NuclearAdmin – Page 11 – Nuclear-Free Campaign

Roxby Downs Indenture Act

2019: See David Noonan’s short briefing paper on the Indenture Act

See also 2011 information posted at this link.

Click here to download a 3-page 2008 PDF statement about the Roxby Downs Indenture Act:

In this webpage:

* Summary

* Peter Burdon’s article

* Greens MP Mark Parnell’s speech in SA Parliament.

Summary

BHP’s Olympic Dam copper/uranium/gold/silver mine in South Australia is a state within a state; it operates under a unique set of laws enshrined in the amended Roxby Downs Indenture Act. That would be unobjectionable except that the Indenture Act allows Olympic Dam wide-ranging exemptions from environmental laws, water management laws, Aboriginal Heritage laws, and it curtails the application of the Freedom of Information Act.

Then SA Liberal Party industry spokesperson Martin Hamilton-Smith said “every word of the [Indenture] agreement favours BHP, not South Australians.” It beggars belief that the SA Labor government would agree to such one-sided terms; and it beggars belief that Mr Hamilton-Smith and his Liberal colleagues waved it through Parliament with no amendments.

The only politician to insist on some scrutiny of the amended Indenture Act was SA Greens MLC Mark Parnell. He was accused of holding the state’s economy to ransom. Yet the transcripts of his late-night Parliamentary questioning of the Labor government ought to be required reading (see here and here). Time and time again the government spokesperson said that BHP wanted such-and-such a provision in the Indenture Act, and the government simply agreed without further consideration or consultation.

For example, Parnell asked why the Indenture Act retains exemptions from the SA Aboriginal Heritage Act. The government spokesperson said: “BHP were satisfied with the current arrangements and insisted on the continuation of these arrangements, and the government did not consult further than that.”

Above the law? Roxby Downs and BHP Billiton’s Legal Privileges

Peter Burdon
Friends of the Earth, Adelaide
May 2006

What would you say if you were told that a large portion of South Australia is subject to an entirely different set of laws to the rest of the state? How would you feel if you knew that those legally responsible for this land consume more energy and water, create more waste and dangerous material and extract more resources than any other body in South Australia?

Over 20 years ago the South Australian Government enacted the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 (Indenture Act). In a single document the Government legislated that some 1.5 million hectares in central South Australia, including the Roxby Downs mine and surrounding areas, would be exempt from some of our most important environmental and indigenous rights legislation. The Indenture Act provides BHP Billiton the legal authority to override the:
· Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988
· Development Act 1993
· Environmental Protection Act 1993
· Freedom of Information Act 1991
· Mining Act 1971
· Natural Resources Act 2004 (including the Water Resources Act 1997)

This decision undermines community expectations that corporations should be regulated to limit the potential damage they can cause and to ensure they remain accountable for their actions. It also challenges the South Australian Government’s expressed commitment to the “strictest environmental standards” for the Roxby Downs/Olympic Dam mine. Such sweeping legislative power is unprecedented and inconsistent with modern practices and government promises.

To view the Roxby Downs Indenture Act:

The Indenture Act and Aboriginal Heritage

The inclusion of the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 (AHA) in the Indenture Act has significant consequences for issues of equality and questions how seriously our State Government treats Indigenous rights and interests.

The AHA is the key legislative enactment aimed at protecting Indigenous heritage in South Australia. Prior to the operation of Native Title in the early 90s the AHA governed most government/Indigenous relations concerning land and cultural heritage. The Act continues to play an important function for Indigenous cultural heritage. However, under the Indenture Act the traditional owners of the land surrounding Roxby Downs, the Kokatha, Arabunna and Barngarla peoples, are now forced to deal with BHP Billiton to have their heritage recognised. As ACF nuclear campaigner David Noonan noted, BHP Billiton is
“[I]n a legal position to undertake any consultation that occurs, decide which Aboriginal groups they consult and the manner of that consultation. As the commercial operator and proponent of expansion within these areas, [BHP Billiton is] in a position of deciding the level of protection that Aboriginal heritage sites received and which sites they recognised.”

Through the Indenture Act, the government has abdicated its responsibility to address Aboriginal Heritage issues in relation to the Roxby Downs mine. They have placed BHP Billiton in a legal position to:
· Ignore the provisions of the 1988 Act designed to protect Aboriginal heritage
· Determine the nature and manner of any consultation with Indigenous communities
· Choose which Aboriginal groups to consult with
· Decide the level of protection that Aboriginal Heritage sites receive
· Decide which Aboriginal Heritage sites they recognise

As owners of the Olympic Dam mine, BHP Billiton clearly cannot participate in decisions concerning the recognition and protection of Aboriginal sites without a gross conflict of interest.

Freedom of Information

In October 2002 Premier Mike Rann and the Minister for Administrative Services, Jay Weatherill, signed the ‘Citizens Right to Information’ charter. This Charter commits the Government of South Australia to making information in Government documents and records readily accessible to the citizens of South Australia. Contained within this document is a promise that the “South Australian Government is committed to attaining the highest standards of openness and accountability.”

To fulfil this promise the Charter directs citizens to the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (FOI) and provides information about how to use the legislation. On this point Friends of the Earth campaigner Joel Catchlove notes,
“Freedom of Information legislation is an indispensable element of any society represented by a government. The legislation promotes government accountability and fosters informed public participation in government.”

Legally, the FOI consists of rights and obligations concerning access to and amendment of, information in the hands of government. The principal right conferred is a general right of access to a document of an agency or an official document of a minister. The other basic rights and obligations which FOI confers or imposes are, in summary:
“The obligation of the responsible minister to publish certain information, including: a statement setting out the organization and functions of agency; a statement of the categories of the document that are maintained in the possession of the agency; and a statement of any information that needs to be available to the public concerning particular procedures of the agency in relation to obtaining access to documents.”
and

“The obligation to make available for inspection and purchase documents that are used by the agency in making decisions, such as manuals containing guidelines and practices.”

Under confidentiality clause 35 of the Indenture Act, BHP Billiton have veto power over information relating to activities undertaken within the 1.5 million hectares covered by the indenture. Mr Catchlove notes:
“There is thus a massive portion of South Australia where mining giant BHP Billiton operates which is not subject to open public review or discussion and the fundamental tenancies of representative government have been laid to waste. The government promises openness and accountability with one hand and takes it away with the other.”

This fact was also commented on by Hedley Bachmann in his 2002 report to the State Government on reporting procedures for the South Australian uranium industry. In his report Bachmann recommended:
“In order to allow the release of information about incidents, which may cause or threaten to cause, serious or material environmental harm or risks to the public or employees, the government should revise and appropriately amend the secrecy/confidentiality causes in the legislation.”

The Bachmann report addressed a range of transparency or secrecy clauses contained in legislation relating to uranium mining. At the conclusion of his work the State government amended two pieces of legislation to comply with his recommendations. They were the
· Radiation Protection Act 1982: Section 19
· Mines and Workers Inspection Act 1920: Section 9

While the veto power held by BHP Billiton remains intact, citizen confidence and faith in the South Australian government cannot. South Australian citizens have a right to know exactly what actions, decisions or activities our representatives and corporations are undertaking, particularly in such a high-risk operation as the Roxby Downs uranium mine. The mine consumes more resources than any other enterprise in the state and has the potential to serious damage the health of South Australian workers and South Australia’s natural heritage. Many natural wonders, which are of deep significance to the land’s Traditional Owners, come under the Indenture Area. Responsible, accountable governments and corporations should have no need for secrecy, and in a project the scale of Roxby Downs, there is too much at stake to maintain it.

Environmental Protection

At 2006 levels of operation, the Roxby Downs/Olympic Dam uranium mine is licensed to take 40 million litres of water a day from the Great Artesian Basin (GAB). The GAB is a vast and ancient body of water that lies deep under the surface of central Australia. It begins in far north Queensland and is a source of water for many pastoral properties and habitats, including the fragile and unique mound springs in South Australia’s arid north. Currently BHP Billiton extracts 33 million litres a day from the GAB and farmers, environmentalists and traditional owners have reported dramatic reductions in water pressure threatening and sometimes extinguishing rare ecosystems. Under the Indenture Act, BHP Billiton is not required to pay for this water.

The radioactive waste tailings dam at Olympic Dam amounts to 60 million tonnes and is growing at 10 million tonnes annually. The tailings dam has been plagued by spills – most significantly in 1994, when the mine operators admitted some five million cubic litres had leaked from the dams over two years. Environmental audits provided to the Rann Government continue to emphasise that the mine tailings are inadequately managed and “an issue of real concern” requiring “the implementation of urgent remedial measures”. BHP Billiton has no long-term plans for the management of these tailings, which because of their radioactivity may remain dangerous for thousands of years. When all valuable resources have been extracted BHP Billiton simply plans to ‘cap’ the tailings dump with soil.

Additionally, Olympic Dam consumes more electricity than any other body in the State, ten percent of the state’s production, effectively making it SA’s single biggest producer of greenhouse gas. This impact will only increase with the mine’s projected expansion.

The Indenture Act provides an override to the Environmental Protection Act 1993 (EPA) and the powers and functions contained within. The EPA was enacted to provide for the protection of the environment and the establishment of an Environmental Protection Authority to monitor and enforce compliance with the Act. The key objective of this legislation is the avoidance of ‘environmental harm’, a term that is defined in the legislation to mean any harm or potential harm to the environment, of whatever degree or duration. Potential harm includes risk of harm and future harm.

The legislation imposes different penalties for offences causing environmental harm. The most heavily penalised offence is the offence of causing serious environmental harm by polluting the environment intentionally or recklessly and with knowledge that serious environmental harm will or might result. A lower penalty is imposed where a person, by polluting the environment, causes serious environmental harm.

The Environmental Protection Authority is charged with enforcing these provisions. The Authority has the power to:
· Serve notices on people violating the EPA and order them to comply.
· Place conditions on licences and other environmental approvals.
· Impose or vary a condition of an environmental authorisation.
· Demand financial assurance to be made where there is a high risk that operation will result in environmental harm. This money is used to counteract resulting environmental or community damage.
· Require an organization to prepare a plan of action in the event of emergencies that might arise out of the operation.

These provisions are South Australia’s most important and strongest environmental safeguards and they are absent from BHP Billitons Olympic Dam operation. In fact, under the Indenture, Primary Industries and Resources South Australia (PIRSA), is responsible for overseeing the project’s environmental standards. As a government body dedicated to promoting mining, PIRSA has a clear conflict of interest in this role. Friends of the Earth Campaigner Sophie Green notes:
“Whether you support the mining operations at Olympic Dam or not commonsense dictates that where a massive project is being undertaken which has the potential (and indeed likelihood) of damaging vast portions of the environment, our strongest environmental safeguards should apply. We are only asking that BHP Billiton be held to the same standard as every other corporation in Australia.”

In reviewing the conditions surrounding the massive 1994 leak, Dr. Gavin Mudd emphasises that the Indenture Act essentially prevents the mine from environmental responsibility and “until the [Indenture] Act is revoked entirely there can be no truly independent, external environmental assessment of the impacts of Olympic Dam”.

Legal accountability and guarantees of BHP Billiton’s environmental performance are crucial, particularly in light of the proposed expansion of the Olympic Dam mine into the largest open cut mine in the world. The scale of this operation and the associated risks threaten damage to the environment on a scale we have not yet seen. Ms Green notes,
Our Government is playing a dangerous balancing game with promises on one hand and contrary legislative action on the other. Actions speak louder than words and its time we demanded more from our representatives.

References:
1 Noonan, D 2006, personal communication, 30 March 2006
2 Government of South Australia, ‘Citizens Right to Information’, accessed 1 May 2006.
3 Catchlove, J 2006, personal communication, 7 April 2006.
4 Catchlove, J 2006, personal communication, 7 April 2006.
5 Bachmann, H 2002, ‘Reporting Independent Review of Reporting Procedures for the SA Uranium Mining Industry, August 2002, p. 1
6 Wiese Bockmann, M 2006, ‘Waste fears at uranium mine’, The Australian, 10 March 2006, p. 7
7 Green, S 2006, personal communication, 7 April 2006.
8 Mudd, G 1997, ‘SA Parliamentary Inquiry into the Tailings System Leakage’, Sea-US, accessed 11 May 2006, <http://www.sea-us.org.au/roxby/sa-inquiry.html>

Greens (SA) Amendment Bill

The Greens’ Bill to repeal the legal privileges was rejected by Liberal and Labor parties.

Legislative Council

GREENS BILL: Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Application of Acts) Amendment Bill
June 6th, 2007
http://www.markparnell.org.au/speech.php?speech=173

On the 6th of June, Mark Parnell introduced and spoke about his Greens Private Members bill, for an act to amend the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982

The Hon. M. PARNELL: The Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 was created to fast-track and protect the establishment and operation of the Olympic Dam copper and uranium mine, which was then owned by a joint venture comprising BP and Western Mining Corporation (which later became WMC Resources Ltd). In 2005 BHP Billiton acquired WMC Resources Ltd and the benefits of this act passed to that company.

The bill I have introduced deals with a small but important aspect of the indenture legislation, that is, the parts of the act that provide that this indenture act takes precedence over other laws of South Australia. Section 7 of the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act provides:

“The law of the state is so far modified as is necessary to give full effect to the indenture and the provisions of any law of the state shall accordingly be construed subject to the modifications that take effect under this act.”

The Act, having created that general precedence over other state law, then goes on to list a large number of public statutes that are to be construed subject to the provisions of the indenture. These include the Commercial Arbitration Act, the Crown Lands Act, the Development Act, the Electricity Corporations Act, the Environment Protection Act, the Harbors and Navigation Act (although, given the location of the Roxby Downs mine, one wonders where this act might fit in; nevertheless, it is subject to this indenture), the Mining Act, the Petroleum Act, and it goes on, finishing with the Water Resources Act. These acts of state parliament are secondary to the provisions of the indenture; the Indenture Act prevails.

The purpose of this bill is basically to say that enough is enough when it comes to exemptions from state law. The deal to get the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act through and get the mine up was made in the 1980s. It is 25 years ago now that this bill went through and standards of law, especially environment protection provisions, have advanced greatly in that time. The special exemptions that helped get the Roxby Downs mines up and running are simply no longer relevant or appropriate in the 21st century. In short, the world’s biggest miner does not need a free kick from the South Australian government or from this parliament. There is absolutely no reason for the mine operators to be granted special favours that give them a potential commercial gain over other miners and other developers.

It will come as no surprise to honourable members to know that my view that indenture laws are bad law applies to this legislation, as it did to the Whyalla legislation passed before I got here. The issue is one of levelling the playing field, of equity, so that corporate players in South Australia are all bound by the same rules and that we do not have special rules for some players over others. What I need to make abundantly clear is that this legislation is not about repealing the indenture act or about closing the Roxby Downs mine: it purely seeks to remove the special exemptions from state law that apply pursuant to this Indenture Act.

The uranium industry has also been calling for a level playing field and, as members might recall, one of the key recommendations of the Uranium Industry Framework Steering Group, which was released in 2006 by commonwealth industry minister Ian Macfarlane, was:

“The Australian government and state and territory governments [to] work cooperatively to ensure that, where possible, environmental and other regulatory arrangements across jurisdictions are harmonised.”

They are important words. Harmonisation means a level playing field, that the law applies equally to all players. The framework document goes on as follows:

“. . . coherent and consistent policy framework reflecting the respective policy objectives, roles and responsibilities of the Australian government and state and territory governments in relation to the regulation of the uranium industry.”

So in a way, my bill puts into effect what the uranium industry itself is calling for — harmonisation and uniform standards to apply to all.

I point out that one piece of legislation which does not apply to Roxby but which would apply to any other miner in South Australia is the Aboriginal Heritage Act. This is the primary piece of legislation in this state to protect our indigenous cultural heritage. However, the indenture act places BHP Billiton in a legal position so that it can choose which Aboriginal groups it acknowledges and consults with, what form that consultation takes, which Aboriginal heritage sites it recognises, and what degree of protection to offer to those sites.

In response to media interest in this bill, Richard Yeeles from BHP Billiton said yesterday in a statement that he released to ABC radio:

“Olympic Dam complies in all respects with Aboriginal heritage legislation — in fact, in making its relationships with Aboriginal groups and protecting Aboriginal heritage, Olympic Dam does much more than the Aboriginal heritage legislation requires.”

My response to that is to thank Richard Yeeles, because that is exactly my point, that is, the indenture act is an anachronism. If we do not need these special privileges, let us get rid of them. It should not be up to BHP Billiton to determine which laws it complies with in this state and to what extent it complies with them. So, I am as one with Richard Yeeles. If he is saying that BHP Billiton is already complying with the law, let us remove the exemption from the indenture legislation.

The Environment Protection Act is another act of this parliament that is part of the exemption in the indenture act. Some aspects of the mine’s operation are monitored by the EPA, but one environmental aspect that is outside that is water resources. The water resources laws now contained in the Natural Resources Management Act do not apply to the Roxby Downs mine. As members would know, because it has been mentioned in this place many times, whilst irrigators and householders are suffering water restrictions, BHP Billiton’s arrangements provide that it gets its water for free and there is no risk to the quantities it can take. That is directly against the national water initiative which says that, when we need to reduce allocations, we need to share the pain of those cuts around. This particular corporate operation does not need to share any of the pain of water cuts to which irrigators and householders are subject.

One question honourable members might be asking themselves is: why bother with amending this indenture act now? Clearly, if and when the expanded open-cut mine is given approval, we will need to rewrite the laws anyway because, clearly, the current indenture act does not apply to a big open-cut mine. The current indenture act applies to a mine with a production of 350 000 tonnes of copper per year, and it is limited to the current method of operation, which basically means that it is underground mining. The Olympic Dam mine currently produces some 235 000 tonnes of copper, and the expansion is projected to increase its output to 500 000 tonnes — and possibly up to one million tonnes — and that will be through an open cut, which will necessitate a review and updating of the act to apply to the mine’s changed circumstances. However, I think it is important that we consider now the appropriateness of an approach that exempts a corporate player from complying with the laws of this state. If the Roxby extension goes ahead, we can reflect the decision we make now in any new arrangements that are put in place.

I do not propose to go into a lot of detail about the explanation of the clauses of the bill. It is a very simple bill. There are two main operative sections, the first of which amends section 7 —modification of state law. The key elements of my bill are that five named acts are removed from the power of that exemption. So, two Aboriginal heritage acts, the Development Act, the Environment Protection Act and the Natural Resources Management Act will apply to the Roxby Downs mine.

In addition to section 7, the bill also provides that the secrecy provisions contained in section 35 of the indenture do not apply in relation to freedom of information applications. I think that is important because the Freedom of Information Act is the standard the law of this state applies to disclosure of information, and it is unfair for secrecy provisions to override that public law. That is not to say that, by making section 35 of the indenture subject to the Freedom of Information Act, it will be open slather; it will not be. The protections in the Freedom of Information Act in relation to commercially confidential material, for example, would continue to apply. However, the message it sends is that the documents BHP Billiton provides to government are equally able to be disclosed under freedom of information as those of any other mining company.

The second main operative provision of the bill is clause 5, which repeals section 9 of the act, which modifies the Aboriginal heritage legislation as it applies to this project. So, again, it levels the playing field and it says that this mine is subject to the Aboriginal heritage legislation in the same way as any other miner would be. In summary, I think most members of the South Australian community would be very surprised to discover that a 25 year old piece of legislation that allows the biggest development in South Australia to follow the least amount of rules is still in place.

It seems very clear to me that there is no financial argument at all for a need for these exemptions. There is no need for BHP Billiton to be given special treatment. This is one of the world’s richest companies. It announced, as I recall, a half year profit of some $8 billion. I do not believe that we do need to tread on eggshells when we are negotiating with large manufacturing corporations such as BHP Billiton. There is no question at all that, in its view, it is here for the long haul, and there is no risk of its taking its bat and ball and going somewhere else because it is being made to comply with the general laws of South Australia. With those comments, I commend the bill to the council.

Summary + articles re Olympic Dam mine expansion

Update: 2012 to 2018 – The planned open-pit mega-expansion was abandoned in mid-2012 – but other, more modest expansion plans are being progressed and explored.

2011 – The SA Greens and FoE Adelaide have been doing great work drawing attention to the many problems with the planned expansion of the Olympic Dam uranium/copper mine. Sadly, the expansion has been approved and critics (especially the SA Greens) have been subjected to a disgraceful smear campaign by the SA Labor government and the Murdoch press for raising questions about the expansion and the enabling legislation – the Roxby Downs Indenture Act. They have been accused of holding the state’s economy to ransom for raising legitimate questions and proposing amendments to the Indenture Act. The SA Liberal Party has acknowledged that every aspect of the Indenture Act favours BHP Billiton at the expense of South Australians – yet the Liberals did not propose or support amendments. Unfortunately the legislation passed through the SA Parliament in November 2011.

Dark day as state laws trashed in Roxby riches rush

http://markparnell.org.au/mr.php?mr=854

29 November 2011

The Parliamentary debate over the Roxby expansion Indenture Bill has confirmed that the State Government has delivered a bad deal for South Australia, says Greens Parliamentary Leader Mark Parnell.

“This is a dark day for our State’s democracy. The Government has locked in for the next 70 years the right of the world’s richest resource company to over-ride all relevant State laws,” said Mr Parnell.

“The hours of debate in Parliament has shown that in the rush to get this deal signed before ex-Premier Rann departed, the State Government has given too much away for too little in return.

“The environmental costs are going to be much higher, and the economic return will be much lower than the SA public rightly expect.

“Parliament has exposed the yawning gap between the Government’s hyperbolic spin over the Roxby riches and the dark reality of this terrible deal.

“Future generations are going to be disgusted with us for giving their resources away for a pittance and leaving them to deal with the enormous toxic legacy of managing the world’s largest radioactive waste dump,” he said.

The Greens put forward a package of amendments that would have positively transformed the Indenture contract.

The controversial Bill has now passed both houses of State Parliament, with only the Greens voting against it.

What the debate exposed:

• The local jobs, manufacturing and local procurement Plan will contain ‘aspirational’ targets only. Not one extra job is guaranteed.

• The ‘net’ economic return to state coffers in years 10-20 of the project could be as low as $10 million / year – and that’s even before millions are given back to BHPB through Federal subsidies like the diesel fuel rebate.

• No explanation for locking in royalty rates at a low rate for 45 years – apart from that is what BHP wanted.

• The Government did not do any comparative economic analysis with similar projects interstate and overseas to see if we were getting a good economic deal.

• There is nothing the Government can do to make BHPB expand their domestic processing up to an additional 200,000 tonnes of ore (as has been promised by the Premier and others). In fact, there is nothing to stop BHP exporting all ore from Roxby Downs to China (including the ore that is currently processed here).

• Govt has relied entirely on BHPB’s figures for the cost of processing in SA rather than exporting South Australian copper ore to China.

• BHPB can continue to extract fossil water from the Great Artesian Basin until 2082, with costs capped for the next 30 years.

• Third parties won’t have any right to access the railways, roads, ports and airports being constructed for the expansion.

• No cumulative impacts of this expansion (beyond the artificial EIS timeframe of 40 years) have been considered.

• The Government doesn’t know what impact the ODX will have on the State’s greenhouse pollution reduction targets.

• The toxic tailings waste dams have been deliberately designed to leak.

• The final operating conditions to protect the marine environment at Point Lowly will not be known for years and will be negotiated in secret.

Letter published in The Advertiser

To mention just one of the indefensible aspects of the Roxby Downs Indenture Act, the legislation retains the exemptions from the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988. Traditional Owners were not even consulted. The government’s spokesperson in Parliament said: “BHP were satisfied with the current arrangements and insisted on the continuation of these arrangements, and the government did not consult further than that.”

Recently it has been revealed that the ‘clean up’ of the Maralinga atomic test site was flawed and will most likely need to be revisited. We shouldn’t be surprised – in 2002 nuclear engineer Alan Parkinson warned that “What was done at Maralinga was a cheap and nasty solution that wouldn’t be adopted on white-fellas land.”

In 1999, SA police pepper-sprayed an 11-year old Adnyamathanha girl at the Beverley uranium mine, and an Adnyamathanha man was evicted from a public forum for suggesting that the meeting be chaired by a Traditional Owner rather than a Liberal MP.

Clearly there is a pattern. It should be enshrined on SA number plates: ‘SA: The Racist State’.

WHAT THE GREENS WANT TO KNOW

http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/greens-mark-parnell-to-fight-for-a-better-deal-on-olympic-dam/story-e6frea6u-1226189079542

November 9, 2011

SA Greens MLC Mark Parnell will put forwared 100 amendments to the Olympic Dam indenture Bill. Greens MLC Mark Parnell said his minority party was “not going to be cut short and stopped from asking the questions that need to be asked”, despite bipartisan support from Labor and the Liberals.

1. ROYALITIES

Why did the Government lock in a royalty regime for 45 years, and why is it based exclusively on old-style production-based royalties, rather than one that captures a fair share of mining profits?

2. ECONOMIC RETURN

How good an economic deal did SA receive when BHP CEO Marius Kloppers is claiming to his shareholders that the Olympic Dam Expansion will be low cost and highly profitable?

3. PROCESSING IN SA RATHER THAN CHINA

How many South Australian jobs will be lost by not requiring BHP to process our ore here in South Australia rather than exporting it to China?

4. EXEMPTION FROM SA LAWS

Why is BHP exempt from over 20 South Australian laws that every other mining company in SA has to comply with?

5. NO URANIUM OPTION

Why wasnt a No Uranium Roxby Expansion considered when we know it is not only technically feasible, it would also mean less water and energy use and more jobs as the processing would be done here in SA, rather than in China?

6. GREAT ARTESIAN BASIN

Why isn’t there a plan to wean BHP off using 42ML/day of ancient water from the Great Artesian Basin, when they plan double that volume in excess capacity (80ML/day) from their desalination plant?

7. DESALINATION PLANT & CUTTLEFISH RISK

Why is the Government prepared to risk the breeding grounds of the Giant Australian Cuttlefish by not requiring the company to build in a different location?

8. RADIOACTIVE LEAKAGE FROM TAILINGS DAM

How can the Government claim that they have met their public commitment for the expansion to meet worlds best environmental practice when only 4 per cent of the tailings dams will be lined and the dams are designed to leak up to 8 million litres of toxic radioactive waste liquid/day?

9. RESPONSIBILITY POST MINE CLOSURE

Who will ultimately be responsible to manage the open pit, tailings dams and rock waste pile for the 10,000 years after the operations cease that the radioactive risk remains: the company or SA taxpayers, and how much will that management cost?

10. GREENHOUSE POLLUTION & RENEWABLE ENERGY

Why isn’t the company committing to any investment in cleaner energy to meet their whopping 650 MW electricity demand beyond the 57MW commitment for powering the desal plant (less than 10 per cent of total demand) to reduce their enormous increase in the states greenhouse pollution of 12-15 per cent?

A case of Olympian incompetence by South Australia

By Paul Cleary, The Australian, October 21, 2011

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/a-case-of-olympian-incompetence-by-south-australia/story-e6frg9if-1226172260137?mid=523

THE royalty agreement negotiated by South Australia for BHP Billiton’s Olympic Dam expansion has robbed the state’s citizens and all Australians of the opportunity to share in the profits of what will become the world’s biggest mine.

This deal is a monumental example of state government incompetence when it comes to acting as custodian of the nation’s mineral wealth.

South Australia has agreed to a regime based solely on percentages and even cents per tonne of the mine’s production. Mike Rann, who stands down today as Premier, has done South Australians a disservice that will cost them dearly for almost half a century.

Rann and his administration should know full well that these royalties fail to capture a fair share of mining profits. This has been in the economic literature since the 1970s and was made more prominent by the Henry review. Yet the deal does not contain a single element of profits-based taxation.

The case for such measures is all the more compelling given that the mineral resources rent tax will not tax the millions of tonnes of copper, uranium, silver and gold the mine will be produce under the 45-year agreement, because the MRRT only applies to coal and iron ore.

Given that this is an agreement negotiated in the 21st century, it beggars belief the state could have agreed to a regime based exclusively on production-based royalties that hark back to medieval times.

But none of these ideas penetrated the thinking of the South Australian government when it negotiated its 45-year agreement for BHP’s $30 billion expansion.

The three-tier regime involves 3.5 per cent for refined mineral products, meaning copper and gold, and 5 per cent for uranium oxide and uranium-bearing copper concentrates.

There’s also 35c per tonne on extractive minerals sold to a third party, but this is not even indexed for inflation, so its value will diminish over the life of the agreement.

When asked to explain how the government could have agreed to a non-indexed royalty, a spokesman said it was a trade-off in negotiations because BHP had asked for the expansion to gain concessional royalty rates for new mines. Well, that issue should not have even been on the table, because Olympic Dam is an existing mine.

The spokesman declined to say why a profits-based regime had not been considered.

This agreement will unfortunately stand as a sad and enduring indictment of the weakness of our state governments when it comes to negotiating with powerful mining multinationals.

The power of BHP was abundantly evident when it signed the agreement with the South Australian government on its home turf in Melbourne, rather than in Adelaide, and then declared that its board had already pre-committed $1.2bn in investment ahead of approval by the state and federal parliaments.

Given the environmental legacy of this mine, including above-ground storage of radioactive tailings and risks to water resources, a profits-based royalty could have been paid directly into a sovereign wealth fund. This fund could be used to compensate future generations who will most certainly have to live with greatly depleted mineral resources, and the environmental consequences of this mammoth venture.

These risks were glossed over by Environment Minister Tony Burke when he approved it under federal law. Burke’s description of the project is even more euphemistic than what is found in BHP’s environmental impact statement.

At no point in his media statement did Burke use the word radioactive. At least BHP’s EIS admits that its tailings heap will be.

Even glossier was Burke’s acceptance of the claim that seepage from the radioactive tailings storage facility would be “neutralised” 4m below the surface by limestone that is 60m deep. None of Burke’s three media advisers responded to questions last week.

BHP is less certain than Burke. Its draft EIS says the mine’s impact on groundwater would “depend” on various unknown factors, such as the “interaction of seepage with the sediments beneath the respective facilities”.

The EIS says that up to 8.2 million litres would seep from the TCF into groundwater each day in the first 10 years of operations, before falling to about 3.2 million litres a day.

Gavin Mudd, a senior lecturer in Monash University’s school of engineering, says BHP “got the lowest cost option on every front”, especially for above-ground storage of radioactive tailings. This is contrary to the practice employed with the Ranger uranium mine.

Mudd says the uncertainty flagged by BHP relates to the way water seeps into limestone creates caves; an imperfect mixing of water into the sediment could cause channels to open up, allowing massive volumes of water to flow into Lake Torrens, less than 100km from the mine.

“You will get these channels opening up — it is the nature of limestone. They have always underestimated seepage. Despite their claims, they still don’t understand as well as they need to to justify their claims,” he says.

The BHP spokeswoman, however, says that the company has been operating tailings storage since 1989, giving it “a long and deep understanding of how they work”.

Mudd, however, points to a 1991 incident in which the mine lost 3 million litres of water in three hours.

BHP argues that its field investigations and modelling have been “peer reviewed and assessed by state and federal government experts”.

Mudd says the process is flawed because the government is “very reliant on data that comes from the company”.

For a project of this nature and magnitude, with inherent risks for future generations, taking out insurance in the form of a future fund is clearly warranted.

But this won’t happen with the royalties agreed to by the myopic state government.

Olympic Dam – summary of the problems with the mine

Updated May 2009 following the release of the Draft EIS for the proposed mine expansion.

2012 update: the planned mega-expansion, discussed below, was cancelled in 2012

THE MINE EXPANSION

On May 1, 2009, BHP Billiton released a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) promoting its plans to turn the Olympic Dam (Roxby Downs) mine in South Australia into the largest uranium mine in the world.

The Olympic Dam uranium deposit is by far the largest on earth. Although the uranium is low-grade, the volume is staggering, amounting to about 2.4 million tonnes (and counting) − 30% of the world’s known conventional uranium reserves. That’s enough uranium to fuel the world’s fleet of 430 power reactors for 40 years.

The mine has been operating since the late 1980s using underground mining. BHP Billiton plans to supplement underground mining with open-cut mining − it plans to make Olympic Dam the largest open-cut mine in the world by digging a pit of about 14.4 cubic kms (4.1×3.5×1 kms). Export of uranium is expected to increase from an average of 4,500 tonnes per year to 19,000 tonnes per year. Copper production is expected to increase from 180,000 tonnes per year to 750,000 tonnes per year, and production of gold and silver is also expected to increase.

The plan would lock Australia in as the world’s uranium quarry and fuel unresolved nuclear waste management problems and unacceptable WMD proliferation risks.

BHP Billiton expects government approval in mid-2010 and will then make final decisions on the scope and timing of the expansion project. A company representative said on the day the EIS was released: “We still have a lot of work to do before we can tell you when this project may start and how much it may cost.”

At the mine site (most information from the Draft EIS):

* The quantity of ore to be processed would increase from 12 million tonnes annually to 72 million tonnes.

* The existing smelter would be expanded and new concentrator and hydrometallurgical plants would be built to process the additional ore, and generate additional concentrate for transport.

* It would take about five years of mining to remove the layer of overburden and expose the first section of the ore body. During this time, about 410 million tonnes per annum of material would be removed from the open pit. Over 40 years, the footprint of the pit would grow to be 14.4 sq kms. The overburden would be used for a ‘Rock Storage Facility’.

* On-site production of refined copper would increase to 350,000 tonnes annually (about twice the current output).

* About 1.6 million tonnes of concentrate would be exported to China annually for further processing, yielding about 400,000 tonnes of refined copper along with several thousand tonnes of uranium and some gold and silver.

New or upgraded infrastructure to support the mine would include (most information from the Draft EIS):

* A 280 megalitre per day (ML/d) coastal desalination plant at Point Lowly on the Upper Spencer Gulf (to supply 200 ML/d of additional water via a 320 km pipeline connection to Olympic Dam and with the potential to supply 80 ML/d elsewhere).

* Either a new 270 km electricity transmission line from Port Augusta to Olympic Dam, and/or a gas pipeline from Moomba and a new gas-fired power station at Olympic Dam.

* A 105 km rail line to connect Olympic Dam to the national rail network near Pimba.

* A new airport to replace the existing airport at Olympic Dam.

* A landing facility on the Upper Spencer Gulf to unload equipment from barges, and an access corridor to a pre-assembly yard on the north-western outskirts of Port Augusta.

* Additional port facilities in SA at Outer Harbor and in the Northern Territory at the Port of Darwin to import supplies and export product

* A new accommodation village for workers.

* Expansion of the Roxby Downs township.

Waste and Weapons

Uranium production at Olympic Dam is expected to increase to 19,000 tonnes per year, sufficient to fuel 95 power reactors which will produce 2,850 tonnes of high-level nuclear waste per year (in the form of spent nuclear fuel). That amount of spent fuel contains 28.5 tonnes of plutonium − enough for 2,850 nuclear weapons each year. Over the lifespan of the mine, it could be responsible for the production of enough plutonium for over 340,000 nuclear weapons. If 99.9% of that plutonium is adequately safeguarded, the remaining 0.1% would suffice to build 340 plutonium bombs similar to the one that destroyed Nagasaki in 1945.

This is all the more troubling given the flaws and limitations of the international nuclear ‘safeguards’ system. A BHP Billiton EIS ‘infosheet’ states that safeguards arrangements “ensure that Australian uranium is used exclusively for peaceful purposes” and is “accounted for in full”. In fact, safeguards fall far short of “ensuring” peaceful use of uranium exports and Australia’s uranium exports are not fully accounted for – there are routine accounting discrepancies (known as Material Unaccounted For). International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei has acknowledged that the IAEA’s rights of inspection are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system is subject to “vulnerabilities” and “clearly needs reinforcement”, that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted” and it operates on a “shoestring budget … comparable to a local police department.” (More information on safeguards <www.nuclear.foe.org.au/safeguards>.)

BHP Billiton sells uranium to nuclear weapons states, states refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, states blocking progress on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, states with a history of secret nuclear weapons research, and states stockpiling ‘civil’ plutonium.

A new low was set in 2006 when the federal government, with BHP Billiton’s support, negotiated a uranium export agreement with the secretive, repressive, militaristic, undemocratic regime in China. The Olympic Dam expansion is heavily dependent on the export of concentrate to China, leaving over one million tonnes of long-lived radioactive wastes each year for China to manage into the future. BHP Billiton intends to transport this radioactive concentrate by train through central Australia and out through the Port of Darwin. Communities and environments will be placed at risk by these hazardous bulk cargoes from Alice Springs to Darwin and across China − and none of these communities will be given a right to refuse these risks.

Dean Dalla Valle, head of BHP Billiton’s uranium division, said on May 1: “Exporting uranium to new customers like China will be an integral part of creating value from the Olympic Dam ore body. We can do this with confidence because China is subject to the same strict safeguards arrangements as all of our other customers.”

However, China is not subject to the same safeguards arrangements as all other customers. As one of the ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states, China’s safeguards are voluntary. Assoc. Prof. Tilman Ruff noted in a 2007 paper that of the 44 proliferation-sensitive nuclear facilities in China, only 10 facilities were eligible for IAEA safeguards, only three had actually been inspected, and only one had a full suite of IAEA safeguards arrangements in place (Briefing Paper #19 at <www.energyscience.org.au>).

Australia should not sell uranium to any nuclear weapon state and must not turn a blind eye to their failure to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or to Russia’s illegal threat to use nuclear weapons against Poland in 2008 over US missile defence plans, or to China’s continuing practice of cultural genocide in Tibet and other human rights violations. An October 2008 Newspoll found that two-thirds of Australians oppose uranium exports to countries with nuclear weapons (73% of women and 51% of men).

The Draft EIS predicts global uranium mine production to double to about 92,000 tonnes of uranium oxide annually by 2030. The estimate is very optimistic. For a more realistic appraisal of the trajectory of nuclear power, see Schneider’s analysis in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:

Radioactive Tailings

Under the mine expansion plan, the production of radioactive tailings, stored above ground, will increase six-fold to 58 million tonnes annually. The current tailings stockpile amounts to 100 million tonnes. BHP Billiton plans up to nine tailings dams in addition to the four that currently receive approximately 10 million tonnes of tailings annually, with their height increasing from the current 30m to 65m. The existing operation consists of 400 ha of tailings dams and 133 ha of evaporation ponds.

The tailings contain a toxic, acidic soup of radionuclides and heavy metals. There have been numerous spills and leaks – most significantly in 1994, when it was revealed that about three billion litres had seeped from the tailings dams over two years.

Mining consultants Advanced Geomechanics noted in a 2004 report that radioactive slurry was deposited “partially off” a lined area of a storage pond at Olympic Dam, contributing to greater seepage and rising ground water levels; that there is no agreed, accurate formula to determine the rate of evaporation of tailings and how much leaks into the ground; and that cells within a tailings pond covered an area more than three times greater than recommended, requiring “urgent remedial measures”.

The problems have not been resolved. Photos taken by an Olympic Dam mine worker in December 2008 show radioactive tailings liquid leaking from the rock ‘armoury’ of the tailings ‘retention’ system. The leaks were ongoing for at least eight months and probably amounted to several million litres, but were not publicly reported by BHP Billiton or the SA government. BHP Billiton said that mine workers taking and releasing photos of the mine would be subject to “disciplinary action”.

Managing the current tailings stockpile is challenging enough and there is every reason to be concerned about BHP Billiton’s capacity to manage a six-fold increase.

Large numbers of bird deaths have been recorded in the vicinity of the evaporation ponds − over 100 deaths in one four-day period in 2004. BHP Billiton says “several measures used to deter fauna from visiting the Tailings Storage Facility over the past decade have met with varying degrees of success, but none have resolved the issue.”

BHP Billiton likes euphemisms. ‘Tailings retention facilities’ retain some but not all tailings. The tailings dams have a ‘rock armoury’ – which leaks. Tailings dams are ‘storage facilities’ – as if to suggest that BHP Billiton has some plan for the waste other than leaving it where it is in perpetuity. BHP Billiton’s plans for Olympic Dam compare unfavourably with the Ranger uranium mine in the NT, where tailings are required to be returned to the pit at the end of the mine’s life and steps taken to ensure the tailings do not have a detrimental impact on the environment for at least 10,000 years.

(BHP to ‘dump mine tailings on ground’, Gavin Lower, May 01, 2009, The Australian, <www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25411908-5013404,00.html>)

Nuclear power advocates like to compare the relatively small volume of waste produced by nuclear plants to the huge volume of waste produced by coal plants. However, to produce enough uranium to operate just one power reactor for just one year, Olympic Dam will produce 611,000 tonnes of radioactive tailings waste (58MT/95).

The Draft EIS states: “An estimated 12 cubic metres of low-level radioactive waste is produced at Olympic Dam annually in the form of personal protective equipment, laboratory equipment, and geological and processing sample wastes generated following analysis for radionuclides, but is not returned to the processing circuit. This would increase to 48 cubic metres annually on completion of the expanded project. After a review of disposal options and government approval in 2006, low-level radioactive waste has been packaged and disposed of within the TSF [Tailings Storage Facility]. Inventories of the waste and its disposal locations are recorded so that it can be managed in the event of future disturbance if the tailings were to be reprocessed. This disposal practice would continue for the expanded project.”

Water Consumption

BHP Billiton proposes an increase in water consumption from 37 million litres daily (from the Great Artesian Basin) to over 250 million litres daily (up to 42 million litres from the Great Artesian Basin, plus 200 million litres or more from a proposed desalination plant).

That total of 250 million litres equates to over 170,000 litres per minute … every minute of every day in the driest state in the driest inhabited continent.

The water take from the Great Artesian Basin has had adverse impacts on precious Mound Springs − unique habitats which support rare and delicate micro flora and fauna, some species of which are unique to a particular Spring. While there is no current plan to increase the rate of water usage from the Great Artesian Basin, nor is there any intention to reduce it.

BHP Billiton’s Draft EIS says the company assessed and rejected the option of a third wellfield in the Great Artesian Basin: “The two existing wellfields supplying the current operation could not sustain the additional demand. It would have been necessary to establish a third wellfield much further into the GAB to ensure the GAB springs were protected. The resulting production of much warmer water would have been technically difficult and very expensive to cool to the required temperature and pipe to Olympic Dam.”

BHP Billiton pays nothing for its massive water take for the Olympic Dam mine despite recording a $17.7 billion profit in 2007-08. That arrangement is enshrined in the Roxby Downs Indenture Act 1982 − as anachronistic a piece of legislation as you’re ever likely to see. (BHP Billiton also has its hand out for more corporate welfare with an ask for around $120 million of public subsidies in the form of diesel fuel rebates over the four year open-pit construction period.)

In February 2007, then Prime Minister John Howard wrote to state Premiers seeking their agreement “to establish proper entitlements, metering, pricing and reporting arrangements for water extracted from the Great Artesian Basin.” Asked whether his proposed new arrangements would apply to Olympic Dam, Mr Howard said: “Everybody’s got to make a contribution to solving this problem.” But within days, he voiced support for BHP Billiton’s “right” to free water from the Artesian Basin. In other words, everyone except BHP Billiton has to make a contribution to solving this problem.

As The Advertiser noted in a November 2005 Editorial, it is “essential … to safeguard the artesian basin water supplies”. To that end, most users are subject to the Great Artesian Basin Management Plan. But BHP Billiton is a law unto itself − its Olympic Dam mine is not subject to the Management Plan and also enjoys exemptions from the SA Natural Resources Act 2004 and the Environment Protection Act 1993.

BHP Billiton has a bore-capping program which, the company claims, saves more water than the mine currently uses. But water extraction for the mine is localised and the adverse impacts are all too apparent to people who have monitored the Mound Springs over the past 20 years. Likewise, the company’s bore capping program is small comfort to pastoralists who suffer reduced water flow from the localised effects of water extraction for the mine.

The proposed desalination plant has raised concerns over its impacts on marine species and fishing industries – in particular from the discharge of brine. The Upper Spencer Gulf is a low flushing fragile marine environment unsuited to siting a desalination plant and BHP Billiton’s preferred site at Point Lowly is the breeding ground of the Charismatic Giant Australian Cuttle Fish.

David Noonan from the Australian Conservation Foundation said: “This is the worst possible place to build an internationally-sized desalination plant. The Gulf is shallow, low-flushing. It’s the breeding ground of the giant cuttlefish which is extremely sensitive to changes in salinity. The plant should be built on the ocean, not the gulf. We could build a reverse osmosis plant at Elliston on Eyre Peninsula’s west coast. Elliston has the ocean flushing that Pt Lowly lacks and enormous potential for year-round wind energy. Taxpayers are paying 20 per cent of the desalination plant’s capital cost and we should also have a big say on where it goes. It’s not good enough to leave it up to BHP.”

Adelaide University marine biologist Assoc. Prof. Bronwyn Gilanders says the sea around Whyalla is actually the world’s largest cuttlefish breeding zone, and that the plant could wipe them out: “Squids and Cuttlefish are generally short-lived. So they live a year; they breed only once. So if you damage the eggs or affect their reproductive ability then potentially that will have devastating consequences on the population.”

Electricity Demand

BHP Billiton expects the mine’s electricity consumption to increase over six-fold from 125 MW to 775 MW, to be sourced from some combination of supply from:

* the SA electricity grid (and the national electricity market) with a new electricity transmission line from Port Augusta.

* a proposed gas-fired on-site 600 MW plant with a pipe from Moomba.

* a proposed co-generation plant using industrial waste heat generated from the burning of sulphur to produce the sulphuric acid required for the new hydrometallurgical plant. This waste heat could be used to generate up to 250 MW.

The Draft EIS says a study is ongoing into the feasibility of a 150 MW concentrated solar thermal plant. Geothermal power is described as an “opportunity for the future”.

The proposed desalination plant would require 35 MW of electricity, which would be supplied by a new 25 km transmission line from the Cultana substation. The Draft EIS says the electricity would be supplied by renewable energy sourced from the National Electricity Market.

Mark Parnell from the SA Greens is advocating a 500 MW solar thermal plant for the mine:

“Large scale solar thermal is the ideal power solution for the expansion project. Solar thermal electricity is a different technology to solar photovoltaics (PVs). A PV system converts sunshine into electricity, whereas solar thermal converts sunshine to heat. This heat is then transferred to a fluid, which drives a turbine to generate electricity. A big advantage of solar thermal electricity is that the heat energy can be stored, potentially allowing electricity to be generated when the sun goes down.

“Solar thermal technology is available now, with 500MW plants currently planned for California and Nevada, where the technology has been road-tested for 20 years. Australia’s biggest engineering firm, WorleyParsons said last year it wants to build 34 large-scale solar thermal power stations in Australia by 2020. The Roxby expansion is the ideal project to kick-start this plan – the Olympic Dam mine needs huge amounts of power, in a spot that’s well away from the grid and bakes in the sun all year round.

“Investing in cutting edge renewable technology will provide a huge smart job boost for South Australia, placing our state at the centre of a new growth industry. The Rann Government must insist BHP Billiton’s enormous appetite for electricity is sated from the sun, not dirty fossil fuels. Otherwise, we’ll be left struggling with old technology and old thinking as the Roxby expansion sends our State’s greenhouse pollution levels sky high.”

Greenhouse Emissions

Greenhouse emissions from the mine (and associated infrastructure) are projected to increase from 900,000 tonnes annually to 4.7 million tonnes, making it all but impossible for South Australia to reach its legislated target of 13 million tonnes. A technical assessment by Monash University engineering lecturer Dr Gavin Mudd estimates emissions would reach 4.5 to 6.6 million tonnes annually — one-third to one-half of the target of 13 million tonnes. (The technical assessment is posted at https://nuclear.foe.org.au/olympic-dam-uranium-copper-mine)

BHP Billiton likes to promote uranium as a fuel for low-carbon nuclear power – but that argument only holds if the comparison is with fossil fuels. According to the 2006 Switkowski report, nuclear power is three times more greenhouse intensive than wind power. Moreover, BHP Billiton wants to take credit for the alleged greenhouse benefits of its uranium exports but not for the WMD proliferation risks or the high-level nuclear waste legacy. Nor does BHP Billiton take any responsibility for the greenhouse emissions arising from the use of its extensive fossil fuel exports.

Dr Mudd said: “South Australia has a legislated greenhouse target to reduce emissions by 60%, limiting total emissions to about 12 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually by 2050. Yet Olympic Dam alone will produce 4.5-6.6 million tonnes annually, making it virtually impossible for South Australia to meet its legislated target. BHP Billiton likes to take credit for its export of uranium to fuel low-carbon nuclear reactors, but that argument is flawed on two counts. Firstly, the end uses of energy exports are not counted in Australia’s greenhouse emissions, and if they were, BHP Billiton would also need to account for its extensive fossil fuel exports. Secondly, the argument rests on the arbitrary and implausible assumption that the only alternative to Olympic Dam uranium exports is to build coal fired power plants.”

Radioactive Racism

Racism in the uranium mining industry in Australia typically involves ignoring the concerns of Traditional Owners insofar as the legal and political circumstances permit; divide-and-rule tactics; bribery; humbugging Traditional Owners – exerting persistent, unwanted pressure until the mining company gets what it wants; providing Traditional Owners with false or misleading information; and threats, most commonly legal threats.

BHP Billiton claims that it consults with Traditional Owners such as the Kokatha and Arabunna. But consultation is hardly the word since the company is under no obligation to take the slightest bit of notice of their views. The mine operates under the Roxby Downs Indenture Act, which provides overrides and exemptions from the SA Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988. The latter is the key law aimed at protecting Indigenous heritage in South Australia. However, under the Indenture Act, BHP Billiton is in a legal position to determine what consultation occurs with Traditional Owners, who is consulted, and nature of any consultation. The company decides the level of protection that Aboriginal heritage sites receive and which sites are recognised. The company claims that it fully complies with Aboriginal heritage legislation even though it is not required to do so – if so, why is the company unwilling to relinquish the legal exemptions it enjoys?

It is ironic that BHP Billiton supports Reconciliation Australia’s ‘good governance’ program and has provided over $2 million to Reconciliation Australia, yet will not relinquish its exemptions from the Aboriginal Heritage Act. The company’s attitude appears to be ‘do as I say, not as I do’.

One particularly notorious incident in the history of the Olympic Dam mine concerned the laying of a water pipeline on the land of Arabunna Traditional Owners in the mid-1990s, when WMC Resources owned the mine. The dispute over the pipeline led to violence, terrorism, imprisonment, and the death of one person. Jan Whyte and Ila Marks summarised the controversy in the July 1996 edition of the Friends of the Earth magazine, Chain Reaction: “It appears that WMC has embarked on a course of side-stepping consultation with the Arabunna as the traditional custodians. It has also taken similar actions in regard to the Kokatha, the traditional custodians for the actual mine site. One method used by mining companies to side-step proper consultation processes is documented in North America and Canada as well as Australia. Mining companies incorporate small Aboriginal groups in areas under dispute and give them financial support. These groups are then regarded as the official representatives for that area and mining companies proceed to consult with them. Thus, it seems as if the companies are going through the correct legal processes whereas, in fact, they are ignoring parties who have legitimate interests.” (See the full article and also the ABC ‘Background Briefing’ transcript at <https://nuclear.foe.org.au/watered-down-negotiations-wmc-picks-both-sides/>.)

Of course, BHP Billiton cannot be held responsible for the actions of WMC Resources over a decade ago. But it seems that little has changed, including BHP Billiton’s refusal to relinquish the overrides and exemptions it enjoys from the Aboriginal Heritage Act.

The Roxby Downs Indenture Act

The proposed expansion of the mine ought to be subject to legislative and regulatory controls and standards at least as rigorous as those that apply to smaller projects. To apply considerably weaker standards is indefensible. Yet the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 provides BHP Billiton the legal authority to override important state legislation including the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988; Environmental Protection Act 1993; Freedom of Information Act 1991; Natural Resources Act 2004 (incorporating water management issues); Development Act 1993; and the Mining Act 1971.

An indication of the sweeping nature of the legal privileges is the statement in the Indenture Act that:

“(1) The law of the State is so far modified as is necessary to give full effect to the Indenture and the provisions of any law of the State shall accordingly be construed subject to the modifications that take effect under this Act.

(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), in the case of any inconsistency between the provisions of any Act or law and of the Indenture, the provisions of the Indenture shall prevail …”

The Indenture Act is currently the subject of secret negotiations between the SA government and BHP Billiton and is expected to be modified in the first half of 2010 to accommodate the mine expansion plans. The SA Labor government has refused to commit to repeal the legal privileges although they are clearly inconsistent with the government’s policy of applying the “strictest environmental standards” to uranium mining.

SA Premier Mike Rann said on the day of the release of the Draft EIS: “It [the mine expansion] has got massive benefits for South Australia but I will insist that world’s best practice in terms of environment is complied with.”

If Mr Rann was serious, he would immediately announce that the indefensible clauses in the Indenture Act will be promptly repealed.

Nor has there been any indication from BHP Billiton that it will relinquish the privileges although they are inconsistent with the company’s policy of meeting “internationally recognised standards”. Olympic Dam does not have to comply with South Australian standards let alone international standards. BHP Billiton Chairman Don Argus said in November 2006 that “we will apply the highest standards … we are acting within the law.” However, Olympic Dam does not operate within the law that applies everywhere else in SA.

Under confidentiality clause 35 of the Indenture Act, BHP Billiton has veto power over public release of information relating to activities undertaken within the 1.5 million hectares covered by the Indenture Act, and related matters such as government/company negotiations. Monash University environmental engineer Dr Gavin Mudd notes that: “until the Indenture Act is revoked entirely there can be no truly independent, external environmental assessment of the impacts of Olympic Dam.”

The Draft EIS (ch.6) says that the Indenture Act “ensures the continuation … of a safe and environmentally acceptable operation”. It does nothing of the sort.

More information

Friends of the Earth https://nuclear.foe.org.au/olympic-dam-uranium-copper-mine/

Dr Gavin Mudd’s articles on Mound Springs, Great Artesian Basin etc http://users.monash.edu.au/~gmudd

SA Greens MLC Mark Parnell http://sagreens.markparnell.org.au/

Waste fears at uranium mine

Michelle Wiese Bockmann, The Australian, 10 March 2006

THE Olympic Dam uranium mine needs urgent improvements in radioactive waste management and monitoring, according to audit reviews. As owner BHP Billiton seeks state and federal government approval for a four-fold, $5 billion expansion at Olympic Dam, concerns about the mine’s tailings storage facilities have been raised in the last two audit reviews provided to the Rann Government.
The reviews, obtained by The Australian under Freedom of Information laws, call on government regulators to “encourage” changes to the deposit of tailings, a radioactive slurry that is a by-product of uranium mining production. More than 10 million tonnes of tailings a year are placed in ponds near the mine.
The review noted radioactive slurry was deposited “partially off” a lined area of a storage pond, which it believed contributed to greater seepage and rising ground water levels.
The review also criticises the lack of an agreed, accurate formula to determine the rate of evaporation of tailings and how much leaks into the ground.
Consultants Advanced Geomechanics conducted the reviews of the tailings storage facilities in 2002 and 2003 when the mine was owned by WMC Resources. In a September 2004 letter to state Department of Primary Industries and Resources, Advanced Geomechanics consultant Richard Jewell urged “strong representation to the operators on these issues to make the changes”.
In April last year, Mr Jewell noted cells within a tailings pond covered 70ha, more than three times greater than a key performance indicator recommended.
“This is an issue of real concern and requires the implementation of urgent remedial measures,” Mr Jewell warns in the letter. He agrees with the auditors’ general conclusion that the tailings facility was “well managed”.
The tailings dams were the subject of a 1996 parliamentary inquiry after previous owners Western Mining Corporation reported in 1994 that five million cubic litres had leaked from them over two years.
“They (the mine owners) have a continuing problem with managing radioactive tailings and a continuing problem with seepage of tailings,” said Australian Conservation Foundation official David Noonan.
Mr Noonan said the audit reviews showed the mine “had failed even the most basic monitoring practices”.
Mr Jewell yesterday confirmed the 2004 auditors had again raised the tailings problems. “But in general from my experience the management at Olympic Dam is as good as I’ve seen anywhere in the world,” he said.

Olympic Dam uranium / copper mine

Please note: Friends of the Earth previously understood that Kokatha people were the uncontested traditional owners of the Roxby Downs region and that view is reflected in some papers on this website. However we now understand traditional ownership is contested.

Note: the most up-to-date information on the Olympic Dam is the material written by David Noonan — please see this separate webpage: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/olympic-dam/

Vale Uncle Kevin Buzzacott, fierce advocate for his people and a nuclear free Australia

Information about proposed expansion of the Olympic Dam uranium/copper mine (first announced in 2019)

Proposed expansion abandoned in 2012: Information about the mine expansion approval process and the amended Roxby Downs Indenture Act

More information on the Roxby Downs Indenture Act

Lizards Revenge protest at Olympic Dam, July 2012

Dr Gavin Mudd’s report on the option of exporting copper, gold and silver but not uranium from Olympic Dam

Alternative Annuals Reports (PDF): 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012

Greenhouse emissions – Olympic Dam mine expansion (PDF) – technical paper by Dr Gavin Mudd, Monash University

Radiation leak plan 15 years out of date

WMC’s racism in the 1990s – Jan Whyte and Ila Marks look at how WMC’s activities divide Aboriginal people. Also: 1995 ABC Radio National Background Briefing story about the outbreak of violence in Marree and its connection to the Roxby Downs mine.

Detailed report on Mound Springs and the Roxby mine’s impacts on them (PDF) By Daniel Keane, 1997

Another report on Mound Springs and the Roxby mine’s impacts on them (PDF) By Gavin Mudd

Massive energy consumption and greenhouse emissions.

Bird deaths from the tailings dam

Accidents and incidents 2003-08 (PDF).

Roxby timeline + accidents 1987-2001

WISE Uranium: Issues at Operating Uranium Mines and Mills – Olympic Dam, Australia

SA Parliamentary Inquiry Into The Tailings System Leakage – In 1994, WMC reported that up to 5 million cubic metres of liquid had leaked from it’s Tailings Retention System at Olympic Dam. According to WMC the leak had been happening for at least 2 years but only became fully understood in January 1994.

Environmental Impacts Statement – submission by Friends of the Earth, Adelaide. August 2009 (PDF)

BHP’s operations overseas – undermining the future

BHP’s OLYMPIC DAM – SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCERNS

Olympic Dam is a state within a state; it operates under a unique set of laws enshrined in the amended Roxby Downs Indenture Act. That would be unobjectionable except that the Indenture Act allows Olympic Dam wide-ranging exemptions from environmental laws, water management laws, Aboriginal Heritage laws, and it curtails the application of the Freedom of Information Act.

In a scathing assessment of the Olympic Dam royalties regime enshrined in the Indenture Act, journalist Paul Clearly wrote in The Australian on 21 October 2011 that the regime “has robbed the state’s citizens and all Australians of the opportunity to share in the profits of what will become the world’s biggest mine.” He added that the agreement “will unfortunately stand as a sad and enduring indictment of the weakness of our state governments when it comes to negotiating with powerful mining multinationals.”

Olympic Dam is a state within a state − and it has shades of a Stalinist state. When a mine worker provided the media with photos of multiple leaks in the tailings dams in 2009, BHP’s response was to threaten “disciplinary action” against any workers caught taking photos. The SA government was conspicuously silent. Have the leaks of toxic tailings liquid been fixed? Who knows. It would be naive to believe anything BHP or the state government has to say on the subject.

In 2010, another worker was sufficiently concerned about occupational health issues at Olympic Dam that he leaked information to the media. The leaked documents show that BHP uses manipulated averages and distorted sampling to ensure its official figures of worker radiation exposure slip under the maximum exposure levels set by government. Are those claims true? Who knows. It would be naive to believe anything BHP or the state government has to say on the subject.

The risks will escalate with plans for a massive expansion of the mine. The BHP whistleblower said. “Assertions of safety of workers made by BHP are not credible because they rely on assumptions rather than, for example, blood sampling and, crucially, an assumption that all workers wear a respirator when exposed to highly radioactive polonium dust in the smelter.” [Update – the planned mega-expansion was cancelled in 2012 but expansion plans are still being pursued.]

So there we have a couple of examples of serious concerns being raised by mine workers, with inadequate responses (or no response at all) by BHP and the SA government, and no way for any of us to get to the truth of the matter. Suffice it to mention one more. Mining consultants Advanced Geomechanics noted in a 2004 report that radioactive slurry was deposited “partially off” a lined area of a storage pond at Olympic Dam, contributing to greater seepage and rising ground water levels; that there is no agreed, accurate formula to determine the rate of evaporation of tailings and how much leaks into the ground; and that cells within a tailings pond covered an area more than three times greater than recommended, requiring “urgent remedial measures” (Michelle Wiese Bockmann, 10 March 2006, ‘Waste fears at uranium mine’, The Australian).

Have any of those problems been addressed? I doubt it. But we do know that the management of radioactive tailings has been an ongoing headache for decades and that the rate of production is set to go through the roof − from 10 million tonnes annually to 68 million tonnes. And we do know that BHP has responded to worker concerns about tailings mismanagement with intimidation instead of information.

The domestic problems with Australia’s uranium industry are compounded by serious international problems. Australia has uranium export agreements with nuclear weapons states with no intention of meeting their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty disarmament obligations; countries with a history of secret nuclear weapons research; countries that refuse to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; countries blocking progress on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; undemocratic, and secretive states with appalling human rights records.

Both major parties now support the abandonment of previous policy of refusing uranium exports to countries that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And the federal government is planning to allow uranium sales to a Middle Eastern dictatorship − the United Arab Emirates. The last time Australia planned uranium sales to a Middle Eastern dictatorship was in late 1978 when the Fraser government was negotiating with the Shah of Iran − a few short months before his overthrow during the Iranian Revolution. You’d think we’d learn.

All of these uranium export agreements are accompanied by safeguards inspection regimes that are at best modest, sometimes tokenistic (e.g. China) and sometimes all but non-existent (e.g. Russia).

Australians are evenly divided on the topic of uranium mining; typically, polls find that a majority of Australians want existing uranium mines to be allowed to run their course but a majority want a ban on new uranium mines. A 2006 Newspoll found that a majority of Coalition voters − yes, Coalition voters − wanted a ban on new uranium mines, as did more than three-quarters of Labor voters. Recent polls indicate that two-thirds of Australians oppose uranium sales to nuclear weapons states and two-thirds oppose the plan to sell uranium to India − a country which has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is engaged in a nuclear arms race with Pakistan and China.

ISL uranium mining – environmental impacts

In-Situ Leach (ISL) Uranium Mining Method Far From ‘Benign’

By Dr. Gavin Mudd
Hydrogeologist / Environmental Engineer, Monash University
2007

The mining technique of in situ leaching (ISL), often referred to as solution mining, is becoming an increasingly favoured method for the extraction of uranium across the world. This is primarily due to its low capital and operating costs compared to conventional mining. Little is known about the environmental impact of this method, and mining companies have been able to exploit this to promote the method as “environmentally benign”.

The ISL process involves drilling groundwater bores or wells into a uranium deposit, injecting corrosive chemicals to dissolve the uranium within the ore zone, then pumping back the uranium-laden solution.

The method should only be applied to uranium deposits located within a groundwater system or confined aquifer, commonly in palaeochannel deposits (old buried river beds).

Although ISL is presented in simplified diagrams by the nuclear industry, the reality is that geological systems are inherently complex and not easily predictable.

There are a range of options for the chemistry of the mining solutions. Either acidic or alkaline chemical agents can be used in conjunction with an oxidising agent to dissolve the uranium.

Typical oxidising agents include oxygen or hydrogen peroxide, while alkaline agents include ammonia or sodium-bicarbonate or carbon dioxide. The most common acidic chemical used is sulphuric acid, although nitric acid has been tried at select sites and in laboratory tests.

The chemicals can have serious environmental impacts and cause long-term and potentially irreversible changes to groundwater quality.

The use of acidic solutions mobilises high levels of heavy metals, such as cadmium, strontium, lead and chromium. Alkaline solutions tend to mobilise only a few heavy metals such as selenium and molybdenum. The ability to restore the groundwater to its pre-mining quality is, arguably, easier at sites that have used alkaline solution chemistry.

A review of the available literature on ISL mines across the world can easily counter the myths promulgated about ISL uranium mining. Whether one examines the USA, Germany, Russia and former annexed states, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Australia or new ISL projects across Asia, the truth remains the same – the ISL technique merely treats groundwater as a sacrifice zone and the problem remains “out of sight, out of mind”.

ISL uranium mining is not controllable, is inherently unsafe and is unlikely to meet “strict environmental controls”. It is not an environmentally benign method of uranium mining.

The use of sulphuric acid solutions at ISL mines across Eastern Europe, as well as a callous disregard for sensible environmental management, has led to many seriously contaminated sites.

Perhaps the most severe example is Straz pod Ralskem in the Czech Republic, where up to 200 billion litres of groundwater is contaminated. Restoration of the site is expected to take several decades or even centuries. For the USA, solution escapes outside of the ‘controlled mining zone’ and difficult restorations have been documented at ISL sites in Texas and Wyoming – including both acid and alkaline leach sites. Australia has encountered these same difficulties, especially at the controversial Honeymoon deposit in South Australia during pilot studies in the early 1980s and at Manyingee in Western Australia until 1985.

The Honeymoon pilot project used sulphuric acid in conjunction with ferric sulphate as the oxidising agent. The wells and aquifer experienced significant blockages due to the minerals jarosite and gypsum precipitating, lowering the efficiency of the leaching process and leading to increased excursions. The aquifers in the vicinity of Honeymoon are known to be connected to aquifers used by local pastoralists to water stock.

For Australia, water of any quality is precious – and particularly so when the only secure supply of water in a region is from groundwater. With the rise of water treatment technologies such as desalination, water of any quality is a valuable resource – environmentally as well as for possible community and industry use. An acid leach-type ISL project, especially as approved for Beverley and Honeymoon without remediation of polluted groundwater, therefore imposes a major environmental risk and pollution burden on future users of groundwater in these regions. ISL mining is therefore far from sustainable.

—

Journal articles, conferences papers etc. by Dr. Mudd on his Monash webpage (last updated 2012) and his RMIT webpage (last updated 2023).

ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION – ROUTINE CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER

This summary is drawn from the Friends of the Earth, Australia submission to the Beverley Four Mile uranium mine application, March 2009.

In-situ leach (ISL) uranium mining involves pumping an acid solution (or an alkaline solution in some cases) into an aquifer. This dissolves the uranium ore and other heavy metals and the solution is then pumped back to the surface. The small amount of uranium is separated at the surface. The liquid radioactive waste – containing radioactive particles, heavy metals and acid – is simply dumped in groundwater.

The 2004 CSIRO report states: “As stated in the Beverley Assessment Report, the bleed solutions, waste solutions from uranium recovery, plant washdown waters and bleed streams from the reverse osmosis plants are collected prior to disposal into the Namba aquifer via disposal wells. These liquid wastes are combined and concentrated in holding/evaporation ponds, with excess injected into selected locations within the mined aquifer. The injected liquid is acidic (pH 1.8 to 2.8) and contains heavy metals and radionuclides originating from the orebody.”

(Taylor, G.; Farrington, V.; Woods, P.; Ring, R.; Molloy, R. (2004): Review of Environmental Impacts of the Acid In-Situ Leach Uranium Mining Process.- CSIRO Land and Water Client Report.)

From being inert and immobile in the ore body, the radionuclides and heavy metals are now bioavailable and mobile in the aquifer.

The volume of liquid waste is discussed in the 7/1/09 Beverley Four Mile Project Public Environment – Report and Mining Lease Proposal document:

“With the inclusion of maximised recycling of water, approximately 2.5 L/s (averaged over a year) of liquid waste will be generated once the Beverley extraction circuits are decommissioned. This will be disposed of at Beverley ML 6321 in the hydraulically isolated formerly mined Beverley Sands aquifers in the North, Central and South wellfields.

“It is noted that initially the Beverley Four Mile resin elution circuit and Beverley ML 6321 capture and elution circuits will operate in parallel. During this time the combined volume of liquid waste will remain within an annualised average rate of 5 L/s.

“At the indicated rate there is enough disposal volume in those three wellfields to accommodate up to 16 years of liquid waste. Additional volume exists in Beverley North East, East and Deep South wellfields. Any extension of liquid waste disposal in these areas would be subject to a successful application to the regulatory authorities using the Beverley Mine Procedure for Management of Liquid Waste Disposal (Appendix C of the MARP, Heathgate 2008c) or its approved successor.”

The Beverley Four Mile proponents have no plans to remediate the polluted aquifer as they say the pollution will ‘attenuate’ – that the aquifer will return to its pre-mining state over time. This claim has been queried by the scientific community as being highly speculative with no firm science behind it.

The 2004 CSIRO report endorsed the dumping of liquid waste in ground-water yet the information and arguments it used in support of that conclusion were tenuous. In short, the CSIRO report exaggerates the problems of pursuing waste management methods other than dumping it in groundwater, and the report trivialises the impacts of dumping liquid waste in groundwater.

The CSIRO report notes that attenuation is “not yet proven” and the timeframe of “several years to decades” could hardly be more vague. The 2004 CSIRO report states in its Executive Summary:

“The use of acid rather than alkaline leaching and disposal of liquid wastes by re-injection into the aquifer is contentious. Available data indicate that both the leach solution and liquid waste have greater concentrations of soluble ions than does the pre-mining groundwater. However as this groundwater has no apparent beneficial use other than by the mining industry, this method of disposal is preferable to surface disposal. Although not yet proven, it is widely believed and accepted that natural attenuation will result in the contaminated water chemistry returning to pre-mining conditions within a timeframe of over several years to decades.”

Elsewhere the 2004 CSIRO report notes uncertainties associated with attenuation:

“The EIA for Beverley and Honeymoon suggest that natural attenuation will occur, however, exact timeframes are not given. The issue of predicting attenuation is made more complex by not fully understanding the microbiological or the mineralogy of the surrounding ore bodies, before and after mining, and how these natural conditions will react with the altered water quality introduced by the injection of leachate, and re-injection of wastewaters. Following general practice, geochemical modelling was undertaken with a series of assumptions where data were not available. Although these assumptions are considered reasonable by the review team, some technical experts have a differing opinion. In any case the results must be considered approximate.

“The monitoring results from Beverley are limited by the short duration of mining and operation, and there are currently no completely mined-out areas for which the water chemistry can be followed after mining to verify the extent of the expected natural attenuation. However, pH results for an area that was trial-mined in 1998 and then left until full-scale mining of the same area was due are shown in Figure 13.

“Note that whilst other data are available for these wells there are not consistent trends in other analytes. There has been little recovery of groundwater chemistry towards background in the test-production wells other than a favourable change for pH. There are presently no equivalent monitoring data for the northern area, which is presently being mined.”

Even if full attenuation does occur over time, it is unlikely to occur in the timeframe of post-mine-closure monitoring proposed by the mining proponent. The 7/1/09 Beverley Four Mile Project Public Environment – Report and Mining Lease Proposal document states:

“Heathgate proposes an initial period of five years from the conclusion of commercial operations to complete the decommissioning of facilities. A monitoring and maintenance program is proposed to run for a further two years, for a total of seven years from the final conclusion of mining activities. The total monitoring period will be reviewed with the regulatory authorities and may be extended.

“Facilities will therefore be fully decommissioned within seven years from the conclusion of the commercial operation. This period includes a post-completion monitoring period for vegetation maintenance, groundwater sampling, drainage repairs and other activities to ensure the long-term permanent rehabilitation of the site.”

The 2004 CSIRO report states: “Natural attenuation is preferred to adjusting the chemistry of the wastewater prior to re-injection as the latter would result in the need for additional chemicals on-site, generation of contaminated neutralisation sludges which would have to be disposed of, risk of potential clogging of pore spaces in the aquifer and associated higher costs.”

Those are not insurmountable problems. Moreover there are alternatives to adjusting the chemistry of waste-water then reinjecting it into the aquifer, such as evaporation followed by management of solid wastes. As the CSIRO report notes:

“10.6 Alternatives to Liquid Waste Re-Injection

“Suggestions made during the community consultation process included not re-injecting the liquid wastes into the aquifer, and neutralisation of waste before re-injection.

“Not re-injecting the waste into the aquifer would require either sophisticated water treatment and/or the installation of much larger evaporation ponds. Both would generate solid wastes to be disposed of in a solid waste repository. When the wastes dried out they would become a possible dust source, which could increase the potential radiation exposure of workers, in particular in relation to dust inhalation, but also from radon inhalation and gamma exposure. Environmental radiation levels at the surface would also increase. These are presently negligible issues associated with the existing ISL practices.

“Neutralisation of the waste liquid prior to re-injection would precipitate out some metal salts, which would need to be filtered before re-injection, and be disposed of in a solid waste repository.

“Also following re-injection it is likely that the re-injection bores would rapidly clog owing to precipitation around the bores, as the injected water and existing acidic water in the aquifer interact. Clogging of re-injection wellfields and associated problems with pipelines and pumps may increase the risk of spills due to operational problems with equipment and increased maintenance.”

None of the issues raised by the CSIRO amount to compelling reasons to support dumping liquid waste in groundwater. Some of the reasons cited are absurd and cast serious doubt over the credibility of the CSIRO review – for example dust suppression is simple and inexpensive.

The SA government should:
* conduct or commission a thorough comparative assessment of the options for managing liquid waste.
* insist that the proponents rehabilite the aquifer to pre-mining conditions and insist on monitoring/remediation until pre-mining conditions are achieved.

The 2004 CSIRO report states:

“For the Beverley operation, groundwater monitoring is required to be conducted for seven years after mining to demonstrate that their expectations in regard to natural attenuation are being borne out.

“Research into the use of and ability of chemical amendments to assist with or speed up the processes of natural attenuation processes may be beneficial, especially where the latter may be slow and/or incomplete. This approach may also be of benefit in the case of plant or equipment failure with resultant contamination of soil or shallow aquifers.”

Has any follow-up work been done to investigate the potential to assist or hasten attenuation?

The 2003 Senate References and Legislation Committee report into the regulation of uranium mining in Australia reported “a pattern of under-performance and non-compliance”, it identified “many gaps in knowledge and found an absence of reliable data on which to measure the extent of contamination or its impact on the environment”, and it concluded that changes were necessary “in order to protect the environment and its inhabitants from serious or irreversible damage”. On ISL mining, the 2003 Senate report stated:
“The Committee is concerned that the ISL process, which is still in its experimental state and introduced in the face of considerable public opposition, was permitted prior to conclusive evidence being available on its safety and environmental impacts.”
“The Committee recommends that, owing to the experimental nature and the level of public opposition, the ISL mining technique should not be permitted until more conclusive evidence can be presented on its safety and environmental impacts.”
“Failing that, the Committee recommends that at the very least, mines utilising the ISL technique should be subject to strict regulation, including prohibition of discharge of radioactive liquid mine waste to groundwater, and ongoing, regular independent monitoring to ensure environmental impacts are minimised.”

In relation to the Beverley mine, Dr. Gavin Mudd, a hydrogeologist based at Monash University, notes: “The critical data which could answer scientific questions concerning contaminant mobility in groundwater has never been released by General Atomics. This is especially important since GA no longer maintain the mine is ‘isolated’ from surrounding groundwater, with desires to expand the mine raising legitimate concerns over the groundwater contamination legacy left at Beverley.”

The 2004 CSIRO report states in its Executive Summary:

“While ISL technology has environmental and safety advantages when projects are well planned and operated (Underhill 1998), there are several acid ISL operations that have been developed and operated with little or no consideration for the environment. The conditions at these sites are a direct consequence of the Soviet-era operation of uranium mines without effective management of environmental aspects of production, without restoration of contaminated areas, much less planning and design for reclamation and long-term containment of wastes. Similar operating conditions without effective pollution control and closure concepts were apparent at uranium sites in other centrally planned economies such as East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary prior to 1990.”

“… The environmental consequences from acid ISL operations under the Soviet-era are significant and a component of the many environmental problems from this era, the majority of which were from mine water/groundwater/tailings/waste rock arising from underground and open cut mines. It is noted that as many of the environmental problems were related to the governance and institutional arrangements of the era, direct comparison with practices in Australia cannot be made.”

However a number of the criticisms made of Soviet-era management apply to uranium mining in SA:
* Captured bureaucracies (e..g PIRSA)
* Slack regulation.
* Political interference (e.g. Rann pre-empting assessment by describing Beverley Four Mile as a “world class” project).
* Orwellian doublespeak (e.g. Peter Garrett describing ISL as “world’s best practice”).

In-situ leach uranium mining

In-situ leach uranium mining in Australia – Beverley, Beverley-Four Mile, Honeymoon etc.

Controversies involving Heathgate and General Atomics and its CEO Neal Blue

In-Situ Leach (ISL) Uranium Mining Method Far From ‘Benign’

Jillian K. Marsh, 2011, “A Critical Analysis of Decision-making Protocols used in Approving a Commercial Mining License for the Beverley Uranium Mine in Adnyamathanha Country: Toward Effective Indigenous Participation in Caring for Cultural Resources.” PhD Environmental Studies Thesis, Department of Geographical and Environmental Studies, The University of Adelaide.

Beverley Four Mile – Friends of the Earth (Australia) submission. 2009

Beverley Four Mile – Friends of the Earth (Adelaide) submission – information regarding ISL mining (PDF)

2002-03 Senate Inquiry – chapter regarding Beverley and Honeymoon ISL mining

Uranium Miners Turning Water Into Liquid Waste

Uranium sales to China

See also the ‘Illusion of Protection‘ document.

Uranium policy a hypocrisy

David Noonan, October 5, 2009

http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/uranium-policy-a-hypocrisy-20091004-ght0.html

As China celebrates the 60th anniversary of communist rule with a slickly orchestrated march down the Avenue of Eternal Peace to Tiananmen Square that featured new nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles, it is a fitting moment to question Australia’s role as uranium supplier to the crouching tiger of our region.

After the United Nations Security Council, with a push from US President Barack Obama, agreed to a historic resolution last month to rid the world of nuclear weapons, Australia needs to consider whether we see our future as supplying China’s uranium market. We also need to assess the broader effects of Australia’s uranium exports on nuclear non-proliferation, regional security and China’s human rights record.

One of Kevin Rudd’s early initiatives as prime minister was to establish the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, co-chaired by former foreign minister Gareth Evans, saying this would be “our gift to the world”.

Unfortunately, Australia can never credibly lead on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament while spreading nuclear risks as one of the world’s largest uranium suppliers. The mismatch between Australia’s rhetoric and the illusion of protection provided by nuclear safeguards is stark in the case of China.

As a uranium exporter, Australia has a responsibility to strengthen nuclear safeguards and to act decisively to disqualify any state that does not fully observe its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. China is modernising – rather than eliminating – its nuclear arsenal and has so far failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China is one country that does not meet its non-proliferation treaty obligations.

BHP Billiton’s plan to expand the Roxby Downs (Olympic Dam) copper and uranium mine is being considered by the federal and South Australian governments. BHP proposes the world’s largest open pit mine as a uranium quarry to fuel the global nuclear industry, with much of its efforts directed towards China. BHP’s plan would see Australia selling uranium-infused bulk copper concentrate for processing in China, transferring more than a million tonnes a year of radioactive waste and thousands of tonnes of uranium.

Australian uranium will effectively disappear off the safeguards radar on arrival in China, a country whose military is inextricably linked to the civilian nuclear sector and where nuclear whistleblowers and critics are brutally suppressed and jailed. This alone is reason to disqualify China from acquiring Australian uranium.

In July, a well-known environmental activist and recipient in 2006 of the prestigious Nuclear-Free Future Award, Sun Xiaodi, and his daughter Sun Dunbai were jailed and sent to a “re-education through labour” camp for their efforts to expose corruption and contamination in China’s nuclear industry.

Sun Xiaodi is a former worker at No. 792 Uranium Mine in Gansu province in north-west China. Since 1988, the whistleblower has travelled repeatedly to Beijing to petition the Government to end corruption in China’s nuclear industry and to speak out for the rights of uranium mine workers.

According to Chinese court documents, the crimes Sun Xiaodi and Sun Dunbai are guilty of include inciting the public with libellous slogans including “nuclear pollution” and “human rights violation”. In reality, Sun Xiaodi and Sun Dunbai are paying a very high price for speaking out.

Australians should recognise that it is not appropriate for us to export uranium to a government that does not tolerate criticism of its nuclear industry and fails to meet minimum international human rights standards. We should also be mindful that our commitments to non-proliferation are in conflict with our “dual use” uranium sales.

Australian uranium produces plutonium – a potent bomb-making material – in nuclear reactors overseas. Australia consents to the separation and stockpiling of this plutonium through the “reprocessing” of spent nuclear fuel waste in a number of countries, including China. While our Government says that the plutonium is only to be used for peaceful purposes, we are in effect being asked to trust this and every future Beijing regime.

Nuclear waste management remains unresolved around the world. With the future of high-level nuclear waste accumulating at reactor sites across the US still unresolved after 50 years of the nuclear industry, how can BHP provide any credible assurances on nuclear waste management in China?

Australia is strutting the international stage claiming credentials as a regional democratic voice, nodding our head in agreement with the US President’s call for the abolition of nuclear weapons, while propping up the nuclear sector in a China that is suppressing human rights, modernising its nuclear weapons arsenal and engaging in building nuclear reactors in Pakistan that will increase plutonium production capacity.

Australia’s reputation and nuclear-safeguard responsibilities should not be further compromised to suit BHP Billiton’s commercial interests. The first shipment of Australian uranium that BHP has now sent to China should be the last.

The only potentially credible future for BHP’s Roxby Down mine and the proposed expansion is to trade only in copper and to leave the uranium and other radioactive wastes at the mine site.

David Noonan is the Australian Conservation Foundation’s nuclear-free campaigner.

China will do what it likes with the uranium we sell it

Mike Steketee, The Australian, April 6, 2006

www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,18721734%255E7583,00.html

JOHN Howard is sparing in his use of superlatives but this week he was moved to describe as “remarkable” the transformation in the relationship between Australia and China.  Indeed. It was only two Liberal governments ago that Australia refused to recognise Red China, as it was commonly referred to. Howard entered parliament in 1974, 18 months after the Whitlam government extended diplomatic recognition and three years after conservatives saw political capital in Gough Whitlam’s visit to China as Opposition leader for talks with premier Zhou Enlai.

“Australia has gained a Chinese candidate, if not a Manchurian candidate, for the prime ministership,” fulminated the National Civic Council’s Bob Santamaria. “In no time at all Mr Zhou had Mr Whitlam on a hook and he played him as a fisherman plays a trout,” said Liberal prime minister William McMahon.

Thirty-five years later, a conservative Government has agreed to sell uranium to China, a country with nuclear weapons which remains a communist dictatorship, albeit a changed one. And Howard, the self-styled most conservative leader the Liberals have had, concedes that, although the safeguards negotiated with China are “very rigorous”, in selling uranium to any country “we have to assume a certain degree of good faith”.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer claimed the safeguards agreements signed by China this week would ensure that Australian uranium would be used “exclusively for peaceful purposes”. The agreements themselves give the lie to that.

As explained in the annual reports of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, uranium is routinely mixed from many sources when it is converted into nuclear fuel, making Australian atoms indistinguishable from the rest. The safeguards agreements do not cover the conversion plants: instead, they require that an equivalent quantity of converted uranium is allocated to a facility, such as an enrichment plant, which is covered by the safeguards. So the argument goes that if Australian uranium were used to make materials for a bomb, it would have no practical effect because an equivalent amount would have been removed.

This is the same agreement we have struck with other countries, including the US, to which we now sell almost 40 per cent of our uranium and which remains the only country to have used nuclear weapons. The safeguards may be strict on paper but enforcement is another matter.

China has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, bringing it under international safeguards, as well as the bilateral ones agreed with Australia.

In fact, it has gone further than the US in bringing into force, as well as signing, the additional protocol that requires increased access to nuclear facilities and more information about nuclear activities.

But China’s history is hardly that of a model nuclear citizen. It has transferred nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and Libya. To adapt Howard’s words, we have to assume a degree of faith that it behaves better in future. As a nuclear weapons state, China chooses which of its facilities are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection.

The international non-proliferation regime is far from watertight, as the IAEA’s Mohamed El Baradei readily acknowledges. He said in a speech last month that IAEA verification operated on an annual budget of about E100 million ($170 million), “a budget comparable to that of a local police department. With these resources, we oversee approximately 900 nuclear facilities in 71 countries. When you consider our growing responsibilities – as well as the need to stay ahead of the game – we are clearly operating on a shoestring budget.”

This is just one of the many challenges El Baradei identified in policing nuclear safeguards. Terrorists had expressed a clear desire to acquire nuclear weapons, he said. In the past decade, the IAEA had recorded more than 650 cases of attempted smuggling of nuclear material. Of 189 signatories to the NPT, 118 still had not brought into force the additional protocol meant to beef up the safeguards. Though disarmament was supposed to be a key goal of the NPT, El Baradei estimated that there were still 27,000 nuclear warheads around the world.

As with other safeguard agreements Australia has negotiated, China cannot enrich uranium greater than 20per cent or reprocess nuclear material – both steps towards making weapons-grade material – without Australian permission. But Australia has never refused a request for reprocessing.

How willing would we be to blow the whistle on China if we suspected it was breaching the safeguards? Not very, judging by how far we are prepared to go to cater to Chinese sensitivities. Police this week went to extraordinary lengths to prevent Falun Gong protesters from polluting the line of sight of visiting Premier Wen Jiabao, even wheeling out the Canberra booze bus to park in front of their banners. If that seems like a small matter, it betrays a larger government attitude.

Of course, Australia already is up to its armpits in the world uranium trade. Refusing to sell to China would not close down its nuclear weapons program, any more than would withholding supplies from the US. Even if we stopped all uranium exports, the world would not quickly become a safer place, given the amount of nuclear material sloshing around. In fact, cutting back access to Australian uranium might have the perverse effect of encouraging more reprocessing and increase the stock of weapons-grade material.

But we should not pretend that we have any control over China’s behaviour. We would be better off putting our efforts into supporting El Baradei’s proposals to take enrichment and reprocessing out of the hands of individual nations and provide them through international facilities.

Uranium exports to China would be a bad risk

Any promises made by China regarding Australian uranium are not to be trusted, says JIM GREEN

Canberra Times, 17/1/06.

A POLL of 1200 Australians last September found that 53 percent were opposed to uranium exports to China, with just 31 percent in favour. Nevertheless, the federal Government is meeting a Chinese delegation in Canberra this week to negotiate a bilateral uranium export agreement.

Some difficult questions arise. What would happen to a whistleblower publicly raising concerns about diversion of materials from China’s nuclear power program to its WMD program? Most likely the same fate as befell Sun Xiaodi, who was concerned about environmental contamination at a uranium mine in north-western China. The non-government organisation Human Rights in China reports that Sun Xiaodi was sacked and harassed, and in April 2005, immediately after speaking to a foreign journalist, he was abducted by state authorities and has not been heard from since.

Beijing’s record of media censorship is equally deplorable. According to Reporters Without Borders, at least 27 journalists were being held in prison at the start of last year, making China the world’s largest prison for journalists. Of the 167 countries surveyed by Reporters Without Borders, China ranked 159th for press freedom.

Uranium sales to China would set a poor precedent. Will we now sell uranium to all repressive, secretive, military states, or just some, or just China?

Clearly we can’t rely on whistleblowers or the Chinese media to inform us of any diversion of Australian uranium for nuclear weapons production. We would be completely reliant on the inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the provisions of the bilateral safeguards agreement being negotiated in Canberra this week.

As a nuclear weapons state, China is not subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. Facilities using Australian uranium would be subject to inspections, but this is no simple matter since ‘our’ uranium is indistinguishable from, and mixed with, uranium sourced elsewhere. Further, the IAEA’s inspection program is chronically under-resourced, so it is unlikely that inspections would be sufficiently numerous and rigorous to provide confidence – let alone certainty – that Australian uranium was not being diverted.

As for the bilateral agreement being negotiated this week, it will probably contain provisions such as a requirement for Australian consent before uranium is enriched beyond 20 percent uranium-235 (highly enriched uranium can be used in nuclear weapons) and a requirement for consent to reprocess spent fuel produced using Australian uranium.

While these provisions are commendable, they have never once been invoked. No customer country has ever sought permission to enrich beyond 20 percent. More importantly, numerous requests to reprocess spent fuel produced from Australian uranium have been received, but they have never once been rejected, even when this leads to the stockpiling of plutonium.

Given that bilateral agreement provisions have been repeatedly watered down, and some key remaining provisions have never once been invoked, it cannot truthfully be claimed that Australia’s uranium export safeguards are better than any in the world. That claim will, however, be made repeatedly this week.

As for the argument that China will simply source uranium from elsewhere if we do not supply it, the argument is morally bankrupt. By the same logic, we might just as well be exporting illegal drugs, or profiting from the detention of political prisoners in China.

Freedom of Information documents released last year reveal that Beijing wants to weaken provisions contained in bilateral agreements, though the detail remains unclear.

Does China want a free hand to enrich uranium or to separate plutonium from spent fuel without seeking Australian consent? Currently, China claims that it is not producing fissile material for its weapons program, but there is no independent verification of the claim.

Perhaps Beijing wants the freedom to transfer Australian uranium, and by-products such as spent fuel and plutonium, to other countries without first seeking Australian consent? That also is an alarming scenario. Beijing joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, and that hopefully represents a lasting change of attitude. But as recently as 2001, the CIA reported that China had provided missile-related items to North Korea and Libya as well as “extensive support” to Pakistan’s nuclear program. In 2003, the US government imposed trade bans on five Chinese firms for selling weapons technology to Iran.

It is not difficult to envisage a scenario whereby the IAEA inspection regime and the bilateral agreement would count for nothing – the most obvious being escalating tension over Taiwan. Beijing promises military action in the event that Taipei declares independence, and Washington promises a military reaction in which Australia could become embroiled. The bilateral agreement would not be worth the paper it’s written on.

Former diplomat Professor Richard Broinowski has voiced his concern that by exporting uranium to China, we could free up China’s limited domestic reserves for military use. Comments made in December by China’s ambassador to Australia, Madame Fu Ying, strengthen this concern. The ambassador reportedly told a Melbourne Mining Club luncheon that China has sufficient uranium for its military program but not enough to accommodate both its military and civil requirements.

Dr. Jim Green is a campaigner with the newly-formed Beyond Nuclear Initiative, a collaboration between the Poola Foundation (Tom Kantor Fund), Friends of the Earth and the Australian Conservation Foundation.

Mate, I nuked myself in the foot

Editorial – Taipei Times – Taiwan
Jan 21, 2006

The Australian newspaper on Wednesday reported that an Australian government source has privately admitted that Canberra cannot prevent Beijing from using uranium bought from Australia in its nuclear arsenal, should the two countries strike a trade deal.

But this minor hitch is not likely to stop sales of uranium to China, because Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) seems to believe, in all seriousness, that China would honor an agreement in which the “use of [Australian uranium] for nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices, military nuclear propulsion [or] depleted uranium munitions will be proscribed,” as a DFAT spokesperson put it.

Whether or not Aussie uranium goes directly into Chinese warheads — or whether it is used in power stations in lieu of uranium that goes into Chinese warheads — makes little difference. Canberra is about to do a deal with a regime with a record of flouting international conventions, notwithstanding the increased oversight that comes with participation in global bodies.

One can almost hear the Australian government’s saliva collecting in its mouth at the prospect of selling billions of dollars of uranium from its huge reserves to an eager customer for decades to come.

Never mind that the customer is an unstable Third World despot with a big chip on its shoulder — and the owner of nuclear warheads and other munitions pointing in potentially inconvenient directions for Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Russia, India and Taiwan, not to mention US bases in the region.

The question that follows is whether Australia can be trusted to do not only the lucrative thing for itself, but also the smart thing for the region when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation. The answer appears to be “no.”

We can expect to hear a lot of highfalutin language from Australia in the weeks to come about the need to modernize China and the role “clean” nuclear energy can play in a country desperate for fuel.

Such “global citizen” shtick won’t wash. All of this is happening as evidence emerges of tawdry connections between DFAT and the Australian Wheat Board, which is under investigation for feeding massive bribes to Iraqi officials while former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was still in power.

What confidence is there to be had in Canberra now that we know Prime Minister John Howard misled the public about the dangers of non-existent Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and lectured on the moral certitude of an invasion, at the same time as people with close government connections — with possible government knowledge — were spreading bags of filthy lucre across Baghdad and beyond?

In China’s case, Canberra has been setting itself up for a sublime strategic fall for some time, with Washington increasingly concerned that Australia might act in a manner that would compromise regional stability, and US strategy in particular.

Were it not so preoccupied with “homeland security” and the grim situation in Iraq, perhaps Washington could better recognize the folly of its deputy sheriff in Asia profiting handsomely from the potential acceleration of China’s nuclear militarization.

“She’ll be right, mate,” is the cry from an Australian who would seek to soothe the tempers of people around him and shut down an embarrassing conversation.

To which Taiwanese can only reply, “It’s not right, and you’re not my mate.”

China’s money blinds many to danger

February 10, 2006, Sydney Morning Herald

www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/chinas-money-blinds-many-to-danger/2006/02/09/1139465796018.html

It is wrong to trust the regime when it says it will not use Australian uranium for weapons, writes Yu Jie.

FOR the past few years, Western countries have gradually lost their vigilance toward the Chinese Communist Party regime. Western countries investing in China have become the greatest help to the maintenance of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic growth.
This is particularly the case with the lopsided development of Shanghai, whose economic bubble is for the most part driven by Western investment.
Western government and business circles are like the ostrich, pretending they cannot see the reality of China’s political system, pretending they don’t know the appalling human rights catastrophe now happening in China, such as the ruthless persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and the Christians worshipping in household churches – more than 100 million citizens pursuing freedom of belief.
This kind of persecution didn’t just happen in the Middle Ages; it’s happening in China today.
The Western policy of appeasement is driven by economic interest. In order to sell China Airbuses and high-speed trains, the French President, Jacques Chirac, when he visited China, shamelessly said the Tiananmen incident belongs to the past century and we should let bygones be bygones.
In the greatest rebuke to him, not long after Chirac returned to France, the Chinese communist authorities opened fire on villagers in Dongzhou in Guangdong province. The Tiananmen incident remains China’s bloody reality.
The French and German governments have for a time energetically campaigned for the European Union to lift the embargo on selling weapons to China, but the regime is one that maintains its political rule by killing people.
I can be regarded only as a nominal citizen. I am 32 this year, but I have never participated in an election – not an election of the head of state nor an election of the mayor. Not even once.
The legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party rule does not come from elections; it comes from military might. The founder of the party, Mao Zedong, once openly declared: “Political power comes from the barrel of a gun.” There has not been any change in this principle today.
One aspect of the party authorities’ foreign policy is to politely propagandise the foreign policy of China’s peaceful rise to the people of the West.
Another aspect is to deliberately let Zhu Chenghu, the head of the National Defence University’s Defence Academy and a People’s Liberation Army major-general, issue an aggressive threat to the whole world, in asserting that China can launch a nuclear war on the West, particularly the United States.
Zhu Chenghu is a crown prince of pure lineage, the grandson of the founder of the Chinese Red Army, Zhu De. According to the Chinese Communist Party ruling principle that “the party commands the gun”, it is not possible for a mere major-general to issue this kind of individual opinion on his own.
Even in a Western country with freedom of expression, a high-ranking military general cannot indiscreetly make his personal views about a nation’s nuclear policy known in a public forum.
Zhu’s views must therefore have received silent approval from the highest authorities – even from the nation’s President, Hu Jintao. It’s just like a master unleashing a fierce and vengeful dog to threaten the neighbours.
But Australian authorities blithely plan to export uranium ore to this highly dangerous regime, one side willingly believing a series of agreements, which China signed, that this uranium ore will not be used for military purposes.
But when have the Communist Party authorities genuinely respected international agreements?
The European Union should not lift the weapons embargo against China, and Australia should not export uranium ore to China.
This shortsighted behaviour can in the short term bring a definite economic benefit. But in the long term it will inevitably endanger world peace.
Yu Jie, the co-founder and vice-president of Independent Chinese PEN Centre, is a writer and intellectual based in Beijing. Translation by Chip Rolley.

Uranium to China could go in nukes

Dan Box, The Australian, January 18, 2006

GOVERNMENT officials negotiating the sale of Australian uranium to China admit there is no guarantee it will never be used in nuclear weapons.
Australian diplomats, due to meet their Chinese counterparts today in Canberra, are expected to push for China to agree to safeguards similar to those signed by other nuclear weapons states that buy Australian uranium, such as the US, Britain and France.
The agreements are designed to prevent the use of Australian uranium in nuclear weapons. However, they allow countries with both nuclear power and nuclear weapons programs to mix Australian uranium with uranium from different sources.
The safeguards state only that an equivalent amount of uranium bought from Australia – designated Australian obligated nuclear material (AONM) – is not used in nuclear weapons.
This means Australian uranium can be mixed with uranium from other sources provided a portion of the total, matching the size of the Australian export, is used only for nuclear energy.
Australian officials admit the system means it is possible for Australian uranium to end up being used in the production of nuclear weapons.
“On an atom-for-atom basis it is theoretically possible,” a government source said.
A spokesman for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said yesterday Australian negotiators would insist that safeguards preventing the use of AONM in weapons production would be a condition of any trade in uranium to China.
“Use of AONM for nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices, military nuclear propulsion (or) depleted uranium munitions will be proscribed,” he said.
Responsibility for monitoring the use of AONM is held by the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, whose director-general, John Carlson, is leading the talks in Canberra.
The office already accepts there is public concern the AONM principle means Australian uranium may end up being used in nuclear weapons. “This overlooks the realities of the situation, that uranium atoms are indistinguishable from one another and there is no practical way of attaching flags to atoms,” it says in a 2000 report.
Critics of the current negotiations also argue that any export deal will allow China to use Australian uranium for its energy, diverting more of its existing uranium supplies to its weapons program.
In December, Chinese ambassador to Australia Fu Ying told an audience at the Melbourne Mining Club that China had enough uranium resources to support its weapons program but would need to import more to meet its power demands.
China is planning a significant expansion of its nuclear energy program.
The Uranium Information Centre says China gets about half its uranium needs from its own mines – about 750 tonnes – with the balance imported from Kazakhstan, Russia and Namibia in Africa.
Today’s talks are the result of years of informal negotiations between government and industry on both sides.
WMC Resources, the former owner of the Olympic Dam uranium mine in South Australia, lobbied Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in 2004 to open up discussions on an export safety agreement.
While Australia sits on about 40 per cent of the world’s known uranium reserves, the industry’s attempts to profit from this have suffered under longstanding Labor policy restricting mine development.
A number of senior party figures, including federal Opposition resources spokesman Martin Ferguson, support a change in the policy, widely expected to be debated at the ALP conference next year. This would be a significant step towards overturning restrictions on uranium development in place in individual Labor-held states.
“It’s hard to accept that under the current policy we can, by 2011 or so, have the largest uranium mine in the world (at Olympic Dam) and be potentially the largest exporter of uranium in the world but, at the same time, say that some other little uranium mine which is a pip on the horizon can’t be developed,” Mr Ferguson said.

New China syndrome

The Bulletin, 02/01/2006,
bulletin.ninemsn.com.au/bulletin/site/articleIDs/8B9E747B1188D978CA257103000722FD (dead link)

If Australia wins a contract to supply uranium to China, it may very well wind up supplying material for nuclear weapons. Paul Daley reports.

So you thought Doctor Strangelove died in the rubble of the Berlin Wall? And the N-bomb menace? About as relevant, you say, as Sting bleating on about the Russians loving their children, too? Prepare for a frightening truth. The New Terrorism that ushered in the 21st century with such terrible effect courtesy of suicide bombers and hijacked passenger planes is fast being superseded by a renewed global nuclear threat.
And it’s not just terrorist groups like al-Qaeda who want to acquire or are threatening to use nuclear weapons. It seems the most onerous sabre-rattling today comes from the original nuclear powers – including China, France and the United States – and newcomers like Israel, Iran, Pakistan and India, which are developing, or already have, their own nukes.
Australia, which owns 40% of the world’s established uranium stocks, is central to the future of global nuclear power and, therefore, to weapons proliferation. China, an emerging superpower and repressive military regime with arguably little distinction between its nuclear energy and weapons programs, is energetically engaged in multi-billion-dollar negotiations with Canberra to buy Australian uranium to fuel its nuclear reactors. It plans to spend up to $40bn on a new program to ensure nuclear fuel provides up to 4% of its voracious domestic energy needs by 2010.
While the deal is worth potentially $450m a year to Australia’s uranium producers, it will be incumbent upon our political leaders to convince us of the virtually impossible – that any atomic material derived from Australian yellowcake sent to China is used solely for peaceful purposes. At the outset of diplomatic negotiations between Beijing and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on January 17 over the proposed Australia-China Nuclear Co-operation Treaty, Australian officials and politicians talked tough: Australia would insist on stringent “safeguards”, they said, to ensure China couldn’t use our uranium for weapons. But that’s impossible to guarantee. Impossible, because any Australian safeguards will be predicated on the fundamentally flawed safety regime of the UN’s Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, which makes inspections of nuclear facilities optional for the five original nuclear weapons states, namely the US, Britain, Russia, France – and China.
In the past few months everything old, at least in the world of weapons of mass destruction, has become new again, as threats and counter-threats of nuclear strikes have issued forth across the globe.
This month, apropos of little, soon-to-be-former French President Jacques Chirac announced Paris reserved the right to use its nuclear arsenal, its force de frappe, against state-sponsored terrorists. This coincided with Israel’s thinly veiled warning that it might launch a nuclear strike against new global bad boy, Iran, if Tehran continued to defiantly pursue its quest to enrich uranium, a critical process in the production of nuclear power – and N-bombs. An overreaction? Just late last year the new Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, did, after all, declare that Israel should be “wiped off the map”. Could this have been anything but a nuclear threat?
All the while China, fast becoming enough of a military and trade colossus to spook the US, last year warned Washington that its intervention in any military conflict over Taiwan would be met with a nuclear response.
“If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition onto the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons,” said Zhu Chenghu, a general in the People’s Liberation Army.
“We, Chinese, will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all the cities east of Xian.Of course, the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese.”
This reverberated in Washington and Taipei, where there is growing alarm over Australia’s negotiations with China.
The Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council, Professor Parris Chang, told The Bulletin that Australia could become an unwitting “accomplice” in China’s nuclear weapons program and should not trust Beijing’s assurances that its nuclear energy and weapons programs are distinct. He also stridently criticised Australia for having “east-tilted” towards China and for putting trade with Beijing ahead of regional security.
“China’s assurance is not that valuable because we know China’s record of proliferation … and, yes, we know of China’s [nuclear technology] assistance to Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Pakistan. And so we look [at] what China is doing instead of just what China is saying,” Chang says.
“Certainly, Australia doesn’t want to be seen as an accomplice in China’s manufacturing of nuclear weapons because the sale of uranium to China, even though the Chinese say this is for nuclear power use, well … the so-called peaceful use of the uranium could be transferred to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
“Australia also ought to place a great emphasis on the peace and security of the South-East Asian area. In recent years we have noticed that Australia has almost east-tilted towards China because of trade considerations … even for the purpose of business, for the interests of Australia, [Taiwan thinks] that really, peace and security in East Asia would be very important.”
Concerns such as Chang’s which, diplomatic sources maintain, are also held (albeit more discreetly) in the Pentagon, will, ironically, only make the prospect of a uranium deal with Australia all the sweeter for China.
One insider to the negotiations told- The Bulletin that while Beijing’s priority was to secure a deal, “it will happily drive a wedge between Washington and Canberra on China policy and security policy relating to Taiwan.
“There is much more riding on this for China than just a uranium deal.”
China is, indeed, playing a deft game with Canberra. It has been underscored almost from the outset by an implied threat that if it gets too difficult, Beijing will take its fantastically lucrative business elsewhere. Beijing also made it clear well before formal negotiations began that it would play hard-ball on safeguards and would not subject itself to further – or perhaps any – IAEA inspections in relation to Australian uranium.
Last September, China’s leading arms control official, Zhang Yan, refused to say if Beijing would allow IAEA inspections as part of the safeguards governing the import of Australian uranium.
“I can’t give you an affirmative guarantee to that,” he told The Australian.
Last December, meanwhile, China’s ambassador to Australia, Madam Fu Ying, reportedly told almost 600 of Australia’s leading mining executives that Australia needed to prove it was a “reliable” uranium supplier if it wanted the business.
“China really needs to be careful in where it chooses its source of supply,” Fu said, adding that the “political environment” of supplier countries was a key factor.
“We don’t want this trade to be interrupted by other factors,” she said.
While the Chinese embassy did not respond to The Bulletin’s repeated requests to interview Fu, insiders say she was effectively warning Australia not to complicate the deal with political bickering over safeguards or, indeed, the merits and safety of nuclear power.
It’s an argument likely to appeal to the pro-mining, pro-nuclear energy Foreign Minister Alexander Downer who, with the imprimatur of John Howard, strongly favours exporting Australian uranium to responsible buyers. The Chinese have gone out of their way to fete Downer over this deal.
“Australia holds the world’s largest uranium reserves, which enables us to make a major contribution to global energy production,” he said in a major speech late last year. “It also means we have the responsibility and the opportunity to have a strong input on international efforts to counter proliferation of nuclear materials.”
Downer and Howard will also be acutely mindful that any public debate on Australian uranium exports will draw attention to deep divisions in the Labor Party over its unworkable 1995 No New Mines Policy, which limits uranium production to the three existing mines – the giant Olympic Dam (which has a third of the world’s uranium reserves) and Beverley mines in South Australia, and the Northern Territory’s Ranger mine. Labor’s state leaders have been seriously at odds over uranium policy. Some opponents, including Western Australia’s recently retired premier Geoff Gallop, argued uranium mining opened the possibility of fissile material falling into the hands of terrorists. Others, like former NSW premier Bob Carr, have been more equivocal while Gallop’s replacement, Alan Carpenter, foreshadowed a change to WA Labor’s stance on uranium mining when he took over. Uranium stocks spiked.
Washington has made it clear it expects Australian military support in the event of any conflict with China over Taiwan. But could, as critics maintain, fissile material derived from Australian uranium find its way into Chinese nuclear warheads fired at American – or indeed, Australian – interests in such circumstances?
The answer, it seems, is yes.
Sources maintain that Australian officials, led by the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office – the section of our foreign service charged with ensuring Australian Obligated Nuclear Material is used solely for peaceful means – expect China will ultimately comply with what are in reality relatively relaxed safeguards imposed on other established nuclear weapons states, like Britain and the US, that have purchased our uranium. While the regulations allow export to countries, such as China, with both nuclear weapons and energy programs, such countries are only required to prove that the equivalent amount of yellowcake – as opposed to the specific uranium in the shipment – is used solely for power generation.
Any Australian uranium imported by China can, therefore, be mixed with uranium from elsewhere and used to make weapons – so long as a portion of the total, equal to the size of the Australian take, is demonstrably used solely for energy production.
As ASNO noted in a 2000 report: “Uranium atoms are indistinguishable from one another and there is no practical way of attaching flags to atoms.”
Since the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which made possession of nuclear weapons the sole prerogative of China and the other nuclear weapons states – the Club of Five – other states must subject themselves to IAEA inspections if they wish to acquire nuclear technology.
Numerous countries – including North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, India and now Iran – have covertly developed nuclear weapons while enriching uranium for energy.
The inherent bias of the IAEA safeguards towards the Club of Five underpins the safety guidelines for Australian uranium exports, because only states outside the club are subject to additional international protocols of random inspection and verification.
Despite much conjecture, it remains unclear what safeguards China will ultimately accept. China has indicated it would prefer Australian officials – rather than IAEA inspectors – to enforce any requisite safeguards attached to the Australian deal.
A DFAT spokeswoman confirmed to The Bulletin that the safeguards being sought by Australia in relation to the proposed uranium deal were based on those of the IAEA.
She said Australia was confident that, in the event of a deal, no Australian uranium would make its way into China’s weapons program. “Consistent with other similar agreements China will be required to give a binding treaty-level commitment to use Australian uranium solely for peaceful purposes. Military purposes will be proscribed. It should be noted that Australian uranium would not be supplied to China for unspecified purposes, but would be sold to Chinese power utilities for electricity generation.”
In the event of a deal, the spokeswoman said, Australians would not carry out inspections. “Under arrangements anticipated, the IAEA would conduct inspections – ASNO would monitor the flow of Australian nuclear material in China through nuclear accountancy, analysis of reporting provided by counterparts, and other relevant information.”
The Australian Conservation Foundation, which opposes nuclear power and uranium exports, is stepping up its campaign against the Australia-China Nuclear Co-operation Treaty. It says all states should be subject to the additional safeguards.
“Our understanding is that a deal is being put forward whereby China will be expected to sign up to the existing safeguard regime, that is a non-binding agreement that will allow China to exclude certain facilities from inspection or opt out, citing national security, altogether,” says the ACF’s David Noonan.
“The ACF is also concerned that China – which, according to a US Congressional report has exported weapons technology to Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, Libya and Syria – does not make a real distinction between its nuclear weapons and energy programs and is opposed to any transparency in the process.”
Despite the ambiguity surrounding China’s nuclear programs, others argue that supplying uranium to China for energy simply frees up other uranium for weapons.
“Yes, sure, of course, unavoidably so – unless China were swimming in such a glut of uranium that it would never consider importing any. But if it is considering importing, then it presumably would not easily have enough for all its needs – civilian and military – without those imports,” says Norman Rubin, director of Nuclear Research at Energy Probe, an anti-nuclear think-tank in Canada, another country negotiating uranium exports to China.
“In those circumstances, even if every atom of Australian uranium can be proved to have ended up in civilian use, Australia would still be helping China to meet its needs for military explosive uranium. One might as well argue that Australians should send money to al-Qaeda for flight training lessons, but not for knives or guns. In fact, sending money to al-Qaeda for textbooks and medicines and food and childcare is probably illegal in Australia, as it should be, because it will inevitably increase their ability to buy explosives and box-cutters.”
“The bottom line,” says the figure involved in the Beijing–Canberra negotiations, “is that China has enough uranium supplies for power or weapons, but not both, to last until 2020.”
The talks between Australia and China will continue in the weeks ahead, but our insider describes the deal as a fait accompli.
All of which might give Sting something new (or should that be old?) to sing about.

Australia’s uranium customer countries

Australia has uranium export agreements with:

* All of the ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states (USA, UK, China, France, Russia), none of which is serious about fulfilling its disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

* India ‒ which has not signed or ratified the NPT, has not signed or ratified the CTBT, continues to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons and to expand its weapons arsenal and to expand its missile capabilities.

* countries with a history of weapons-related research based on their civil nuclear programs (such as South Korea and Taiwan)

* countries that have not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (China, USA)

* countries blocking progress on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (e.g. USA).

* undemocratic, secretive states with appalling human rights records (e.g. China, Russia, United Arab Emirates).

Australian governments, and uranium companies operating in Australia, are disinterested in lax nuclear safety standards in uranium customer countries. The most dramatic illustration of this was the fact that Australian uranium was in the Fukushima reactors during the explosions, meltdowns and fires in March 2011. They knew about the grossly inadequate nuclear safety standards in Japan, and the grossly inadequate regulation of Japan’s nuclear industry, but they did nothing about it and continued to sell uranium to TEPCO and other Japanese companies.

Ukraine – India – Russia – China – United Arab Emirates – South Korea – Japan

Australia’s uranium sales fuel insecurity (2-page briefing note by David Noonan, Feb. 2021).

Uranium sales to Ukraine

Australian yellowcake fuels Ukrainian fires
Friends of the Earth submission to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
Friends of the Earth supplementary submission to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

Uranium sales to India

Uranium sales to Russia

Joint Standing Committee on Treaties rejects uranium sales to Russia – Report #94 or click here for direct download (PDF)
Uranium Sales to Russia (PDF file) (FoE Submission to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, June 2008)
Parliamentary Committee Rejects Howard/Putin Agreement
Treaties Committee rejects Russia uranium agreement (2008 Online Opinion article)
Should we be selling uranium still to Russia? Dave Sweeney, 4 August 2014
Can Russia be trusted with our uranium? Jim Green, March 22, 2010, Fairfax ‘National Times’ websites

Uranium sales to China

Uranium sales to United Arab Emirates

Uranium sales to South Korea

Nuclear corruption and the partial reform of South Korea’s nuclear mafia

South Korea: Nuclear scandal widens

Uranium sales to Japan

Australian uranium fuelled Fukushima (March 2021 article in The Ecologist)

Australia’s role in the Fukushima disaster (older articles)

Radioactive by-products of Australian uranium spew out from Fukushima (2011)

Australian uranium fuelled Fukushima

Jim Green and David Noonan, The Ecologist, 9 March 2021

https://theecologist.org/2021/mar/09/australian-uranium-fuelled-fukushima

The Fukushima nuclear disaster was fuelled by Australian uranium but lessons have not been learned and the uranium industry ‒ aided and abetted by the national government ‒ continues to fuel global insecurity with irresponsible uranium export policies.

Fukushima was an avoidable disaster, fuelled by Australian uranium and the hubris and profiteering of Japan’s nuclear industry in collusion with compromised regulators and captured bureaucracies.

The Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission ‒ established by the Japanese Parliament ‒ concluded in its 2012 report that the accident was “a profoundly man-made disaster that could and should have been foreseen and prevented” if not for “a multitude of errors and wilful negligence that left the Fukushima plant unprepared for the events of March 11”.

The accident was the result of “collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO”, the Commission found.

Overseas suppliers

But overseas suppliers who turned a blind eye to unacceptable nuclear risks in Japan have largely escaped scrutiny or blame. Australia’s uranium industry is a case in point.

Yuki Tanaka from the Hiroshima Peace Institute noted: “Japan is not the sole nation responsible for the current nuclear disaster. From the manufacture of the reactors by GE to provision of uranium by Canada, Australia and others, many nations are implicated.”

There is no dispute that Australian uranium was used in the Fukushima reactors. The mining companies won’t acknowledge that fact — instead they hide behind claims of “commercial confidentiality” and “security”.

But the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office acknowledged in October 2011 that: “We can confirm that Australian obligated nuclear material was at the Fukushima Daiichi site and in each of the reactors — maybe five out of six, or it could have been all of them”.

BHP and Rio Tinto, two of the world’s largest mining companies, supplied Australian uranium to TEPCO and that uranium was used to fuel Fukushima.

The mining companies have failed to take any responsibility for the catastrophic impacts on Japanese society that resulted from the use of their uranium in a poorly managed, poorly regulated industry.

They can’t claim ignorance

Moreover, the mining companies can’t claim ignorance. The warning signs were clear. Australia’s uranium industry did nothing as TEPCO and other Japanese nuclear companies lurched from scandal to scandal and accident to accident.

The uranium industry did nothing in 2002 when it was revealed that TEPCO had systematically and routinely falsified safety data and breached safety regulations for 25 years or more.

The uranium industry did nothing in 2007 when over 300 incidents of ‘malpractice’ at Japan’s nuclear plants were revealed (104 of them at nuclear power plants).

It did nothing even as the ability of Japan’s nuclear plants to withstand earthquakes and tsunamis came under growing criticism from industry insiders and independent experts.

And the uranium industry did nothing about the multiple conflicts of interest plaguing Japanese nuclear regulators.

“Deeply saddened”

Mirarr senior Traditional Owner Yvonne Margarula ‒ on whose land in the Northern Territory Rio Tinto’s Ranger uranium mine operated ‒ said she was “deeply saddened” that uranium from Ranger was exported to Japanese nuclear power companies including TEPCO.

No such humility from the uranium companies. They get tetchy at any suggestion of culpability, with the Australian Uranium Association describing it as “opportunism in the midst of human tragedy” and “utter nonsense”.

Yet, Australia could have played a role in breaking the vicious cycle of mismanagement in Japan’s nuclear industry by making uranium exports conditional on improved management of nuclear plants and tighter regulation.

Even a strong public statement of concern would have been heard by the Japanese utilities (unless it was understood to be rhetoric for public consumption) and it would have registered in the Japanese media.

But the industry stuck its head in the sand

But the uranium industry denied culpability and instead stuck its head in the sand. Since the industry is in denial about its role in fuelling the Fukushima disaster, there is no reason to believe that it will behave more responsibly in future.

Successive Australian governments did nothing about the unacceptable standards in Japan’s nuclear industry. Julia Gillard ‒ Australia’s Prime Minister at the time of the Fukushima disaster ‒ said the disaster “doesn’t have any impact on my thinking about uranium exports”.

‘Nuclear village’

Signification elements of Japan’s corrupt ‘nuclear village’ ‒ comprising industry, regulators, politicians and government agencies ‒ were back in control just a few years after the Fukushima disaster. Regulation remains problematic.

Add to that ageing reactors, and companies facing serious economic stress and intense competition, and there’s every reason for ongoing concern about nuclear safety in Japan.

Professor Yoshioka Hitoshi, a Kyushu University academic who served on the government’s 2011-12 Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, said in October 2015:

“Unfortunately, the new regulatory regime is … inadequate to ensure the safety of Japan’s nuclear power facilities. The first problem is that the new safety standards on which the screening and inspection of facilities are to be based are simply too lax.

“While it is true that the new rules are based on international standards, the international standards themselves are predicated on the status quo.

“They have been set so as to be attainable by most of the reactors already in operation. In essence, the NRA made sure that all Japan’s existing reactors would be able to meet the new standards with the help of affordable piecemeal modifications ‒ back-fitting, in other words.”

Fuelling global insecurity

In the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon called for an independent cost-benefit inquiry into uranium trade. The Australian government failed to act.

Inadequate regulation was a root cause of the Fukushima disaster yet Australia has uranium supply agreements with numerous countries with demonstrably inadequate nuclear regulation, including China, India, Russia, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Ukraine.

Likewise, Australian uranium companies and the government turn a blind eye to nuclear corruption scandals in countries with uranium supply agreements: South Korea, India, Russia and Ukraine among others.

Uranium sales to India, UAE, Ukraine

Indeed, Australia has signed up to expand its uranium trade to sell into insecure regions.

In 2011 ‒ the same year as the Fukushima disaster ‒ the Australian government agreed to to allow uranium exports to India.

This despite inadequate nuclear regulation in India, and despite India’s ongoing expansion of its nuclear weaponry and delivery capabilities.

A uranium supply agreement with the United Arab Emirates was concluded in 2013 despite the obvious risks of selling uranium into a politically and militarily volatile region where nuclear facilities have repeatedly been targeted by adversaries intent on stopping covert nuclear weapons programs. Australia was planning uranium sales to the Shah of Iran months before his overthrow in 1979.

A uranium supply agreement with Ukraine was concluded in 2016 despite a host of safety and security concerns, and the inability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out safeguards inspections in regions annexed by Russia. (In 2014, Australia banned uranium sales to Russia, with then Prime Minister Tony Abbott stating: “Australia has no intention of selling uranium to a country which is so obviously in breach of international law as Russia currently is.”)

China

Australia’s uranium supply agreement with China, concluded in 2006, has not been reviewed despite abundant evidence of inadequate nuclear safety standards, inadequate regulation, lack of transparency, repression of whistleblowers, world’s worst insurance and liability arrangements, security risks, and widespread corruption.

Civil society and NGO’s are campaigning to wind back Australia’s atomic exposures in the uranium trade with emphasis on uranium sales to China.

China’s human rights abuses and a range of strategic insecurity issues warrant a cessation of uranium sales. China’s ongoing human rights abuses in Tibet and mass detention and forced labour against Uyghurs in Xinjiang are severe breaches of international humanitarian law and UN Treaties.

China proliferated nuclear weapons know-how to Pakistan, targets Australia in cyber-attacks, and is causing regional insecurity on the India border, in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and in the Pacific.

BHP’s Olympic Dam is the only company still selling Australian uranium into China. There is a case for the ‘Big Australian’ to forego uranium sales overall and an onus to end sales to China.

A federal Parliamentary Inquiry in Australia is investigating forced labour in China and the options for Australia to respond. A case is before this Inquiry to disqualify China from supply of Australian uranium sales (see submission 02 on human rights abuses and submission 02.1 on security risks).

Weapons proliferation risks

Australia supplies uranium with scant regard for nuclear safety risks. Likewise, proliferation risks are given short shrift.

Australia has uranium export agreements with all of the ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states – the U.S., U.K., China, France, Russia – although not one of them takes seriously its obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue disarmament in good faith.

Australia claims to be working to discourage countries from producing fissile (explosive) material for nuclear bombs, but nonetheless exports uranium to countries blocking progress on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

And Australia gives Japan open-ended permission to separate and stockpile plutonium although that stockpiling fans regional proliferation risks and tensions in North-East Asia.

An industry in decline

Despite liberal export policies, Australian uranium sales are in long-term decline and now represent only 8.9 percent of world uranium usage.

With the Ranger mine shut down and no longer processing ore for uranium exports, there are only two operating uranium mines in Australia: BHP’s Olympic Dam copper-uranium mine and the smaller General Atomics’ Beverley Four Mile operation ‒ both in South Australia.

Uranium accounts for less than 0.3 percent of Australia’s export revenue and less than 0.1 percent of all jobs in Australia.

One wonders why an industry that delivers so little is given carte blanche by the government to do as it pleases.

Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia. David Noonan is an independent environment campaigner.

How low can Australia go with uranium export policy?

Jim Green, 9 December 2011, Online Opinion

http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=12991&page=0

How low can Australia go with uranium export policy? We now have uranium export agreements with all of the ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states – the U.S., U.K., China, France, Russia – although not one of them takes seriously its obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue disarmament in good faith. That weakness, among others, is now being used to justify disregarding the NPT altogether with sales to India. Selling uranium to countries in breach of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms violates Australian government policy and binding Labor platform policy. That’s pretty low.

We claim to have championed the adoption of ‘Additional Protocols’, agreements that provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with somewhat greater powers to uncover covert weapons programs. But we waited until all of our customer countries had an Additional Protocol in place before making it a condition of uranium sales; that’s not leveraging improvements in the safeguards regime, it’s low-brow PR.

We claim to be working to discourage countries from producing fissile (explosive) material for nuclear bombs, yet we export uranium to countries blocking progress on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. And we give Japan permission to separate and stockpile plutonium although that stockpiling has fanned regional proliferation risks and tensions in North-East Asia for many years.

In 1993, cables from the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo posed these questions: “Can Japan expect that if it embarks on a massive plutonium recycling program that Korea and other nations would not press ahead with reprocessing programs? Would not the perception of Japan’s being awash in plutonium and possessing leading edge rocket technology create anxiety in the region?”

Australia’s response? We have weakened the previous policy of requiring case-by-case permission to separate and stockpile plutonium, and we now give Japan open-ended permission. That’s pretty low. In theory, Australia has a relatively ‘strict’ policy of requiring Australian consent to separate and stockpile plutonium produced from Australian uranium. In practice we have failed when put to the test and permission to separate plutonium has never once been refused.

We sell uranium to countries with a recent history of weapons-related research. In 2004, South Korea disclosed information about a range of weapons-related R&D over the preceding 20 years. Australia has supplied South Korea with uranium since 1986. We don’t know whether Australian uranium or its by-products were used in any of the illicit research in South Korea. The attitude from the Howard government and its safeguards office was ‘see no evil, hear no evil’.

The 2006 approval to sell uranium to China set another new low: uranium sales to an undemocratic, secretive state with an appalling human rights record (such as jailing nuclear whistle-blowers). That precedent was reinforced with the subsequent approval of uranium sales to Russia (another undemocratic nuclear weapons state, though Russia prefers to deal with dissidents by poisoning them with radioactive polonium).

The Russian agreement set a new low: uranium sales to a country that is very rarely visited by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspectors – just two inspections over the past decade. Federal parliament’s treaties committee recommended against uranium sales to Russia until some sort of safeguards system was put in place, only to have its recommendation ignored.

Another new low with the Russian agreement: we granted permission to Russia to process Australian uranium at a nuclear plant that is entirely beyond the scope of IAEA inspections. The IAEA has no authority to inspect the plant even if it had the resources and the inclination to do so.

The decision to sell to India sets a new low: uranium sales to a country which is outside the NPT altogether and is not subject to the requirement of the ‘declared’ weapons states to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. As former Defence Department Secretary Paul Barratt recently said: “The discrimination is in India’s favour, not against it.”

And another low: India would be the only one of Australia’s uranium customers that is definitely continuing to produce fissile material for weapons (China may also be doing so).

And another low: we take pride in Australia’s ‘leadership’ role in the development of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty yet we sell uranium to countries that have signed but not ratified the CTBT (the U.S and China) and the government now plans to sell uranium to India, which has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT. The CTBT remains in limbo because those three countries, and a few others, refuse to ratify it.

And another low: if uranium sales to India proceed, it will be the first time since the Cold War that we have sold uranium to a country which is engaged in a nuclear arms race. India and Pakistan have increased the size of their nuclear weapons arsenals by 25-35 per cent over the past year alone. Both continue to develop nuclear-capable missiles. Both are expanding their capacity to produce fissile material. Both refuse to sign or ratify the CTBT.

The India decision marks a low-point in Australia’s international diplomacy. To permit uranium sales with no meaningful commitment by India to curb its weapons program, and to de-escalate the South Asian nuclear arms race, is spineless, irresponsible, dangerous sycophancy.

How low can we go? Plans are in train to sell uranium to the United Arab Emirates, probably followed by other undemocratic states in the Middle East. We were planning uranium sales to the Shah of Iran months before his overthrow in 1979. The Middle East has been (and remains) a nuclear hot-spot with numerous covert nuclear weapons programs – successful, aborted, destroyed or ongoing. The Middle East has also seen numerous conventional military strikes and attempted strikes on nuclear plants, in Iraq (several times), Iran, Israel, and most recently Israel’s strike on a suspected reactor site in Syria.

Short of selling uranium deliberately and specifically for weapons production – as we did after World War II – I don’t think its possible for Australian uranium export policy to sink any lower. I suppose we can take some comfort from that. Sort of. Not really.

Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth and author of a detailed briefing paper on uranium sales to India.

A Year Of Nuclear Bungles

Jim Green, 19 Dec 2012, New Matilda

http://newmatilda.com/2012/12/19/year-nuclear-bungles

The nuclear industry inflicts far more damage on itself than its opponents could ever hope to. The mere mention of the easily-preventable Fukushima disaster probably suffices to establish that point, but there are many more examples. To make the task manageable, this snapshot of recent nuclear shenanigans, jiggery-pokery, goings-on and own-goals is restricted to countries that Australia sells uranium to (or plans to sell uranium to).

Tests carried out at the European Union’s 143 nuclear power reactors have exposed hundreds of problems requiring up to €25 billion (AU$31 billion) to remedy, according to a report by the EU energy commissioner. The report concludes that “practically all” plants need safety improvements.

Gee-whiz “next generation” power reactors in Finland and France continue to embarrass the industry. When the contract was signed in 2003 for a new “European Pressurized Reactor” (EPR) in Finland, completion was anticipated in 2009. Now, commercial operation is not anticipated until 2015 — six years behind schedule. The estimated cost ballooned from €3 billion to €6.4 billion, and up again to €8 billion (AU$10 billion). Peter Atherton, utilities analyst at Citigroup, said: “There are few companies in the world that can take a loss of that size and remain solvent.”

EDF’s Flamanville 3 EPR reactor in northern France is also behind schedule — it was originally meant to enter service in 2012 but that date has been pushed back to 2016. Its estimated cost has grown from €3.3 billion to €8 billion, and up again to €8.5 billion. Italian utility Enel recently pulled out of the project, prompting UBS analyst Per Lekander to say: “In a way, the last 24 hours have killed French nuclear finally because the cost makes it totally impossible to export and now you have one of the few partners actively withdrawing; it looks really bad.”

In November, a report by the UK National Audit Office said that nuclear waste stored in run-down buildings at the Sellafield nuclear complex poses an “intolerable risk“, and that costs of plant decommissioning have spiralled out of control. In the same month, UK government agencies filed nine charges against the owners of Sellafield for illegal dumping of radioactive waste.

The National Audit Office estimates the total future costs for decommissioning Sellafield, over a century or so, will be £67 billion (AU$103 billion) — well up from the 2009 estimate of £47 billion (AU$72 billion). Estimates of the clean up costs for a range of UK nuclear sites including Sellafield have jumped from a 2005 estimate of £56 billion (AU$86 billion) to over £100 billion.

In South Korea, five engineers were charged with covering up a potentially dangerous power failure at the Kori-I reactor in May. The accident occurred because of a failure to follow safety procedures. The manager of the reactor decided to conceal the incident and to delete records, despite a legal obligation to notify the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission.

In early November, the South Korean government shut down two reactors at Yeonggwang to replace thousands of parts that had been supplied with forged quality and safety warranties. Plant owner Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) has acknowledged possible bribery and collusion by KHNP officials as well as corruption by firms supplying reactor parts. In late November there were further revelations and the current total stands at 8601 reactor parts, 10 firms and six reactors. Inadequate and compromised regulation has been a key contributor to the problems in South Korea’s nuclear industry — just as it was a key factor behind the Fukushima disaster in Japan.

South Korea wants to develop uranium enrichment technology (a direct route to nuclear weapons material) in violation of its commitments under the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In Sweden, problems with back-up generators have forced two reactors off-line. One of the reactors had only just restarted after over a year out of service following problems with the turbine system and damage to the reactor vessel. The Swedish Nuclear Safety Authority has uncovered a deficit of at least €3.4 billion in the Swedish Nuclear Waste Fund.

The Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) — established by the Japanese Parliament — has lifted the lid on the widespread corruption that led to the Fukushima disaster. The report states that the accident was “a profoundly man-made disaster that could and should have been foreseen and prevented” if not for “a multitude of errors and wilful negligence that left the Fukushima plant unprepared for the events of March 11”. The accident was the result of “collusion between the government, the regulators and [plant operator] TEPCO”.

The NAIIC report is equally scathing about the response to the disaster: “Insufficient evacuation planning led to many residents receiving unnecessary radiation exposure. Others were forced to move multiple times, resulting in increased stress and health risks — including deaths among seriously ill patients.” The report notes that most of the 150,000 evacuees from the nuclear disaster are still dislocated and they “continue to face grave concerns, including the health effects of radiation exposure, displacement, the dissolution of families, disruption of their lives and lifestyles and the contamination of vast areas of the environment.”

Australia fuels proliferation tensions in North Asia by allowing Japan open ended permission to separate and stockpile weapons-useable plutonium produced from Australian uranium. The issue has resurfaced in recent months thanks to Japan’s nuclear hawks. Former defence minister Shigeru Ishiba put it bluntly: “Having nuclear plants shows to other nations that Japan can make nuclear weapons.”

Last year, US President Obama told a nuclear security summit: “We simply can’t go on accumulating huge amounts of the very material, like separated plutonium, that we are trying to keep away from terrorists.” Yet Australia gives open ended permission to Japan to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel and to stockpile it.

India’s comptroller and auditor-general, Vinod Rai, has found that the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is ineffective and negligent. He found that 60 per cent of regulatory inspections for operating nuclear power reactors were either delayed or not undertaken at all. Smaller radiation facilities operate with no oversight at all. Existing legislation gives the board almost no punitive power.

Meanwhile, the Indian government continues to attack and murder citizens opposing nuclear power plants; to expand its nuclear weapons arsenal and its missile capabilities; and to thumb its nose at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Nuclear security remains very poor and corruption is widespread.

Diplomatic cables from the US embassy in Beijing raise serious concerns about safety in China’s nuclear industry. Cables say that cheap, old technology is “vastly increasing” risks. Professor He Zuoxiu, who helped to develop China’s nuclear weapons program, warns about the pace of China’s nuclear power program: “Are we really ready for this kind of giddy speed? I think not — we’re seriously underprepared, especially on the safety front.” Experts from the Chinese Academy of Sciences warn that China lacks a fully independent safety and regulatory agency and that risks are further increased by shortages of qualified staff.

The first consignment of uranium from Australia has arrived in Russia following the 2010 ratification of a uranium supply agreement. Unfortunately, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspections of Australian uranium (and its by-products) will be rare if indeed any inspections take place at all. In 2008, Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties concluded that: “It is essential that actual physical inspection by the IAEA occurs at any Russian sites that may handle [Australian Obligated Nuclear Materials]. Further, the supply of uranium to Russia should be contingent upon such inspections being carried out.” The Gillard Government ignored the recommendation and ratified the agreement.

In the United States, the New York Times reports that security guards at a nuclear weapons plant who failed to stop an 82-year-old nun from reaching a bomb fuel storage building were also cheating on a “security knowledge test”. At least 99 nuclear accidents — resulting in the loss of human life and/or more than US$50,000 (AU$47,000) of property damage — occurred worldwide between 1952 and 2009. Most of them — 56 out of 99 — occurred in the US.

In August, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announced the suspension of all reactor licensing decisions until political and legal disputes regarding high level nuclear waste management are resolved. Former NRC commissioner Peter Bradford said that “the reactors awaiting construction licenses weren’t going to be built anytime soon … Falling demand, cheaper alternatives and runaway nuclear costs had doomed their near-term prospects”. Over AU$10 billion and over 20 years effort was wasted on plans for a nuclear waste dump at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, before the scandal-plagued project was cancelled by the Obama Administration in 2009.

All these shenanigans would be a great laugh if they took place in, say, a Bureau de Change. But the nuclear industry brings with it immense risks: catastrophic accidents and WMD proliferation (and nuclear warfare has the potential to cause catastrophic climate change as well as killing millions directly).

Selling WMD feedstock (in the form of uranium) to dictatorships, crooks, murderers and proliferators is a mug’s game. Just ask BHP Billiton — the world’s largest mining company has disbanded its Uranium Division, cancelled the Olympic Dam mine expansion (citing the depressed uranium price), and sold the Yeelirrie uranium deposit in WA for less than 7 per cent of the nominal value of the uranium resource.

Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, Australia.

Nuclear ambitions must put safety first

Dave Sweeney, 30 October 2015, Fairfax

http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/comment/nuclear-ambitions-must-put-safety-first-20151030-gkmqtm.html

It’s now three years since then-Premier Campbell Newman back-flipped on a ‘crystal clear’ commitment and opened the door for the uranium industry in Queensland. The decision, made without consultation, evidence or any independent analysis was explained on the basis of a potential uranium sales deal with India.

Since this time – and to their considerable credit – the re-elected Labor government has reinstated the state’s long-standing and popular ban on uranium mining.

As the uranium lobbyists and former LNP mines minister Andrew Cripps continue to beat the radioactive drum it is useful to look at the risks and roadblocks that mean there will be no smooth passage to India for any Australian uranium.

In September the federal Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties completed a detailed examination of the proposed sales deal and its implications. Despite strong personal support for the sales plan by then PM Tony Abbot the government controlled committee took a far more considered and cautious approach.

The committee’s report identified a range of serious and unresolved nuclear safety, security and regulatory concerns with the proposed sales deal – as well as questioning its uncertain legal basis.

The cross party committee further recommended no uranium sales take place at this time or under the current terms of the Australia-India Nuclear Co-operation Agreement and outlined a series of pre-conditions that need to resolved before any future sales to India.

These include the full separation of military and civil nuclear facilities, the establishment of an independent nuclear regulatory authority, a review of the adequacy and independence of the regulatory framework, IAEA verification that inspections of nuclear facilities are of best practice standard, improved decommissioning planning and more.

So far, all well and good: a contested sales plan with significant national and regional risks has been reviewed by Parliament and been found wanting with a prescription of much more work required.

The question now is whether Malcolm Turnbull will respect and reflect JSCOT’s recommendations. And there is added concern because right now Trade Minister Andrew Robb is touring India.

In Abu Dhabi in April last year Australia inked a uranium supply deal with the United Arab Emirates, even though a series of recommendations from a separate JSCOT inquiry had not been realised at the time of signing. It was Trade Minister Robb’s hand that signed the paper for the fast-tracked deal.

It took a further seven months before the government’s rationale for this unseemly haste was disclosed to the federal Parliament. In a clear case of prioritising nuclear interests ahead of national interest the primary driver for the deal was to provide “certainty to Australian uranium producers who operate in a competitive international market”.

This short-circuiting of due process and accountability cannot be repeated in relation to the proposed Indian uranium deal. The stakes are simply too high.

The agreement with India weakens many of Australia’s nuclear safeguards and standards and opens the door for Australian uranium to find its way into Indian weapons. If the uranium sales agreement is advanced there will also be sustained pressure for Australia to apply equally inadequate standards to other uranium customer countries.

It would create a dangerous and irresponsible precedent for Australia’s already risky uranium exports and could lead to increased pressure on Queensland and other reluctant states over uranium mining.

In 2012 a review of the Indian nuclear sector by the Indian Auditor General found profound failures in safety, governance and regulation and warned of “a Fukushima or Chernobyl-like disaster if the nuclear safety issue is not addressed”. In the shadow of the continuing – and Australian uranium-fuelled – Fukushima nuclear crisis there are compelling reasons not to supply uranium to India.

As it currently stands the proposed Indian agreement puts no constraints on India’s nuclear weapons program, fails to advance non-proliferation outcomes and doesn’t even provide effective scrutiny of Australian uranium.

Australia, including Queensland, clearly has a key role to play in supporting India’s legitimate energy aspirations. But this cannot and must not be advanced by a retreat from responsibility on nuclear safeguards and security. Malcolm Turnbull should pay heed to the findings of the JSCOT report and not be rushed by those with poor track records and overt atomic agendas.

Dave Sweeney is a nuclear-free campaigner for the Australian Conservation Foundation.

Updates, articles and media releases about ASNO.

In this file:

* Some updates on ASNO’s activities

* Article in The Age about ASNO’s false and misleading evidence to the treaties committee’s inquiry into the Howard/Putin agreement.

* Opinion piece by Prof. Broinowski and Assoc. Prof. Tilman Ruff.

* FoE media release about ASNO accepting award from pro-nuclear lobby group.

* Crikey article by Assoc. Prof. Tilman Ruff

A 2002 AFR article about ASNO/safeguards + follow-up letters is posted at this archived webpage:

http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/30410/20090218-0153/www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/uraniumbombs.html

Updates

April 2008 – Ian Biggs from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) refuses a request to provide a substantive, written response to the detailed EnergyScience critique of ASNO.

September 2008 – Most of ASNO’s evidence to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties inquiry into the Howard/Putin deal is rejected by the Committee. For example, the Committee concludes that uranium sales should be contingent on the conduct of IAEA safeguards whereas ASNO argues that (non-existent) safeguards will “ensure” that Australian uranium remains in peaceful use.

John Carlson/ASNO and Ian Biggs/DFAT conspicuously failed to inform the Committee that there has not been a single IAEA safeguards inspection in Russia since 2001 although that information was surely available to them. To be precise, Carlson acknowledged that point in verbal evidence to the Committee but only after the information had already been provided to the Committee by an NGO.

September 2008 – Ian Biggs (DFAT) and John Carlson (ASNO) appointed to advisory/secretariat roles with the Rudd government’s International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

October 2008 – The Australian Nuclear Association, a pro-nuclear lobby group, presents an ASNO representative with the annual ANA award, in recognition of ASNO’s “outstanding contributions to progressing safeguards and non-proliferation on behalf of Australia over many years.” It is inappropriate for a statutory office holder to accept an award from a lobby group.

January 2010. Evidently John Carlson is leaving ASNO – his Director General job has been advertised.

2011. Wikileaks revelations regarding ASNO Director-General John Carlson’s lobbying within the UN/IAEA to oust IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei. (Carlson is no longer with ASNO – he does some work for the Lowy Institute.)

Nuclear watchdog feels the heat over Russia deal

William Birnbauer
October 5, 2008
www.theage.com.au/national/nuclear-watchdog-feels-the-heat-over-russia-deal-20081004-4ty9.html?page=-1

AUSTRALIA’S nuclear safeguard agency has been accused of incompetence and providing false evidence to MPs who were assessing the merits of a proposed $1 billion uranium export deal with Russia.

Protest groups, which have been critical of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) for many years, celebrated recently when the joint parliamentary committee on treaties recommended against proceeding with the Russian deal.

The committee’s majority report rebuffed most of ASNO’s arguments in favour of a nuclear agreement, citing serious doubts about the checks and balances on Russia’s nuclear facilities.

Friends of the Earth has lodged a complaint with the treaty committee about the evidence ASNO officials gave to the committee earlier this year and may ask Parliament’s privileges committee to investigate.

The $1 billion uranium deal, forged by former prime minister John Howard and Russia’s then-president Vladimir Putin in September last year, would have helped Russia realise its plan to build another 40 nuclear power plants by 2020. It already has 31.

Australia, with almost 30% of the world’s uranium reserves, is the second-largest uranium producer after Canada.

In a major embarrassment to ASNO, the Labor-dominated committee rejected its assurances that Russia was taking steps to separate its civil and military sectors and that civil reactors would be inspected by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials.

“While the committee notes ASNO’s assurances, the committee also notes that … IAEA safeguards failed to discover the efforts of Iraq and Libya to develop nuclear weapons,” the committee said.

It heard that the agency had not conducted safeguards inspections in Russia since 2001. “The supply of uranium to Russia should be contingent upon such inspections being carried out.”

ASNO officials also told the committee that Russia had taken steps to secure its nuclear sites, but the committee said questions remained about the smuggling of nuclear material within Russia.

It recommended the Federal Government consult the US, Britain, the European Union, Canada and Japan on whether the theft of nuclear material in Russia had been addressed.

The committee also rejected ASNO’s assurances that safeguards would prevent Australian uranium from being used in nuclear weapons. “The committee considers it is important to recognise that the material and capacity to produce nuclear power intrinsically involves the capacity to produce fissile material usable for nuclear weapons,” it said.

Liberal committee members produced a dissenting report which backed ASNO’s position.

Committee chairman Kelvin Thomson declined to criticise ASNO but told The Sunday Age that its evidence was “vigorously contested by non-government groups”.

Anti-nuclear, environment and medical groups called on the Federal Government to reform ASNO, urging its removal from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade due to conflicts with the department’s role in trade promotion.

Australian Conservation Foundation spokesman David Noonan said ASNO did not reflect the Rudd Government’s policies on strengthening nuclear safeguards.

He said it was incompatible for the Government to be launching an international commission on non-proliferation and disarmament while a key government agency was proposing to sell uranium to Russia, which recently threatened to use nuclear weapons against Poland.

Friends of the Earth nuclear campaigner Jim Green recently wrote to the joint standing committee on treaties complaining about false statements made by ASNO and federal Coalition members. He said ASNO “falsely asserted” that IAEA safeguards would “ensure” Australian uranium was used only for peaceful purposes. But there was no requirement in the Howard-Putin deal for any IAEA inspections.

The president of the Medical Association for Prevention of War, Dr Sue Wareham, said ASNO’s evidence was not credible.

ASNO’s director-general, John Carlson, was unavailable for comment.

DANGER: NUKE COVER-UP

Prof. Richard Broinowski and Assoc. Prof. Tilman Ruff
Herald Sun
September 03, 2007
www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,22350333-5000117,00.html

THE agency dealing with Australia’s uranium exports is making an absurd claim. The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office says Australia sells uranium only to countries with “impeccable” non-proliferation credentials.

In fact, Australia has uranium export agreements with nuclear weapon states that are failing to fulfil their disarmament obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Australia is also dealing with states with a history of covert nuclear weapons research based on their “civil” nuclear programs. The Australian Government permits uranium sales to countries, including the United States, which are blocking progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

This is supported by the Safeguards Office and the Government proposes allowing uranium sales to India, which is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is a serious blow to the international non-proliferation regime, yet has been met with silence from the Safeguards Office.

Last year’s debate on uranium sales to China showed the Safeguards Office at its worst. The Safeguards Office did not know the number of nuclear facilities in China, nor which of these would process uranium and its by-products. The Safeguards Office was dismissive of China having the worst record of exports of proliferation-sensitive materials and know-how of any of the nuclear weapon states.

The Safeguards Office claims that all nuclear materials derived from Australia’s uranium exports are “fully accounted for”. But that claim is false. There are frequent accounting discrepancies involving Australia’s nuclear exports. What the Safeguards Office means when it says that nuclear material is “fully accounted for” is that it has accepted all the explanations provided by uranium customer countries for accounting discrepancies, however fanciful those explanations may be.

Perhaps the most misleading of the claims made by the Safeguards Office is its repeated assertion that nuclear power does not present a weapons proliferation risk. In fact, power reactors have been used directly in weapons programs. Some examples include India, which is reserving eight out of 22 power reactors for weapons production.

The inevitable conclusion arising from our detailed critique of the Safeguards Office is that, at best, it is ineffectual. At worst, the Safeguards Office serves the commercial interests of the nuclear industry and the political interests of those who promote it. It contributes more to the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation than to the solutions.

We call on the Federal Government to establish an independent public inquiry to review all aspects of the Safeguards Office. The inquiry should be adequately resourced, and should have powers similar to those of a royal commission.

Prof RICHARD BROINOWSKI is a former Australian ambassador and Assoc Prof TILMAN RUFF is the Australian chair of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.

Detailed report: <www.energyscience.org.au>

NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS OFFICE FURTHER DISCREDITS ITSELF

Friends of the Earth
Media Release – October 24, 2008

The Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office (ASNO) is today bringing itself into further disrepute by accepting an award from a pro-nuclear lobby group, the Australian Nuclear Association (ANA).

Friends of the Earth nuclear campaigner Dr Jim Green said: “ASNO is an independent statutory office and should not be accepting an award from a lobby group. Yesterday, ASNO claimed in Senate Estimates that the ANA is not a lobby group but an industry group. But the ANA is a lobby group – its constitution includes the aim of ‘promoting … the use of nuclear science and technology’. And ASNO is clearly accepting an award from the industry it purports to regulate.

“The credibility of ASNO is already under serious challenge as its false and misleading evidence was comprehensively rejected by the parliamentary treaties committee’s recent inquiry into the Howard/Putin uranium deal. For example, ASNO misled the committee with false claims that safeguards would “ensure” that Australian uranium does not end up in Putin’s weapons, but research by Friends of the Earth revealed that there have been no IAEA inspections in Russia since 2001.”

Friends of the Earth has lodged a complaint (available on request) with the Parliamentary Privileges Committee regarding ASNO’s false ‘evidence’ to the treaties committee.

“ASNO is notorious for peddling false claims, such as its claims that nuclear power does not pose a WMD proliferation risk, that Australia only sells uranium to countries with ‘impeccable’ non-proliferation credentials, and that all of Australia’s uranium is ‘fully accounted for’,” Dr Green concluded.

Crikey.com.au article

1/11/07:
Assoc. Prof Tilman Ruff, Australian chair of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, writes:

On 3 September, the Herald Sun published an opinion piece by myself and retired diplomat Prof. Richard Broinowski on the failings of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO), the Canberra-based government organisation which is meant to minimise the risk of Australian uranium being diverted to nuclear weapons production.

Our opinion piece summarised a detailed paper which we sent to Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. We asked him to respond to our recommendation for an independent, public inquiry into the operations of ASNO. We were rather astonished to find that Mr Downer asked ASNO to respond on his behalf! Talk about putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop.

Not surprisingly, the ASNO response fails to respond to any of the substantive issues we raised – indeed our original paper noted ASNO’s “conspicuous failure” to address substantive criticisms.

The ASNO response also repeats the lie that safeguards “ensure” that Australian uranium will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Australia relies on the International Atomic Energy Agency to safeguard our nuclear exports, yet the head of the Agency concedes that its safeguards system suffers from “vulnerabilities” and that efforts to improve it have been “half-hearted”.

It may be expedient for the government to have a safeguards office which asserts that “nuclear power is not a proliferation risk”, but basing public policy on a tissue of lies hardly makes for good policy and is all the more lamentable when it involves the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Critique of ASNO

Jim Green
National nuclear campaigner – Friends of the Earth, Australia.
<jim.green@foe.org.au>

March 2007

(See also EnergyScience Briefing Paper #19, August 2007, <www.energyscience.org.au> – a detailed critique of the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office written by Prof. Richard Broinowski, Assoc. Prof. Tilman Ruff, Dr. Alan Roberts and Jim Green.)

Acronyms

* AONM – Australian-obligated nuclear materials – e.g. Australian-origin uranium and its by-products such as depleted uranium and plutonium.
* ASNO – so-called Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office
* HEU – highly-enriched uranium
* IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
* MUF – Material Unaccounted For.

Safeguards are not and could never be 100% effective

The Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office (ASNO) routinely misleads the Australian public and our political representatives when it asserts that international and bilateral safeguards agreements and processes “ensure” or “provide assurances” that Australian uranium and its by-products such as depleted uranium and plutonium, known collectively as Australian-obligated nuclear materials (AONM), will not contribute to weapons proliferation.

Those agreements and processes certainly attempt to prevent diversion of nuclear materials to weapons programs but they are not and could never be 100% effective.

ASNO and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade routinely offer these false “assurances”. The ASNO website illustrates the point:
1. The risk of diversion of AONM is not acknowledged in a document linked from the front page of ASNO’s website, “Australia’s Uranium Export Policy”, <www.dfat.gov.au/security/aus_uran_exp_policy.html>. That document asserts that “Australia’s uranium export policy … provides assurances that exported uranium and its derivatives cannot benefit the development of nuclear weapons or be used in other military programs.” Why no acknowledgement of the risk of diversion of AONM for nuclear weapons research and/or production?
2. That document links to another, “Australia’s Network of Nuclear Safeguards Agreements”, <www.dfat.gov.au/security/nuclear_safeguards.html>, which asserts that: “All of Australia’s uranium is exported for exclusively peaceful purposes, and only to countries and parties with which Australia has a bilateral safeguards Agreement. These Agreements ensure that Australia’s nuclear exports remain in exclusively peaceful use …” Why no acknowledgement of the risk of diversion of AONM?
3. That document links to an excerpt from the Australian Safeguards Office Annual Report 1998-99, <www.asno.dfat.gov.au/annual_report_9899/25_years.html>, which asserts that bilateral safeguards agreements “were established to ensure that nuclear items exported from Australia remain in exclusively peaceful use, and in no way enhance or contribute to any military purpose.” Why no acknowledgement of the risk of diversion of AONM?

The ASNO website links to the so-called Uranium Information Centre, which also fails to acknowledge the risk of diversion of AONM. We can easily understand why the industry-funded Uranium Information Centre peddles misinformation – it has a commercial interest in doing so. But what is ASNO’s excuse? While ASNO is an independent statutory authority, as it should be, it exhibits the tendencies of a captured bureaucracy.

Occasionally, ASNO will concede the indisputable point that there is a risk of diversion of AONM – for example, ASNO Director-General John Carlson (2005) states that “… of course it is possible diversion might occur in the future …”. However, it is far more common for ASNO to provide false “assurances” which strongly imply that there is no risk of diversion.

ASNO should clearly acknowledge on its website that there is a risk of diversion of AONM, and it should remove or modify statements which imply otherwise.

AONM is not fully accounted for

Carlson (2002) says: “All Australian-obligated nuclear material [AONM], including plutonium, is fully accounted for.” That is false. There are routine accounting discrepancies – called ‘Material Unaccounted For’. MUF refers to discrepancies between the ‘book stock’ (the expected measured amount) and the ‘physical stock’ (the actual measured amount) of nuclear materials at a location under safeguards. Such discrepancies are frequent due to the difficulty of precisely measuring amounts of nuclear material.

What Carlson means when he says that all AONM is “fully accounted for” is that ASNO has accepted all the various reasons given for MUF over the years, however fanciful those explanations may or may not be. (ASNO refuses to provide specific data on MUF discrepancies or even aggregate information. Nor has ASNO adequately justified this secrecy.)

Carlson (2005) states: “MUF certainly does not imply that AONM is missing. When ASNO concludes that all AONM is accounted for, this means, inter alia, that we are satisfied about the explanation for any MUF.”

In other words, when ASNO says all AONM is fully accounted for, it means all AONM is not fully accounted for.

It is agreed that MUF does not necessarily mean that diversion has occurred – the problem is that we cannot be certain that diversion of MUF has not occurred on each and every occasion when there is a difference between recorded and measured quantities. The inevitability of accounting discrepancies provides an obvious loophole for would-be proliferators. The problem is most acute with facilities processing large volumes of nuclear material, and in particular those processing large volumes of fissile material such as reprocessing plants.

South Korea

ASNO (letter, available on request) insists that South Korea did not use AONM in its long-standing secret nuclear weapons research program from 1979-2000. How can ASNO be sure? According to the letter, one reason is that the South Koreans say so!

We still do not know – and will probably never know – whether AONM was used in the South Korean secret nuclear weapons research program:
* We have the assurance of South Korean authorities – but the value of such an assurance is highly questionable in the circumstances.
* There could not possibly have been diversion before 1986 since there was no transfer of AONM to South Korea until 1986.
* Carlson (2005) states in relation to post-1986 unauthorised activities that: “… the IAEA’s investigations showed that the nuclear material used was produced from indigenous sources, Accordingly, ASNO is satisfied that no AONM was involved.” But the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) appears to base its conclusions in part on “information provided by the ROK”, so the argument becomes circular. Moreover, the claim that only indigenous material was used is contested (Kang et al., 2005).

Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

Carlson (2000) states that “… in some of the countries having nuclear weapons, nuclear power remains insignificant or non-existent.” Carlson’s attempt to absolve civil nuclear programs from the proliferation problem ignores the well-documented use of civil nuclear facilities and materials in weapons programs as well as the important political ‘cover’ civil programs provide for military programs. It also ignores the more specific links between nuclear power and weapons proliferation.

Of the ten states known to have produced nuclear weapons:
* eight have nuclear power reactors.
* North Korea has no operating power reactors but an ‘Experimental Power Reactor’ is believed to have been the source of the fissile material (plutonium) used in the November 2006 nuclear bomb test, and North Korea has power reactors partly constructed under the Joint Framework Agreement.
* Israel has no power reactors, though the pretence of an interest in the development of nuclear power helped to justify nuclear transfers to Israel.

Power reactors are certainly used in support of India’s nuclear weapons program – this is no longer in dispute since India is refusing to subject numerous power reactors to safeguards under the US/India nuclear agreement.

The US itself is using a power reactor to produce tritium for use in nuclear weapons.

Pakistan may be using power reactor/s in support of its nuclear weapons program.

North Korea’s October 2006 weapon test is believed to have used plutonium from an ‘Experimental Power Reactor’.

Then Australian Prime Minister John Gorton certainly had military ambitions for the power reactor he pushed to have constructed at Jervis bay in NSW in the late 1960s – he later admitted that the agenda was to produce both plutonium and electricity.

Moreover, nuclear power reactors per sé need not be directly involved in weapons research/production in order for a nuclear power program to provide cover and support for a weapons program. For example, the nuclear weapons programs in South Africa and Pakistan were clearly outgrowths of their power programs although enrichment plants, not power reactors, produced the fissile material for use in weapons. Likewise, nuclear power programs typically involve the construction of research/training reactors which can be and have been used in weapons programs (e.g. India, Israel).

Iraq is another illustration of the potential for nuclear power programs to facilitate nuclear weapons programs even if power reactors are not used to produce fissile material for weapons, or even if power reactors are not built. While Iraq’s nuclear research program provided much cover for the weapons program, stated interest in developing nuclear power was also significant. According to Khidhir Hamza (1998), a senior nuclear scientist involved in Iraq’s weapons program: “Acquiring nuclear technology within the IAEA safeguards system was the first step in establishing the infrastructure necessary to develop nuclear weapons. In 1973, we decided to acquire a 40-megawatt research reactor, a fuel manufacturing plant, and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, all under cover of acquiring the expertise needed to eventually build and operate nuclear power plants and produce and recycle nuclear fuel. Our hidden agenda was to clandestinely develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce weapon-grade plutonium.”

Carlson’s view also sits uncomfortably with the concentration of nuclear power in weapons states – almost 60% of global nuclear power output is in the nuclear weapons states and those power programs involve large numbers of nuclear scientists, technicians, engineers etc., with frequent transfer to and from nuclear weapons programs.

In short, the attempt to distance nuclear power programs from weapons proliferation is disingenuous. While currently-serving politicians and bureaucrats are prone to obfuscation on this point, several retired politicians have recently noted the link between power and weapons:
* Former US Vice President Al Gore said in 2006: “For eight years in the White House, every weapons-proliferation problem we dealt with was connected to a civilian reactor program. And if we ever got to the point where we wanted to use nuclear reactors to back out a lot of coal … then we’d have to put them in so many places we’d run that proliferation risk right off the reasonability scale.”
* Former US President Bill Clinton said in 2006: “The push to bring back nuclear power as an antidote to global warming is a big problem. If you build more nuclear power plants we have toxic waste at least, bomb-making at worse.”
* Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating said in 2006: “Any country with a nuclear power program “ipso facto ends up with a nuclear weapons capability”.

Carlson (2000) says: “If we look to the history of nuclear weapons development, we can see that those countries with nuclear weapons developed them before they developed nuclear power programs.” However, ostensibly civil nuclear programs clearly preceded and facilitated the successful development of nuclear weapons in India, Pakistan, and in the former nuclear weapons state South Africa.

Carlson (2006) states: “I have pointed out on numerous occasions that nuclear power as such is not a proliferation problem – rather the problem is with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies …” The claim is false, no matter how many times Carlson makes it:
* Power reactors have been used directly in weapons programs.
* Power programs have facilitated and provided cover for weapons programs even without direct use of power reactor/s in the weapons program.
* And, as will now be discussed, power reactors produce large volumes of weapons-useable plutonium and can be operated on a short irradiation cycle to produce large volumes of weapon-grade plutonium.

Plutonium grades

Statements by Carlson/ASNO about the weapons useability of below-weapon-grade plutonium grossly distort the available scientific evidence and can only be seen as an attempt to promote uranium exports and to absolve governments and uranium mining companies of their culpability in increasing the global stockpile of weapons-useable plutonium. (For a detailed discussion and references to the scientific literature, see https://nuclear.foe.org.au/plutonium-grades-and-nuclear-weapons-2/.)

In addition to the actual and potential use of below-weapon-grade plutonium in nuclear weapons, power reactors can be operated on a shorter-than-usual irradiation cycle to maximise the proportion of plutonium relative to other, unwanted plutonium isotopes. Thus, power reactors can produce large volumes (hundreds of kilograms per year) of weapon-grade plutonium, and as little as 3-4 kgs of this weapon-grade plutonium is required to build one nuclear weapon.

Carlson (2002) states that Australian-obligated plutonium is not weapon-grade but he fails to note that below-weapon-grade plutonium can be – and has been – used in nuclear weapons. Further, weapon-grade plutonium is produced using Australian uranium – in the normal course of events this weapon-grade plutonium is produced in power reactors and in the normal course of events it is converted to fuel-grade then reactor-grade plutonium in the reactor. It is misleading for Carlson to state that Australian-obligated plutonium is not weapon-grade without noting that below-weapon-grade plutonium can be and has been used in nuclear weapons.

Carlson (2002) says “weapons-grade plutonium is not produced in the normal operation of power reactors” though he knows it is and he knows that below-weapon-grade plutonium has been used in weapons.

Research reactors can be used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Israel and India are the most notorious examples of ‘research’ reactors being used for this purpose – most of the fissile material for their nuclear arsenals comes from research reactors.

IAEA safeguards

Carlson (2002) defends the IAEA’s safeguards system and says it provides the “foundation” for preventing misuse of Australian-obligated nuclear materials. The safeguards system was exposed as a farce by the Iraqi regime in the 1980s and early ’90s – see the voluminous material on this scandal published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (<www.thebulletin.org>) and by the IAEA (<www.iaea.org>). Since the Iraq debacle, efforts have been made to improve the system, but it still inadequate.

Apart from the nuclear industry and its apologists, including ASNO, there is universal acknowledgement of serious flaws with the safeguards system. Indeed Dr Mohamed El Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA, has stated that the IAEA’s basic inspection rights are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system suffers from “vulnerabilities”, that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted”, and that the safeguards system operates on a “shoestring budget”. (See statements at <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/index.html>.)

Compare those acknowledgements from the IAEA Director General with ASNO’s false “assurances” that safeguards prevent diversion of AONM.

The IAEA has two roles – promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and preventing weapons proliferation. Since the materials and facilities required for peaceful nuclear research and power programs can be and have been used for nuclear weapons R&D and in some cases full-scale weapons production, the IAEA’s two roles can be described as: trying to prevent weapons proliferation while actively promoting the expanded use of materials and facilities which can in many cases be used for nuclear weapons research and/or production. The contradiction is obvious notwithstanding Carlson’s (2005) comments about the two roles being “complementary” rather than “inconsistent”. By Carlson’s logic, drug-running operations would neatly complement efforts to stem the trade in illicit drugs.

Membership of the Board of Governors of the IAEA is weighted in favour of countries with significant nuclear programs. Carlson (2005) fails to see the problem arising from that weighting. The problem is that countries with significant nuclear programs may have reasons, e.g. commercial reasons, to downplay the proliferation risks associated with civil nuclear programs. South Australian Premier Mike Rann’s observation in a 1982 paper is pertinent: “Again and again, it has been demonstrated here and overseas that when problems over safeguards prove difficult, commercial considerations will come first.”

(Numerous articles on the flawed nuclear safeguards system are posted at: https://nuclear.foe.org.au/safeguards/)

Uranium customer countries

Carlson (1998) makes the absurd claim that: “One of the features of Australian policy … is very careful selection of our treaty partners. We have concluded bilateral arrangements only with countries whose credentials are impeccable in this area.”

Carlson’s claim is demonstrably false. Australia has uranium export agreements with nuclear weapons states (most or all of which are failing to fulfil their NPT disarmament obligations), states with a history of covert nuclear weapons research based on their ‘civil’ nuclear programs, states blocking progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and states blocking progress on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

To give some examples:

1. The US is breaching its NPT disarmament commitments in many ways: refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; making a mockery of the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty by blocking any inspection or verification measures; engaging in research on new generations of nuclear weapons; indicating that it might begin nuclear weapons testing again; resuming the production of tritium for use in nuclear weapons and using a ‘civil’ power reactor to produce the tritium; acknowledging in its 2002 Nuclear Posture Review that it intends to maintain its nuclear arsenal “forever”; embarking on nuclear co-operation with India (a non-NPT state); threatening first-use nuclear strikes; and developing a nuclear hit-list of seven states, all of them NPT member states except North Korea, and five of them non-nuclear weapons states.

The disgraceful role of the US, and its manifold breaches of its NPT obligations, have been ignored by the Australian government. Successive Australian governments have claimed that the US is in compliance with its NPT obligations because of the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. But even that solitary achievement is largely a function of creative accounting “worthy of Enron” according to the US Natural Resources Defense Council. Moreover, the numbers argument can be misleading. Due to technical enhancement, the smaller stockpile of US nuclear weapons actually has an increased destructive power.

2. France and the UK are also customers of Australian uranium and, like the US, neither country has the slightest intention of fulfilling its NPT disarmament obligations. The UK government is strongly advocating replacement of its Trident nuclear system. In January 2006, French President Jacques Chirac declared that French nuclear weapons would be used in fighting terrorism, increasing rather than decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.

3. The federal government has negotiated a bilateral treaty with China to permit uranium sales. China is a nuclear weapons state with no intention of fulfilling its NPT disarmament obligations, and it refuses to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Further, the Chinese state is undemocratic and repressive. It is difficult to imagine a nuclear industry worker in China publicly raising safety, security or proliferation concerns without reprisal. It is a closed, secretive state – which makes safeguarding AONM all the more difficult. China is included in the US’s Nuclear Posture Review hit-list because of the “ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces” and its “still developing strategic objectives”.

4. Japan, a major customer of Australian uranium, has developed a nuclear ‘threshold’ or ‘breakout’ capability – it could produce nuclear weapons within months of a decision to do so, relying heavily on facilities, materials and expertise from its civil nuclear program. An obvious source of fissile material for a weapons program in Japan would be its stockpile of plutonium – including Australian-obligated plutonium. In April 2002, the then leader of Japan’s Liberal Party, Ichiro Ozawa, said Japan should consider building nuclear weapons to counter China and suggested a source of fissile material: “It would be so easy for us to produce nuclear warheads; we have plutonium at nuclear power plants in Japan, enough to make several thousand such warheads.”

Japan’s plutonium policy is anything but impeccable. It is irresponsible. Diplomatic cables in 1993 and 1994 from US Ambassadors in Tokyo describe Japan’s accumulation of plutonium as “massive” and questioned the rationale for the stockpiling of so much plutonium since it appeared to be economically unjustified. A March 1993 diplomatic cable from US Ambassador Armacost in Tokyo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, obtained under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, posed these questions: “Can Japan expect that if it embarks on a massive plutonium recycling program that Korea and other nations would not press ahead with reprocessing programs? Would not the perception of Japan’s being awash in plutonium and possessing leading edge rocket technology create anxiety in the region?” (Greenpeace, 1999.)

Yet successive Australian governments have allowed Japan to stockpile Australian-obligated plutonium. Not once has a reprocessing request from Japan been refused.

5. South Korea is another major customer of Australian uranium with less than impeccable credentials. In 2004, South Korea disclosed information about a range of activities which violated its NPT commitments – uranium enrichment from 1979-81, the separation of small quantities of plutonium in 1982, uranium enrichment experiments in 2000, and the production of depleted uranium munitions from 1983-1987.

Nuclear weapons states

Carlson (2005) states that it is it is “not plausible” that a non nuclear weapons state would seek nuclear weapons because the nuclear weapons states are not meeting their NPT commitments. Why not? According to IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei (2005): “[W]e must show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm. As long as some countries place strategic reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, other countries will emulate them. We cannot delude ourselves into thinking otherwise.”

Likewise, El Baradei (2004) noted that: ”There are some who have continued to dangle a cigarette from their mouth and tell everybody else not to smoke.”

So by the logic of no less an authority than Dr. Mohamed El Baradei – Nobel Peace Prize winner and IAEA Director General – Carlson is deluding himself.

Carlson’s illogical and incomprehensible statement is out of step not only with the IAEA Director General but also with the expert Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nobel Laureats, Cold War warriors such as Henry Kissinger and countless experts in non-proliferation.

Declared and undeclared facilities

Carlson (2006) stresses the use of undeclared facilities in Iraq’s nuclear weapons program from the 1970s to 1991:

“It is well known that discovery of the undeclared Iraq program after the first Gulf War showed inadequacies in “traditional” IAEA safeguards, especially as regards possible undeclared nuclear activities. This is what prompted the program to strengthen safeguards, of which the Additional Protocol is a part.

“It is also well known that the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities requires substantial further development, this is the most serious challenge to safeguards – also discussed at length in my annual reports. Australian uranium is exported for declared nuclear programs under IAEA safeguards – the problem of detecting undeclared activities does not show that safeguards on declared activities are inadequate.” (emphasis in original)

However there is abundant evidence of safeguarded facilities being used in the nuclear weapons program in Iraq (Green, 2002).

For example, the safeguarded, highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuelled IRT research reactor was frequently used in the Iraqi weapons program:

1. A fuel element from the IRT reactor was used for a plutonium extraction experiment.

2. On three other occasions, fuel elements were fabricated from undeclared uranium dioxide in an Experimental Reactor Fuel Fabrication Laboratory, they were secretly irradiated in the IRT reactor and then chemically processed in an unsafeguarded Radiochemical Laboratory containing hot cells.

3. The reactor was used to make polonium-210 for neutron initiator research, using bismuth targets.

4. The reactor was used to produce small quantities of plutonium-238, which could have been used for neutron initiator research instead of short lived polonium-210.

5. The reactor could potentially have produced sufficient plutonium for one weapon over a period of several years using fuel and/or a uranium blanket and/or uranium targets; this risk, albeit small, was increased by the fact that IAEA inspections of the reactor were infrequent because of the low risk status of the reactor.

6. HEU fuel for the IRT reactor, and the 0.5 MW(th) Tammuz-II reactor, was diverted during Iraq’s 1990-1991 ‘crash program’.

7. ‘Dirty’ radiation bombs were produced and three test bombs were exploded in Iraq in 1987, using materials irradiated in the IRT and/or Tammuz II research reactors (the more powerful IRT reactor was the better suited of the two reactors for the purpose).

Not once did the IAEA detect these proscribed uses of the ‘safeguarded’ IRT reactor.

The US military clearly believed the IRT and Tammuz II reactors represented a proliferation threat and bombed them in 1991.

The IAEA (1997, p.53) states that the IRT reactor was of “very limited usefulness as a plutonium production reactor” but made a “useful” contribution to the nuclear weapons research and development program.

Iraq’s accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a net positive for its nuclear weapons program. Safeguards did little to thwart the program, and NPT accession facilitated technology transfer. IAEA safeguards inspector Roger Richter resigned in 1981, having written to the US State Department the year before stating: ‘The most disturbing implication of the Iraqi nuclear program is that the NPT agreement has had the effect of assisting Iraq in acquiring the nuclear technology and nuclear material for its program by absolving the cooperating nations of their moral responsibility by shifting it to the IAEA. These cooperating nations have thwarted concerted international criticism of their actions by pointing to Iraq’s signing of NPT, while turning away from the numerous, obvious and compelling evidence which leads to the conclusion that Iraq is embarked on a nuclear weapons program.” (Quoted in MacLachlan and Ryan (1991); see also Nucleonics Week, June 25, 1981, p.3.)

Conclusion

ASNO has a track record of making false and misleading statements. Numerous other examples could be provided in addition to those included in this paper. Since ASNO has proven itself unwilling to redress this problem, the Commonwealth government should hold ASNO to account.

References

Anon., November 12, 1990, “Blix Says IAEA Does Not Dispute Utility of Reactor-Grade Pu for Weapons,” Nuclear Fuel, p.8.

Blix, H., November 1, 1990, Letter to the Nuclear Control Institute, Washington DC.

Carlson, John, December 21, 1998, Evidence before Joint Committee on Treaties, <www.aph.gov.au/hansard/joint/commttee/j2022.pdf>.

Carlson, John, 2000, “Nuclear Energy and Non-proliferation – Issues and Challenges: An Australian Perspective”, Paper prepared for JAIF Symposium on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Tokyo, 9-10 March 2000.

Carlson, John, November 15, 2002, Australian Financial Review, Letter to the Editor. <www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/uraniumbombs.html>

Carlson, John, 2005, supplementary submission 33.1 to
House Standing Committee on Industry and Resources, Inquiry into developing Australia’s non-fossil fuel energy industry, <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/isr/uranium/subs.htm>
or direct download: <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/isr/uranium/subs/sub33_1.pdf>.

Carlson, John, November 27, 2006, supplementary submission 30.2 to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Inquiry into Uranium Sales To China, <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/ jsct/8august2006/subs2/sub30_2.pdf>.

El Baradei, Mohamed, 2004, Quoted in James Traub, “The Netherworld of Nonproliferation”, New York Times, June 13.

El Baradei, Mohamed, 2005, <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n006.html>.

Green, Jim, 2002, Myth of the Peaceful Atom: Research Reactors and Nuclear Weapons, https://nuclear.foe.org.au/research-reactors-nuclear-weapons/

Greenpeace, September 1, 1999, “Confidential diplomatic documents reveal U.S. proliferation concerns over Japan’s plutonium program”, media release.

Hamza, Khidhir, 1998, “Inside Saddam’s secret nuclear program”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October, Vol.54, No.5.

International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997, “Fourth consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)”, IAEA Document S/1997/779, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, October, <www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_1997_779.pdf>

Kang, Jungmin, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter, 2005, “South Korea’s nuclear surprise”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February, Vol.61, No.01, pp.40-49, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=jf05kang>.

Koutsoukis, Jason, November 9, 2002, “Has anybody seen Australia’s uranium?”, Australian Financial Review, pg. 21.

MacLachlan, Ann and Margaret Ryan, 1991, “Allied bombing of Iraqi reactors provokes no safeguards debate”, Nucleonics Week, January 31.

Nuclear Safeguards

General information

The unprofessional, dishonest Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office (ASNO)

More information about safeguards

Australian literature (dealing with Australian and international issues)

Friends of the Earth information on connections between peaceful nuclear programs and weapons proliferation.
Friends of the Earth information on Australia’s uranium customer countries.
Medical Association for Prevention of War information on safeguards.
Medical Association for the Prevention of War and Australian Conservation Foundation, 2006, ‘An Illusion of Protection: The Unavoidable Limitations of Safeguards’.
Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office (federal government agency)
Value-subtracting: Form vs. substance in Australian uranium safeguard policy, Richard Leaver, Austral Special Report 09-08S, 11 December 2009, Nautilus Institute
Nuclear Safeguards: some Canadian questions about Australian policy, Richard Leaver, Austral Policy Forum 09-5A, 23 February 2009

International literature:

International Atomic Energy Agency – Safeguards & Verification
Henry Sokolski (ed.), Feb 2008, ‘Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom‘ (also online here)
Alan J. Kuperman, David Sokolow, and Edwin S. Lyman, March 18, 2014, ‘Can the IAEA Safeguard Fuel-Cycle Facilities?’, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project, click here or for direct download click here and see the project homepage.
Former IAEA Safeguards Director Pierre Goldschmidt, 15 Nov 2011, ‘Looking beyond Iran and North Korea for Safeguarding the Foundations of Nuclear Nonproliferation’.
Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office, United States Army War College, June 2014, ‘Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation‘.
Henry Sokolski, 3 Nov 2010, ‘Building Support for the Agencys Safeguards Mission’, Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre, (or direct download)
Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre and see in particular the section on the non-proliferation regime.
Nuclear Power Joint Fact Finding Dialogue, June 2007

Summary – the limitations of safeguards

Short excerpt from August 2015 submission to the SA Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission, by Friends of the Earth, Australia; the Australian Conservation Foundation; and the Conservation Council of SA.

The limitations of safeguards − summary

There are many problems and limitations with the international safeguards system.[1] In articles and speeches during his tenure as IAEA Director General from 1997− 2009, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei said that the Agency’s basic rights of inspection are “fairly limited”, that the safeguards system suffers from “vulnerabilities” and “clearly needs reinforcement”, that efforts to improve the system have been “half-hearted”, and that the safeguards system operates on a “shoestring budget … comparable to that of a local police department”.

Problems with safeguards include:

Chronic under-resourcing.[2] El Baradei told the IAEA Board of Governors in 2009: “I would be misleading world public opinion to create an impression that we are doing what we are supposed to do, when we know that we don’t have the money to do it.”[3] Little has changed since 2009. Meanwhile, the scale of the safeguards challenge is ever-increasing as new facilities are built and materials stockpiles grow.
Issues relating to national sovereignty and commercial confidentiality adversely impact on safeguards.
The inevitability of accounting discrepancies. Nuclear accounting discrepancies are commonplace and inevitable due to the difficulty of precisely measuring nuclear materials. The accounting discrepancies are known as Material Unaccounted For (MUF). There have been incidents of large-scale MUF in Australia’s uranium customer countries such as the UK and Japan.[4]
Incorrect/outdated assumptions about the amount of fissile material required to build a weapon.
The fact that the IAEA has no mandate to prevent the misuse of civil nuclear facilities and materials − at best it can detect misuse/diversion and refer the problem to the UN Security Council. As the IAEA states: “It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion or the setting up of an undeclared or clandestine nuclear programme.”[5] Numerous examples illustrate how difficult and protracted the resolution (or attempted resolution) of such issues can be, e.g. North Korea, Iran, Iraq in the 1970s and again in the early 1990s. Countries that have breached their safeguards obligations can simply withdraw from the NPT and pursue a weapons program, as North Korea has done.
Safeguards are shrouded in secrecy − to give one example, the IAEA used to publish aggregate data on the number of inspections in India, Israel and Pakistan, but even that nearly worthless information is no longer publicly available.
There are precedents for the complete breakdown of nuclear safeguards in the context of political and military conflict − examples include Iraq, Yugoslavia and several African countries.
Currently, IAEA safeguards only begin at the stage of uranium enrichment. Application of IAEA safeguards should be extended to fully apply to mined uranium ores, to refined uranium oxides, to uranium hexafluoride gas, and to uranium conversion facilities, as well as enrichment and subsequent stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Joint Standing Committe on Treaties (JSCT) recommended in 2008 that “the Australian Government lobbies the IAEA and the five declared nuclear weapons states under the NPT to make the safeguarding of all conversion facilities mandatory.”[6] However the Australian Government rejected the recommendation in its 2009 response to the JSCT report.[7]
There is no resolution in sight to some of the most fundamental problems with safeguards such as countries invoking their right to pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and developing a weapons capability as North Korea has done. More generally, responses to suspected non-compliance with safeguards agreements have been highly variable, ranging from inaction to economic sanctions to UN Security Council-mandated decommissioning programmes. Some states prefer to take matters into their own hands: Israel bombed and destroyed a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, the US bombed and destroyed a reactor in Iraq in 1991 and Israel bombed and destroyed a suspected reactor site in Syria in 2007.

In 1982, Mike Rann identified the core problem: “Again and again, it has been demonstrated here and overseas that when problems over safeguards prove difficult, commercial considerations will come first.”[8]

References:

[1] For information on safeguards see the papers listed at https://nuclear.foe.org.au/links/#safeguards

[2] See section 6 in: ‘The Nuclear Safeguards System: An Illusion of Protection‘, 2010.

[3] Mohamed El Baradei, 16 June 2009, ‘Director General’s Intervention on Budget at IAEA Board of Governors’, www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/director-generals-intervention-budget-iaea-board-governors

[4] See section 4 in: ‘The Nuclear Safeguards System: An Illusion of Protection‘, 2010.

[5] IAEA, 1993, Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Safeguards in the 1990s.

[6] Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 2008, ‘Report 94: Review into Treaties tabled on 14 May 2008’, www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jsct/14may2008/report1/fullreport.pdf

[7] Australian Government, 2009, ‘Government Response to Report 94 of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties: Australia-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement’

[8] Mike Rann, March 1982, ‘Uranium: Play It Safe’.