warren Mundine has confirmed what many First Nations leaders and community members suspected all along – he doesn’t represent anyone but the Prime Minister, Tony Abbott. The Chairman of the Indigenous …

——————->

Elders reject Warren Mundine’s attack on Green groups

Warren Mundine is a man driven by ideology whose Lore and Culture is dollar signs, according to two prominent Elders who were responding to Mr Mundine’s scathing attack on Green groups. In an opinion …

09 July 2014

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Who says Mundine can represent us?

22 August 2013

Leaders react to Tony Abbott’s advisory council plans Reaction to Warren Mundine’s Garma address have been mixed with one leader declaring Mr Mundine was “on another planet” and “should not be up there …

——————->

Mundine my “kindred spirit” to fix plight of First Peoples, says Abbott

15 August 2013

Coalition leader, Tony Abbott believes he and Warren Mundine are kindred spirits seeking to improve the plight of Aboriginal people. Mr Abbott said there was a need to convert all the good thinking from …

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Green groups hit back at Mundine

8 July 2014

http://www.afr.com/p/national/green_groups_hit_back_at_mundine_fA4HGMI1uF5TZlQgBIKxhK

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Response to Warren Mundine, letter published in the Australian Financial Review

April 2012

http://nuclearfree.wordpress.com/media/?preview=true&preview_id=11&previ…

It’s time to stop radioactive racism

Globally the nuclear industry is in decline and has been for a long time. The price of uranium was briefly inflated along with false dreams of a nuclear renaissance, in reality the industry is waning. The Fukushima disaster reminded both communities and financial institutions that nuclear power is far too risky for life on this planet.

In Western Australia we have a very aggressive uranium exploration program, sponsored by the State Government, yet deeply opposed by the people. We have a strong history of resistance against uranium mines and a proud history of stopping these mines. In the 1970′s my elders fought against uranium mining at Yeelirrie. In the 1980′s people from the Western Desert marched down St Georges Terrace in the thousands against uranium mining on their lands and we are proud to say we’ve never had a uranium mine in WA. We are going to keep it that way.

Warren Mundine wrote to the Financial Review promoting the nuclear industry. He wants uranium mining, he wants nuclear power and he wants the international community to dispose of its nuclear waste here, all on our lands. Mr Mundine does not speak for us here in Western Australia and has no right to talk about what should or should not happen on our country.

Some of the communities who are being barraged by these wanna be miners have generations of knowledge about uranium ‘poison’. We know better than most, the dangers of uranium. We also have generations worth of experience in dealing with mining companies , of witnessing their broken promises and the deep enduring failures of government to protect our country and people.

We don’t need someone from the East Coast, from Canberra or Canada to tell us what we should or shouldn’t do. Uranium stays in the ground. We have a saying, “Wanti* Uranium, leave it in the ground!” (*leave it)

The nuclear industry across Australia takes it’s toll on Aboriginal communities; from the nuclear weapons testing in Maralinga and Monte Bello island, from the trial mines in Wiluna, Yeelirrie and Manyingee in WA, to the abandoned mines in the NT & Queensland at Rum Jungle and Alligator River and Mary Kathleen, the existing mines at Ranger and Beverley and Roxby Downs in SA. The defeated proposed waste dump in South Australia now proposed for Muckaty Station in the NT. This industry preys on remote Aboriginal communities keeping everything out of sight and out of mind.

Across Australia there has never been a uranium mine that has not leaked radioactive mine waste into the environment, this industry has been tried and consistently failed.

The risk to our lands, to life itself far outweigh the measly rewards, the few jobs on offer, the State government royalties. It is not worth the long term damage to our country and to our water.

These mines will only last for 10 years or 20 years but as custodians we have thousands of years of waste. Long after this State government is a memory, long after the mining companies have gone broke we will be living with the radioactive legacy of their greedy short term ambitions. I and the people of West Australian Nuclear Free Alliance will not sell future generations short.

Kado Muir is the Chairperson of the West Australia Nuclear Free Alliance, he is a Ngalia man and a custodian for Yeelirrie – one of the uranium deposits under exploration by BHP Billiton.

Michael Shellenberger’s pro-nuclear lobby group ‘Environmental Progress’

Michael Shellenberger ‒ Self-confessed liar; Dangerous promoter of worldwide nuclear weapons proliferation; Supports abolition of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; Darling of the dishonest, far-right Murdoch media.

In this webpage:


A devastating three-part critique of Shellenberger’s behavior over many years


Articles in Nuclear Monitor — review of Shellenberger’s book ‘Apocalypse Never’

Articles published in Nuclear Monitor #888, July 30, 2020

Finally, Shellenberger admits to his long history of dishonesty — see the first of these articles:

Book review: Michael Shellenberger goes full Trump with reheated conspiracy theories: Shellenberger’s book Apocalypse Never serves up ‘luke-warmism’ ‒ downplaying the risks associated with climate change and attacking environmentalists for climate ‘alarmism’. But he has been misrepresenting and attacking climate science since 2010 if not earlier. His current luke-warmism is reheated, and there’s certainly nothing new about his demonization of environmentalists.

Shellenberger’s nuclear nonsense: economics, waste, radiation, disasters: Michael Shellenberger claims that his book Apocalypse Never is based on the ‘best-available science’. But the book’s many claims about nuclear issues are based on selective use of expert views, or attributed to anonymous ‘experts’ or even ‘friends’, or based on nothing at all.

Shellenberger’s nuclear nonsense: The myth of the peaceful atom: Shellenberger thinks nuclear weapons “make us peaceful” and he promotes nuclear weapons proliferation. Having previously written at length about the many interconnections between nuclear power and weapons programs ‒ and having criticized the “nuclear community” for its “increasingly untenable position of having to deny these real world connections” ‒ Shellenberger himself now downplays and denies the connections.


Questions Michael Shellenberger won’t answer, falsehoods  he refuses to correct

Here’s a list of questions sent repeatedly to Shellenberger in 2018. He has not responded. Questions 1 and 4-8 refer to falsehoods that Shellenberger refuses to correct. Questions 2,3 and 9 refer to some of his unhinged and conspiratorial attacks on NGOs.

  1. You state “One of FOE-Greenpeace’s biggest lies about nuclear energy is that it leads to weapons.”[1] Leaving aside the point that the connections between civil and military nuclear programs are well understood[2] ‒ and a number of the connections are openly acknowledged by nuclear industry bodies and supporters[3] ‒ can you cite any FOE statements about nuclear power/weapons connections which could reasonably be described as “lies”?
  2. You assert that FOE “oppose cheap and abundant energy”.[4] Do you have any evidence to justify that statement?
  3. You assert that the anti-nuclear movement has a “long history of Malthusian anti-humanism aimed at preventing “overpopulation” and “overconsumption” by keeping poor countries poor.”[5] Can you provide any evidence in support of that statement that doesn’t date from the 1960s or early 1970s?
  4. In an ‘investigative piece’ aimed squarely at FOE and Greenpeace, you list three groups which you claim have accepted donations “from fossil fuel … investors”[1]. However FOE and Greenpeace aren’t included in the list of three groups. Do you have any evidence of FOE or Greenpeace receiving donations from fossil fuel investors, other than the 1969 donation to FOE that you frequently cite?
  5. You assert that donors and board members of FOE “are the ones who win the government contracts to build solar and wind farms, burn dirty “renewable” biomass, and import natural gas from the United States and Russia.”[1] Do you have any evidence to support that statement?
  6. You insinuate in a newspaper article that FOE accepts funding from natural gas companies.[6] Elsewhere, your group asserts that FOE is “fossil fuel-funded”.[7] Do you have any evidence to support those claims?
  7. You assert[1] that FOE keeps its donors secret and in support of that claim you cite an article that doesn’t even mention FOE.[5] Do you have any evidence to support the claim?
  8. You claim that FOE has hundreds of millions of dollars in its bank and stock accounts.[8] Do you have any evidence to support that statement?
  9. You assert that FOE’s “agenda has never been to protect humankind but rather to punish us for our supposed transgressions.”[1] Do you have any evidence to support that statement?

References:

  1. Michael Shellenberger, 16 Oct 2017, ‘Enemies of the Earth: Unmasking the Dirty War Against Clean Energy in South Korea by Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Greenpeace’, http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/10/16/enemies-of-the-earth-unmasking-dirty-war-friends-of-earth-greenpeace-south-korea-nuclear-energy
  2. Nuclear Monitor #804, 28 May 2015, ‘The myth of the peaceful atom’, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/804/myth-peaceful-atom
  3. Nuclear Monitor #850, ‘Nuclear power, weapons and ‘national security”, 7 Sept 2017, https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/850/nuclear-power-weapons-and-national-security
  4. Michael Shellenberger, Mark Nelson, Madi Czerwinski, Michael Light, John Lindberg, and Minshu Deng / Environmental Progress, Aug 2017, ‘The High Cost of Fear: Understanding the Costs and Causes of South Korea’s Proposed Nuclear Energy Phase-Out’, http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/8/22/the-high-cost-of-fear
  5. Michael Shellenberger, 25 July 2017, ‘Greenpeace’s Dirty War on Clean Energy, Part I: South Korean Version’, http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/7/25/greenpeaces-dirty-war-on-clean-energy-part-i-south-korean-version
  6. Michael Shellenberger, July 2017, ‘Why the World Needs South Korea’s Nuclear’, http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/7/24/chosun-op-ed-why-the-world-needs-south-koreas-nuclear
  7. www.facebook.com/environmentalprogress/posts/1972320853034270
  8. Michael Shellenberger, Mark Nelson, Madi Czerwinski, Michael Light, John Lindberg, and Minshu Deng / Environmental Progress, Aug 2017, ‘The High Cost of Fear: Understanding the Costs and Causes of South Korea’s Proposed Nuclear Energy Phase-Out’, http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/8/22/the-high-cost-of-fear

Book review: Bad science and bad arguments abound in ‘Apocalypse Never’ by Michael Shellenberger

A new book that critiques environmentalism is ‘deeply and fatally flawed.’

By Dr. Peter H. Gleick, 15 July 2020

https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2020/07/review-bad-science-and-bad-arguments-abound-in-apocalypse-never/

Think, if you will, of the feud between the Montagues and the Capulets in “Romeo and Juliet.” Or of the 1863-1891 classic American feud between the Hatfields and the McCoys, warring families in West Virginia and Kentucky.

In the decades-old tensions involving environmental science, population, resource dynamics, and ecology, it’s the Malthusians and the Cornucopians. Subscribing to the wisdom of English economist Thomas Malthus, Malthusians express concerns that exponential human population growth and economic demands will outrun global resources needed to support people, undermining long-term sustainability. Cornucopians, in contrast – with their nod to the cornucopia or “horn of plenty” of Greek mythology – hold that technological advances can sustain societal needs and that unbounded economic growth and increased population are positive, giving rise to more good ideas.

Review

The historical tensions and intellectual debates between Malthusians and Cornucopians are now more than two centuries old and have evolved. In recent years, the public conversation around critical global crises like human-caused climate change, deforestation and species extinction, population pressures, and new and worsening public health threats has grown louder, harsher, and increasingly ideological. As the sciences have improved, the deep complexity and connections among these problems have also become more apparent, as have urgent calls to address them through local, national, and global actions.

A recent entry in this debate is Michael Shellenberger’s “Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All” (HarperCollins Publishers, 2020). Shellenberger explains in his introduction that he seeks to counter and dismiss what he considers irrational, overwrought arguments of pending Malthusian catastrophes; instead, he seeks to promote the Cornucopian view that environmental problems can be eliminated if we’d just pursue aggressive economic growth, simple technological advances, and increased tapping of abundant natural resources. In doing so, he echoes previous efforts of authors like Herman Kahn, Julian Simon, and Bjørn Lomborg.

Climate dialogue seen as ‘out of control’

Shellenberger self-describes as an environmentalist activist and a bringer of facts and science to counter “exaggeration, alarmism, and extremism that are the enemy of a positive, humanistic, and rational environmentalism.” He decided to write this book because he believes “the conversation about climate change and the environment has, in the last few years, spiraled out of control.”

Voices of reason and clear analyses in the contentious debates about how to tackle our global problems are welcome. Unfortunately, the book is deeply and fatally flawed. At the simplest level, it is a polemic based on a strawman argument: To Shellenberger, scientists, “educated elite,” “activist journalists,” and high-profile environmental activists believe incorrectly that the end of the world is coming and yet refuse to support the only solutions that he thinks will work – nuclear energy and uninhibited economic growth.

‘What is new in here isn’t right, and what is right isn’t new.’

But even if the author properly understood the complexity and nature of global challenges, which he does not, and got the science right, which he did not, a fatal flaw in his argument is the traditional Cornucopian oversimplification of his solutions – reliance on economic growth and silver-bullet technology. As the great American journalist and humorist H. L. Mencken said, “there is always a well-known solution to every human problem – neat, plausible, and wrong.” Mencken also warned against those who know precisely what is right and what is wrong, a warning especially worth hearing in the highly complex and uncertain worlds of global climate, pandemics, and environmental change.

But the problems in the book go much deeper. The author wanders from topic to topic, jumping from personal anecdote to polemical arguments to data and numbers carefully chosen to support his views, making it difficult for the reader to follow his threads. The most serious flaw, however, is that he assumes a position and seeks data and facts to fit that position rather than, as science demands, using data and facts to develop, test, and refine a theory. As a result, the book suffers from logical fallacies, arguments based on emotion and ideology, the setting up and knocking down of strawman arguments, and the selective cherry-picking and misuse of facts, all interspersed with simple mistakes and misrepresentations of science. Distressingly, this is also an angry book, riddled with ugly ad hominem attacks on scientists, environmental advocates, and the media.

I provide just a few examples of these flaws here – a comprehensive catalog would require its own book. In short, what is new in here isn’t right, and what is right isn’t new.

Two Cornucopian ideas lie at the heart of this book: The first idea is that there are no real “limits to growth” and environmental problems are the result of poverty and will be solved by having everyone get richer. This idea isn’t original and has long been debunked by others (for a few examples see hereherehere, and here).

View that nuclear alone can address needs

The second idea – and the focus of much of Shellenberger’s past writings – is that climate and energy problems can and should be solved solely by nuclear power. He writes, “Only nuclear, not solar and wind, can provide abundant, reliable, and inexpensive heat,” and, “Only nuclear energy can power our high-energy human civilization while reducing humankind’s environmental footprint.” (“Apocalypse Never” – hereafter “AN” – pp. 153 and 278) The many economic, environmental, political, and social arguments levied against nuclear are simply dismissed as having no merit, for example: “As for nuclear waste, it is the best and safest kind of waste produced from electricity production. It has never hurt anyone and there is no reason to think it ever will.” (AN, p. 152) His passionate belief that nuclear is the only answer to our energy and climate problems (maybe along with a mega-dam on the Congo River in Africa) is matched by the corollary that renewable energy alternatives – he calls them “unreliables” (AN, p. 176) – are bad because he asserts they are small scale, intermittent, and their economic, environmental, political, and social problems disqualifying.

The argument that poverty and environmental threats are intertwined is both correct and not new. It lies at the heart of international development efforts, including the early United Nations Millennium Development Goals and the current Sustainable Development Goals, which state:

“The Sustainable Development Goals are the blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all. They address the global challenges we face, including those related to poverty, inequality, climate change, environmental degradation, peace and justice. The 17 Goals are all interconnected.” (emphasis added)

Similarly, mainstream experts in environmental science and environmental economics have long acknowledged that all energy options have complex sets of environmental advantages and disadvantages. The fields of energy risk assessment, integrated environmental systems analysis, and ecological economics have addressed them for decades.

Using the facade of ‘strawman arguments’

Shellenberger regularly sets up other strawman arguments and then knocks them down. [A strawman argument is an effort to refute an argument that hasn’t been made by replacing your opponent’s actual argument with a different one.] One of the most prevalent strawman arguments in the climate debate is that scientists claim climate change “causes” extreme events, when in fact, climate scientists make careful distinctions between “causality” and “influence” – two very different things. This area, called “attribution science,” is one of the most exciting aspects of climate research today.

Shellenberger sets up the strawman argument that people are incorrectly claiming recent extreme events (like forest fires, floods, heat waves, and droughts) were caused by climate change, and then he debunks this strawman. “Many blamed climate change for wildfires that ravaged California” (AN, p.2) and “the fires would have occurred even had Australia’s climate not warmed.” (AN p. 21) He misrepresents how the media reported on the fires, describing a New York Times story on the 2019 Amazon fires: “As for the Amazon, The New York Times reported, correctly, that the ‘fires were not caused by climate change.’” But here Shellenberger is cherry-picking a quote: If you look at the actual article he cites, the journalist makes clear the “influence” of climate change just two sentences later:

“These fires were not caused by climate change. They were, by and large, set by humans. However, climate change can make fires worse. Fires can burn hotter and spread more quickly under warmer and drier conditions.” (emphasis added)

He also misunderstands or misrepresents the extensive and growing literature on the links between climate change and extreme events, saying “But climate change so far has not resulted in increases in the frequency or intensity of many types of extreme weather” (AN, p. 15) citing out-of-date research, including a workshop from 15 years ago. In fact, a large and growing body of literature already shows strong links between climate change and extreme events, including hurricanes, heat deaths, flooding, decreasing ice, and more (see, for a few examples, herehere, and here), and this literature has been expanding rapidly. For instance, in 2019, the American Meteorological Society, or AMS, published a summary – produced annually – with 21 peer-reviewed analyses of extreme weather in 2018 including the research of 121 scientists from 13 countries. The severe Four Corners drought in the U.S., intense heat waves on the Iberian peninsula and in northeast Asia, exceptional precipitation in the mid-Atlantic states, and record-low sea ice in the Bering Sea were all examples of extreme weather events “made more likely by human-caused climate change.” As Jeff Rosenfeld, the editor-in-chief of the AMS series, noted, “We’ve now published more than 100 of these attribution studies in this AMS series and can see how powerful this science is getting. Attribution studies increasingly yield useful, nuanced conclusions that embrace real-world complexity,” Rosenfeld wrote. “They collectively make an ever starker statement about the human influence on extreme weather.”

Another example of a serious conceptual confusion is his chapter dismissing the threat of species extinctions. The chapter is full of misunderstandings of extinction rates, ecosystem and biological functions, confusions about timescales, and misuses of data. For example, Shellenberger confuses the concept of species “richness” with “biodiversity” and makes the astounding claim that

“Around the world, the biodiversity of islands has actually doubled on average, thanks to the migration of ‘invasive species.’ The introduction of new plant species has outnumbered plant extinctions one hundred fold.” (AN, p. 66)

By this odd logic, if an island had 10 species of native birds found only there and they went extinct, but 20 other invasive bird species established themselves, the island’s “biodiversity” would double. This error results from a misunderstanding of the study he cites, which properly notes that simply assessing species numbers (richness not biodiversity) on islands ignores the critical issues of biodiversity raised by invasive species, including the disruption of endemic species interactions, weakening of ecosystem stability, alteration of ecosystem functions, and increasing homogenization of flora and fauna.

Another set of classic logical fallacies is the misuse, misrepresentation, and selective use of evidence. Shellenberger sees himself as the white knight bringing science and facts to emotional arguments. “Every fact, claim, and argument in this book is based on the best-available science … Apocalypse Never defends mainstream science from those who deny it on the political Right and Left.” (AN, p. xiii) But often, his arguments are based on inappropriate use of evidence, outdated or cherry-picked science, misunderstandings or misrepresentation, or just outright errors.

One of the most common flaws is his confusing use of the terms “can,” “could,” “will,” “will likely,” and so on. These grammatical choices usually reflect classic Cornucopian optimism and the advantage of telling the audience a positive story, rather than one based on the actual evidence. For example, he claims:

“When it comes to food production, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) concludes that crop yields will increase significantly, under a wide range of climate scenarios.” (AN, p. 6, emphasis added)

What great news, if only we knew for sure it were true and under all plausible climate scenarios. But in fact, this is a misrepresentation of the 2018 FAO report cited, which looks at possible futures and actually says:

“Climate change already has negative effects on crop yields, livestock production and fisheries, particularly in low- and middle- income countries. Such impacts are likely to become even stronger later in this century. (emphasis added)

“Unaddressed climate change, which is associated, inter alia, with unsustainable agricultural practices, is likely to lead to more land and water use, disproportionately affecting poor people and exacerbating inequalities within and between countries. This carries negative implications for both food availability and food access.

There are many other examples where his optimism (things “will” happen) overrides the scientific evidence and uncertainties about the future.

Misrepresenting what scientists actually say or said

Shellenberger’s discussion of nuclear energy and risk also misrepresents what scientists say. He states “mixing up reactors and bombs was, as we say, the go-to strategy for Malthusian environmentalists” (AN, p. 242), but to support this claim he offers the work of Drs. Paul and Anne Ehrlich and John Holdren in their 1977 book Ecoscience. Shellenberger quotes their factual statement that “A large reactor’s inventory of long-lived radioactivity is more than one thousand times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.” (Ecoscience, p. 445) But he then falsely says they are implying reactors can explode like bombs: “The implication was wrong. Nuclear reactors cannot detonate like bombs.” (AN, p. 242) Shellenberger was eager to set up the strawman that “Malthusian environmentalists” don’t know the difference between nuclear reactors and nuclear bombs, but in the paragraph right before the statement he quoted, Ehrlich, Ehrlich, and Holdren (the latter trained in part as a nuclear physicist, by the way) literally write: “It is physically impossible for an LWR [light-water reactor] or any thermal-neutron reactor to blow up like a nuclear bomb.” (Ecoscience, p. 444)

This is just one of a series of misrepresentations of the works of the Ehrlichs and Holdren. Just a few paragraphs later, for instance, he says “Holdren and the Ehrlichs had to claim fossil fuels were scarce to oppose the extension of fertilizers and industrial agriculture to poor nations and to raise the alarm over famine.” (AN, p. 242) This is the exact opposite of what they have long argued. To quote Dr. Holdren: “What environmentalists mainly say on this topic is not that we are running out of energy, but that we are running out of environment – that is, running out of the capacity of air, water, soil, and biota to absorb” the environmental, social, and health impacts of burning fossil fuels. (emphasis added)

Another example of the confusions running through Shellenberger’s narratives is the section “Greed Saved the Whales, Not Greenpeace.” His argument is that cheap oil, epitomized by the discovery of oil in Pennsylvania, saved the whales: “The discovery of the Drake Well led to widespread production of petroleum-based kerosene… thus saving the whales.” (AN, p. 111) Just a page later, however, he acknowledges “But then, whaling came back, and in a big way. Between 1904 and 1978, whalers killed one million whales, nearly three times more than had been harvested before.” He then claims that cheap vegetable oils (ironically in the form of palm oil from deforestation in the Congo) saved the whales, but then again has to acknowledge that massive whale kills continued.

What finally led to today’s almost near moratorium on whale hunts? Not just changes in market forces, not changes in energy sources, not “greed” and the growth in wealth and prosperity as he argues, but the change in public opinion pushed by environmental groups and the public. And oddly, his last sentence in this chapter acknowledges this: “When it comes to protecting the environment by moving to superior alternatives, public attitudes and political action matter” (AN, p. 125) – exactly the point of environmental advocacy groups like Greenpeace that worked to change public opinion.

Scientific uncertainty is not the same as ‘We don’t know’

Shellenberger misunderstands the concept of “uncertainty” in science, making the classic mistake of thinking about uncertainty in the colloquial sense of “We don’t know” rather than the way scientists use it to present “a range of possibilities.” In his discussion about catastrophic tipping points like loss of ice sheets, forest and species die back in the Amazon, and changes in ocean circulation, he says (AN, p. 25):

“The high level of uncertainty on each, and a complexity that is greater than the sum of its parts, make many tipping point scenarios unscientific … there is no scientific evidence that one would be more probable or catastrophic than other potentially catastrophic scenarios, including an asteroid impact, super-volcanoes, or an unusually deadly influenza pandemic.”

This is both wrong and hardly comforting. First, high levels of uncertainty are not “unscientific” and second, while most of the climate assessments of the IPCC and others generally do not assess the risk of global catastrophes like these, they do not rule them out, especially if we are too slow to act. The late climate scientist Dr. Stephen Schneider, in a critique of this same argument made by another Cornucopian, addressed the critical importance of looking at extreme risk probabilities at the “fat tail” of probability distributions and said:

“It is precisely because the responsible scientific community cannot rule out such catastrophic outcomes at a high level of confidence that climate mitigation policies are seriously proposed.”

Thus, when scientists discuss possible catastrophic climate risks, they are not being “apocalyptic” – they are responsibly identifying risks that must be evaluated and discussed in the context of science, economics, public policy, and public health.

Another classic logical fallacy is to try to discredit an opponent’s argument by attacking the person and her or his motives, rather than the argument – hence the Latin “ad hominem” (“against the man”). Ad hominem attacks are pervasive in this book and detract from its tone and the content. Shellenberger attacks “apocalyptic environmentalists” as “oblivious, or worse, unconcerned” about poverty (AN, p. 35) or for opposing a massive dam on the Congo river. (AN, p. 276) He attacks the finances of leading environmental groups and leaders like the late David Brower, arguing they have taken donations from fossil fuel companies to “greenwash the closure of nuclear plants.” (AN, p. 205) And he attacks the motives, reputations, and science of many individual environmental and geophysical scientists whose work contradicts his arguments.

Do media and environmental scientists have the opposite of a ‘love for humanity’?

But Shellenberger has a special level of animosity for the press:

“News media, editors, and journalists might consider whether their constant sensationalizing of environmental problems is consistent with their professional commitment to fairness and accuracy, and their personal commitment to being a positive force in the world. While I am skeptical that stealth environmental activists working as journalists are likely to change how they do their reporting, I am hopeful that competition from outside traditional news media institutions, made possible by social media, will inject new competitiveness into environmental journalism and raise standards” (AN, p. 277-278)

In the most disturbing examples of vicious personal attacks, he paints broad categories of people who disagree with him as motivated by a hatred of humanity:

“When we hear activists, journalists, IPCC scientists, and others claim climate change will be apocalyptic unless we make immediate, radical changes, including massive reductions in energy consumption, we might consider whether they are motivated by love for humanity or something closer to its opposite (AN, p. 275, emphasis added). We must fight against Malthusian and apocalyptic environmentalists who condemn human civilization and humanity itself.” (AN, p. 274) (emphasis added).

He argues in his closing sections that people worried about environmental disasters are playing out “a kind of subconscious fantasy for people who dislike civilization” (AN, p. 270) and suggests that people who oppose the solutions he prefers do so because they long for the destruction of civilization – a nasty attack on the motives of all those working in this field.

Finally, the book is riddled with a variety of simple errors. Any book with as many numbers, citations, and claims is at risk of having some mistakes, of course. But the number and scope of them here is problematic. A comprehensive catalog is well beyond the scope of this review, but one example is a massive misstatement of the amount of water required to produce energy. He says “And burning gas rather than coal for electricity requires 25 to 50 times less water.” (AN, p. 118) As shown by the actual numbers from the reference he cites, however, the difference is a factor of around two or less, not 25 to 50. And in an important omission, he fails to note that key renewable energy sources such as wind and solar photovoltaics require far less water per unit of electricity produced than all fossil fuel and nuclear thermal plants. In his discussion about climate change and extreme events, he leaves out extensive peer-reviewed evidence (like this 2015 paper, among many others) showing how fire seasons have gotten much longer as a result of rising temperatures and changing precipitation patterns. He claims, twice (AN pp. 211 and 241), that nuclear power plants produce “zero pollution” – an inaccurate and unnecessary exaggeration.

A common shared goal for ‘a better future’

Shellenberger no doubt believes in, and supports, the goal of a better future. So do environmental scientists, activists, and any decent human. The disagreements we hear lie in different perceptions of the root causes of our crises and the choice of solutions to move our current world to that better future. But ideological polemics, misunderstandings and misrepresentations of science, and angry ad hominem attacks on others working in the field do nothing to move us in the right direction.

There is uncertainty about the best path forward. Those who believe the evidence shows our current path crosses dangerous planetary limits and may lead to severe environmental and social disruption can’t prove an apocalyptic future will happen – they’re arguing we must do what we can to avoid it. But neither can Cornucopians prove that narrow technological solutions and unconstrained economic growth will avoid those catastrophic futures. The imbalance of these viewpoints is key however: if Malthusians are wrong, all they would have done is made the world a better place. If Cornucopians are wrong, apocalyptic outcomes are indeed a real possibility.

Where does that leave us? Identifying, publicizing, and working to avoid future environmental and social disasters is vitally important. I’ve worked at the intersection of science and policy on issues of climate change, freshwater resources, and environmental conflicts for more than 40 years, and the good news is that positive, effective solutions exist. We know how to provide safe water and sanitation to the billions who still lack it. We know we must now work to both cut greenhouse gas emissions to reduce the severity of climate change and at the same time work to adapt to the impacts we can no longer avoid. We know how to improve agricultural efficiency to both grow enough food for everyone and to get it to hungry mouths.

What we lack are adequate efforts to prioritize solutions, fix governmental and institutional failures, motivate policymakers, and, sadly, talk rationally to each other about moving forward quickly and effectively. This book fails to contribute to those much-needed efforts.

Dr. Peter H. Gleick is president emeritus of the Pacific Institute, a member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, a MacArthur Fellow, and winner of the 2018 Carl Sagan Prize for Science Popularization.


The four types of climate denier, and why you should ignore them all

Damian Carrington, 30 Jul 2020, The Guardian

A new book, described as “deeply and fatally flawed” by an expert reviewer, recently reached the top of Amazon’s bestseller list for environmental science and made it into a weekly top 10 list for all nonfiction titles.

How did this happen? Because, as Brendan Behan put it, “there’s no such thing as bad publicity”. In an article promoting his book, Michael Shellenberger – with jaw-dropping hubris – apologises on behalf of all environmentalists for the “climate scare we created over the last 30 years”.

Shellenberger was named a hero of the environment by Time magazine in 2008 and is a loud advocate of nuclear power, but the article was described by six leading scientists as “cherry-picking”, “misleading” and containing “outright falsehoods”.

The article was widely republished, even after being removed from its first home, Forbes, for violating the title’s editorial guidelines on self-promotion, adding further heat to the storm. And this is why all those who deny the reality or danger of the climate emergency should be ignored. Obviously, I have broken my own rule here, but only to make this vital point once and for all.

The science is clear, the severity understood at the highest levels everywhere, and serious debates about what to do are turning into action. The deniers have nothing to contribute to this.

However infuriating they are, arguing with them or debunking their theories is likely only to generate publicity or money for them. It also helps to generate a fake air of controversy over climate action that provides cover for the vested interests seeking to delay the end of the fossil fuel age.

But the deniers are not all the same. They tend to fit into one of four different categories: the shill, the grifter, the egomaniac and the ideological fool.

The book I started with has now been knocked off the environmental bestsellers list, fittingly enough by one published by the environmental hero Rachel Carson, in 1951. I can’t profess to know what Shellenberger’s motivation was, but one thing is clear: the egomaniacs and ideological fools will get the place in history they so lust for. It will be a small footnote marking the useful idiots of the climate war.


Book review: Michael Shellenberger’s reheated critique of climate ‘alarmism’

Jim Green, RenewEconomy, 7 Aug 2020

https://reneweconomy.com.au/book-review-michael-shellenbergers-reheated-critique-of-climate-alarmism-54464/

California-based Michael Shellenberger first courted controversy in 2004 with his ‘death of environmentalism’ critique of the environment movement and has continued to attract controversy by promoting nuclear power, demonising renewable energy (“renewables are worse for the environment than fossil fuels”) and demonising the environment movement that he claims to be part of.

Shellenberger’s is now into ‘luke-warmism’ — downplaying the risks associated with climate change and attacking environmentalists for climate and environmental ‘alarmism’. That’s the focus of his new book, Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All. In fact, Shellenberger has been downplaying climate risks since 2010 if not earlier — his luke-warmism is reheated.

A number of factual rebuttals of Shellenberger’s claims about environmental alarmism have been written, and more will follow (1,2,3,4,5). Climate Feedback asked six scientists to review Shellenberger’s lengthy opinion piece which promotes his book. They found its overall scientific credibility to be ‘low’ and most found it indulged in cherry-picking and misleading statements.

Shellenberger’s claim that “climate change is not making natural disasters worse” is inaccurate and contradicts numerous scientific studies linking climate change to temperature extremes, drought, precipitation patterns, and wildfires.

His claims about species extinction are wrong, his claims about fires and their connection to climate change are misleading and contradict scientific studies, his claim that 100% renewables would require increasing the land used for energy from today’s 0.5% to 50% is wildly inaccurate, and so on.

Daniel Swain from UCLA and the US National Center for Atmospheric Research said Shellenberger’s article “presents a mix of out-of-context facts and outright falsehoods to reach conclusions that are, collectively, fundamentally misleading”. Jennifer Francis from the Woods Hole Research Center said that “many statements are half-truths or based on cherry-picked information” and “some are outright false.”

Shellenberger’s luke-warmism reads like a PR campaign clumsily constructed by a fossil fuel company. In response to sea level rise ‘alarmism’, he reassures us that “Netherlands became rich, not poor while adapting to life below sea level”.

Right-wing, anti-environment supporters

Predictably, the right-wing, anti-environment media are amplifying Shellenberger’s messages. The Murdoch News Corp. press has been especially excited — Shellenberger is “News Corps latest golden ”environmentalist’ … pushing the Murdoch line against renewables” according to former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.

Ketan Joshi joined the dots:

“Shellenberger appeared three times on Sky News Australia, a News Corp outlet that relies heavily on major advertising dollars from several key fossil fuel companies and lobby groups; eg Hancock Prospecting and the federal and NSW Minerals Council. He wrote or featured in ten articles in The Australian, which regularly places full page advertisements from the coal lobby.”

Climate science-denying organisations, including those with links to fossil fuel industries, are also falling over themselves to promote Shellenberger and his new book. His interview with the far-right, fossil fuel-funded Heartland Institute — one of many such interviews — is mutual admiration from start to finish.

“Climate needs to have its importance diminished”, Shellenberger told the Heartland Institute. “The main function of the IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] appears to be to terrify people. I don’t know what else it does. … I’m not sure the organisation needs to exist any more,” he said.

Pro-nuclear frenemies

Shellenberger’s latest claims have attracted criticism even from some nuclear power advocates. Climate scientist Kerry Emanuel said he was “very concerned” about Shellenberger’s opinion piece and is reconsidering his position as an adviser to Shellenberger’s lobby group Environmental Progress. Emanuel said Shellenberger is “embracing disinformation” and that there is “plenty of evidence” that climate change is making natural disasters worse despite Shellenberger’s claim to the contrary.

Climate scientist Tom Wigley said “some damage will be done” as Shellenberger’s words “may be misrepresented by people who don’t believe in human-caused global warming”.

Zeke Hausfather from the Breakthrough Institute (which Shellenberger co-founded in 2007) said that Shellenberger’s opinion piece includes a mix of “accurate, misleading, and patently false statements” and that “inaccurately downplaying real climate risks is deeply problematic and counterproductive”.

Hausfather said the Breakthrough Institute and Shellenberger are “not on friendly terms” and Shellenberger “in no way reflects our views”, partly because of disagreements “about the role of nuclear as a climate silver bullet vs. part of a broader portfolio of decarbonization technologies”.

Nuclear engineer Katie Mummah said: “Michael Shellenberger is not the only pro-nuclear environmentalist and many of us do not share his views on 1. whether or not climate change is a crisis 2. the value of renewables 3. how to communicate about nuclear energy 4. nuclear weapons.”

Australian economist Prof. John Quiggin writes:

“Michael Shellenberger’s “apology essay” is the last gasp of “ecomodernism”. Although ecomodernists make a lot of claims, the only one that is distinctive is that nuclear power is the zero-carbon “baseload” energy source needed to replace coal, and that mainstream environmentalists have wrongly opposed it.

“Historically, there is something to this. It would have been better to keep on building nuclear plants in the 1980s and 1990s than to switch from oil to coal, and it was silly for Germany to shut down nuclear power before coal.

“But none of that is relevant anymore, at least in the developed world. Solar PV and wind, backed up storage are far cheaper than either nuclear or coal. As a result, there have been very few new coal or nuclear plants constructed in developed countries in recent years. …

“At this point, Shellenberger is faced with the choice between admitting that the mainstream environmentalists were right or explicitly going over to the other side. He has chosen the latter.”

Technically accurate nuclear snapshot

Strangely, Shellenberger provides a good snapshot of the current state of nuclear power in Apocalypse Never, followed by this caveat: “While all of the above is technically accurate, I carefully excluded key facts in order to be misleading …”

Here’s a sample of his technically accurate snapshot:

“Every effort to make nuclear plants safer makes them more expensive, according to experts, and higher subsidies from governments are required to make them cost-effective. Those soaring subsidies, combined with the financial cost of accidents like Fukushima, estimated to be between 35 trillion yen and 81 trillion yen ($315 billion to $728 billion) by one private Japanese think tank, make nuclear one of the most expensive ways to generate electricity.

“Meanwhile, from Finland and France to Britain and the United States, nuclear plants are way behind schedule and far over budget. Two new nuclear reactors at Britain’s Hinkley Point C were estimated to cost $26 billion but will now cost as much as $29 billion. Expansion of a nuclear plant near Augusta, Georgia, which was supposed to take four years and cost $14 billion for two new reactors, is now expected to take ten years and cost as much as $27.5 billion. All of this makes nuclear too slow and expensive to address climate change, many experts say.

“Nuclear has what energy experts call a “negative learning curve,” meaning we get worse at building it the more we do it. Most technologies have a positive learning curve. Take solar panels and wind turbines, for instance. Their costs declined 75 percent and 25 percent, respectively, since 2011. The more we make of them, the better we get at it and the cheaper they become. …

“Today, the developed world is abandoning nuclear. Germany is almost done phasing it out. France has reduced nuclear from 80 percent to 71 percent of its electricity and is committed to reduce it to 50 percent. In the United States, nuclear could decline from 20 percent to 10 percent of its electricity by 2030. Belgium, Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan are all phasing out their nuclear plants.”

That’s a good summary of the sickly state of nuclear power and it isn’t much changed by the “key facts” that Shellenberger “carefully excluded” – fringe claims about radiation and health, wishful thinking about nuclear economics, promoting nuclear weapons proliferation and celebrating the connections between nuclear power and weapons, etc.

Dr. Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia and editor of the Nuclear Monitor newsletter.


Is there a future for ‘pro-nuclear environmentalism’?

Jim Green, 30 Oct 2017, RenewEconomy

For a longer version of this article please click here.

Michael Shellenberger is visiting Australia this week. He has been a prominent environmentalist (of sorts) since he co-authored the 2004 essay, The Death of Environmentalism. These days, as the President of the California-based ‘Environmental Progress’ lobby group, he is stridently pro-nuclear, hostile towards renewable energy and hostile towards the environment movement.

Shellenberger is visiting to speak at the International Mining and Resources Conference in Melbourne. His visit was promoted by Graham Lloyd in The Australian in September. Shellenberger is “one of the world’s leading new-generation environmental thinkers” according to The Australian, and if the newspaper is any guide he is here to promote his message that wind and solar have failed, that they are doubling the cost of electricity, and that “all existing renewable technologies do is make the electricity system chaotic and provide greenwash for fossil fuels.”

Trawling through Environmental Progress literature, one of their recurring themes is the falsehood that “every time nuclear plants close they are replaced almost entirely by fossil fuels”. South Korea, for example, plans to reduce reliance on coal and nuclear under recently-elected President Moon Jae-in, and to boost reliance on gas and renewables. But Shellenberger and Environmental Progress ignore those plans and concoct their own scare-story in which coal and gas replace nuclear power, electricity prices soar, thousands die from increased air pollution, and greenhouse emissions increase.

Fake scientists and radiation quackery

Environmental Progress’ UK director John Lindberg is described as an “expert on radiation” on the lobby group’s website. In fact, he has no scientific qualifications. Likewise, a South Korean article falsely claims that Shellenberger is a scientist and that article is reposted, without correction, on the Environmental Progress website.

Shellenberger says that at a recent talk in Berlin: “Many Germans simply could not believe how few people died and will die from the Chernobyl accident (under 200) and that nobody died or will die from the meltdowns at Fukushima. How could it be that everything we were told is not only wrong, but often the opposite of the truth?”

There’s a simple reason that Germans didn’t believe Shellenberger’s claims about Chernobyl and Fukushima ‒ they are false.

Shellenberger claims that “under 200” people have died and will die from the Chernobyl disaster, but in fact the lowest of the estimates of the Chernobyl cancer death toll is the World Health Organization’s estimate of “up to 9,000 excess cancer deaths” in the most contaminated parts of the former Soviet Union. And of course there are higher estimates for the death toll across Europe.

Shellenberger claims that the Fukushima meltdowns “killed precisely no one” and that “nobody died or will die from the meltdowns at Fukushima”. An Environmental Progress report has this to say about Fukushima: “[T]he science is unequivocal: nobody has gotten sick much less died from the radiation that escaped from three meltdowns followed by three hydrogen gas explosions. And there will be no increase in cancer rates.”

In support of those assertions, Environmental Progress cites a World Health Organization report that directly contradicts the lobby group’s claims. The WHO report concluded that for people in the most contaminated areas in Fukushima Prefecture, the estimated increased risk for all solid cancers will be around 4% in females exposed as infants; a 6% increased risk of breast cancer for females exposed as infants; a 7% increased risk of leukaemia for males exposed as infants; and for thyroid cancer among females exposed as infants, an increased risk of up to 70% (from a 0.75% lifetime risk up to 1.25%).

Applying a linear-no threshold (LNT) risk factor to the estimated collective radiation dose from Fukushima fallout gives an estimated long-term cancer death toll of around 5,000 people. Nuclear lobbyists are quick to point out that LNT may overestimate risks from low dose and low dose-rate exposure ‒ but LNT may also underestimate the risks according to expert bodies such as the US National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation.

Attacking environment groups

Shellenberger reduces the complexities of environmental opposition to nuclear power to the claim that in the 1960s, an “influential group of conservationists within Sierra Club feared that cheap, abundant electricity from nuclear would result in overpopulation and resource depletion” and therefore decided to campaign against nuclear power.

If such views had any currency in the 1960s, they certainly don’t now. Yet Environmental Progress asserts that Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (FOE) “oppose cheap and abundant energy” and Shellenberger asserts that “the FOE-Greenpeace agenda has never been to protect humankind but rather to punish us for our supposed transgressions.” And Shellenberger suggests that such views are still current by asserting that the anti-nuclear movement has a “long history of Malthusian anti-humanism aimed at preventing “overpopulation” and “overconsumption” by keeping poor countries poor.”

In an ‘investigative piece‘ ‒ titled ‘Enemies of the Earth: Unmasking the Dirty War Against Clean Energy in South Korea by Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Greenpeace’ ‒ Shellenberger lists three groups which he claims have accepted donations “from fossil fuel and renewable energy investors, as well as others who stand to benefit from killing nuclear plants”. FOE and Greenpeace don’t feature among the three groups even though the ‘investigative piece’ is aimed squarely at them.

Undeterred by his failure to present any evidence of FOE and Greenpeace accepting fossil fuel funding (they don’t), Shellenberger asserts that the donors and board members of FOE and Greenpeace “are the ones who win the government contracts to build solar and wind farms, burn dirty “renewable” biomass, and import natural gas from the United States and Russia.” Really? Where’s the evidence? There’s none in Shellenberger’s ‘investigative piece’.

In an article for a South Korean newspaper, Shellenberger states: “Should we be surprised that natural gas companies fund many of the anti-nuclear groups that spread misinformation about nuclear? The anti-nuclear group Friends of the Earth ‒ which has representatives in South Korea ‒ received its initial funding from a wealthy oil man …” He fails to note that the donation was in 1969! And he fails to substantiate his false insinuation that FOE accepts funding from natural gas companies, or his false claim that natural gas companies fund “many of the anti-nuclear groups”.

Shellenberger’s ‘investigative piece‘ falsely claims that FOE keeps its donors secret, and in support of that falsehood he cites an article that doesn’t even mention FOE. Environmental Progress falsely claims that FOE has hundreds of millions of dollars in its bank and stock accounts.

Shellenberger claims that the “greatest coup” of FOE and Greenpeace in South Korea was an “Hollywood-style anti-nuclear disaster movie” which was released last year and has been watched by millions, mostly on Netflix. But FOE and Greenpeace had nothing to do with the production of the movie!

In light of all the above falsehoods, it seems a bit rich for Shellenberger to accuse anti-nuclear groups of being “flagrantly dishonest”. For good measure, he accuses anti-nuclear groups of being “corrupt” ‒ without a shred of evidence.

Environmental Progress has an annual budget of US$1.5 million, Shellenberger claims, and he asks how Environmental Progress “can possibly succeed against the anti-nuclear Goliath with 500 times the resources.” An anti-nuclear Goliath with 500 times their budget of US$1.5 million, or US$750 million in annual expenditure on anti-nuclear campaigns? Shellenberger claims that Greenpeace has annual income of US$400 million to finance its work in 55 nations ‒ but he doesn’t note that only a small fraction of that funding is directed to anti-nuclear campaigns. FOE’s worldwide budget is US$12 million according to Environmental Progress ‒ but only a small fraction is directed to anti-nuclear campaigns.

A future for pro-nuclear environmentalism?

The nuclear power industry is having one of its worst ever years. Environmental Progress is warning about nuclear power’s “rapidly accelerating crisis” and other pro-nuclear lobbyists have noted that “the industry is on life support in the United States and other developed economies“.

The biggest disaster for the nuclear industry this year has been the bankruptcy filing of Westinghouse and the decision to abandon two partially-built reactors in the US after at least A$11.5 billion was spent on the project. But that’s just the tip of the iceberg:

Industries tied to nuclear power are struggling. “It has never been a worse time for uranium miners”, said Alexander Molyneux from Paladin Energy in October 2016. He should know ‒ Perth-based Paladin was put into administration in July this year. Here in Australia, BHP produces uranium as a by-product of its giant copper mine at Olympic Dam in SA; Heathgate Resources operates the small Four Mile mine in SA; and Rio Tinto has finished mining uranium at Ranger in the NT and is processing remaining stockpiles before getting to work on a half-billion dollar rehabilitation.

Prices for uranium conversion (converting uranium to uranium hexafluoride) have been in freefall in recent years and the price for uranium hexafluoride has been in freefall. The price for uranium enrichment (increasing the ratio of uranium-235 to uranium-238) was at an all-time low last year and has fallen further this year.

The only nuclear industry that is booming is nuclear decommissioning ‒ the World Nuclear Association anticipates US$111 billion (A$145 billion) worth of decommissioning projects to 2035.

How much longer will the nuclear lobbyists keep flogging the dead nuclear horse? Perhaps not too much longer. It’s worth keeping in mind that nuclear lobbyists ‒ especially the self-styled ‘pro-nuclear environmentalists’ ‒ are few in number. David Roberts summed up the situation in 2013, when Robert Stone’s ‘Pandora’s Promise‘ propaganda film was launched:

“There is no budding environmentalist movement for nukes. Ever since I started paying attention to “nuclear renaissance” stories about a decade ago, there’s always been this credulous, excitable bit about how enviros are starting to come around. The roster of enviros in this purportedly burgeoning movement: Stewart Brand, the Breakthrough Boys, and “Greenpeace cofounder Patrick Moore,” who has been a paid shill for industry for decades (it sounds like the Pandora folks were wise enough to leave him out). More recently George Monbiot and Mark Lynas have been added to the list.

“This handful of converts is always cited with the implication that it’s the leading edge of a vast shift, and yet … it’s always the same handful. … In the movie, Shellenberger says, “I have a sense that this is a beautiful thing … the beginning of a movement.” I fear he has once again mistaken the contents of his navel for the zeitgeist.”

—- Dr Jim Green edits the Nuclear Monitor newsletter and is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia.


Nuclear lobbyist Michael Shellenberger learns to love the bomb, goes down a rabbit hole

Jim Green, 6 September 2018, ‘Nuclear lobbyist Michael Shellenberger learns to love the bomb, goes down a rabbit hole’, Nuclear Monitor #865, https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/865/nuclear-monitor-865-6-september-2018

In 2015, Nuclear Monitor published a detailed critique of the many ways nuclear industry insiders and lobbyists trivialize and deny the connections between nuclear power (and the broader nuclear fuel cycle) and nuclear weapons proliferation.1

Since then, the arguments have been turned upside down with prominent industry insiders and lobbyists openly acknowledging power-weapons connections. This remarkable about-turn has clear origins in the crisis facing nuclear power and the perceived need to secure increased subsidies to prevent reactors closing and to build new ones.2

One thread of the new sales pitch ‒ one which doesn’t fundamentally contradict long-standing denials of power-weapons connections ‒ has been a ratcheting up of the argument that countries with a thriving nuclear export industry, (necessarily) underpinned by a thriving domestic nuclear industry, are best placed to influence which countries can or can’t pursue weapons.3

Another thread of the new sales pitch ‒ and this really is new ‒ is to openly link to nuclear power to weapons, to celebrate the connections and to use them to lobby for greater subsidies for nuclear power.2 The US Nuclear Energy Institute, for example, tried in mid-2017 to convince politicians in Washington that if the AP1000 reactor construction projects in South Carolina and Georgia weren’t completed, it would stunt development of the nation’s nuclear weapons complex.4

The Nuclear Energy Institute paper wasn’t publicly released. But in the second half of 2017, numerous nuclear insiders and lobbyists openly acknowledged power-weapons connections and called for additional subsidies for nuclear power. The most important of these initiatives was a paper by the Energy Futures Initiative ‒ a creation of Ernest Moniz, who served as energy secretary under President Barack Obama.5

Even the uranium industry has jumped on the bandwagon, with two US companies warning that reliance on foreign sources threatens national security and lodging a petition with the Department of Commerce calling for US utilities to be required to purchase a minimum 25% of their requirements from domestic mines.6

Decades of deceit have been thrown overboard with the new sales pitch linking nuclear power and weapons. However there are still some hold-outs.7 Ted Norhaus, a self-styled ‘pro-nuclear environmentalist’, argues that to conflate nuclear power with nuclear weapons is “extremely misleading” because they involve different physics, different technologies and different institutions.8

Ben Heard ‒ a nuclear lobbyist in Australia whose ‘Bright New World’ lobby group accepts secret corporate donations9,10 ‒ attacked the Australian Conservation Foundation for its failure to acknowledge the “obvious distinction” between nuclear power and weapons and for “co-opting disarmament … toward their ideological campaigns against peaceful science and technology”.11

Heard wrote in December 2017: “Peace is furthered when a nation embraces nuclear power, because it makes that nation empirically less likely to embark on a nuclear weapons program. That is the finding of a 2017 study published in the peer-reviewed journal International Security.”11 In fact, that non-statistically significant finding sat alongside a contrary, statistically significant finding in the International Security journal article: the annual probability of starting a nuclear weapons program is more than twice as high in countries with an operating power reactor or one under construction.12

Until recently, another nuclear lobbyist continuing to deny power-weapons connections was Michael Shellenberger from the ‘Environmental Progress’ pro-nuclear lobby group in the US. He told an IAEA conference last year that “nuclear energy prevents the spread of nuclear weapons”.13 And he claimed last year that “one of FOE-Greenpeace’s biggest lies about nuclear energy is that it leads to weapons” and that there is an “inverse relationship between energy and weapons”.14 He concluded that article by asserting that “nuclear is our only source of energy with a transcendent moral purpose, to lift all humans out of poverty, reverse humankind’s negative environmental impact, and guarantee peace.”14

One of Shellenberger’s bright ideas was to launch a campaign to garner international support for the construction of nuclear power reactors in North Korea.15 That would ‒ somehow, magically ‒ curtail or end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. This “atoms for peace” initiative would be, in Shellenberger’s words, “one of the best means of creating peace with North Korea”.14 No matter that his “new framework” is much the same as the old 1994 Agreed Framework, which was a complete failure.16

Shellenberger’s backflip

In two articles published in August, Shellenberger has done a 180-degree backflip on the power-weapons connections.17,18

“[N]ational security, having a weapons option, is often the most important factor in a state pursuing peaceful nuclear energy”, Shellenberger now believes.19

A recent analysis from Environmental Progress finds that of the 26 nations that are building or are committed to build nuclear power plants, 23 have nuclear weapons, had weapons, or have shown interest in acquiring weapons.20 “While those 23 nations clearly have motives other than national security for pursuing nuclear energy,” Shellenberger writes, “gaining weapons latency appears to be the difference-maker. The flip side also appears true: nations that lack a need for weapons latency often decide not to build nuclear power plants … Recently, Vietnam and South Africa, neither of which face a significant security threat, decided against building nuclear plants …”17

Here is the break-down of the 26 countries that are building or are committed to build nuclear power plants:17

Shellenberger points to research by Fuhrmann and Tkach which found that 31 nations had the capacity to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, and that 71% of them created that capacity to give themselves weapons latency.21

Current patterns connecting the pursuit of power and weapons stretch back across the 60 years of civilian nuclear power. Shellenberger notes that “at least 20 nations sought nuclear power at least in part to give themselves the option of creating a nuclear weapon” ‒ Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, France, Italy, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libya, Norway, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, West Germany, Yugoslavia.17

Nuclear weapons ‒ a force for peace?

So far, so good. The pursuit of nuclear power and weapons are often linked. That’s a powerful reason to eschew nuclear power, to strengthen the safeguards system, to tighten export controls, to restrict the spread of enrichment and reprocessing, and so on. But Shellenberger has a very different take on the issues.

Discussing the Fuhrmann and Tkach article (and studiously avoiding a vast body of contrary literature), Shellenberger writes:17

“What was the relationship between nuclear latency and military conflict? It was negative. “Nuclear latency appears to provide states with deterrence-related benefits,” they [Fuhrmann and Tkach] concluded, “that are distinct from actively pursuing nuclear bombs.”

“Why might this be? Arriving at an ultimate cause is difficult if not impossible, the authors note. But one obvious possibility is that the “latent nuclear powers may be able to deter conflict by (implicitly) threatening to ‘go nuclear’ following an attack.” …

“After over 60 years of national security driving nuclear power into the international system, we can now add “preventing war” to the list of nuclear energy’s superior characteristics. …

“As a lifelong peace activist and pro-nuclear environmentalist, I almost fell out of my chair when I discovered the paper by Fuhrmann and Tkach. All that most nations will need to deter military threats is nuclear power ‒ a bomb isn’t even required? Why in the world, I wondered, is this fact not being promoted as one of nuclear powers many benefits?

“The answer is that the nuclear industry and scientific community have tried, since Atoms for Peace began 65 years ago, to downplay any connection between the two ‒ and for an understandable reason: they don’t want the public to associate nuclear power plants with nuclear war.

“But in seeking to deny the connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, the nuclear community today finds itself in the increasingly untenable position of having to deny these real world connections ‒ of motivations and means ‒ between the two. Worse, in denying the connection between energy and weapons, the nuclear community reinforces the widespread belief that nuclear weapons have made the world a more dangerous place when the opposite is the case. …

“In the real world, nuclear weapons have only been used to end or prevent war — a remarkable record for the world’s most dangerous objects.

“Nuclear energy, without a doubt, is spreading and will continue to spread around the world, largely with national security as a motivation. The question is whether the nuclear industry will, alongside anti-nuclear activists, persist in stigmatizing weapons latency as a nuclear power “bug” rather than tout it as the epochal, peace-making feature it is.”

Shellenberger asks why the deterrent effect of nuclear power isn’t being promoted as one of its many benefits. A better answer to the one he offers is that the premise is nonsense. Nuclear weapons can have a deterrent effect ‒ in a uniquely dangerous and potentially uniquely counterproductive manner ‒ but any correlation between latent nuclear weapons capabilities and reduced military conflict is just that, correlation not causation.

In a second article, Shellenberger offers the contrarian wisdom that “nuclear weapons make us peaceful”.18 He writes:

“The widespread assumption is that the more nations have nuclear weapons, the more dangerous the world will be. But is that really the case? … [I]t is impossible not to be struck by these facts:

“The division of the world into nuclear-armed and unarmed nations has long been arbitrary and unfair. Nuclear-armed nations, except for France, hypocritically punished India for decades with trade sanctions for acquiring a weapon. …

“[A] world without nuclear weapons would be a world where relatively weak nations ‒ like France and Britain before World War II and North Korea and Iran today ‒ are deprived the only power on Earth capable of preventing a military invasion by a more powerful adversary. Who are we to deny weak nations the nuclear weapons they need for self-defense? The answer should by now be clear: hypocritical, short-sighted, and imperialistic.”

So Iran should be encouraged to develop nuclear weapons ‒ or perhaps Iran should be gifted nuclear weapons by an enlightened weapons state. Shellenberger cites long-term nuclear weapons proliferation enthusiast Kenneth Waltz, who claims that the “decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis … will end only when a balance of military power is restored”.18 Dictators Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi ought to have acquired nuclear weapons, according to Shellenberger, not least because they were killed and their regimes overthrown after they gave up the pursuit of nuclear weapons.18 Shellenberger cites a German academic who argues that a nuclear-armed Germany “would stabilize NATO and the security of the Western World”.18,22 We “should be glad that North Korea acquired the bomb” according to Shellenberger.18 And on it goes ‒ his enthusiasm for nuclear weapons proliferation knows no bounds.

What to make of Shellenberger’s conversion?

No doubt there will be more acknowledgements of power-weapons connections by nuclear industry insiders and lobbyists. As Shellenberger notes, the nuclear ‘community’ today finds itself in an increasingly untenable position denying the connections.17

What to make of Shellenberger’s advocacy of nuclear weapons proliferation? There is a degree of domestic support for nuclear weapons programs in weapons states … but few people support generalized nuclear weapons proliferation and few would swallow Shellenberger’s arguments including his call to shred the non-proliferation and disarmament system and to encourage weapons proliferation.

Understanding of the power-weapons connections, combined with opposition to nuclear weapons, is one of the motivations driving opposition to nuclear power. According to Shellenberger, the only two US states forcing the closure of nuclear plants, California and New York, also had the strongest nuclear disarmament movements.17

There is some concern that claims that the civil nuclear industry is an important (or even necessary) underpinning of a weapons program will be successfully used to secure additional subsidies for troubled nuclear power programs (e.g. in the US, France and the UK). After all, nuclear insiders and lobbyists wouldn’t abandon their decades-long deceit about power-weapons connections if not for the possibility that their new argument will gain traction, among politicians if not the public.

The growing acknowledgement ‒ and public understanding ‒ of power-weapons connections might have consequences for nuclear power newcomer countries such as Saudi Arabia. Assuming that the starting point is opposition to a Saudi nuclear weapons program, heightened sensitivity might constrain nuclear exporters who would otherwise export to Saudi Arabia with minimalist safeguards and no serious attempt to check the regime’s weapons ambitions. Or it might not lead to that outcome … as things stand, numerous nuclear exporters are scrambling for a share of the Saudi nuclear power program regardless of proliferation concerns.

More generally, a growing understanding of power-weapons connections might lead to a strengthening of the safeguards system along with other measures to firewall nuclear power from weapons. But again, that’s hypothetical and it is at best some way down the track ‒ there is no momentum in that direction.

And another hypothetical arising from the growing awareness about power-weapons connections: proliferation risks might be (and ought to be) factored in as a significant negative in comparative assessments of power generation options.

‘Shellenberger has gone down a rabbit hole’

As for Shellenberger, Nuclear Monitor has previously exposed the litany of falsehoods in his writings on nuclear and energy issues.16 In his most recent articles he exposes himself as an intellectual lightweight prepared to swing from one extreme of a debate to the other if that’s what it takes to build the case for additional subsidies for nuclear power.

A dangerous intellectual lightweight. Responding to Shellenberger’s more-the-merrier attitude towards nuclear weapons proliferation, pro-nuclear commentator Dan Yurman puts it bluntly: “Here’s the problem. The more nations have nuclear weapons, the more dangerous the world will be. Sooner or later some tin pot dictator or religious zealot, is likely to push a button and send us all to eternity.”23

Shellenberger’s about-turn on power-weapons connections provoked a hostile response from Yurman:23

“Shellenberger has crossed a red line for the global commercial nuclear industry, which has done everything in its power to avoid having the public conflate nuclear weapons with commercial nuclear energy. Worse, he’s given opponents of nuclear energy, like Greenpeace, a ready-made tool to attack the industry. …

“In the end he may have painted himself into a corner. Not only has he alienated some of his supporters on the commercial nuclear side of the house, but he also has energized the nonproliferation establishment, within governments and among NGOs, offering them a rich opportunity promote critical reviews of the risks of expanding nuclear energy as a solution to the challenge of climate change. …

“Shellenberger has gone down a rabbit hole with his two essays promoting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Given all the great things he has done to promote commercial nuclear energy, it is a perplexing and disturbing development.

“It’s ok to be contrarian, but I fear he will pay a price for it with reduced support from some of his current supporters and he will face critical reviews from detractors of these essays. In the end public support and perception of the safety of nuclear energy may be diminished by these essays since they will lead to increased conflating of commercial nuclear energy with nuclear weapons. The fatal attraction of the power of nuclear weapons has lured another victim. It’s an ill-fated step backwards.”

References:

  1. Nuclear Monitor #804, 28 May 2015, ‘The myth of the peaceful atom’, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/804/myth-peaceful-atom
  2. Nuclear Monitor #850, 7 Sept 2017, ‘Nuclear power, weapons and ‘national security”, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/850/nuclear-power-weapons-and-national-security
  3. Nuclear Monitor #850, ‘Does the US need a strong nuclear industry to prevent proliferation abroad?’, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/850/does-us-need-strong-nuclear-industry-prevent-proliferation-abroad
  4. Amy Harder, 16 June 2017, ‘Nuclear scramble on tax credits’, www.axios.com/nuclear-scramble-on-tax-credits-2442400126.html
  5. Energy Futures Initiative, 2017, ‘The U.S. Nuclear Energy Enterprise: A Key National Security Enabler’, https://energyfuturesinitiative.org/news/2017/8/15/efi-releases-nuclear-energy-enterprise-study, https://energyfuturesinitiative.org/s/EFI-nuclear-paper-17-Aug-2017.pdf
  6. Nuclear Monitor #857, 14 Feb 2018, ‘2017 in review: Uranium is best left in the ground’, https://wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/857/2017-review-uranium-best-left-ground
  7. Nuclear Monitor #858, ”Pro-nuclear environmentalists’ in denial about power/weapons connections’, https://wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/858/pro-nuclear-environmentalists-denial-about-powerweapons-connections
  8. Ted Norhaus, 14 May 2017, ‘Time to stop confusing nuclear weapons with nuclear power’, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/333329-time-to-stop-confusing-nuclear-weapons-with-nuclear
  9. Friends of the Earth, ‘Ben Heard and the fake environment group ‘Bright New World’ that accepts secret corporate donations’, https://nuclear.foe.org.au/ben-heard-secret-corporate-donations/
  10. www.brightnewworld.org/how-to-give-our-donations-policy/
  11. Ben Heard, 12 Dec 2017, ‘Australian Conservation Foundation leverages peace prize against peaceful technology’, www.brightnewworld.org/media/2017/12/12/acfnot4peace
  12. Nicholas L. Miller, 2017, ‘Why Nuclear Energy Programs Rarely Lead to Proliferation’, International Security 42, No. 2, pp.40-77, www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/ISEC_a_00293, Appendix: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/8EMSFK
  13. Michael Shellenberger, 30 Oct 2017, ‘Saving Power in Danger: Michael Shellenberger Keynote Address to IAEA’, http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/10/30/saving-power-in-danger-keynote-address-to-iaea-inter-ministerial-2017
  14. Michael Shellenberger, 16 Oct 2017, ‘Enemies of the Earth: Unmasking the Dirty War Against Clean Energy in South Korea by Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Greenpeace’, http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2017/10/16/enemies-of-the-earth-unmasking-dirty-war-friends-of-earth-greenpeace-south-korea-nuclear-energy
  15. 1 June 2017, ‘US-Korea Letter’, www.environmentalprogress.org/us-korea-letter
  16. Nuclear Monitor #853, 30 Oct 2017, ‘Exposing the misinformation of Michael Shellenberger and ‘Environmental Progress”, www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/853/exposing-misinformation-michael-shellenberger-and-environmental-progress
  17. Michael Shellenberger, 29 Aug 2018, ‘For Nations Seeking Nuclear Energy, The Option To Build A Weapon Remains A Feature Not A Bug’, www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/29/for-nations-seeking-nuclear-energy-the-option-to-build-a-weapon-remains-a-feature-not-a-bug/#4288de6e2747
  18. Michael Shellenberger, 6 Aug 2018, ‘Who Are We To Deny Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons They Need For Self-Defense?’, www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/06/who-are-we-to-deny-weak-nations-the-nuclear-weapons-they-need-for-self-defense/
  19. Michael Shellenberger, 28 Aug 2018, ‘How Nations Go Nuclear: An Interview With M.I.T.’s Vipin Narang’, http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2018/8/28/vipin-narang-interview
  20. Environmental Progress, 2018, Nations Building Nuclear ‒ Proliferation Analysis, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1YA4gLOekXNXiwpggCEx3uUpeu_STBlN_gHD60B5QG1E/edit#gid=0
  21. Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin Tkach, 8 Jan 2015, ‘Almost nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency dataset’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894214559672, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0738894214559672
  22. Christian Hacke, 6 Aug 2018, ‘As America Becomes Isolationist Under Trump, Germany Should Pursue Nuclear Weapons for Self-Defense’, http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2018/8/6/as-america-becomes-isolationist-under-trump-germany-should-pursue-nuclear-weapons-for-self-defense
  23. Dan Yurman, 30 Aug 2018, ‘The Fatal Attraction of Nuclear Weapons Lures Another Victim’, http://neutronbytes.com/2018/08/30/the-fatal-attraction-of-nuclear-weapons-lures-another-victim/

‘Almost Trumpian in its incoherence’: Critical responses to Michael Shellenberger’s promotion of nuclear weapons proliferation

Jim Green, 6 September 2018, ”Almost Trumpian in its incoherence’: Critical responses to Michael Shellenberger’s promotion of nuclear weapons proliferation’, Nuclear Monitor #865, https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/865/nuclear-monitor-865-6-september-2018

Ironically, one of the most thorough critiques of Michael Shellenberger’s dangerous advocacy of nuclear weapons proliferation1,2 was written by Environmental Progress attorney Frank Jablonski and published on the Environmental Progress website.3 Shellenberger is founder and president of Environmental Progress.

Jablonski writes:3

“From Shellenberger’s article2 you would conclude that, for any “weak nation”, or for the “poor or weak” persons within such nations, things are bound to improve with acquisition of nuclear weapons. So, for humanitarian reasons, the imperialistic nations and hypocritical people standing in the way of that acquisition should get out of the way. No. The article’s contentions are falsified by … logical untenability, things it got wrong, and things it left out. While Shellenberger’s willingness to take controversial positions has often been valuable, a “contrarian” view is not always right just because it is contrarian.”

Jablonski draws a parallel with NRA pro-guns propaganda:3

“The article seems to presume that if the nuclear non-proliferation framework is eliminated, nuclear capabilities will be quickly equalized through some kind of dystopian Oprah episode in which “YOU get a weapon, YOU get a weapon, EVERYBODY gets a weapon!!!”. The resulting equalization of capabilities will lead to peace, kind of in the vein of the NRA slogan that “an armed (international) society is a polite society”.

“This is, quite obviously, not how proliferation develops. Allowing ready access to nuclear weapons likely spreads them first to relatively strong nations that are already feeling international pressure, likely because of disturbing human rights records, hegemonic ambitions, or both. It may be hypocritical to try to deny nuclear weapons to autocracies that aspire to them, but these nations themselves can be “imperialist”, i.e., aspiring hegemons seeking to dominate their neighbors.

“By introducing the possibility that a neighboring nation may seek nuclear weapons, making such weapons broadly available disadvantages nations that prefer to spend their resources on development instead of militarization. There are good reasons for nations not to want to be pressured into a nuclear arms race with aspiring hegemons. …

“Forcing the weakest nations to compete for nuclear weapons to keep up with stronger and more aggressive neighbors is a recipe for harming the “poor and weak”, not helping them.”

On deterrence, Jablonski writes: “the fact that deterrence works in some circumstances does not mean that removing barriers to acquisition of nuclear weapons will result in generalized deterrence and stability”.3

As for Shellenberger’s attack on the “hypocritical, short-sighted, and imperialistic” who would “deny weak nations the nuclear weapons they need for self-defense”2, Jablonski writes:

“Who are these “hypocritical imperialists” that want to deny nuclear weapons to “weak nations”? I suggest that they include a lot of people who don’t want autocrats to get nuclear weapons, who don’t want nations forced into regional nuclear arms races, who want nuclear technology directed towards human welfare, and who want no-one, ever again, to die in a nuclear war.”3

‘Almost Trumpian in its incoherence’

Sam Seitz, a student at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, takes issue with Shellenberger’s claims that no nuclear powers have been invaded (“a pretty misleading statistic” and “wrong”); that battle deaths worldwide have declined by 95% (“fails to prove that nuclear weapons are responsible for this trend … as we are frequently reminded, correlation and causation are not equivalent”); that Indian and Pakistani deaths in two disputed territories declined sharply after Pakistan’s first nuclear weapons test in 1998 (“doesn’t account for non-nuclear factors like the role of outside mediation and domestic politics”); and that Nazi Germany invaded France because the French lacked a credible deterrent (“makes very little sense and conflates several things … also silly”).4

Seitz attempts to decipher one of Shellenberger’s indecipherable arguments:

“Shellenberger then argues that nuclear weapons moderate state behavior because “History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable.” (quote from Waltz) This makes absolutely no sense. Either nukes ensure existential security, preventing great power intervention, or they make countries more vulnerable, but to argue that nukes simultaneously make countries more and less vulnerable is almost Trumpian in its incoherence. And sure, maybe nuclear weapons promote foreign policy moderation, but that isn’t the same thing as internal moderation: The Cultural Revolution occurred after China had nuclear weapons, after all.”

Seitz points to another problem:

“Shellenberger presumably is only advocating for American acceptance of proliferation. After all, forcing other countries to go along with Washington is the exact kind of interference and American bullying he seems to so despise. But not every country will agree. Israel has struck nascent nuclear programs on several occasions, for example, and the Soviets almost launched an attack on the Chinese nuclear program. So, even if nuclear weapons make conflict less likely, attempting to acquire nuclear weapons actually tends to precipitate conflict as potential adversaries try desperately to stop a proliferator before it is too late. This is, after all, the reason the U.S. and its coalition partners invaded Iraq.”

Shellenberger points to the same problem, asking whether latency could “also be a threat to peace?” and noting Israeli and US threats to take pre-emptive action against Iran.1 He doesn’t offer an answer or explore the issue further. He might ‒ but doesn’t ‒ explore scenarios such as multiple simultaneous Chernobyl- or Fukushima-scale catastrophes deliberately inflicted by warring nation-states.

Friendly fire

Even those who Shellenberger cites approvingly in support of his arguments differ with him on fundamental points. He describes Vipin Narang as an “up-and-coming star in the field of nuclear peace and security studies”, but Narang doesn’t share his sanguine view about nuclear weapons security.5 According to Narang:5

“Pakistan may be one or two senior radicalized officers from having a threat to, or breakdown of, command and control. We assume there will be continuity in government, and regular transitions. The trouble is chaos or irregular leadership transitions, and uncertainty about the control of nuclear weapons in the state. Kim Jong Un has signaled that he has sole authority over nuclear weapons. But when he flew Air China to Singapore to meet with Trump, what if there had been rumor the plane had been shot down en route? What is his command and control? What if he feared being shot down and put in place a “dead hand” procedure which means, “If I’m shot down, you fire a nuclear ICBM at New York?” Rumors can go viral and there have been no way for those in Pyongyang to reach Kim, and they may have assumed the worst. These are the kinds of things that scare me.”

Asked by Shellenberger if it is the case that the more nuclear weapons states there are, the better, Narang responded:5

“Nuclear weapons do deter. I understand why weak nations want them. They do provide deterrence against invasion. They do provide existential protection. The question is are there some states, with certain regime types or civil-military relations, where the risks outweigh the perceived deterrence benefits?

“But states like North Korea, Pakistan, and Egypt have potentially more volatile domestic political situations than, for example Japan or Germany or India. And even India is very opaque about its management and security procedures and the US has been concerned about lax oversight even there ‒ and even the US itself is not immune to the risks of accidents, having had quite a few snafus of its own recently.

“So even in the most stable of states, the risk of accidents is real. Add to that mix the potential for violent domestic upheaval and one has to question whether having nuclear weapons possessed by a state at risk of coup or revolution is a good thing. You start getting into a world where more countries have them, there’s simply more systemic risk.”

References:

    1. Michael Shellenberger, 29 Aug 2018, ‘For Nations Seeking Nuclear Energy, The Option To Build A Weapon Remains A Feature Not A Bug’, www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/29/for-nations-seeking-nuclear-energy-the-option-to-build-a-weapon-remains-a-feature-not-a-bug/#4288de6e2747
    2. Michael Shellenberger, 6 Aug 2018, ‘Who Are We To Deny Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons They Need For Self-Defense?’, www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/06/who-are-we-to-deny-weak-nations-the-nuclear-weapons-they-need-for-self-defense/
    3. Frank Jablonski, 24 Aug 2018, ‘Shellenberger Is Wrong About Proliferation’, http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2018/8/24/shellenberger-is-wrong-about-proliferation
    4. Sam Seitz, 6 Aug 2018, ‘The Nonproliferation Regime Exists for a Reason, Let’s Not Tear it Up’, https://politicstheorypractice.com/2018/08/06/the-nonproliferation-regime-exists-for-a-reason-lets-not-tear-it-up/
    5. Michael Shellenberger, 28 Aug 2018, ‘How Nations Go Nuclear: An Interview With M.I.T.’s Vipin Narang’, http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2018/8/28/vipin-narang-interview

Nuclear power’s weapons link: Cause to limit, not boost exports

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

By Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski, September 20, 2018

thebulletin.org/2018/09/nuclear-powers-weapons-link-cause-to-limit-not-boost-exports/

The criticism that supporters of US nuclear exports have found most difficult to counter has been that their wares give an importing country a big leg up on getting a bomb. For decades the exporters’ response has been to pretend this was not so. Now comes Michael Shellenberger, a prominent nuclear power advocate, who casts all this aside. Yes, he writes, there is a strong link between nuclear electricity and weapons, and in fact most countries that built nuclear power plants did so with weapons at least partly in mind. But this is not so much a confession as a sales pitch. He thinks the weapons potential of nuclear power plants actually prevents war—the weapons shadow cast by nuclear plants itself deters enemies—and that this attribute should be exploited as a sales advantage by US nuclear exporters.

Shellenberger’s assessment of the nuclear power-weapons link is important rhetorically because it comes from the nuclear side of the house. He has been celebrated by the nuclear industry and the conservative press as one of the new breed, “pro-technology,” environmental activists who joined the nuclear ranks and are not afraid to do battle with their colleagues over nuclear power. So, his admission about the closeness of civilian and military nuclear technology—realistically what lawyers call a declaration against interest—carries a certain weight and may convince people who have up to now resisted the notion.

But Shellenberger goes on. He was always a bit unrestrained in his advocacy of nuclear power, and in speaking of nuclear weapons he surpasses himself. In an earlier piece, he presents an anecdotal case on why nuclear weapons were a cure-all for world conflict.

He said if only “weak” France had nuclear weapons in 1940 then “strong” Germany would not have attacked. But what if Germany was the one with the bomb?

He also points to India and Pakistan: They had three large wars before they armed themselves with nuclear weapons but none afterwards, only “border skirmishes” with relatively low casualties. And if such conflicts got out of hand and led to nuclear weapon use, well, not to worry—Shellenberger cites an academic “expert” who claims that the nuclear conflict would surely be contained at the “tactical” level. In truth, of course, no one has any idea.

That the presence of nuclear weapons has reduced the frequency of war is an arguable proposition. But one only has to consider the experience of the Cuban Missile Crisis to realize it comes at the price of gambling on nuclear war. Most people have forgotten about them, but our nuclear forces are still on alert, and their use is not ruled out. The “experts” speak of deployment for deterrence only, but deterrence is predicated on use in certain circumstances.

All these inescapable uncertainties apparently got swept away in Shellenberger’s mind by the “Eureka” moment he describes in the latest article: Based on a paper by a couple of political science professors, he asserts that a nuclear power program itself provides a significant level of “deterrence-related” benefits — “a bomb isn’t even required.” He says that when he thought of this, he almost fell off his chair. Why, he wondered, was this fact “not being promoted as one of nuclear power’s many benefits?”

One reason is that it’s a ridiculous proposal based on half-baked ideas.

But there is a serious side to this too. Unfortunately, his views, foolish as they are, are not so different from primitive views privately held in high official and semi-official nuclear circles. It is useful to bring them out of hiding, and we have to thank Shellenberger for that.

Take the Bush Administration’s 2005 nuclear deal with India. It tore a gaping hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and yet was described as promoting nonproliferation. Is there anyone so foolish as to believe that hypocrisy? Or to doubt that India’s interest in the arrangement was mainly fortifying its nuclear weapons? And wasn’t the notion of supporting India as a strategic foil to China at the core of US interest?

Consider also the current administration’s efforts to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia to facilitate nuclear exports to that country. One doesn’t even have to speculate about the Saudis’ interest in bombs—the Crown Prince famously made that clear. And from the US side, it is also clear that a reason to put nuclear technology in the hands of the Saudis is to frighten Iran.

The immediate nuclear issue now is what controls, if any, our government should impose on the proposed US-Saudi nuclear cooperative agreement. The sensible course from the security point of view, which Secretary of State Pompeo has publicly backed, is to make sure Saudi Arabia will not have the capacity to produce nuclear explosives—a controlling condition called the gold standard. But the Saudis are pushing back on that—for obvious reasons—and their supporters in the administration would like to relax the export controls that would apply, in part to get the business but also to have another stick to shake at Iran.

We should have none of this. It has been settled US policy for decades that we don’t want more countries with nuclear weapons or countries threatening to make them. Where we haven’t been consistent in applying that policy regarding nuclear power exports, we need to make corrections, not by exporting more, but less.


Film review: Michael Moore’s weird world of renewable energy haters

Jim Green, Nuclear Monitor #886, 4 June 2020, https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/886/nuclear-monitor-886-8-june-2020 or https://www.foe.org.au/planet_of_the_humans

This is a short excerpt – for the full article see the above links.

‘Planet of the Humans’ (POTH) has been watched by millions, and has attracted an extraordinary amount of commentary, since it was made freely available in April. …

Michael Shellenberger has enthusiastically promoted POTH, saying that it exposes “why renewables are worse for environment than fossil fuels” and using the anti-renewables diatribe to promote nuclear power.

Ted Nordhaus, a nuclear power advocate who collaborated with Shellenberger on the ‘death of environmentalism’ in the mid-2000s, criticized Shellenberger and some others for being “so single-mindedly pro-nuclear and anti-renewables that they have cheered the movie’s cherry-picking, exaggerations, and conspiracies while largely excusing its deep Malthusianism.”

Shellenberger has become a favorite of the far-right and the climate science deniers. He was interviewed by Tucker Carlson on Fox TV last year, attacking renewables and in particular the ‘green new deal’. Recently Shellenberger was interviewed by Andrew Bolt ‒ Australia’s version of Tucker Carlson ‒ to promote POTH and to promote nuclear power.

Shellenberger’s forthcoming book suggests his lurch to the anti-environment right is almost complete. The Harper Collins website provides this description of the book:

“The risk of Earth warming to very high temperatures is increasingly unlikely thanks to slowing population growth and abundant natural gas. Curiously, the people who are the most alarmist about the problems also tend to oppose the obvious solutions. What’s really behind the rise of apocalyptic environmentalism? There are powerful financial interests. There are desires for status and power. But most of all there is a desire among supposedly secular people for transcendence. This spiritual impulse can be natural and healthy. But in preaching fear without love, and guilt without redemption, the new religion is failing to satisfy our deepest psychological and existential needs.”

So climate change isn’t such a problem, and those who think it is should support nuclear power (and gas!) … but they don’t for quasi-religious reasons. Where have we heard that before? That’s right ‒ from Carlson, Bolt and the rest of the far-right.

One last observation about this weird world of renewable energy haters ‒ their extraordinary ability to turn on a dime and to contradict themselves. … Shellenberger told Tucker Carlson last year that one of the reasons people oppose nuclear power is that “they associate it with the bomb, which is wrong, they are two separate technologies.” But in 2018 Shellenberger argued that “having a weapons option is often the most important factor in a state pursuing peaceful nuclear energy” and that “at least 20 nations sought nuclear power at least in part to give themselves the option of creating a nuclear weapon”.