Articles on proposed NT dump

We Still Can’t Manage Nuclear Waste

Jim Green, 16 Feb 2011

http://newmatilda.com/2011/02/16/we-still-cant-manage-nuclear-waste

If Lucas Heights can’t maintain health and safety standards, what reason is there to believe Martin Ferguson’s planned nuclear waste dump at Muckaty Station will be safe, asks Jim Green

It’s a sad truth that whistleblowers have provided the public with more information about accidents at the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor site on Sydney’s outskirts than the site’s operator — the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) — ever has.

After a report on ABC’s Lateline last week, it’s clear that this pattern has been repeated. A secret report by Comcare, the federal government’s workplace safety watchdog, finds that ANSTO has under-reported accidents, breached safety standards, and breached health and safety laws.

The Comcare report was produced in response to revelations last year by ANSTO whistleblower David Reid. The report finds that ANSTO did not take all reasonable steps to maintain a safe working environment; failed to take all reasonable steps to train and supervise ANSTO Health employees; failed to comprehensively risk assess its radiopharmaceutical production process; failed to notify Comcare of safety incidents; and that ANSTO’s suspension of David Reid was “somewhat extreme” and that he was denied procedural fairness.

You’d hope that the Federal Government would step in to redress the problems at Lucas Heights and to do so with some urgency.

No such luck. The government has asked for a “review” of the Comcare report. And if that review finds its way into the public arena it will most likely be thanks to a whistleblower. If the review doesn’t produce the answers the government wants to hear, further reviews will likely be commissioned until the government gets the whitewash it wants.

These problems have obvious relevance for ANSTO workers and for the residents of surrounding suburbs, all the more so in light of ANSTO’s approach to emergency planning. Nuclear engineer Tony Wood, former head of ANSTO’s Division of Reactors and Engineering, said (pdf) way back in 2001:

“Another document called the Sutherland Shire Local Disaster Plan is needed to cater for the public. This plan is a most remarkable document. … In the whole document there is no mention of the words ‘iodine’ or ‘nuclear’ or ‘reactor’ and only one mention of ‘ANSTO’. No one would guess from reading this plan that there was a nuclear reactor in the area. … Here is a document presented as a reactor emergency plan that doesn’t mention the words ‘reactor’ or ‘radioactivity” because it doesn’t want to upset people.”

In the event of an accident with off-site consequences, local residents would have to sue ANSTO to achieve redress. On this issue Wood was even more scathing:

“I believe that it is very important that the public be told the truth even if the truth is unpalatable. I have cringed at some of ANSTO’s public statements. Surely there is someone at ANSTO with a practical reactor background and the courage to flag when ANSTO is yet again, about to mislead the public. For example, the claim ANSTO makes for nuclear indemnity is indefensible.”

The problems at ANSTO also have national significance. ANSTO is actively promoting the development of nuclear power in Australia — although the organisation has demonstrably failed to competently and safely run a much smaller nuclear research facility.

More immediately, ANSTO is up to its neck in the plan to establish a national nuclear waste repository in the Northern Territory, both as the main source of the waste and as the operator of the repository (if it proceeds).

Federal Resources Minister Martin Ferguson plans to put the National Radioactive Waste Management Bill before Parliament this month. Mussolini would blush. The Bill gives Ferguson the power to override all state and territory laws that could in any way impede his dump plan — and the power to override almost all Commonwealth laws. Public health laws, occupational heath and safety regulations, road safety laws — all subject to ministerial whim.

Ferguson claims that the Traditional Owners for the proposed dump site at Muckaty Station, 120 kilometres north of Tennant Creek, support the proposal. In truth, some do, but many do not. Letters of protest and petitions from Muckaty Traditional Owners have been ignored. Muckaty Traditional Owners have initiated legal action in the Federal Court challenging the nomination of the site, yet Mr Ferguson persists with the fiction that Traditional Owners support the dump.

Ferguson has refused repeated requests from concerned Traditional Owners to meet with them. His latest excuse for ignoring them is that the matter is subject to legal action. He has also said that he will consult Traditional Owners after a decision has been made on the proposed Muckaty dump — a thorough reworking of the traditional of consultation.

Ferguson says he will “respect” the Federal Court’s decision but in fact he is pre-empting it by pushing forward with legislation which entrenches Muckaty as the only site under active consideration for a national repository. Interestingly, Ferguson’s Bill is very similar to Howard-era legislation (pdf) which Labor slammed as being “sordid” and “draconian”.

Ziggy Switkowski, who was until recently the Chair of the ANSTO Board, has been promoting the construction of 50 power reactors in Australia. Over a 50 year lifespan, 50 reactors would be responsible for 1.8 billion tonnes of radioactive tailings waste at uranium mines. The reactors would be responsible for a further 430,000 tonnes of depleted uranium waste, a by-product of the uranium enrichment process (which would most likely take place overseas). The reactors would directly produce 75,000 tonnes of high-level nuclear waste and 750,000 cubic metres of low-level and intermediate-level waste.

The Labor Party promised to address radioactive waste management issues in a manner which is “scientific, transparent, accountable, fair and allows access to appeal mechanisms” and to “ensure full community consultation in radioactive waste decision-making processes”. Every one of those promises has been broken by Martin Ferguson and his Waste Management Bill.

It’s very clear that nuclear power reactors produce vastly more waste than ANSTO’s research reactor. The government needs to demonstrate a capacity to safely and responsibly manage the Lucas Heights research reactor and the waste it produces before trying to sell us on the idea of a nuclear power industry.


Rudd Government dumping election commitments

Jim Green, Online Opinion, 23 December 2008
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=8330&page=0

With a Senate Committee report on Thursday calling for the repeal of draconian laws allowing the imposition of a radioactive waste dump in the absence of any consultation with or consent from Aboriginal Traditional Owners, it is time for resources and energy minister Martin Ferguson to come clean on his plans for managing this contentious issue.

Labor voted against the Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act in 2005/06 with senior Labor MPs describing it as ‘extreme’, ‘arrogant’, ‘draconian’, ‘sorry’, ‘sordid’, and ‘profoundly shameful’. At its 2007 national conference, the ALP voted unanimously to repeal the legislation. Over a year later and Martin Ferguson has not budged while Prime Minister Kevin Rudd – for all his boasting about keeping election promises – has conspicuously failed to ensure that this commitment is kept.

The Labor Government will most likely repeal the Radioactive Waste Management Act in the new year but the controversy over radioactive waste management will continue. The waste in question ranges from the relatively innocuous – such as lightly-contaminated lab-coats – to the far more hazardous and long-lived wastes arising from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods from reactors at Lucas Heights.

If the Labor Government intends to pursue the Howard Government’s plan to establish a dump in the Northern Territory, it will need to override NT laws – and thereby break its pre-election pledge to respect state/territory laws which outlaw the imposition of radioactive waste dumps.

Four sites in the NT are under consideration. None of the four sites was short-listed when a national site selection study was undertaken in the 1990s, informed by scientific, environmental and social criteria. The NT sites were short-listed under the Howard government simply because the NT was seen as a soft political target. Thus Labor’s commitment to handle the issue in a scientific manner will go out the window if the NT sites are pursued.

Early in the new year, Mr Ferguson is expected to wave around a consultant’s report purporting to demonstrate that his favoured site is ideal for a radioactive dump – just as his predecessor, Senator Peter McGauran, paraded a consultant’s report in 2002 purporting to demonstrate that a site immediately adjacent to a missile and rocket testing range in South Australia was the safest place in the nation for a radioactive waste dump. Controversy forced the Howard government to abandon that location, then to abandon the SA dump plan altogether, and Mr McGauran was demoted to a junior ministry for his heavy-handed and clumsy mismanagement of the issue.

Labor’s election commitment to handle the issue transparently went out the window long ago. In April, Mr Ferguson refused to provide substantive answers to questions on his radioactive waste plans, simply asserting that all matters raised were “under consideration”. The secrecy was such that even a question about what specific matters were under consideration was also said to be under consideration!

Mr Ferguson is likely to try to impose a radioactive waste dump in an area in the Muckaty Land Trust, 120 kms north of Tennant Creek. This site was nominated by the Northern Land Council despite vocal opposition from a number of Traditional Owners whose country will be affected by the proposal.

Traditional Owner’s are divided. Dianne Stokes, a Muckaty Traditional Owner who has been leading the campaign against the dump, said at the Senate Committee hearing in Alice Springs; “We want to keep talking about it and continue to fight it until we are listened to. The big capital N-O. The Ngapa clan and the rest of the other totems in that land trust are all connected. We have connections to each other and are related to each other. We are the same tribe, the one ancestral cultural group of people who are the strong voice, and one voice, in that country”.

Muckaty Traditional Owner Marlene Bennett told the Committee hearing in Alice Springs: “I would just like to question why Martin Ferguson is sitting on this issue like a hen trying to hatch an egg. The people of the Northern Territory elected the Labor Party. We were led to believe that the nuclear waste thing would be all overturned and overruled, and at this moment we are extremely disappointed. How many times do we have to say no? No means no.”.

The opposition of numerous Muckaty Traditional Owners was expressed during the Senate inquiry and has also been acknowledged by the ALP at federal and territory levels. Among others, Indigenous affairs minister Jenny Macklin has acknowledged the opposition and distress of Muckaty Traditional Owners, while in 2001 she publicly acknowledged that Australia has no need for the nuclear reactors which are the greatest source of the problem.

In April, the NT Labor conference unanimously adopted a resolution acknowledging that the nomination of Muckaty was not made with the full and informed consent of all Traditional Owners, that it did not comply with the Aboriginal Land Rights Act and that the Muckaty nomination should be repealed.

One wonders if the fate that befell Peter McGauran will be visited on Martin Ferguson – demotion for clumsy, heavy-handed mismanagement of a contentious issue that demands a more considered, intelligent approach.


NUCLEAR WASTE AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

Jim Green, national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth:

ABC Radio National – ‘Perspective’, Feb 7 2008

http://www.abc.net.au/rn/perspective/stories/2008/2153906.htm

Given that it was a clear point of policy difference between the major parties, it was surprising that the Coalition government’s efforts to impose a nuclear waste repository on unwilling communities received so little media interest during the election campaign.

This issue provides a window into relations between the Coalition government and Indigenous people over the past decade and a test of the former government’s policy of practical reconciliation.

In February 1998, the Coalition government announced its intention to build a national nuclear waste repository near Woomera in South Australia. Leading the battle against the repository were the Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta, a council of senior Aboriginal women. Many of the Kungka Tjuta witnessed first-hand the impacts of the British nuclear bomb tests at Maralinga in the 1950s. They were sceptical about the Coalition government’s claim that nuclear waste destined for the Woomera repository was ‘safe’. After all, the waste would be kept at the Lucas Heights reactor site in Sydney if it was perfectly safe, or simply dumped in landfill.

The Maralinga legacy continued to resonate in another way. A clean-up of Maralinga in the late 1990s generated controversy when nuclear engineer and whistleblower Alan Parkinson revealed that it had been compromised by cost-cutting. This was disconcerting for South Australians since the same government department responsible for the Maralinga clean-up was also responsible for the Woomera repository. Alan Parkinson’s book on the Maralinga clean-up, Maralinga: Australia’s Nuclear Waste Cover-up, was published by ABC Books last year. Mr Parkinson said: “What was done at Maralinga was a cheap and nasty solution that wouldn’t be adopted on white-fellas land.”

The proposed repository generated such controversy in South Australia that the Coalition government secured the services of a public relations company. Correspondence between the company and the federal government was released under Freedom of Information laws. In one exchange, a government official asks the PR company to remove sand-dunes from a photo selected to adorn a brochure. The explanation provided by the government official was that: “Dunes are a sensitive area with respect to Aboriginal Heritage.” The sand-dunes were removed from the photo, only for the government official to ask if the horizon could be straightened up as well.

The federal government used compulsory land acquisition powers to take control of land for a repository in SA, extinguishing all Native Title rights and interests. The Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta continued to implore the federal government to get their ears out of the pockets, and after six long years the government did just that. In the lead-up to the 2004 federal election, with the repository issue biting politically, the government decided to cut its losses and abandon its plans for a repository in SA.

The ears went straight back into the pockets, however. Unequivocal promises not to impose a repository in the Northern Territory were broken by the Coalition government after the 2004 election. Traditional Owners were not consulted before three sites in the Territory were short-listed for a repository.

Government ministers asserted that the three sites are “some distance from any form of civilisation” or, more bluntly, that they are “in the middle of nowhere”. This is offensive to Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people living and running successful pastoral and tourist enterprises three, five and 18 kilometres from the sites.

And then in 2005, the Coalition government rail-roaded the Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act through parliament. This legislation provides wide-ranging exemptions from Aboriginal heritage protection laws. Then in 2006, the government rail-roaded amendments to the Waste Management Act through parliament. The amendments state that a nuclear dump site nomination is legally valid even without consultation with, or consent from, Traditional Owners.

The former Coalition government prided itself on its approach of ‘practical reconciliation’. However, its handling of the nuclear waste issue suggests that practical reconciliation was nothing more than rhetoric. Let’s hope that the Rudd Labor government avoids the temptation to impose a nuclear waste repository on an unwilling Indigenous community.

The successful campaign against nuclear dumping in SA

1998-2004

Howard’s nuclear dump backdown

On July 14, 2004, the federal government announced that it had abandoned plans to build a national radioactive waste dump in South Australia. The backdown was a major victory for the environmental and Aboriginal organisations which fought the dump plan for over six years.

The government announced its intention to build the dump near Woomera, 500 kms north of Adelaide, in February 1998 – just a few months after it announced its intention to build a new nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights in southern Sydney. The two plans were closely linked. Up to 90% of the waste to be dumped in SA is stored at Lucas Heights. And the political agenda was simply to get radioactive waste out of Lucas Heights in order to reduce public opposition to the new reactor.

A campaign to oppose the dump took shape. The Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta – a senior Aboriginal women’s council from northern SA – took up the fight, as did the Kokatha traditional owners. The Kungkas – victims of the British nuclear testing program at Maralinga and Emu Field in the 1950s – have been supported by the GANG (Girls Against Nuclear Genocide) who have moved to Coober Pedy to help fight the proposed nuclear dump.

The Kungka Tjuta recounted time and again their experiences of the Maralinga nuclear test program in South Australia in the 1950s. They knew first hand about the problems of the nuclear industry and pleaded with the politicians to ‘get their ears out of their pockets’.

The Maralinga experience also influenced the dump campaign in another way. The federal government completed a ‘clean-up’ of Maralinga in the late 1990s, but it was grossly inadequate. Even after the ‘clean-up’, kilograms of plutonium remain buried in shallow, unlined trenches in totally unsuitable geology. The botched ‘clean-up’ was hardly reassuring.

The federal government planned to build two facilities at Woomera – an underground dump for lower-level waste, and an above-ground store for ‘interim’ storage of higher-level wastes including those arising from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods from the Lucas Heights reactor. As public and media opposition to the dump plans grew, the Olsen Liberal government in SA sniffed the political wind and announced in 1999 that it would accept the underground dump but would legislate in an attempt to ban the higher-level waste store. The Labor Party – state and federal – trumped them by announcing opposition to both the dump and the store.

Several environment groups have fought the dump plan since it was first announced, including Friends of the Earth and the Australian Conservation Foundation. Opposition to the dump grew along the transport corridor linking Lucas Heights to Woomera, in no small part because of Friends of the Earth’s Nuclear Freeways project. On numerous occasions FoE activists took a mock nuclear waste castor along the transport corridor, building relations with communities all the time. This project was highly successful. Of the 18 councils along the transport corridor, 16 took a position of opposing the dump and the trucking of radioactive waste through their communities. FoE also organised numerous ‘radioactive exposure’ tours, taking hundreds of students to nuclear sites in SA – the proposed dump site and the uranium mines at Honeymoon, Beverley and Roxby Downs.

The Nuclear Freeways project was also significant in linking the dump proposal to the root of the problem – the planned new reactor at Lucas Heights. While the federal government mounted scare campaigns about waste stored in urban areas, it became increasingly well known that the dump plan had nothing to do with the small volumes of waste stored around the country and the everything to do with Lucas Heights. The NSW government was persuaded to hold a parliamentary inquiry into radioactive waste management in 2003-04, and that inquiry concluded that the dump proposal could not be justified and should be abandoned.

The Labor Party won the 2002 election in SA, and in the following year it legislated in an attempt to ban any form of national radioactive waste facility being built in SA.

The SA Labor government also tried a legal manoeuvre to stop the dump in 2003 – announcing its intention to declare the dump site a public park, which would make it immune from compulsory acquisition by the federal government. That led the federal government to use an urgency provision in the land acquisition act to seize control of the dump site with the stroke of a pen in mid-2003. The SA Labor government challenged the land seizure in the federal court, but lost. The SA government appealed the judgement to the full bench of the Federal Court, and that appeal was upheld in June 2004 – reversing the land seizure.

By July 2004, the Howard government was in trouble. It had the option of appealing the Federal Court decision to the High Court, but that appeal would have been deeply unpopular and it probably would not have succeeded in any case. And already, the dump was shaping up as a key issue in marginal seats in SA. For example, in the marginal seat of Adelaide, polling showed that the dump was second only to Medicare as a vote-swinging issue.

The Howard government decided to cut its losses and abandon the dump plan. The government said it would instead attempt to find a site to co-locate both lower and higher level wastes.

The victory of the dump campaign is something to savour – a fantastic result reflecting an enormous amount of hard work by a broad, effective alliance.

The Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta’s ‘Irati Wanti’ website is archived at

<http://web.archive.org/web/20080718193150/www.iratiwanti.org/home.php3>

‘We are winners because of what’s in our hearts, not what’s on paper.’

Open Letter from the Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta – senior Aboriginal women’s council from northern SA – after the Federal Government abandoned its plan to build a national radioactive waste dump in South Australia.

August 2004

People said that you can’t win against the Government. Just a few women. We just kept talking and telling them to get their ears out of their pockets and listen. We never said we were going to give up. Government has big money to buy their way out but we never gave up. We told Howard you should look after us, not try and kill us. Straight out. We always talk straight out. In the end he didn’t have the power, we did. He only had money, but money doesn’t win.

Happy now – Kungka winners. We are winners because of what’s in our hearts, not what’s on paper. About the country, bush tucker, bush medicine and Inma (traditional songs and dances). Big happiness that we won against the Government. Victorious. And the family and all the grandchildren are so happy because we fought the whole way. And we were going away all the time. Kids growing up, babies have been born since we started. And still we have family coming. All learning about our fight.

We started talking strong against the dump a long time ago, in 1998 with Sister Michelle. We thought we would get the Greenies to help us. Greenies care for the same thing. Fight for the same thing. Against the poison.

Since then we been everywhere talking about the poison. Canberra, Sydney, Lucas Heights, Melbourne, Adelaide, Silverton, Port Augusta, Roxby Downs, Lake Eyre. We did it the hard way. Always camping out in the cold. Travelling all over with no money. Just enough for cool drink along the way. We went through it. Survivors. Even had an accident where we hit a bullock one night on the way to Roxby Downs. We even went to Lucas Heights Reactor. It’s a dangerous place, but we went in boldly to see where they were making the poison – the radiation. Seven women, seven sisters, we went in.

We lost our friends. Never mind we lost our loved ones. We never give up. Been through too much. Too much hard business and still keep going. Sorry business all the time. Fought through every hard thing along the way. People trying to scare us from fighting, it was hard work, but we never stopped. When we were going to Sydney people say “You Kungkas cranky they might bomb you”, but we kept going. People were telling us that the Whitefellas were pushing us, but no everything was coming from the heart, from us.

We showed that Greenies and Anangu can work together. Greenies could come and live here in Coober Pedy and work together to stop the dump. Kungkas showed the Greenies about the country and the culture. Our Greenie girls are the best in Australia. We give them all the love from our hearts. Family you know. Working together – that’s family. Big thank you to them especially. We can’t write. They help us with the letters, the writing, the computers, helped tell the world.

Thank you very much for helping us over the years, for everything. Thank you to the Lord, all our family and friends, the Coober Pedy community, Umoona Aged Care, the South Australian Government and all our friends around Australia and overseas. You helped us and you helped the kids. We are happy. We can have a break now. We want to have a rest and go on with other things now. Sit around the campfire and have a yarn. We don’t have to talk about the dump anymore, and get up and go all the time. Now we can go out together and camp out and pick bush medicine and bush tucker. And take the grandchildren out.

We were crying for the little ones and the ones still coming. With all the help – we won. Thank you all very much.

No Radioactive Waste Dump in our Ngura – In our Country!

Kupa Piti Kungka Tjuta

Coober Pedy, South Australia

Ivy Makinti Stewart

Eileen Kampakuta Brown

Eileen Unkari Crombie

Emily Munyungka Austin

Angelina Wonga

Tjunmutja Myra Watson

Nuclear medicine and the proposed national radioactive waste dump

To download a 2-page paper addressing these issues right-click here.

Nuclear waste and nuclear medicine in Australia

Jim Green, Online Opinion, 16 Nov 2021

https://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=21721&page=0

Claims that the Australian government’s proposed national nuclear waste storage and disposal ‘facility‘ near Kimba in South Australia is required to support nuclear medicine are not supported by the facts.

Australia’s radioactive waste arises from the production and use of radioactive materials in scientific research and industrial, agricultural and medical applications. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), operator of the research reactor at Lucas Heights, south of Sydney, is the main source of waste destined for a national nuclear waste facility. (Other waste streams ‒ such as those generated at uranium mines, and wastes from nuclear weapons testing ‒ would not be disposed of at the national facility.)

The vast majority of nuclear medicine procedures are diagnostic imaging procedures; the remainder are for therapy or palliation (pain relief). According to Medicare figures, nuclear medicine represents less than three percent of medical imaging. Nuclear medicine should not be confused with X-rays using iodine contrast, radiotherapy or chemotherapy, which are used much more commonly.

ANSTO is increasing production of nuclear waste from its radioisotope export business ‒ it plans to ramp up production of technetium-99m, the most commonly used medical radioisotope, from one percent of global supply to 25-30 percent. When all costs, including final waste disposal, are considered, this business costs taxpayers and leaves Australia with much more radioactive waste. The government subsidy to ANSTO for 2019-20 alone was $282 million.

The federal government claims that waste storage at Lucas Heights is reaching capacity and that failure to find a new waste storage or disposal site will impact on medical radioisotope supply and thus adversely affect public health.

Those claims ignore several important points:

* Nuclear medicine typically uses short-lived radioisotopes and the waste does not require special handling after a short period of radioactive decay.

* The absence of a national waste storage or disposal facility has not adversely impacted nuclear medicine, nor will the establishment of such a facility improve nuclear medicine.

* Waste can be safely stored at Lucas Heights for decades to come, as has been acknowledged by the national nuclear regulator, by the Australian Nuclear Association, and even by ANSTO itself.

Before delving into those arguments, it should be noted that only a small fraction of the waste generated at Lucas Heights ‒ and an even smaller fraction of radioactive waste generated nationally ‒ arises from the production or use of medical radioisotopes. Keith Pitt, the minister responsible for radioactive waste management, claims that “more than 80 per cent of Australia’s radioactive waste stream is associated with the production of nuclear medicine”. A figure of just 20 percent would be closer to the mark; less than 1 percent if uranium mine wastes are included in the calculations.

In any case, the fact that some waste is of medical origin doesn’t mean that a poorly designed and executed plan for a national waste facility should be accepted. The current plan for a waste facility near Kimba is contentious and problematic for numerous reasons, not least the unanimous opposition of the Barngarla Traditional Owners and the government’s extraordinary refusal to allow Traditional Owners to participate in a ‘community ballot’. The racism has been so crude that it attracted criticism from Coalition MPs (and others) on federal parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Another concern is that the National Health and Medical Research Council’s ‘Code of practice for the near-surface disposal of radioactive waste in Australia’ states that a repository should not be built on agricultural land. Thus the Kimba site should have been precluded from consideration.

Scare-mongering

Regardless of the outcome of the current push for a national waste facility ‒ and bearing in mind that all previous plans have been abandoned ‒ there will be an ongoing need for hospitals to store clinical waste. After nuclear medicine is used in a patient, the vast majority is stored on site while it decays. Within a few days, it has lost so much radioactivity that it can go to a normal rubbish tip. There will always be multiple waste storage locations even if a national facility is established.

The government’s claim that a national waste facility is urgently required lest nuclear medicine be affected amounts to scare-mongering. Tilman Ruff, Associate Professor at the Nossal Institute for Global Health at Melbourne University, notes: “The emotive but fallacious claim that provision of nuclear medicine services needed for diagnosis and treatment of cancer will be jeopardised if a new nuclear waste dump is not urgently progressed is being dishonestly but persistently promoted.”

Likewise, health professionals noted in a joint statement in 2011: “The production of radioactive isotopes for nuclear medicine comprises a small percentage of the output of research reactors. The majority of the waste that is produced in these facilities occurs regardless of the nuclear medicine isotope production. Linking the need for a centralised radioactive waste storage facility with the production of isotopes for nuclear medicine is misleading.”

Nigel Scullion, then a Coalition Senator, said in 2005 that “Australia will not get access to radiopharmaceuticals” if a nuclear waste repository site was not quickly cleared of any impediments.

Indeed Scullion claimed that access to medical radioisotopes would cease by the end of 2006. Fifteen years later, access to radioisotopes has not been affected and the sky hasn’t fallen in ‒ but Coalition MPs continue with their cynical scare-mongering.

Go back another decade, and the Howard government was scare-mongering to win support for its plan to replace the HIFAR research reactor at Lucas Heights with a new reactor. It wasn’t at all clear that a domestic reactor was required for medical radioisotope production. After all, countries such as the US, the UK and Japan had sophisticated nuclear medicine with little or no reliance on domestic reactor supply.

Indeed there were expert views that a new reactor would adversely affect public health. Prof. Barry Allen, a former chief research scientist at ANSTO, Head of Biomedical Physics Research at the St. George Cancer Care Centre, and author of over 220 publications, told Radio National’s Background Briefing program in 1998:

“I mean it’s reported that if we don’t have a reactor, people will die because they won’t be getting their nuclear medicine and radioisotopes. I think that’s rather unlikely. Most of the isotopes can be imported into Australia; some are being generated on the cyclotron. But on the other hand, a lot of people are dying of cancer and we’re trying to develop new cancer therapies which use radioisotopes, which emit alpha particles which you cannot get from reactors. And if it comes down to cost benefit, I think a lot more people would be saved if we could proceed with targeted alpha cancer therapy, than being stuck with a reactor when we could in fact have imported those isotopes.”

ANSTO’s Lucas Heights site

ANSTO’s Lucas Heights site cannot be used for disposal of nuclear waste. It is unlikely that the site would meet relevant criteria, and in any case federal legislation prohibits waste disposal there.

But nuclear waste can be (and is) stored at Lucas Heights; indeed much of the waste destined for a national facility is currently stored there.

Claims that storage capacity at Lucas Heights is nearing capacity and that a national waste facility site is urgently needed have been flatly rejected by Dr Carl-Magnus Larsson, CEO of the federal nuclear regulator, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA). Dr Larsson stated in parliamentary testimony in 2020: “Waste can be safely stored at Lucas Heights for decades to come”.

Similar comments have been made by ANSTO officers, by the federal government department responsible for radioactive waste management, and by the Australian Nuclear Association. ANSTO officers have noted that “ANSTO is capable of handling and storing wastes for long periods of time” and that waste is stored there “safely and securely”.

Long-lived intermediate-level waste

Of particular concern is long-lived intermediate-level waste (ILW) including waste arising from the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel from the OPAL research reactor at Lucas Heights as well as earlier research reactors. The government plans to move this ILW to the Kimba site for above-ground storage while a deep underground disposal site is found. (Lower-level wastes will be permanently disposed of at Kimba if the project proceeds.)

But the process of finding an ILW disposal site has barely begun and will take decades; indeed ARPANSA has flagged a timeline of 100 years or more.

The vast majority of ILW is currently stored at Lucas Heights. Why not leave it at Lucas Heights ‒ described by an ANSTO officer as “the most secure facility we have got in Australia” ‒ until a disposal site is found? The government doesn’t have a good answer to that question ‒ indeed it has no answer at all beyond false claims about storage capacity limitations and scare-mongering about nuclear medicine supply.

Until such time as a disposal site is available, ILW should be stored at Lucas Heights for the following reasons:

* Australia’s nuclear expertise is heavily concentrated at Lucas Heights;

* Storage at Lucas Heights would negate risks associated with transportation over thousands of kilometres;

* Security at Lucas Heights is far more rigorous than is proposed for Kimba (a couple of security guards); and

* Ongoing storage at Lucas Heights avoids unnecessary costs and risks associated with double-handling, i.e. ILW being moved to Kimba only to be moved again to a disposal site.

Conversely, above-ground storage of ILW in regional South Australia increases risk, complexity and cost ‒ for no good reason.

Need for an independent inquiry

The current plan for a waste facility at Kimba should be scrapped. It is unacceptable to be disposing of nuclear waste against the unanimous wishes of Barngarla Traditional Owners, and ILW storage at Kimba makes no sense for the reasons discussed above.

Australia needs a thorough independent inquiry of both nuclear waste disposal and production. We need a long-term disposal plan that avoids double-handling and unnecessary movement of radioactive materials and meets world’s best practice standards.

An inquiry should include an audit of existing waste stockpiles and storage. This could be led by the federal nuclear regulator ARPANSA in consultation with relevant state agencies. This audit would include developing a prioritised program to improve continuing waste storage and handling facilities, and identifying non-recurrent or legacy waste sites and exploring options to retire and decommission these.

An inquiry would also identify and evaluate the full suite of radioactive waste management options. That would include the option of maintaining existing arrangements until suitable disposal options exist for both ILW and lower-level wastes.

Radioisotope production options

We also need to thoroughly investigate medical radioisotope production options with the aim of shifting from heavy reliance on reactor production in favour of cyclotrons (a type of particle accelerator). Among other advantages, cyclotrons produce far less radioactive waste than research reactors.

PET scanning is the fastest growth segment in nuclear medicine. Overwhelmingly this is used in cancer diagnosis and increasingly in therapy, and relies only on cyclotrons for supply.

We have a choice: whether we follow ANSTO’s expensive business model to ramp up reactor manufacture of radioisotopes ‒ and the long-lived radioactive waste that goes with it ‒ or collaborate with Canada and other countries to develop cyclotron manufacture of radioisotopes that does not produce long-lived nuclear waste.

ANSTO is a taxpayer-funded organisation. The decision to ramp up reactor waste production will leave many future generations with radioactive materials that last hundreds of thousands of years.

Clean cyclotron production of technetium-99m was approved in Canada last year, and should become the future of radioisotope production. It avoids the accident and terrorist risks of nuclear reactors, has no weapons proliferation potential, and creates very little nuclear waste.
Cyclotron radioisotope manufacture at multiple sites will also be more reliable than our single reactor, which has a record of multiple unplanned outages.
We should be leaders in this field, not laggards.

Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia. His PhD thesis on the replacement of the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor focused on medical radioisotope supply options for Australia.

More information:

* Dr Margaret Beavis and Dr Peter Karamoskos (Medical Association for Prevention of War), 2017, ‘Ten more questions about Australia’s nuclear waste’

* Medical Association for Prevention of War, 2017, Submission to ARPANSA re medical radioisotope production

* Medical Association for Prevention of War − nuclear medicine

* Video: ‘Debunking the myths around medicine and a nuclear waste dump

* Friends of the Earth: nuclear waste / medicine

* Friends of the Earth: ANSTO, radioisotope production, etc.


Nuclear medicine and the proposed national radioactive waste dump

Jim Green, December 2015

National nuclear campaigner – Friends of the Earth, Australia

To download a 2-page paper addressing these issues right-click here.

“As health organisations, we are appalled that access to nuclear medical procedures is being used to justify the proposed nuclear waste dump. Most waste from these procedures break down quickly and can be safely disposed of either on site or locally.”  − Dr Bill Williams, Medical Association for the Prevention of War

“Linking the need for a centralized radioactive waste storage facility with the production of isotopes for nuclear medicine is misleading. The production of radioactive isotopes for nuclear medicine comprises a small percentage of the output of research reactors. The majority of the waste that is produced in these facilities occurs regardless of the nuclear medicine isotope production.” − Nuclear Radiologist Dr Peter Karamoskos

Summary

Proponents of a national radioactive waste facility (a repository for lower-level wastes and a co-located store for higher-level wastes) claim or imply that nuclear medicine would be jeopardised if the facility does not proceed. There is no basis to such claims – they amount to dishonest scare-mongering.

Proponents claim that most or all of the waste that the federal government wants to dispose of or store at a national repository/store arises from medicine, specifically the production and use of medical radioisotopes. However, measured by radioactivity, the true figure is just 10-20%. Measured by volume, the figure may be within that range or it may be higher than 20% − but it takes some creative accounting to justify the claim that most or even all of the waste is medical in origin.

In any case, the fact that some waste is of medical origin doesn’t mean that a national repository/store is the best way to manage the waste.

If the plan for a national repository/store does not proceed, medical waste will continue to be stored at the Lucas Heights reactor site operated by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and, in much smaller volumes, at hospitals. Some waste is used in hospitals and then sent back to ANSTO (e.g. molybdenum ‘cows’ that have been ‘milked’ of the daughter radionuclide, technetium-99m − by far the most commonly used medical radioisotope). That is no problem since ANSTO and hospitals continue to produce radioactive waste and thus they have an ongoing need for on-site waste stores and waste management expertise regardless of the options for periodic off-site disposal.

Nuclear medicine is not being adversely affected by the absence of a national radioactive waste repository/store. Nuclear medicine will not benefit from the creation of a national radioactive waste repository/store.

The incessant references to nuclear medicine to ‘sell’ the proposed radioactive waste repository/store amount to nothing more than emotive propaganda − which is what critics of the proposed national radioactive waste repository/store are routinely accused of.

Scare mongering

Successive governments have engaged in a scare campaign in relation to medical isotopes. Here are some examples:

·         Senator Nigel Scullion, who purports to represent the NT in the Federal Senate, said: “If we don’t have a site that is clear of any impediments by April [2006] then by December 2006 Australia will not get access to radio pharmaceuticals that are essential to the early diagnosis of cancer and to deal with many cardiovascular issues in Australia.” (13/10/05, abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200510/s1481671.htm) Senator Scullion’s scare-mongering was proven to be false.

·         A joint media released by Nigel Scullion and David Tollner, the CLP Member for Solomon in the NT Parliament, said: “A delay [in building the waste facility] would severely limit the availability of life-saving radiopharmaceuticals used in the treatment of cardiovascular disease and early intervention against cancer, particularly breast cancer.” That one paragraph contains layers of confusion and misinformation. As the Medical Association for the Prevention of War noted, Senator Scullion and Mr Tollner were “peddling a lie” (ABC, 17/10/05).

·         National MP John Cobb said: “But let me ask this: do people want hospitals, do they want life-saving cancer treatment and equipment …? … I must stress how much medical waste is involved. I wonder whether those who have such a problem with it want to close down our hospitals.” (House of Representatives, 16 October 2003, pp.21329-30) Needless to say, no hospitals have been closed down, no hospitals will be closed down, no-one wants hospitals closed down.

·         In 2002, science minister Peter McGauran accused WA Premier Geoff Gallop of putting at risk life-saving nuclear medical research by refusing to accept that its waste had to be stored somewhere. (‘Premiers dump on waste site’, The Australian, August 7, 2002.)

Much of the pro-dump propaganda is somewhat less disingenuous than the comments of Senator Scullion, Mr Tollner, Mr Cobb, and Mr McGauran, implying rather than asserting that nuclear medicine would be jeopardised if the NT dump plan does not proceed. For example federal resources minister Martin Ferguson said in 2010: “We need a repository. We need nuclear medicine. All Australians benefit from the outcome of establishing a low and medium level repository in Australia, because half a million Australians a year demand access to nuclear medicine.” (www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2010/03/04/2836622.htm)

David Tollner said he approached then Prime Minister John Howard about funding an oncology unit at Royal Darwin Hospital as compensation for hosting a nuclear waste facility. (16/10/05, abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200510/s1483293.htm) If there is a need for an oncology unit in Darwin, it would be totally unacceptable for federal support to be dependent on acceptance of a nuclear waste dump.

Fraction of the radioactive waste of medical origin

The federal Labor government − as with the previous government − routinely asserts that most of the waste is a by-product of the production and use of medical isotopes. Sadly, that false claim is sometimes echoed in the NT, as with the August 2011 NT News editorial which asserted that the waste arises “almost solely” from nuclear medicine.

Here are some examples of politicians peddling misinformation:

·         Then resources minister Ian Macfarlane said the nuclear waste arises “predominantly from medical services” (6/6/05, www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2005/s1385915.htm).

·         Then science minister Peter McGauran said: “However, the Government remains totally and utterly committed to the safe and secure storage of low level radioactive waste − the bulk of which is produced from nuclear medicine procedures, and is the necessary by-product of life-saving medicine.” (24/6/2004, www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2004/s1139557.htm)

·         Mr McGauran said that the waste destined for the national dump “is largely produced by nuclear medicine” (ABC Radio National, Australia Talks Back, 5/2/02).

·         In 1997, Mr McGauran said that “During this year more than 260 000 Australians will have a nuclear medicine procedure. … As a result of these procedures, some 35 spent fuel rods are generated by the Lucas Heights research reactor every year.” However just 10% of the spent fuel can be attributed to medical radioisotope production.

·         Then science minister Brendan Nelson said on 2/11/05 in Parliament that “… much of [the nuclear waste is] sourced from hospitals around Australia, which is currently stored at ANSTO. We have another 1,800 cubic metres at Woomera, much of that sourced from hospitals. In fact most of this stuff comes from hospitals. …” Hospitals account for only a tiny fraction of the waste (about 3% by volume). Just over 2000 cubic metres of low-level waste are stored at Woomera and none of it is of medical origin. Mr Nelson had no idea what he was talking about.

For low-level waste (LLW) and short-lived intermediate-level waste (SLILW):

* The claim that most of the waste is of medical origin certainly cannot be true in relation to waste volume, since 54% of the volume is non-medical CSIRO soil.

* A rough estimate would be as follows: say one quarter of ANSTO’s waste is medical (1320/4=330m3), and one third of the state/territory waste is medical (151/3=50 m3), so overall perhaps ONE TENTH (380/3700 m3) of the national inventory of LLW/SLILW is a by-product of medical isotope production and nuclear medicine. Or if we assume that one half of ANSTO’s waste is medical (1320/2=660m3), the overall figure is 710/3700 or 19%.

For long-lived intermediate-level waste (LLILW):

* Only a small fraction of this waste could be attributed to medical isotope production. Spent fuel accounts for a large majority of the radioactivity of Australia’s LLILW (though only a small fraction of the volume), and according to ANSTO (1993 Research Reactor Review submission), just 10% of the Lucas Heights ‘HIFAR’ reactor’s neutrons were used for medical isotope production. Presumably a similar figure applies for the new OPAL reactor − there is no reason to believe otherwise.

* Of the rest of Australia’s LLILW (other than spent fuel), about half by volume comprises reactor and isotope production wastes (limited detail is available), but this would account for only a small fraction of the LLILW inventory when measuring by radioactivity.

In sum, for LLW plus SLILW plus LLILW, 10-20% of the current stockpile would be the plausible range for medical waste − closer to 10% if measuring by radioactivity (because spent reactor fuel is such a large contributor to total radioactivity) and closer to 20% if measuring by volume.

For current and future production, roughly 30-40% of the volume could be attributed to medicine, but if measuring by radioactivity the figure would still be in the range of 10-20% (again because the radioactivity figures are dominated by spent fuel).

What should be done?

Two parallel processes should be initiated regarding radioactive waste management in Australia: a radioactive waste audit, and a National Commission or comparable public inquiry mechanism.

The federal government should immediately initiate an audit of existing waste stockpiles and storage. This could be led by the federal nuclear regulator ARPANSA in consultation with relevant state agencies with responsibility for radioactive waste. This audit would include developing a prioritised program to improve continuing waste storage and handling facilities, and identifying non-recurrent or legacy waste sites and exploring options to retire and de-commission these.

A National Commission would restore procedural and scientific rigour, and stakeholder and community confidence in radioactive waste management. It would identify and evaluate the full suite of radioactive waste management options. That would include the option of maintaining existing arrangements, keeping in mind that 95% of the waste is securely stored at two Commonwealth facilities: ANSTO’s Lucas Heights facility, and a large volume of very low level waste stored on Defence Department land at Woomera, SA.

The above issues are addressed in detail in a 2014 paper posted at: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/wp-content/uploads/Responsible-Radioactive-Waste-Management-The-need-for-an-Inquiry-Final.pdf

More information

−−− ‘Nuclear Medicine in Australia: a Joint Health Sector Position Statement’, March 2011, www.mapw.org.au/files/downloads/JHPS_Nuclear-Medicine-%20in%20Australia%20March%202011.pdf

(“Nuclear medicine involves the use of radioisotopes for the diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions. Significant concerns exist within the Australian community and amongst health professionals and scientific experts regarding current research reactor based production and the Commonwealth Government’s position regarding the disposal of these radioisotopes. On the basis of current information, we, the undersigned members of the health sector, recommend that the nuclear medicine industry in Australia undergo a full independent inquiry.”)

−−− Medical Association for Prevention of War − nuclear medicine section:
www.mapw.org.au/nuclear-chain/nuclear-medicine

−−− Friends of the Earth webpages on nuclear medicine, radioisotope production, and Lucas Heights: www.nuclear.foe.org.au/ansto

−−− Dr Margaret Beavis, 2 Dec 2015, ‘Is Australia becoming the world’s nuclear waste dump by stealth?’, Sydney Morning Herald, www.smh.com.au/comment/is-australia-becoming-the-worlds-nuclear-waste-dump-by-stealth-20151122-gl4v04.html


Nuclear Waste In Australia: A Few Home Truths

Dr Margie Beavis, 7 March 2016, https://newmatilda.com/2016/03/07/50511/

The Federal government is seeking a location for a nuclear waste facility. But the provision of information to communities has been problematic, with some major flaws.

Claims have been made that provision of nuclear medicine services is a key reason to build it, but existing medical waste makes up a very small proportion of the total waste requiring disposal.

In addition, little has been said about ANSTO’s business plan to greatly ramp up Australia’s reactor based production of isotopes from 1 per cent to over 25 per cent of the world’s market, which will massively increase the amount of long-lived radioactive waste produced in the future.

A new process may reduce the volume of the waste, but the actual quantity of radioactive material to store will be significantly greater, and will become most of the radioactive waste Australia produces.

In Australia nuclear medicine isotopes are indeed useful, but according to Medicare figures represent less than 3 per cent of medical imaging. They are most commonly used for bone scans and some specialised heart scans. They are not needed (as claimed by government) for normal X-rays, most heart scans and the vast majority of cancer treatments (surgery, chemotherapy and radiotherapy).

Government statements that one in two Australians at some point in their life need nuclear medicine stretch credibility.

It is interesting to hear government adviser Dr Geoff Currie’s contribution to this debate. But it does not reflect the position of the world leaders in isotope production.

The Canadians, who have been the leading exporters and best practice experts producing 30 per cent of the world’s isotopes for many decades, are in the process of phasing out nuclear reactor production.

Canada produced a “Report of the Expert Review Panel on Medical Isotope Production 2009“. After this report the Canadian government stated, “Canadians have been left to shoulder a disproportionate amount of the nuclear waste burden associated with reactor-based isotope production. This includes the significant costs associated with long-term management of the waste. The Government favours a new paradigm in which Canadians benefit from Canadian-based isotope production, supplemented if necessary from the world market, and supply is sustainable because of reduced waste and improved economics.”

They gave a number of other reasons why Canada wished to phase out reactor use. These included reliability of supply (reactor breakdowns created worldwide isotope supply shortages); investment in reactor production of medical isotopes would crowd out investment in innovative alternative production technologies like cyclotrons; and reactor production was the most expensive option, at no stage commercially viable without major taxpayer subsidies.

The Canadian Triumf research team had a successful pilot project in January 2015. They demonstrated a process that enables the routine production of sufficient Tc-99m (which is 85 per cent of isotopes used) to satisfy the daily demand for a population the size of British Columbia – or 500 patients – from a six-hour run on a common brand of medical cyclotrons.

Clinical trials began in early 2015. There are plans to have 24 cyclotrons operating across Canada by 2018, when they are planning to close down their reactor.

A very comprehensive 2010 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency report found reactor based isotope production requires significant taxpayer subsidies, as the cost of sale does not cover the cost of production.

The report concludes: “In many cases the full impact of Mo-99/Tc-99m provision was not transparent to or appreciated by governments… The full costs of waste management, reactor operations, fuel consumption, etc were not included in the price structure. This is a subsidisation by one country’s taxpayers of another country’s health care system. Many governments have indicated that they are no longer willing to provide such subsidisation.”

Clearly cyclotron production of nuclear medicine is not widely available right now, but planned in Canada in the next three to five years. How rapidly we adopt their technology will determine how long we need to use reactor produced isotopes.

What is needed urgently is a debate about how much waste we make. We have a choice: whether we follow ANSTO’s expensive business model to ramp up reactor manufacture (and the long-lived radioactive waste that goes with it), or collaborate with Canada to develop cyclotron manufacture of isotopes that does not produce long-lived nuclear waste.

It is a bit like Australia’s stance on coal for energy – with continued reliance on 19th century technology rather than a switch to 21st century renewables – do we continue with 20th century reactor technology and back the wrong horse?

ANSTO is a taxpayer-funded organisation. The decision to ramp up reactor waste production will leave many future generations with radioactive materials that last hundreds of thousands of years. So for the six communities proposed, Australia’s future nuclear waste burden is the elephant in the room.

When managing toxic materials, the first principle should be reducing their production at source. We urgently need an inquiry into nuclear waste production in Australia, given we already have more radioactive waste than we know what to do with.

Roxby timeline + accidents 1987-2001

Taken from: http://www.sea-us.org.au/roxby/roxstory.html

# 2001    Incident : Summary – Spills totalled 4,216,000 litres, no location or other data provided (except detail below).
# Incident : Undated – Total of NINE Process spills (including December incident below), no location or other data provided.
# Incident : Undated – TWO ‘Pond’ spills, no location or other data provided.
# Incident : Undated – ‘Undefined’ spill at the Port Adelaide sulfur yard.
# Incident : Undated – ‘Undefined’ Diesel ‘leak’ from a bulk storage tank at Olympic Dam, no location or other data provided.
# Incident : ‘Late’ – ~30,000 litres of Diesel spill at a Pump Station for Borefield B, no data provided.
# Incident : December 12 – 427,000 litres of Process leaching slurry containing 0.1% U (1,000,000 ppb) accidentally spilled from a holding tank. This represents a mass of uranium of about 0.43 t of uranium.
# Incident : October 21 – Large scale FIRE in the Solvent Extraction section of the Olympic Dam processing complex. Exact details still remain unclear, though it did apparently involve the release of radionuclides into the environment (mainly the atmosphere for wide dispersion).
# Incident : May – ~40,000 litres of Diesel spilt from underground fuel lines at Pump Station 1, Borefield A, and spread some 200 m from the source. The lines had corroded, since they were more than 15 years old. The residual contamination left in groundwater as there was perceived to be “no significant environmental risk” (pp 17).
# 2000    Incident : 106 spills totalled 2,021,000 litres, no location or other data provided..
# Incident : January 20 – Three workers were in the underground mine when explosives detonated. Although not injured, it represents a major breach in blasting safety procedures.
# 1999    Incident : December 23 – Part of the solvent extraction plant goes up in flames – this is where the copper and uranium is extracted. Allegedly, the fire was contained outside the uranium section with no contact with radioactive materials, although the detail is unclear. The fire could be seen as far as 25 km away at nearby Andamooka.
# Incident : December – Two workers seriously injured in a sulphuric acid spill.
# Incident : October 12 – Radioactive scrap metal detected at WMC’s scrap metal merchant in Adelaide. Load returned to Roxby.
# Incident : March 31 – Copper smelter explodes late at night, causing extensive damage. No workers injured.
# March 26 – Court case brought against Hugh Morgan (chief of WMC) and federal ministers Alexander Downer and Robert Hill, alleging genocide against the Arabunna people by the Roxby mine.
# March 26 – Official opening of the expansion, specially by Prime Minister John Howard.
# 1998    Incident : March 6 – Man is crushed to death in the underground mine at Roxby.
# 1997    December 11 – A further Amendment to the Roxby Indenture is passed through the SA parliament giving WMC responsibility for Aboriginal Heritage over 1.5 million hectares, well beyond the mine lease.
# December 3 – Senator Robert Hill, Federal Environment Minister, approves expansion to 200,000 tpa of copper and 4,000 tpa of uranium, but advises more environmental studies will be required for the full proposed expansion.
# Incident : November 30 – Union strike over the leak and spillage of sulphuric acid. 70 employees walked off the job after 23 workers had been overcome by fumes in the smelter area.
# November 6 – Supplement to the EIS released by WMC (their comments and responses to public comments on the Draft Expansion EIS).
# October 2 – ROXSTOP finishes with immense success.
# September 22 – ROXSTOP Desert Action and Music Festival begins at Roxby Downs, being the first major protest at the mine for over a decade. It includes protests at the minesite, blockading the highway of the delivery of equipment for the expansion, a public meeting on worker’s health, a music festival in the Mound Springs area, tours and witnessing of the damage to the Mound Springs by the two Borefields, and people having a ball doing it!
# May 12 – Draft Expansion Project EIS released for public comment.
# (Early) EIS for the proposed expansion of mining at Olympic Dam/Roxby Downs is announced.
# 1996    December – Amendments to the Indenture are made giving legal rights to WMC for extraction of up to 42 Ml/d of fossil Great Artesian Basin water every day for the next 40 years. This allows an increase in production to 350,000 tpa of copper and 7,000 tpa of uranium. This amendment was made without public scutiny and commits SA to at least another 100 years of uranium mining at Roxby.
# November – Borefield B, with one operational bore, is commissioned and bought into production.
# September – Work begins on the construction of Borefield B, deeper into the Great Artesian Basin in order to supply up to 42 million litres per day (Ml/d).
# July 15 – WMC Board commits to the major expansion of Roxby Downs, with “detailed design” to 200,000 tonnes per year copper level, and “conceptual design” to 350,000 tonnes per year of copper.
# April 24 – The SA Government Inquiry into the Olympic Dam Tailings Leakage is released, with damning indictments of WMC and yet still endorses their environmental management.
# January – John Faulkener, Federal Environment Minister, confirms the approval for expansion to 150,000 tpa and a special water licence is granted to WMC by the SA government.
# WMC announce plans for expansion to 350,000 tpa of copper and 7,000 tpa of uranium.
# 1995    WMC announces expansion to 150,000 tpa of copper and the development of Borefield B. Mines and Energy SA (MESA) modelling projections of the 50 year drawdown and Great Artesian Basin recovery rates are not made public.
# Roxby Downs completes second minor expansion to a production capacity of copper and uranium of about 85,000 and 1,600 tonnes per year, respectively.
# 1994    Incident : February 14 – WMC reveals that up to 5 million cubic metres of liquid has leaked from its tailings retention system at Roxby Downs. According to WMC the leak had been happening for at least two years but only became fully understood in January 1994.
# 1993    September – Memo from the Department of Mines and Energy (MESA) warns of a “potential problem” with water seepage and uranium tailings at the site.
# May – WMC and the Department’s of Mines and Energy and the Environment acknowledge that the tailings dam has been leaking.
# Minister for Mineral Resources approves increase in drawdown from 2 to 4 metres at the boundary of Borefield A. Approval restricted to 4 metres to try and protect the Mound Springs.
# April – WMC announce plans for a further expansion (‘Optimisation 2’).
# March 31 – WMC formally acquire 100% ownership of Olympic Dam. The cost to WMC was US$419 million
# March – British Petroleum (BP) withdraw from the Olympic Dam Joint Venture and sell their share to WMC.
# 1992    Incident : Worker dies at Roxby as the explosives he was setting underground prematurely detonate.
# Roxby Downs completes minor expansion to a production capacity of copper and uranium of about 66,000 and 1,200 tonnes per year, respectively.
# 1991    Approval given by the South Australian Government to expand Borefield A.
# February 19 – WMC/BP announce plans for a minor expansion (‘Optimisation 1’).
# 1990    Anti-uranium demonstrators block the path 3 shipments of Roxby output at Port Adelaide, a total of 24 uranium-carrying trucks. The uranium was sold to Sweden, Britain and the USA.
# 1989    Incident : November 5 – A total of 320 mm of rainfall at Olympic Dam led to major flooding. Increased groundwater levels were noted, as were the potential for flood waters to enter limestone cavities.
# 1988    Incident : November 5 – Major accident at the copper smelter during the official opening ceremony when a loud bang followed by a massive flame burst occurs.
# November 5 – Official opening of the Olympic Dam Project, including ‘special guest’ Norman Foster (former Labour politician).
# June 22 – First ore milled in the Olympic Dam metallurgical complex, production capacity of copper and uranium is about 45,000 and 900 tonnes per year, respectively.
# 1987    Mid – Surface decline and entrance tunnel completed.
# February – Operation of Borefield A commences.
# Incident : February – Major failure at the desalination plant when 70 ML in about 1 hour is lost through a massive limestone cavity beneath the surface of the storage pond. The estimated flow rate of the leak was up to 20,000 litres per second. The difficulty of predicting and locating potential limestone cavities was recognised.

Energy consumption and greenhouse emissions.

BHP to use half of state’s electricity

Jeremy Roberts | March 27, 2008
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23437824-5013404,00.html

BHP Billiton will need nearly half of South Australia’s current electricity supply to power its vastly expanded Olympic Dam copper and uranium mine.

The mining company wrote to potential suppliers this month revealing that power demand for the mine was expected to top 690 megawatts when it reaches full production in 10 years.

This 30 per cent increase on previous forecasts for the mine 600km northwest of Adelaide is equivalent to nearly 42 per cent of South Australia’s total electricity consumption and nearly half of Adelaide’s power supply.

An industry insider yesterday described as “staggering” BHP’s new power needs, which exceed previous forecasts by 170mW.

It would require the building of new power stations in the state at a time when incentives for business to invest in traditional power generation are clouded by efforts to combat global warming.

The new BHP forecast comes a week after the Rudd Government’s Garnaut report on greenhouse emissions recommended power generators not be compensated in a carbon trading scheme.

South Australia has been an importer of electricity for several years, and its power distribution system was stretched to capacity to meet demand during the record heatwave earlier this month.

BHP is the state’s largest single power consumer, taking 120mW. The company will use the aditional 570mW to power on-site mineral processing to separate uranium, copper and gold, as well as for the expanded Roxby Downs township, a larger airport and the new open-cut mining operation.

The instability in the power generation sector adds to the challenges BHP faces in developing Olympic Dam.

A company spokeswoman yesterday described the request for 690mW of power as an estimate. “The expansion project remains in pre-feasibility and is yet to be approved,” she said. But in correspondence to the state’s power suppliers, dated March 5 and marked “commercial in confidence”, BHP calls for expressions of interest to supply the power.

The correspondence was followed by in-person briefings on March 12, and asks suppliers to address three supply options: power generation at the Olympic Dam site, elsewhere in the state, or a combination of both.

The company says 60MW of the power would be used to run a desalination plant planned for the coast of the Upper Spencer Gulf, and to pump the water 320km north to Olympic Dam.

Providing the additional power within a 10-year timeframe will challenge South Australia’s energy planners.

Gas-fired power stations normally take up to three years to build, industry sources said. Queensland’s largest coal-fired power station, Kogan Creek in the western Darling Downs, which was opened last December, took four years to build.

Sourcing base-load renewable energy from “hot rocks” geothermal sources in the north of the state may become an option, but the technology has not yet been proved viable.

The South Australian Government has not imposed any mandatory requirements on BHP to source renewable energy.

South Australian Greens MP Mark Parnell said the lack of renewable energy sources for Olympic Dam would make the state a “greenhouse pariah”.

“Our state risks being left with a huge carbon black hole as we become the greenhouse dump for one of the world’s richest companies,” Mr Parnell said.


BHP snubs SA carbon reductions

Jeremy Roberts

November 29, 2007
The Australian
<www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22838774-643,00.html>

BHP Billiton has distanced itself from South Australia’s ambitious greenhouse gas reduction and renewable energy targets, vowing to use the “most economic” power source for its massive Olympic Dam expansion.

On a hot, dry day in Adelaide, new chief executive Marius Kloppers said the company’s “local” operations – dominated by the proposed Olympic Dam expansion 600km north of Adelaide – would not be singled out to generate greenhouse gas reductions.

“It is a global issue – it is not a local issue,” he said after addressing his first annual general meeting in Australia as chief executive.

Mr Kloppers rejected “any specific item” in BHP’s portfolio of 33 current and proposed projects, including an expanded Olympic Dam, as producing emissions cuts.

“What we need to do is deploy every dollar in the most effective way – not target it towards any specific item which might, or might not, be the most effective one in the portfolio,” he said.

Mr Kloppers’ stance was backed by chairman Don Argus, who was asked if he would like to see significant renewable energy supply an expanded Olympic Dam copper and uranium mine.

“We will work on the most economic way to power what we have to power in this development,” he said.

With Olympic Dam already the state’s biggest consumer of electricity, the proposed expansion would more than triple its power demand to about 400 megawatts.

The company has committed itself to a 6 per cent cut in greenhouse gas emissions from its operations by 2012.

But the comments by BHP executives fly in the face of the Rann Government’s target of cutting greenhouse gas emissions in South Australia to 60 per cent of 1990 levels by 2050.

The target was written into Australia’s first climate change law, passed in July, which also aimed to have 20 per cent of electricity consumption coming from renewable sources by 2014.

The targets have been criticised for being voluntary. But Mr Rann said yesterday that the Government “was working with big and small business, to help meet these ambitious targets”.

He pointed to the emerging hot rocks energy sector, based in the mid-north and northeast of the state, which “may prove to be a vital source of energy for our booming mining industry”.

The expansion of the Olympic Dam mine has been delayed since company statements last year pointed to the release of an environmental impact statement by mid-2007.

The release of the massive document is now expected in late 2008 or early 2009, as the company addresses state government concerns over the project’s environmental and greenhouse effects. The delay also stems from BHP’s examination of a radical redrawing of its project.

Roxby Downs Indenture Act

2019: See David Noonan’s short briefing paper on the Indenture Act

See also 2011 information posted at this link.

Click here to download a 3-page 2008 PDF statement about the Roxby Downs Indenture Act:

In this webpage:

* Summary

* Peter Burdon’s article

* Greens MP Mark Parnell’s speech in SA Parliament.


Summary

BHP’s Olympic Dam copper/uranium/gold/silver mine in South Australia is a state within a state; it operates under a unique set of laws enshrined in the amended Roxby Downs Indenture Act. That would be unobjectionable except that the Indenture Act allows Olympic Dam wide-ranging exemptions from environmental laws, water management laws, Aboriginal Heritage laws, and it curtails the application of the Freedom of Information Act.

Then SA Liberal Party industry spokesperson Martin Hamilton-Smith said “every word of the [Indenture] agreement favours BHP, not South Australians.” It beggars belief that the SA Labor government would agree to such one-sided terms; and it beggars belief that Mr Hamilton-Smith and his Liberal colleagues waved it through Parliament with no amendments.

The only politician to insist on some scrutiny of the amended Indenture Act was SA Greens MLC Mark Parnell. He was accused of holding the state’s economy to ransom. Yet the transcripts of his late-night Parliamentary questioning of the Labor government ought to be required reading (see here and here). Time and time again the government spokesperson said that BHP wanted such-and-such a provision in the Indenture Act, and the government simply agreed without further consideration or consultation.

For example, Parnell asked why the Indenture Act retains exemptions from the SA Aboriginal Heritage Act. The government spokesperson said: “BHP were satisfied with the current arrangements and insisted on the continuation of these arrangements, and the government did not consult further than that.”


Above the law? Roxby Downs and BHP Billiton’s Legal Privileges

Peter Burdon
Friends of the Earth, Adelaide
May 2006

What would you say if you were told that a large portion of South Australia is subject to an entirely different set of laws to the rest of the state? How would you feel if you knew that those legally responsible for this land consume more energy and water, create more waste and dangerous material and extract more resources than any other body in South Australia?

Over 20 years ago the South Australian Government enacted the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 (Indenture Act). In a single document the Government legislated that some 1.5 million hectares in central South Australia, including the Roxby Downs mine and surrounding areas, would be exempt from some of our most important environmental and indigenous rights legislation. The Indenture Act provides BHP Billiton the legal authority to override the:
· Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988
· Development Act 1993
· Environmental Protection Act 1993
· Freedom of Information Act 1991
· Mining Act 1971
· Natural Resources Act 2004 (including the Water Resources Act 1997)

This decision undermines community expectations that corporations should be regulated to limit the potential damage they can cause and to ensure they remain accountable for their actions. It also challenges the South Australian Government’s expressed commitment to the “strictest environmental standards” for the Roxby Downs/Olympic Dam mine. Such sweeping legislative power is unprecedented and inconsistent with modern practices and government promises.

To view the Roxby Downs Indenture Act:

 The Indenture Act and Aboriginal Heritage

The inclusion of the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 (AHA) in the Indenture Act has significant consequences for issues of equality and questions how seriously our State Government treats Indigenous rights and interests.

The AHA is the key legislative enactment aimed at protecting Indigenous heritage in South Australia. Prior to the operation of Native Title in the early 90s the AHA governed most government/Indigenous relations concerning land and cultural heritage. The Act continues to play an important function for Indigenous cultural heritage. However, under the Indenture Act the traditional owners of the land surrounding Roxby Downs, the Kokatha, Arabunna and Barngarla peoples, are now forced to deal with BHP Billiton to have their heritage recognised. As ACF nuclear campaigner David Noonan noted, BHP Billiton is
“[I]n a legal position to undertake any consultation that occurs, decide which Aboriginal groups they consult and the manner of that consultation. As the commercial operator and proponent of expansion within these areas, [BHP Billiton is] in a position of deciding the level of protection that Aboriginal heritage sites received and which sites they recognised.”

Through the Indenture Act, the government has abdicated its responsibility to address Aboriginal Heritage issues in relation to the Roxby Downs mine. They have placed BHP Billiton in a legal position to:
· Ignore the provisions of the 1988 Act designed to protect Aboriginal heritage
· Determine the nature and manner of any consultation with Indigenous communities
· Choose which Aboriginal groups to consult with
· Decide the level of protection that Aboriginal Heritage sites receive
· Decide which Aboriginal Heritage sites they recognise

As owners of the Olympic Dam mine, BHP Billiton clearly cannot participate in decisions concerning the recognition and protection of Aboriginal sites without a gross conflict of interest.

Freedom of Information

In October 2002 Premier Mike Rann and the Minister for Administrative Services, Jay Weatherill, signed the ‘Citizens Right to Information’ charter. This Charter commits the Government of South Australia to making information in Government documents and records readily accessible to the citizens of South Australia. Contained within this document is a promise that the “South Australian Government is committed to attaining the highest standards of openness and accountability.”

To fulfil this promise the Charter directs citizens to the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (FOI) and provides information about how to use the legislation. On this point Friends of the Earth campaigner Joel Catchlove notes,
“Freedom of Information legislation is an indispensable element of any society represented by a government. The legislation promotes government accountability and fosters informed public participation in government.”

Legally, the FOI consists of rights and obligations concerning access to and amendment of, information in the hands of government. The principal right conferred is a general right of access to a document of an agency or an official document of a minister. The other basic rights and obligations which FOI confers or imposes are, in summary:
“The obligation of the responsible minister to publish certain information, including: a statement setting out the organization and functions of agency; a statement of the categories of the document that are maintained in the possession of the agency; and a statement of any information that needs to be available to the public concerning particular procedures of the agency in relation to obtaining access to documents.”
and

“The obligation to make available for inspection and purchase documents that are used by the agency in making decisions, such as manuals containing guidelines and practices.”

Under confidentiality clause 35 of the Indenture Act, BHP Billiton have veto power over information relating to activities undertaken within the 1.5 million hectares covered by the indenture. Mr Catchlove notes:
“There is thus a massive portion of South Australia where mining giant BHP Billiton operates which is not subject to open public review or discussion and the fundamental tenancies of representative government have been laid to waste. The government promises openness and accountability with one hand and takes it away with the other.”

This fact was also commented on by Hedley Bachmann in his 2002 report to the State Government on reporting procedures for the South Australian uranium industry. In his report Bachmann recommended:
“In order to allow the release of information about incidents, which may cause or threaten to cause, serious or material environmental harm or risks to the public or employees, the government should revise and appropriately amend the secrecy/confidentiality causes in the legislation.”

The Bachmann report addressed a range of transparency or secrecy clauses contained in legislation relating to uranium mining. At the conclusion of his work the State government amended two pieces of legislation to comply with his recommendations. They were the
· Radiation Protection Act 1982: Section 19
· Mines and Workers Inspection Act 1920: Section 9

While the veto power held by BHP Billiton remains intact, citizen confidence and faith in the South Australian government cannot. South Australian citizens have a right to know exactly what actions, decisions or activities our representatives and corporations are undertaking, particularly in such a high-risk operation as the Roxby Downs uranium mine. The mine consumes more resources than any other enterprise in the state and has the potential to serious damage the health of South Australian workers and South Australia’s natural heritage. Many natural wonders, which are of deep significance to the land’s Traditional Owners, come under the Indenture Area. Responsible, accountable governments and corporations should have no need for secrecy, and in a project the scale of Roxby Downs, there is too much at stake to maintain it.

Environmental Protection

At 2006 levels of operation, the Roxby Downs/Olympic Dam uranium mine is licensed to take 40 million litres of water a day from the Great Artesian Basin (GAB). The GAB is a vast and ancient body of water that lies deep under the surface of central Australia. It begins in far north Queensland and is a source of water for many pastoral properties and habitats, including the fragile and unique mound springs in South Australia’s arid north. Currently BHP Billiton extracts 33 million litres a day from the GAB and farmers, environmentalists and traditional owners have reported dramatic reductions in water pressure threatening and sometimes extinguishing rare ecosystems. Under the Indenture Act, BHP Billiton is not required to pay for this water.

The radioactive waste tailings dam at Olympic Dam amounts to 60 million tonnes and is growing at 10 million tonnes annually. The tailings dam has been plagued by spills – most significantly in 1994, when the mine operators admitted some five million cubic litres had leaked from the dams over two years. Environmental audits provided to the Rann Government continue to emphasise that the mine tailings are inadequately managed and “an issue of real concern” requiring “the implementation of urgent remedial measures”. BHP Billiton has no long-term plans for the management of these tailings, which because of their radioactivity may remain dangerous for thousands of years. When all valuable resources have been extracted BHP Billiton simply plans to ‘cap’ the tailings dump with soil.

Additionally, Olympic Dam consumes more electricity than any other body in the State, ten percent of the state’s production, effectively making it SA’s single biggest producer of greenhouse gas. This impact will only increase with the mine’s projected expansion.

The Indenture Act provides an override to the Environmental Protection Act 1993 (EPA) and the powers and functions contained within. The EPA was enacted to provide for the protection of the environment and the establishment of an Environmental Protection Authority to monitor and enforce compliance with the Act. The key objective of this legislation is the avoidance of ‘environmental harm’, a term that is defined in the legislation to mean any harm or potential harm to the environment, of whatever degree or duration. Potential harm includes risk of harm and future harm.

The legislation imposes different penalties for offences causing environmental harm. The most heavily penalised offence is the offence of causing serious environmental harm by polluting the environment intentionally or recklessly and with knowledge that serious environmental harm will or might result. A lower penalty is imposed where a person, by polluting the environment, causes serious environmental harm.

The Environmental Protection Authority is charged with enforcing these provisions. The Authority has the power to:
· Serve notices on people violating the EPA and order them to comply.
· Place conditions on licences and other environmental approvals.
· Impose or vary a condition of an environmental authorisation.
· Demand financial assurance to be made where there is a high risk that operation will result in environmental harm. This money is used to counteract resulting environmental or community damage.
· Require an organization to prepare a plan of action in the event of emergencies that might arise out of the operation.

These provisions are South Australia’s most important and strongest environmental safeguards and they are absent from BHP Billitons Olympic Dam operation. In fact, under the Indenture, Primary Industries and Resources South Australia (PIRSA), is responsible for overseeing the project’s environmental standards. As a government body dedicated to promoting mining, PIRSA has a clear conflict of interest in this role. Friends of the Earth Campaigner Sophie Green notes:
“Whether you support the mining operations at Olympic Dam or not commonsense dictates that where a massive project is being undertaken which has the potential (and indeed likelihood) of damaging vast portions of the environment, our strongest environmental safeguards should apply. We are only asking that BHP Billiton be held to the same standard as every other corporation in Australia.”

In reviewing the conditions surrounding the massive 1994 leak, Dr. Gavin Mudd emphasises that the Indenture Act essentially prevents the mine from environmental responsibility and “until the [Indenture] Act is revoked entirely there can be no truly independent, external environmental assessment of the impacts of Olympic Dam”.

Legal accountability and guarantees of BHP Billiton’s environmental performance are crucial, particularly in light of the proposed expansion of the Olympic Dam mine into the largest open cut mine in the world. The scale of this operation and the associated risks threaten damage to the environment on a scale we have not yet seen. Ms Green notes,
Our Government is playing a dangerous balancing game with promises on one hand and contrary legislative action on the other. Actions speak louder than words and its time we demanded more from our representatives.

References:
1 Noonan, D 2006, personal communication, 30 March 2006
2 Government of South Australia, ‘Citizens Right to Information’, accessed 1 May 2006.
3 Catchlove, J 2006, personal communication, 7 April 2006.
4 Catchlove, J 2006, personal communication, 7 April 2006.
5 Bachmann, H 2002, ‘Reporting Independent Review of Reporting Procedures for the SA Uranium Mining Industry, August 2002, p. 1
6 Wiese Bockmann, M 2006, ‘Waste fears at uranium mine’, The Australian, 10 March 2006, p. 7
7 Green, S 2006, personal communication, 7 April 2006.
8 Mudd, G 1997, ‘SA Parliamentary Inquiry into the Tailings System Leakage’, Sea-US, accessed 11 May 2006, <http://www.sea-us.org.au/roxby/sa-inquiry.html>


Greens (SA) Amendment Bill

The Greens’ Bill to repeal the legal privileges was rejected by Liberal and Labor parties.

Legislative Council

GREENS BILL: Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Application of Acts) Amendment Bill
June 6th, 2007
http://www.markparnell.org.au/speech.php?speech=173

On the 6th of June, Mark Parnell introduced and spoke about his Greens Private Members bill, for an act to amend the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982

The Hon. M. PARNELL: The Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 was created to fast-track and protect the establishment and operation of the Olympic Dam copper and uranium mine, which was then owned by a joint venture comprising BP and Western Mining Corporation (which later became WMC Resources Ltd). In 2005 BHP Billiton acquired WMC Resources Ltd and the benefits of this act passed to that company.

The bill I have introduced deals with a small but important aspect of the indenture legislation, that is, the parts of the act that provide that this indenture act takes precedence over other laws of South Australia. Section 7 of the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act provides:

“The law of the state is so far modified as is necessary to give full effect to the indenture and the provisions of any law of the state shall accordingly be construed subject to the modifications that take effect under this act.”

The Act, having created that general precedence over other state law, then goes on to list a large number of public statutes that are to be construed subject to the provisions of the indenture. These include the Commercial Arbitration Act, the Crown Lands Act, the Development Act, the Electricity Corporations Act, the Environment Protection Act, the Harbors and Navigation Act (although, given the location of the Roxby Downs mine, one wonders where this act might fit in; nevertheless, it is subject to this indenture), the Mining Act, the Petroleum Act, and it goes on, finishing with the Water Resources Act. These acts of state parliament are secondary to the provisions of the indenture; the Indenture Act prevails.

The purpose of this bill is basically to say that enough is enough when it comes to exemptions from state law. The deal to get the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act through and get the mine up was made in the 1980s. It is 25 years ago now that this bill went through and standards of law, especially environment protection provisions, have advanced greatly in that time. The special exemptions that helped get the Roxby Downs mines up and running are simply no longer relevant or appropriate in the 21st century. In short, the world’s biggest miner does not need a free kick from the South Australian government or from this parliament. There is absolutely no reason for the mine operators to be granted special favours that give them a potential commercial gain over other miners and other developers.

It will come as no surprise to honourable members to know that my view that indenture laws are bad law applies to this legislation, as it did to the Whyalla legislation passed before I got here. The issue is one of levelling the playing field, of equity, so that corporate players in South Australia are all bound by the same rules and that we do not have special rules for some players over others. What I need to make abundantly clear is that this legislation is not about repealing the indenture act or about closing the Roxby Downs mine: it purely seeks to remove the special exemptions from state law that apply pursuant to this Indenture Act.

The uranium industry has also been calling for a level playing field and, as members might recall, one of the key recommendations of the Uranium Industry Framework Steering Group, which was released in 2006 by common­wealth industry minister Ian Macfarlane, was:

“The Australian government and state and territory governments [to] work cooperatively to ensure that, where possible, environmental and other regulatory arrangements across jurisdictions are harmonised.”

They are important words. Harmonisation means a level playing field, that the law applies equally to all players. The framework document goes on as follows:

“. . . coherent and consistent policy framework reflecting the respective policy objectives, roles and responsibilities of the Australian government and state and territory governments in relation to the regulation of the uranium industry.”

So in a way, my bill puts into effect what the uranium industry itself is calling for — harmonisation and uniform standards to apply to all.

I point out that one piece of legislation which does not apply to Roxby but which would apply to any other miner in South Australia is the Aboriginal Heritage Act. This is the primary piece of legislation in this state to protect our indigenous cultural heritage. However, the indenture act places BHP Billiton in a legal position so that it can choose which Aboriginal groups it acknowledges and consults with, what form that consultation takes, which Aboriginal heritage sites it recognises, and what degree of protection to offer to those sites.

In response to media interest in this bill, Richard Yeeles from BHP Billiton said yesterday in a statement that he released to ABC radio:

“Olympic Dam complies in all respects with Aboriginal heritage legislation — in fact, in making its relationships with Aboriginal groups and protecting Aboriginal heritage, Olympic Dam does much more than the Aboriginal heritage legislation requires.”

My response to that is to thank Richard Yeeles, because that is exactly my point, that is, the indenture act is an anachronism. If we do not need these special privileges, let us get rid of them. It should not be up to BHP Billiton to determine which laws it complies with in this state and to what extent it complies with them. So, I am as one with Richard Yeeles. If he is saying that BHP Billiton is already complying with the law, let us remove the exemption from the indenture legislation.

The Environment Protection Act is another act of this parliament that is part of the exemption in the indenture act. Some aspects of the mine’s operation are monitored by the EPA, but one environmental aspect that is outside that is water resources. The water resources laws now contained in the Natural Resources Management Act do not apply to the Roxby Downs mine. As members would know, because it has been mentioned in this place many times, whilst irrigators and householders are suffering water restrictions, BHP Billiton’s arrangements provide that it gets its water for free and there is no risk to the quantities it can take. That is directly against the national water initiative which says that, when we need to reduce allocations, we need to share the pain of those cuts around. This particular corporate operation does not need to share any of the pain of water cuts to which irrigators and householders are subject.

One question honourable members might be asking themselves is: why bother with amending this indenture act now? Clearly, if and when the expanded open-cut mine is given approval, we will need to rewrite the laws anyway because, clearly, the current indenture act does not apply to a big open-cut mine. The current indenture act applies to a mine with a production of 350 000 tonnes of copper per year, and it is limited to the current method of operation, which basically means that it is underground mining. The Olympic Dam mine currently produces some 235 000 tonnes of copper, and the expansion is projected to increase its output to 500 000 tonnes — and possibly up to one million tonnes — and that will be through an open cut, which will necessitate a review and updating of the act to apply to the mine’s changed circumstances. However, I think it is important that we consider now the appropriateness of an approach that exempts a corporate player from complying with the laws of this state. If the Roxby extension goes ahead, we can reflect the decision we make now in any new arrangements that are put in place.

I do not propose to go into a lot of detail about the explanation of the clauses of the bill. It is a very simple bill. There are two main operative sections, the first of which amends section 7 —modification of state law. The key elements of my bill are that five named acts are removed from the power of that exemption. So, two Aboriginal heritage acts, the Development Act, the Environment Protection Act and the Natural Resources Management Act will apply to the Roxby Downs mine.

In addition to section 7, the bill also provides that the secrecy provisions contained in section 35 of the indenture do not apply in relation to freedom of information applications. I think that is important because the Freedom of Information Act is the standard the law of this state applies to disclosure of information, and it is unfair for secrecy provisions to override that public law. That is not to say that, by making section 35 of the indenture subject to the Freedom of Information Act, it will be open slather; it will not be. The protections in the Freedom of Information Act in relation to commercially confidential material, for example, would continue to apply. However, the message it sends is that the documents BHP Billiton provides to government are equally able to be disclosed under freedom of information as those of any other mining company.

The second main operative provision of the bill is clause 5, which repeals section 9 of the act, which modifies the Aboriginal heritage legislation as it applies to this project. So, again, it levels the playing field and it says that this mine is subject to the Aboriginal heritage legislation in the same way as any other miner would be. In summary, I think most members of the South Australian community would be very surprised to discover that a 25 year old piece of legislation that allows the biggest development in South Australia to follow the least amount of rules is still in place.

It seems very clear to me that there is no financial argument at all for a need for these exemptions. There is no need for BHP Billiton to be given special treatment. This is one of the world’s richest companies. It announced, as I recall, a half year profit of some $8 billion. I do not believe that we do need to tread on eggshells when we are negotiating with large manufacturing corporations such as BHP Billiton. There is no question at all that, in its view, it is here for the long haul, and there is no risk of its taking its bat and ball and going somewhere else because it is being made to comply with the general laws of South Australia. With those comments, I commend the bill to the council.

Summary + articles re Olympic Dam mine expansion

Update: 2012 to 2018 – The planned open-pit mega-expansion was abandoned in mid-2012 – but other, more modest expansion plans are being progressed and explored.

2011 – The SA Greens and FoE Adelaide have been doing great work drawing attention to the many problems with the planned expansion of the Olympic Dam uranium/copper mine. Sadly, the expansion has been approved and critics (especially the SA Greens) have been subjected to a disgraceful smear campaign by the SA Labor government and the Murdoch press for raising questions about the expansion and the enabling legislation – the Roxby Downs Indenture Act. They have been accused of holding the state’s economy to ransom for raising legitimate questions and proposing amendments to the Indenture Act. The SA Liberal Party has acknowledged that every aspect of the Indenture Act favours BHP Billiton at the expense of South Australians – yet the Liberals did not propose or support amendments. Unfortunately the legislation passed through the SA Parliament in November 2011.


Dark day as state laws trashed in Roxby riches rush

http://markparnell.org.au/mr.php?mr=854

29 November 2011

The Parliamentary debate over the Roxby expansion Indenture Bill has confirmed that the State Government has delivered a bad deal for South Australia, says Greens Parliamentary Leader Mark Parnell.

“This is a dark day for our State’s democracy. The Government has locked in for the next 70 years the right of the world’s richest resource company to over-ride all relevant State laws,” said Mr Parnell.

“The hours of debate in Parliament has shown that in the rush to get this deal signed before ex-Premier Rann departed, the State Government has given too much away for too little in return.

“The environmental costs are going to be much higher, and the economic return will be much lower than the SA public rightly expect.

“Parliament has exposed the yawning gap between the Government’s hyperbolic spin over the Roxby riches and the dark reality of this terrible deal.

“Future generations are going to be disgusted with us for giving their resources away for a pittance and leaving them to deal with the enormous toxic legacy of managing the world’s largest radioactive waste dump,” he said.

The Greens put forward a package of amendments that would have positively transformed the Indenture contract.

The controversial Bill has now passed both houses of State Parliament, with only the Greens voting against it.

What the debate exposed:

• The local jobs, manufacturing and local procurement Plan will contain ‘aspirational’ targets only. Not one extra job is guaranteed.

• The ‘net’ economic return to state coffers in years 10-20 of the project could be as low as $10 million / year – and that’s even before millions are given back to BHPB through Federal subsidies like the diesel fuel rebate.

• No explanation for locking in royalty rates at a low rate for 45 years – apart from that is what BHP wanted.

• The Government did not do any comparative economic analysis with similar projects interstate and overseas to see if we were getting a good economic deal.

• There is nothing the Government can do to make BHPB expand their domestic processing up to an additional 200,000 tonnes of ore (as has been promised by the Premier and others). In fact, there is nothing to stop BHP exporting all ore from Roxby Downs to China (including the ore that is currently processed here).

• Govt has relied entirely on BHPB’s figures for the cost of processing in SA rather than exporting South Australian copper ore to China.

• BHPB can continue to extract fossil water from the Great Artesian Basin until 2082, with costs capped for the next 30 years.

• Third parties won’t have any right to access the railways, roads, ports and airports being constructed for the expansion.

• No cumulative impacts of this expansion (beyond the artificial EIS timeframe of 40 years) have been considered.

• The Government doesn’t know what impact the ODX will have on the State’s greenhouse pollution reduction targets.

• The toxic tailings waste dams have been deliberately designed to leak.

• The final operating conditions to protect the marine environment at Point Lowly will not be known for years and will be negotiated in secret.


Letter published in The Advertiser

To mention just one of the indefensible aspects of the Roxby Downs Indenture Act, the legislation retains the exemptions from the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988. Traditional Owners were not even consulted. The government’s spokesperson in Parliament said: “BHP were satisfied with the current arrangements and insisted on the continuation of these arrangements, and the government did not consult further than that.”

Recently it has been revealed that the ‘clean up’ of the Maralinga atomic test site was flawed and will most likely need to be revisited. We shouldn’t be surprised – in 2002 nuclear engineer Alan Parkinson warned that “What was done at Maralinga was a cheap and nasty solution that wouldn’t be adopted on white-fellas land.”

In 1999, SA police pepper-sprayed an 11-year old Adnyamathanha girl at the Beverley uranium mine, and an Adnyamathanha man was evicted from a public forum for suggesting that the meeting be chaired by a Traditional Owner rather than a Liberal MP.

Clearly there is a pattern. It should be enshrined on SA number plates: ‘SA: The Racist State’.


WHAT THE GREENS WANT TO KNOW

http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/greens-mark-parnell-to-fight-for-a-better-deal-on-olympic-dam/story-e6frea6u-1226189079542

November 9, 2011

SA Greens MLC Mark Parnell will put forwared 100 amendments to the Olympic Dam indenture Bill. Greens MLC Mark Parnell said his minority party was “not going to be cut short and stopped from asking the questions that need to be asked”, despite bipartisan support from Labor and the Liberals.

1. ROYALITIES

Why did the Government lock in a royalty regime for 45 years, and why is it based exclusively on old-style production-based royalties, rather than one that captures a fair share of mining profits?

2. ECONOMIC RETURN

How good an economic deal did SA receive when BHP CEO Marius Kloppers is claiming to his shareholders that the Olympic Dam Expansion will be low cost and highly profitable?

3. PROCESSING IN SA RATHER THAN CHINA

How many South Australian jobs will be lost by not requiring BHP to process our ore here in South Australia rather than exporting it to China?

4. EXEMPTION FROM SA LAWS

Why is BHP exempt from over 20 South Australian laws that every other mining company in SA has to comply with?

5. NO URANIUM OPTION

Why wasnt a No Uranium Roxby Expansion considered when we know it is not only technically feasible, it would also mean less water and energy use and more jobs as the processing would be done here in SA, rather than in China?

6. GREAT ARTESIAN BASIN

Why isn’t there a plan to wean BHP off using 42ML/day of ancient water from the Great Artesian Basin, when they plan double that volume in excess capacity (80ML/day) from their desalination plant?

7. DESALINATION PLANT & CUTTLEFISH RISK

Why is the Government prepared to risk the breeding grounds of the Giant Australian Cuttlefish by not requiring the company to build in a different location?

8. RADIOACTIVE LEAKAGE FROM TAILINGS DAM

How can the Government claim that they have met their public commitment for the expansion to meet worlds best environmental practice when only 4 per cent of the tailings dams will be lined and the dams are designed to leak up to 8 million litres of toxic radioactive waste liquid/day?

9. RESPONSIBILITY POST MINE CLOSURE

Who will ultimately be responsible to manage the open pit, tailings dams and rock waste pile for the 10,000 years after the operations cease that the radioactive risk remains: the company or SA taxpayers, and how much will that management cost?

10. GREENHOUSE POLLUTION & RENEWABLE ENERGY

Why isn’t the company committing to any investment in cleaner energy to meet their whopping 650 MW electricity demand beyond the 57MW commitment for powering the desal plant (less than 10 per cent of total demand) to reduce their enormous increase in the states greenhouse pollution of 12-15 per cent?


A case of Olympian incompetence by South Australia

By Paul Cleary, The Australian, October 21, 2011

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/a-case-of-olympian-incompetence-by-south-australia/story-e6frg9if-1226172260137?mid=523

THE royalty agreement negotiated by South Australia for BHP Billiton’s Olympic Dam expansion has robbed the state’s citizens and all Australians of the opportunity to share in the profits of what will become the world’s biggest mine.

This deal is a monumental example of state government incompetence when it comes to acting as custodian of the nation’s mineral wealth.

South Australia has agreed to a regime based solely on percentages and even cents per tonne of the mine’s production. Mike Rann, who stands down today as Premier, has done South Australians a disservice that will cost them dearly for almost half a century.

Rann and his administration should know full well that these royalties fail to capture a fair share of mining profits. This has been in the economic literature since the 1970s and was made more prominent by the Henry review. Yet the deal does not contain a single element of profits-based taxation.

The case for such measures is all the more compelling given that the mineral resources rent tax will not tax the millions of tonnes of copper, uranium, silver and gold the mine will be produce under the 45-year agreement, because the MRRT only applies to coal and iron ore.

Given that this is an agreement negotiated in the 21st century, it beggars belief the state could have agreed to a regime based exclusively on production-based royalties that hark back to medieval times.

But none of these ideas penetrated the thinking of the South Australian government when it negotiated its 45-year agreement for BHP’s $30 billion expansion.

The three-tier regime involves 3.5 per cent for refined mineral products, meaning copper and gold, and 5 per cent for uranium oxide and uranium-bearing copper concentrates.

There’s also 35c per tonne on extractive minerals sold to a third party, but this is not even indexed for inflation, so its value will diminish over the life of the agreement.

When asked to explain how the government could have agreed to a non-indexed royalty, a spokesman said it was a trade-off in negotiations because BHP had asked for the expansion to gain concessional royalty rates for new mines. Well, that issue should not have even been on the table, because Olympic Dam is an existing mine.

The spokesman declined to say why a profits-based regime had not been considered.

This agreement will unfortunately stand as a sad and enduring indictment of the weakness of our state governments when it comes to negotiating with powerful mining multinationals.

The power of BHP was abundantly evident when it signed the agreement with the South Australian government on its home turf in Melbourne, rather than in Adelaide, and then declared that its board had already pre-committed $1.2bn in investment ahead of approval by the state and federal parliaments.

Given the environmental legacy of this mine, including above-ground storage of radioactive tailings and risks to water resources, a profits-based royalty could have been paid directly into a sovereign wealth fund. This fund could be used to compensate future generations who will most certainly have to live with greatly depleted mineral resources, and the environmental consequences of this mammoth venture.

These risks were glossed over by Environment Minister Tony Burke when he approved it under federal law. Burke’s description of the project is even more euphemistic than what is found in BHP’s environmental impact statement.

At no point in his media statement did Burke use the word radioactive. At least BHP’s EIS admits that its tailings heap will be.

Even glossier was Burke’s acceptance of the claim that seepage from the radioactive tailings storage facility would be “neutralised” 4m below the surface by limestone that is 60m deep. None of Burke’s three media advisers responded to questions last week.

BHP is less certain than Burke. Its draft EIS says the mine’s impact on groundwater would “depend” on various unknown factors, such as the “interaction of seepage with the sediments beneath the respective facilities”.

The EIS says that up to 8.2 million litres would seep from the TCF into groundwater each day in the first 10 years of operations, before falling to about 3.2 million litres a day.

Gavin Mudd, a senior lecturer in Monash University’s school of engineering, says BHP “got the lowest cost option on every front”, especially for above-ground storage of radioactive tailings. This is contrary to the practice employed with the Ranger uranium mine.

Mudd says the uncertainty flagged by BHP relates to the way water seeps into limestone creates caves; an imperfect mixing of water into the sediment could cause channels to open up, allowing massive volumes of water to flow into Lake Torrens, less than 100km from the mine.

“You will get these channels opening up — it is the nature of limestone. They have always underestimated seepage. Despite their claims, they still don’t understand as well as they need to to justify their claims,” he says.

The BHP spokeswoman, however, says that the company has been operating tailings storage since 1989, giving it “a long and deep understanding of how they work”.

Mudd, however, points to a 1991 incident in which the mine lost 3 million litres of water in three hours.

BHP argues that its field investigations and modelling have been “peer reviewed and assessed by state and federal government experts”.

Mudd says the process is flawed because the government is “very reliant on data that comes from the company”.

For a project of this nature and magnitude, with inherent risks for future generations, taking out insurance in the form of a future fund is clearly warranted.

But this won’t happen with the royalties agreed to by the myopic state government.


Olympic Dam – summary of the problems with the mine

Updated May 2009 following the release of the Draft EIS for the proposed mine expansion.

2012 update: the planned mega-expansion, discussed below, was cancelled in 2012

THE MINE EXPANSION

On May 1, 2009, BHP Billiton released a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) promoting its plans to turn the Olympic Dam (Roxby Downs) mine in South Australia into the largest uranium mine in the world.

The Olympic Dam uranium deposit is by far the largest on earth. Although the uranium is low-grade, the volume is staggering, amounting to about 2.4 million tonnes (and counting) − 30% of the world’s known conventional uranium reserves. That’s enough uranium to fuel the world’s fleet of 430 power reactors for 40 years.

The mine has been operating since the late 1980s using underground mining. BHP Billiton plans to supplement underground mining with open-cut mining − it plans to make Olympic Dam the largest open-cut mine in the world by digging a pit of about 14.4 cubic kms (4.1×3.5×1 kms). Export of uranium is expected to increase from an average of 4,500 tonnes per year to 19,000 tonnes per year. Copper production is expected to increase from 180,000 tonnes per year to 750,000 tonnes per year, and production of gold and silver is also expected to increase.

The plan would lock Australia in as the world’s uranium quarry and fuel unresolved nuclear waste management problems and unacceptable WMD proliferation risks.

BHP Billiton expects government approval in mid-2010 and will then make final decisions on the scope and timing of the expansion project. A company representative said on the day the EIS was released: “We still have a lot of work to do before we can tell you when this project may start and how much it may cost.”

At the mine site (most information from the Draft EIS):

* The quantity of ore to be processed would increase from 12 million tonnes annually to 72 million tonnes.

* The existing smelter would be expanded and new concentrator and hydrometallurgical plants would be built to process the additional ore, and generate additional concentrate for transport.

* It would take about five years of mining to remove the layer of overburden and expose the first section of the ore body. During this time, about 410 million tonnes per annum of material would be removed from the open pit. Over 40 years, the footprint of the pit would grow to be 14.4 sq kms. The overburden would be used for a ‘Rock Storage Facility’.

* On-site production of refined copper would increase to 350,000 tonnes annually (about twice the current output).

* About 1.6 million tonnes of concentrate would be exported to China annually for further processing, yielding about 400,000 tonnes of refined copper along with several thousand tonnes of uranium and some gold and silver.

New or upgraded infrastructure to support the mine would include (most information from the Draft EIS):

* A 280 megalitre per day (ML/d) coastal desalination plant at Point Lowly on the Upper Spencer Gulf (to supply 200 ML/d of additional water via a 320 km pipeline connection to Olympic Dam and with the potential to supply 80 ML/d elsewhere).

* Either a new 270 km electricity transmission line from Port Augusta to Olympic Dam, and/or a gas pipeline from Moomba and a new gas-fired power station at Olympic Dam.

* A 105 km rail line to connect Olympic Dam to the national rail network near Pimba.

* A new airport to replace the existing airport at Olympic Dam.

* A landing facility on the Upper Spencer Gulf to unload equipment from barges, and an access corridor to a pre-assembly yard on the north-western outskirts of Port Augusta.

* Additional port facilities in SA at Outer Harbor and in the Northern Territory at the Port of Darwin to import supplies and export product

* A new accommodation village for workers.

* Expansion of the Roxby Downs township.

Waste and Weapons

Uranium production at Olympic Dam is expected to increase to 19,000 tonnes per year, sufficient to fuel 95 power reactors which will produce 2,850 tonnes of high-level nuclear waste per year (in the form of spent nuclear fuel). That amount of spent fuel contains 28.5 tonnes of plutonium − enough for 2,850 nuclear weapons each year. Over the lifespan of the mine, it could be responsible for the production of enough plutonium for over 340,000 nuclear weapons. If 99.9% of that plutonium is adequately safeguarded, the remaining 0.1% would suffice to build 340 plutonium bombs similar to the one that destroyed Nagasaki in 1945.

This is all the more troubling given the flaws and limitations of the international nuclear ‘safeguards’ system. A BHP Billiton EIS ‘infosheet’ states that safeguards arrangements “ensure that Australian uranium is used exclusively for peaceful purposes” and is “accounted for in full”. In fact, safeguards fall far short of “ensuring” peaceful use of uranium exports and Australia’s uranium exports are not fully accounted for – there are routine accounting discrepancies (known as Material Unaccounted For). International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei has acknowledged that the IAEA’s rights of inspection are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system is subject to “vulnerabilities” and “clearly needs reinforcement”, that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted” and it operates on a “shoestring budget … comparable to a local police department.” (More information on safeguards <www.nuclear.foe.org.au/safeguards>.)

BHP Billiton sells uranium to nuclear weapons states, states refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, states blocking progress on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, states with a history of secret nuclear weapons research, and states stockpiling ‘civil’ plutonium.

A new low was set in 2006 when the federal government, with BHP Billiton’s support, negotiated a uranium export agreement with the secretive, repressive, militaristic, undemocratic regime in China. The Olympic Dam expansion is heavily dependent on the export of concentrate to China, leaving over one million tonnes of long-lived radioactive wastes each year for China to manage into the future. BHP Billiton intends to transport this radioactive concentrate by train through central Australia and out through the Port of Darwin. Communities and environments will be placed at risk by these hazardous bulk cargoes from Alice Springs to Darwin and across China − and none of these communities will be given a right to refuse these risks.

Dean Dalla Valle, head of BHP Billiton’s uranium division, said on May 1: “Exporting uranium to new customers like China will be an integral part of creating value from the Olympic Dam ore body. We can do this with confidence because China is subject to the same strict safeguards arrangements as all of our other customers.”

However, China is not subject to the same safeguards arrangements as all other customers. As one of the ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states, China’s safeguards are voluntary. Assoc. Prof. Tilman Ruff noted in a 2007 paper that of the 44 proliferation-sensitive nuclear facilities in China, only 10 facilities were eligible for IAEA safeguards, only three had actually been inspected, and only one had a full suite of IAEA safeguards arrangements in place (Briefing Paper #19 at <www.energyscience.org.au>).

Australia should not sell uranium to any nuclear weapon state and must not turn a blind eye to their failure to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or to Russia’s illegal threat to use nuclear weapons against Poland in 2008 over US missile defence plans, or to China’s continuing practice of cultural genocide in Tibet and other human rights violations. An October 2008 Newspoll found that two-thirds of Australians oppose uranium exports to countries with nuclear weapons (73% of women and 51% of men).

The Draft EIS predicts global uranium mine production to double to about 92,000 tonnes of uranium oxide annually by 2030. The estimate is very optimistic. For a more realistic appraisal of the trajectory of nuclear power, see Schneider’s analysis in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:

Radioactive Tailings

Under the mine expansion plan, the production of radioactive tailings, stored above ground, will increase six-fold to 58 million tonnes annually. The current tailings stockpile amounts to 100 million tonnes. BHP Billiton plans up to nine tailings dams in addition to the four that currently receive approximately 10 million tonnes of tailings annually, with their height increasing from the current 30m to 65m. The existing operation consists of 400 ha of tailings dams and 133 ha of evaporation ponds.

The tailings contain a toxic, acidic soup of radionuclides and heavy metals. There have been numerous spills and leaks – most significantly in 1994, when it was revealed that about three billion litres had seeped from the tailings dams over two years.

Mining consultants Advanced Geomechanics noted in a 2004 report that radioactive slurry was deposited “partially off” a lined area of a storage pond at Olympic Dam, contributing to greater seepage and rising ground water levels; that there is no agreed, accurate formula to determine the rate of evaporation of tailings and how much leaks into the ground; and that cells within a tailings pond covered an area more than three times greater than recommended, requiring “urgent remedial measures”.

The problems have not been resolved. Photos taken by an Olympic Dam mine worker in December 2008 show radioactive tailings liquid leaking from the rock ‘armoury’ of the tailings ‘retention’ system. The leaks were ongoing for at least eight months and probably amounted to several million litres, but were not publicly reported by BHP Billiton or the SA government. BHP Billiton said that mine workers taking and releasing photos of the mine would be subject to “disciplinary action”.

Managing the current tailings stockpile is challenging enough and there is every reason to be concerned about BHP Billiton’s capacity to manage a six-fold increase.

Large numbers of bird deaths have been recorded in the vicinity of the evaporation ponds − over 100 deaths in one four-day period in 2004. BHP Billiton says “several measures used to deter fauna from visiting the Tailings Storage Facility over the past decade have met with varying degrees of success, but none have resolved the issue.”

BHP Billiton likes euphemisms. ‘Tailings retention facilities’ retain some but not all tailings. The tailings dams have a ‘rock armoury’ – which leaks. Tailings dams are ‘storage facilities’ – as if to suggest that BHP Billiton has some plan for the waste other than leaving it where it is in perpetuity. BHP Billiton’s plans for Olympic Dam compare unfavourably with the Ranger uranium mine in the NT, where tailings are required to be returned to the pit at the end of the mine’s life and steps taken to ensure the tailings do not have a detrimental impact on the environment for at least 10,000 years.

(BHP to ‘dump mine tailings on ground’, Gavin Lower, May 01, 2009, The Australian, <www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25411908-5013404,00.html>)

Nuclear power advocates like to compare the relatively small volume of waste produced by nuclear plants to the huge volume of waste produced by coal plants. However, to produce enough uranium to operate just one power reactor for just one year, Olympic Dam will produce 611,000 tonnes of radioactive tailings waste (58MT/95).

The Draft EIS states: “An estimated 12 cubic metres of low-level radioactive waste is produced at Olympic Dam annually in the form of personal protective equipment, laboratory equipment, and geological and processing sample wastes generated following analysis for radionuclides, but is not returned to the processing circuit. This would increase to 48 cubic metres annually on completion of the expanded project. After a review of disposal options and government approval in 2006, low-level radioactive waste has been packaged and disposed of within the TSF [Tailings Storage Facility]. Inventories of the waste and its disposal locations are recorded so that it can be managed in the event of future disturbance if the tailings were to be reprocessed. This disposal practice would continue for the expanded project.”

Water Consumption

BHP Billiton proposes an increase in water consumption from 37 million litres daily (from the Great Artesian Basin) to over 250 million litres daily (up to 42 million litres from the Great Artesian Basin, plus 200 million litres or more from a proposed desalination plant).

That total of 250 million litres equates to over 170,000 litres per minute … every minute of every day in the driest state in the driest inhabited continent.

The water take from the Great Artesian Basin has had adverse impacts on precious Mound Springs − unique habitats which support rare and delicate micro flora and fauna, some species of which are unique to a particular Spring. While there is no current plan to increase the rate of water usage from the Great Artesian Basin, nor is there any intention to reduce it.

BHP Billiton’s Draft EIS says the company assessed and rejected the option of a third wellfield in the Great Artesian Basin: “The two existing wellfields supplying the current operation could not sustain the additional demand. It would have been necessary to establish a third wellfield much further into the GAB to ensure the GAB springs were protected. The resulting production of much warmer water would have been technically difficult and very expensive to cool to the required temperature and pipe to Olympic Dam.”

BHP Billiton pays nothing for its massive water take for the Olympic Dam mine despite recording a $17.7 billion profit in 2007-08. That arrangement is enshrined in the Roxby Downs Indenture Act 1982 − as anachronistic a piece of legislation as you’re ever likely to see. (BHP Billiton also has its hand out for more corporate welfare with an ask for around $120 million of public subsidies in the form of diesel fuel rebates over the four year open-pit construction period.)

In February 2007, then Prime Minister John Howard wrote to state Premiers seeking their agreement “to establish proper entitlements, metering, pricing and reporting arrangements for water extracted from the Great Artesian Basin.” Asked whether his proposed new arrangements would apply to Olympic Dam, Mr Howard said: “Everybody’s got to make a contribution to solving this problem.” But within days, he voiced support for BHP Billiton’s “right” to free water from the Artesian Basin. In other words, everyone except BHP Billiton has to make a contribution to solving this problem.

As The Advertiser noted in a November 2005 Editorial, it is “essential … to safeguard the artesian basin water supplies”. To that end, most users are subject to the Great Artesian Basin Management Plan. But BHP Billiton is a law unto itself − its Olympic Dam mine is not subject to the Management Plan and also enjoys exemptions from the SA Natural Resources Act 2004 and the Environment Protection Act 1993.

BHP Billiton has a bore-capping program which, the company claims, saves more water than the mine currently uses. But water extraction for the mine is localised and the adverse impacts are all too apparent to people who have monitored the Mound Springs over the past 20 years. Likewise, the company’s bore capping program is small comfort to pastoralists who suffer reduced water flow from the localised effects of water extraction for the mine.

The proposed desalination plant has raised concerns over its impacts on marine species and fishing industries – in particular from the discharge of brine. The Upper Spencer Gulf is a low flushing fragile marine environment unsuited to siting a desalination plant and BHP Billiton’s preferred site at Point Lowly is the breeding ground of the Charismatic Giant Australian Cuttle Fish.

David Noonan from the Australian Conservation Foundation said: “This is the worst possible place to build an internationally-sized desalination plant. The Gulf is shallow, low-flushing. It’s the breeding ground of the giant cuttlefish which is extremely sensitive to changes in salinity. The plant should be built on the ocean, not the gulf. We could build a reverse osmosis plant at Elliston on Eyre Peninsula’s west coast. Elliston has the ocean flushing that Pt Lowly lacks and enormous potential for year-round wind energy. Taxpayers are paying 20 per cent of the desalination plant’s capital cost and we should also have a big say on where it goes. It’s not good enough to leave it up to BHP.”

Adelaide University marine biologist Assoc. Prof. Bronwyn Gilanders says the sea around Whyalla is actually the world’s largest cuttlefish breeding zone, and that the plant could wipe them out: “Squids and Cuttlefish are generally short-lived. So they live a year; they breed only once. So if you damage the eggs or affect their reproductive ability then potentially that will have devastating consequences on the population.”

Electricity Demand

BHP Billiton expects the mine’s electricity consumption to increase over six-fold from 125 MW to 775 MW, to be sourced from some combination of supply from:

* the SA electricity grid (and the national electricity market) with a new electricity transmission line from Port Augusta.

* a proposed gas-fired on-site 600 MW plant with a pipe from Moomba.

* a proposed co-generation plant using industrial waste heat generated from the burning of sulphur to produce the sulphuric acid required for the new hydrometallurgical plant. This waste heat could be used to generate up to 250 MW.

The Draft EIS says a study is ongoing into the feasibility of a 150 MW concentrated solar thermal plant. Geothermal power is described as an “opportunity for the future”.

The proposed desalination plant would require 35 MW of electricity, which would be supplied by a new 25 km transmission line from the Cultana substation. The Draft EIS says the electricity would be supplied by renewable energy sourced from the National Electricity Market.

Mark Parnell from the SA Greens is advocating a 500 MW solar thermal plant for the mine:

“Large scale solar thermal is the ideal power solution for the expansion project. Solar thermal electricity is a different technology to solar photovoltaics (PVs). A PV system converts sunshine into electricity, whereas solar thermal converts sunshine to heat. This heat is then transferred to a fluid, which drives a turbine to generate electricity. A big advantage of solar thermal electricity is that the heat energy can be stored, potentially allowing electricity to be generated when the sun goes down.

“Solar thermal technology is available now, with 500MW plants currently planned for California and Nevada, where the technology has been road-tested for 20 years. Australia’s biggest engineering firm, WorleyParsons said last year it wants to build 34 large-scale solar thermal power stations in Australia by 2020. The Roxby expansion is the ideal project to kick-start this plan – the Olympic Dam mine needs huge amounts of power, in a spot that’s well away from the grid and bakes in the sun all year round.

“Investing in cutting edge renewable technology will provide a huge smart job boost for South Australia, placing our state at the centre of a new growth industry. The Rann Government must insist BHP Billiton’s enormous appetite for electricity is sated from the sun, not dirty fossil fuels. Otherwise, we’ll be left struggling with old technology and old thinking as the Roxby expansion sends our State’s greenhouse pollution levels sky high.”

Greenhouse Emissions

Greenhouse emissions from the mine (and associated infrastructure) are projected to increase from 900,000 tonnes annually to 4.7 million tonnes, making it all but impossible for South Australia to reach its legislated target of 13 million tonnes. A technical assessment by Monash University engineering lecturer Dr Gavin Mudd estimates emissions would reach 4.5 to 6.6 million tonnes annually — one-third to one-half of the target of 13 million tonnes. (The technical assessment is posted at https://nuclear.foe.org.au/olympic-dam-uranium-copper-mine)

BHP Billiton likes to promote uranium as a fuel for low-carbon nuclear power – but that argument only holds if the comparison is with fossil fuels. According to the 2006 Switkowski report, nuclear power is three times more greenhouse intensive than wind power. Moreover, BHP Billiton wants to take credit for the alleged greenhouse benefits of its uranium exports but not for the WMD proliferation risks or the high-level nuclear waste legacy. Nor does BHP Billiton take any responsibility for the greenhouse emissions arising from the use of its extensive fossil fuel exports.

Dr Mudd said: “South Australia has a legislated greenhouse target to reduce emissions by 60%, limiting total emissions to about 12 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually by 2050. Yet Olympic Dam alone will produce 4.5-6.6 million tonnes annually, making it virtually impossible for South Australia to meet its legislated target. BHP Billiton likes to take credit for its export of uranium to fuel low-carbon nuclear reactors, but that argument is flawed on two counts. Firstly, the end uses of energy exports are not counted in Australia’s greenhouse emissions, and if they were, BHP Billiton would also need to account for its extensive fossil fuel exports. Secondly, the argument rests on the arbitrary and implausible assumption that the only alternative to Olympic Dam uranium exports is to build coal fired power plants.”

Radioactive Racism

Racism in the uranium mining industry in Australia typically involves ignoring the concerns of Traditional Owners insofar as the legal and political circumstances permit; divide-and-rule tactics; bribery; humbugging Traditional Owners – exerting persistent, unwanted pressure until the mining company gets what it wants; providing Traditional Owners with false or misleading information; and threats, most commonly legal threats.

BHP Billiton claims that it consults with Traditional Owners such as the Kokatha and Arabunna. But consultation is hardly the word since the company is under no obligation to take the slightest bit of notice of their views. The mine operates under the Roxby Downs Indenture Act, which provides overrides and exemptions from the SA Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988. The latter is the key law aimed at protecting Indigenous heritage in South Australia. However, under the Indenture Act, BHP Billiton is in a legal position to determine what consultation occurs with Traditional Owners, who is consulted, and nature of any consultation. The company decides the level of protection that Aboriginal heritage sites receive and which sites are recognised. The company claims that it fully complies with Aboriginal heritage legislation even though it is not required to do so – if so, why is the company unwilling to relinquish the legal exemptions it enjoys?

It is ironic that BHP Billiton supports Reconciliation Australia’s ‘good governance’ program and has provided over $2 million to Reconciliation Australia, yet will not relinquish its exemptions from the Aboriginal Heritage Act. The company’s attitude appears to be ‘do as I say, not as I do’.

One particularly notorious incident in the history of the Olympic Dam mine concerned the laying of a water pipeline on the land of Arabunna Traditional Owners in the mid-1990s, when WMC Resources owned the mine. The dispute over the pipeline led to violence, terrorism, imprisonment, and the death of one person. Jan Whyte and Ila Marks summarised the controversy in the July 1996 edition of the Friends of the Earth magazine, Chain Reaction: “It appears that WMC has embarked on a course of side-stepping consultation with the Arabunna as the traditional custodians. It has also taken similar actions in regard to the Kokatha, the traditional custodians for the actual mine site. One method used by mining companies to side-step proper consultation processes is documented in North America and Canada as well as Australia. Mining companies incorporate small Aboriginal groups in areas under dispute and give them financial support. These groups are then regarded as the official representatives for that area and mining companies proceed to consult with them. Thus, it seems as if the companies are going through the correct legal processes whereas, in fact, they are ignoring parties who have legitimate interests.” (See the full article and also the ABC ‘Background Briefing’ transcript at <https://nuclear.foe.org.au/watered-down-negotiations-wmc-picks-both-sides/>.)

Of course, BHP Billiton cannot be held responsible for the actions of WMC Resources over a decade ago. But it seems that little has changed, including BHP Billiton’s refusal to relinquish the overrides and exemptions it enjoys from the Aboriginal Heritage Act.

The Roxby Downs Indenture Act

The proposed expansion of the mine ought to be subject to legislative and regulatory controls and standards at least as rigorous as those that apply to smaller projects. To apply considerably weaker standards is indefensible. Yet the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 provides BHP Billiton the legal authority to override important state legislation including the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988; Environmental Protection Act 1993; Freedom of Information Act 1991; Natural Resources Act 2004 (incorporating water management issues); Development Act 1993; and the Mining Act 1971.

An indication of the sweeping nature of the legal privileges is the statement in the Indenture Act that:

“(1) The law of the State is so far modified as is necessary to give full effect to the Indenture and the provisions of any law of the State shall accordingly be construed subject to the modifications that take effect under this Act.

(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), in the case of any inconsistency between the provisions of any Act or law and of the Indenture, the provisions of the Indenture shall prevail …”

The Indenture Act is currently the subject of secret negotiations between the SA government and BHP Billiton and is expected to be modified in the first half of 2010 to accommodate the mine expansion plans. The SA Labor government has refused to commit to repeal the legal privileges although they are clearly inconsistent with the government’s policy of applying the “strictest environmental standards” to uranium mining.

SA Premier Mike Rann said on the day of the release of the Draft EIS: “It [the mine expansion] has got massive benefits for South Australia but I will insist that world’s best practice in terms of environment is complied with.”

If Mr Rann was serious, he would immediately announce that the indefensible clauses in the Indenture Act will be promptly repealed.

Nor has there been any indication from BHP Billiton that it will relinquish the privileges although they are inconsistent with the company’s policy of meeting “internationally recognised standards”. Olympic Dam does not have to comply with South Australian standards let alone international standards. BHP Billiton Chairman Don Argus said in November 2006 that “we will apply the highest standards … we are acting within the law.” However, Olympic Dam does not operate within the law that applies everywhere else in SA.

Under confidentiality clause 35 of the Indenture Act, BHP Billiton has veto power over public release of information relating to activities undertaken within the 1.5 million hectares covered by the Indenture Act, and related matters such as government/company negotiations. Monash University environmental engineer Dr Gavin Mudd notes that: “until the Indenture Act is revoked entirely there can be no truly independent, external environmental assessment of the impacts of Olympic Dam.”

The Draft EIS (ch.6) says that the Indenture Act “ensures the continuation … of a safe and environmentally acceptable operation”. It does nothing of the sort.

More information

Friends of the Earth https://nuclear.foe.org.au/olympic-dam-uranium-copper-mine/

Dr Gavin Mudd’s articles on Mound Springs, Great Artesian Basin etc http://users.monash.edu.au/~gmudd

SA Greens MLC Mark Parnell http://sagreens.markparnell.org.au/


Waste fears at uranium mine

Michelle Wiese Bockmann, The Australian, 10 March 2006

THE Olympic Dam uranium mine needs urgent improvements in radioactive waste management and monitoring, according to audit reviews. As owner BHP Billiton seeks state and federal government approval for a four-fold, $5 billion expansion at Olympic Dam, concerns about the mine’s tailings storage facilities have been raised in the last two audit reviews provided to the Rann Government.
The reviews, obtained by The Australian under Freedom of Information laws, call on government regulators to “encourage” changes to the deposit of tailings, a radioactive slurry that is a by-product of uranium mining production. More than 10 million tonnes of tailings a year are placed in ponds near the mine.
The review noted radioactive slurry was deposited “partially off” a lined area of a storage pond, which it believed contributed to greater seepage and rising ground water levels.
The review also criticises the lack of an agreed, accurate formula to determine the rate of evaporation of tailings and how much leaks into the ground.
Consultants Advanced Geomechanics conducted the reviews of the tailings storage facilities in 2002 and 2003 when the mine was owned by WMC Resources. In a September 2004 letter to state Department of Primary Industries and Resources, Advanced Geomechanics consultant Richard Jewell urged “strong representation to the operators on these issues to make the changes”.
In April last year, Mr Jewell noted cells within a tailings pond covered 70ha, more than three times greater than a key performance indicator recommended.
“This is an issue of real concern and requires the implementation of urgent remedial measures,” Mr Jewell warns in the letter. He agrees with the auditors’ general conclusion that the tailings facility was “well managed”.
The tailings dams were the subject of a 1996 parliamentary inquiry after previous owners Western Mining Corporation reported in 1994 that five million cubic litres had leaked from them over two years.
“They (the mine owners) have a continuing problem with managing radioactive tailings and a continuing problem with seepage of tailings,” said Australian Conservation Foundation official David Noonan.
Mr Noonan said the audit reviews showed the mine “had failed even the most basic monitoring practices”.
Mr Jewell yesterday confirmed the 2004 auditors had again raised the tailings problems. “But in general from my experience the management at Olympic Dam is as good as I’ve seen anywhere in the world,” he said.

Olympic Dam uranium / copper mine

Please note: Friends of the Earth previously understood that Kokatha people were the uncontested traditional owners of the Roxby Downs region and that view is reflected in some papers on this website. However we now understand traditional ownership is contested.

Note: the most up-to-date information on the Olympic Dam is the material written by David Noonan — please see this separate webpage: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/olympic-dam/

Vale Uncle Kevin Buzzacott, fierce advocate for his people and a nuclear free Australia

Information about proposed expansion of the Olympic Dam uranium/copper mine (first announced in 2019)

Proposed expansion abandoned in 2012: Information about the mine expansion approval process and the amended Roxby Downs Indenture Act

More information on the Roxby Downs Indenture Act

Lizards Revenge protest at Olympic Dam, July 2012

Dr Gavin Mudd’s report on the option of exporting copper, gold and silver but not uranium from Olympic Dam

Alternative Annuals Reports (PDF): 2009201020112012

Greenhouse emissions – Olympic Dam mine expansion (PDF) – technical paper by Dr Gavin Mudd, Monash University

Radiation leak plan 15 years out of date

WMC’s racism in the 1990s – Jan Whyte and Ila Marks look at how WMC’s activities divide Aboriginal people. Also: 1995 ABC Radio National Background Briefing story about the outbreak of violence in Marree and its connection to the Roxby Downs mine.

Detailed report on Mound Springs and the Roxby mine’s impacts on them (PDF) By Daniel Keane, 1997

Another report on Mound Springs and the Roxby mine’s impacts on them (PDF) By Gavin Mudd

Massive energy consumption and greenhouse emissions.

Bird deaths from the tailings dam

Accidents and incidents 2003-08 (PDF).

Roxby timeline + accidents 1987-2001

WISE Uranium: Issues at Operating Uranium Mines and Mills – Olympic Dam, Australia

SA Parliamentary Inquiry Into The Tailings System Leakage – In 1994, WMC reported that up to 5 million cubic metres of liquid had leaked from it’s Tailings Retention System at Olympic Dam. According to WMC the leak had been happening for at least 2 years but only became fully understood in January 1994.

Environmental Impacts Statement – submission by Friends of the Earth, Adelaide. August 2009 (PDF)

BHP’s operations overseas – undermining the future

BHP’s OLYMPIC DAM – SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCERNS

Olympic Dam is a state within a state; it operates under a unique set of laws enshrined in the amended Roxby Downs Indenture Act. That would be unobjectionable except that the Indenture Act allows Olympic Dam wide-ranging exemptions from environmental laws, water management laws, Aboriginal Heritage laws, and it curtails the application of the Freedom of Information Act.

Then SA Liberal Party industry spokesperson Martin Hamilton-Smith said “every word of the [Indenture] agreement favours BHP, not South Australians.” It beggars belief that the SA Labor government would agree to such one-sided terms; and it beggars belief that Mr Hamilton-Smith and his Liberal colleagues waved it through Parliament with no amendments.

The only politician to insist on some scrutiny of the amended Indenture Act was SA Greens MLC Mark Parnell. He was accused of holding the state’s economy to ransom. Yet the transcripts of his late-night Parliamentary questioning of the Labor government ought to be required reading (see here and here). Time and time again the government spokesperson said that BHP wanted such-and-such a provision in the Indenture Act, and the government simply agreed without further consideration or consultation.

For example, Parnell asked why the Indenture Act retains exemptions from the SA Aboriginal Heritage Act. The government spokesperson said: “BHP were satisfied with the current arrangements and insisted on the continuation of these arrangements, and the government did not consult further than that.”

In a scathing assessment of the Olympic Dam royalties regime enshrined in the Indenture Act, journalist Paul Clearly wrote in The Australian on 21 October 2011 that the regime “has robbed the state’s citizens and all Australians of the opportunity to share in the profits of what will become the world’s biggest mine.” He added that the agreement “will unfortunately stand as a sad and enduring indictment of the weakness of our state governments when it comes to negotiating with powerful mining multinationals.”

Olympic Dam is a state within a state − and it has shades of a Stalinist state. When a mine worker provided the media with photos of multiple leaks in the tailings dams in 2009, BHP’s response was to threaten “disciplinary action” against any workers caught taking photos. The SA government was conspicuously silent. Have the leaks of toxic tailings liquid been fixed? Who knows. It would be naive to believe anything BHP or the state government has to say on the subject.

In 2010, another worker was sufficiently concerned about occupational health issues at Olympic Dam that he leaked information to the media. The leaked documents show that BHP uses manipulated averages and distorted sampling to ensure its official figures of worker radiation exposure slip under the maximum exposure levels set by government. Are those claims true? Who knows. It would be naive to believe anything BHP or the state government has to say on the subject.

The risks will escalate with plans for a massive expansion of the mine. The BHP whistleblower said. “Assertions of safety of workers made by BHP are not credible because they rely on assumptions rather than, for example, blood sampling and, crucially, an assumption that all workers wear a respirator when exposed to highly radioactive polonium dust in the smelter.” [Update – the planned mega-expansion was cancelled in 2012 but expansion plans are still being pursued.]

So there we have a couple of examples of serious concerns being raised by mine workers, with inadequate responses (or no response at all) by BHP and the SA government, and no way for any of us to get to the truth of the matter. Suffice it to mention one more. Mining consultants Advanced Geomechanics noted in a 2004 report that radioactive slurry was deposited “partially off” a lined area of a storage pond at Olympic Dam, contributing to greater seepage and rising ground water levels; that there is no agreed, accurate formula to determine the rate of evaporation of tailings and how much leaks into the ground; and that cells within a tailings pond covered an area more than three times greater than recommended, requiring “urgent remedial measures” (Michelle Wiese Bockmann, 10 March 2006, ‘Waste fears at uranium mine’, The Australian).

Have any of those problems been addressed? I doubt it. But we do know that the management of radioactive tailings has been an ongoing headache for decades and that the rate of production is set to go through the roof − from 10 million tonnes annually to 68 million tonnes. And we do know that BHP has responded to worker concerns about tailings mismanagement with intimidation instead of information.

The domestic problems with Australia’s uranium industry are compounded by serious international problems. Australia has uranium export agreements with nuclear weapons states with no intention of meeting their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty disarmament obligations; countries with a history of secret nuclear weapons research; countries that refuse to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; countries blocking progress on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; undemocratic, and secretive states with appalling human rights records.

Both major parties now support the abandonment of previous policy of refusing uranium exports to countries that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And the federal government is planning to allow uranium sales to a Middle Eastern dictatorship − the United Arab Emirates. The last time Australia planned uranium sales to a Middle Eastern dictatorship was in late 1978 when the Fraser government was negotiating with the Shah of Iran − a few short months before his overthrow during the Iranian Revolution. You’d think we’d learn.

All of these uranium export agreements are accompanied by safeguards inspection regimes that are at best modest, sometimes tokenistic (e.g. China) and sometimes all but non-existent (e.g. Russia).

Australians are evenly divided on the topic of uranium mining; typically, polls find that a majority of Australians want existing uranium mines to be allowed to run their course but a majority want a ban on new uranium mines. A 2006 Newspoll found that a majority of Coalition voters − yes, Coalition voters − wanted a ban on new uranium mines, as did more than three-quarters of Labor voters. Recent polls indicate that two-thirds of Australians oppose uranium sales to nuclear weapons states and two-thirds oppose the plan to sell uranium to India − a country which has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is engaged in a nuclear arms race with Pakistan and China.

ISL uranium mining – environmental impacts

In-Situ Leach (ISL) Uranium Mining Method Far From ‘Benign’

By Dr. Gavin Mudd
Hydrogeologist / Environmental Engineer, Monash University
2007

The mining technique of in situ leaching (ISL), often referred to as solution mining, is becoming an increasingly favoured method for the extraction of uranium across the world. This is primarily due to its low capital and operating costs compared to conventional mining. Little is known about the environmental impact of this method, and mining companies have been able to exploit this to promote the method as “environmentally benign”.

The ISL process involves drilling groundwater bores or wells into a uranium deposit, injecting corrosive chemicals to dissolve the uranium within the ore zone, then pumping back the uranium-laden solution.

The method should only be applied to uranium deposits located within a groundwater system or confined aquifer, commonly in palaeochannel deposits (old buried river beds).

Although ISL is presented in simplified diagrams by the nuclear industry, the reality is that geological systems are inherently complex and not easily predictable.

There are a range of options for the chemistry of the mining solutions. Either acidic or alkaline chemical agents can be used in conjunction with an oxidising agent to dissolve the uranium.

Typical oxidising agents include oxygen or hydrogen peroxide, while alkaline agents include ammonia or sodium-bicarbonate or carbon dioxide. The most common acidic chemical used is sulphuric acid, although nitric acid has been tried at select sites and in laboratory tests.

The chemicals can have serious environmental impacts and cause long-term and potentially irreversible changes to groundwater quality.

The use of acidic solutions mobilises high levels of heavy metals, such as cadmium, strontium, lead and chromium. Alkaline solutions tend to mobilise only a few heavy metals such as selenium and molybdenum. The ability to restore the groundwater to its pre-mining quality is, arguably, easier at sites that have used alkaline solution chemistry.

A review of the available literature on ISL mines across the world can easily counter the myths promulgated about ISL uranium mining. Whether one examines the USA, Germany, Russia and former annexed states, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Australia or new ISL projects across Asia, the truth remains the same – the ISL technique merely treats groundwater as a sacrifice zone and the problem remains “out of sight, out of mind”.

ISL uranium mining is not controllable, is inherently unsafe and is unlikely to meet “strict environmental controls”. It is not an environmentally benign method of uranium mining.

The use of sulphuric acid solutions at ISL mines across Eastern Europe, as well as a callous disregard for sensible environmental management, has led to many seriously contaminated sites.

Perhaps the most severe example is Straz pod Ralskem in the Czech Republic, where up to 200 billion litres of groundwater is contaminated. Restoration of the site is expected to take several decades or even centuries. For the USA, solution escapes outside of the ‘controlled mining zone’ and difficult restorations have been documented at ISL sites in Texas and Wyoming – including both acid and alkaline leach sites. Australia has encountered these same difficulties, especially at the controversial Honeymoon deposit in South Australia during pilot studies in the early 1980s and at Manyingee in Western Australia until 1985.

The Honeymoon pilot project used sulphuric acid in conjunction with ferric sulphate as the oxidising agent. The wells and aquifer experienced significant blockages due to the minerals jarosite and gypsum precipitating, lowering the efficiency of the leaching process and leading to increased excursions. The aquifers in the vicinity of Honeymoon are known to be connected to aquifers used by local pastoralists to water stock.

For Australia, water of any quality is precious – and particularly so when the only secure supply of water in a region is from groundwater. With the rise of water treatment technologies such as desalination, water of any quality is a valuable resource – environmentally as well as for possible community and industry use. An acid leach-type ISL project, especially as approved for Beverley and Honeymoon without remediation of polluted groundwater, therefore imposes a major environmental risk and pollution burden on future users of groundwater in these regions. ISL mining is therefore far from sustainable.

Journal articles, conferences papers etc. by Dr. Mudd on his Monash webpage (last updated 2012) and his RMIT webpage (last updated 2023).


ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION – ROUTINE CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER

This summary is drawn from the Friends of the Earth, Australia submission to the Beverley Four Mile uranium mine application, March 2009.

In-situ leach (ISL) uranium mining involves pumping an acid solution (or an alkaline solution in some cases) into an aquifer. This dissolves the uranium ore and other heavy metals and the solution is then pumped back to the surface. The small amount of uranium is separated at the surface. The liquid radioactive waste – containing radioactive particles, heavy metals and acid – is simply dumped in groundwater.

The 2004 CSIRO report states: “As stated in the Beverley Assessment Report, the bleed solutions, waste solutions from uranium recovery, plant washdown waters and bleed streams from the reverse osmosis plants are collected prior to disposal into the Namba aquifer via disposal wells. These liquid wastes are combined and concentrated in holding/evaporation ponds, with excess injected into selected locations within the mined aquifer. The injected liquid is acidic (pH 1.8 to 2.8) and contains heavy metals and radionuclides originating from the orebody.”

(Taylor, G.; Farrington, V.; Woods, P.; Ring, R.; Molloy, R. (2004): Review of Environmental Impacts of the Acid In-Situ Leach Uranium Mining Process.- CSIRO Land and Water Client Report.)

From being inert and immobile in the ore body, the radionuclides and heavy metals are now bioavailable and mobile in the aquifer.

The volume of liquid waste is discussed in the 7/1/09 Beverley Four Mile Project Public Environment – Report and Mining Lease Proposal document:

“With the inclusion of maximised recycling of water, approximately 2.5 L/s (averaged over a year) of liquid waste will be generated once the Beverley extraction circuits are decommissioned. This will be disposed of at Beverley ML 6321 in the hydraulically isolated formerly mined Beverley Sands aquifers in the North, Central and South wellfields.

“It is noted that initially the Beverley Four Mile resin elution circuit and Beverley ML 6321 capture and elution circuits will operate in parallel. During this time the combined volume of liquid waste will remain within an annualised average rate of 5 L/s.

“At the indicated rate there is enough disposal volume in those three wellfields to accommodate up to 16 years of liquid waste. Additional volume exists in Beverley North East, East and Deep South wellfields. Any extension of liquid waste disposal in these areas would be subject to a successful application to the regulatory authorities using the Beverley Mine Procedure for Management of Liquid Waste Disposal (Appendix C of the MARP, Heathgate 2008c) or its approved successor.”

The Beverley Four Mile proponents have no plans to remediate the polluted aquifer as they say the pollution will ‘attenuate’ – that the aquifer will return to its pre-mining state over time. This claim has been queried by the scientific community as being highly speculative with no firm science behind it.

The 2004 CSIRO report endorsed the dumping of liquid waste in ground-water yet the information and arguments it used in support of that conclusion were tenuous. In short, the CSIRO report exaggerates the problems of pursuing waste management methods other than dumping it in groundwater, and the report trivialises the impacts of dumping liquid waste in groundwater.

The CSIRO report notes that attenuation is “not yet proven” and the timeframe of “several years to decades” could hardly be more vague. The 2004 CSIRO report states in its Executive Summary:

“The use of acid rather than alkaline leaching and disposal of liquid wastes by re-injection into the aquifer is contentious. Available data indicate that both the leach solution and liquid waste have greater concentrations of soluble ions than does the pre-mining groundwater. However as this groundwater has no apparent beneficial use other than by the mining industry, this method of disposal is preferable to surface disposal. Although not yet proven, it is widely believed and accepted that natural attenuation will result in the contaminated water chemistry returning to pre-mining conditions within a timeframe of over several years to decades.”

Elsewhere the 2004 CSIRO report notes uncertainties associated with attenuation:

“The EIA for Beverley and Honeymoon suggest that natural attenuation will occur, however, exact timeframes are not given. The issue of predicting attenuation is made more complex by not fully understanding the microbiological or the mineralogy of the surrounding ore bodies, before and after mining, and how these natural conditions will react with the altered water quality introduced by the injection of leachate, and re-injection of wastewaters. Following general practice, geochemical modelling was undertaken with a series of assumptions where data were not available. Although these assumptions are considered reasonable by the review team, some technical experts have a differing opinion. In any case the results must be considered approximate.

“The monitoring results from Beverley are limited by the short duration of mining and operation, and there are currently no completely mined-out areas for which the water chemistry can be followed after mining to verify the extent of the expected natural attenuation. However, pH results for an area that was trial-mined in 1998 and then left until full-scale mining of the same area was due are shown in Figure 13.

“Note that whilst other data are available for these wells there are not consistent trends in other analytes. There has been little recovery of groundwater chemistry towards background in the test-production wells other than a favourable change for pH. There are presently no equivalent monitoring data for the northern area, which is presently being mined.”

Even if full attenuation does occur over time, it is unlikely to occur in the timeframe of post-mine-closure monitoring proposed by the mining proponent. The 7/1/09 Beverley Four Mile Project Public Environment – Report and Mining Lease Proposal document states:

“Heathgate proposes an initial period of five years from the conclusion of commercial operations to complete the decommissioning of facilities. A monitoring and maintenance program is proposed to run for a further two years, for a total of seven years from the final conclusion of mining activities. The total monitoring period will be reviewed with the regulatory authorities and may be extended.

“Facilities will therefore be fully decommissioned within seven years from the conclusion of the commercial operation. This period includes a post-completion monitoring period for vegetation maintenance, groundwater sampling, drainage repairs and other activities to ensure the long-term permanent rehabilitation of the site.”

The 2004 CSIRO report states: “Natural attenuation is preferred to adjusting the chemistry of the wastewater prior to re-injection as the latter would result in the need for additional chemicals on-site, generation of contaminated neutralisation sludges which would have to be disposed of, risk of potential clogging of pore spaces in the aquifer and associated higher costs.

Those are not insurmountable problems. Moreover there are alternatives to adjusting the chemistry of waste-water then reinjecting it into the aquifer, such as evaporation followed by management of solid wastes. As the CSIRO report notes:

“10.6 Alternatives to Liquid Waste Re-Injection

“Suggestions made during the community consultation process included not re-injecting the liquid wastes into the aquifer, and neutralisation of waste before re-injection.

“Not re-injecting the waste into the aquifer would require either sophisticated water treatment and/or the installation of much larger evaporation ponds. Both would generate solid wastes to be disposed of in a solid waste repository. When the wastes dried out they would become a possible dust source, which could increase the potential radiation exposure of workers, in particular in relation to dust inhalation, but also from radon inhalation and gamma exposure. Environmental radiation levels at the surface would also increase. These are presently negligible issues associated with the existing ISL practices.

“Neutralisation of the waste liquid prior to re-injection would precipitate out some metal salts, which would need to be filtered before re-injection, and be disposed of in a solid waste repository.

“Also following re-injection it is likely that the re-injection bores would rapidly clog owing to precipitation around the bores, as the injected water and existing acidic water in the aquifer interact. Clogging of re-injection wellfields and associated problems with pipelines and pumps may increase the risk of spills due to operational problems with equipment and increased maintenance.”

None of the issues raised by the CSIRO amount to compelling reasons to support dumping liquid waste in groundwater. Some of the reasons cited are absurd and cast serious doubt over the credibility of the CSIRO review – for example dust suppression is simple and inexpensive.

The SA government should:
* conduct or commission a thorough comparative assessment of the options for managing liquid waste.
* insist that the proponents rehabilite the aquifer to pre-mining conditions and insist on monitoring/remediation until pre-mining conditions are achieved.

The 2004 CSIRO report states:

“For the Beverley operation, groundwater monitoring is required to be conducted for seven years after mining to demonstrate that their expectations in regard to natural attenuation are being borne out.

“Research into the use of and ability of chemical amendments to assist with or speed up the processes of natural attenuation processes may be beneficial, especially where the latter may be slow and/or incomplete. This approach may also be of benefit in the case of plant or equipment failure with resultant contamination of soil or shallow aquifers.”

Has any follow-up work been done to investigate the potential to assist or hasten attenuation?

The 2003 Senate References and Legislation Committee report into the regulation of uranium mining in Australia reported “a pattern of under-performance and non-compliance”, it identified “many gaps in knowledge and found an absence of reliable data on which to measure the extent of contamination or its impact on the environment”, and it concluded that changes were necessary “in order to protect the environment and its inhabitants from serious or irreversible damage”. On ISL mining, the 2003 Senate report stated:
            “The Committee is concerned that the ISL process, which is still in its experimental state and introduced in the face of considerable public opposition, was permitted prior to conclusive evidence being available on its safety and environmental impacts.”
“The Committee recommends that, owing to the experimental nature and the level of public opposition, the ISL mining technique should not be permitted until more conclusive evidence can be presented on its safety and environmental impacts.”
“Failing that, the Committee recommends that at the very least, mines utilising the ISL technique should be subject to strict regulation, including prohibition of discharge of radioactive liquid mine waste to groundwater, and ongoing, regular independent monitoring to ensure environmental impacts are minimised.”

In relation to the Beverley mine, Dr. Gavin Mudd, a hydrogeologist based at Monash University, notes: “The critical data which could answer scientific questions concerning contaminant mobility in groundwater has never been released by General Atomics. This is especially important since GA no longer maintain the mine is ‘isolated’ from surrounding groundwater, with desires to expand the mine raising legitimate concerns over the groundwater contamination legacy left at Beverley.”

The 2004 CSIRO report states in its Executive Summary:

“While ISL technology has environmental and safety advantages when projects are well planned and operated (Underhill 1998), there are several acid ISL operations that have been developed and operated with little or no consideration for the environment. The conditions at these sites are a direct consequence of the Soviet-era operation of uranium mines without effective management of environmental aspects of production, without restoration of contaminated areas, much less planning and design for reclamation and long-term containment of wastes. Similar operating conditions without effective pollution control and closure concepts were apparent at uranium sites in other centrally planned economies such as East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary prior to 1990.”

“… The environmental consequences from acid ISL operations under the Soviet-era are significant and a component of the many environmental problems from this era, the majority of which were from mine water/groundwater/tailings/waste rock arising from underground and open cut mines. It is noted that as many of the environmental problems were related to the governance and institutional arrangements of the era, direct comparison with practices in Australia cannot be made.”

However a number of the criticisms made of Soviet-era management apply to uranium mining in SA:
* Captured bureaucracies (e..g PIRSA)
* Slack regulation.
* Political interference (e.g. Rann pre-empting assessment by describing Beverley Four Mile as a “world class” project).
* Orwellian doublespeak (e.g. Peter Garrett describing ISL as “world’s best practice”).

In-situ leach uranium mining

In-situ leach uranium mining in Australia – Beverley, Beverley-Four Mile, Honeymoon etc.

Controversies involving Heathgate and General Atomics and its CEO Neal Blue

In-Situ Leach (ISL) Uranium Mining Method Far From ‘Benign’

Jillian K. Marsh, 2011, “A Critical Analysis of Decision-making Protocols used in Approving a Commercial Mining License for the Beverley Uranium Mine in Adnyamathanha Country: Toward Effective Indigenous Participation in Caring for Cultural Resources.” PhD Environmental Studies Thesis, Department of Geographical and Environmental Studies, The University of Adelaide.

Beverley Four Mile – Friends of the Earth (Australia) submission. 2009

Beverley Four Mile – Friends of the Earth (Adelaide) submission – information regarding ISL mining (PDF)

2002-03 Senate Inquiry – chapter regarding Beverley and Honeymoon ISL mining

Uranium Miners Turning Water Into Liquid Waste